Wallace v. Belleview Properties Corp.
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Dr. Stephen L. Wallace appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation ("the defendants"). In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years. In 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, but that they were not. Wallace asserted that, as a result of reported water leaks that were left unrepaired, the office was infested with toxic mold. Therefore, he had to close his practice to avoid exposing his employees and his patients to the toxic mold. The defendants successfully filed a motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. In 2010, Wallace filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that Wallace did not timely file his notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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rel: 12/21/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 1100902 Dr. Stephen L. Wallace v. Belleview Properties Corporation e t a l . Appeal from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t Bessemer D i v i s i o n (CV-05-1619) WISE, Court, Justice. Dr. defendant Stephen below, L. Wallace, appeals from the plaintiff/counterclaima summary judgment ofthe 1100902 Jefferson Circuit Corporation, in L.P., We August 1991, Property shopping was renewed a second time center December 22, collectively leased office in Fairfield, A r o u n d 1996, and Management as "the Procedural History Shopping Center the ("IPF"), appeal. Wallace dental practice. Properties Partnership Infinity d i s m i s s the his On Belleview Limited and F a c t s and Belleview of ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to defendants"). In favor IPF/Belleview HR/Belleview, Corporation Court the space in the A l a b a m a , t o use for defendants renewed W a l l a c e ' s lease. purchased The i n 2003 f o r a t e r m o f f i v e 2005, Wallace sued the lease years. defendants, 1 a l l e g i n g f r a u d and s u p p r e s s i o n ; n e g l i g e n c e ; w a n t o n n e s s ; b r e a c h of contract; unjust enrichment; s u p e r v i s i o n , and r e t e n t i o n . Wallace and negligent training, alleged that, during the t e r m o f t h e l e a s e , he r e p o r t e d v a r i o u s m a i n t e n a n c e p r o b l e m s t o the defendants. assured him that He a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e d e f e n d a n t s the p r o b l e m s w o u l d be taken care of, they W a l l a c e a l s o named K e n n e t h R o s e n , an o f f i c e r o r manager o f one o r more o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s , as a d e f e n d a n t . The t r i a l c o u r t u l t i m a t e l y e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f R o s e n , and W a l l a c e does n o t c h a l l e n g e t h a t j u d g m e n t i n t h i s a p p e a l . 1 2 1100902 were not. Wallace asserted that, as a r e s u l t of reported w a t e r l e a k s t h a t were l e f t u n r e p a i r e d , t h e o f f i c e was i n f e s t e d with t o x i c mold. Therefore, he a s s e r t e d , i n A p r i l closed h i s p r a c t i c e to avoid exposing patients to the t o x i c The defendants Wallace h i s employees and h i s mold. filed answers asserted a f f i r m a t i v e defenses. a l l e g i n g breach 2005, he to the complaint A l s o , IPF f i l e d a c o u n t e r c l a i m of contract, e s s e n t i a l l y seeking unpaid answered the and counterclaim, alleging that rent. he was c o n s t r u c t i v e l y e v i c t e d from t h e premises because o f t h e mold i n f e s t a t i o n and a s s e r t i n g d e f e n s e s t o IPF's counterclaim. On A u g u s t 28, 2009, t h e d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d summary j u d g m e n t as t o W a l l a c e ' s claims a motion f o r a against them. On S e p t e m b e r 11, 2009, I P F f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t on i t s c o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t W a l l a c e . trial On J a n u a r y 20, 2010, t h e c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n s f o r a summary judgment. On January 27, 2010, t h e t r i a l granting the defendants' Wallace's court entered an order m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t as t o c l a i m s a g a i n s t them. The t r i a l j u d g m e n t as t o a l l c l a i m s f i l e d b y W a l l a c e 3 court c e r t i f i e d the as f i n a l pursuant 1100902 to Rule was 54(b), taking A l a . R. IPF's motion c o u n t e r c l a i m under On court order and to to P. for Finally, 2 a i t stated that i t summary j u d g m e n t as 2010, Wallace f i l e d reconsider s e t the or matter vacate a motion asking i t s January for a hearing. f i l e d a motion i n o p p o s i t i o n to Wallace's 27, The IPF's 15, 2010, motion for the a trial summary court motion. conducted judgment on its a On hearing on counterclaim the t r i a l c o u r t the a on summary e x p l a i n i n g as f o l l o w s : "The case s h o u l d be there serious is 2 a tried and judgment denied counterclaim, Court i s of the o p i n i o n t h a t heard because the question R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. the trial 2010. On December 27, 2010, for 2010, The against Wallace. motion of C i v . P., Court notes constructive eviction this that and provides, i n relevant p a r t : "When more t h a n one c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i s p r e s e n t e d i n an a c t i o n , whether as a claim, counterclaim, c r o s s - c l a i m , o r t h i r d - p a r t y c l a i m , o r when m u l t i p l e p a r t i e s a r e i n v o l v e d , t h e c o u r t may d i r e c t t h e e n t r y o f a f i n a l j u d g m e n t as t o one o r more b u t f e w e r t h a n a l l o f t h e c l a i m s o r p a r t i e s o n l y upon an express d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y and upon an e x p r e s s d i r e c t i o n f o r the e n t r y of judgment." 4 the defendants c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n on A p r i l 27, December to i t s advisement. F e b r u a r y 11, trial Civ. 1100902 promissory estoppel counterclaim." "Any other February of 2011, are specifically result, order defense 2010, hearing asked on M a r c h hereby Wallace t h e December 27, a a of the I n t h a t order, the t r i a l motions 14, During as plaintiff to said court also s t a t e d : o v e r r u l e d and denied." On f i l e d a request f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n order. on March 21, 2011, counsel for t h a t t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m be d i s m i s s e d . 21, of d i s m i s s a l 2011, i n the the case. a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t on May 2, trial court entered Wallace a IPF As a final f i l e d a n o t i c e of 2011. Discussion In his jurisdiction appeal of appeal and in the statement c o u r t ' s M a r c h 21, However, he h i s b r i e f to t h i s 2011, f i n a l order of c a t e g o r i z e s h i s a r g u m e n t s as f o l l o w s Court: 1. "The t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r g r a n t i n g p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t was i n e r r o r b e c a u s e g e n u i n e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t . " 2. "The t r i a l c o u r t ' s December 27, 2010, o r d e r denying r e l i e f under Rule 60 was an abuse of discretion." was of i n h i s b r i e f to t h i s Court, Wallace purports to from the t r i a l dismissal. in notice 3. "The T r i a l C o u r t ' s R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n e f f e c t i v e or, i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , the r u l e 5 1100902 a d o p t e d i n A l l e n v. B r i g g s , 60 So. 3d 899 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 1 0 ) , s h o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d o r m o d i f i e d b a s e d on t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e . " Also, i n t h e summary o f t h e a r g u m e n t p o r t i o n o f h i s b r i e f t o this Court, Wallace states: "This appeal is filed to c h a l l e n g e an e r r o n e o u s g r a n t o f summary j u d g m e n t , d e n i a l o f a Rule 60 m o t i o n , a n d an i m p r o p e r certification." challenging Therefore, and i n e f f e c t i v e i t i s clear that t h e summary j u d g m e n t t h e t r i a l Rule 54(b) Wallace is court entered i n f a v o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s on J a n u a r y 27, 2010, a n d t h e d e n i a l o f his motion f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , r a t h e r than the t r i a l c o u r t ' s March 21, 2011, f i n a l The appeal order of d i s m i s s a l . defendants argue t h a t t h i s Court s h o u l d d i s m i s s t h i s as u n t i m e l y . Specifically, they contend that the n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was f i l e d more t h a n 42 d a y s a f t e r t h e t r i a l court certified t h e summary judgment on Wallace's a g a i n s t them as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) . claims The d e f e n d a n t s a l s o a s s e r t t h a t , i f W a l l a c e ' s m o t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r was filed p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59, i t was d e n i e d b y o p e r a t i o n o f l a w a f t e r 90 d a y s , a n d t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was n o t f i l e d w i t h i n 42 d a y s after that denial. Finally, they a l l e g e that, i f Wallace's m o t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r was f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , i t was 6 1100902 d e n i e d on December 27, 2010, and t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was not filed that the within defendants With 42 days after date. We agree with that Wallace's appeal i s untimely. regard to 4 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. App. when P., an appeal should be taken, Rule provides: " E x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d h e r e i n , i n a l l c a s e s i n w h i c h an a p p e a l i s p e r m i t t e d by l a w as o f r i g h t t o t h e supreme c o u r t o r t o a c o u r t o f a p p e a l s , t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l r e q u i r e d by R u l e 3 [ , A l a . R. App. P.,] s h a l l be f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h i n 42 d a y s (6 weeks) o f t h e d a t e o f t h e e n t r y of the judgment or o r d e r a p p e a l e d from " With r e g a r d to t o l l i n g the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of appeal, Rule 4 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. App. P., provides: "The f i l i n g o f a p o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e s 50, 52, 55 o r 59 o f t h e A l a b a m a R u l e s o f C i v i l Procedure ( [ A l a . R. C i v . P.]) s h a l l s u s p e n d the running of the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l . I n c a s e s where p o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n s a r e f i l e d , t h e f u l l time f i x e d f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of appeal s h a l l be computed f r o m t h e d a t e o f t h e e n t r y i n t h e c i v i l d o c k e t o f an o r d e r g r a n t i n g o r d e n y i n g s u c h m o t i o n . I f s u c h p o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n i s deemed d e n i e d u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f R u l e 59.1 o f t h e A l a b a m a R u l e s o f C i v i l Procedure, then the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l s h a l l be computed f r o m t h e d a t e o f d e n i a l of s u c h m o t i o n by o p e r a t i o n o f l a w , as p r o v i d e d f o r i n R u l e 59.1." With regard to postjudgment Ala. R. C i v . P., motions i n c i v i l cases, Rule provides, i n relevant 7 part: 59, 1100902 "(e) M o t i o n t o A l t e r , Amend, o r V a c a t e a Judgment. A m o t i o n t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e t h e j u d g m e n t s h a l l be f i l e d n o t l a t e r t h a n t h i r t y (30) days a f t e r e n t r y o f t h e j u d g m e n t . " Finally, R u l e 5 9 . 