Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. v. City of Gulf Shores
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The Fort Morgan Civic Association, Inc. and Charles Browdy, a resident of the unincorporated Fort Morgan area of Baldwin County and a member of the Association (collectively "the FMCA"), sued the City of Gulf Shores and its mayor and city council seeking a court order declaring the City's annexation of a 19.3-mile segment of the land on which Fort Morgan Road is located and the adjacent land to be invalid.1 Following a nonjury trial, the trial court held that the FMCA had failed to establish that the Fort Morgan annexation was invalid; it accordingly entered a judgment in favor of the City. The FMCA appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "because the FMCA submitted evidence at that trial indicating that two parcels of property included in the Fort Morgan annexation were owned by private individuals and because the City failed to submit any evidence indicating that those same parcels were owned by the State, the trial court exceeded its discretion in upholding the annexation."
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REL: 04/27/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 1101440 F o r t Morgan C i v i c A s s o c i a t i o n , Inc., and C h a r l e s A. Browdy v. C i t y o f G u l f Shores e t a l . Appeal from Baldwin C i r c u i t Court (CV-03-556) PER CURIAM. The Fort Association"), Morgan Civic and C h a r l e s Association, A. Browdy, a I n c . ("the resident ofthe u n i n c o r p o r a t e d F o r t Morgan a r e a o f B a l d w i n C o u n t y a n d a member of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o c o l l e c t i v e l y as 1101440 "the FMCA"), city council City") s u e d t h e C i t y o f G u l f S h o r e s a n d i t s mayor a n d (hereinafter referred to collectively i n the Baldwin Circuit Court seeking as " t h e a court order d e c l a r i n g t h e C i t y ' s a n n e x a t i o n o f a 1 9 . 3 - m i l e segment o f t h e land on w h i c h land ("the F o r t Morgan a n n e x a t i o n " ) t o be i n v a l i d . a nonjury Fort trial, Morgan Road i s l o c a t e d and t h e a d j a c e n t 1 Following t h e t r i a l c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e FMCA h a d f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e F o r t Morgan a n n e x a t i o n was i n v a l i d ; i t accordingly entered appeals. a judgment i n f a v o r o f t h e C i t y . We r e v e r s e The FMCA a n d remand. I. Sometime surveyor i n late 2002 or e a r l y for Volkert & Associates, contacted David Bodenhamer, behalf of Volkert's c l i e n t , then 2003, Noel Hand, I n c . , an e n g i n e e r i n g mayor of Gulf a firm, Shores, on r e a l - e s t a t e d e v e l o p e r D a v i d Head, to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of Gulf Shores annexing property t o i t s west and e x t e n d i n g Morgan p e n i n s u l a . in pursuing i t s city limits f u r t h e r down t h e F o r t P r e s u m a b l y , Hand a n d Head were i n t e r e s t e d t h i s annexation because property annexed i n t o t h e C i t y o f G u l f S h o r e s w o u l d have a c c e s s t o c i t y s e r v i c e s a n d be F o r t Morgan Road i s a l s o known a s F o r t Morgan P a r k w a y , D i x i e - G r a v e s P a r k w a y , a n d S t a t e Highway 180. 1 2 1101440 subject to Gulf Shores' zoning requirements more restrictive zoning requirements a d o p t e d f o r t h e F o r t Morgan a r e a . as o p p o s e d t o Baldwin County the had G u l f S h o r e s had considered the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p a n d i n g w e s t w a r d on p r e v i o u s occasions; h o w e v e r , i t was apparently a f t e r m e e t i n g w i t h Hand and Head t h a t G u l f Shores d e c i d e d t o pursue the s p e c i f i c expansion plan now being challenged 19.3 m i l e s l o n g and 330 limit of the m u n i c i p a l edge of the Fort the annexation f e e t wide e x t e n d i n g limits Morgan historic property Morgan 80-foot-wide recreation completed, as areas. i t was well s e e k t o be followed western eastern site. Once The predominant F o r t Morgan Road and i t s r i g h t - o f - w a y ; however, the annexed as sidewalks the expected Morgan p e n i n s u l a c o n t i g u o u s The from the a l s o i n c l u d e d unimproved p r o p e r t y Road, property Shores t o the of G u l f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h i s p r o p e r t y was approximately of a p i e c e of Fort that and Morgan other adjacent to several public- annexation property on the Shores. Fort 2 r e c o r d i s u n c l e a r as t o t h e e x a c t c i r c u m s t a n c e s Shores' was t o the annexed p r o p e r t y would a l s o annexed i n t o G u l f Gulf Fort decision to pursue the Fort that Morgan F o l l o w i n g t h e a n n e x a t i o n , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 80 o t h e r p a r c e l s o f l a n d i n t h e F o r t Morgan a r e a were a n n e x e d i n t o G u l f S h o r e s . 2 3 1101440 annexation; property however, was owned under by the State, communicated i t s i n t e r e s t government officials. the b e l i e f Gulf that the Shores apparently i n annexing the property On M a r c h 2 5 , 2003, subject to state Bob R i l e y , then governor o f Alabama, and B a r n e t t Lawley, then commissioner o f the Alabama Department o f C o n s e r v a t i o n and N a t u r a l Resources, submitted the State formally a petition requesting on that behalf of the property o f Alabama be a n n e x e d Shores pursuant t o § 11-42-21, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . 2003, council of Gulf the c i t y approving the subsequently annexation request, On A p r i l 14, a d o p t e d an which Gulf ordinance ordinance was s i g n e d b y t h e mayor a n d p u b l i s h e d i n t o l a w . Following the completion residents Shores into o f t h e F o r t Morgan annexation, o f t h e F o r t Morgan p e n i n s u l a b e g a n p r o t e s t i n g t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e h a d b e e n no p u b l i c h e a r i n g on t h e a n n e x a t i o n petition and v o i c i n g annexation. their E n t r e a t i e s were l o c a l government o f f i c i a l s , thereafter general asked annexed p r o p e r t y . Mayor apparently made and, i n response, Bodenhamer Bradley displeasure Byrne t o deannex with the t o s t a t e and Governor Riley the recently and Steve M c M i l l a n , state l e g i s l a t o r s f r o m B a l d w i n C o u n t y , a l s o made s i m i l a r r e q u e s t s t o 4 1101440 city officials Morgan of Gulf annexation Shores. However, b e l i e v i n g t h e F o r t t o be b e n e f i c i a l to Gulf Shores, Mayor Bodenhamer a n d t h e c i t y c o u n c i l r e f u s e d t h e r e q u e s t s . 