Ex parte Capstone Building Corporation. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: William Walker v. Capstone Building Corporation)
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
1090966
Ex p a r t e C a p s t o n e B u i l d i n g C o r p o r a t i o n
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF C I V I L APPEALS
(In
r e : W i l l i a m Walker
v.
Capstone B u i l d i n g
Corporation)
( T u s c a l o o s a C i r c u i t C o u r t , CV-07-900226;
C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s , 2081153)
On A p p l i c a t i o n f o r R e h e a r i n g
MURDOCK,
This
the
Justice.
Court's
opinion
o f June
3, 2 0 1 1 , i s w i t h d r a w n , a n d
following i ssubstituted therefor.
1090966
We
g r a n t e d Capstone
a writ
of c e r t i o r a r i
Civil
Appeals
2081153,
March
in
Building
Corporation's
to review the d e c i s i o n
Walker
v.
26, 2010]
Capstone
petition for
of the Court
Building
S o . 3d
Corp.,
( A l a . C i v . App.
of
[Ms.
2010),
i n w h i c h t h e C o u r t of C i v i l A p p e a l s , r e l y i n g upon t h i s C o u r t ' s
decision
i n McKenzie
v. K i l l i a n ,
887
applied
a
statute
limitations
six-year
wantonness.
based
on
six-year
§
statute
the
of
rather
6-2-38(l).
explained
of wanton
statute
that
§
found
that
in
a
a tort
Ala.
We
claim
to the
Code
1975,
of l i m i t a t i o n s
hereby
of wantonness
overrule
are subject
o f l i m i t a t i o n s f o u n d i n A l a . Code
with
reverse
this
holding
the judgment
of
claim
subject
statute
6-2-38(l).
( A l a . 2004),
to
m i s c o n d u c t was
claims
Consistent
b e l o w , we
2 d 861
Court held
limitations
1 975,
and c o n f i r m
two-year
this
than the two-year
i n A l a . Code
McKenzie
§
allegations
6-2-34(1),
found
In McKenzie,
of
So.
and
as
to
1975,
further
of the Court of
Civil
Appeals.
I.
The
pertinent
Facts
facts
and
as
Procedural
stated
" [ W i l l i a m 'Toby'] W a l k e r
Capstone and s e v e r a l f i c t i t i
J u l y 10, 2007.
He a l l e g e d
the
general
contractor
on
2
History
i n Walker
a r e as
follows:
f i l e d an a c t i o n a g a i n s t
ously
named p a r t i e s on
t h a t C a p s t o n e had been
a construction
j o b on
1090966
w h i c h he h a d w o r k e d .
W a l k e r a l l e g e d t h a t , on J u l y
12, 2 0 0 5 , w h i l e w o r k i n g a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e , he
s t e p p e d on
a manhole cover,
which f l i p p e d over,
c a u s i n g him t o f a l l p a r t i a l l y i n t o the manhole
and
causing
him
serious
injury.
He
asserted
that
Capstone had been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r o v i d i n g a s a f e
work environment at the s i t e but t h a t i t had
failed
in
that
responsibility.
Walker
alleged
that
C a p s t o n e p r e v i o u s l y h a d b e e n made a w a r e t h a t
the
m a n h o l e c o v e r t h a t h a d f l i p p e d o v e r was n o t p r o p e r l y
secured
and
was
unsafe
because
of
a
previous
accident
i n v o l v i n g the
same m a n h o l e c o v e r .
He
a l l e g e d that Capstone's f a i l u r e to properly secure
the
manhole
cover
constituted
negligence
or
wantonness.
"On A p r i l 2 0 , 2 0 0 9 , C a p s t o n e f i l e d a m o t i o n t o
dismiss
or,
in
the
alternative, for
a
summary
judgment.
I t contended t h a t the evidence developed
during
discovery
demonstrated
that
the
incident
g i v i n g r i s e t o W a l k e r ' s a c t i o n o c c u r r e d on J u n e 6,
2005, not
on
J u l y 12,
2005, as
alleged in
the
complaint.
As a r e s u l t , C a p s t o n e a r g u e d , W a l k e r ' s
claims
a l l e g i n g negligence
and
wantonness
were
b a r r e d by the t w o - y e a r s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s s e t
f o r t h i n § 6-2-38, A l a . Code 1975.
In support of
i t s m o t i o n , C a p s t o n e s u b m i t t e d , among o t h e r t h i n g s ,
t h e i n c i d e n t r e p o r t g e n e r a t e d as a r e s u l t o f
the
accident
forming
the
basis
of
Walker's
action,
d e p o s i t i o n e x c e r p t s , and a f f i d a v i t s .
Walker
filed
a r e s p o n s e t o C a p s t o n e ' s m o t i o n i n w h i c h he a r g u e d
t h a t t h e r e was
a question
o f f a c t as t o when t h e
i n c i d e n t o c c u r r e d and t h a t , even i f h i s
negligence
claim
was
barred
by
the
applicable
statute
of
limitations,
his
claim
of
wantonness
was,
he
maintained,
subject
to
a
six-year
statute
of
l i m i t a t i o n s t h a t h a d n o t r u n a t t h e t i m e he
filed
his
action.
"
3
1090966
"On
A u g u s t 10, 2 0 0 9 , t h e t r i a l c o u r t
granted
C a p s t o n e ' s m o t i o n and e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t i n
its
favor."
So.
3d
Walker
that the
applied
at
.
appealed
six-year
to h i s
to
the
Court
s t a t u t e of
claim
of
Civil
limitations
alleging
Appeals,
found i n §
wantonness:
arguing
6-2-34(1)
1
"Walker contends t h a t the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s
a p p l i c a b l e to wantonness claims
i s set
forth
in
§ 6 - 2 - 3 4 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975,
which provides
that
' [ a ] c t i o n s f o r any t r e s p a s s
to p e r s o n or
liberty,
s u c h as f a l s e i m p r i s o n m e n t o r a s s a u l t a n d b a t t e r y , '
a r e s u b j e c t t o a s i x - y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s . He
argues
that,
because
i t i s undisputed
that
his
a c t i o n was
f i l e d w i t h i n s i x years of the date
on
w h i c h he
was
a l l e g e d l y i n j u r e d , the
trial
court
e r r e d when i t e n t e r e d a s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f
C a p s t o n e as t o h i s w a n t o n n e s s c l a i m .
In a s s e r t i n g
t h a t a r g u m e n t , W a l k e r r e l i e s on o u r s u p r e m e c o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n s i n M c K e n z i e v. K i l l i a n ,
8 87 So.
2d
861
(Ala.
2 0 0 4 ) , and C a r r v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e f i n i n g &
Manufacturing
Co.,
13
So.
3d
947
(Ala.
2009)
(plurality opinion)."
___
So.
3d
After
a t ___
(footnote
discussing
the
International
Refining
&
(Ala.
the
of
2009),
Court
omitted).
decisions
Manufacturing
Civil
Appeals
Co.,
13
and
4
Carr
So.
v.
3d
947
continued:
On a p p e a l t o t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s , W a l k e r
c l a i m of negligence.
___ So. 3d a t ___
n.2.
1
his
i n McKenzie
abandoned
1090966
"In
the
present
case,
Walker
alleged
that
C a p s t o n e a c t e d w i t h w a n t o n n e s s and,
i n so
doing,
caused h i s personal i n j u r i e s .
B a s e d on t h e h o l d i n g
i n M c K e n z i e and t h e p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n i n C a r r ,
we
must c o n c l u d e t h a t W a l k e r ' s wantonness c l a i m
is
g o v e r n e d by
the
s i x - y e a r s t a t u t e of
limitations
a p p l i c a b l e to t r e s p a s s c l a i m s , r a t h e r than the
twoyear s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s the t r i a l court a p p l i e d .
As s u c h , t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s summary j u d g m e n t w i t h
r e g a r d t o W a l k e r ' s w a n t o n n e s s c l a i m i s due
to
be
reversed.
"We
note Capstone's argument t h a t , i f McKenzie
and
Carr
require t h i s court to apply
a
six-year
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s to Walker's wantonness c l a i m ,
those decisions represent u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l attempts
by our supreme c o u r t t o c r e a t e a s e p a r a t e cause of
a c t i o n f o r w a n t o n n e s s , e v e n t h o u g h t h e A l a b a m a Code
does not
enumerate such a c l a i m ,
as
w e l l as
a
j u d i c i a l a t t e m p t t o amend t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s
p r o v i d e d by the Alabama Code.
As s u c h , C a p s t o n e
a r g u e s , M c K e n z i e a n d C a r r s h o u l d be o v e r r u l e d .
"We
will
not
address
the
merits
of
this
contention.
T h i s c o u r t i s bound by t h e d e c i s i o n s o f
our
s u p r e m e c o u r t , a n d we
are not at l i b e r t y
to
o v e r r u l e those d e c i s i o n s or t o choose not to f o l l o w
them.
See
State
Farm Mut.
Auto.
Ins.
Co.
v.
C a r l t o n , 867 So. 2 d 3 2 0 , 325
( A l a . C i v . App.
2001)
('This c o u r t
i s bound by
the
decisions
of
the
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t ,
see
§ 12-3-16, A l a .
Code
1975,
a n d we
h a v e no
a u t h o r i t y to overrule
that
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s . ' ) . We r e c o g n i z e t h a t a m a j o r i t y
o f t h e members o f t h e supreme c o u r t d i d n o t j o i n t h e
m a i n o p i n i o n i n C a r r ; h o w e v e r , as p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d ,
Justice
See's
opinion
concurring
i n the
result
reached i n Carr demonstrates t h a t a m a j o r i t y of the
members o f t h e supreme c o u r t d e c i d i n g t h a t c a s e w e r e
of the view t h a t McKenzie p r o v i d e s t h a t claims
of
wantonness are
subject
to a six-year statute
of
limitations.
So l o n g a s M c K e n z i e i s b i n d i n g on t h i s
c o u r t , we m u s t a n d we w i l l a p p l y i t s h o l d i n g . "
5
1090966
So.
3d
at
.
Capstone p e t i t i o n e d t h i s
arguing
that
we
should
judgment
of
the
Court
presented
Court
i s a pure question
by
821
this
Court.
So.2d
overrule
of
Simcala,
197,
200
(Ala.
Statute
of
of
subject
law
Inc.
v.
the
question
that
Capstone.
following
was
Walker's
falls
provision
m u s t be
claim
period
within
of
Coal
the
question
novo
review
Trade,
Inc.,
§
does
provided
the
" A l l actions
of
another
for
not
as
6-2-34(1)
a
fall
six
to person
or a s s a u l t
within
provided
the
by
the
or
and
six-year
default,
catchall
states:
any i n j u r y t o t h e p e r s o n
arising
from
contract
6
wanton
years:
i n § 6 - 2 - 3 4 ( 1 ) , t h e n , by
which
of
provides:
any
trespass
imprisonment
not
six-
applicable
result
commenced w i t h i n
two-year period
6-2-38(l),
i s whether the
i n § 6-2-34(1) i s
injured
Section
"(1)
Actions
for
l i b e r t y , s u c h as f a l s e
battery."
it
The
t o de
American
presented
he
claim
limitations
reverse
Analysis
to
If
certiorari,
2001).
provided
"The
and
Appeals.
year l i m i t a t i o n s period
c o n d u c t by
of
Limitations
Specifically,
Walker's
McKenzie
Civil
II.
A.
for a writ
or r i g h t s
and
not
1090966
specifically
enumerated i n
b r o u g h t w i t h i n two
years."
In
§
applying
6-2-34(1)
to
the
there
are
which
Court
of
the
M c K e n z i e v.
(Ala.
of
2009)
so
as
Court.
to
See,
So.
2d
becomes
&
2d
861
constitute
952,
964
binding
to d e c i d e the
case,
State
ex
cause.").
was
of
As
Co.,
j o i n e d by
courts
the
Judges or
equivalent
allegation
of
limitations
Although
the
in
to
main
six-year
§ 6-2-34] a p p l i c a b l e . "
opinion
Carr
v.
So.
3d
947
i n only
decision
ACLU
of
i n Carr
7
one
of
the
of
the
Alabama,
pronouncement
i t
has
the
qualified
in
the
opinion.
intentional
i n t e n t renders the
[i.e.,
and
i n d i c a t e d , the main o p i n i o n
a plurality
law
rely:
Justices
In McKenzie, t h i s Court c o n c l u d e d t h a t
the
did,
a majority
unless
acted
upon
and
13
("[N]o a p p e l l a t e
of
Court
main o p i n i o n
r e l . James v.
inferior
a majority
this
(Ala. 2004),
The
be
Capstone
have,
precedential
( A l a . 1998)
on
Carr,
a
must
limitations
of
Manufacturing
M c K e n z i e , was
e.g.,
c o n c u r r e n c e of
other
So.
might
(plurality opinion).
those d e c i s i o n s ,
Court
711
Refining
decisions
Appeals
887
of
a l l e g i n g that
two
Civil
section
statute
claim
only
Killian,
International
six-year
Walker's
wantonly,
this
relied
"wanton c o n d u c t i s
conduct.
Such
an
statutory period
887
So.
2d
of
at
870.
upon M c K e n z i e ,
only
1090966
four
Justices
956.
of
Four
this
a
Justice
case
however,
13
So.
dissented.
offered
concurring
opinion
main
opinion.
Carr,
13
So.
3d
is
the view
he
"because
that
troubling."
i n the r e s u l t ) .
that
would
i n the
to o v e r r u l e McKenzie,
author
" a p p l i c a t i o n [of
13
So.
3d
J u s t i c e See
concur
result in
in
at
956
McKenzie]
J.,
u l t i m a t e l y concluded,
the
result
I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , we
a n d we
Carr,
(See,
of
we h a v e n o t b e e n a s k e d t o o v e r r u l e
3d a t 9 5 6 - 5 8 .
at
Id.
special writing concurring
See
this
the
other J u s t i c e s concurred i n the r e s u l t ; the
opinion
In
in
joined
the
main
McKenzie."
have been
do s o f o r t h e r e a s o n s
asked
hereinafter
discussed.
