IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE In re the Marriage of: MICHAEL ROBERT HART, Petitioner/Appellee, v. KARI ROSE HART, Respondent/Appellant.
DIVISION ONE FILED: 03/03/09 PHILIP G. URRY,CLERK BY: DN
) No. 1 CA-CV 07-0794 ) ) DEPARTMENT A ) ) ) OPINION ) ) ) ) ) ) )
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. FC 2001-006632 The Honorable Sarah D. Grant, Judge, Retired VACATED AND REMANDED
Law Offices of Dennis G. Bassi PLLC By Dennis G. Bassi Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee Law Offices of John R. Zarzynski By John R. Zarzynski Attorney for Respondent/Appellant B A R K E R, Judge ¶1
Phoenix
Phoenix
Kari Rose Hart (“Mother”) appeals from a modification
order granting Michael Robert Hart (“Father”) sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties’ two minor children and ordering that Mother’s parenting time be supervised. For the
reasons
that
follow,
we
vacate
the
custody
order
and
the
parenting time order and remand for further proceedings.1 Facts and Procedural Background ¶2 When the parties divorced in 2003, Mother was awarded
sole legal custody and primary physical custody of their two children. Mother had At that time both parents lived in Arizona. remarried and, after an evidentiary In 2005 and
hearing
custody evaluation, was permitted to relocate with the children to Texas. ¶3 Father briefly moved to Texas to be near the children.
However, he returned to Arizona approximately six months later after being unable to find steady employment. time, Mother to separated an from her This husband required and Around the same moved the with the
children
apartment.
that
children
change schools. ¶4 In June 2007 Father filed a petition for mediation Mother did not appear Father then
seeking physical custody of the children.2
for the mediation conference on July 12, 2007. filed a petition to modify custody.
He also filed a petition
for temporary orders to allow the children to remain in Arizona
Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 28(g), we address an additional issue raised by Mother in a separately filed Memorandum Decision. The parties’ parenting plan required them to mediate disputes before bringing an action in court. 2
2
1
and
start
school.3
Mother
was
served
with
notice
and
the
petitions. the
The court also entered an order to appear regarding to modify child custody, parenting time and
petition
support, and the motion for temporary orders. appear set a “hearing” for July 27, 2007. ¶5 appeared court
The order to
Mother filed her response on July 26, 2007. telephonically, that it but was her attorney a was present.
Mother The
stated
holding
“resolution
management
conference.”
After determining that it had jurisdiction, the Mother
court proceeded to hear the merits of the petition.
objected that she was not prepared for an evidentiary hearing because the court’s order to appear stated that it would not hear testimony at this hearing. The court overruled her
objections and allowed Father to testify. ¶6 The court continued the hearing until August 14, 2007,
and denied Father’s request that the children remain with him in Arizona pending the court’s ruling. Texas to be with Mother in August. ¶7 Subsequently, the court concluded that it would be in The children returned to
the children’s best interests to live with Father in Arizona and for Mother to have only supervised parenting time in the summer or on school breaks. Mother filed a motion for reconsideration
3
summer.
The children had been in Father’s custody over the
3
arguing that there was no evidence of a substantial and material change in circumstances and that the court failed relating to to make the
findings
regarding
several
relevant
factors
children’s best interests. The court denied the motion without comment. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes We have (“A.R.S.”)
jurisdiction
section 12-2101(C) (2003). Discussion 1. Adequacy of the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to the Custody Order Mother argues that the court abused its discretion by
¶8
failing to make detailed findings of fact in compliance with A.R.S. § 25-403(B) (2007). Father contends that this court must
presume that the family court made every finding necessary to support its judgment evidence and in sustain the to judgment support if the there is
sufficient conclusion.
the
record
court’s
“We review the [family] court’s decision regarding Owen v. Blackhawk,
child custody for an abuse of discretion.”
206 Ariz. 418, 420, ¶ 7, 79 P.3d 667, 669 (App. 2003). ¶9 must In making a custody determination, the family court consider the factors enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-403(A)
regarding the children’s best interests. case, the court must make specific
In a contested custody findings regarding all
relevant factors and the reasons the decision is in the best
4
interests of the children.
Section 25-403(B) provides: “In a
contested custody case, the court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child.”