13, 2003, t h e FMCA sued the City, seeking a On May court order d e c l a r i n g v o i d t h e F o r t Morgan a n n e x a t i o n and a l l subsequent annexations contiguous by G u l f Shores of property to the annexed p r o p e r t y . Over t h e s u c c e e d i n g various motions, years, t h e FMCA a n d t h e C i t y e.g., motions to dismiss and filed motions r e q u e s t i n g a summary j u d g m e n t , a l l o f w h i c h were d e n i e d . At one p o i n t i n November 2007, t h e FMCA a n d t h e C i t y a p p e a r e d t o have r e a c h e d however, the subsequently to a vote. April a general t h a t w o u l d have e n d e d t h e d i s p u t e ; membership of the Association r e j e c t e d t h a t p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t when i t was p u t A two-day n o n j u r y 27-28, entered a settlement trial was f i n a l l y c o n d u c t e d on 2 0 1 1 , a n d , on J u l y 22, 2 0 1 1 , t h e t r i a l judgment i n favor of the City. The FMCA appeals. II. "Because the t r i a l court heard ore tenus evidence d u r i n g t h e bench t r i a l , the ore tenus s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w a p p l i e s . Our o r e t e n u s s t a n d a r d of review i s w e l l s e t t l e d . '"When a j u d g e i n a 5 court now 1101440 n o n j u r y case h e a r s o r a l t e s t i m o n y , a judgment b a s e d on f i n d i n g s o f f a c t b a s e d on t h a t t e s t i m o n y w i l l be p r e s u m e d c o r r e c t a n d w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l e x c e p t f o r a p l a i n a n d p a l p a b l e e r r o r . " ' S m i t h v. M u c h i a , 854 So. 2d 85, 92 ( A l a . 2003) (quoting A l l s t a t e I n s . Co. v. S k e l t o n , 675 So. 2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996)). "'"The o r e t e n u s r u l e i s g r o u n d e d upon t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t when t h e t r i a l c o u r t h e a r s o r a l t e s t i m o n y i t h a s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o e v a l u a t e t h e demeanor a n d c r e d i b i l i t y o f witnesses." H a l l v. M a z z o n e , 486 So. 2d 408, 410 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . The r u l e a p p l i e s t o " d i s p u t e d i s s u e s o f f a c t , " whether the dispute i s based entirely upon oral t e s t i m o n y o r upon a c o m b i n a t i o n of o r a l t e s t i m o n y and documentary e v i d e n c e . Born v. C l a r k , 662 So. 2d 669, 672 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) . The ore tenus standard of review, s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d , i s as f o l l o w s : " ' " [ W ] h e r e t h e e v i d e n c e has b e e n [presented] ore tenus, a presumption of correctness attends the trial court's c o n c l u s i o n on i s s u e s o f f a c t , a n d t h i s Court w i l l not d i s t u r b the t r i a l court's conclusion unless it i s clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence, but w i l l a f f i r m the j u d g m e n t i f , u n d e r any r e a s o n a b l e aspect, i t i s supported by c r e d i b l e evidence."' "Reed v. B o a r d o f T r s . f o r A l a b a m a S t a t e U n i v . , 7 78 So. 2d 791, 795 ( A l a . 2000) ( q u o t i n g R a i d t v. C r a n e , 342 So. 2d 358, 360 ( A l a . 1 9 7 7 ) ) . However, ' t h a t p r e s u m p t i o n [ o f c o r r e c t n e s s ] h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n when t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s shown t o have i m p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d the law t o the f a c t s . ' Ex p a r t e B o a r d o f Z o n i n g 6 1101440 Adjustment 1994)." of Mobile, Kennedy v. B o l e s 636 So. 2d 415, 417 (Ala. I n v s . , I n c . , 53 So. 3d 60, 67-68 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) . III. On a p p e a l , that the Fort annexation, t h e FMCA makes e s s e n t i a l l y two a r g u m e n t s : Morgan annexation a method constitutes a of annexation (1) "long-lasso" prohibited since this C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n C i t y o f F u l t o n d a l e v. C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , 507 So. 2d 489, 490-91 ( A l a . 1987); a n d (2) t h a t the Fort Morgan a n n e x a t i o n i s i n v a l i d b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e d i d n o t own a l l the annexed p r o p e r t y , contrary p e t i t i o n for annexation. Because t h e annexed t o the State's claim i nthe We c o n s i d e r t h e s e a r g u m e n t s i n t u r n . property consists of a 19.3-mile s t r i p o f l a n d e s s e n t i a l l y t r a c k i n g F o r t Morgan Road, t h e FMCA argues that annexation. So. 2d the annexation is a prohibited long-lasso I n C i t y o f S p a n i s h F o r t v . C i t y o f Daphne, 774 567, 574-75 (Ala. 2000), we described long-lasso a n n e x a t i o n s as f o l l o w s : "Under [ t h e l o n g - l a s s o ] method, a c i t y w o u l d p u r p o r t t o annex a p u b l i c roadway o f some l e n g t h i n an e f f o r t t o c r e a t e c o n t i g u i t y w i t h an o u t l y i n g p a r c e l o f p r o p e r t y t h a t w o u l d n o t o t h e r w i s e be c o n t i g u o u s with the e x i s t i n g municipal limits. C i t y of F u l t o n d a l e v. C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , 507 So. 2d 489, 491 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) . In C i t y of Fultondale, t h i s Court 7 1101440 e x p l i c i t l y o v e r r u l e d C i t y o f T u s k e g e e v. L a c e y , 486 So. 2d 393 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) . I n C i t y o f Tuskegee, t h e C i t y o f T u s k e g e e h a d a n n e x e d 14 m i l e s o f a p u b l i c roadway, w i t h o u t a n n e x i n g a n y p r o p e r t y l y i n g a l o n g t h a t roadway, i n o r d e r t o c r e a t e c o n t i g u i t y w i t h an outlying parcel of property. Although t h i s Court u p h e l d t h a t a n n e x a t i o n i n C i t y o f Tuskegee, t h i s Court overruled that d e c i s i o n i n C i t y of Fultondale. In C i t y o f F u l t o n d a l e , t h i s Court e x p l a i n e d i t s r e a s o n s f o r r e j e c t i n g t h e l o n g - l a s s o method o f annexation: "'Although Alabama l a w does not r e q u i r e t h a t m u n i c i p a l b o u n d a r i e s form a r e g u l a r shape, t h e l e g a l and p o p u l a r i d e a of a m u n i c i p a l i t y i n t h i s country i s " t h a t o f o n e n e s s , community, l o c a l i t y , v i c i n i t y ; a c o l l e c t i v e body, n o t s e v e r a l b o d i e s ; a c o l l e c t i v e body o f i n h a b i t a n t s t h a t i s , a body o f p e o p l e c o l l e c t e d o r g a t h e r e d i n one mass, n o t s e p a r a t e d into distinct m a s s e s , a n d h a v i n g a community o f i n t e r e s t b e c a u s e r e s i d e n t s o f t h e same p l a c e , n o t different places." 56 Am. J u r . 2d M u n i c i p a l C o r p o r a t i o n s § 69 a t 125 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; C i t y o f D o t h a n [v. B o a r d o f Comm'rs o f D a l e Cnty., 295 A l a . 1 3 1 , 324 So. 2d 772 (1975)].' "507 So. 2d a t 4 9 1 . " A l t h o u g h acknowledging t h a t t h e annexed p r o p e r t y a public roadway, the C i t y argues a n n e x a t i o n was n o t a l o n g - l a s s o of annexed p r o p e r t y public right-of-way of t h a t w i d t h , that the Fort Morgan annexation because t h e s t r i p was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 330 f e e t w i d e a n d t h e accounted f o r only approximately t h e r e s t b e i n g made up o f u n i m p r o v e d 8 contains 80 f e e t property, 1101440 sidewalks, and argument, recreational the City Millbrook, cites City 621 So. 2d 267 upheld the C i t y areas. a county explicitly adopted the order o f the t r i a l than "[t]he t h e roadway," Court i n the center. property, consist wide and s o , we i n which i t 621 So. 2d a t 273, a n d n o t e d involving long, or corridors, s o l e l y of a public Birmingham county-owned In doing court, of so l o n g thin this approved strips as t h e c o r r i d o r right-of-way. larger that Fultondale, relatively of Court r a i l r o a d b e d ... i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y had, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g C i t y annexations City this f r o m 75 t o 100 f e e t containing of i t s v. i n which annexation of a abandoned r a i l r o a d b e d v a r y i n g reasoned that support Prattville ( A l a . 