We
first
exception
question
to
observe
the
of what
that
long
line
statute
of
McKenzie
of
cases
§
deciding
6-2-38(l)
during
was
the
the
843
2d
was
alone
applicable
answered
of
135-36
Jim Walter
( A l a . 2002)
8
Homes,
such
the
to
period
cases
was
I n c . v.
(holding
an
a
that question
limitations
Examples
as
addressed
immediately before McKenzie
following:
133,
two-year
applicable.
t h e two d e c a d e s
include
So.
that
that
limitations
c l a i m o f w a n t o n n e s s and t h a t r e p e a t e d l y
by
stands
that
of
decided
decided
Nicholas,
a claim
of
1090966
w a n t o n n e s s was
Bank
& Trust
wantonness
Co.,
800,
805
m u s t be
of
Co. ,
So.
2d
filed
years
their
after
wantonness
Control,
at
§
1268,
for
1274
...
of
by
Henson v.
( A l a . 1993)
1992)
("An
w i t h i n two
of
v.
...
Smith,
(Ala.
v.
("The
actions,
v.
action
623,
1993
two-year
Celtic
(Ala.
cause
719
So.
governed
--
2d
by
Ins.
the
over
two
and
Valley
1993)
statute"
Life
the
negligence
their
627
So.
("Because
i n August
--
727
U n i t e d Am.
1997 )
of
wantonness
of
wantonness
Booker
(claim
P.A.,
accrual
Georgia
Peoples
limitations);
alleging
the
accrued
the
Smith
of
t i m e - b a r r e d . " ) ; Rumford v.
"governed
(Ala.
of
1340
2d
....");
action
t h e i r complaint
wantonness
( A l a . 2001)
Sweet & F r e e s e ,
(claim
claims
S a n d e r s v.
statute
years
So.
years
brought
two
62 9
6-2-38(l));
686
limitations);
claims are
Inc.,
wantonness
("[A]n
1333,
[plaintiffs]
683,
two-year
1998)
of
6-2-38(l));
2d
I n s . Co.
(Ala.
statute
§
Frazer,
within
Life
802-03
700
by
( A l a . 1999)
brought
two-year
So.
Langston,
action.");
797,
817
governed
Cunningham v.
2d
b a r r e d under
Ins.
Pest
(claim
of
of l i m i t a t i o n s
Co.,
621
So.
2d
statutory
period
of l i m i t a t i o n s
found
...
6-2-38,
Medtronic,
alleging
at
Inc.,
...
So.
wantonness
years a f t e r the cause
9
607
§
of a c t i o n
2d
...
is
two
156,
159
must
be
accrued.").
1090966
See
also Spain
101,
125
must
be
( A l a . 2003)
brought
accrued.'"
within
in part,
Medtronic,
Inc.,
Indeed,
a
See
200 6 ) , a n d
607
Boyce
Inc.,
916
2d
So.
to
3,
in
.
this
to
In her
2
156,
Cassese,
this
Malsch
60 0 , 60 1
case,
dissenting opinion.
appendix
2d
also
2011,
the
concurring
statute
"unambiguous
June
...
in
159
of
v.
two-year
when
then
this
2d
Bell
2005)
So.
Chief
(claim
action
Smith
this
2d
200,
of
dissent,
on
Chief
rehearing.
(Ala.
Textron,
wantonness
limitations").
Cobb
See
Court
207-0 9
issued
an
authored
a
That d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n i s a t t a c h e d
opinion
v.
wantonness
945-46
originally
Justice
...
concurring
Helicopter
s t a t u t e [ ] of
Court
to
932,
8 95
2d
1992))).
McKenzie,
So.
of
(quoting
limitations
941
(Ala.
cause
(Ala.
after
So.
wantonness
part,
dissenting i n part)
So.
v.
See
opinion
after
G i l m o r e v . M & B R e a l t y Co.,
2004).
On
years
J.,
two-year
(Ala.
subject
two
and
T o b a c c o C o r p . , 872
action alleging
even i n cases d e c i d e d
applied
claims.
("'An
(Johnstone,
specially
has
v. Brown & W i l l i a m s o n
So.
J u s t i c e Cobb r e f e r r e d t o
as
an
3d
at
"years
T h e C o u r t ' s o p i n i o n on o r i g i n a l s u b m i s s i o n r e s p o n d e d t o
some o f t h e v i e w s e x p r e s s e d
i n that dissent.
Because
those
r e s p o n s e s made f o r a m o r e t h o r o u g h a n d s i f t i n g e x p l a n a t i o n o f
the
Court's
h o l d i n g and
rationale in this
case,
we
have
appended t h e n C h i e f J u s t i c e Cobb's d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n
and
r e t a i n e d t h e r e s p o n s e i n t h i s o p i n i o n on r e h e a r i n g .
2
10
1090966
of
ongoing
confusion
governing
willful
dissent,
preceded
Appendix,
until
w a n t o n n e s s , as
wanton
torts"
this
3d
no
statute
the
and
So.
McKenzie,
six-year
regarding
at
.
McKenzie
that
Six-Year Statutes
1998)),
and
opinion
to
and
purposes
other
period
proof
of
a
which
alluded,
§
Court
than
given
the
case,
ascertaining
the
the
the
at
the
To
of
statute
that,
the
a claim
cases
Actions
Two-Year and
Rev.
1049
Cobb's
they
cases,
the
(Spring
dissenting
did
between
so
for
limitations
pleadings
extent
of
referenced
Tort
applicable
a l l i n such
applicable
to
distinction
and
the
is
Most of the
s u f f i c i e n c y of
claim).
addressed
Justice
her
applied
law-review a r t i c l e
Chief
to
McKenzie.
ever
6-2-34(1)
a d d r e s s e d the
on
determining
of
this
in
however,
Webb, L i m i t a t i o n
then
w a n t o n n e s s was
context
decision
reality,
period
according
D i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the
trespass
(e.g.,
that,
understood.
i n the
Suzanne
limitations
o f L i m i t a t i o n s , 49 A l a . L.
apparently
trespass
of
t e r m i s now
(Linda
u n d e r A l a b a m a Law:
The
l i m i t a t i o n s of
r e v i e w e d i n M c K e n z i e and
in
Court's
decision
of
proper
the
or
issue
i t was
of l i m i t a t i o n s .
not
of
of
in
3
I n W.T.
R a t l i f f Co.
v . H e n l e y , 405
So.
2d 141
(Ala.
1981), t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d
a statute-of-limitations issue,
but i t s d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s i s s u e r e l a t e d to a c l a i m o t h e r than
the c l a i m of wantonness d i s c u s s e d l a t e r i n the o p i n i o n .
The
3
11
1090966
Thus,
with
the
the
decisions
exception
of
of
this
Carr,
since
addressed
the
limitations
p e r i o d p r e s c r i b e d by
claims
the
it
question
is in this
§
T h a t a n s w e r was
one,
by
6-2-38(l)
the
before
McKenzie,
§ 6-2-38(l)
the
and
not
be b r o u g h t w i t h i n two
in
compelled i n those cases,
as
that
other
statutes.
"[a]ll
actions
conduct
do
not
arise
another
enumerated
b e l o w , n e i t h e r do
"trespass"
period
In
out
action
they f a l l
to which
§
arising
enumerated i n t h i s
years."
Walker's claims
of
two-year
answered that question
provides
specifically
have
to
i n j u r y to the p e r s o n or r i g h t s of a n o t h e r not
contract
that
and,
is applicable
t e x t of t h a t and
plainly
McKenzie
whether
of wantonness have u n i f o r m l y
affirmative.
noted,
any
specific
Court
contract
within
§
w i t h i n the
and
As
for
from
s e c t i o n must
a l l e g i n g wanton
do
not
implicate
As
explained
6-2-38.
category
of a c t i o n s
6-2-34(1) makes a s i x - y e a r
for
limitations
applicable.
McKenzie,
dissenting
opinion
this
in
Court
quoted
S t r o z i e r v.
from
Marchich,
Justice
Jones's
380
2d
So.
804,
opinion
contained
no
analysis
as
to
the
appropriate
l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d w i t h r e s p e c t to the c l a i m of wantonness.
A l s o , t h e u n d e r l y i n g t o r t was a t r e s p a s s t o l a n d g o v e r n e d b y
§ 6-2-34(2), A l a .
Code 1975, n o t a t r e s p a s s t o t h e p e r s o n o r
l i b e r t y o f a n o t h e r as i n t h e p r e s e n t
case.
12
1090966
809
( A l a . 1980),
i n concluding
McKenzie
turned
wrongful
conduct.'"
it
we r e a f f i r m t h i s
goes,
both McKenzie
have
indeed
actions
that
on " ' t h e d e g r e e
the issue
of c u l p a b i l i t y
McKenzie,
labeled
from
fundamental conclusion
as
a causality-based
trespass
and
c u l p a b i l i t y - b a s e d d i s t i n c t i o n , i . e . , between
and t h o s e b a s e d i n n e g l i g e n c e .
however,
whether
of
s
does n o t answer,
as
as sound.
As
as a g e n e r a l
on
to a
intentional torts
Acceptance of t h i s
i s a trespass
rule
between
the case
conclusion,
but only begs, the separate
a c l a i m of wantonness
question
claim f o r purposes
6-2-34(1).
With
this
Insofar
distinction
trespass
in
of the a l l e g e d
887 S o . 2 d a t 8 7 0 .
and S t r o z i e r document, c o u r t s
moved
presented
respect
opinion
to this
separate
question,
the author
of
o b s e r v e d as f o l l o w s i n h i s d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n i n
Carr:
"In
discussing
the
transition
from
a
jurisprudence
that
categorized
causes
of action
b a s e d on t h e c a u s a l s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s t o o n e t h a t
categorizes
based
on
the
culpability
of
the
tortfeasor,
one
well
known
authority
makes
no
mention
of recklessness
or wantonness,
instead
dividing
actions
m e r e l y between
those i n v o l v i n g
i n t e n t i o n a l conduct and t h o s e i n v o l v i n g n e g l i g e n c e .
See W. P a g e K e e t o n , P r o s s e r a n d K e e t o n on t h e Law o f
Torts
a t 29-31
(5th ed. 1984).
Further,
the
d i s c u s s i o n i n Prosser e x p l a i n s that causes of a c t i o n
for
trespass,
assault
and
battery,
and
false
13
1090966
i m p r i s o n m e n t -- i n o t h e r w o r d s , c a u s e s o f a c t i o n o f
t h e v e r y t y p e a d d r e s s e d i n § 6 - 2 - 3 4 ( 1 ) -- i n v o l v e
i n t e n t i o n a l conduct by t h e t o r t f e a s o r :
'Terms s u c h
as b a t t e r y , a s s a u l t a n d f a l s e i m p r i s o n m e n t , w h i c h
w e r e v a r i e t i e s o f t r e s p a s s , came t o b e a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h i n t e n t , and n e g l i g e n c e
emerged as a s e p a r a t e
tort.
...
There
is still
some
occasional
c o n f u s i o n , a n d some t a l k o f a n e g l i g e n t " a s s a u l t a n d
b a t t e r y , " b u t i n general these terms a r e r e s t r i c t e d
to cases of i n t e n t . '
I d . a t 30 ( f o o t n o t e
omitted).
'"The
i n t e n t i o n t o do h a r m , o r an u n l a w f u l i n t e n t ,
i s o f t h e v e r y e s s e n c e o f an a s s a u l t , a n d w i t h o u t i t
there
c a n be none."'
I d . a t 30 n . 17
(quoting
R a e f e l d t v . K o e n i g , 152 W i s . 4 5 9 , 4 6 2 , 140 N.W. 5 6 ,
57
(1912)).
S e e a l s o i d . a t 31 n . 18 ( e x p l a i n i n g
t h a t ' a s s a u l t and b a t t e r y , f a l s e i m p r i s o n m e n t , and
t r e s p a s s t o l a n d ' were ' d e r i v e d from t r e s p a s s ' ) .
"Our
own c a s e s l i k e w i s e h o l d t h a t t h e t y p e s o f
c l a i m s d e s c r i b e d i n § 6-2-34(1) i n v o l v e i n t e n t i o n a l
harm t o t h e p l a i n t i f f .
See, e.g., Harper v. W i n s t o n
C o u n t y , 892 S o . 2 d 3 4 6 , 353 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) ( e x p l a i n i n g
that
the unconsented touching
i n an a s s a u l t a n d
b a t t e r y must have been done i n t e n t i o n a l l y ) ;
Crown
C e n t . P e t r o l e u m C o r p . v . W i l l i a m s , 679 S o . 2 d 651
( A l a . 1996) ( f a l s e - i m p r i s o n m e n t
case).
In contrast,
' " ' [ w ] a n t o n e s s ' has been d e f i n e d by t h i s C o u r t as
t h e c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some a c t o r t h e o m i s s i o n o f
some d u t y , w h i l e k n o w i n g o f t h e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s
and b e i n g c o n s c i o u s t h a t , f r o m d o i n g o r o m i t t i n g t o
do an a c t , i n j u r y w i l l l i k e l y o r p r o b a b l y r e s u l t . " '
B o z e m a n v . C e n t r a l B a n k o f t h e S o u t h , 646 S o . 2 d
601,
603 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) ( q u o t i n g
Stone v. S o u t h l a n d
Nat'l
I n s . Corp.,
58 9 S o . 2 d 128 9,
1292 ( A l a .
1991)).
'To p r o v e w a n t o n n e s s , i t i s n o t e s s e n t i a l
to prove that the defendant e n t e r t a i n e d a s p e c i f i c
design
or i n t e n t to i n j u r e the p l a i n t i f f . '
Alfa
Mut.
I n s . C o . v . R o u s h , 723 S o . 2 d 1 2 5 0 , 1 2 5 6 ( A l a .
19 9 8 ) . "
14
1090966
Carr,
13 S o . 3 d a t 9 6 2 - 6 3
omitted;
some e m p h a s i s
In A l f a M u t u a l
(Ala.
