CHAPA v. MCSO

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE RALPH JOHN CHAPA, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) MCSO EMPLOYEE B0738, ) ) Defendant/Appellee. ) ) __________________________________) DIVISION ONE FILED: 6/25/2013 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: mjt No. 1 CA-CV 12-0191 DEPARTMENT C MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure) Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CV2011-021566 The Honorable John Christian Rea, Judge AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED Ralph John Chapa Plaintiff/Appellant in propria persona Phoenix William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney by Joseph I. Vigil, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Phoenix S W A N N, Judge ¶1 Ralph John Chapa appeals the superior court s order dismissing his complaint with prejudice under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to allow Chapa the opportunity to file an amended complaint. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In 2011, Chapa, an inmate in custody of the Maricopa County Sheriff s Institutional grievances Office Grievance included ( MCSO ), Appeal allegations submitted Forms that to the numerous the MCSO Inmate MCSO. His refused [him] services in filing documents with the court on his behalf, and that the MCSO was denying him access to the courts. An MCSO representative responded to Chapa s grievances by stating that with a few exceptions, Inmate Legal Services at the MCSO does not file motions for inmates represented by counsel. ¶3 In December superior court 2011, against Chapa Defendant, filed an a complaint MCSO in employee. the Chapa alleged that by refusing to file his documents with the courts, Defendant had Constitution, assembly, deprived him including: the of due his rights process administration of of under law, justice, the Arizona petition and privileges and immunities, and the right to communicate with the courts and aid in his own defense. Also in December 2011, Chapa filed a Motion for TRO [temporary restraining order] and a Preliminary Injunction, Court Intervention, [and] Court Orders, claiming that Defendant was unlawfully . . . deciding what [he could] 2 research and restricting [his] acces[s] to the court. The court denied the motion. ¶4 In January 2012, Defendant moved to dismiss Chapa s complaint. Defendant contended that Chapa s complaint fail[ed] to any provide facts to support his claim constitutional rights have been violated. that any of his Further, Defendant argued that Chapa does not have a constitutional right to act as his own attorney while he is being represented[.] Defendant pointed out that Chapa had appointed counsel for the criminal case relating to his imprisonment yet still want[ed] to be able to file his own motions and communicate directly with the judge in his criminal case[.] ¶5 Chapa filed a response to the motion to dismiss. Chapa attached numerous exhibits illustrating his attempts to have the MCSO mail motions and correspondence to the court, to obtain paper to prepare for his defense, and to obtain legal reference materials. The exhibits showed that the MCSO mailed letters for Chapa to his attorney and to the Arizona Supreme Court, but refused to mail numerous documents to the superior court, including motions and letters related to his criminal case, on the grounds that Chapa was represented by an attorney. ¶6 On Defendant s February motion to unsigned minute entry. 2, 2012, dismiss, the superior without Chapa appealed. 3 court explanation, granted in an In August 2012, we suspended the appeal and revested jurisdiction in the superior court for the entry of a signed, appealable order. The superior court entered such an order in October 2012 and specified that the dismissal was with prejudice. appeal. Thereafter, we reinstated the We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7 We review the trial court s dismissal of a complaint de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 863, 866 (2012). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss an action for [f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the pleading does not comply with Rule 8. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008). follows the notice pleading standard under Rule Arizona 8, which requires Arizona courts [to] evaluate a complaint s well-pled facts, [so] mere conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 419, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d at 346. only legal conclusions Therefore, a complaint that states will dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). ¶8 Because motions Cullen, 218 Ariz. at to not satisfy Rule 8 and may be to state a Id. dismiss for failure claim are not favored, [d]ismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) only if as a matter of law [ ] plaintiffs would not be 4 entitled to relief under susceptible of proof. any interpretation of the facts Coleman, 213 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 8, 284 P.3d at 867 (citation omitted). Dismissal with prejudice is warranted when the opportunity to amend the complaint could not cure its defects. See Sun World Corp. v. Pennysaver, Inc., 130 Ariz. 585, 589, 637 P.2d 1088, 1092 (App. 1981).1 DISCUSSION I. THE SUPERIOR COURT DID NOT ERR BY DISMISSING CHAPA S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, BUT IT DID ERR BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE. A. ¶9 first Chapa s Complaint Provided Insufficient Factual Support To Demonstrate That His Due Process Rights Were Violated. Citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), Chapa contends because refusing that Defendant to his denied transmit his presiding over his case. right him to due access motions to or process the mail was trial letters violated court to by judges He alleges that the MCSO would not supply him with paper to prepare his case, and would not provide him with legal reference materials related to his criminal case. ¶10 Chapa is correct that the federal and state constitutions require that inmates receive meaningful access to 1 It is well-established . . . that a party who conducts a case without an attorney is entitled to no more consideration from the court than a party represented by counsel, and is held to the same standards expected of a lawyer. Kelly v. NationsBanc Mortg. Corp., 199 Ariz. 284, 287, ¶ 16, 17 P.3d 790, 793 (App. 2000). 