1 , A l a . R. C i v . P., p r o v i d e s : "No p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e s 50, 52, 55, o r 59 s h a l l r e m a i n p e n d i n g i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r more t h a n n i n e t y (90) d a y s , u n l e s s w i t h the express consent of a l l the p a r t i e s , which consent s h a l l appear o f r e c o r d , or u n l e s s extended b y t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o w h i c h an a p p e a l o f t h e j u d g m e n t w o u l d l i e , a n d s u c h t i m e may be f u r t h e r e x t e n d e d f o r g o o d c a u s e shown. A f a i l u r e by the t r i a l c o u r t t o r e n d e r an o r d e r d i s p o s i n g o f a n y pending postjudgment motion within the time p e r m i t t e d hereunder, o r any e x t e n s i o n t h e r e o f , s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a d e n i a l o f s u c h m o t i o n as o f t h e d a t e o f the e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e p e r i o d . " As t h e d e f e n d a n t s n o t e , W a l l a c e c l e a r l y f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of a p p e a l more t h a n the 42 days after the t r i a l court certified summary j u d g m e n t i n t h e i r f a v o r as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) on J a n u a r y 27, 2010. However, on F e b r u a r y 11, 2010, Wallace f i l e d a motion a s k i n g the t r i a l court t o r e c o n s i d e r or vacate i t s January 27, 2010, c o n s i d e r e d a postjudgment motion order. I f that to alter, motion is amend, o r v a c a t e f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59, i t was d e n i e d b y o p e r a t i o n o f l a w 90 d a y s rule not after i t was f i l e d , on i t w i t h i n extended. 90 days Wallace because the t r i a l court d i d not and t h e time f o r r u l i n g d i d not f i l e 8 h i s notice on i t was of appeal 1100902 within 42 days after a postjudgment appeal i s not denied by T h e r e f o r e , i f the motion to r e c o n s i d e r o p e r a t i o n of law. was motion the date filed the pursuant motion to Rule filed because, pursuant to Rule he s a y s , he s o u g h t inadvertence, surprise, was filed 59, pursuant 60(b) , relief motion to r e c o n s i d e r rather than or excusable n e g l e c t . to Rule 60(b) had expired Housing Auth. Civ. (Ala. App. and C i v . App. See a l s o 2009) not time motions those filed 59, I f the not Rule 59.1, i t was 676 2d 344, " i t was after 90 Conway filed." So. motion v. 345 (Ala. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 38 So. 3d 54, ("[T]he 90-day p e r i o d 63 for ruling on a n n o u n c e d i n R u l e 59.1, A l a . R. C i v . P., a p p l i e s only to motions and the of Birmingham D i s t . , 1996) . postjudgment from Rule as t h e r e s u l t o f m i s t a k e , n o t d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n o f l a w p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59.1 days Wallace's timely. Wallace argues t h a t h i s postjudgment was was f i l e d u n d e r R u l e s 50, 52, 55, and under Rule 60(b)."). However, e v e n i f W a l l a c e ' s m o t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r was a p o s t j u d g m e n t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 60, i t was 59, motion d e n i e d on December 27, 2010, filed and W a l l a c e d i d n o t f i l e h i s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w i t h i n 42 d a y s a f t e r 9 1100902 that date. 3 T h e r e f o r e , whether Wallace's motion t o r e c o n s i d e r constituted a pursuant Rule to postjudgment 60, motion his notice pursuant of appeal to Rule was 59 not or timely filed. I n what i s a p p a r e n t l y an a t t e m p t t o a v o i d a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t h i s appeal i s u n t i m e l y , Wallace argues t h a t , because the issues presented issues i n IPF's certification argues, in his were c o u n t e r c l a i m , the i n this the time claims c a s e was for filing an intertwined trial with c o u r t ' s Rule improper; therefore, appeal d i d not 54(b) Wallace start to u n t i l a l l t h e c l a i m s i n t h e c a s e were d i s p o s e d o f by t h e c o u r t ' s M a r c h 21, 2011, the run trial order dismissing IPF's counterclaim. We recognize that Wallace filed a request for c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e December 27, 2010, o r d e r on F e b r u a r y 14, 2011. However, 3 "[a]fter a t r i a l c o u r t has d e n i e d a postjudgment m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , t h a t c o u r t does n o t have jurisdiction to entertain a successive postjudgment motion to ' r e c o n s i d e r ' or o t h e r w i s e r e v i e w i t s o r d e r d e n y i n g t h e R u l e 60(b) m o t i o n , and such a s u c c e s s i v e postjudgment motion does not suspend the r u n n i n g of the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l . " Ex p a r t e K e i t h , 771 even assuming t h a t clarification did f i l i n g a n o t i c e of So. 2d 1018, 1022 ( A l a . 1998) . T h e r e f o r e , i t was t i m e l y f i l e d , W a l l a c e ' s r e q u e s t f o r not suspend the running of the time f o r a p p e a l f r o m t h e December 27, 2010, o r d e r . 10 1100902 In Allen 2010), v. B r i g g s , t h e Alabama rejected a similar 60 So. 3d 899, 903-05 Court Appeals of Civil c o n t e n t i o n , r e a s o n i n g as ( A l a . C i v . App. addressed follows: " A l l e n f i r s t a t t e m p t s t o c h a l l e n g e t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f EBMC. However, t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f EBMC was e x p r e s s l y made a f i n a l j u d g m e n t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., by t h e i n c l u s i o n o f some o f t h e l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t r u l e i n t h e summary-judgment o r d e r . See Sho-Me M o t o r L o d g e s , I n c . v. J e h l e - S l a u s o n C o n s t r . Co., 4 66 So. 2d 83, 87 ( A l a . 1985) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t ' [ t ] h e C o u r t f u r t h e r f i n d s t h e r e i s no j u s t reason f o r delay i n the e n t r y of s a i d f i n a l j u d g m e n t ' was s u f f i c i e n t t o make a j u d g m e n t f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) ); s e e a l s o S c h n e i d e r N a t ' l C a r r i e r s , I n c . v. T i n n e y , 776 So. 2d 753, 755 ( A l a . 2000) ( n o t i n g t h a t ' i f i t i s c l e a r a n d o b v i o u s f r o m t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n i t s o r d e r that the court intended to enter a f i n a l order p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , t h e n we w i l l t r e a t t h e o r d e r as a f i n a l j u d g m e n t ' e v e n t h o u g h t h e o r d e r may n o t c o n t a i n a l l the language i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i t i s , i n f a c t , an o r d e r d i r e c t i n g t h e e n t r y o f a final judgment). A l t h o u g h A l l e n a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t a R u l e 5 4 ( b ) c e r t i f i c a t i o n was n o t p r o p e r i n t h i s c a s e , we have h e l d t h a t he i s p r e c l u d e d f r o m r a i s i n g t h a t i s s u e now, b e c a u s e , i n s o f a r as h i s a p p e a l i s f r o m t h e summary-judgment o r d e r , h i s a p p e a l comes t o o l a t e , h a v i n g b e e n f i l e d more t h a n 42 d a y s a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f t h e summary-judgment o r d e r on J u l y 31, 2009. See L a r y v. G a r d e n e r , 908 So. 2d 955, 957 n.1 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2005) ( c i t i n g B a g l e y v. Mazda M o t o r C o r p . , 864 So. 2d 301, 316-17 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ) ; s e e a l s o Ex p a r t e K i n g , 776 So. 2d 31, 38 ( A l a . 2000) ( L y o n s , J., concurring specially) (indicating that, i n J u s t i c e L y o n s ' s o p i n i o n , t h e remedy f o r a p a r t y who believes that a Rule 54(b) certification is defective i s to 'timely f i l [ e ] a p e t i t i o n f o r a writ of mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e t r i a l j u d g e t o s e t a s i d e 11 and 1100902 the Rule 54(b) certification, possibly as an a l t e r n a t i v e remedy s o u g h t a t t h e same t i m e as an a p p e a l i s t a k e n f r o m t h e o r d e r p u r p o r t e d l y made f i n a l by t h e R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n ' ) . " D e s p i t e our h o l d i n g i n L a r y , the d i s s e n t argues that a p a r t y s h o u l d be permitted to raise a c h a l l e n g e t o a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n on a p p e a l from a s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r e d judgment. 60 So. 3d a t 908. The d i s s e n t a t t e m p t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h L a r y on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f i n L a r y d i d n o t have a v a l i d c h a l l e n g e t o t h e R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 60 So. 3d a t 908. However, i n L a r y we d i d n o t d i s c u s s t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s s u e ; i n s t e a d , we c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t the c h a l l e n g e to the Rule 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n w o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d b e c a u s e t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s ' c h a l l e n g e s a r e u n t i m e l y b e c a u s e he d i d not f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal w i t h r e s p e c t t o [ t h e R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e summary] j u d g m e n t w i t h i n 42 d a y s o f i t s e n t r y . ' L a r y , 908 So. 2d a t 957 n.1. "However, t h e d i s s e n t ' s a p p r o a c h i s n o t w i t h o u t support. An appellate court may raise the i m p r o p r i e t y o f a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n ex mero motu when t h a t j u d g m e n t i s p r e s e n t e d i n a t i m e l y appeal. G r e g o r y v. F e r g u s o n , 10 So. 3d 596, 597 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2008) . The r i g h t o f an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r ex mero motu t h e p r o p r i e t y o f a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n stems f r o m i t s power t o d e t e r m i n e i t s own j u r i s d i c t i o n , w h i c h jurisdiction f l o w s , i n p a r t , from the t i m e l y a p p e a l from a f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t . See D z w o n k o w s k i v. S o n i t r o l o f M o b i l e , I n c . , 892 So. 2d 354, 361 ( A l a . 2004) ( s t a t i n g , i n an o p i n i o n d i s m i s s i n g an a p p e a l b a s e d on an i m p r o p e r use o f a R u l e 54(b) certification, t h a t ' a l l p a r t i e s have o v e r l o o k e d a f u n d a m e n t a l f l a w i n these a p p e l l a t e proceedings t h e a b s e n c e o f an a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t ' ) ; G r e g o r y , 10 So. 3d a t 597 ('However, t h i s c o u r t may c o n s i d e r [ t h e ] i s s u e [ o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n ] ex mero motu b e c a u s e t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r a j u d g m e n t o r 12 1100902 o r d e r i s s u f f i c i e n t l y f i n a l t o s u p p o r t an a p p e a l i s jurisdictional.'). Thus, i f a Rule 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d t o have been i m p r o p e r l y e n t e r e d , t h e j u d g m e n t so c e r t i f i e d i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be n o n f i n a l a n d t h e r e f o r e u n a b l e t o s u p p o r t an appeal. D z w o n k o w s k i , 892 So. 2d a t 3 6 1 . I f t h a t i s t h e c a s e , a n d an i m p r o p e r l y c e r t i f i e d judgment i s not a final j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e o f an improper certification, why s h o u l d an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t be precluded from c o n s i d e r i n g , on a p p e a l f r o m t h e judgment r e s o l v i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g c l a i m o r c l a i m s , the p r o p r i e t y of the c e r t i f i c a t i o n and, i f t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n was i m p r o p e r , t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g i n t e r l o c u t o r y judgment? "Our r e s e a r c h h a s r e v e a l e d t h a t o n l y two f e d e r a l a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have c o n s i d e r e d t h i s p r e c i s e i s s u e and that those two courts reached opposite conclusions. See I n r e L i n d s a y , 59 F.3d 942, 951 ( 9 t h C i r . 