1998),
explained
intent
to
alleging
Co. v . R o u s h ,
i n the above-quoted
wantonness
injure
(footnotes
added).
Insurance
cited
that
(Murdock, J . , d i s s e n t i n g )
another
involved
was
not
723 S o .
passage,
this
recklessness
an
element
2d 1250
Court
and
of
that
a
claim
wantonness:
"'Wantonness' i s s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d as
'[c]onduct
w h i c h i s c a r r i e d on w i t h a r e c k l e s s o r c o n s c i o u s
disregard of the r i g h t s or safety of others.' A l a .
Code 1 9 7 5 , § 6 - 1 1 - 2 0 ( b ) ( 3 ) .
'Wantonness' has been
d e f i n e d b y t h i s C o u r t a s t h e c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some
a c t o r t h e o m i s s i o n o f some d u t y , w h i l e k n o w i n g o f
the e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s and b e i n g c o n s c i o u s t h a t ,
f r o m d o i n g o r o m i t t i n g t o do an a c t , i n j u r y w i l l
l i k e l y or probably r e s u l t .
Bozeman v. C e n t r a l Bank
o f t h e S o u t h , 646 S o . 2 d 601 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) .
To p r o v e
wantonness, i t i s not e s s e n t i a l to prove that the
defendant entertained a s p e c i f i c design or i n t e n t to
injure the p l a i n t i f f .
J o s e p h v . S t a g g s , 519 S o . 2 d
952
( A l a . 1988).
...
C e r t a i n language i n Lynn
Strickland
[Sales
& Service,
I n c . v.
Aero-Lane
F a b r i c a t o r s , I n c . , 510 S o . 2 d 1 4 2 , 145 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) , ]
suggested that a s p e c i f i c design or i n t e n t to i n j u r e
the
plaintiff
was
an
element
of a
claim f o r
wantonness.
To t h e e x t e n t
t h a t Lynn S t r i c k l a n d
deviates
from
the
statutory
definition
of
w a n t o n n e s s , as f o l l o w e d by t h i s C o u r t , i t i s h e r e b y
overruled."
723
So.
Thicklin,
2d
a t 1256
(emphasis
824 S o . 2 d 723
Porterfield
v. L i f e
added).
( A l a . 2002)
& C a s . Co.
15
See
(citing
also
Ex
parte
A l f a v. Roush);
of Tennessee,
242 A l a . 1 0 2 ,
1090966
105,
5 S o . 2 d 7 1 , 73
Corbitt,
(quoting
Central
411,
118
following proposition:
"'To
constitute willful
with
there
must
a design
be
a
knowledge
purpose
may
knowledge
disregard
116
of
absent,
the
and
probable
110
22
So.
900
A l a . 328,
the
the
So.
345
or i n t e n t i o n a l
a c t done
or
and
[(1897)].'"
with
Birmingham
concert
and b a t t e r y .
of
the
latter
actionable
pertinent
that
with
employs
with
the
We
the
the
foregoing,
term
concepts of
R.
with
reckless
v.
Moorer,
& E.
Louisville
Co.
&
v.
N.R.
62 A m . S t . R e p .
we
"trespass"
false
note
in
§
that
causes
--
imprisonment
an
intent
as f o r m s o f t r e s p a s s .
doctrine
"where g e n e r a l
requiring
of
"noscitur
a
We
sociis,"
the
6-2-34(1)
and
note the aforementioned h i s t o r i c a l
i n j u r y -the
design
(emphasis added)).
Consistent
legislature
this
G.S.R. Co.
[(1896)];
t h e a c t be
omitted
Co. v . A n c h o r s , A d m ' r , 114 A l a . 4 9 2 , 22 S o . 2 7 9 ,
116
accompanied
i n wantonness
Alabama
v.
(1928), f o r the
danger
consequence,
[(1897)];
20
756
i n j u r y , whether
while
of such consequence.
A l a . 642,
Bowers,
be
755,
of
or purpose to i n f l i c t
one o f c o m m i s s i o n o r o m i s s i o n ,
or
So.
o f G e o r g i a Ry.
A l a . 410,
injury
218
(1 941)
in
assault
derivation
to
cause
the
likewise
find
which
holds
a n d s p e c i f i c w o r d s w h i c h a r e c a p a b l e o f an
16
1090966
analogous meaning are
color
from
restricted
Winner
v.
1982)
72
each
Marion
not
and
99
(1916),
that
negligence
4
that
I f we
to
the
that
of
Western
the
Tel.
Union
C.
Sands,
(4th
ed.
other,
2d
they
take
words
general
So.
are
less
1061,
Co.,
general."
1064
196
Ala.
this
C o u r t has
degree of
and
Sutherland
(Ala.
570,
1973)).
stated
that
culpability
wantonness
"are
accept
Inc.,
the
510
So.
difference
2d
Statutory
"[w]antonness
than
negligence"
qualitatively
Lynn S t r i c k l a n d Sales
Fabricators,
are
the
Comm'n, 415
tort concepts."
Aero-Lane
with
and
merely a higher
that
1987).
v.
§ 47.16
i s true
different
v.
Cnty.
State
So.
so
one
to a sense analogous to
Construction
is
other,
(citing
It
associated
& Serv.,
142,
i n these
145
Inc.
(Ala.
concepts
This
Court
indicated
i n Lynn
S t r i c k l a n d that
this
" d i f f e r e n c e i n q u a l i t y rather than i n degree" i s rooted i n a
" d i f f e r e n c e o f d e g r e e ... so m a r k e d as t o a m o u n t s u b s t a n t i a l l y
to a d i f f e r e n c e i n k i n d " :
4
"This
'difference in quality rather
than
in
d e g r e e ' i s w e l l r e c o g n i z e d and f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d by
leading
authorities
on
tort
law.
Restatement
( S e c o n d ) o f T o r t s § 500 comment g ( 1 9 6 5 ) , p r o v i d e s ,
in part, that
' [ t ] h e d i f f e r e n c e between
reckless
m i s c o n d u c t and c o n d u c t i n v o l v i n g o n l y s u c h a quantum
o f r i s k as i s n e c e s s a r y t o make i t n e g l i g e n t i s a
difference
i n the
degree of the
risk,
but
this
difference
o f d e g r e e i s so m a r k e d as
to
amount
s u b s t a n t i a l l y to a d i f f e r e n c e i n k i n d . ' "
17
1090966
as
qualitative
accept
the
i n nature,
difference
qualitative
i n nature,
That s a i d ,
in
Carr,
claims
same
purposes
matter
certainly
and
more
reached
may
intent
as
distinctive.
See o b s e r v e d i n h i s s p e c i a l
the conclusion
"does n o t r e q u i r e
Court
akin
tort
3 d a t 958 n.
words,
claims
that
nor
6
a l l
some
held
for
writing
i n McKenzie
that
statute-of-limitations
wanton
to negligence
has r e p e a t e d l y
intentional
other
we
wantonness
and f o r t h a t
intentional-tort
more c l o s e l y
So.
then
o f r e c k l e s s a n d w a n t o n c o n d u c t o u g h t t o be t r e a t e d t h e
as
this
between
as J u s t i c e
questioning
however,
than
that
form
c o n d u c t be
t o an i n t e n t i o n a l
wantonness
of
i s required
i s neither
i n the r e s u l t ) .
i s that
we
c o n c l u d e t h a t r e c k l e s s o r w a n t o n c o n d u c t i s n o t an
tort.
Strickland,
be
able
an
13
In
to
intentional
5
Lynn
tort;
'super-negligence.'"
(See, J . , c o n c u r r i n g
that
considered
510 S o . 2 d a t 1 4 6 .
W h e t h e r w a n t o n n e s s a n d i n t e n t a r e i n some r e s p e c t s m o r e
s i m i l a r t o one a n o t h e r t h a n a r e n e g l i g e n c e a n d r e c k l e s s n e s s i s
n o t t h e q u e s t i o n we m u s t a n s w e r .
I t i s n o t a s i f we h a v e
b e f o r e us a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o f two y e a r s f o r n e g l i g e n c e
and
a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s of s i x years f o r i n t e n t i o n a l
a c t s , w i t h t h e s e two o p t i o n s as o u r o n l y c h o i c e s a n d o u r t a s k
b e i n g s i m p l y t o d e c i d e t o w h i c h o f t h e s e two t y p e s o f w r o n g f u l
c o n d u c t a w a n t o n a c t i s more s i m i l a r .
I n s t e a d , we h a v e a t
issue a s p e c i f i c statute that prescribes a six-year statute of
limitations
for intentional
torts
and a c a t c h a l l
statute
5
18
1090966
We
are
wantonness
and
clear
are
that
to
alleging
reckless
of
harm
to
claims
of
which
we
interpret
"trespass
assault
the
and
reckless
two-year
to
contract
and
Then C h i e f
"[t]he
majority
wanton
than
those
§
six-year
false
we
or
period
rights
specifically
of
another
enumerated
6-2-34(1),
simply
puts
of
therein, i.e.,
imprisonment
actions
not
forward
the
providing
for
arising
in this
or
claims
within
any
from
section."
J u s t i c e Cobb's d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n
opinion
place
statute
fall
"[a]ll
are
alleging
conclude that
conduct
for
intent,
cannot
of
described
and
conduct
c a t c h a l l p r o v i s i o n i n § 6-2-38(l)
person
not
a
s u c h as
wanton
than
therefore
Concomitantly,
and
recklessness
governance
imposing
liberty,
limitations
the
the
We
intentional torts
battery."
governance of the
injury
as
to p e r s o n or
alleging
a
within
or
claims
a plaintiff.
wantonness
on
that
d i f f e r e n t concepts
d i f f e r e n t types
distinctively
limitations
conclusion
fundamentally
claims
intentional
the
stated
the
that
opposing
p r e s c r i b i n g a two-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s f o r a l l t o r t s
n o t e x p r e s s l y r e f e r e n c e d i n t h e f o r m e r s t a t u t e o r some s i m i l a r
specific
statute.
Under the
choices
made f o r us b y
the
l e g i s l a t u r e , our t a s k i s s i m p l y to d e c i d e
i f wantonness i s
intent.
I f i t i s , a c l a i m a l l e g i n g i t f a l l s w i t h i n the former
s t a t u t e ; i f , by d e f i n i t i o n , i t i s s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t , a c l a i m
alleging
i t falls
outside
that
statute.
Plainly,
i t is
something d i f f e r e n t .
19
1090966
arguments
this
So.
(Ala. 2004)."
2d
at
861
.
in
difference
law
As
of
this
Chief
(again,
that
i s simply
v.
Killian,
opinion,
incorrect.
The
that
is
a
recognition
claim
a
of
wantonness
and
the
is
a notion
little
McKenzie
and
trespass
on
the
on
culpability
that
we
r e a f f i r m today),
a t t e n t i o n to
--
and
no
rather
a n a l y s i s of
than
McKenzie
--
the
After
the
intentional
the extent
"As
the
267
is
the
at
870.
The
following conclusory
of the C o u r t ' s
Court
Johns[,
tort.
treatment
recognized
Ala.
equivalent
261,
in
101
i n law
So.
of t h i s
[Louisville
2d
265
gave
very
meaning
of
and
declaration is
issue i n McKenzie:
& N a s h v i l l e R.R.
(1958)],
to i n t e n t i o n a l
case
causation
wantonness or the d i f f e r e n c e between a c l a i m of wantonness
an
a
" d e t a i l e d the
trespass
of
our
is
Id.
one
3d
intentional
case."
d i f f e r e n c e between
for
there
an
887
So.
basis
J u s t i c e Cobb c o n c e d e d , M c K e n z i e
trespass
trespass
in
Appendix to t h i s
case
between
concluding
and
rejected
Such a v i e w
decision
tort.
Court
wanton
conduct."
887
v.]
conduct
So.
2d
6
I n L o u i s v i l l e & N a s h v i l l e R.R.
v . J o h n s , 267 A l a .
261,
101 So.
2d 265
( 1 9 5 8 ) , t h i s C o u r t was c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h e t h e r
t h e p l a i n t i f f had s a t i s f i e d common-law p l e a d i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s
i n a complaint attempting to a s s e r t corporate l i a b i l i t y f o r
the wanton a c t s of i t s employee where the c o r p o r a t e d e f e n d a n t
had not d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the a c t .
In a d d i t i o n , t h a t
6
20
1090966
As
relied
did
the
i n her
Justice
Strozier
Jones
v.
Court
i n McKenzie,
dissenting
in
a
380
Chief
o p i n i o n upon t h e v i e w s
dissenting
Marchich,
then
So.
opinion
2d
804,
in
806
the
(Ala.
Justice
Cobb
expressed
by
1980
of
case
1980):
" ' " T h e r a t i o n a l e f o r my v i e w c o m p o r t s w i t h t h e
fundamental
concepts of our f a u l t - b a s e d system of
t o r t law.
One who
i n j u r e s another, or
another's
property,
as
a result
of
conduct
intentionally
committed
s h o u l d be h e l d t o a h i g h e r d e g r e e
of
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t h a n one who i n j u r e s a n o t h e r t h r o u g h
a s i m p l e l a c k o f due c a r e .
J u s t as t h e
former,
because of i t s h i g h e r degree of c u l p a b i l i t y , c a r r i e s
a p o t e n t i a l f o r p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s , so s h o u l d i t a l s o
carry
a
longer period
within
which
to
enforce
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r such i n t e n t i o n a l wrong.
One
who
k n o w i n g l y s e t s i n t o m o t i o n , by i n t e n t i o n a l l y d o i n g
...
an
a c t , a sequence
of events
resulting
in
reasonably f o r e s e e a b l e i n j u r y to another, whether
the r e s u l t i n g i n j u r y i s immediate or c o n s e q u e n t i a l ,
i n my o p i n i o n , h a s c o m m i t t e d a t r e s p a s s w i t h i n t h e
contemplation
of
the
six-year
statute
of
limitations.