5 the courts, including access to a law library assistance from persons trained in the law. or adequate Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828; State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 540, ¶ 47, 2 P.3d 89, 99 (App. 1999). But Chapa s complaint simply alleges that these rights were denied him -- it fails to provide any facts that could give rise to relief in his favor. The complaint therefore does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 8, and we affirm its dismissal. B. The Trial Court Erred by Dismissing the Complaint with Prejudice. ¶11 Chapa next contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint with prejudice because the trial court did not explain premis[e] to its decision, collaterally never attack or gave Chapa appeal, any and legal failed to provide Chapa with an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Although Chapa s complaint contained only conclusory legal statements with no factual support, we conclude on this record that it is possible that he may be able to cure this defect by amending his complaint to include sufficient facts. ¶12 ensure The right to meaningful access to courts exists to that opportunity an to inmate present is afforded claimed a reasonably violations constitutional rights to the courts. fundamental Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825; Clark, 196 Ariz. at 540, ¶ 47, 2 P.3d at 99. 6 of adequate States shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful access to the courts[,] and therefore, [i]t is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824-25; Knight v. Superior Court (State), 161 Ariz. 551, 556, 779 P.2d constitutionally 1290, 1295 required to (App. 1989) supply an ( [T]he inmate state with is materials necessary to prepare legal papers, such as a reasonable amount of writing envelopes, paper, and pencils, tablets, to carbon paper, enable him grievance to meet forms, his legal needs. ). ¶13 In Arizona, prisoners also have the right to send and receive legal materials without interference from the jail. See Knight, 161 Ariz. at 556, 779 P.2d at 1295 ( As long as jail officials do not prevent him from sending or receiving legal materials, no violation of his right to access to the courts has occurred. ). Manual legal To this end, the Arizona Department of Corrections explicitly documents provides without prisoners interference: with the right Staff who to mail processes outgoing inmate mail may inspect it for contraband, but shall not read or censor mail being sent to . . . [t]he inmate s attorney, Corrections a judge, Dep t or court. Order 914.05 7 Ariz. (Feb. Dep t 26, of 2010), http://www.azcorrections.gov/policysearch/900/0914.pdf (last visited June 4, 2013). ¶14 Here, the exhibits that Chapa attached to his response to Defendant s motion to dismiss could allow a finder of fact to infer that the MCSO refused to provide Chapa with paper to draft documents for his criminal case, refused to mail his motions and correspondence to the court on numerous occasions, and refused to provide him with legal reference materials for his criminal matter. ¶15 Defendant contends that she did not deny Chapa access to the courts because he has no constitutional right to hybrid representation under either the federal or the Arizona constitution, and therefore had no right to contact the courts as a pro per litigant because he was (as Chapa has acknowledged) represented by an attorney in his criminal case. criminal defendant representation, State v. (1994). has the Cornell, trial 179 Moreover, legitimately no contact court Ariz. there the constitutional has 314, are court times even right discretion 325, But though a to to hybrid allow it. 878 P.2d 1352, 1363 when an inmate may when represented -- for example, if counsel has failed to conduct the representation in a diligent or competent fashion. inmate s communication is The determination whether an appropriate court, not jail staff. 8 is to be made by the ¶16 On this record, Chapa could file an amended complaint stating a cognizable claim. The trial court erred by dismissing the complaint with prejudice. II. CHAPA HAS FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE EVIDENCE THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS BIASED. ¶17 Chapa also contends that the trial judge OF THE delayed issuing an appealable order on the motion to dismiss due to his bias of inmate pro-se litigants. to support this assertion. feeling or spirit of We find nothing in the record Bias and prejudice mean a hostile ill will, or undue favoritism, toward one of the litigants. Ariz. 313, 322, 848 P.2d 1375, 1384 (1993). presumed to be free of bias and prejudice. a party in a criminal case or State v. Hill, 174 A trial judge is State v. Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 247, 741 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1987). presumption, friendship To rebut this must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the judge is biased and must file a motion that alleges specific grounds of partiality. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.1; see also A.R.S. § 12-409. did not file such a motion. Id.; Here, Chapa The mere fact that the superior court did not provide Chapa with a signed appealable order in a timely fashion does not demonstrate that the court was hostile or had any ill will toward Chapa. From this record, we cannot determine any specific cause for the delay. 9 CONCLUSION ¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court s grant of the motion to dismiss, reverse the court s ruling that the case be dismissed with prejudice, and remand with the instruction that the order of dismissal be amended to show that the dismissal is without prejudice. /s/ ___________________________________ PETER B. SWANN, Presiding Judge CONCURRING: /s/ ____________________________________ DIANE M. JOHNSEN, Judge /s/ ____________________________________ RANDALL M. HOWE, Judge 10

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