1995) ( h o l d i n g t h a t '[a] R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , r i g h t o r wrong, s t a r t s t h e t i m e f o r a p p e a l r u n n i n g ' ) , a n d Page v. P r e i s s e r , 585 F.2d 336, 338 ( 8 t h C i r . 1978) ( h o l d i n g t h a t 'when a district court erroneously c e r t i f i e s a c l a i m as a p p r o p r i a t e f o r immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), a p a r t y may r a i s e t h a t c l a i m i n a t i m e l y a p p e a l f r o m an a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n on t h e r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s i n t h e lawsuit'). A l t h o u g h we comprehend t h e r e a s o n i n g b e h i n d t h e r u l e a n n o u n c e d i n Page, w h i c h h i n g e s on t h e i d e a t h a t an e r r o n e o u s l y c e r t i f i e d j u d g m e n t i s , i n f a c t , n o t a f i n a l j u d g m e n t a t a l l , Page, 585 F.2d a t 338, we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e b e t t e r c o u r s e i s t o require that a party seeking to challenge the p r o p r i e t y o f a R u l e 5 4 ( b ) c e r t i f i c a t i o n do s o i n a t i m e l y a p p e a l from t h e c e r t i f i e d judgment. As explained i n In re Lindsay, '[t]his avoids u n c e r t a i n t y f o r c o u n s e l a b o u t when t o a p p e a l . ' In r e L i n d s a y , 59 F.3d a t 951. "Alabama l a w i s w e l l s e t t l e d -- ' [ a ] j u d g m e n t c e r t i f i e d by a t r i a l c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) i s a f i n a l a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t [ , and] t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 13 1100902 t r i g g e r s t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e 42-day a p p e a l p e r i o d . ' L e w i s v. S t a t e , 463 So. 2d 154, 155 ( A l a . 1985) . To a l l o w a l a t e r a p p e a l of a judgment c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) i n t h o s e circumstances in which a party desires to argue that the certification was improper injects uncertainty r e g a r d i n g t h e t i m e t o a p p e a l and t h e f i n a l i t y o f judgments. I f a j u d g m e n t c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l may be appealed at a l a t e r date, the p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i s l e f t i n l i m b o , u n c e r t a i n whether the judgment i n i t s f a v o r i s , i n f a c t , f i n a l or whether i t might, at the time the remaining c l a i m or c l a i m s i n the a c t i o n are resolved, be rendered ineffective because the a p p e l l a t e court determines t h a t the Rule 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n was i m p r o p e r . I n a d d i t i o n , i f a p a r t y w a i t s t o a p p e a l the c e r t i f i e d judgment because i t believes that the certification was improperly g r a n t e d , t h a t p a r t y r i s k s an a p p e l l a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n was, i n f a c t , p r o p e r l y made, w i t h the r e s u l t i n g f o r e c l o s u r e of the r i g h t to a p p e a l r e g a r d i n g the c e r t i f i e d judgment. See 15A Charles A. Wright et a l . Federal Practice & P r o c e d u r e § 3914.7 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining that, typically, i f a party fails t o appeal from a j u d g m e n t c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , Fed. R. C i v . P., t h e r i g h t t o r e v i e w i s l o s t and s t a t i n g t h a t 'a p a r t y who b e l i e v e s t h a t a j u d g m e n t was i m p r o p e r l y e n t e r e d w o u l d be b e t t e r a d v i s e d t o t a k e a p r o t e c t i v e a p p e a l and u r g e t h a t t h e a p p e a l be dismissed'). We t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t t h e r u l e a n n o u n c e d i n Page and, consistent with Lary, embrace the h o l d i n g i n In re L i n d s a y . Thus, i n s o f a r as A l l e n ' s a p p e a l r e l a t e s t o t h e summary j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f EBMC, t h e a p p e a l i s d i s m i s s e d . 3 II " Of course, the time f o r appeal would be s u s p e n d e d by a t i m e l y f i l e d p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n directed to the certified judgment, see Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. ('The filing of a p o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e s 50, 52, 55 o r 3 14 1100902 59 o f t h e A l a b a m a R u l e s o f C i v i l Procedure ... f i l i n g a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l . ' ) , and, t h e r e f o r e , i n those circumstances, the time f o r appeal would e x p i r e upon t h e g r a n t o r d e n i a l o f t h e p o s t j u d g m e n t motion." (Footnote omitted.) Wallace argues because t h a t 54(b) that c a s e was certification he should not be bound d e c i d e d s e v e r a l months a f t e r was entered i n this case. by Allen the Rule However, h i s argument i s n o t w e l l t a k e n b e c a u s e t h i s C o u r t and t h e C o u r t o f Civil Appeals cases. this had applied I n L e w i s v. Court pursuant stated: to Rule certification State, "A 54(b) triggers the 463 same So. judgment 2d 154, certified is a final the reasoning 155 by i n previous ( A l a . 1985), a trial court a p p e a l a b l e judgment; running of the 42-day the appeal period." In 2003), as Bagley v. Mazda Motor Corp., t h i s Court addressed a s i t u a t i o n 864 So. 2d 301 (Ala. s i m i l a r to Wallace's follows: "The B a g l e y s ' f i n a l a r g u m e n t i s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g a summary j u d g m e n t f o r Creekside r e g a r d i n g the fraud claim. Creekside a r g u e s t h a t t h e B a g l e y s ' a p p e a l on t h i s c l a i m was untimely. We n o t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n i t i a l l y e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t f o r C r e e k s i d e on May 11, 1998, and s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t i t was c e r t i f y i n g t h a t j u d g m e n t as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . 15 1100902 R. C i v . P. The c o u r t amended i t s summary-judgment o r d e r on May 21, 1998, t o c l a r i f y t h a t t h e May 11 j u d g m e n t c o v e r e d o n l y t h e f r a u d c l a i m . On J u l y 14, 1998, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an 'Amended O r d e r Nunc P r o Tunc,' a g a i n e n t e r i n g a p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t for Creekside on the fraud claim, and again certifying t h e j u d g m e n t as f i n a l . Rule 54(b) states, i n pertinent part: "'When more t h a n one c l a i m f o r r e l i e f i s p r e s e n t e d i n an a c t i o n , ... t h e c o u r t may d i r e c t t h e e n t r y o f a f i n a l j u d g m e n t as t o one o r more b u t f e w e r t h a n a l l o f t h e c l a i m s o r p a r t i e s o n l y upon an e x p r e s s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y and upon an e x p r e s s d i r e c t i o n f o r the e n t r y of judgment.' " R u l e 4, A l a . R. App. P., p r o v i d e s , i n r e l e v a n t p a r t , t h a t , ' i n a l l c a s e s i n w h i c h an a p p e a l i s p e r m i t t e d by l a w ... t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l r e q u i r e d by R u l e 3 s h a l l be f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h i n 42 d a y s (6 weeks) o f t h e d a t e o f t h e e n t r y of the judgment or o r d e r a p p e a l e d from ' "In opposing Creekside's t i m e l i n e s s challenge, the Bagleys c i t e Brown v. W h i t a k e r C o n t r a c t i n g C o r p . , 681 So. 2d 226 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1996) . In Brown, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t and c e r t i f i e d i t as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. The C o u r t o f C i v i l Appeals h e l d t h a t genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t e d as t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m . The C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s went on t o s t a t e : "'The t r i a l court, i n i t s order, should l i s t the f a c t o r s which i t c o n s i d e r e d i n r e a c h i n g i t s d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g whether to certify the judgment, p u r s u a n t t o Rule 54(b), i n order t h a t the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i s b e t t e r equipped to review the t r i a l c o u r t ' s action 16 1100902 "'... H e r e a f t e r , i f a trial court should f a i l to l i s t the f a c t o r s considered, t h e n t h e c a s e w i l l be r e t u r n e d s o t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t can l i s t t h o s e f a c t o r s . ' "681 So. 2d a t 229. I n S c h n e i d e r N a t i o n a l C a r r i e r s , I n c . v. T i n n e y , 776 So. 2d 753, 755 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , t h i s C o u r t e x p r e s s l y o v e r r u l e d Brown, p o i n t i n g o u t : "'We h e l d i n Sho-Me [Motor L o d g e s , I n c . v. J e h l e - S l a u s o n C o n s t r u c t i o n Co., 466 So. 2d 83 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) , ] t h a t i f i t i s c l e a r a n d obvious from t h e language used by t h e t r i a l court i n i t s order that the court intended to enter a f i n a l order pursuant t o Rule 5 4 ( b ) , t h e n we w i l l t r e a t t h e o r d e r as a f i n a l judgment ' " I n S c h n e i d e r , we f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t ' [ n ] o t h i n g i n Rule 54(b) r e q u i r e s findings to buttress the c o n c l u s i o n " t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y . " A l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d i s an " e x p r e s s d e t e r m i n a t i o n . " ' 776 So. 2d a t 755-56. "The B a g l e y s a r g u e t h a t r e l y i n g on Brown t h e y ' t o o k no a c t i o n t o a p p e a l s a i d O r d e r as u n d e r t h e l a w a t t h a t t i m e i t c o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d a f i n a l o r d e r s i n c e t h e Judgment m e r e l y s t a t e d t h a t i t was "a f i n a l Summary Judgment" a n d t h a t t h e r e was no j u s t reason f o r delay.' However, Brown p r o v i d e d that i f the t r i a l court f a i l e d t o l i s t the factors considered i n certifying a judgment as final p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , t h e c a s e w o u l d be remanded for the t r i a l court to l i s t the factors. The a p p r o a c h a d v o c a t e d i n Brown was n o t reasonably subject t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n that the court's order was n o t a f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e o r d e r b e c a u s e i t l a c k e d c e r t a i n p h r a s e o l o g y ; i n order f o r t h e case p r o p e r l y t o be remanded, r a t h e r t h a n t h e a p p e a l ' s j u s t b e i n g d i s m i s s e d , t h e j u d g m e n t w o u l d have t o be one t h a t w o u l d s u p p o r t an a p p e a l . I n Ex p a r t e P r i t c h e t t , 812 So. 2d 1157 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , t h i s C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e 17 1100902 e f f e c t o f Brown and n o t e d t h a t a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n i n Brown, 'the Court of Civil Appeals routinely remanded c a s e s t h a t d i d n o t meet t h e l e v e l of s p e c i f i c i t y r e q u i r e d by Brown.' 812 So. 2d a t 1158. "In the present case, the 42-day period p r e s c r i b e d by R u l e 4, A l a . R. App. P., f o r f i l i n g an a p p e a l b e g a n t o r u n on J u l y 14, 1998, a t t h e l a t e s t , t h e day t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r nunc p r o tunc, which, for the second time, expressly c e r t i f i e d t h e p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f C r e e k s i d e as t o t h e f r a u d c l a i m as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o Rule 54(b). Even i f C r e e k s i d e h a d n o t p o i n t e d o u t the u n t i m e l i n e s s of the appeal of t h a t r u l i n g , ' [ i ] t i s the duty of t h i s Court to take n o t i c e of the f i l i n g d a t e o f an a p p e a l and, i f f i n d i n g t h e a p p e a l t o be u n t i m e l y , t o d i s m i s s i t ex mero motu. Stewart v. Y o u n g e r , 375 So. 2d 428 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) . ' L e w i s v. State, 463 So. 2d 154, 155 ( A l a . 