"'"Indeed, I have s e a r c h e d i n v a i n f o r p o s s i b l e
a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r l i m i t i n g the
p e r i o d of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i n c e r t a i n t o r t cases to
one y e a r a n d i n o t h e r c a s e s t o s i x y e a r s . I s u b m i t
that
the
only
logical,
as
well
as
the
only
d e f e n s i b l e , b a s i s f o r t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s the e x t e n t
of the wrong or the degree of c u l p a b i l i t y . " ' "
c a s e was d e c i d e d b a s e d on a c a u s a l i t y - b a s e d v i e w o f t r e s p a s s
a n d t r e s p a s s on t h e c a s e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e m o d e r n c u l p a b i l i t y based view.
See J o h n s , 267 A l a . a t 2 7 6 - 7 7 , 101 So. 2 d a t 2 7 9 ¬
80.
21
1090966
Appendix,
870,
J.,
So.
quoting
that
of
Strozier,
fundamental
concept
tort.
stating,
f o r example,
that
a result
of conduct
a
"conduct
887
So.
"intentionally
"reasonably
As
lack
870.
of
due
committed"
...
an
intended
injures
the
fact
already noted,
this
an
to
that
Court
"the
the
ignoring
that
the
consequences,
...
as
h e l d to
injures
another
i t s reference
"intentional
the
is
concept
s h o u l d be
by
passage
results
another"
as
reasonable
a
to
wrong."
refers
in
to
only
a
"trespass,"
foreseeability
Id.
agrees,
only
insofar
as
i t goes,
of the
defensible
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s
22
(Jones,
another
n o t i o n e x p r e s s e d a t t h e end
i . e . , that
a p p l y i n g a two-year
as
act"
i s a negligence standard.
passage,
and
and
at
passage
into
i n p a r t by
care"
2d
added)).
quoted
committed
So.
809-10
so
Subsequently,
doing
w i t h the fundamental
quoted
the
" [ o ] n e who
foreseeable injury
notwithstanding
clearly
acts
887
at
of wantonness
intentionally
intentionally
at
2d
o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t h a n one who
simple
2d
with
I t does
intended
through
So.
o m i t t e d ; emphasis
between
a h i g h e r degree
380
difficulty
the
intentional
difference
(quoting McKenzie,
(emphasis
i t collapses
an
at
in turn
dissenting)
The
3d
above-
basis"
for
t o some c o n d u c t
and
1090966
a
six-year
degree
not
statute
of c u l p a b i l i t y "
because
been
of l i m i t a t i o n s
we,
unable
support
like
to
of the wrongdoer.
Justice
find,
a different
to other
Jones,
"policy
We
have
conduct
do s o , h o w e v e r ,
searched
considerations"
conclusion,
but because
i s"the
f o r , but
that
the legislature
h a s made t h e p o l i c y c h o i c e f o r u s b y s t a t u t e . M o r e o v e r ,
Justice
Jones,
we
cannot
conclude
that
B.
Stare
As
" t h e degree
earlier
as
f o r purposes of
of c u l p a b i l i t y . "
Decisis
i n this
Insurance
overrule
unlike
i t i s appropriate to
c o n f l a t e t h e concepts o f wantonness and i n t e n t
assessing
would
Co.
a
v.
case,
this
Parham,
decision
of
693
this
and t h e r e b y r e a f f i r m
t h e law of Alabama
Court
So.
2d
Court
a rule
f o r many
23
was
409
made
that
years
asked
in
(Ala.
only
a
Foremost
1997 ) ,
few
to
years
had been r e c o g n i z e d
before
that
recent
1090966
decision.
Court
7
In deciding
i n Foremost
to overrule
the e a r l i e r
decision, the
declared:
"Although
this
Court
strongly
believes
i n the
d o c t r i n e o f s t a r e d e c i s i s a n d makes e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e
attempt to maintain the s t a b i l i t y of the law, t h i s
Court has had t o r e c o g n i z e
on o c c a s i o n t h a t i t i s
n e c e s s a r y and p r u d e n t t o admit p r i o r m i s t a k e s and t o
t a k e t h e s t e p s n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e t h a t we f o s t e r a
system of j u s t i c e t h a t i s manageable and t h a t i s
f a i r to a l l concerned.
See, e.g., J a c k s o n v. C i t y
of F l o r e n c e ,
2 94 A l a . 5 9 2 , 5 9 8 , 320 S o . 2 d 6 8 , 73
(1975), i n which J u s t i c e Shores, w r i t i n g f o r t h i s
Court, stated:
'As s t r o n g l y a s we b e l i e v e i n t h e
s t a b i l i t y o f t h e l a w , we a l s o r e c o g n i z e
that
there
i s merit, i f not honor, i n admitting p r i o r mistakes
and c o r r e c t i n g them.'"
L i k e t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , one o f t h e i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d i n
Foremost r e l a t e d t o the proper operation
of a statute of
limitations.
In this regard, the s p e c i f i c issue presented i n
F o r e m o s t was when a f r a u d c a u s e o f a c t i o n " a c c r u e d " u n d e r A l a .
Code 1 9 7 5 , § 6 - 2 - 3 0 ( a ) , so as t o t r i g g e r t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e
l i m i t a t i o n s period of § 6-2-38(l).
B e f o r e 1989, t h e C o u r t had
c o n s t r u e d t h e t e r m " a c c r u e d " i n t h a t c o n t e x t t o mean t h a t " a
fraud
claim
accrued,
thus commencing t h e r u n n i n g
of the
s t a t u t o r y l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d , when t h e p l a i n t i f f
discovered
t h e f r a u d o r when t h e p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d h a v e d i s c o v e r e d t h e
fraud i n the exercise of reasonable care."
693 S o . 2 d a t 4 1 7 .
U n d e r t h e c o m b i n e d e f f e c t o f H i c k o x v . S t o v e r , 551 S o . 2 d 2 5 9
( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) , and H i c k s v. G l o b e L i f e & A c c i d e n t I n s u r a n c e Co.,
584 S o . 2 d 458 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , t h a t j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was
changed
so t h a t
the theretofore
recognized
"reasonabler e l i a n c e " s t a n d a r d was r e p l a c e d b y a " j u s t i f i a b l e - r e l i a n c e "
standard.
U n d e r t h a t new s t a n d a r d , a p e r s o n ' s r e l i a n c e was t o
be j u d g e d o n l y b y w h a t he o r s h e a c t u a l l y knew o f f a c t s t h a t
w o u l d h a v e p u t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n on n o t i c e o f f r a u d .
693
So. 2 d a t 4 1 8 . The C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d i n F o r e m o s t t h a t t h e s o c a l l e d " r e a s o n a b l e - r e l i a n c e " s t a n d a r d was i n f a c t t h e p r o p e r
c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y term " a c c r u e d " and o v e r r u l e d
H i c k o x a n d H i c k s on t h a t p o i n t .
7
24
1090966
693
So. 2d a t 4 2 1 .
Consistent
the
extent
within
§
that
the
wantonness
the foregoing,
i t holds
six-year
6-2-34(1).
We
that
a
statute
once
claims
limitations
In
with
her dissenting
in §
by
McKenzie
of wantonness
limitations
reaffirm
are governed
now e m b o d i e d
overrule
claim
of
again
we
now
falls
found
the proposition
the two-year
to
in
that
statute
of
6-2-38(l).
opinion
on o r i g i n a l
submission,
then
C h i e f J u s t i c e Cobb c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s t r e s s i n g "
what
the
she d e s c r i b e d
critical
as t h i s
judicial
"some s o r t o f ' o t h e r
changes
at
reject,
both
The
the
On
original
these
that
Appendix
analysis
based
on c o n f u s i n g
to this
submission
and t o a c t as
opinion,
So.
we
rejected,
a n d we
characterizations
and t h e i r
and i n c o n s i s t e n t
decision
concerning
discussions
appendix,
i n McKenzie
25
again
J u s t i c e ' s " d i s t r e s s " was
the
o f w a n t o n n e s s was n o t s e t t l e d a n d was
Court's
3d
premise.
than c u l p a b i l i t y , "
this
decisis"
disregard
i n t h e wake o f c o m p o s i t i o n
"the law i n Alabama
legal
to
p o l i c y of stare
stated premise f o r the Chief
notion
rather
"willingness to
legislature'"
i n the Court.
.
Court's
So.
and
proper
i n fact
of c a u s a l i t y
3d a t
, prior
that
"McKenzie
1090966
represented
legal
As
a thorough and p e r s u a s i v e
policy
we
t o be a p p l i e d . "
between
Appendix,
noted,
have
persuasive
d i d provide
McKenzie
discussion"
"trespass"
culpability
present
discussion of the proper
rather
"a
of
and
thorough
on
.
and
of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
the case"
causality.
and
3d a t
thorough
"a
the p r o p r i e t y
"trespass
than
So.
based
upon
I t d i d n o t , however,
persuasive
discussion"
of
the
r e s p e c t i v e m e a n i n g s o f t h e t e r m s w a n t o n n e s s a n d i n t e n t , o r how
the concepts r e p r e s e n t e d
in
§ 6-2-34(1)
noted,
and § 6 - 2 - 3 8 ( l ) .
f o r many y e a r s
consistently
limitations
McKenzie
exception,
and
before
decided,
a majority
terms r e l a t e t o the language
Moreover,
applied
JJ.,
Carr,
with
one
of t h i s
13 S o . 3 d a t 956
concurring
a
of wantonness,
i n the
Court
just
has been
our cases
statute
as t h e y
of
did after
Even
suggested with
in
that
their
vote
the a n a l y s i s i n McKenzie.
(See, S t u a r t ,
result);
(Murdock, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) .
two-year
exception.
t h a t t h e y h a d some c o n c e r n r e g a r d i n g
See
as a l s o
M c K e n z i e was d e c i d e d ,
expressly
to claims
was
by those
Carr,
Smith,
13
So.
and
3d
Bolin,
at
959
I n t h e o n l y o p i n i o n w r i t t e n by any
o f t h e f o u r J u s t i c e s who c o n c u r r e d
26
i n the result only, J u s t i c e
1090966
See
opined
revisit
that
McKenzie,
In
not only
Shores
repeated
United
States
Federal
this
Court
were
i t w o u l d be a p p r o p r i a t e
revisiting
applicable
v.
i f a n d when
and
overruling
i n Foremost,
Supreme C o u r t
but also
i n cases
E l e c t i o n Commission,
asked
today,
admonition
we
of
the admonitions
such
U.S.
as C i t i z e n s
find
Justice
of the
United
, 130 S. C t . 876
(2010):
"[I]f
the precedent
under
consideration
itself
depart[s] from the Court's j u r i s p r u d e n c e , r e t u r n i n g
to the ' " i n t r i n s i c a l l y sounder" d o c t r i n e e s t a b l i s h e d
i n p r i o r c a s e s ' may ' b e t t e r s e r v [ e ] t h e v a l u e s o f
stare
decisis
than
would
following
[ t h e ] more
recently
decided
case
inconsistent
with
the
decisions
that
came
before
i t . '
Adarand
Constructors,
I n c . v. Pena,
515 U.S.
2 0 0 , 231
(1995);
see a l s o H e l v e r i n g
[v. H a l l o c k ,
30 9 U.S.
1 0 6 ] , a t 119 [ ( 1 9 4 0 ) ] ; R a n d a l l [ v . S o r r e l l , 54 8 U.S.
230],
a t 274 [ ( 2 0 0 6 ) ]
(Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Abrogating
the
errant
precedent,
rather
than
r e a f f i r m i n g or extending
i t , might b e t t e r
preserve
the
law's coherence and c u r t a i l
the precedent's
disruptive effects."
U.S.
at
, 130 S . C t . a t 9 2 1 .
" ' [ S ] t a r e d e c i s i s i s a p r i n c i p l e o f p o l i c y and n o t
a mechanical formula
of adherence to the l a t e s t
d e c i s i o n , h o w e v e r r e c e n t a n d q u e s t i o n a b l e , when s u c h
adherence i n v o l v e s c o l l i s i o n with a p r i o r d o c t r i n e
more e m b r a c i n g i n i t s s c o p e , i n t r i n s i c a l l y s o u n d e r ,
and v e r i f i e d by e x p e r i e n c e . '
H e l v e r i n g v. H a l l o c k ,
309
U.S. 10 6, 11 9 (1940 ) .
R e m a i n i n g t r u e t o an
'intrinsically
sounder'
doctrine
established i n
27
to
t o do s o .
McKenzie
the above-quoted
t o be
1090966
prior
cases
better
serves
the
values
of
stare
d e c i s i s t h a n w o u l d f o l l o w i n g a more r e c e n t l y d e c i d e d
case
inconsistent
with
the
decisions
that
came
b e f o r e i t ; the l a t t e r c o u r s e w o u l d s i m p l y compound
the
recent
error
and
would
likely
make
the
unjustified
break
from
previously
established
doctrine
c o m p l e t e . In such a s i t u a t i o n ,
'special
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' e x i s t s to depart from the
recently
decided case."
Adarand
Constructors,
Inc.
(1995)
(emphasis
added)
decisis
as
issue
For
to
the
an
v.
Pena,
(considering
of
515
the
U.S.
200,
operation
231-33
of
stare
constitutionalinterpretation).
reasons explained,
McKenzie a l t e r e d the
law
8
in
a
manner t h a t , u n d e r w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s c o n c e r n i n g
the
operation
now
8
"Stare
of
the
doctrine
d e c i s i s i s not
of
an
stare
decisis,
inexorable
we
are
command.
"Particularly
where
a
precedent
or
series
of
p r e c e d e n t s h a s b e e n t r e a t e d as a u t h o r i t a t i v e f o r a
long time, c o u r t s are g e n e r a l l y r e t i c e n t to d e v i a t e
f r o m t h a t p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y where t h e p r e c e d e n t has
been f o l l o w e d f o r a l o n g p e r i o d of years.
fi
"...
