State v. Love

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, ) ) Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) SAMUEL LOVE, ) ) Appellant. ) ) __________________________________) CA-CR 09-0329 DIVISION ONE FILED: 11/09/10 RUTH WILLINGHAM, ACTING CLERK BY: DLL DEPARTMENT A MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court) Appeal from the Superior Court of Maricopa County Cause No. CR2008-105585-001 DT The Honorable Paul J. McMurdie, Judge AFFIRMED James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Cory Engle, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant Phoenix Terry Goddard, Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel And Joseph T. Maziarz Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section Attorneys for Appellee Phoenix T H O M P S O N, Judge ¶1 degree Samuel Love (defendant) appeals his conviction of second murder, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on sudden quarrel or heat of passion manslaughter as a lesser-included offense. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In February 2008, the state indicted defendant with one count of second degree murder, a class one dangerous felony. The following evidence was presented at trial. ¶3 Defendant and his friend, Hawkins, were in line for lunch at the St. Vincent de Paul cafeteria in Phoenix when they stopped to talk to someone at a table and the line moved past them. When Hawkins noticed, she walked back and regained her place in line. A few minutes later, defendant saw the victim coming toward [defendant] and he was quite agitated. Defendant and the victim began trad[ing] insults back and forth. ¶4 Defendant testified the argument was verbal until the victim allegedly called defendant a nigger, at which point defendant initiated a physical confrontation. Defendant testified that he stepped toward the victim, and that the victim stepped back with his right foot and made a motion to go to his hip pocket. Defendant testified he recognized that as the motion of somebody going to draw a weapon, so defendant pulled out his knife and held it up in the air. Defendant testified the victim then withdrew his hand from his pocket and was unarmed, and that the victim s eyes got kind of big when he saw defendant brandishing the knife. Defendant testified he lowered the knife and that the victim reached up, grabbed his shoulder, and hit [defendant] in the ear [and] at the same time he grabbed [defendant]. 2 ¶5 Defendant further testified that during the ensuing struggle, he believed the sheath was still on the knife and that he was using the flat of the blade to get [the victim] off of him. He testified he had no intention of hurting him. One eyewitness, however, testified that she saw defendant pull the knife out of the sheath. Another eyewitness testified that defendant used a thrusting motion to strike the victim, and the witness had the impression defendant was wielding a knife that was covered up by defendant s clothing. The victim died from multiple sharp force injuries, suffering eight stab wounds on his neck, chest, abdomen, and arms. The state s medical examiner, Dr. Hu, described one stab wound to the victim s neck as a fatal injury received from a significant slicing movement. Additionally, Dr. Hu testified that two other wounds to the victim s chest and liver were fatal. ¶6 During the discussion of jury instructions, defendant requested a sudden heat of passion instruction under A.R.S. § 131103(A)(2)(2010). The trial court noted that words alone are not enough to constitute adequate provocation. Defendant s counsel stated that defendant had testified the victim hit his ear before defendant stabbed him, but the prosecutor pointed out that defendant testified he had already brandished a knife before the victim hit defendant. The trial court concluded, I don t see the evidence there for sudden quarrel or heat of passion. ¶7 The trial court instructed the jurors on intentional, 3 knowing, and reckless second-degree murder, as well as the lesserincluded offense of reckless manslaughter and negligent homicide. The jurors were also instructed on justification. During deliberations, the foreperson of the jury submitted the following question to the trial court: Can you provide additional clarification or definitions to the explanation of: 2nd degree murder v. manslaughter or a material definition that may cater to the layman? ¶8 The trial court noted, it s very hard for a lot of the jurors to distinguish between second-degree murder and manslaughter as it relates to the recklessness. The court and the parties then agreed on the following response: Second Degree Murder and Manslaughter may both result from recklessness. The difference is that the culpable recklessness in Manslaughter is less than the culpable recklessness involved in Second Degree Murder. If you would like more argument on this point, let us know. ¶9 The jurors convicted defendant of second degree murder and found the offense to be a dangerous offense. Pursuant to Rule 24.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court ordered the parties to brief whether it erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Defendant filed a motion for new trial arguing the court erred in refusing to give the requested instruction, which was denied. ¶10 The trial court sentenced defendant to a mitigated term 4 of 14 years imprisonment and credited defendant with 446 days of presentence incarceration. conviction and sentence. Defendant timely appealed his We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031, and - 4033(A)(1) (2010). II. ¶11 DISCUSSION Defendant argues he was deprived of a fair trial and due process when the trial court refused to give an instruction on sudden quarrel or heat of passion manslaughter. We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court s denial of a requested jury instruction. 126 P.3d 148, 150 (2006). of the evidence. ¶12 State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 12, We defer to the trial court s assessment Id. at 5, ¶ 23, 126 P.3d at 154. Sudden quarrel or heat of passion manslaughter upon adequate provocation requires proof of a different circumstance than second degree murder. Peak v. Acuna, 203 Ariz. 83, 84, ¶ 6, 50 P.3d 833, 834 (2002). To be entitled to an instruction on manslaughter under A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2), the evidence must be such that the jurors could reasonably find that defendant committed the offense upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim. defines adequate provocation as Section 13-1101(4)(2010) conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a reasonable person of self-control. 5 It is well-established that [w]ords alone are not adequate provocation to justify a manslaughter instruction. State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 68, 859 P.2d 169, 178 (1993) (citing State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 162, 568 P.2d 1054, 1060 (1977)). ¶13 Defendant contends that because the victim s fatal injury was inflicted in the midst of a sudden physical quarrel sparked by the verbal argument between the victim and the defendant, adequate provocation However, supported exists to defendant s by instruction. the support the manslaughter case theory of the evidence to be must entitled instruction. be to reasonably the requested See State v. Kinkade, 147 Ariz. 250, 253-54, 709 P.2d 884, 887-88 (1985) (instruction on lesser-included offense not warranted because evidence overwhelmingly supported state s theory and contradicted defendant s version of the facts). ¶14 Defendant testified that once he pulled out his knife, the victim withdrew his hand from his pocket and was unarmed, and that the victim s eyes got kind of big once he realized defendant had a weapon. According to defendant, the victim used a racial slur, grabbed defendant s shoulder, and hit defendant in the ear. Defendant then stabbed the victim numerous times and slit his throat. In light of the victim s significant injuries and the testimonies of eyewitnesses and the state s medical examiner, no reasonable juror would conclude that defendant killed the victim upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate 6 provocation by the victim. A.R.S. § 13-1103(A)(2) (emphasis added). ¶15 The evidence here does not reasonably support defendant s theory that provocation. his actions were engendered by the victim s See State v. Edgin, 110 Ariz. 416, 418, 520 P.2d 288, 290 (1974) (defendant s requested manslaughter instruction was properly denied because nothing in the evidence would establish that defendant s passion was aroused by adequate provocation; deliberate use of a deadly weapon in such a way that it is likely to and does produce death evinces deliberate formed design to kill, supporting murder charge). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the sudden quarrel or heat of passion manslaughter instruction was not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the refusal to give defendant s requested instruction was not error. III. ¶16 CONCLUSION We affirm defendant s conviction and sentence. /s/ ______________________________ JON W. THOMPSON, Judge CONCURRING: /s/ ___________________________________ DONN KESSLER, Presiding Judge /s/ ___________________________________ DANIEL A. BARKER, Judge 7

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.