1985) . The B a g l e y s ' n o t i c e o f a p p e a l , f i l e d on A p r i l 29, 2002, a l m o s t f o u r y e a r s a f t e r t h e p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t was l a s t c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l , i s u n t i m e l y as t o t h a t p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t and t h e B a g l e y s ' appeal from t h a t p a r t i a l judgment i s d i s m i s s e d . " Bagley, 864 So. 2d a t 315-17. A l s o , i n L a r y v. G a r d e n e r , 908 So. 2d 955 2005), sued Farm Bureau, t h a t damaged h i s v e h i c l e . Gardener's He automobile-liability i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r , a l l e g i n g t h a t i t had a c t e d i n b a d failing App. L a r y sued Gardener, a l l e g i n g n e g l i g e n c e i n c o n n e c t i o n with a motor-vehicle c o l l i s i o n also (Ala. Civ. faith by t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e c o l l i s i o n and t o pay b e n e f i t s u n d e r Gardener's policy. Farm Lary's claims against i t . Bureau On filed June 30, 18 a motion to dismiss 2003, t h e t r i a l court 1100902 entered a judgment i n Farm Bureau's favor and d i r e c t e d t h e e n t r y o f a f i n a l j u d g m e n t as t o a l l c l a i m s a g a i n s t F a r m B u r e a u pursuant t o Rule 54(b), the trial court entered G a r d e n e r , and L a r y On favor appeal, A l a . R. C i v . P. a summary Lary attempted to challenge t o those claims. those claims judgment in f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l on May o f F a r m B u r e a u and t h e R u l e regard On A p r i l as u n t i m e l y , 54(b) 12, 2004, favor of 20, 2004. t h e judgment i n certification with The C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s r e j e c t e d holding: " A l t h o u g h L a r y has a s s e r t e d i n h i s b r i e f s t o t h i s c o u r t t h a t t h a t j u d g m e n t , and t h e d i r e c t i o n o f the e n t r y of a f i n a l judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , were e r r o n e o u s , h i s c h a l l e n g e s a r e u n t i m e l y b e c a u s e he d i d n o t f i l e a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h a t j u d g m e n t w i t h i n 42 d a y s o f i t s entry. See B a g l e y v. Mazda M o t o r C o r p . , 864 So. 2d 301, 315-17 ( A l a . 2003) ( h o l d i n g t h a t an a p p e a l t a k e n a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f a judgment d i s p o s i n g o f a l l remaining c l a i m s and p a r t i e s was i n e f f e c t i v e t o secure appellate review o f a judgment entered p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) s e v e r a l y e a r s b e f o r e h a n d , despite the contention that the Rule 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n h a d been i m p r o p e r ) . " Lary, 908 So. 2d a t 957 n.1. B o t h B a g l e y and L a r y certifications cases, were the courts i n v o l v e d a r g u m e n t s t h a t R u l e 54(b) improper found and that invalid. the Rule 54(b) Also, certification c o u l d n o t be c h a l l e n g e d a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f o t h e r 19 i n both proceedings 1100902 i n t h e c a s e b e c a u s e t h e a p p e a l s were u n t i m e l y f i l e d . the d e c i s i o n i n A l l e n was the f i r s t time the Court of A p p e a l s r e f e r e n c e d I n r e L i n d s a y , 59 F.3d 942 it was not the f i r s t time t h a t decision decision i n L a r y and by t h i s Bagley. in Allen Therefore, we was c o u r t had r e f u s e d t o hear supported by Court's decisions reject Civil (9th C i r . 1995), u n t i m e l y a p p e a l f r o m a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n . court's Although Wallace's an Rather, that i t s previous i n Lewis argument and that he s h o u l d n o t be b o u n d by t h e h o l d i n g i n A l l e n . In the a l t e r n a t i v e , Wallace argues t h a t the r u l e adopted i n A l l e n s h o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d o r m o d i f i e d b a s e d on t h e f a c t s of this case. Wallace also argues that the A l l e n opinion makes i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s s u p p o r t f o r h i s argument t h a t an appellate Rule c o u r t s h o u l d be a b l e t o r e v i e w t h e p r o p r i e t y 54(b) certification on an appeal from a of a judgment r e s o l v i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s i n t h e c a s e , and he u r g e s us t o f o l l o w Page v. P r e i s s e r , 585 F.2d 336 than In re Lindsay. (8th C i r . 1978), rather A l t h o u g h t h e r e may be some s u p p o r t f o r a d i f f e r e n t f i n d i n g , i n i t so p i n i o n i n A l l e n the Court of C i v i l Appeals clearly "reject[ing] and concisely explained i t s reasons for t h e r u l e a n n o u n c e d i n Page and, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 20 1100902 Lary, embrac[ing] 905. the holding i n In re Lindsay." We a g r e e w i t h t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l the p o l i c y considerations i n Allen Appeals' 60 So. 3d a t analysis of and w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n that court reached i n A l l e n . "The f i l i n g of a t i m e l y n o t i c e of appeal i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a c t . L e w i s v. S t a t e , 463 So. 2d 154, 155 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) . 'A j u d g m e n t c e r t i f i e d b y a t r i a l c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54(b) i s a f i n a l a p p e a l a b l e judgment; the c e r t i f i c a t i o n t r i g g e r s the running of t h e 42-day a p p e a l p e r i o d . ' 463 So. 2d a t 1 5 5 . " Painter (Ala. v. McWane C a s t I r o n P i p e Co., 987 So. 2 d 522, 529 2007). "An a p p e a l s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d i f t h e n o t i c e o f appeal was not timely filed t o invoke the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the appellate court." R u l e 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. App. P. When t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r s a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e i s a f a c i a l l y v a l i d o r d e r f r o m which t h e time f o r f i l i n g a notice of appeal s t a r t s We n o t e , a s d i d t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s 3 d a t 904 n.3: 4 So. to run. i n A l l e n , 60 "Of c o u r s e , t h e t i m e f o r a p p e a l w o u l d be s u s p e n d e d by a t i m e l y f i l e d p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n d i r e c t e d t o t h e c e r t i f i e d j u d g m e n t , s e e R u l e 4 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. App. P. ('The f i l i n g o f a p o s t - j u d g m e n t motion p u r s u a n t t o R u l e s 50, 52, 55 o r 59 o f t h e A l a b a m a Rules of C i v i l Procedure ... s h a l l s u s p e n d t h e running o f t h e time for filing a notice of a p p e a l . ' ) , and, t h e r e f o r e , i n those c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e t i m e f o r a p p e a l w o u l d e x p i r e upon t h e g r a n t o r 21 4 1100902 As the U n i t e d States Court of Appeals noted i n In re Lindsay: wrong, starts uncertainty 951. f o r the Ninth Circuit "A R u l e 5 4 ( b ) d e t e r m i n a t i o n , r i g h t o r the time f o r appeal running. This f o r c o u n s e l a b o u t when t o a p p e a l . " avoids 59 F.3d a t Any o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w o u l d e v i s c e r a t e R u l e 5 4 ( b ) a n d render i t meaningless. alternative Therefore, we reject Wallace's argument. Conclusion For the reasons s e t f o r t h h e r e i n , Wallace d i d not t i m e l y file h i s notice of appeal. A c c o r d i n g l y , we appeal f o r lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n . dismiss this See R u l e 2 ( a ) , A l a . R. App. P. ("An a p p e a l s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d i f t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was not t i m e l y f i l e d t o invoke the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the appellate court."). APPEAL DISMISSED. Malone, C . J . , and S t u a r t , P a r k e r , and Main, J J . , concur. Murdock, J . , c o n c u r s Woodall, B o l i n , specially. a n d Shaw, J J . , d i s s e n t . d e n i a l of the postjudgment 22 motion." 1100902 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g specially). I agree w i t h t h e main o p i n i o n . to I write separately first o f f e r i n P a r t A below a r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e main o p i n i o n and for t h e a u t h o r i t i e s upon w h i c h writing support upon consists of additional of our h o l d i n g today. the i t relies. necessarily purposes of execution Part authority Finally, synonymous reasons in i n P a r t C, I comment nature and f i n a l i t y and B of t h i s of finality for f o r purposes of appeal. A. A court's correctness authority to make a decision o f t h a t d e c i s i o n a r e two d i f f e r e n t and things. the The a u t h o r i t y t o make a d e c i s i o n i s n o t d e p e n d e n t upon t h e m a k i n g of a c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n . err, but, unless pursuant of those and addressed i n c l u d i n g any procedures, may temporal the court's stand. Under our Rules specifically determination" i s recognized procedures, that are part decision w i l l is the error to applicable restrictions A court with a u t h o r i t y t o decide of Appellate given Procedure, the t r i a l t h e a u t h o r i t y t o make as t o w h e t h e r there an i s any " j u s t court "express[] reason f o r d e l a y " i n m a k i n g f i n a l an o r d e r t h a t a d j u d i c a t e s a t l e a s t one of, but l e s s than a l l , the claims 23 i n an a c t i o n . Rule 54(b), 1100902 Ala. or R. C i v . P. The an and appellate is the make a " c o r r e c t " decision "erroneous" erroneous t r i a l c o u r t may unless reversed p r o c e d u r e s , the n a t u r e of the but, in determined accordance decision with i t makes w i l l a u t h o r i t y to decision to be established stand. This decide. I n most c a s e s , t h e g r a n t o f a u t h o r i t y t o a t r i a l c o u r t decide i f there grant of authority adjudicated remain i s "no to unreasonable "'that risk H i g h l a n d s of Lay, So. separate whether the cited adjudication of inconsistent claim LLC v. [Ms. would results.'" 3d , therein. Murphree, ( A l a . 2012) I n c . v. R o s e n b e r g , 63 So. cases decide t r a n s l a t e s to a being i s "so c l o s e l y i n t e r t w i n e d " w i t h a c l a i m t h a t pending 2012] j u s t reason f o r delay" 3d 1256, This will pose See, 1110674, A u g u s t that 10, Fair, ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) ) , and i s a decision an e.g., (quoting L i g h t i n g 1263 to requires the the t r i a l c o u r t t o c a r e f u l l y a s s e s s t h e f a c t u a l , as w e l l as legal, issues assess the involved risk of i n the respective inconsistent adjudicated separately. susceptible to judicial d e c i s i o n committed i n the trial claims results Id. review Although for f i r s t place court. 24 if and likewise those claims i t is a i t is error, are decision still to the a u t h o r i t y of a the 1100902 If, not a then, "just a determination reason f o r delay" a u t h o r i t y of the t r i a l that issue decision i s one that c o u r t , a d e c i s i o n b y t h a t c o u r t as t o i s not " i n v a l i d and v o i d " i n t h e same c o u r t h a s no a u t h o r i t y t o make i t . incorrect, therefore, determination to suggest as t o w h e t h e r t h e r e i s "invalid" i s or i s i s w i t h i n the i s v o i d when i t i s made i n a c i r c u m s t a n c e the t r i a l delay" as t o w h e t h e r t h e r e or "void." that a be a i n which The d i s s e n t i s trial i s any " j u s t I t may way court's reason f o r i n c o r r e c t and subject to r e v e r s a l , but i t i s a d e c i s i o n that i s w i t h i n the power o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make, a t l e a s t u n d e r t h e p r e d i c a t e circumstances described i n Rule 54(b), one c l a i m i s p r e s e n t e d i . e . , where more t h a n and t h e t r i a l c o u r t has a d j u d i c a t e d t h e e n t i r e t y o f a t l e a s t one o f , b u t l e s s t h a n a l l , t h o s e claims. 