A c o u r t may o v e r r u l e p r e c e d e n t a f t e r r e v i e w i n g
the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the e x i s t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
a s t a t u t e , the extent to which t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
has b e e n f i x e d i n t h e f a b r i c of t h e law,
and
the
strength
of
arguments
for
changing
the
interpretation."
2 0 Am.
Jur.
Courts
§
131
(2005).
28
1090966
impelled
and
to o v e r r u l e .
I f we
o v e r r u l e McKenzie,
erroneous
error
and
decision.
to adhere
our
legislature
its
judicial
we
be
e n s h r i n i n g i n our
by
this
the
and
'other l e g i s l a t u r e '
in
State,"
and
Appendix
principles
be
to the p o l i c y
authority
these
failure
A
would
follow
would
s o r t of
this
d i d not
Court
to
law
admit
an
i t s
c h o i c e t h a t h a s b e e n made b y
course
equate[]
that
would
th[is]
"undermine[]
Court
with
some
to the detriment of a l l the c o u r t s
to t h i s
opinion,
to the detriment of the d o c t r i n e
So.
3d a t
,
of s e p a r a t i o n of powers.
9
W h a t w o u l d be t r u l y " d i s t r e s s i n g " w o u l d be i f , when t h i s
C o u r t h a s made an e r r o r a s i t d i d i n M c K e n z i e ,
i t would
be
u n w i l l i n g t o " c o n f e s s " t h a t e r r o r and s e t t h e law r i g h t .
9
I n t h e 17 m o n t h s p r i o r t o t h e o r i g i n a l i s s u a n c e o f t h e
o p i n i o n i n t h i s c a s e on J u n e 3, 2 0 1 1 ( i . e . , t h e p e r i o d d a t i n g
back t o the b e g i n n i n g of 2010), t h i s C o u r t had i s s u e d o p i n i o n s
i n 9 cases o v e r r u l i n g p r e e x i s t i n g precedent.
See W i l l i a m s v .
S t a t e , 73 So. 3d 738 ( A l a . 2 0 1 1 ) ; E x p a r t e R o g e r s , 68 So. 3d
773
( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) ; H u t c h i n s o n v . S t a t e , 66 So. 3d 220 ( A l a .
2010);
S t e e l e v . F e d e r a l N a t ' l M o r t g . A s s ' n , 69 So. 3d 89
(Ala. 2010);
E l l i o t t v . N a v i s t a r , I n c . , 65 So. 3d 379 ( A l a .
2010);
DGB, L L C v . H i n d s , 55 So. 3d 218 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) ;
Riley
v . C o r n e r s t o n e C m t y . O u t r e a c h , 57 So. 3d 704
( A l a . 2010);
R o b e r t s o n v . G a d d y E l e c . & P l u m b i n g , L L C , 53 So. 3d 75 ( A l a .
2010);
and Teer v. J o h n s t o n ,
60 So.
3d 253
( A l a . 2010).
A l t h o u g h t h e r e were i n f a c t c o m p o s i t i o n changes i n the C o u r t
b e t w e e n t h e d a t e o f t h e p r e c e d e n t o v e r r u l e d and t h e d e c i s i o n
o v e r r u l i n g i t , most o f t h o s e c a s e s o v e r r u l i n g p r i o r d e c i s i o n s
were r e n d e r e d by a unanimous v o t e o f t h e C o u r t .
In each of
them, t h e C o u r t , as i t d o e s t o d a y , f e l t c o m p e l l e d t o o v e r r u l e
one o r m o r e p r i o r d e c i s i o n s b a s e d on i t s g o o d - f a i t h b e l i e f
t h a t d o i n g so c o m p o r t e d
with well
established
principles
r e l a t i n g t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f s t a r e d e c i s i s a n d was n e c e s s a r y t o
29
1090966
C.
Prospective
Application
We now t u r n t o t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h
on
June
respect
period
3, 2 0 1 1 , a n d r e a f f i r m
to
litigants
as
today
t o whom
p r e v i o u s l y announced
by
the rule
should
Walker's
announced
i n McKenzie,
retroactively
Although
usual
c l a i m was
this
timely filed
but
t o him the r u l e
the retroactive
practice,
1 0
be
Court
untimely
under
limitations
has
r e g a r d , we
note
the rule
o f law announced
"circumstances
with
i n McKenzie
i f we
application
announced
applied
the six-year
begun t o r u n b u t has n o t y e t e x p i r e d . I n t h i s
that
we
were
of law
to
apply
today.
of judgments i s the
occasionally
dictate
that
set
the law r i g h t .
I n n o n e o f t h e m d i d a n y member o f t h i s
C o u r t c h a l l e n g e t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h o s e i n t h e m a j o r i t y as b e i n g
a f u n c t i o n of a n y t h i n g other than such a g o o d - f a i t h b e l i e f .
Such a c h a l l e n g e would have been i l l - c o n c e i v e d i n each o f
t h o s e c a s e s , j u s t a s i t was i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e .
10
"[R]etroactive
application
of
judgments
is
overwhelmingly
the normal
practice.
M c C u l l a r v.
U n i v e r s a l U n d e r w r i t e r s L i f e I n s . C o . , 687 S o . 2 d 156
( A l a . 1996) ( p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n ) . ' R e t r o a c t i v i t y " i s
in
keeping
with the t r a d i t i o n a l
f u n c t i o n of the
c o u r t s t o d e c i d e c a s e s b e f o r e them b a s e d upon t h e i r
best current understanding of the law
I t also
reflects
the declaratory
theory
of
law,
...
according t o which the courts are understood only t o
f i n d t h e l a w , n o t t o make i t . " '
687 S o . 2 d 1 5 6 ,
q u o t i n g J a m e s B. Beam D i s t i l l i n g C o . v . G e o r g i a , 5 0 1
U.S. 5 2 9 , 5 3 5 - 3 6 ,
111 S . C t . 2 4 3 9 ,
2 4 4 3 - 4 4 , 115
L . E d . 2 d 481 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . "
30
1090966
judicial
Ins.
decisions
be
applied
C o r p . v. S u t h e r l a n d ,
this
context,
"[t]he
700
application
decision
a
exercised
So.
2d
43,
In
(Ala.
on
51
First
1998),
matter
a
So. 2 d 3 4 7 ,
determination
prospective
is
of
of
a
( A l a . 1990)
Tennessee
Court
of
decision
judicial
case-by-case
this
prospectively."
Bank,
N.A.
352
( A l a . 1997).
In
the
retroactive
or
overruling
discretion
basis."
(opinion
Professional
on
v.
Ex
a
that
parte
prior
must
Coker,
be
575
rehearing).
Snell,
718
So.
2d
20
discussed
"certain factors a court should consider i n deciding
whether
a
judicial
decision
i s to
be
applied
nonretroactive.
See C h e v r o n O i l Co. v . H u s o n , 404
U.S.
97 , 92 S. C t . 34 9, 30 L. E d . 2 d 296
(U.S.
1971).
We
quoted
the
Chevron
O i l factors
in
M c C u l l a r v. U n i v e r s a l U n d e r w r i t e r s L i f e I n s . Co.,
687 So. 2 d 156 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) :
"'"First,
the
decision
to
be
applied
nonretroactive
must
establish
a
new
principle
o f l a w , e i t h e r by
overruling
c l e a r p a s t p r e c e d e n t on w h i c h l i t i g a n t s may
have r e l i e d , see, e.g., Hanover Shoe, I n c .
v . U n i t e d S h o e M a c h i n e r y C o r p . , [392
U.S.
4 8 1 , 88 S. C t . 2 2 2 4 , 2 2 3 3 , 30 [ 2 0 ] L. E d .
2d 1231
(1968),]
...
or by d e c i d i n g
an
i s s u e o f f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n whose r e s o l u t i o n
was n o t c l e a r l y f o r e s h a d o w e d , s e e ,
e.g.,
A l l e n v. S t a t e B o a r d o f E l e c t i o n s ,
[393
U.S.
5 4 4 , 5 7 2 , 89 S. C t . 8 1 7 , 8 3 5 , 22 L.
Ed. 2d 1 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ] .
Second,
i t has
been
Professional
(Ala. 1997).
Ins. Corp.
v.
Sutherland,
31
70 0
So.
2d
347,
352
1090966
s t r e s s e d t h a t 'we m u s t ... w e i g h t h e m e r i t s
and d e m e r i t s i n e a c h c a s e by l o o k i n g t o t h e
p r i o r h i s t o r y of the r u l e i n q u e s t i o n , i t s
purpose
and
effect,
and
whether
retrospective
operation w i l l
further
or
retard
i t s operation.'
Linkletter
v.
W a l k e r , [381 U.S.
618 , 62 9, 85 S. C t .
1731,
1 7 3 7 - 3 8 , 14 L. E d . 2d 601 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ] . F i n a l l y ,
we
have weighed the
inequity
imposed
by
retroactive
application,
for
'[w]here
a
decision
of
this
Court
could
produce
substantial inequitable results i f applied
r e t r o a c t i v e l y , t h e r e i s ample b a s i s i n our
cases
for
avoiding
the
"injustice
or
hardship"
by
a
holding
of
nonretroactivity.'"'
"687
So. 2d
1 0 6 - 0 7 , 92
(1971))."
718
So.
2d
factors,"
a t 165
( q u o t i n g C h e v r o n O i l , 404
S.
Ct.
at
355,
30
L.
Ed.
2d
at
"[a]
24.
Consistent
decision
with
overruling
the
U.S.
at
aforesaid
the
(2005).
interest
Compare
"appropriate"
prior
precedent
e l e m e n t s as
for
to
to
of
justice."
Foremost,
apply
and
certain
determining
the
statute-of-limitations
20
693
Am.
So.
Jur.
2d
prospectively
reinstating
t y p e s of
date
of
32
a
at
claims
accrual
2d
by
421
of
rules
and
such
equity
Courts
§
(finding
decision
earlier
fraud
purposes).
"Chevron
a j u d i c i a l p r e c e d e n t may
l i m i t e d to p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n where r e q u i r e d
in
at
296
be
or
151
i t
overruling
as
the
to
the
standard
claims
for
1090966
The a b o v e - d i s c u s s e d p r i n c i p l e s r e q u i r e
our
ruling
of persons
generally
who
have been w a n t o n l y
years
a n d who
Court
announced
the
so as t o i m m e d i a t e l y
therefore
six-year
could
limitations
cut o f f the
relied
Thus,
period
upon t h e r u l e
f o r a person
announced
than
two
years
original
issuance
conclude
that
from
n o t be
person
whose
3,
of the Court's
i t i s just
period
June
i n McKenzie
affected
2011
opinion
and e q u i t a b l e
by
our holding
limitations
period
in this
that
the
expire
will,
on a d a t e
(the date
i n this
would
this
a s t o whom
under the r u l e announced i n the p r e s e n t case, e x p i r e
less
claims
i n j u r e d w i t h i n the l a s t s i x
have
i n McKenzie.
t h a t we n o t a p p l y
of
the
case),
we
limitations
case.
more
For a
than
two
y e a r s f r o m J u n e 3, 2 0 1 1 , h o w e v e r , e q u i t y d o e s n o t r e q u i r e
that
that
than
person
would
a party
other
have
words,
causes
of
as
action,
a
of a c t i o n
shall
time
whose c a u s e
the o r i g i n a l
case,
more
unless
of
our
two
and
holding,
on o r b e f o r e
i s s u a n c e by t h i s
have
h i s or her a c t i o n
o f a c t i o n a c c r u e d on t h a t
result
accrued
to bring
years
Court
from
to the extent
33
June
date.
litigants
In
whose
3, 2 0 1 1 , t h e d a t e
of i t s opinion
that
date
to
that
the time
in this
bring
their
for
filing
1090966
their
in
action
McKenzie
On
our
under
would
in
six-year
expire
rehearing,
holding
the
A
a n d two
of
this
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r i n the
of
a
purely
curiae
notes
should
be
Terminal
Jefferson
legislative
our
guided
Ry.
v.
County
announced
sooner.
Capstone
Part
limitations period
as
seek to
frame
"premised
on
a
[McKenzie] Court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
to
The
argument
Foremost,
instead
by
cases
Lyles,
797
So.
Commission
curiae
opinion
issue."
citation
amici
v.
but
like
2d
So.
amici
that
State
(Ala.
32
the
suggests
Alabama
432
Edwards,
of
Docks
2001 ),
3d
572
"This
case i s d i f f e r e n t [from Foremost].
The
Court's
decision
here
is
premised
on
a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r i n the Court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of
a
purely
legislative
issue.
The
Court
has
o v e r r u l e d M c K e n z i e [ v . K i l l i a n , 887 So. 2 d 861 ( A l a .
2 0 0 4 ) , ] a s we h a v e s e e n , b e c a u s e t h a t c a s e b r e a c h e d
the s e p a r a t i o n of powers.
...
" C o n c l u s i v e g u i d a n c e on p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n
thus
comes,
not
from
Foremost,
but
from
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y weighted cases l i k e L y l e s ,
supra,
and E d w a r d s , s u p r a . Where c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s a r e
in play, t h i s Court explained i n Lyles,
prospective
d e c i s i o n s are 'disfavored':
34
and
(Ala.
2009):
"'Since
the
Constitution
does
not
change from y e a r to year; s i n c e i t does not
conform to our d e c i s i o n s , but our d e c i s i o n s
are supposed to conform to i t ; the n o t i o n
t h a t our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n
we
1090966
in
a
particular
decision
could
take
p r o s p e c t i v e f o r m d o e s n o t make s e n s e . '
"Lyles,
7 97
So.
2d
a t 439
A s s ' n s , I n c . v.
S m i t h , 4 96
(Scalia, J., concurring))."
Brief
of A m i c i
Defense
Lawyers
Rehearing,
By
such
at
Business Council
Association
Lyles
the
fact
in
or
and
Edwards,
that
an
to whether t h a t
prospectively.
holds.
that
For
prospective
this
issue,
predicate
faulty.