1993), of Millbrook's road of In of d i d not See, e.g., C i t y o f v. W i l k i n s o n , 516 So. 2d 585 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) , a n d C i t y o f Dothan v. B o a r d o f Comm'rs o f D a l e C n t y . , 295 A l a . 1 3 1 , 324 So. 2d 772 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . The FMCA, h o w e v e r , a r g u e s t h a t applicable condoned and argues t h a t i n City annexation corridor o f Dothan involves at least C i t y of P r a t t v i l l e i s not a n n e x a t i o n s s u c h as t h o s e are permissible some " p r i v a t e " only when t h e property. 3 In The FMCA h a s n o t a s k e d t h i s C o u r t t o o v e r r u l e C i t y o f Dothan o r made t h e argument t h a t a l l c o r r i d o r a n n e x a t i o n s 3 9 1101440 s u p p o r t o f t h i s a r g u m e n t , t h e FMCA c i t e s Town o f V a n c e v. C i t y of Tuscaloosa, 661 So. 2d 739, 744 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , i n w h i c h this Court that the stated " ' [ c ] o r r i d o r ' annexations annexation of a small s t r i p of p r i v a t e property; annexations right-of-way." involve the annexation However, upon a r e v i e w of a involve 'long l a s s o ' public road of our caselaw, i t i s apparent that the d e f i n i t i o n of c o r r i d o r annexation o f f e r e d i n should be p r o h i b i t e d . To t h e c o n t r a r y , i t expressly r e c o g n i z e s t h e v a l i d i t y o f c o r r i d o r a n n e x a t i o n s under Alabama law i n i t s b r i e f f i l e d w i t h t h i s C o u r t . FMCA's b r i e f , pp. 37¬ 39. Even as i t was a u t h o r i z i n g l o n g - l a s s o a n n e x a t i o n s i n C i t y of Tuskegee, t h i s Court e x p l i c i t l y recognized that the majority of courts i n other j u r i s d i c t i o n s t r e a t c o r r i d o r annexations with d i s f a v o r . 486 So. 2d a t 396. Long-lasso a n n e x a t i o n s have s i n c e b e e n p r o h i b i t e d b y t h i s C o u r t ; h o w e v e r , we have c o n t i n u e d to recognize the v a l i d i t y of c o r r i d o r a n n e x a t i o n s , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g some J u s t i c e s ' s t a t e d r e l u c t a n c e t o do s o . See, e . g . , C i t y o f M a d i s o n v. C i t y o f H u n t s v i l l e , 555 So. 2d 755, 763 ( A l a . 1989) ( S t e a g a l l , J . , c o n c u r r i n g specially) (recognizing the r u l e of stare d e c i s i s but e x p r e s s i n g r e s e r v a t i o n s about a l l o w i n g c o r r i d o r a n n e x a t i o n s ) , and C i t y o f F u l t o n d a l e , 507 So. 2d a t 492 ( H o u s t o n , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t he w o u l d o v e r r u l e C i t y o f D o t h a n a n d " a b o l i s h s t r i p o r c o r r i d o r a n n e x a t i o n i n Alabama, and r e q u i r e a s u b s t a n t i a l common b o u n d a r y f o r m u n i c i p a l a n n e x a t i o n as i s r e q u i r e d b y a s u b s t a n t i a l m a j o r i t y o f t h e s t a t e s " ) . However, no p a r t y i n t h i s c a s e h a s a s k e d us t o o v e r r u l e C i t y o f D o t h a n , and we a c c o r d i n g l y l e a v e any r e e x a m i n a t i o n o f o u r h o l d i n g i n that case f o r another day. See Moore v. P r u d e n t i a l R e s i d e n t i a l S e r v s . L t d . P ' s h i p , 849 So. 2d 914, 926 ( A l a . 2002) ( " S t a r e d e c i s i s commands, a t a minimum, a d e g r e e o f r e s p e c t f r o m t h i s C o u r t t h a t makes i t d i s i n c l i n e d t o o v e r r u l e c o n t r o l l i n g p r e c e d e n t when i t i s n o t i n v i t e d t o do s o . " ) . 10 1101440 Town o f V a n c e i s u n n e c e s s a r i l y the relevant statute. 4 A n n e x a t i o n by p e t i t i o n Code 1975, w h i c h "contiguous to municipality. l i m i t e d and i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h requires the i s g o v e r n e d b y § 11-42-21, A l a . only corporate that t h e annexed limits" of the land be annexing A l t h o u g h C i t y o f T u s k e g e e v. L a c e y , 486 So. 2d 393, 396 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) , was o v e r r u l e d b y C i t y o f F u l t o n d a l e , t h e City o f Tuskegee statutory Court requirement properly that noted the land statute." "[t]here be p r i v a t e p u b l i c , a n d we f i n d no b a s i s f o r r e a d i n g the that In C i t y of P r a t t v i l l e , i s no rather than this limitation into t h i s C o u r t a f f i r m e d an a n n e x a t i o n o f a s t r i p o f county-owned p r o p e r t y , and, i n C i t y o f D o t h a n , we a f f i r m e d t h e a n n e x a t i o n o f a s t r i p o f p r o p e r t y owned b y a q u a s i - g o v e r n m e n t a l a i r p o r t a u t h o r i t y . Fultondale, 507 So. (describing t h e owner 2d at 492 (Houston, o f t h e annexed See C i t y o f J . , dissenting) property i n C i t y of M o r e o v e r , t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f c o r r i d o r a n n e x a t i o n s i n Town o f V a n c e was d i c t a i n a s m u c h as t h e C o u r t u l t i m a t e l y h e l d t h a t i t was u n n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e a n n e x a t i o n b e f o r e i t c o n s t i t u t e d a p e r m i s s i b l e c o r r i d o r a n n e x a t i o n o r an i n v a l i d l o n g - l a s s o a n n e x a t i o n b e c a u s e t h a t c a s e i n v o l v e d an a n n e x a t i o n by l e g i s l a t i o n , a n d t h e C o u r t n o t e d t h a t " t h e [Alabama] C o n s t i t u t i o n i s t h e o n l y l i m i t a t i o n on t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s a u t h o r i t y t o annex, w h i l e m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , on t h e o t h e r hand, are l i m i t e d by t h e requirements o f t h e g e n e r a l laws, i n c l u d i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f c o n t i g u i t y . " 661 So. 2d a t 744. 