5 T h e p r e d i c a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s d e s c r i b e d i n R u l e 5 4 ( b ) were n o t p r e s e n t i n Page v. P r e i s s e r , 585 F.2d 336 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , d i s c u s s e d i n b o t h t h e m a i n o p i n i o n a n d t h e d i s s e n t . I n Page, t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a s i t u a t i o n where t h e trial c o u r t h a d a t t e m p t e d t o c e r t i f y as f i n a l n o t t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n o f an e n t i r e c l a i m , b u t a d e c i s i o n b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t as t o t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f o n l y one o f s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i e s " proposed by t h e p l a i n t i f f i n support of t h e o n l y c l a i m a l l e g e d i n h e r complaint. As t h e Page c o u r t explained: 5 " I n h e r c o m p l a i n t i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Page s o u g h t t o have c e r t a i n Iowa r e g u l a t i o n s i n v a l i d a t e d . She a s s e r t e d a l t e r n a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r i e s i n 25 1100902 P r o f e s s o r Moore e x p l a i n s t h a t i t i s a j u d g m e n t " e n t e r e d u n d e r t h e a u t h o r i t y o f R u l e 54(b) " t h a t " b e g i n s t h e r u n n i n g o f time to appeal." P r a c t i c e § 54.26[1] according appeal to 10 James William (3d ed. 2012) . P r o f e s s o r Moore, a Rule A p p e l l a t e Rule 54(b) 4(a) Moore's "[a]n not seek aggrieved the time party specifically, e q u i v o c a t i o n as "A R u l e time to e n t r y of not the Professor review of the Moore must permitted a f t e r t h e r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s have b e e n a d j u d i c a t e d . " more Federal Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , judgment w i t h i n and may Moore explains by judgment Id. Even without follows: 54(b) j u d g m e n t b e g i n s t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e appeal r e g a r d l e s s of the p r o p r i e t y of the t h a t judgment. In o t h e r words, whether or c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n e n t e r i n g s u p p o r t o f h e r a r g u m e n t . Her c o m p l a i n t , h o w e v e r , a r o s e o u t o f a s i n g l e t r a n s a c t i o n and a s s e r t e d o n l y a s i n g l e c l a i m . See Edney v. F i d e l i t y & G u a r a n t y L i f e I n s u r a n c e Company, s u p r a , 348 F.2d [136] a t 138 [ ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 6 8 ) ] . As t h e Supreme C o u r t has r e c e n t l y stated: " ' R u l e 54(b) 'does n o t claim action.'" apply to a single 585 F.2d a t 339 ( q u o t i n g L i b e r t y Mut. I n s . Co. v. W e t z e l , 424 U.S. 737, 743 (1976) (emphasis a d d e d ) ) . T h i s may p o i n t t o a b a s i s f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g Page f r o m t h e p r e s e n t c a s e and t h e c a s e s r e l i e d upon by t h e m a i n o p i n i o n , see a l s o n o t e 9, i n f r a , though i t i s not n e c e s s a r y t o f u l l y c o n s i d e r t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y for purposes of t h i s case. 26 1100902 judgment i s i r r e l e v a n t t o the p a r t i e s ' o b l i g a t i o n t o timely appeal." Id. (emphasis added). I t i s t r u e t h a t t h i s C o u r t and t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l repeatedly have acted ex mero was no "just Co. have there reason f o r delay." Mart Stores, Ins. they court i n i t s decision that p e r c e i v e d e r r o r by t h e t r i a l motu Inc., 8 So. 3d o f A l a b a m a , 74 So. when See, or Hammock v. Wal- ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) ; Watson v. 939 Life 3d 470 e.g., we ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011) . t h a t d e c i s i o n w o u l d have meant t h a t t h e final on a p p e a l f o r purposes of found i t necessary determination appropriate error c o u l d not in by the trial arguments that jurisdiction i t s appealability. court, i n the despite have reason c a s e s where we for d e c i s i o n -- delay" although have r e v e r s e d t h e t r i a l d e c i s i o n , we in error 27 have was i s , we never have delay" absence of i t , because implicated to assess the u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t a n t i v e judgment p r e s e n t e d those considered the concerning would appellate court That judgment j u s t reason f o r briefs determination of the "no to underlying i n f a c t p r o p e r l y be to address the We c o u r t as have done s o , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e e r r o r by t h e t r i a l presented Appeals the merits i n the case. c o u r t ' s "no held the that of In just that beyond the a u t h o r i t y or 1100902 the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the t r i a l have found f a u l t w i t h merits have and been not court. To t h e c o n t r a r y , when we t h a t d e c i s i o n , we have done so on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n was able to review d e c i s i o n i t s e l f , on the i t s merits, c a s e t h a t d e c i s i o n i t s e l f has "no just on i t s void. reason for We delay" i n each case because i n each been b r o u g h t w i t h i n the "bosom" o f t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i n a t i m e l y manner. i . e . , w i t h i n t h e day days from the Our Appeals, opinions to discussed quintessentially decision, the of t h a t d e c i s i o n date in and and Part those B below, uniquely final act adjudication the Court therefore reflect Civil the as the final is in imparts that finality claim. of of 54(b) only nature 6 c o u r t as t o t h e c l a i m i t a d d r e s s e s b u t that of of itself. a Rule a d e c i s i o n t h a t not word of the t r i a l fact entry 42 i s intended t o an Ultimately, otherwise nonfinal these opinions e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the f a c t t h a t t h i s i s a are determination S e e g e n e r a l l y G o l l o t t e v. P e t e r b i l t o f M o b i l e , I n c . , 582 So.2d 459, 463 ( A l a . 1991) ("The e n t r y of a f i n a l judgment made a l l r u l i n g s l e a d i n g up t o t h a t j u d g m e n t s u b j e c t to a p p e a l , and an a p p e a l f r o m t h a t j u d g m e n t a l l o w s t h e a p p e l l a n t t o a r g u e on a p p e a l any a l l e g e d e r r o r a t any p o i n t i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s t h a t l e d t o t h a t j u d g m e n t . " ) ; L e w i s v. S t a t e , 4 63 So. 2d 154, 155 ( A l a . 1985) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e 42-day p e r i o d a p p l i c a b l e to a p p e a l s from f i n a l judgments runs from t h e d a t e o f e n t r y o f t h e R u l e 54(b) d e t e r m i n a t i o n i t s e l f , n o t from the date of e n t r y of the u n d e r l y i n g judgment). 6 28 1100902 within the authority of the t r i a l court, a n d m o r e o v e r i s one t h a t c o n t e m p l a t e s no f u r t h e r a c t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e t r i a l court and t h a t , therefore, judgment i n and o f i t s e l f . 7 i s properly treated I t i s for this as a final reason that the "A f i n a l j u d g m e n t h a s been d e f i n e d b y t h e c o u r t s as one t h a t 'ends t h e l i t i g a t i o n on t h e m e r i t s a n d l e a v e s n o t h i n g f o r t h e c o u r t t o do b u t e x e c u t e t h e j u d g m e n t . ' " Moore's F e d e r a l Practice § 202.02 (3d e d . 2012) ( q u o t i n g C a t l i n v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 324 U.S. 463, 467 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ) . See, e . g . , K e i t h v. T r u c k S t o p s C o r p . , 909 F.2d 743, 746 (3d C i r . 1990) ("An o r d e r s u b s t a n t i v e l y c h a n g i n g a j u d g m e n t c o n s t i t u t e s a new j u d g m e n t w i t h i t s own t i m e f o r a p p e a l a t l e a s t where t h e change i s t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r t o be r e v i e w e d . " ) . See g e n e r a l l y 15B C h a r l e s A l a n W r i g h t e t a l . , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e a n d P r o c e d u r e § 3916 (2d ed. 1 9 9 2 ) , q u o t i n g w i t h a p p r o v a l f r o m I n r e F a r m e r s ' L o a n & T r u s t Co., 129 U.S. 206, 213 ( 1 8 8 9 ) , t o e x p l a i n as f o l l o w s : 7 "'[T]he d o c t r i n e t h a t , a f t e r a decree which disposes of a p r i n c i p a l s u b j e c t o f l i t i g a t i o n and s e t t l e s t h e r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s i n regard to that matter, there may s u b s e q u e n t l y a r i s e important matters r e q u i r i n g the j u d i c i a l a c t i o n of the court i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e same p r o p e r t y , a n d some o f t h e same r i g h t s l i t i g a t e d i n t h e main s u i t , making n e c e s s a r y substantive and i m p o r t a n t orders and d e c r e e s i n w h i c h t h e most m a t e r i a l r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s may be p a s s e d upon b y t h e c o u r t , a n d w h i c h , when t h e y partake of the nature of f i n a l decisions of those r i g h t s , may be a p p e a l e d f r o m , i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d b y the d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s c o u r t . ' " (The t r e a t i s e a l s o n o t e s " t h e s i m p l e p o i n t t h a t once t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s have been c o m p l e t e d , f i n a l j u d g m e n t appeal should be available upon conclusion of most post-judgment proceedings" and that "[t]he finality r e q u i r e m e n t i s met b y o r d e r s e n t e r e d a f t e r f i n a l j u d g m e n t , t o o l a t e o r t o o c o l l a t e r a l t o be r e v i e w e d e f f e c t i v e l y on a p p e a l f r o m t h e f i n a l j u d g m e n t , upon c o m p l e t e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e 29 1100902 determination the u n d e r l y i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y a n d t h a t j u d g m e n t s h o u l d be f i n a l must be a p p e a l e d , i f a t a l l , w i t h i n t h e 42-day p e r i o d f o r a p p e a l i n g f i n a l judgments p r e s c r i b e d by our r u l e s . B. The well respected treatise, Federal Practice and P r o c e d u r e , e x p l a i n s as f o l l o w s : "The v a r i o u s p u r p o s e s t h a t may p r o m p t e n t r y o f judgment under R u l e 54(b) a l l s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r i g h t t o r e v i e w s h o u l d be l o s t i f a p p e a l i s n o t t a k e n w i t h i n t h e o r d i n a r y a p p e a l t i m e r u l e s as m e a s u r e d from t h e e n t r y o f judgment. Only t h i s r u l e can achieve repose f o r a defendant, support prompt execution, and e f f e c t u a t e a purpose t o conduct f u r t h e r proceedings w i t h t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t some m a t t e r s a r e f i n a l l y r e s o l v e d o r i n s t e a d must be d e a l t w i t h anew i n l i g h t o f t h e v i e w s o f t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s . And so i t has been h e l d t h a t t h e r i g h t to review i s l o s t . " 15A C h a r l e s A l a n W r i g h t e t a l . , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e a n d P r o c e d u r e § 3914.7 The (2d e d . 1992) same t r e a t i s e (emphasis added; footnote omitted). further states: post-judgment proceeding.") Compare S t a t e v. C h a n d l e r , 4 60 So. 2d 1302, 1305 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1984) ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t an o r d e r d e n y i n g c o l l e c t i o n o f a p r i o r j u d g m e n t was i t s e l f a f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e i t c o n t e m p l a t e d no f u r t h e r a c t i o n b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t : "The d e n i a l o f t h e m o t i o n t o enforce t h e s u p e r s e d e a s bonds e f f e c t i v e l y t e r m i n a t e d t h e S t a t e ' s e f f o r t s t o c o l l e c t i t s j u d g m e n t f r o m t h e s u r e t i e s on t h e b o n d . I t was a f i n a l j u d g m e n t . " ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ) . 