We
i t s part,
"disfavored."
for
Support
"conclusive
the
of
amici
Alabama
Application
note
that
comes f r o m
curiae
appear
decision
f o r no o t h e r
decision will
for
be
is
application
however,
of
case
necessary
because,
argument
such
f o r us
as
advanced
a
to
based
the
upon
in
retroactively
explicitly
further
amici
so
stated
decision
discussed
by
argue
consideration
applied
neither
cases
to
L y l e s , upon w h i c h Edwards r e l i e d ,
I t i s not
the
guidance"
appellate
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s allows
regard
o f A l a b a m a and
6-7.
asserting that
as
that
Curiae
( q u o t i n g Am.
Trucking
U.S.
167,
201
(1990 )
is
address
below,
curiae
the
is
1 1
We
a l s o note t h a t L y l e s i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t h a t the
" r e t r o a c t i v i t y i s s u e " c o n f r o n t i n g t h e C o u r t i n L y l e s was
not,
as h e r e , how
to a p p l y the immediate d e c i s i o n of t h i s C o u r t
o v e r r u l i n g one o f i t s own p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n s .
Instead,
the
q u e s t i o n i n L y l e s was w h e t h e r t o a p p l y t o t h e c a s e b e f o r e i t
11
35
1090966
This
Court's
constitution,
any
decision
today
state
or f e d e r a l ,
either
"constitutional
decision
today
error"
correct
made
Scalia's
Smith,
special
496 U.S.
n o r does
prior
(1990),
decision.
the Constitution";
rather,
Court
and i n t h e p r e s e n t case
discern
correctly
language
i n i t s place a
intent
and 6 - 2 - 3 8 ( l ) .
from
Justice
Trucking Ass'n
v.
"interpretation
provided i n both
r e f l e c t s merely
the l e g i s l a t i v e
o f §§ 6 - 2 - 3 4 ( 1 )
advanced
d i d not i n McKenzie,
the analysis
McKenzie
Our
construction.
passage
n o r do we i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , e n g a g e i n some
of
the
Contrary to the suggestion
i n American
this
on
i trecognize
interpretation
of the quoted
concurrence
167
based
a n d we s u p p l y t o d a y
interpretation.
the invocation
not
of statutory
the statutory
was i n c o r r e c t ,
statutory
by
any
i s simply a matter
We r e c o g n i z e t o d a y t h a t
i n McKenzie
in
is
an e f f o r t t o
reflected
i n the
1 2
w h a t t h e C o u r t r e f e r r e d t o a s an " o u t c o m e - d e t e r m i n a t i v e c h a n g e
i n t h e p o s i t i v e l a w " p r o v i d e d by an e x t e r n a l s o u r c e , n a m e l y a
d e c i s i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t as t o t h e m e a n i n g
o f t h e E l e v e n t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
797 S o . 2 d a t 4 3 8 . B e c a u s e t h a t d e c i s i o n was r e n d e r e d b y t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t " h e a r d " t h e
appeal i n L y l e s , t h i s Court answered that q u e s t i o n i n the
affirmative.
I d . a t 439.
The o n l y r e f e r e n c e i n o u r a n a l y s i s t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n
comes i n r e s p o n s e
t o t h e v i e w e x p r e s s e d by former C h i e f
J u s t i c e Cobb i n h e r d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n on o r i g i n a l s u b m i s s i o n
1 2
36
1090966
The
brief
of the amici
curiae
i n support
of
rehearing
a l s o seeks t o d i m i n i s h
t h i s C o u r t ' s c o n c e r n w i t h any p o t e n t i a l
unfairness
of a f u l l y
r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of our holding
today
citing
by
legislature's
a
general
only
authority
rule
alter
Of c o u r s e ,
action
that,
the
proposition
a l t e r a t i o n of a l i m i t a t i o n s period
the p l a i n t i f f ' s
8-9.
for
by
we
the p l a i n t i f f ' s
"remedy."
substantive
i t snature,
makes
here
"a new
with
a
does n o t as
rights, but
See b r i e f o f a m i c i
are not concerned
that
curiae, at
legislative
rule."
1 3
Even
a
(see a p p e n d i x t o t h i s o p i n i o n ,
So. 3d a t
) that the
c o u r s e f o l l o w e d i n o u r o r i g i n a l d e c i s i o n -- a n d o u r d e c i s i o n
t o d a y -- i t s e l f r e p r e s e n t s a c t i o n b y t h i s C o u r t a s "some s o r t
of 'other l e g i s l a t u r e ' " i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e s e p a r a t i o n - o f powers p r o v i s i o n of t h e Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n .
Specifically,
i n P a r t I I . B . , we f i r s t d i s c u s s t h e p r i n c i p l e s t h a t s u r r o u n d
and i n f o r m t h e d o c t r i n e o f s t a r e d e c i s i s a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t
t h a t d o c t r i n e does n o t p r e v e n t our o v e r r u l i n g McKenzie i n t h i s
case.
We t h e n r e a s o n t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e d o c t r i n e o f s t a r e
d e c i s i s d o e s n o t p r e v e n t u s f r o m o v e r r u l i n g M c K e n z i e , i f we
did not overrule
McKenzie today and announce a s t a t u t o r y
interpretation
that
comports
with
our understanding
of
l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t , t h a t w o u l d be t h e c o u r s e t h a t w o u l d i n
f a c t p l a c e t h i s Court i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f a c t i n g , i n t h e words
of
then
Chief
Justice
Cobb,
as
"some
sort
of
'other
legislature.'"
Appendix to t h i s opinion,
So. 3d a t
.
"'Legislation
... l o o k s
to the future
and changes
e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s b y m a k i n g a new r u l e
New O r l e a n s
Pub.
Serv., I n c . v.
C o u n c i l o f New O r l e a n s ,
4 9 1 U.S. 3 5 0 ,
370-71 (1989) ( q u o t i n g P r e n t i s v . A t l a n t i c C o a s t L i n e Co., 211
U.S. 2 1 0 , 2 2 6
(1908)).
1 3
37
1090966
legislature,
the
point
however,
that
commencement
See
cannot
i t does
not permit
of actions
Thomas v . N i e m a n n ,
legislature
provided
action
may
or
time
142 S o . 5 5 0 , 550
124,
125
542,
must
remain
of
the
existence
cannot
would
be
be
was
our
to
reasonable
reaffirmed
today.
The
("[T]he
limitation
causes of
225 A l a . 1 9 9 ,
238 A l a .
t o t h e remedy
the
regardless
44 A l a .
injury
of the
has
source
i t remained
in
occurred.").
we a d h e r e t o o u r c o n c l u s i o n
announce
decision
transition
after
provided
a
to
and
the
decision
that
applied
to bring
more t h a n two y e a r s
that
rule
would
not
announced
application f o r rehearing
38
that
cut o f f the right
so as t o i m m e d i a t e l y
original
of
for existing
curtailed
s u i t upon any c l a i m t h a t had a c c r u e d
to
( A l a . 1981)
("[T]he r i g h t
breached,
the breach
unjust
retroactively
claims.
and Coleman v. Holmes,
(1939)
B a s e d on t h e f o r e g o i n g ,
it
accrued
v. Loveman,
of action vested,
which
when
f o r the
See g e n e r a l l y P i c k e t t v M a t t h e w s ,
and r i g h t
duty
(1932);
period to
time
periods
i s allowed
5 4 5 , 192 S o . 2 6 1 , 264
occurred
shorten
Cronheim
201,
and
a reasonable
397 S o . 2 d 9 0 , 93
t o be b r o u g h t . " ) ;
(1870).
a limitations
to vindicate already
create
a reasonable
shorten
prior
provide
then
filed
a
and
by
1090966
Capstone
curiae
and t h e b r i e f
provide
us w i t h
i n support
no
thereof
compelling
filed
reason
by t h e a m i c i
to alter
this
conclusion.
Notwithstanding
our r e j e c t i o n
rehearing
a s t o why we s h o u l d
decision
i n this
prospective
argument
should
case
of the arguments
revisit
should,
as
our conclusion
a
general
rule,
made
that our
have
and t h e a m i c i
b e made f o r C a p s t o n e
curiae
itself.
that
As C a p s t o n e
an
exception
argues:
"Despite
i t s agreement w i t h
[Capstone],
this
Court
has
elected
to
apply
this
opinion
p r o s p e c t i v e l y only, meaning t h a t Capstone w i l l not
receive
t h e b e n e f i t from coming
forward
as t h e
vehicle to allow f o r the c o r r e c t i o n of the law.
Alabama j u r i s p r u d e n c e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a p r e v a i l i n g
p a r t y on a p p e a l s h o u l d be r e w a r d e d f o r i t s e f f o r t s
i n coming forward t o c o r r e c t erroneous d e c i s i o n s .
This Court has p r e v i o u s l y determined t h a t such a
policy
provides
'an i n c e n t i v e f o r l i t i g a n t s
to
c h a l l e n g e e x i s t i n g r u l e s o f law t h a t a r e i n need o f
r e f o r m . ' H o s e a O. W e a v e r & S o n s , I n c . v . T o w n e r , 663
So.
2 d 8 9 2 , 899 ( A l a . 19 9 5 ) ( q u o t i n g
Prospective
A p p l i c a t i o n o f J u d i c i a l D e c i s i o n s , 33 A l a . L. R e v . ,
463, 473 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . "
The
a
a p p l i c a t i o n , we a r e p e r s u a d e d b y t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
of Capstone
Capstone's
on
application f o rrehearing,
amici
c u r i a e make a s i m i l a r
a t 2.
argument:
"Capstone has s u c c e s s f u l l y p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court f o r
a c o r r e c t i o n o f t h e l a w — b u t w i l l be d e n i e d r e l i e f
i n i t s own c a s e .
[ T h e a m i c i c u r i a e ] h a v e f o u n d no
other
decision
i n which
this
Court
rendered
a
39
1090966
j u d g m e n t w i t h t h a t e f f e c t . C f . P a l m H a r b o r Homes,
I n c . v . T u r n e r , 796
So.
2d 2 9 5 ,
297
( A l a . 2001 )
( r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n o f new d e c i s i o n t o p a r t i e s
a t b a r w o u l d ' r e w a r d [ ] t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y on
the
appeal,
thereby
providing
"an
incentive
for
litigants
to challenge
e x i s t i n g r u l e s of law
that
are i n need of reform"') ( q u o t i n g P r o f . Ins. Corp.
v. S u t h e r l a n d ,
700 So. 2d 3 4 7 , 352
(Ala. 1997))."
Brief
of
Defense
amici
curiae
Lawyers A s s o c i a t i o n ,
Authorities
are
cited
reflected in
the
application
Unocal
Business
of
Corp.,
an
990
by
at
both
2d
Capstone
of
a d o p t e d by
291
o f A l a b a m a and
(Ala.
the
and
the
issue
this
Court
amici
of
curiae
prospective
in Griffin
2008):
"'"The
determination
of
the
r e t r o a c t i v e or p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of
a decision overruling a prior decision is
a m a t t e r of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n t h a t must
be e x e r c i s e d on a c a s e - b y - c a s e b a s i s . " Ex
p a r t e C o k e r , 575 So. 2d 4 3 , 51 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) ,
c i t i n g C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m v. B l o u n t C o u n t y ,
533 So. 2d 534
( A l a . 1988); S t a t e Dep't of
Revenue v.
Morrison
Cafeterias
Consol.,
I n c . , 487 So. 2d 898
(Ala. 1985). Although
circumstances
occasionally
dictate
that
j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s be a p p l i e d p r o s p e c t i v e l y
o n l y , r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of judgments
is
overwhelmingly
the
normal
practice.
McCullar
v.
Universal
Underwriters
Life
Ins.
Co.,
687
So.
2d
156
(Ala.
1996)
(plurality opinion). "Retroactivity 'is in
keeping w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n
of
the
courts
to decide
cases before
them
b a s e d upon t h e i r b e s t c u r r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of
the
law
It
also
reflects
the
40
Alabama
13.
discussion
opinion
So.
Council
v.
1090966
d e c l a r a t o r y t h e o r y o f l a w , ... a c c o r d i n g t o
which the courts are understood
only to
f i n d t h e l a w , n o t t o make i t . ' " 687 S o . 2 d
1 5 6 , q u o t i n g J a m e s B. Beam D i s t i l l i n g C o .
v . G e o r g i a , 5 0 1 U.S. 5 2 9 , 5 3 5 - 3 6 , 111 S.
Ct.
2439,
2443-44,
115 L. E d . 2 d 4 8 1
(1991).
W h i l e r e l i a n c e upon p r i o r l a w i s
an
"important
variable
that
must
be
appraised
in
every
case
presenting
q u e s t i o n s o f p r o s p e c t i v i t y , " we
conclude
t h a t , as a p o l i c y m a t t e r , t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
of t h i s newly adopted r u l e t o these p a r t i e s
"rewards
the p r e v a i l i n g
party
on t h e
a p p e a l , t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g 'an i n c e n t i v e f o r
l i t i g a n t s to challenge e x i s t i n g rules of
l a w t h a t a r e i n n e e d o f r e f o r m . ' " H o s e a O.
W e a v e r & S o n s , I n c . v . T o w n e r , 663 S o . 2 d
8 9 2 , 899 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , q u o t i n g P r o s p e c t i v e
A p p l i c a t i o n o f J u d i c i a l D e c i s i o n s , 33 A l a .
L . R e v . 4 6 3 , 473 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . '
" P r o f e s s i o n a l I n s . Corp.
3 4 7 , 352 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) .
v. S u t h e r l a n d ,
700 S o . 2 d
"'Because t h e r u l e s t a t e d i n t h i s o p i n i o n
would change t h i s C o u r t ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f
the l i m i t a t i o n s p r o v i s i o n o f § 6-5-547(a)
and r e j e c t i t s p r e v i o u s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e
s t a t u t e , a c o n s t r u c t i o n [ t h e p l a i n t i f f ] may
h a v e r e l i e d o n , we w o u l d a p p l y t h i s new
rule
prospectively
only,
i . e . , to
legal-malpractice actions f i l e d after the
date
o f t h i s d e c i s i o n . See P r o f e s s i o n a l
I n s . C o r p . v . S u t h e r l a n d , 700 S o . 2 d 3 4 7 ,
351-52 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) ; F o r e m o s t I n s . Co. v .