4 11 1101440 Dothan as a corporation" "tax-exempt, and making distinction between Accordingly, we corridor public, property the i t hold annexation non-elector, point and that must a there that there was governmental is include to avoid being quasi-municipal no entity). requirement private, as categorized as C i t y that no that opposed a the a to long-lasso annexation. We therefore agree w i t h the Fort Morgan a n n e x a t i o n i s analogous to the C i t y of M i l l b r o o k ' s a n n e x a t i o n of the county-owned Prattville. In stated 507 So. 2d undisputedly way. City i t s holding "[A]nnexation abandoned of in railroad Fultondale, the final bed this in Court sentence of 491. The annexed property of succinctly the by use o f p u b l i c r o a d r i g h t s - o f - w a y at City opinion: is invalid." in this case d i d not c o n s i s t s o l e l y of a p u b l i c - r o a d r i g h t - o f - Rather, the annexed p r o p e r t y consisted l a n d 330 f e e t w i d e , l e s s t h a n 25% o f w h i c h was of-way. As i n C i t y of P r a t t v i l l e , s u b s e q u e n t l y p e t i t i o n e d t o be b a s e d upon t h e i r new of a strip a public right- a d d i t i o n a l property owners annexed i n t o the annexing contiguity with the of originally city annexed p r o p e r t y ; h o w e v e r , t h a t f a c t does n o t t r a n s f o r m t h e a n n e x a t i o n 12 1101440 into a long-lasso a n n e x a t i o n t h a t must be h e l d i n v a l i d . F o r t Morgan a n n e x a t i o n c a n n o t be v o i d e d was a prohibited long-lasso The on t h e b a s i s t h a t i t annexation. IV. The FMCA n e x t a r g u e s t h a t t h e F o r t Morgan a n n e x a t i o n i s i n v a l i d b e c a u s e , t h e FMCA a l l e g e s , t h e S t a t e d i d n o t own a l l the annexed p r o p e r t y . parcels of property S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e FMCA a r g u e s t h a t included i n t h e annexed property were two p a r c e l s were The FMCA a r g u e s t h a t t h i s fact owned b y t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t owned b y p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s . requires because the e n t i r e (1) w i t h o u t annexed p r o p e r t y five Fort Morgan these and t h a t seven annexation parcels, t o be portions w o u l d n o t be c o n t i g u o u s t o G u l f voided of the Shores, and (2) n e i t h e r t h e a l l e g e d p r i v a t e owners n o r any r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e f e d e r a l government s i g n e d t h e a n n e x a t i o n p e t i t i o n . § 11-42-21 petition (stating that a requirement f o r annexation i s t h a t a l l t h e owners o f t h e p r o p e r t y See by t o be a n n e x e d sign the p e t i t i o n ) . At trial, t h e FMCA i d e n t i f i e d five were owned b y t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t and 56. In support of t h i s parcels lots i t alleged 5, 15, 43, 44, a r g u m e n t , t h e FMCA s u b m i t t e d t h e 13 1101440 d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y of Nathan F e l t o n , a l e a d law examiner f o r the Bureau Department of Land Management of the I n t e r i o r . with Felton the United testified States that r e v i e w e d t h e t r a c t b o o k s m a i n t a i n e d by t h e f e d e r a l he had government to record a l l t r a n s a c t i o n s of f e d e r a l public-domain lands that those records i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e s e f i v e p a r c e l s had never l e f t the possession o f t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t s i n c e t h e y were f i r s t s u r v e y e d i n t h e e a r l y 1800s. the five and parcels encompassed He f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d the e n t i r e width that of d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s o f F o r t Morgan Road and s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t t h e f e d e r a l government public had never or p r i v a t e public-domain lands The City conveyed these lots and accordingly that belonging acknowledges they t o any to the f e d e r a l that, although entity were still government. the State had a p p r o x i m a t e l y 300 deeds r e p r e s e n t i n g p a r c e l s o f p r o p e r t y that were i n c l u d e d i n t h e F o r t Morgan a n n e x a t i o n , t h e S t a t e d i d n o t have a d e e d f o r e v e r y p a r c e l o f p r o p e r t y the Fort Morgan acknowledges that Nevertheless, upheld the annexation. i t had no deed t h a t was i n c l u d e d i n Specifically, for lots the C i t y argues that the t r i a l Fort Morgan annexation 14 because, 43, the 44, and City 56. court c o r r e c t l y i t argues: (1) 1101440 Felton's testimony was inconclusive; (2) t h e r e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a was of a l l the annexed assessor's records; a 1961, May 24, listing 43, property and on federal We and 56, letter and evidence l i s t e d as t h e owner Baldwin County t o t h e Alabama claimed Secretary i n Alabama only omitted l o t 5 on of State lots 15, of the behalf government. disagree testimony with the was i n c o n c l u s i v e . e x c h a n g e r e g a r d i n g who City's argument that Felton's The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h e f o l l o w i n g owned t h e s e five parcels: "Q. [FMCA's c o u n s e l : ] So i s i t t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e B u r e a u o f L a n d Management t h a t t h e s e five p a r c e l s t h a t we a r e d i s c u s s i n g h e r e t o d a y a r e p u b l i c domain l a n d s ? "A. [ F e l t o n : ] Yes. "Q. I s i t t h e B u r e a u o f L a n d Management's p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e s e f i v e p a r c e l s do n o t b e l o n g i n any manner t o t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a ? "A. The That's c o r r e c t . " City attempts that there that tax (3) t h e B u r e a u o f L a n d Management i n a l l f e d e r a l p u b l i c lands 44, the was to counter m i g h t be o t h e r records Felton's records m i g h t have been lost testimony by arguing F e l t o n d i d not review and b y n o t i n g t h a t and Felton would not say f o r c e r t a i n t h a t t h e f e d e r a l government had n o t 15 1101440 conveyed the l o t s at i s s u e . speculation that testimony. subject, are However, t h e s e a r g u m e n t s a r e mere not supported by Felton's actual When c r o s s - e x a m i n e d by t h e C i t y ' s a t t o r n e y on F e l t o n t e s t i f i e d as this follows: "Q. S i t t i n g h e r e t o d a y , can you s a y f o r c e r t a i n that the U n i t e d States g o v e r n m e n t has not c o n v e y e d [ l o t 5] t o any o t h e r e n t i t y , w h e t h e r p u b l i c or p r i v a t e ? "A. I can o n l y s a y , b a s e d on what I t h e r e c o r d s , t h e y have n o t . have seen in " "Q. "Is i t possible that from the t r a c t books? "A. I t i s p o s s i b l e , but I wouldn't say t h a t t h e r e a r e p a g e s m i s s i n g f r o m t h i s one. But t h a t ' s a possibility, yes." While acknowledging that there "pertain to these lands" in pages could c o u l d be field be other missing documents offices, Felton that also t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e were no o t h e r s o u r c e documents m a i n t a i n e d by the Bureau conveyance reviewed. Felton's of of these Land Management lands other that than would the C o n s i d e r e d as a w h o l e , t h e r e was reflect records he no e q u i v o c a t i o n t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t owned t h e lots. 16 a had in five 1101440 The C i t y next argues t h a t the t r i a l nevertheless c o r r e c t because t h a t t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a was there c o u r t ' s judgment was evidence was indicating l i s t e d on t h e B a l d w i n C o u n t y t a x a s s e s s o r ' s r e c o r d s as t h e owner o f a l l t h e p a r c e l s o f p r o p e r t y included i n the A l a . Code 1975, this the article person valorem F o r t Morgan annexation. Section 11-42-20, p r o v i d e s t h a t " [ t ] h e t e r m 'owners,' as u s e d i n [governing i n whose annexation name the by petition], property shall i s assessed mean for ad t a x purposes i n the absence of p r o o f t o the c o n t r a r y . " S e t t i n g a s i d e the i s s u e whether F e l t o n ' s testimony c o n s t i t u t e d such