30 1100902 " [ R u l e 54] does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t a j u d g m e n t be e n t e r e d when t h e c o u r t d i s p o s e s o f one o r more c l a i m s o r t e r m i n a t e s t h e a c t i o n as t o one o r more p a r t i e s . Rather, i t g i v e s the court d i s c r e t i o n to e n t e r a f i n a l j u d g m e n t i n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and i t p r o v i d e s much-needed c e r t a i n t y i n d e t e r m i n i n g when a f i n a l and a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t has b e e n e n t e r e d . "The r e q u i r e m e n t i n R u l e 54(b) t h a t t h e c o u r t make an e x p r e s s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no j u s t r e a s o n f o r d e l a y i n g t h e r e v i e w o f a j u d g m e n t on fewer than a l l of the c l a i m s or i n v o l v i n g fewer than a l l o f t h e p a r t i e s i n an a c t i o n e l i m i n a t e s any d o u b t whether an immediate appeal may be sought. C o n v e r s e l y , i t makes c l e a r when an a p p e a l must be s o u g h t o r t h e r i g h t t o a p p e a l w i l l be l o s t , s i n c e the time f o r a p p e a l b e g i n s t o run from the e n t r y of an o r d e r t h a t meets t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e r u l e . " 10 C h a r l e s A l a n W r i g h t e t a l . , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and § 2654 (3d ed. In South 1998) Jacquot Dakota appellate v. (emphasis Rozum, Supreme decisions P r e i s s e r , 585 F.2d noted 336 942 (9th C i r . 1995), the main opinion notes, held that wrong, s t a r t s "'[a] the time N.W.2d 498 reviewed in the the main (S.D. same 2010), two opinion: the federal Page v. ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , and I n r e L i n d s a y , 59 F.3d appeals added). 790 Court Procedure which in Rule reach opposite r e s u l t s . Lindsay 54(b) the federal court of determination, right or f o r appeal running.'" ( q u o t i n g L i n d s a y , 59 F.3d at 31 As 951). So. 3d at 1100902 The Page South Dakota and L i n d s a y , Supreme concluded require a party seeking so by a timely judgment. Court, that the b e t t e r to challenge appeal after after discussing course i s to a Rule 54(b) o r d e r the entry of that both t o do partial I n so d o i n g i t s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i e d upon L i n d s a y a n d one o t h e r c a s e , t h e d e c i s i o n o f o u r own C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s in Allen quoting v. B r i g g s , So.3d much o f t h e p a s s a g e main o p i n i o n . the 60 decision See 899 from A l l e n t h a t So. 3d a t of the South ( A l a . C i v . App. . Dakota 2010), appears i n the I f i n d b o t h A l l e n and Supreme C o u r t t o be w e l l reasoned. The d i s s e n t i n g opinion suggests that our "caselaw" i s a t odds w i t h t o d a y ' s d e c i s i o n . to "long-standing practice I t s u g g e s t s t h a t we s h o u l d found "abandon o u r c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e . " reported i n our caselaw" So. 3d a t A l a b a m a " c a s e l a w " a t odds w i t h and n o t I f i n d no our d e c i s i o n n o r do I f i n d any A l a b a m a c a s e s t h a t h e r e t o f o r e some " l o n g - s t a n d i n g " . adhere today, have e n d o r s e d or " c u r r e n t " p r a c t i c e d i f f e r e n t than t h a t a r t i c u l a t e d by t h e main o p i n i o n today. To t h e c o n t r a r y , f o u r A l a b a m a p r e c e d e n t s d i s c u s s e d i n t h e main opinion indicate a "current" 32 practice that i s exactly 1100902 what i s articulated i n the main d e c i s i o n s were r e n d e r e d b y t h i s rule fully i n accord with opinion. Two of C o u r t and a r t i c u l a t e the holding these a i n t h e main clear opinion. See t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e m a i n o p i n i o n o f L e w i s v. S t a t e , So. 2d 154, 155 ( A l a . 1985) ("A j u d g m e n t c e r t i f i e d by a t r i a l c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 54 (b) i s a f i n a l appealable the o f t h e 42-day certification period."), 317 triggers the running and B a g l e y v. Mazda M o t o r C o r p . , 864 ( A l a . 2003) ("The 463 Bagleys' notice judgment; appeal So. 2d 301, of appeal, filed ... a l m o s t f o u r y e a r s a f t e r t h e p a r t i a l summary j u d g m e n t was certified as f i n a l , i s untimely j u d g m e n t and t h e B a g l e y s ' dismissed."). as t o t h a t partial summary a p p e a l from t h a t p a r t i a l judgment i s So. 3d a t . M o r e o v e r , two o t h e r A l a b a m a a p p e l l a t e c o u r t o p i n i o n s expressly Rule addressed 54(b) last challenges certification itself to the and propriety have held have of the that the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t can a d d r e s s t h a t i s s u e o n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t an a p p e a l b r o u g h t w i t h i n 42 d a y s o f t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . A l l e n v. B r i g g s , 60 So. 3d a t 903 of See ( " A l t h o u g h A l l e n a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n was n o t p r o p e r i n t h i s case, we have held that he i s precluded 33 from raising that 1100902 i s s u e now, because, i n s o f a r as h i s a p p e a l i s f r o m t h e summary- j u d g m e n t o r d e r , h i s a p p e a l comes t o o l a t e , more than 42 days after o r d e r on J u l y 31, 200 9." 908 So. 2d 955, 957 n.1 the e n t r y of (emphasis h a v i n g been the summary-judgment a d d e d ) ) ; L a r y v. ( A l a . C i v . App. 2005) filed Gardener, ("Although Lary has a s s e r t e d i n h i s b r i e f s t o t h i s c o u r t t h a t [ t h e c e r t i f i e d ] j u d g m e n t , and t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e e n t r y o f a f i n a l pursuant to Rule 5 4 ( b ) , were e r r o n e o u s , untimely because he respect (emphasis The to that d i d not judgment added)). file within a 42 judgment his challenges n o t i c e of days of appeal are with i t s entry." 8 dissent also states: " [ U ] n c e r t a i n t y as t o t h e f i n a l i t y o f a c e r t i f i e d judgment s t i l l e x i s t s d e s p i t e the r u l e e x p r e s s e d i n the main opinion. Although a p a r t y must now immediately challenge an improper Rule 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n by a p p e a l , n o t h i n g p r e v e n t s t h e t r i a l court from later recognizing that the claims C o n s i s t e n t w i t h my own r e s e a r c h , t h e r e i s no m e n t i o n i n any o f t h e s e f o u r c a s e s , i n c l u d i n g A l l e n , d e c i d e d i n 2010, o f any p r e c e d e n t s o f t h i s C o u r t o r o f t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s ever approving of a " p r a c t i c e " of a p p e l l a t e - c o u r t review of t h e p r o p r i e t y o f a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n as p a r t o f an a p p e a l (a) t h a t c h a l l e n g e s s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r e d j u d g m e n t s and (b) t h a t i s f i l e d more t h a n 42 d a y s a f t e r t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n order. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e o n l y i s s u e as t o t h e o v e r r u l i n g o f p r i o r p r e c e d e n t t h a t e x i s t s i n the p r e s e n t case i s p r e s e n t e d by Dr. S t e p h e n L. W a l l a c e , t h e p l a i n t i f f b e l o w , who f i n d s i t n e c e s s a r y t o a s k us t o o v e r r u l e A l l e n . 8 34 1100902 d i s p o s e d i n t h e p r i o r judgment a r e i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h remaining c l a i m s i n t h e case and v a c a t i n g that improvident c e r t i f i c a t i o n . " So. at 3d a t . the outset conclusion the from passage and t h e p r e d i c a t e i n the l a s t sentence trial court from later a judgment t h e main certified appeal i s not taken, judicata" that as f i n a l that appropriate claims i n t h e same way as an final judgment. j u d g m e n t becomes " f i n a l " i s taken. Having the adjudicated claims the c l a i m s , " t h e whole i n t h e same s e n s e as does a n y f i n a l w h i c h no a p p e a l prevents t o d a y i s t h a t t h e a p p e a l must be t a k e n a p p e a l must be t a k e n f r o m a n y o t h e r remaining that ... a r e i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h r e m a i n i n g of our h o l d i n g finding misread recognizing stated for this As t o t h e p r e d i c a t e n o t i o n t h a t " n o t h i n g disposed point of t h i s stated opinion. I b e l i e v e that both the conclusion and t h a t entered claim When an and " r e s judgment a final from judgment i s not intertwined with t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e c l a i m is_ f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n , a n d no a p p e a l h a v i n g b e e n t a k e n from t h a t judgment, t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s i n f a c t p r e v e n t e d from l a t e r changing i t s mind and t r y i n g made f i n a l . Likewise, Such i s t h e n a t u r e therefore, stated at the outset I t o undo what i t h a s a l r e a d y of a " f i n a l disagree with judgment." the conclusion o f the above-quoted passage, i . e . , t h a t 35 1100902 u n c e r t a i n t y as t o t h e exists." an The finality of a c e r t i f i e d judgment "still s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d requirement that a party i m m e d i a t e a p p e a l f r o m a j u d g m e n t c e r t i f i e d as the circumstances presented i n t h i s not take final uncertainty. In the an attempt to dissent further support asserts case c r e a t e s under i t s p o s i t i o n as in a footnote certainty, quoted that above, "[t]he main o p i n i o n a d d r e s s e s the i s s u e i n t h i s case i n terms of a w a i v e r " and that, " [ i ] f the improperly final, opinion purports to hold that trial after 30 court would lose j u r i s d i c t i o n days." So. 3d at n. over 11. d i s s e n t adds t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h w o u l d " f o r e c l o s e " an that should Again, The an c e r t i f i e d judgment, l e f t u n c h a l l e n g e d , i s a c t u a l l y then the judgment main be a v a i l a b l e to the I believe main o p i n i o n the of one of d i s s e n t misreads the certified as "final" several The "avenue" losing party. does i n d e e d h o l d entirety the that claims opinion. a j u d g m e n t as in u n d e r R u l e 54(b) main an is "actually the that action to is final." T h a t i n f a c t i s t h e v e r y p o i n t o f t h e m a i n o p i n i o n , j u s t as i t is the relies. point of the a u t h o r i t i e s upon w h i c h t h e Of c o u r s e , t h i s a l s o can be e x p r e s s e d as a When someone f o r g o e s t h e i r r i g h t t o a p p e a l any 36 main final opinion "waiver." judgment, 1100902 they can be said to have "waived" their right to appeal. A g a i n , t h e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a p a r t y must t a k e an i m m e d i a t e the a p p e a l f r o m a j u d g m e n t c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l under c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s case c r e a t e s c e r t a i n t y ; i t forecloses no "avenue" unappealed not foreclosed following any final, judgment. C. Finally, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o acknowledge nature of the f i n a l i t y of e x e c u t i o n and the synonymous o f a R u l e 54 (b) j u d g m e n t f o r p u r p o s e s f o r purposes of appeal. The purposes and e f f e c t s o f a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t an o r d e r c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l u n d e r R u l e 54(b) i s f i n a l f o r a l l t h e same p u r p o s e s as any o t h e r j u d g m e n t and, a c c o r d i n g l y , must be viewed as b e i n g "as Charles Alan Wright § (3d e d . 