Failure to make the requisite findings pursuant to A.R.S. § 25403 can constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal and a remand. See Owen, 206 Ariz. at 421-22, ¶ 12, 79 P.3d at 670-
71 (holding that the family court abused its discretion in its custody award by not making findings on the record, and
subsequently reversing and remanding for additional findings); Downs v. Scheffler, 206 Ariz. 496, 501, 503, ¶¶ 19, 34, 80 P.3d 775, 780, 782 (App. 2003) (holding the same but also ordering further cross-examination); In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, 526, 527, ¶¶ 5, 11, 38 P.3d 1189, 1191, 1192 (App. 2002) (vacating a custody award based on the lack of findings and remanding for findings). ¶10 absence The or family court’s of any findings of the do not refer to the
presence
ten
enumerated
statutory
factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-403(A). was “abundantly clear” that it was
The court stated that it in the children’s best
interests to relocate from Texas back to Arizona and that Mother only have supervised parenting time. The court found that
Mother left the children alone after school on weekdays and “at other times when Mother [was] with her new boyfriend.” Father,
5
conversely, had his mother watch the children when he worked. The court also noted that Mother no longer lived with her
husband but had moved the children into a “small apartment,” which required a change of schools. Finally, the court was
concerned that Mother posed nude with her boyfriend on an adult website. ¶11 Although these are all relevant facts, there are no
findings as to the following statutory factors: (1) the wishes of the children and parents as to custody; (2) the interaction and relationships between the children and parents and, in this case, the children and Father’s mother, with whom he lives; (3) the children’s adjustment to home, school, and community; (4) the physical and mental health of the children and parents; (5) which parent is more likely to allow frequent and meaningful contact with the other parent; (6) which parent has provided primary care; (7) whether any coercion or duress was used in obtaining a custody agreement; and (8) whether there was any false reporting of child abuse or neglect. 403(A). ¶12 factors. There was evidence regarding many of the foregoing See A.R.S. § 25-
For example, the children, ages nine and twelve at the
time, apparently told Father they wanted to move to Arizona. Father and his mother testified about their neighborhood and the local school. Mother also testified about her community, the
6
children’s
school,
and
their
activities
in
Texas.
Mother
testified that her oldest child was doing well in school and about how she had dealt with her child’s learning disabilities. Both parents testified positively about their ability to coparent when both were living in Texas. Mother testified that Mother also
she had been the primary caregiver since 2005.
testified that she could find a babysitter for afterschool hours but that there had never been any problems with the children. Mother testified that she did not expose the children to the adult website; however, Father claimed they knew the name of the website. ¶13 family Father argues that this court must presume that the court made the necessary findings to support its
judgment.
However, the cases Father cites predate A.R.S. § 25-
403(B), which was in effect here and specifically requires that “[i]n a contested custody case, the court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors . . . .” (Emphasis added.) See also Downs, 206 Ariz. at 501, ¶ 19, 80
P.3d at 780; Owen, 206 Ariz. at 421-22, ¶ 12, 79 P.3d at 670-71; and Diezsi, 201 Ariz. at 526, ¶ 5, 38 P.3d at 1191. Compare
Stanberry v. Stanberry, 81 Ariz. 215, 216-17, 303 P.2d 706, 706 (1956) (holding in a custody decision prior to the adoption of A.R.S. § 25-403(B) that when “no findings of fact appear in the record, the presumption is that the court found every fact
7
necessary to support the judgment”). comply with the statute. − which with In the this
The findings here did not case, a weighing was not of the
statutory required
factors to
family but
court did
statutorily – may have
document
findings
yielded a different outcome. 79 P.3d at 670. ¶14 allow
See Owen, 206 Ariz. at 421, ¶ 12,
Accordingly, we vacate the custody order and remand to the family court to make additional findings and
conclusions in accordance with A.R.S. § 25-403. custody findings, addressed. order, rather of than simply remand number
We vacate the for of additional factors not
because
the
significant
See Diezsi, 201 Ariz. at 527, ¶ 11, 38 P.3d at 1192 By doing
(vacating custody award based on lack of findings).
so, we do not suggest a particular outcome on remand nor do we require additional evidentiary proceedings, unless the court
determines that they would be appropriate. 2. ¶15 Supervised Parenting Time Mother also contends that the family court abused its
discretion by ordering that her parenting time be supervised because (1) Father never requested such a restriction and (2) the court failed to make findings to support this restriction pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-410(B) (2007) or A.R.S. § 25-411(D) (Supp. 2008).
8
¶16
In
his
petition
to
modify
custody,
Father
did
not
request sole custody or supervised parenting time. 410(B) and 25-411(D) allow the court to order
Both §§ 25supervised
parenting time sua sponte if the court finds that in the absence of supervision the children’s physical health would be
endangered or their emotional development significantly impaired or that unsupervised parenting time would seriously endanger the children’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.
