Justia.com Opinion Summary: Appellees Randall and Penny West were charged with child abuse after an infant in their foster care died from severe head trauma. During their joint trial, each moved for an acquittal at the close of the State’s case and after the close of evidence. The trial court denied those motions. The jury found both guilty on child abuse charges. After the trial, Appellees renewed their motions for acquittal which this time was granted by the trial court. The court held that there was no evidence to prove who injured the child. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision granting Appellees’ motions. The appellate court used the Supreme Court’s holding in the “Hyder” case. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court overturned its holding in “State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court” (“Hyder”), which placed conditions on trial courts’ granting of post-verdict motions for acquittal. The Court held that the “Hyder” case was now inconsistent with state law. In this case, the trial judge thoroughly explained his reasons for granting defendants’ post-verdict motions. Because the appellate court reviewed the trial court’s ruling under “Hyder” conditions, it did not determine whether the trial court’s record reflected substantial evidence to warrant the convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s decision, remanded the case for the lower court to address the sufficiency of the evidence and the merits of the trial court’s decision.
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SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
STATE OF ARIZONA,
)
)
Appellant, )
)
v.
)
)
RANDALL D. WEST and PENNY A.
)
WEST,
)
)
Appellees. )
)
)
__________________________________)
Arizona Supreme Court
No. CR-10-0306-PR
Court of Appeals
Division Two
No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0342
Pima County
Superior Court
No. CR20063310
O P I N I O N
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable John S. Leonardo, Judge
________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals Division Two
224 Ariz. 575, 233 P.3d 1154 (App. 2010)
VACATED AND REMANDED
________________________________________________________________
BARBARA LAWALL, PIMA COUNTY ATTORNEY
By
Jacob R. Lines, Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for State of Arizona
Tucson
ROBERT J. HIRSH, PIMA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
By
Frank P. Leto
Attorney for Randall D. West
Tucson
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS JACOBS
Tucson
By
Thomas F. Jacobs
Attorney for Penny A. West
________________________________________________________________
P E L A N D E R, Justice
¶1
The
issue
presented
is
whether
the
same
standard
governs a trial court’s rulings on pre-verdict and post-verdict
motions for judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure
20.
We
hold
that
the
same
standard
applies,
disapproving of any contrary language in State ex rel. Hyder v.
Superior Court, 128 Ariz. 216, 624 P.2d 1264 (1981).
I.
¶2
after
Randall and Penny West were charged with child abuse
an
trauma.
infant
in
their
foster
care
died
from
severe
head
During their joint trial, each moved for judgment of
acquittal under Rule 20(a) at the close of the State’s case and
after
the
motions.
close
of
evidence.
The
trial
court
denied
those
The jury then found Randall guilty of reckless child
abuse under circumstances not likely to produce death or serious
injury
and
Penny
guilty
of
negligent
child
abuse
under
circumstances likely to produce death or serious injury.
¶3
After
trial,
the
defendants
timely
renewed
motions for judgment of acquittal under Rule 20(b).
their
The trial
court granted the motions, finding that although “a rational
trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
victim’s injury was caused by an act of child abuse,” there was
“no substantial evidence proving whether it was both or only one
defendant that did so” and “no substantial evidence to establish
whether either defendant permitted the injury, and, if so, which
one.”
¶4
The court of appeals reversed.
2
State v. West, 224
Ariz. 575, 576 ¶ 1, 233 P.3d 1154, 1155 (App. 2010).
The court
concluded that, in finding “insufficient evidence to support the
defendants’ convictions” but without identifying any evidentiary
or other legal error at trial, the trial court had improperly
“re-determined the quantum of evidence in violation of Hyder.”
Id. at 578 ¶ 12, 233 P.3d at 1157.
¶5
We
granted
the
defendants’
petitions
for
review
to
consider what standard governs a trial court’s ruling on postverdict motions for judgment of acquittal under Rule 20(b), an
issue of statewide importance that involves interpretation of
one of our rules.
See State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 42 ¶ 8,
97 P.3d 865, 867 (2004).
We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24
(2003).
II.
¶6
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(a) provides that
on a defendant’s motion or its own initiative, a trial court
“shall enter a judgment of acquittal” before the verdict “if
there is no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction,” and
that “[t]he court’s decision on a defendant’s motion shall not
be reserved, but shall be made with all possible speed.”
Rule
20(b) provides that “[a] motion for judgment of acquittal made
before verdict may be renewed by a defendant within 10 days
after the verdict was returned.”
3
¶7
In Hyder, this Court set aside the trial court’s post-
verdict judgment of acquittal because the judge had cited no
“legal
basis”
for
that
ruling
and
finding of no substantial evidence.”
P.2d at 1272-73.
denied
a
“gave
no
reasons
for
his
128 Ariz. at 224-25, 624
Hyder also said that if the trial court has
pre-verdict
motion
for
judgment
of
acquittal,
“the
judge may only redetermine the quantum of evidence if he is
satisfied
that
he
erred
previously
evidence”
and
changes
rulings.”