2654 also final" et a l . , 1998), under the of the rule." referenced " c o l l a t e r a l effects" the other f i n a l states that (Emphasis 10 Procedure "Rule effects added.) o f a R u l e 54(b) Procedure: 37 and collateral same as t h o s e o f any o t h e r j u d g m e n t . i n F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and judgment. Federal Practice f o r example, i s i m p o r t a n t because determination as any 54(b) of a The judgment are As f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d 1100902 "Because Rule 54(b) provides a means of rendering a final judgment on part of a m u l t i p l e - c l a i m o r m u l t i p l e - p a r t y a c t i o n , i t has an effect on various other rules or procedures connected with the r e n d i t i o n of judgment. For e x a m p l e , as was s t a t e d e a r l i e r , once t h e r e has been a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n and a f i n a l j u d g m e n t has been e n t e r e d , t h e t i m e f o r a p p e a l b e g i n s t o r u n . S i m i l a r l y , p r e c l u s i o n p r i n c i p l e s a r e b a s e d on a f i n a l j u d g m e n t so t h a t s i n c e a R u l e 54(b) o r d e r i s v i e w e d as f i n a l , i t has b i n d i n g e f f e c t . On t h e o t h e r hand, i f no c e r t i f i c a t e i s s u e s , t h e c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n o r o r d e r r e m a i n s i n t e r l o c u t o r y and t h e above e f f e c t s w i l l not take p l a c e . " O t h e r m a t t e r s t h a t s h o u l d be n o t e d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e e n t r y o f a j u d g m e n t u n d e r R u l e 54(b) a r e t h a t i t e n a b l e s a l i e n t o be i m p o s e d on t h e j u d g m e n t d e b t o r ' s p r o p e r t y and a w r i t o f e x e c u t i o n t o be issued to begin the process of c o l l e c t i n g any damage[s] award. S e c t i o n 1962 o f T i t l e 28 p r o v i d e s t h a t e v e r y d i s t r i c t - c o u r t j u d g m e n t s h a l l be a l i e n on t h e p r o p e r t y i n t h e s t a t e i n w h i c h t h e c o u r t i s s i t t i n g , i n accordance w i t h the law of t h a t s t a t e ; s t a t e l a w commonly r e q u i r e s a j u d g m e n t t o be f i n a l i n order to create a l i e n . " A n o t h e r e f f e c t o f a R u l e 54(b) o r d e r i s on t h e a c c r u a l o f i n t e r e s t on a j u d g m e n t , s i n c e i n t e r e s t b e g i n s t o a c c u m u l a t e o n l y on a j u d g m e n t t h a t has become f i n a l . " 10 Federal likewise Rule P r a c t i c e and explains 54(b) is that a Procedure a judgment final specifically emphasizing "running time of to § 2661. certified judgment "for i t s finality appeal," as well Professor as final under a l l purposes," f o r purposes as Moore of f o r purposes " r e s j u d i c a t a , " t h e a c c r u a l o f i n t e r e s t and " e x e c u t i o n . " 38 the of See 1100902 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e § 5 4 . 2 6 [ 1 ] - [ 4 ] . Co. v. R u s s w i n e C o n s t r . 1969) ("[T]he role Corp., Rule See a l s o R e d d i n g & 417 F.2d 721, 728 54(b) p l a y s with (D.C. reference Cir. to the f i n a l i t y o f a judgment f o r p u r p o s e s o f a p p e a l has i m p l i c a t i o n s as regards its finality f o r purposes of execution as w e l l . " (footnote omitted)). The latter authorities, i n c l u d i n g the opinion of the U n i t e d States Court of Appeals f o r the D i s t r i c t of Columbia i n Redding, p o i n t t o the absolute u n w o r k a b i l i t y be the r i g h t word i n many cases j u d g m e n t as t o a c l a i m i s c e r t i f i e d ensues deed entered where a and e x e c u t i o n (so t h a t a money j u d g m e n t i s c o l l e c t e d o r a judgment years acquiesced appeal of a scenario as f i n a l to land decide "chaos" would i s d e l i v e r e d ) , only later the losing party t h a t he o r she s h o u l d n o t so r e a d i l y i n the c e r t i f i e d an a l r e a d y e x e c u t e d on t o have the remainder judgment i s e i t h e r f i n a l have judgment and t h e r e f o r e choose t o judgment a l o n g w i t h t h e judgment of the claims i n the case. 9 A o r i t i s n o t . The l a w does n o t have T h i s p r o b l e m c o u l d n o t ensue from t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f an o r d e r o f t h e n a t u r e c e r t i f i e d i n Page. Where a c o u r t h a s m e r e l y e x p r e s s e d i t s v i e w as t o one o f s e v e r a l e l e m e n t s o f a c l a i m o r , as i n Page, one o f s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e a r g u m e n t s made i n s u p p o r t o f a c l a i m , t h e r e i s no " o r d e r " o r " j u d g m e n t " i n p l a c e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g r e l i e d upon o r e x e c u t e d . 9 39 1100902 two t y p e s o f f i n a l i t y , one b r a n d o f f i n a l i t y being upon a j u d g m e n t and able to execute finality for purposes of f o r purposes of another brand of appealability. Finality for p u r p o s e s o f a p p e a l and f o r p u r p o s e s o f e x e c u t i o n a r e t h e same. "Enforcement judgment of which a judgment determines by with l i a b i l i t i e s of the p a r t i e s . " § 57 (2005). Edition See § 3:133 upon a f i n a l finality also, execution finality 30 Am. e.g., ... 2 presupposes the rights f o r purposes and J u r . 2d E x e c u t i o n s , E t c . Federal Procedure, Lawyer ("Since an e x e c u t i o n o r d i n a r i l y i s s u e s judgment, f i n a l i t y a only f o r p u r p o s e s o f e x e c u t i o n and o f a p p e a l s h o u l d be t h e same."). A r u l i n g by t h i s C o u r t t h a t a d e f e n d a n t (or a plaintiff) can be t o l d y e a r s a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f a j u d g m e n t , c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l by an a u t h o r i z e d t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r t h a t was n o t a p p e a l e d a t t h e t i m e by t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y , f a c t not f i n a l t h a t t h a t j u d g m e n t was and t h a t a d e f e n d a n t who on w i t h h i s l i f e may be that a p l a i n t i f f the p l a i n t i f f ' s years later and f o r c e d back to disgorge themselves c o n t i n g e n c y f e e s , and e x p e n s e judgment, have since or occurred) no t h o u g h t he c o u l d move i n t o the l i t i g a t i o n l a w y e r may doubt 40 be (or required of a monetary r e c o v e r y , reimbursements to surrender land in from a upon w h i c h would be collected construction a source of may real 1100902 consternation R u l e 54(b) among the bench and the bar. Insofar i s concerned, such a r u l i n g would take the out of the word "final." 41 as "final" 1100902 SHAW, J u s t i c e (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. law, appeals Nicholson, settled E x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by from final v. 785, 790 l i e only 845 that So. 2d '[a]n appeal judgment w h i c h i s not Servicenters, will final.'" I n c . , 360 So. judgments. (Ala. not 2002) an order ( q u o t i n g R o b i n s o n v. 2d 299, c o u r t , an a p p e a l 302 of r i g h t ...."); v. L u c a s , 2d 1070, 1073 534 So. This See A l a . Code ( A l a . 1988) Williams, 12 whether So. an 3d Powell, a 631, order jurisdictional...."'" 281 p r o v i d e d by l a w , over 718 So. 2d 80, nonfinal 636 ( q u o t i n g H i n s o n v. 82 1999), j u d g m e n t i s an Court."). t h i s C o u r t does judgment. from quoting ( A l a . C i v . App. Inc. ( " [ S e c t i o n 12-22¬ ( A l a . 2008) appealed ( A l a . C i v . App. court John C r a n e - H o u d a i l l e , e s s e n t i a l precondition f o r appealing to t h i s jurisdiction or Computer (Ala. 1978))). 2] e m b o d i e s o u r t i m e - h o n o r e d r u l e t h a t a f i n a l E x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e well l i e s to the a p p r o p r i a t e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t as a m a t t e r 280, is § 12-22-2 ("From any f i n a l j u d g m e n t o f t h e c i r c u i t or probate have ("It l i e from p r i n c i p l e i s not a s p i r a t i o n a l ; i t i s s t a t u t o r y . 1975, Gilbert Crutcher ("'"The is Hinson, 745 1998))). v. question final i n turn not is So. 2d Powell v. This i s b e c a u s e a n o n f i n a l j u d g m e n t i s i n t e r l o c u t o r y and i s s u b j e c t t o 42 1100902 change b y a t r i a l c o u r t , w h i c h r e t a i n s j u r i s d i c t i o n remainder of the case. 447 ( A l a . 1994) entered Miller v. S a n t i a g o , over the 642 So. 2d 446, ("However, b e c a u s e no f i n a l j u d g m e n t h a d b e e n i n this case, a l l orders up to that point i n t e r l o c u t o r y , and, t h e r e f o r e , s u b j e c t t o c h a n g e . " ) . such a nonfinal, i n t e r l o c u t o r y j u d g m e n t "does were Further, 'not t e r m i n a t e t h e a c t i o n as t o any o f t h e c l a i m s o r p a r t i e s , and t h e o r d e r o r o t h e r f o r m o f d e c i s i o n i s s u b j e c t t o r e v i s i o n a t any time b e f o r e t h e e n t r y o f j u d g m e n t a d j u d i c a t i n g a l l t h e c l a i m s and t h e r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s o f a l l t h e p a r t i e s . ' " Marion C o r p . , 411 So. 2d 130, 132 ( A l a . 1982) H a l l m a n v. (quoting Rule 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P . ) . A p r o p e r c e r t i f i c a t i o n u n d e r R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., will deem an otherwise purposes of Florence, 936 So. 2d 508, 512 R. C i v . P., appellate nonfinal judgment jurisdiction. Sparks ( A l a . 2006) " ) . An i m p r o p e r "final" v. City for of ("Rule 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . confers appellate j u r i s d i c t i o n n o n f i n a l order as over an otherwise R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , h o w e v e r , does n o t r e n d e r a n o n f i n a l j u d g m e n t a p p e a l a b l e , does n o t c o n f e r j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h i s C o u r t , and w i l l n o t s u p p o r t an appeal. 354, 362 D z w o n k o w s k i v. S o n i t r o l o f M o b i l e , ( A l a . 2004) ("'[T]he 43 trial I n c . , 892 So. 2d court cannot confer 1100902 appellate entry jurisdiction upon o f judgment under R u l e this [C]ourt through directing 54(b) i f t h e judgment is not o t h e r w i s e " f i n a l . " ' " ( q u o t i n g Computer S e r v i c e n t e r s , I n c . , 360 So. 2d a t 3 0 2 ) ) ; H a r l a n Home B u i l d e r s , I n c . v . H a y s l i p , 58 So. 3d 102, 108 n.3 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) ( " [ T ] h e summary j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d b y the trial c o u r t was n o t a f i n a l appealable to this j u d g m e n t t h a t was p r o p e r l y C o u r t a t t h e t i m e i t was e n t e r e d o r a t t h e t i m e i t was p u r p o r t e d l y c e r t i f i e d a s f i n a l b y t h e t r i a l therefore, this Court acquired no p u r p o r t e d appeal o f t h a t judgment."). certification and this i sinvalid Court w i l l jurisdiction and v o i d , jurisdiction court; over t h e Thus, i f a R u l e 5 4 ( b ) t h e judgment i s n o n f i n a l , e x mero motu n o t e and d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l . our l a c k of a p p e l l a t e D z w o n k o w s k i , 892 So. 2d at 362 ("'"When i t i s d e t e r m i n e d t h a t an o r d e r a p p e a l e d is not a f i n a l judgment, i t i s the duty d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l ex mero motu."'" 858 from of the Court t o ( q u o t i n g Tatum v . Freeman, So. 2d 979, 980 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 3 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n P o w e l l v . R e p u b l i c N a t ' l L i f e I n s . Co., 293 A l a . 1 0 1 , 102, 300 So. 2d 359, 360 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) ) . We do n o t a d d r e s s , ex mero motu, a mere m i s t a k e ; we do, h o w e v e r , a d d r e s s , ex mero motu, t h e f a c t that a judgment appellate i s not f i n a l jurisdiction. 44 and t h a t the Court lacks 1100902 Further, aside an improper Rule 54(b) certification set because of not because of a t e c h n i c a l d e f a u l t , but is the r i s k o f an i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t b e t w e e n t h e j u d g m e n t c e r t i f i e d as f i n a l and claims. ("[A] the Schlarb R u l e 54(b) issues in the s u b s e q u e n t f i n a l j u d g m e n t on v. Lee, 955 So. certification claim being 2d 418, should certified remain pending i n the t r i a l court 419-20 not and the be a remaining ( A l a . 