STATE OF ARIZONA v. ARTHUR JAMES QUINTANA, JR.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. ARTHUR JAMES QUINTANA JR., Appellant. No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0088 Filed February 24, 2016 THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24. Appeal from the Superior Court in Gila County No. S0400CR201300557 The Honorable Gary V. Scales, Judge Pro Tempore AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Emily Danies, Tucson Counsel for Appellant STATE v. QUINTANA Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Miller concurred. E C K E R S T R O M, Chief Judge: ¶1 Following a jury trial, appellant Arthur Quintana Jr. was convicted of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor, both dangerous crimes against children. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms, the longer of which was a sentence of life without the possibility of release for thirty-five years. ¶2 On appeal, counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 2 P.3d 89 (App. 1999), stating she had reviewed the record and found no “arguable question of law” to raise on appeal. Quintana did not file a supplemental brief. In our review of the record pursuant to Anders, however, we discovered a non-frivolous issue relating to Quintana’s having been convicted of both molestation and sexual conduct with a minor. Citing State v. Ortega, we ordered additional briefing. 220 Ariz. 320, ¶¶ 25-28, 206 P.3d 769, 777-78 (App. 2008). ¶3 Quintana contends his conviction for both counts based on a single act violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He contends such error is fundamental and his conviction for child molestation should therefore be set aside. The state acknowledges that this court in Ortega determined that child molestation is a lesser included offense of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen and that conviction for both offenses “violate[s] the prohibition against double jeopardy when they are based on a single act.” But it 2 STATE v. QUINTANA Decision of the Court contends Ortega was wrongly decided.1 The state does not dispute that Quintana committed only one touching. ¶4 “Respect for precedent demands ‘that we not lightly overrule precedent and we do so only for compelling reasons.’” State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, ¶ 37, 68 P.3d 418, 426 (2003), quoting Lowing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Ariz. 101, 107, 859 P.2d 724, 730 (1993). “[W]e depart from this doctrine of stare decisis only with ‘special justification’—something ‘more than that a prior case was wrongly decided.’” Wells v. Fell, 231 Ariz. 525, ¶ 11, 297 P.3d 931, 934 (App. 2013), quoting Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, ¶ 37, 68 P.3d at 426. The state’s argument that Quintana’s convictions should both be affirmed is based on the premise that if the legislature “specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes” the court may impose multiple punishments in a single trial. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); see also State v. Siddle, 202 Ariz. 512, ¶ 13, 47 P.3d 512, 1155 (App. 2002). But nothing in A.R.S. §§ 13-1410 or 13-1405(B) provides a “’clear indication’” of an inten[t] to authorize multiple punishments.” Siddle, 202 Ariz. 512, ¶ 9, 47 P.3d at 516. And even were we to accept the state’s contention that A.R.S. § 13-705(M) showed such an intent, 2 that statute, along with the case law on which the state relies, existed at the time this court decided Ortega, and the state’s argument therefore amounts to one that Ortega was wrongly decided. We therefore see no basis on which to depart from our precedent, and we conclude Quintana’s conviction for both 1 The state also asserts that our supreme court’s decision in State v. Jones, 235 Ariz. 501, 334 P.3d 191 (2014), dictates that the “multiple punishments were otherwise proper here.” But, Jones addresses multiple punishments for the same act made punishable in different ways by different statutes under A.R.S. § 13-116, not the central question here—whether child molestation is a lesser included offense of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen. Section 13-705(M) is the statutory provision mandating consecutive sentences for dangerous crimes against children. Notably in this context, it allows for concurrent sentencing in some contexts when the crime of conviction is child molestation of one child. § 13-705(M). 2 3 STATE v. QUINTANA Decision of the Court child molestation and sexual conduct violated double jeopardy principles. Thus, we vacate the conviction for the lesser included offense. ¶5 Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, however, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt on the sexual conduct count. See State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 914, 914 (App. 1999). The evidence presented at trial showed Quintana put his fingers inside the vagina of the victim, who was then five or six years old. We further conclude the sentence imposed on the sexual conduct conviction is within the statutory limit. See A.R.S. §§ 13-705(B); 13-1401(3), (4); 13-1405. ¶6 Therefore, we vacate Quintana’s conviction and sentence for child molestation and affirm his conviction and sentence for sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age. 4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