Id. at 224, 624 P.2d at 1272.
his
in
“position
considering
on
prior
improper
evidentiary
Although this language
arguably is dictum, our appellate courts, including the court of
appeals in this case, have applied it strictly.
E.g., State v.
Villarreal, 136 Ariz. 485, 487, 666 P.2d 1094, 1096 (App. 1983).
¶8
For
several
reasons,
we
now
disapprove
of
the
conditions Hyder placed on a trial court’s granting of postverdict
motions
for
judgment
of
acquittal
under
Rule
20(b).
First, they are not grounded in the language of Rule 20 and, in
fact, are inconsistent with the rule when read as a whole.
Rule
20(b) permits a defendant, after verdict, to renew a motion for
judgment of acquittal made before verdict under Rule 20(a) and
does not limit the trial judge in any way.
(a),
the
only
question
is
whether
evidence to warrant a conviction.”
“there
Under subsection
is
no
substantial
By imposing an additional
requirement for granting post-verdict motions under Rule 20(b),
4
Hyder
departs
from
the
rule’s
language
by
essentially
prohibiting trial judges from granting such motions even if the
judge
concludes
that
no
substantial
evidence
supports
a
conviction.
¶9
Under Hyder, a defendant who merely “renews” his pre-
verdict motion may not obtain relief under Rule 20(b).
Unless
the defendant can show evidentiary, legal error during trial, a
post-verdict motion is futile because the judge is confined to
his
denial
of
the
pre-verdict,
Rule
20(a)
motion.
This
construct conflicts with the language of Rule 20.
¶10
Second, Hyder’s qualifications lacked any supporting
authority
or
rationale,
and
case
law
elsewhere
is
to
the
contrary.
For example, federal courts (applying Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29(c), the counterpart to our Rule 20(b))
apply the same standard to both pre-verdict and post-verdict
motions for judgment of acquittal.
See United States v. Rojas,
554 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he test for determining
whether to grant such a [Rule 29(c)] motion is whether at the
time of the motion there was relevant evidence from which the
jury
could
reasonably
find
(the
defendant)
guilty
beyond
a
reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in light favorable to the
Government.”)
(quotation
omitted);
2A
Charles
Alan
Wright
et
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 465 (4th ed. 2010) (“The
standard on a motion after discharge of the jury is the same as
5
on a motion at the close of the government’s case or of all the
evidence.”).
Likewise,
other
state
courts
apply
the
same
standard to pre-verdict and post-verdict motions, thus requiring
the judge to grant a post-verdict judgment of acquittal if the
state
did
not
conviction.
adduce
See
substantial
People
v.
Paiva,
evidence
765
P.2d
to
581,
support
582
a
(Colo.
1988); cf. State v. Spinale, 937 A.2d 938, 944-45 (N.H. 2007)
(stating sole question on a defendant’s post-verdict motion for
judgment notwithstanding a guilty verdict is whether evidence is
legally sufficient to support conviction).
¶11
raise
Third, the qualifications Hyder added to Rule 20(b)
constitutional
strictly
applied,
are
concerns.
not
met,
If
a
those
trial
qualifications,
court
must
let
a
conviction stand even if it finds post-verdict no substantial
evidence to warrant the conviction.
illogical
and,
settled law.
(stating
Due
more
importantly,
But that potentiality is
would
conflict
with
well-
See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 (1982)
Process
Clause
prohibits
convictions
based
upon
legally insufficient evidence); State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64,
71, 796 P.2d 866, 873 (1990); cf. State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz.
485, 492 ¶ 19, 975 P.2d 75, 82 (1999) (“[I]f the evidence at
trial was insufficient to support the conviction, the charges
must be dismissed.”).
¶12
Fourth, Hyder’s limitation makes little sense from a
6
policy and systemic standpoint.
Because Hyder sharply limits
the ability to grant a post-verdict motion under Rule 20(b),
judges in close cases might err on the side of granting the
defendant’s
double
pre-verdict
jeopardy
motion
principles
under
would
challenging that ruling on appeal.
476 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1986).
Rule
20(a),
preclude
the
and
if
state
so,
from
See Smalis v. Pennsylvania,
Conversely, if judges are able to
reassess the quantum of evidence after a verdict, there will be
less incentive to grant pre-verdict motions under Rule 20(a).
¶13
In
addition,
unlike
the
limited
special
action
procedure available to the state in Hyder, 128 Ariz. at 218 &
n.3, 624 P.2d at 1266 & n.3, a statutory avenue for appellate
review
currently
exists
should
verdict judgment of acquittal.
a
trial
court
grant
a
post-
A 1992 statutory amendment now
allows the state to appeal from such a ruling.