2006) entered claim i f the that will '"are so c l o s e l y i n t e r t w i n e d t h a t s e p a r a t e a d j u d i c a t i o n w o u l d p o s e an u n r e a s o n a b l e r i s k i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s . " ' " (quoting Clarke-Mobile Counties Dist. So. (Ala. v. quoting P r i o r Energy Corp., 2d 88, 95 2d 1373, may prejudice 1374 in 514 Such i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s both p a r t i e s to the l i t i g a t i o n . believe decision (Ala. 1987))). Gas 2002), i n t u r n B r a n c h v. S o u t h T r u s t Bank o f D o t h a n , N.A., So. I 834 of that Page v. our caselaw Preisser, 585 is F.2d consistent 336, 338 with (8th 1978) : " I t i s c l e a r that a d i s t r i c t court's d e c i s i o n to i s s u e a R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t e i s not conclusive. Appellate courts have b r o a d r e v i e w i n g power i n determining w h e t h e r a d i s t r i c t c o u r t has properly a p p l i e d t h e r u l e and c o r r e c t l y c e r t i f i e d an a p p e a l . See S c h w a r t z v. Compagnie G e n e r a l T r a n s a t l a n t i q u e , 405 F.2d 270, 274 (2d C i r . 1968); RePass v. V r e e l a n d , 357 F.2d 801, 804-805 (3d C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) ; 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 45 the Cir. 1100902 P r o c e d u r e § 2655 a t 35 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . I n most cases, however, u n l i k e t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n , the party c h a l l e n g i n g the c e r t i f i c a t i o n takes a t i m e l y appeal f r o m t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r . Our r e s e a r c h h a s f a i l e d t o d i s c l o s e any c a s e s s p e c i f i c a l l y d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r a p a r t y who n e g l e c t s t o t a k e a t i m e l y a p p e a l f r o m a district court's Rule 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n may challenge the p r o p r i e t y of that c e r t i f i c a t i o n a f t e r t h e p e r i o d o f t i m e f o r t a k i n g an a p p e a l h a s e x p i r e d ; and i f the c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s h e l d t o have b e e n e r r o n e o u s , w h e t h e r t h e p a r t y may, i n h i s a p p e a l f r o m the c o u r t ' s f i n a l judgment o f t h e r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s , seek review o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s adverse d e c i s i o n on t h e s u b s t a n t i v e c l a i m u n d e r l y i n g t h e R u l e 5 4 ( b ) certification. "We h o l d t h a t s u c h c h a l l e n g e s may be made; a n d when a d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r o n e o u s l y c e r t i f i e s a c l a i m as a p p r o p r i a t e f o r immediate appeal under Rule 5 4 ( b ) , a p a r t y may r a i s e t h a t c l a i m i n a t i m e l y a p p e a l f r o m an a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n on t h e r e m a i n i n g claims i n the l a w s u i t . While, t e c h n i c a l l y , the p e r i o d f o r t a k i n g an a p p e a l b e g i n s t o r u n f r o m t h e time the d i s t r i c t court enters final judgment p u r s u a n t t o t h e R u l e 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , i f t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s e r r o n e o u s , t h e r e i s , i n f a c t , no p r o p e r f i n a l j u d g m e n t f r o m w h i c h a p a r t y must a p p e a l . Thus, i f an a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g a s i n g l e c l a i m i s i n c o r r e c t l y c a t e g o r i z e d b y t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t as one i n v o l v i n g m u l t i p l e c l a i m s , a p a r t y o u g h t n o t be p r e c l u d e d from r a i s i n g t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e c o u r t ' s c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n a t i m e l y a p p e a l f r o m an a d v e r s e j u d g m e n t on t h e o t h e r c l a i m s i n t h e l a w s u i t . " (Emphasis added.) not confer appellate jurisdiction erroneous An e r r o n e o u s R u l e 5 4 ( b ) c e r t i f i c a t i o n exists Rule jurisdiction only when a judgment 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n judgment. 46 on t h i s does Court; appellate i s final, not create does a n d an a final 1100902 The found main opinion reverses i n our caselaw. Here, aggrieved party's f a i l u r e Rule 54(b) this certification long-standing the Court holds practice that the t o a p p e a l i m m e d i a t e l y from a f a u l t y and the resulting unappealable, n o n f i n a l j u d g m e n t w a i v e s any f u t u r e c h a l l e n g e t o t h e i m p r o p e r certification. certification over Thus, what was an e r r o n e o u s , m i s t a k e n , that would not confer appellate invalid jurisdiction t h e u n d e r l y i n g j u d g m e n t h a s become u n a s s a i l a b l e b y t h e parties. I s e e no n e e d t o abandon o u r c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e . o p i n i o n notes Rule that the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n certainty when Specifically, Briggs, 60 an can raise immediate the Court of C i v i l So. 3d 899 The m a i n nature of a d e f e c t i v e problematic appeal is issues not Appeals stated ( A l a . C i v . App. 2010), taken. no u n c e r t a i n t y . party time can w a i t u n t i l Under o u r c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e , a final 1 0 i n A l l e n v. that there e x i s t e d u n c e r t a i n t y r e g a r d i n g the time i n which t o appeal. see of I although a judgment i s e n t e r e d , a t which a l l t h e c l a i m s i n an a c t i o n a r e d i s p o s e d o f , and then c h a l l e n g e t h e Rule 54(b) c e r t i f i c a t i o n , i f the c e r t i f i c a t i o n These u n c e r t a i n t i e s are h y p o t h e t i c a l - - t h e y are not a t p l a y under t h e f a c t s o f t h e i n s t a n t case. 10 47 1100902 is upheld, then previously a challenge certified as Thus, t o e n s u r e t h a t an to the certified proper course known r i s k Allen out of our merits of the judgment u n d e r R u l e 54(b) is untimely. hear a challenge appellate court notes p a r t y may another purported uncertainty judgment w o u l d In o t h e r words, appear final c e r t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f , such c e r t i f i c a t i o n when a f i n a l by of any event, challenge nothing i t c a n n o t be the opinion. improper prevents the e l e c t to uncertainty certified said that reliance the on a as to take. the finality of a e x i s t s d e s p i t e the r u l e expressed i n Although an in the e n t i r e case i s f i n i s h e d i s yet t h e p a r t i e s may c e r t i f i e d judgment s t i l l main such judgment b e f o r e a n o t h e r known r i s k claims thus e x p o s i n g the p r e v i o u s l y "uncertainty"; unaware although and parties are the can be c h a l l e n g e d But the arising the judgment t o a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w . In is a v i r t u e of judgment d i s p o s i n g of a l l the the a c t i o n i s entered, certified appeal c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e , n a m e l y t h e u n c e r t a i n t y as t o certified vacated to The accept. f i n a l i t y of the c e r t i f i e d judgment. the can action i s certain; failure aggrieved also the j u d g m e n t , a p r u d e n t p a r t y must a p p e a l . of the final to Rule trial a party 54(b) court 48 must now certification from l a t e r immediately by appeal, recognizing that 1100902 the c l a i m s d i s p o s e d i n the p r i o r judgment are i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h remaining claims certification. Although i n the case and vacating that improvident 1 1 the main opinion undertakes to cure the u n c e r t a i n t i e s i d e n t i f i e d i n A l l e n , none o f t h o s e u n c e r t a i n t i e s a c t u a l l y a f f e c t the i n s t a n t case. But the p r o b l e m a t i c issue t h a t does e x i s t i s t h e d a n g e r o f an i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t , w h i c h clearly occurred in this case. The attempt to address u n c e r t a i n t i e s not the main opinion, a t p l a y , has in an enshrined i n c o n s i s t e n t judgments. B o t h the u n c e r t a i n t i e s i d e n t i f i e d i n the main o p i n i o n the and risk our of inconsistent results can be alleviated i f o f t e n s t a t e d i n v i t a t i o n t o c a u t i o n i s heeded: The m a i n o p i n i o n a d d r e s s e s t h e i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e i n t e r m s o f a w a i v e r by t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y o f any r i g h t t o c h a l l e n g e t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n ; i t does n o t a p p e a r t o h o l d t h a t an improperly certified judgment, l e f t unchallenged, is actually final. I f t h e m a i n o p i n i o n p u r p o r t s t o h o l d t h a t an i m p r o p e r l y c e r t i f i e d judgment, l e f t u n c h a l l e n g e d , i s a c t u a l l y f i n a l , then the t r i a l c o u r t would l o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n over the j u d g m e n t a f t e r 30 d a y s . See G e o r g e v. S i m s , 888 So. 2d 1224, 1227 (Ala. 2004) ("Generally, a trial court has no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o m o d i f y o r amend a f i n a l o r d e r more t h a n 30 d a y s a f t e r t h e j u d g m e n t has b e e n e n t e r e d , e x c e p t t o c o r r e c t clerical errors."). Such a h o l d i n g , I s u b m i t , w o u l d f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e o u r R u l e 54(b) j u r i s p r u d e n c e by o f t e n f o r e c l o s i n g t h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g avenue a v a i l a b l e t o a d d r e s s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s , as d i s c u s s e d i n S c h l a r b , s u p r a . 11 49 1100902 "This Court looks with some c e r t i f i c a t i o n s under Rule 54(b). disfavor upon "'It bears repeating, here, that " ' [ c ] e r t i f i c a t i o n s under Rule 54(b) s h o u l d be e n t e r e d o n l y i n e x c e p t i o n a l c a s e s a n d s h o u l d n o t be e n t e r e d r o u t i n e l y . ' " S t a t e v . L a w h o r n , 830 So. 2d 720, 725 ( A l a . 2002) ( q u o t i n g B a k e r v. B e n n e t t , 644 So. 2d 901, 903 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) . . . . ) . "'"Appellate review i n a piecemeal fashion i s not favored."'" Goldome C r e d i t C o r p . [ v . P l a y e r , 869 So. 2d 1146, 1148 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 3 ) ] ( q u o t i n g Harper Sales Co. v. Brown, Stagner, R i c h a r d s o n , I n c . , 742 So. 2d 190, 192 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n Brown v. W h i t a k e r C o n t r a c t i n g C o r p . , 681 So. 2d 226, 229 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1996)) (emphasis added).'" S c h l a r b , 955 So. 2d a t 419 ( q u o t i n g D z w o n k o w s k i , 892 So. 2d a t 363). It is certification results; that improper creates issuance and certification that court t h e main Rule 54(b) inconsistent judgment remains refuses to issue a i s improper. opinion trades the easily " u n c e r t a i n t i e s " c r e a t e d b y an e r r o n e o u s R u l e 5 4 ( b ) certification for inconsistent results." would the w e l l apply improperly trial a and i f the p r i o r when a c e r t i f i c a t i o n believe recognized the of uncertainty no u n c e r t a i n t y e x i s t s uncertified I the an increased Schlarb, settled "unreasonable 955 So. 2d a t 419-20. principles c e r t i f i e d u n d e r R u l e 54(b) 50 risk that a i s not a f i n a l of I judgment judgment, 1100902 Dzwonkowski, s u p r a ; t h a t n o n f i n a l judgments a r e i n t e r l o c u t o r y and s u b j e c t t o m o d i f i c a t i o n Miller, and change b y t h e t r i a l court, s u p r a ; and t h a t a n o n f i n a l j u d g m e n t i s g e n e r a l l y n o t subject to appellate Bolin, jurisdiction. J . , concurs. 51 Sparks, supra.
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