In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Reid K.
Annotate this CaseTwenty-six year old Reid K. was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia at age 16. He experienced delusions and severe command auditory hallucinations in the form of seven different voices that often instructed him to harm and kill other people, including members of his family and his home village. Reid had been prescribed antipsychotic medication since age 16 to help control his hallucinations and manage his illness, but he has repeatedly stopped taking his medications as prescribed. When Reid stopped taking his prescribed medications or smoked large quantities of marijuana (which he did regularly), the voices increased in intensity and his hallucinations got worse. Pertinent to this appeal, Reid was hospitalized in November 2012 and again prescribed psychiatric medication (though it was unclear whether that hospitalization required an involuntary commitment). Following Reid’s discharge from the hospital, Reid met telephonically with his outpatient psychiatrist, Dr. Joshua Sonkiss, who was responsible for overseeing Reid’s medication regimen. Reid stopped taking his medication soon after his release from the hospital. He testified that he stopped taking his medication because he wanted to see “how far [he] would go before anything could happen.” Reid missed between ten and twenty percent of his outpatient appointments with Dr. Sonkiss and did not disclose to Dr. Sonkiss that he had stopped taking his medication as prescribed. Reid heard voices telling him to kill people for up to seven of the eight months after being off his medications. In August 2013 the superior court entered a 30-day involuntary civil commitment order for Reid. After holding a contested evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that Reid was likely to harm others and that no less restrictive alternative existed to prevent potential harm. Reid appealed that 30-day commitment. Shortly after Reid’s 30-day commitment, Reid’s doctors petitioned for a 90-day commitment. At the trial on the requested 90-day commitment, Reid stipulated that he was mentally ill and, as a result, was likely to cause harm to himself or others. Reid’s 30-day commitment order thus did not have collateral consequences in light of his subsequent 90-day commitment based on his stipulation. Moreover the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply. Reid’s appeal was therefore dismissed as moot.
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