trial "proof court Baldwin to the c o n t r a r y , " we s t a t e d i n i t s order County tax Alabama i s a s s e s s e d even though the assessor's note t h a t , even though that records "[t]he City presented to State show t h e f o r t h e e n t i r e F o r t Morgan R o a d t r a c t " City r e p e a t e d l y makes t h e of tax-assessor records. of and same a s s e r t i o n i n i t s b r i e f t o t h i s C o u r t , t h e r e c o r d , i n f a c t , c o n t a i n s no evidence the Accordingly, such the p r e s u m p t i o n o f § 11-42-20 i s i n a p p l i c a b l e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e May 24, 1961, l e t t e r from the Bureau of L a n d Management t o t h e A l a b a m a S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e l i s t i n g a l l f e d e r a l p u b l i c lands i n Alabama 17 yet o m i t t i n g l o t s 15, 43, 1101440 44, and 56 government is evidence had d i s c l a i m e d indicating that the i t s interest i n those f e d e r a l government, however, a p p a r e n t l y did s t i l l as called of that surveyor date. and Conservation At t r i a l , engineer the C i t y with the Alabama a n d N a t u r a l R e s o u r c e s , who federal lots. claim l o t 5 Terry Boyd, Department a of t e s t i f i e d that l o t 5 h a d been c o n v e y e d t o t h e S t a t e b y d e e d on A u g u s t 12, 1936: "Q. L e t me show you what has been m a r k e d as D e f e n d a n t ' s E x h i b i t No. 1 and a s k you what t h e document i s ? "A. I t ' s a deed from I d o n ' t have my reading glasses. I t ' s t o t h e Alabama S t a t e Commission o f F o r e s t r y f o r $1 f r o m t h e from the G u l f B e a c h L a n d and D e v e l o p m e n t Company. I t says t h e 2 1 s t day o f A p r i l 1930 a t t h e t o p o f t h e d e e d and i t was s i g n e d A u g u s t 12, 1938 [ s i c ] . "Q. Now "A. But i t d e s c r i b e s a p a r c e l of l a n d c o n t a i n i n g 185 a c r e s t h a t l i s t s s t a t i o n s a l o n g F o r t Morgan or Dixie-Graves Parkway and i t lists the s e c t i o n s o f l a n d and i t ' s i n T o w n s h i p 9 S o u t h , Range 2 E a s t i s where i t commences. And i t ' s got a bunch of c a l l s i n t h i s from, l i k e I say, containing i t s a y s 185.8 a c r e s , t h e same more o r l e s s . "Q. I s t h a t a t r u e and a c c u r a t e c o p y o f t h e d e e d m a i n t a i n e d by t h e Department o f C o n s e r v a t i o n ? "A. Yes. 18 The 1101440 "Q. A n d was that the o r i g i n a l of that deed m a i n t a i n e d b y y o u r o f f i c e as p a r t o f t h e D i x i e Graves Parkway d o c u m e n t a t i o n ? "A. Yes. "[The C i t y t h e r e a f t e r moved t o a d m i t D e f e n d a n t ' s e x h i b i t No. 4, a l a r g e r c o p y o f t h e deed.] "Q. Does t h a t a p p e a r t o be t h e same? "A. Yeah. I was w r o n g . A u g u s t 1936. I t was t h e 1 2 t h day o f " "Q. D i d you e v e r d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o r n o t t h a t d e e d c o r r e s p o n d e d w i t h any o f t h e l o t s t h e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t w e l l , I'm s o r r y . What, i f any, l o t s d i d t h a t deed c o r r e s p o n d w i t h ? " "A. To my r e c o l l e c t i o n I mean, t h i s i s c o v e r s 185 a c r e s . f i n d i t on t h e map b a c k t o 2006, L o t s 5 a n d 15. a long s t r i p of land that So, I mean, I c o u l d p r o b a b l y a n d p l o t i t up f o r y o u . "Q. L o o k i n g a t P l a i n t i f f ' s E x h i b i t No. 16 [a map o f the annexed p r o p e r t y ] , i s i t w e l l , your t e s t i m o n y w h i c h l o t s do t h e s e c o n c e r n ? "A. I t w o u l d be t h o s e two. T h a t ' s s e c t i o n 25 and 26 T o w n s h i p N o r t h 5 a n d 15. Like I said, i t ' s a long s t r i p that covers a l o tof parcels there." Thus, B o y d t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d , i n f a c t , have a d e e d f o r l o t s 5 a n d 15. 19 1101440 In conclusion, following evidence the trial concerning court federal had before ownership of the f i v e d i s p u t e d p a r c e l s : (1) F e l t o n ' s d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y that lots 5, 15, 43, 44, a n d 56 were government; i t the indicating owned b y t h e f e d e r a l (2) t h e May 24, 1 9 6 1 , l e t t e r from t h e Bureau o f L a n d Management i n d i c a t i n g t h a t l o t 5 b u t n o t l o t s 15, 43, 44, g o v e r n m e n t ; a n d (3) a n d 56 Boyd's was owned b y t h e f e d e r a l testimony indicating that the State had acquired o w n e r s h i p o f l o t s 5 a n d 15 v i a a 1936 d e e d . This conflicting evidence make a required determination. owned t h e f i v e evidence the trial court I t did, concluding disputed t o support parcels that presumption of correctness to factual t h a t t h e S t a t e o f Alabama of land. conclusion, Because there i t i s afforded under t h e o r e tenus r u l e , was a a n d we accordingly decline to overrule i t . The in the FMCA a l s o a r g u e s , h o w e v e r , t h a t two p a r c e l s Fort individuals Morgan who annexation d i d not sign S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e FMCA s u b m i t t e d were the owned by annexation adjacent private petition. i n t o e v i d e n c e two deeds d a t e d M a r c h 1924 w h e r e b y Carawan N e l s o n a n d Fanny N e l s o n two included conveyed p a r c e l s o f l a n d t o C i c e r o N e l s o n a n d K a t e Ward. 20 1101440 Coleman B r y a r s , owner o f A l a b a m a L a n d T i t l e , in Baldwin County, t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l a title company t h a t F o r t Morgan Road t r a v e r s e s b o t h o f t h e s e p a r c e l s and t h a t t h e y were i n c l u d e d i n the F o r t Morgan annexation. He further testified that he r e s e a r c h e d t h e t i t l e t o b o t h o f t h e s e p a r c e l s by e x a m i n i n g the records tax at assessor's the Baldwin o f f i c e , from County probate t h e i r p a t e n t up office to the and time of h i s t e s t i m o n y , and t h a t he c o u l d f i n d no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e y had e v e r been c o n v e y e d t o t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a . argues that Bryars's t i t l e s e a r c h was The City incomplete because d i d not c o n s u l t r e c o r d s a t the Department of C o n s e r v a t i o n he and N a t u r a l R e s o u r c e s ; however, t h i s argument l a c k s m e r i t i n l i g h t of § 9-2-121(c), department or A l a . Code 1975, w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h a t any S t a t e agency t h a t h o l d s p r o p e r t y i n t h e S t a t e must " f i l e the county wherein conveying title to such such or a c q u i r e s l e g a l o r have f i l e d land l i e s l a n d out title for record i n a l l i n s t r u m e n t s and of or into to the deeds State of Alabama." At t r i a l , Max, the C i t y a l s o s u b m i t t e d the t e s t i m o n y of Becky an e m p l o y e e o f t h e B a l d w i n C o u n t y Revenue O f f i c e . Max t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had s e a r c h e d t h e t a x a s s e s s o r ' s r e c o r d s and 21 1101440 f o u n d no property o f f F o r t M o r g a n Road t h a t was t h e name o f C i c e r o N e l s o n o r K a t e Ward. assessed She d i d n o t , h o w e v e r , s t a t e i n whose name t h e two p a r c e l s i n q u e s t i o n were for tax purposes, whether i t was the individual. M o r e o v e r , t h e FMCA a r g u e s , tax she records Ward's names had searched the State or assessed some other she d i d n o t s t a t e what for Cicero records in existing Nelson's in and 2011 Kate when she testified, the r e c o r d s e x i s t i n g i n 2003 when t h e F o r t Morgan annexation o c c u r r e d , o r t h e r e c o r d s f r o m d e c a d e s e a r l i e r when F o r t Morgan Road was The trial allegedly court privately constructed. r e s o l v e d the issue regarding owned p a r c e l s by concluding these that, two even t h o u g h t h e S t a t e c o u l d n o t p r o d u c e deeds e s t a b l i s h i n g t i t l e these p a r c e l s , which traversed Fort nevertheless s u f f i c i e n t evidence Morgan Road, by prescription o r by a r g u e s t h a t no s u c h e v i d e n c e In 618 Kerlin v. Tensaw L a n d ( A l a . 