Neither the court’s written order nor the transcript of the proceedings in open court contains express findings on these issues, but §§ 25-410(B) and 25-411(D), unlike § 25-403(B), do not require such findings. Section 25-410(B) provides that “if
the court finds” certain circumstances, it “shall order” a local social service agency to become involved as set forth in the statute.4 Section 25-411(D) similarly provides that the court
4
The full text of A.R.S. § 25-410(B) is as follows: If either parent requests the order, or if all contestants agree to the order, or if the court finds that in the absence of the order the child's physical health would be endangered or the child's emotional development would be significantly impaired, and if the court finds that the best interests of the child would be served, the court shall order a local social service agency to exercise continuing supervision over the case to assure that the custodial or parenting time terms of the decree are carried out. At 9
may not restrict parenting time “unless it finds” a certain standard has been met.5 On the other hand, in A.R.S. § 25-403(B)
the legislature specifically required that “the court shall make specific findings on the record [.]” (Emphasis added.) Thus,
both A.R.S. §§ 25-410(B) and 25-411(D) require that the trial court must “find” certain facts in order to grant the specified relief, but there is no requirement, as there is in A.R.S. § 25403(B), that findings be reduced to writing or stated on the record. ¶17 As shown by these statutes, the legislature chose to
make “specific findings on the record” a requirement in some circumstances but not in others. The legislature knows how to
make written findings a requirement and did not do so here. Under such circumstances, require the that standard we has do principles not of statutory impose not a to
construction requirement require. 971 P.2d
judicially
legislature
intentionally
chosen
See Luchanski v. Congrove, 193 Ariz. 176, 179, ¶ 14, 636, 639 (App. 1998) (“When the legislature has
specifically included a term in some places within a statute and
the discretion of the court, reasonable fees for the supervision may be charged to one or both parents, provided that the fees have been approved by the supreme court.
5
411(D).
See infra ¶ 19 for the complete text of A.R.S. § 25-
10
excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”); see also U.S.
Parking Sys. v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989) (reciting the same rule). We decline to
judicially engraft a requirement of oral or written “findings” onto A.R.S. §§ 25-410(B) and 25-411(D). This, however, does not
end our inquiry as to whether Mother is entitled to relief under these statutes. ¶18 Although we presume that the trial court knows the law
and applies the correct standard, Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 58, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App. 2004), that presumption may be rebutted by the record. Frederickson v. McIntyre, 52 Ariz.
61, 64, 78 P.2d 1124, 1126 (1938) (“We indulge the presumption always that the action of the trial court was regular and proper in the absence of a record controverting such presumption.”) (emphasis added); Brewer v. Peterson, 9 Ariz. App. 455, 458, 453 P.2d 966, 969 (1969) (“The controlling law, as we see it, is that an appellate court must assume that the trial court did no wrong, in the absence of a showing to the contrary.”) (emphasis added). Here, the language in the order makes it clear that the In its order, the
family court applied an incorrect standard.
court stated: “It is abundantly clear to the court that it is in the children’s best interest . . . for Mother to have only supervised visitation with the children in the summer or during
11
holiday breaks from school.”
The standard applicable under both
A.R.S. §§ 25-410(B) and 25-411(D), however, requires more than just a “best interest” test. ¶19 Under A.R.S. § 25-410(B), in addition to a best
interest test, the standard requires the court to find that “in the absence of the order the child’s physical health would be endangered or the child’s emotional development would be
significantly impaired.”6 Section 25-411(D) likewise provides: The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child, but the court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the court expressly stated the This was that the the
standard it applied to be a best interest standard. error. The on court was required time moral to determine
restrictions child’s
parenting mental,
“would or
endanger
seriously health,”
physical,
emotional
under
A.R.S. § 25-411(D) or that “the child’s physical health would be endangered or the child’s emotional development would be
significantly impaired” under A.R.S. § 25-410(B).
6
As we noted
A.R.S. § 25-410(B) also makes mandatory the appointment of a “local social service agency.” The trial court, on remand, should identify whether it is proceeding under A.R.S § 25-410(B) or § 25-411(D) or both. 12
earlier, this does not require a finding on the record. error here is that the wrong standard was applied. court not stated it the standard the incorrectly, we
The
Had the have then that
would and
presumed
that
applied there
appropriate facts
standard to
considered
whether
were
support
determination. 883. order
See Fuentes, 209 Ariz. at 58, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d at
Because the wrong standard was applied, we vacate the concerning supervised parenting time and remand for
application of the proper standard to the facts here. 3. ¶20 Attorney’s Fees on Appeal Mother requests an award of attorney’s fees on appeal We do not find that
pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324 (Supp. 2008).
Father took unreasonable positions on appeal, and we do not have any current financial information for the parties upon which to base an award of attorney’s fees. For these reasons, we deny
Mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal but award her costs on appeal.
13
Conclusion ¶21 We vacate the custody and supervised parenting time
order and remand for further proceedings.
__________________________________ DANIEL A. BARKER, Judge CONCURRING:
___________________________________ MICHAEL J. BROWN, Presiding Judge ___________________________________ MARGARET H. DOWNIE, Judge
14
