Dewayne Ledbetter v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

OLLY NEAL, JUDGE

DIVISION III

DEWAYNE LEDBETTER

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR00-91

SEPTEMBER 13, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR99-981]

HONORABLE JOHN BERTRAN PLEGGE, CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Dewayne Ledbetter, appeals the judgment of the Pulaski County Circuit Court convicting him of domestic battering in the second degree for which he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment as a habitual offender. On appeal, Ledbetter contends the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support a conviction for domestic battering in the second degree. Specifically, he argues the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he caused the victim's injuries. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant was charged with violating Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-304(a)(2) (Repl. 1997), which provides that a person commits domestic battering in the second degree if: "With the purpose of causing physical injury to a family or household member, he causes physical injury to a family or household member by means of a deadly weapon [.]"

The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction iswhether the State presented substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the

verdict. Smith v. State, 68 Ark. App. 106, 3 S.W.3d 712 (1999). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and sustain the conviction if any substantial evidence to support the verdict is present. Willingham v. State, 60 Ark. App. 132, 959 S.W.2d 74 (1998). Substantial evidence is that evidence forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 482 (2000). In determining whether substantial evidence was presented, we consider only the evidence tending to support the verdict. Id.

At trial, Felicia Conley testified that some of her relatives were visiting her at the residence that she shared with appellant when she and appellant began arguing about the television. One of Ms. Conley's relatives, Reginald Ennis, intervened on her behalf, and a fight ensued between Mr. Ennis and appellant. After more of Ms. Conley's relatives pulled the two men apart, appellant left the home. According to Ms. Conley, appellant returned fifteen or twenty minutes later. She stated that she was standing with Mr. Ennis when appellant returned. She further testified that she noticed appellant kept one of his hands behind his back and she assumed he was carrying a gun. She warned Mr. Ennis, who ran out of the house followed by appellant. Ms. Conley testified appellant returned to the house alone and demanded his clothes. Ms. Conley gave appellant his clothes and warned him that she would call the police if he tried to enter the house again. According to Ms. Conley, appellant then burst into the house. Another relative, Latrice Robinson, stepped in front of appellant. He and Ms. Robinson tussled until they fell into a glass table. Ms. Conley statedshe then ran out the door of the house and tripped and fell on the sidewalk as appellant chased her. While she was laying on the sidewalk appellant hit her in the head three or four times with a crowbar. She testified she was rendered unconscious and was later treated at the hospital for two cuts requiring fourteen and four stitches, respectively.

The only other witness called at trial was Ms. Conley's niece, Latrice Robinson. Ms. Robinson testified that after she and appellant fell into the table, he chased Ms. Conley into the front lawn where she tripped on the sidewalk. Ms. Robinson further testified that appellant struck Ms. Conley three or four times with an object she believed to be a crowbar. Appellant argues the testimony of Ms. Conley and Ms. Robinson is not sufficient to establish that he caused the injuries necessitating Ms. Conley's hospital visit and subsequent stitches. Appellant suggests that while the State proved that he struck Ms. Conley in the head with a crowbar, that she suffered injuries, and received fourteen stitches, her injuries may have resulted from her fall on the sidewalk rather than from his striking her with the crowbar. Causation is defined by the Arkansas Code as follows:

Causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant operating either alone or concurrently with another cause unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant clearly insufficient.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-205 (Repl. 1997).

The circumstances here are akin to those in Jenkins v. State, 60 Ark. App. 122, 959 S.W.2d 427 (1998), where a girlfriend jumped through a second-story window while attempting to escape an attack from her boyfriend and suffered a fractured elbow, pelvis,ankle and facial bones. This court found the victim's jumping through the window and the boyfriend's attack to be one continuous occurrence sufficient to establish guilt.

In considering only the evidence that supports the verdict, in this case, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for domestic battering in the second degree. The only evidence presented at trial was that after Ms. Conley fell, appellant stood over her and struck her three or four times in the head with a crowbar. Based on this record, we find that Ms. Conley's fall and appellant's striking her with the crowbar was one continuous occurrence and that there was substantial evidence to support appellant's conviction for domestic battering in the second degree.

Affirmed.

Pittman and Stroud, JJ., agree.