1980), t h i s Court statute. was was to support a f i n d i n g t h a t the S t a t e had a c q u i r e d t h e p r o p e r t i e s t h r o u g h either there to adverse possession, On appeal, admitted at t r i a l . & T i m b e r Co., 390 So. the We FMCA agree. 2d 616, s u m m a r i z e d t h e e l e m e n t s t h a t must be p r o v e n b e f o r e a f i n d i n g o f a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n 22 can be made: 1101440 " I n A l a b a m a t h e r e a r e b a s i c a l l y two t y p e s o f a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n , t h e s e two t y p e s b e i n g s t a t u t o r y adverse possession and adverse possession by prescription. A d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n by p r e s c r i p t i o n r e q u i r e s a c t u a l , e x c l u s i v e , open, n o t o r i o u s a n d h o s t i l e p o s s e s s i o n under a c l a i m o f r i g h t f o r a p e r i o d of twenty years. See, F i t t s v. A l e x a n d e r , 277 A l a . 372, 170 So. 2d 808 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . Statutory a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n r e q u i r e s t h e same e l e m e n t s , b u t the s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r t h a t i f the adverse p o s s e s s o r h o l d s under c o l o r o f t i t l e , has p a i d t a x e s f o r t e n y e a r s , o r d e r i v e s h i s t i t l e by descent c a s t o r d e v i s e f r o m a p o s s e s s o r , he may a c q u i r e t i t l e i n t e n y e a r s , as o p p o s e d t o t h e t w e n t y y e a r s r e q u i r e d f o r a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n b y p r e s c r i p t i o n . § 6-5-200, Ala. Code 1975. See, Long v. L a d d , 273 A l a . 410, 142 So. 2d 660 ( 1 9 6 2 ) . " The S t a t e does n o t p a y t a x e s on p r o p e r t y i t owns; h o w e v e r , as noted p r e v i o u s l y , there indicating that these was title or a testamentary evidence adduced at two p a r c e l s were e v e n a s s e s s e d S t a t e , much l e s s e v i d e n c e of no trial to the i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e had c o l o r claim t o have devise. Thus, obtained the the land trial court through erred a in c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e c o u l d have a c q u i r e d t h e two p a r c e l s via s t a t u t o r y adverse The at FMCA a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e trial of "actual, possession years" possession. under presented e x c l u s i v e , open, n o t o r i o u s a n d h o s t i l e a claim so as t o s u p p o r t of right a finding 23 for a period of adverse of twenty possession by 1101440 prescription. there was highway, evidence ran across presumably further 390 So. 2d a t 618. used argues, by only that A t most, t h e FMCA a r g u e s , Fort the property and t h a t the p u b l i c . would Morgan Road, a State t h e highway was This even not support evidence, t h e FMCA a f i n d i n g that the S t a t e h a d a c q u i r e d t h e roadway i t s e l f b y a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n much l e s s t h e e n t i r e t y o f t h e two p a r c e l s general rule i s t o the e f f e c t that because the p u b l i c t h e owner, s u b j e c t t o t h e e a s e m e n t . " Ala. 373, 377, 71 So. 2d 18, 21 "[t]he acquires easement o n l y i n t h e h i g h w a y s , t h e f e e o f t h e l a n d in an remaining P u r v i s v. B u s e y , 260 (1954). See a l s o Town o f E l m o r e v . Town o f C o o s a d a , 957 So. 2d 1096, 1101 ( A l a . 2006) ("The Purvis case ... stands f o r the proposition that a property owner o f e i t h e r s i d e o f a roadway r e t a i n s o w n e r s h i p of roadway the up to the center p r e s c r i p t i v e easement o b t a i n e d line in spite of a by t h e p u b l i c . " ) . We a g r e e t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e State had a c q u i r e d title t o t h e two p a r c e l s a l l e g e d t o be p r i v a t e l y owned v i a a d v e r s e possession by p r e s c r i p t i o n . The o n l y evidence before the t r i a l c o u r t r e g a r d i n g o w n e r s h i p o f t h o s e two p a r c e l s i n d i c a t e d 24 1101440 that t h e y were trial court owned by C i c e r o accordingly erred Nelson and Kate i n upholding Ward. the Fort Morgan annexation because t h e S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n f o r annexation, was n o t s i g n e d b y a l l owners o f t h e a n n e x e d p r o p e r t y , The which d i d not comply w i t h § 11-42-21. V. The FMCA s u e d t h e C i t y , a s k i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d e c l a r e the Fort Morgan long-lasso annexation annexation annexed p r o p e r t y the the a nonjury City. either o r because, included property p a r t y who i n i t i a t e d Following invalid t h e FMCA the annexation the t r i a l However, b e c a u s e alleged, the n o t owned b y t h e S t a t e and s i g n e d trial, as a p r o h i b i t e d court petition. ruled i n favor of t h e FMCA s u b m i t t e d evidence a t t h a t t r i a l i n d i c a t i n g t h a t two p a r c e l s o f p r o p e r t y i n c l u d e d i n the F o r t Morgan a n n e x a t i o n were owned b y p r i v a t e individuals and b e c a u s e t h e C i t y f a i l e d t o s u b m i t a n y e v i d e n c e indicating that the t r i a l court those same p a r c e l s exceeded The G u l f were owned i t s discretion i n upholding Shores o r d i n a n c e g r a n t i n g annexation and accordingly void. effecting by t h e S t a t e , the the State's the Fort Morgan annexation. petition for annexation A l l subsequent annexations of p r o p e r t y 25 is on 1101440 the Fort Morgan contiguity upon peninsula property by included annexation are l i k e w i s e void. at 1098 n. 3 ( s t a t i n g property i s invalid, the City in that the relied Fort for Morgan See Town o f E l m o r e , 957 So. 2d that i f the annexation of a p a r c e l of then a l l p r o p e r t i e s s u b s e q u e n t l y annexed b a s e d on c o n t i g u i t y w i t h t h e p a r c e l i n v o l v e d i n t h e now v o i d annexation invalid"). the "are noncontiguous a n d t h e a n n e x a t i o n o f them i s The j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l court i s reversed and c a u s e remanded. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Malone, C . J . , and S t u a r t , B o l i n , P a r k e r , Shaw, M a i n , a n d Wise, J J . , concur. W o o d a l l and Murdock, J J . , concur i n t h e r e s u l t . 