See A.R.S. § 13-
4032(7) (2010) (permitting state to appeal from orders granting
judgment of acquittal after guilty verdict).
is
reversed
on
appeal,
the
verdict
of
And if that ruling
guilt
can
simply
reinstated without violating double jeopardy protections.
be
See
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).
¶14
For these reasons, we disavow Hyder to the extent it
provides that a trial court may grant a post-verdict judgment of
acquittal under Rule 20(b) only if the court concludes that it
“consider[ed] improper evidence” and changes its “position on
7
prior evidentiary rulings.”
128 Ariz. at 224, 624 P.2d at 1272.
The standards for ruling on pre- and post-verdict motions for
judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 are the same.
On either
motion, the controlling question is solely whether the record
contains “substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.”
Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 20(a).
¶15
This question of sufficiency of the evidence is one of
law, subject to de novo review on appeal.
State v. Bible, 175
Ariz. 549, 595, 858 P.2d 1152, 1198 (1993) (“We conduct a de
novo review of the trial court’s decision [on a Rule 20 motion],
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict.”).
The appropriate standards that trial courts should
employ in ruling on motions under Rule 20(a) or (b) are well
established but bear repeating here.
¶16
On
all
such
motions,
“the
relevant
question
is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Mathers, 165 Ariz. at 66, 796 P.2d at 868 (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).1
1
“Substantial evidence,”
In view of this objective legal standard, we disavow
statements in Hyder and other Arizona cases that a trial court’s
ruling on Rule 20 motions hinges on whether the court
subjectively “has a conscientious conviction that the elements
of the offense have not been proven.” Hyder, 128 Ariz. at 224,
8
Rule
20’s
lynchpin
phrase,
“is
such
proof
that
‘reasonable
persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion
of
defendant’s
guilt
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt.’”
Id. at 67, 796 P.2d at 869 (quoting State v. Jones, 125 Ariz.
417,
419,
610
circumstantial
P.2d
51,
evidence
53
(1980)).
should
be
Both
considered
in
whether substantial evidence supports a conviction.
direct
and
determining
See State
v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 290, 908 P.2d 1062, 1075 (1996).
¶17
As we noted in Mathers, however, “[t]he fact that a
jury convicts a defendant does not in itself negate the validity
of the earlier motion for acquittal” because “[i]f it did, a
jury finding of guilt would always cure the erroneous denial of
an acquittal motion.”
165 Ariz. at 67, 796 P.2d at 869.
“[A]
properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it
can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at
317).
¶18
On the other hand, “[w]hen reasonable minds may differ
on inferences drawn from the facts, the case must be submitted
to the jury, and the trial judge has no discretion to enter a
judgment of acquittal.”
State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603, 944
P.2d 1204, 1217 (1997); accord State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191,
624 P.2d at 1272; see also State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 205,
403 P.2d 521, 524 (1965).
9
212 ¶ 87, 84 P.3d 456, 477 (2004).
Thus, in ruling on a Rule 20
motion, unlike a motion for a new trial under Arizona Rule of
Criminal Procedure 24.1(c)(1), a trial court may not re-weigh
the facts or disregard inferences that might reasonably be drawn
from the evidence.
P.2d
272,
276
See State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 97, 692
(1984)
(contrasting
applicable
standards
for
motions under Rule 20 and Rule 24.1); cf. Peak v. Acuna, 203
Ariz. 83, 85 ¶ 9, 50 P.3d 833, 835 (2002) (in ruling on a motion
for new trial, judge acts as a “so-called thirteenth juror” and
may
grant
motion
if
he
“simply
disagrees
with
the
jury’s
resolution of conflicting facts” and “believes the conviction is
against the weight of the evidence”).
¶19
Finally, although Rule 20 does not require a trial
court to specify reasons for granting a post-verdict motion for
judgment of acquittal, we strongly encourage judges to do so.
That practice will aid the parties and appellate courts, which
(on any appeal from the ruling) will review de novo whether
there is substantial evidence to support a conviction, applying
the same standard governing trial court rulings under Rule 20.
See Bible, 175 Ariz. at 595, 858 P.2d at 1198; State v. Guerra,
161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989).
¶20
Here, the trial judge thoroughly explained his reasons
for granting defendants’ post-verdict motions under Rule 20(b).
Because the court of appeals understandably reviewed the trial
10
court’s ruling under Hyder’s now-discarded limitation, however,
the
appellate
court
did
not
determine
whether
the
record
reflects substantial evidence to warrant the convictions.
We
therefore remand the case to the court of appeals to address the
sufficiency of the evidence and the merits of the trial court’s
granting of judgments of acquittal under Rule 20(b).
See State
v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 261, 263, 782 P.2d 737, 739 (1989); Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 31.19(i)(3).
III.
¶21
The court of appeals’ opinion is vacated and the case
is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
__________________________________
A. John Pelander, Justice
CONCURRING:
_____________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice
_____________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice
_____________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
_____________________________________
Robert M. Brutinel, Justice
11
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