P a r h a m , 693 S o . 2 d 4 0 9 , 4 2 1 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) ;
McCullar
v. U n i v e r s a l U n d e r w r i t e r s
Life
I n s . C o . , 687 S o . 2 d 1 5 6 , 1 6 5 - 6 6 ( A l a .
1996).'
"Ex p a r t e P a n e l l , 7 5 6 S o . 2 d 8 6 2 , 869 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 )
( p l u r a l i t y opinion of three J u s t i c e s , but a l l s i x
41
1090966
remaining Justices
c o n c u r r e d i n the
result,
thus
joining
in
the
decision
for
prospective
relief
only)."
990
So.
2d
at
312-13
(adopting
Harwood's s p e c i a l w r i t i n g
755,
761
(Ala.
After
Justice
this
Court
reasoning
i n C l i n e v. A s h l a n d ,
of
Inc.,
Justice
970
So.2d
2007)).
discussing
Harwood
the
in
his
in Griffin,
the
factors
special
outlined
writing
in
in
Chevron
Cline,
adopted
continued:
"My
view
of
the
proper
construction
to
be
a c c o r d e d the term ' a c c r u e d ' i n § 6-2-30(a) i n
the
context
of
toxic-substance-exposure
cases
would
e s t a b l i s h a new p r i n c i p l e o f l a w b y o v e r r u l i n g
clear
p a s t p r e c e d e n t on w h i c h l i t i g a n t s may
have r e l i e d .
This consideration
weighs i n f a v o r of a p r o s p e c t i v e
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e , as d o e s t h e p u r p o s e o f
time l i m i t a t i o n s for f i l i n g actions.
On t h e
other
hand, C l i n e ,
as t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n
bringing
a b o u t a c h a n g e i n t h e l a w s h o u l d be r e w a r d e d f o r h i s
e f f o r t s a n d t o d e n y h i m t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e new
rule
w o u l d h a v e a c h i l l i n g e f f e c t on l i t i g a n t s who
desire
to c h a l l e n g e e x i s t i n g r u l e s of law t h a t are i n need
o f r e f o r m . W e i g h i n g t h e m e r i t s and d e m e r i t s o f
the
possible
options for effectuating
t h e new
rule, I
w o u l d recommend t h a t
i t be
accorded a completely
p r o s p e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n , save o n l y f o r i t s a p p l i c a t i o n
i n C l i n e ' s c a s e , where i t would a p p l y r e t r o a c t i v e l y .
Therefore,
except
for
Cline,
only
those
persons
whose l a s t e x p o s u r e t o a t o x i c s u b s t a n c e , and
first
manifest
injury
resulting
from
that
exposure,
o c c u r r e d w i t h i n two
y e a r s of the o p i n i o n a d o p t i n g
t h e new
r u l e w o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o h a v e t h e
accrual
of t h e i r cause of a c t i o n d e t e r m i n e d a c c o r d i n g to the
new
rule."
42
Oil,
by
1090966
Griffin,
second
990
So.
2d
emphasis
We
see
approach
no
a t 313-14
(first
emphasis
in
original;
added).
reason
to
i n the present
hesitate
case.
in
As
following
noted,
the
Walker
same
filed
a
c o m p l a i n t on J u l y 1 0 , 2 0 0 7 , a l l e g i n g c l a i m s b o t h o f n e g l i g e n c e
and w a n t o n n e s s b a s e d
a date
less
(although
occurred
before
that
t h a n two y e a r s b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g
i t was
on J u n e
later
6,
the f i l i n g
Walker
period
any p a r t i c u l a r
announced
Civil
Walker
Appeals
reliance
A c c o r d i n g l y , we
reversing
i n question
than
i s no
on
two
years
indication
the
six-year
i n d e c i d i n g when t o
conclude
wantonness
that
today's
claim.
Conclusion
t h e summary
i s r e v e r s e d ; the case
the t r i a l
There
the f o r e g o i n g , the judgment
judgment by t h e C o u r t
of
the events
i n McKenzie
should apply to Walker's
on
of the complaint
and t h e r e f o r e more
III.
Based
that
of the complaint).
h i s complaint.
decision
shown
2005,
placed
limitations
file
on e v e n t s t h a t o c c u r r e d on J u l y 1 2 , 2 0 0 5 ,
of C i v i l
judgment
i s remanded
Appeals
court.
43
of
the Court
of
entered against
f o r the entry of a
affirming
the judgment
1090966
A P P L I C A T I O N GRANTED; O P I N I O N OF JUNE 3, 2 0 1 1 , WITHDRAWN;
OPINION
S U B S T I T U T E D ; REVERSED AND
Stuart,
Bolin,
Murdock
and Main,
Woodall,
REMANDED.
P a r k e r , Shaw, a n d W i s e ,
J J . ,concur
J . , dissents.
44
J J . , concur.
specially.
1090966
MURDOCK, J u s t i c e
In
addition
dissenting
(Ala.
on
opinion
to
opinion
1980)
opinion),
Cobb
(concurring specially).
(a
i t s reliance
i n Strozier
reliance
the dissenting
June
3,
that
would
of the concepts
manner
which
i n then
that
have
difference
actor
of intent
and
involving
in
the
appendix
the confusion
and wantonness
then
analyzed
804
main
Justice
to the
and/or
by t h e
various
the discharge of a
Cobb's
t h e same
effect,
I will
intent
firearm
entails
to produce
the intent
o f some
an a c t , i n j u r y w i l l
first
opinion
address
the
t o do an a c t , b u t n o t t h e
the consequence
i s t o be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e .
the omission
dissenting
and wantonness.
or i n j u r y
As n o t e d ,
f o r which
the
"wantonness" has
a s t h e " ' c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some a c t
duty,
while
c o n d i t i o n s and b e i n g c o n s c i o u s t h a t ,
do
an
Justice
been d e f i n e d by our cases
or
as
Chief
between
Wantonness
intent
So. 2d
B e f o r e a d d r e s s i n g these h y p o t h e t i c a l s and o t h e r
statements
would
discussed
perpetuate
i t described
situations
i n t o a crowd.
i s
380
Jones's
o p i n i o n i s s u e d by then C h i e f
conflation
hypothetical
Justice
v. M a r c h i c h ,
2011, and a t t a c h e d
i s s u e d today,
in
upon
likely
knowing
of the e x i s t i n g
from doing or o m i t t i n g t o
or probably r e s u l t . ' "
45
George v.
1090966
Alabama
Power
A l f a Mut.
Co.,
13
I n s . Co.
v.
So.
3d
360,
R o u s h , 723
368
So.
(Ala.
2d
1250,
(emphasis o m i t t e d ;
emphasis added))
J o h n s o n , 75
624
( A l a . 2011)
(to l i k e
opinion,
wantonness
involves
in
the
So.
main
omitted
with
reckless
3d
knowledge
d i s r e g a r d of
of
105,
case).
element
5
So.
2d
Specific
of
"'[c]onduct
Co.
§
v.
723
conduct
So.
on
"probability"
So.
injure
the
on
been
with
at
1256
done
and
3d
turn
plaintiff
statutorily
(quoting
with
Ala.
another
not
an
defined
as
conscious
A l f a Mut.
Ala.
or
at
is
a r e c k l e s s or
or s a f e t y of o t h e r s . ' "
2d
noted
o f T e n n e s s e e , 242
in
v.
Code
Ins.
1975,
1 4
contrast,
carried
"'"act
quoting
w h i c h has
Co.
1998)
As
consequence,
(1941),
to
(Ala.
S o u t h e r n Ry.
an
73
is carried
rights
6-11-20(b)(3)).
In
the
Roush,
probable
(quoting
effect).
& Cas.
71,
wantonness,
d i s r e g a r d of the
; Norfolk
Life
intent
which
1256
such consequence."'"
( q u o t i n g P o r t e r f i e l d v.
102,
the
2008 )
the
concept
by
of
the
a
of
actor
given
intent
merely
does
with
consequence.
an
not
apply
to
awareness
of
Instead,
the
law
S e e a l s o A l a b a m a P a t t e r n J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n s : C i v i l 29.00
(2d e d . 1 9 9 3 ) ( C u m . S u p p . 2 0 1 0 ) : " [ A n
actor]'s
conduct i s
wanton i f [he/she] c o n s c i o u s l y a c t s of f a i l s to a c t w i t h a
r e c k l e s s or c o n s c i o u s
d i s r e g a r d of the r i g h t s or s a f e t y of
o t h e r s and [ h e / s h e ] i s aware t h a t harm w i l l l i k e l y o r p r o b a b l y
result."
(Emphasis added.)
1 4
46
1090966
reserves
desires
the term
or
is substantially certain
from h i s or her
Torts
the
"intent" for circumstances
act.
As
(1965) e x p l a i n s ,
Restatement
desires
to
believes
result
further
cause
that
from
The
of
this
it."
to
consequences
consequences
the
i n j u r y to
actor
result
(Second)
of
' i n t e n t ' i s used throughout
Subject
(Emphasis
the
of the Restatement
" [ t ] h e word
the
the
§ 8A
of
where
of
are
added.)
denote
his
that
act,
the
or
actor
that
substantially certain
he
to
1 5
c o m m e n t s t o § 8A o f t h e R e s t a t e m e n t
(Second)
of
Torts
explain:
"a.
' I n t e n t , ' as i t i s u s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e
Restatement
of
Torts,
has
reference
to
the
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f an a c t r a t h e r t h a n t h e a c t i t s e l f .
...
'Intent' i s l i m i t e d , wherever i t i s used, to
the consequences of the a c t .
Section 1
explains that
1 5
of
the
"[a] p e r s o n
consequence i f :
"(a)
producing
the
that
Restatement
acts
with
person
acts
consequence;
the
(Third)
intent
with
or
of
added.)
47
(2010)
to produce
a
purpose
of
the
"(b)
the
person
acts
knowing
consequence i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y c e r t a i n to
(Emphasis
Torts
that
the
result."
1090966
"b. A l l c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h t h e a c t o r d e s i r e s t o
b r i n g a b o u t a r e i n t e n d e d , as t h e word i s u s e d i n
t h i s R e s t a t e m e n t . I n t e n t i s n o t , however, l i m i t e d t o
c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h a r e d e s i r e d . I f t h e a c t o r knows
t h a t the consequences are c e r t a i n , or s u b s t a n t i a l l y
certain,
t o r e s u l t from h i s a c t , and s t i l l
goes
a h e a d , he i s t r e a t e d b y t h e l a w as i f he h a d i n f a c t
d e s i r e d t o p r o d u c e t h e r e s u l t . As t h e p r o b a b i l i t y
that the consequences
will
f o l l o w d e c r e a s e s , and
becomes l e s s t h a n s u b s t a n t i a l c e r t a i n t y , t h e a c t o r ' s
c o n d u c t l o s e s t h e c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t , and becomes
m e r e r e c k l e s s n e s s , as d e f i n e d i n § 5 0 0 . "
(Emphasis
added.)
Comment f t o R e s t a t e m e n t
discusses
the
difference
(Second)
between
of Torts
intentional
§ 500
(1965)
misconduct
recklessness:
"f.
Intentional
misconduct
and
recklessness
contrasted.
Reckless
misconduct
differs
from
intentional
wrongdoing
in
a
very
important
p a r t i c u l a r . W h i l e an a c t t o be r e c k l e s s m u s t be
i n t e n d e d by t h e a c t o r , t h e a c t o r does n o t i n t e n d t o
cause t h e harm w h i c h r e s u l t s from i t . I t i s enough
t h a t he r e a l i z e s o r , f r o m f a c t s w h i c h he
knows,
should r e a l i z e that there i s a strong p r o b a b i l i t y
t h a t h a r m may r e s u l t , e v e n t h o u g h he h o p e s o r e v e n
expects
that
h i s conduct
will
prove
harmless.
However, a s t r o n g p r o b a b i l i t y i s a d i f f e r e n t t h i n g
from the s u b s t a n t i a l
certainty
without which
he
c a n n o t be s a i d t o i n t e n d t h e h a r m i n w h i c h h i s a c t
results."
(Emphasis
added.)
American
and
Jurisprudence
explains
i t this
way:
"An i n d i v i d u a l may u n d e r t a k e an i n t e n t i o n a l a c t ,
i f t h e a c t i s u n d e r t a k e n w i t h o u t an i n t e n t t o
48
and
1090966
harm or a s u b s t a n t i a l c e r t a i n t y t h a t
harm
will
r e s u l t f r o m t h e a c t , t h e a c t o r i s n o t g u i l t y o f an
i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t . Instead, i n such a s i t u a t i o n , the
activity
is
properly
classified
as
reckless
d i s r e g a r d o f s a f e t y o r r e c k l e s s m i s c o n d u c t . To be
r e c k l e s s , t h e a c t m u s t be i n t e n d e d
by t h e a c t o r ;
b u t , a t t h e same t i m e , t h e a c t o r d o e s n o t i n t e n d t o
cause t h e harm w h i c h r e s u l t s from i t . Thus, r e c k l e s s
m i s c o n d u c t r e s u l t s when a p e r s o n , w i t h no i n t e n t t o
cause
harm,
i n t e n t i o n a l l y performs
an
act
so
u n r e a s o n a b l e a n d d a n g e r o u s t h a t he o r s h e k n o w s o r
should
know i t i s h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t h a r m
will
r e s u l t ....
Nevertheless,
e x i s t e n c e of p r o b a b i l i t y
i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m s u b s t a n t i a l c e r t a i n t y , w h i c h i s an
i n g r e d i e n t of t h e i n t e n t t o cause harm w h i c h r e s u l t s
from the a c t . "
57A
Am.
Jur.
footnotes
Negligence
§
27 6
(2004)
(emphasis
added;
omitted).