26 1101440 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g i n t h e r e s u l t ) . I concur write i n t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d by t h e main o p i n i o n . separately jurisprudence discussed as i n Part t o express concerns to so-called regarding "long-lasso I I I o f t h e main o p i n i o n this I Court's annexations" as a n d t o comment on the use o f t h e ore tenus s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n P a r t IV o f t h e opinion. Long-Lasso Annexations The main opinion reasons from existing precedent conclude that the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a " l o n g - l a s s o " turns on w h e t h e r t h e " l a s s o " e n c o m p a s s e s roadway. of to annexation more t h a n a p u b l i c The o p i n i o n n o t e s t h a t i n C i t y o f F u l t o n d a l e v . C i t y B i r m i n g h a m , 507 So. 2d 489, 491 ( A l a . 1987), this Court h e l d t h a t " a n n e x a t i o n by u s e o f p u b l i c r o a d r i g h t s - o f - w a y i s invalid." I t then relies on the fact that P r a t t v i l l e v . C i t y o f M i l l b r o o k , 621 So. 2d 267 t h i s Court permitted roadway i n City of ( A l a . 1993), a " c o r r i d o r " annexation that included a t h a t was o n l y part of a wider strip of land: "'The c o r r i d o r i n t h e M i l l b r o o k case i s a county-owned r a i l r o a d bed w h i c h h a s a p u b l i c roadway on p a r t o f i t . however, is substantially larger 27 than The r a i l r o a d b e d , the roadway. A 1101440 s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of the c o r r i d o r , approximately o f a m i l e , has no roadway on i t a t a l l . ' " ( q u o t i n g and a d o p t i n g Preoccupation fundamental the t r i a l quarters 621 So. 2d a t 273 order). w i t h t h e roadway c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i g n o r e s t h e reasoning underlying decision. In the course Lacey, So. 486 court's three 2d 393 the City of o v e r r u l i n g C i t y ( A l a . 1985), the C i t y Court observed t h a t " [ t ] h e p u b l i c road of Fultondale o f T u s k e g e e v. of Fultondale rights-of-way annexed i n C i t y o f T u s k e g e e were u s e d m e r e l y t o c r e a t e c o n t i g u i t y and, in effect, point. We annexation to avoid the requirement do n o t b e l i e v e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e in this manner." noted that "the wholesale of annexation Id. of a touching could 507 So. 2d a t 491. allowance invite intended a t some to allow The Court o f ' t h e l o n g l a s s o method' abuse and s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b l e m s . " I t happened t h a t t h e " l o n g l a s s o " i n C i t y o f F u l t o n d a l e was i n f a c t a roadway, and, i n d e e d , the Court in ruling that this the annexation i n v a l i d as a m a t t e r o f l a w . Id. f a c t was n o t i c e d by i n that Nonetheless, case was the i n c l u s i o n o f a p u b l i c roadway i s n o t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t makes " l o n g lassos" unacceptable. Instead, gravamen o f t h e c a s e a g a i n s t as t h e C o u r t e x p l a i n e d , "long 28 l a s s o s " i s as f o l l o w s : the 1101440 " A l t h o u g h A l a b a m a law does n o t r e q u i r e that m u n i c i p a l b o u n d a r i e s form a r e g u l a r shape, the l e g a l and p o p u l a r i d e a o f a m u n i c i p a l i t y i n t h i s country i s ' t h a t o f o n e n e s s , community, l o c a l i t y , v i c i n i t y ; a c o l l e c t i v e body, not s e v e r a l b o d i e s ; a c o l l e c t i v e body o f i n h a b i t a n t s -- t h a t i s , a body o f p e o p l e c o l l e c t e d or g a t h e r e d t o g e t h e r i n one mass, n o t separated into distinct masses, and having a community o f i n t e r e s t b e c a u s e r e s i d e n t s o f t h e same place, not different places.' 56 Am. Jur. 2d M u n i c i p a l C o r p o r a t i o n s § 69 a t 125 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; C i t y o f D o t h a n [v. D a l e C o u n t y Comm'n, 295 A l a . 131, 324 So. 2d 772 (1975)]. The annexations proposed by F u l t o n d a l e and T r u s s v i l l e do n o t c r e a t e a c o l l e c t i v e body o f i n h a b i t a n t s , b u t , r a t h e r , s e v e r a l b o d i e s s c a t t e r e d across an a r e a , a r e s u l t we feel the l e g i s l a t u r e d i d not i n t e n d . " 507 So. 2d a t 491 Clearly, Fultondale (emphasis added). the essential rationale d e c i s i o n i s that annexing a long r e a c h a n o t h e r "community, l o c a l i t y , i s not "contiguous" municipality, intended by into do strip City of of l a n d to [or] v i c i n i t y , " the i s an not of The r a t i o n a l e of the artifice a one to separate share with not Court was c o n s i s t i n g s o l e l y of achieve body of the a annexation inhabitants and the e x i s t i n g m u n i c i p a l i t y a community o f i n t e r e s t g r o u n d e d i n t h e i r p l a c e 29 that annexing a n n e x a t i o n p o w e r t h a t was l a s s o " -- w h e t h e r o r n o t a municipality l a n d o w n e r s who of legislature. r o a d w a y -- the to the e x i s t i n g b o u n d a r i e s of the i s a use the that a "long public of of residency. 1101440 In t h i s case, G u l f Shores annexed the 330-foot-wide so that i t could peninsula. The reach property f a c t t h a t the the Fort Morgan s t r i p of l a n d annexed i s w i d e r t h a n F o r t Morgan Road i s b e s i d e the l o c a t e d on strip the p o i n t . The 5 point i s that annexation r e s u l t s i n a m u n i c i p a l i t y that i s spread over g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i s p a r a t e a r e a s 19 m i l e s a p a r t and t h a t t h i s i s made p o s s i b l e only land i t so that through can be annexation claimed of that a narrow the strip properties of are "contiguous." Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s or d i s a p p r o v a l l i k e w i s e do of these kinds not base t h e i r o f a n n e x a t i o n s on approval whether a n n e x a t i o n c o n s i s t s s o l e l y o f a roadway o r s o m e t h i n g the slightly wider. "The use o f a t h i n s t r i p o f l a n d t o c o n n e c t a d i s e m b o d i e d p a r c e l o f l a n d t o a m u n i c i p a l i t y has b e e n v a r i o u s l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d as ' c o r r i d o r , ' ' s t r i p , ' ' s h o e s t r i n g , ' or 'long l a s s o ' annexation. Those d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e a s h o r t h a n d r e f e r e n c e t o t h e use o f long, r a d i a t i n g s t r i p s which i n t e r s e c t municipal boundaries f o r o n l y a r e l a t i v e l y narrow, short distance, as a means o f a n n e x i n g an otherwise disembodied, d i s t a n t l y - p l a c e d t e r r i t o r i a l area." I n d e e d , the main o p i n i o n n o t e s t h a t " [ t ] h e p r e d o m i n a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h i s p r o p e r t y was F o r t Morgan Road and i t s approximately 80-foot-wide right-of-way So. 3d a t 5 30 1101440 S t a t e e x r e l . Dep't o f T r a n s p . 618, v. C i t y 621 ( D e l . Ch. 1989) (emphasis of Milford, added). 576 A . 2 d The f a c t i s that a s i g n i f i c a n t majority of "courts aregenerally loath to f i n d one t e r r i t o r y t o be c o n t i g u o u s t o a n o t h e r where t h e o n l y between t h e two i s f o r g e d De-Annexation P.3d 504, 237 S.W.2d 483, 484-85 supra; P o t v i n v . Chubbuck, 76 I d a h o 386, 237 I l l . Dec. 529, 709 N.E.2d v. C i t y o f Owensboro, 1964); Griffin v. C i t y 1999); Owosso Twp. v . C i t y N.W.2d 421, City of 453, 284 P.2d (1999); o f Robards, 990 S.W.2d 634, 640 (Ky. o f Owosso, 385 M i c h . 587, 189 422 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; S t a t e e x r e l . D a n i e l s o n v . V i l l a g e o f of Hastings, Middletown 998, 1000 383 S.W.2d 510, 511-12 (Ky. Mound, 234 M i n n . 5 3 1 , 48 N.W.2d 855, 856 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ; Johnson v. 241 Neb. 2 9 1 , 488 N.W.2d 20, 24 v . McGee, 39 O h i o S t . 3 d 284, ( 1 9 8 8 ) ; Watson v . D o o l i t t l e , 10 O h i o App. 771, (1951); 417 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ; C i t y o f C h a r l e s t o n v . W i t m e r , 304 I l l . App. Ridings City In re o f C e r t a i n R e a l P r o p . f r o m C i t y o f S e m i n o l e , 102 218 A r k . Milford, 3d corridor." 120, 130-31 ( O k l a . 2004) (emphasis a d d e d ) ( c i t i n g C l a r k v . Holt, 414, by a narrow link 775 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; C i t y of Rapid C i t y 31 (1992); 530 N.E.2d 902, 905 2d 143, 226 N.E.2d v. Anderson, 612 N.W.2d 1101440 289, 293 (S.D. 2 0 0 0 ) ; a n d Town o f Mt. P l e a s a n t R a c i n e , 24 W i s . 2d 4 1 , 127 N.W.2d 757, 760 Like t h i s Court, other the courts v. C i t y o f (1964)). repeatedly have e m p h a s i z e d f a c t t h a t a m u n i c i p a l i t y i s s u p p o s e d t o be a u n i f i e d body of i n h a b i t a n t s as t h e r e a s o n f o r n o t p e r m i t t i n g t h e s e t y p e s o f annexations. See, e.g., C e r t a i n Real S e m i n o l e , 102 P.3d a t 130 ( o b s e r v i n g Prop. from C i t y of that "[t]he basic idea of a m u n i c i p a l i t y i s t h a t o f a u n i f i e d body o f i n h a b i t a n t s h a v i n g a community mass, w i t h not o f i n t e r e s t and g a t h e r e d recognized together and w e l l - d e f i n e d separate and disconnected areas"); i n a single external boundaries, C i t y o f R a p i d C i t y v. A n d e r s o n , 612 N.W.2d a t 294 ( n o t i n g t h a t " [ t ] o a l l o w t h e use o f ' c o r r i d o r ' a n n e x a t i o n s w o u l d be t o d e f e a t t h e b a s i c c o n c e p t of a m u n i c i p a l corporation, t h a t o f u n i t y and compactness"); C i t y o f M i l f o r d , 576 A . 2 d a t 624 ("[T]he f u n d a m e n t a l concept o f a m u n i c i p a l i t y [ i s ] 'a body o f p e o p l e c o l l e c t e d o r g a t h e r e d together i n one mass, n o t s e p a r a t e d i n t o d i s t i n c t m a s s e s , a n d h a v i n g a community o f i n t e r e s t b e c a u s e r e s i d e n t s place, not d i f f e r e n t places.' C i t y of Fultondale B i r m i n g h a m , 507 So. 2d a t 4 9 1 . furthered by a l l o w i n g o f t h e same annexation 32 v. C i t y o f T h a t o b j e c t i v e w o u l d n o t be methods that create not a 1101440 collective body o f inhabitants but, scattered across an a r e a , ' I d . , and by technical rather, means of a strip 'crazy-quilt boundaries which administer.' Town o f N.W.2d a t bodies ' i s o l a t e d areas connected a Pleasant Mt. 'several few are feet wide,' difficult v. City of ... with to Racine, 127 cases from t h i s Court i n d i c a t e t h a t the 760."). I n sum, previous a n n e x a t i o n at i s s u e here i s of the i m p e r m i s s i b l e v a r i e t y because i t i s c o n t r a r y to the "long-lasso" idea of a m u n i c i p a l i t y as b e i n g a " c o l l e c t i v e body o f i n h a b i t a n t s , " and a s i g n i f i c a n t m a j o r i t y o f o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s do n o t a p p r o v e o f t h i s k i n d o f annexation, whether i t is referred " c o r r i d o r , " or " l o n g - l a s s o " a n n e x a t i o n . succinctly to as a "strip," As t h e M i l f o r d c o u r t observed: " [ I ] t w o u l d be i l l o g i c a l and u n s o u n d t o a t t r i b u t e t o t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , b a s e d s o l e l y on i t s use o f t h e term 'contiguous,' an i n t e n t i o n to place its i m p r i m a t u r upon t h e a b u s e s and c a p r i c i o u s e x e r c i s e s o f t h e a n n e x a t i o n power t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f c o u r t s have so w i d e l y and r e s o u n d i n g l y r e j e c t e d . In the a b s e n c e o f more e x p l i c i t s t a t u t o r y g u i d a n c e , i t i s f a r more l o g i c a l and s e n s i b l e t o assume t h a t t h e G e n e r a l Assembly i n t e n d e d t h a t the C i t y of M i l f o r d s h o u l d grow by a n n e x i n g o u t l y i n g t e r r i t o r y i n a manner t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the fundamental c o n c e p t o f a m u n i c i p a l i t y , t h a t i s , 'a body o f p e o p l e c o l l e c t e d o r g a t h e r e d t o g e t h e r i n one mass, n o t s e p a r a t e d i n t o d i s t i n c t m a s s e s , and h a v i n g a 33 1101440 community o f i n t e r e s t b e c a u s e r e s i d e n t s o f t h e same p l a c e , n o t d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s . ' C i t y o f F u l t o n d a l e v. C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , 507 So. 2d a t 4 9 1 . " 576 A . 2 d a t 624. T h a t s a i d , t h e argument p r e s e n t e d insofar as t h e i s s u e s opinion are concerned. annexation discussed i n Part The FMCA of the nature at issue b y t h e FMCA i s l i m i t e d I I I o f t h e main argues i s valid that whether should turn an on whether t h e s t r i p o f l a n d employed i n c l u d e s p r i v a t e property. Because t h e main I agree with the conclusion reached opinion that t h i s i s not the appropriate to judge will "long-lasso" not reverse a r g u e d on a p p e a l , 380 ( A l a . 2006), annexations, a trial court's c r i t e r i o n upon w h i c h a n d b e c a u s e we judgment S m i t h v . Mark Dodge, I n c . , I concur i n the r e s u l t o p i n i o n as t o t h e i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d by generally on a g r o u n d n o t 934 So. 2d 375, r e a c h e d by t h e main i n Part I I I thereof. A p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e Ore Tenus Standard I am c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e m a i n o p i n i o n s u g g e s t s r e l i a n c e upon t h e o r e t e n u s s t a n d a r d the issues discussed i n Part with respect to IV o f the o p i n i o n . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t some o f t h e " f a c t s " i n t e g r a l t o t h e t r i a l court's decision certain -- e . g . , t h a t Felton 34 d i d i n fact review 1101440 records a n d what he o b s e r v e d i n t h o s e r e c o r d s testimony review there turn by Felton i s , of course, are issues upon or others, the presence or same. To extent, standard I absence of do i s appropriate. 35 standard I t seems, h o w e v e r , IV o f t h e o p i n i o n content of c e r t a i n p u b l i c records, that the ore tenus applicable. i n Part -- t u r n on o r a l that certain of that ultimately deeds, the and t h e l e g a l i m p o r t o f t h e not b e l i e v e the ore tenus
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