Perhaps
authored
2d
by
the simplest
Professor
explanations
come f r o m t h e
hornbook
Prosser:
"The t h r e e m o s t b a s i c e l e m e n t s o f [ t h e ] m o s t
common u s a g e o f ' i n t e n t ' a r e t h a t (1) i t i s a s t a t e
of
mind,
(2) a b o u t
consequences
o f an
act
(or
o m i s s i o n ) a n d n o t a b o u t t h e a c t i t s e l f , a n d (3) i t
extends not o n l y to h a v i n g i n the mind a purpose (or
d e s i r e ) to b r i n g about given consequences but a l s o
h a v i n g i n mind a b e l i e f
(or knowledge) t h a t
given
consequences
are s u b s t a n t i a l l y c e r t a i n to r e s u l t
from the a c t . "
W.
§
Page K e e t o n
8,
p.
34
et a l . , Prosser
( 4 t h ed.
1984)
and K e e t o n
(first
49
two
on t h e Law
emphases
in
of
Torts
original;
1090966
other
emphasis
provided
with
added;
this
footnotes
very
omitted).
helpful
1 6
distinction
We
also
are
by
Professor
Prosser:
" [ T ] h e m e r e k n o w l e d g e a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n o f a r i s k -¬
s o m e t h i n g s h o r t o f s u b s t a n t i a l c e r t a i n t y -- i s n o t
intent.
The d e f e n d a n t who a c t s i n t h e b e l i e f o r
c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t t h e a c t i s c a u s i n g an a p p r e c i a b l e
r i s k o f h a r m t o a n o t h e r may b e n e g l i g e n t , a n d i f t h e
r i s k i s g r e a t t h e c o n d u c t may b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s
r e c k l e s s o r w a n t o n , b u t i t i s n o t an i n t e n t i o n a l
wrong."
Prosser,
At
§ 8, p . 36
odds w i t h
(emphasis
added).
the foregoing
C h i e f J u s t i c e C o b b made r e f e r e n c e
fundamental
principles,
i nher dissenting opinion to
wantonness as " g e n e r a l i z e d i n t e n t i o n a l
conduct."
main
She
opinion,
following
So.
3d
at
then
.
then
series of hypothetical circumstances
Appendix to
posited
the
and outcomes:
P r o f e s s o r P r o s s e r g o e s on t o e x p l a i n t h a t a n o t h e r s o u r c e
o f " c o n f u s i o n " i s t h e " f a i l u r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n (1) t h e
f a c t u a l e l e m e n t s e s s e n t i a l t o a f i n d i n g o f i n t e n t , " as q u o t e d
i n t h e t e x t o f t h i s w r i t i n g , and "(2) t h e elements o f proof
a n d a r g u m e n t t h a t a d v o c a t e s a n d f a c t f i n d e r s may b r i n g t o b e a r
i n addressing the question whether those f a c t u a l elements are
present i n a given case."
P r o s s e r , § 8, p p . 3 5 - 3 6 . A s t o t h e
latter,
Prosser
e x p l a i n s t h a t o n e o f t h e common w a y s o f
proving
the factual
e l e m e n t s i s t o show t h a t
"given the
circumstances
d i s c l o s e d i n the evidence, a reasonable
person
i n t h e a c t o r ' s p o s i t i o n w o u l d h a v e known t h a t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s
i n q u e s t i o n were s u b s t a n t i a l l y c e r t a i n t o f o l l o w [ h i s o r h e r ]
act."
I d . , a t 36.
1 6
50
1090966
" T h u s , i f one who
i s i n a crowd a c c i d e n t l y drops a
l o a d e d f i r e a r m t h a t d i s c h a r g e s and i n j u r e s a n o t h e r ,
the a c t i o n a b l e t o r t i s negligence.
I f that person
i n t e n t i o n a l l y discharges
the f i r e a r m i n t o a crowd
and
injures
another,
the
actionable
tort
is
wantonness.
And i f t h a t p e r s o n i n t e n t i o n a l l y f i r e s
t h e f i r e a r m a t a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n and i n j u r e s t h a t
p e r s o n t h e t o r t becomes a s s a u l t and b a t t e r y .
Unlike
the
tort
of
negligence,
i n both wantonness
and
assault
and
battery,
there
is intent
to
cause
injury.
That i s , i n both the wanton s h o o t i n g
and
the
assault
and
battery,
there
is intentional
conduct."
Appendix,
doing,
So.
the
Chief
3d
at
(some
Justice conflated
emphasis
the
added).
c o n c e p t s of
In
intent
so
and
wantonness.
The
Chief
wanton
last
sentence
shooting
and
might consider
to
the
act,
Furthermore,
statement
is
Wantonness
the
conduct"
one
result
above-quoted
J u s t i c e Cobb's d i s s e n t i n g
intentional
there
i n the
the
rather
the
that
achieved
i s true,
word
to
by
to
last
and
but
the
that
only
sentence
contemplate
act.
of
that
to
the
there
extent
a
of
the
assault
and
--
is
simply
the
actor
the
is
that
act.
--
the
battery,
wrong.
intends
necessary
then
reference
excerpt
It i s only
51
" i n both
the
and
injury"
from
battery,
consequences
wantonness
cause
their
--
" c o n d u c t " n a r r o w l y as
to
" i n both
not
assault
than
next
intent
does
--
opinion
excerpt
that
the
the
1090966
injury
resulting
Again,
the
certainty,"
57A
and
"[t]he
that
h a r m t o a n o t h e r may
c o n d u c t may
an
"likely"
who
wrong."
respect
to
another."
series
where,
Appendix,
concerned
necessarily
that
apply
[a]
So.
a
two-year
in
this
foregoing
her
purpose to
of
authorities,
injure
as
8,
an
Likewise,
to
and
actor
the
the
put
Id.
tort,
location
density
of
52
the
of
is
she
person
injures
a c t o r had
the
crowd
Cobb
would
concluded,
Consistent
merely
with
Justice
c r o w d , t h e n he
not
i t is
limitations
however, i f the
the
Justice
i t , "[a]
Chief
because,
of
36.
a c r o w d and
of
or
risk
then Chief
.
statute
situation
intentional
belief
hypotheticals
she
276
r i s k i s great
p.
by
at
someone i n t h e
wantonness.
the
§
of
a c t i o n a b l e t o r t i s wantonness."
the
the
§
appreciable
firearm into
3d
Negligence
i f the
Prosser,
her
discharges
from
r e c k l e s s or wanton, but
situation
the
to
"probable."
different
in
an
most s p e c i f i c c o n c e r n e x p r e s s e d
with
guilty
2d
acts
n e g l i g e n t , and
or
is
Jur.
i s causing
intentional
intentionally
"the
be
act
c h a r a c t e r i z e d as
reference
was
Am.
defendant
the
is
probability
be
The
Cobb
act
of
consciousness
not
the
"existence
substantial
(2004),
from
an
in
c r o w d m i g h t be
with a l l
as h i s
or
or
is
she
act
of
relation
such
that
1090966
the
jury
may
infer
that
the
"substantially
c e r t a i n " that
injured,
the
firearm.
treat
and,
given
Under a l l the
1 7
either
circumstance
therefore,
Cobb i n t h e
two-year
manner
the
someone
i n which
foregoing
as
concern
of
knew
in
the
the
that
i t
would
crowd
actor
was
be
discharged
a u t h o r i t i e s , the
law
the
would
i n v o l v i n g i n t e n t i o n a l conduct,
expressed
dissenting opinion
statute
actor
by
regarding
limitations
w o u l d be
then
the
Chief
Justice
a p p l i c a t i o n of
misplaced.
17
"The m o v e m e n t o f t h e f i n g e r w h i c h f i r e s a gun i s t h e
same, w h e t h e r i t t a k e s p l a c e i n a c r o w d e d c i t y ,
or
i n t h e s o l i t u d e o f t h e M o j a v e D e s e r t , and
regardless
of the a c t o r ' s s t a t e of mind about the consequences.
But
t h e l e g a l o u t c o m e w i l l d e p e n d on t h e
actor's
surroundings
and t h e a c t o r ' s s t a t e o f m i n d
"...
[Intent]
extends
not
only
to
those
consequences which are d e s i r e d , but a l s o to those
which the a c t o r b e l i e v e s are s u b s t a n t i a l l y c e r t a i n
t o f o l l o w f r o m what the a c t o r does.
The a c t o r
who
f i r e s a b u l l e t i n t o a d e n s e c r o w d may f e r v e n t l y p r a y
t h a t t h e b u l l e t w i l l h i t no o n e , b u t i f t h e
actor
knows t h a t i t i s u n a v o i d a b l e t h a t t h e b u l l e t
will
h i t someone, the a c t o r i n t e n d s t h a t c o n s e q u e n c e . "
Prosser
§
8,
p.
35.
53
a
1090966
MAIN, J u s t i c e
I
main
concur
i n the
opinion
trespass
Rather,
to
(concurring
no
not
be
a
field
has
I write
to
as
interpreted
of
note
holding
operation
that trespass
that
in tort
i s not
the
that
claims.
equivalent
wantonness.
I see
i t , the
"wantonness,"
Essentially,
Truck
and
Line,
Inc.
delinquency
care
1990).'"
160,
he
or
v.
i s defined
ought
great."
163-64
Bank of the
"'the
South,
conscious
while
conscious
as
between
646
So.
2d
Black's
doing
from
of
908,
Law
fails
whether
"Wanton"
2d
of
601,
some a c t
the
doing
603
or
omitting
54
i t
legal
to
(6th
ed.
an
Central
(wantonness
omission
do
So.
"reckless"
Bozeman v.
conditions
the
slight,
Fargason, 7 3 0
the
to
be
1032
( A l a . 1994)
existing
or
( A l a . 2002)
to that
i s akin
See
Hornady
to e x h i b i t
Dictionary
ex r e l . C l a y t o n v.
follows:
See
915
" r e f e r [ r i n g ] only
exhibit,
So.
as
"careless."
w h e n e v e r a man
to
"negligence,"
explained
i n j u r y or outcome.
knowing
that,
847
(Ala. 1999))).
to the
is
i s akin to
Meadows,
(quoting Clayton
with respect
duty,
"trespass"
which r e s u l t s
which
ordinary,
basic distinction
"negligence"
("'"Negligence"
is
opinion.
the main o p i n i o n holds
As
2d
main
should
longer
specially).
of
some
and
being
act,
injury
1090966
will
likely
Nat'l
or p r o b a b l y r e s u l t . ' " (quoting
Corp.,
Ins.
Galaxy
("'To
S t o n e v.
(Ala.
Cable,
589
Inc.
So.
v.
2d
1289,
Davis,
58
e s t a b l i s h wantonness, the
defendant,
with
consciously
and
reckless
567
Refining
J.,
the
Co.,
dissenting)
that
procurement
of
that
the
a
by
harm
t h e s e causes of
the
So.
3d
of
the
to
statute
Arnold,
See
947,
a
to
(Ala.
959
action
the
for
and
plaintiff").
action
are
2010)
643
564,
"intentional"
with
v.
So.
omitted
International
(Murdock,
analysis
of
trespass
the
55
the
"involve
"intentional
Finally,
distinguishable,
because
I
believe
i n a complaint would govern
of l i m i t a t i o n s .
the
consequences,
( A l a . 2009)
detailed
and
2d
Carr
tortfeasor"
adequacy of p l e a d i n g s
applicable
101
must p r o v e t h a t
to
akin
causes
conduct
v.
is
(containing
intentional
each of
13
Martin
outcome.
i n j u r y or
& Mfg.
proposition
93,
plaintiff
"Trespass"
1994))).
to
3d
1991)));
i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i d some w r o n g f u l a c t o r
(quoting
regard
So.
indifference
some known d u t y . ' "
(Ala.
1292
Southland
the
1090966
WOODALL, J u s t i c e
I
861
agree
am
not
convinced that
( A l a . 2004),
that
(dissenting).
was
the d e c i s i o n
respectfully
McKenzie
wrongly
v.
decided;
s h o u l d be
dissent.
56
Killian,
887
therefore,
I
overruled.
So.
do
2d
not
Consequently,
I
1090966
A P P E N D I X TO O P I N I O N OF THE COURT
The
dissenting
accompanied
opinion
opinion
the release
on o r i g i n a l
on
of then
June
submission
COBB, C h i e f
Justice
J u n e 3, 2 0 1 1 ] ) .
3,
Justice
Cobb
2011, of t h i s
i n this
(dissenting
I respectfully dissent.
Chief
case
[from
Court's
i s s e t out below:
original
The m a j o r i t y
that
opinion
opinion
simply
of
puts
forward t h e opposing arguments t h i s Court r e j e c t e d i n McKenzie
v.
Killian
detailed
887 S o . 2 d 861 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) .
the law of trespass
application,
ongoing
governing
which
confusion
willful
and t r e s p a s s
application
regrading
and wanton
In McKenzie, the Court
had
resulted
the proper
torts.
on t h e c a s e a n d i t s
i n years
limitations
The C o u r t
of
period
stated:
"The
p r o b l e m p r e s e n t e d by t h e dependence upon
c a u s a l i t y i s i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e p r o b l e m a t i c r e s u l t
of a l l o w i n g a l e s s c u l p a b l e w r o n g d o e r t o be e x p o s e d
to
a significantly
longer
statutory
limitations
period
than
that
applicable
t o a more
culpable
w r o n g d o e r , d e p e n d i n g upon t h e c h a r a c t e r
of force
a p p l i e d . S e e t h e Webb a r t i c l e [ ] f o r d i s c u s s i o n o f
t h e s e a n o m a l i e s . See a l s o J u s t i c e J o n e s ' s d i s s e n t i n g
o p i n i o n i n S t r o z i e r [ v . M a r c h i c h , 380 S o . 2 d 8 04 ,
1
Linda
S u z a n n e Webb, L i m i t a t i o n o f T o r t A c t i o n s
under
A l a b a m a Law: D i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n t h e T w o - y e a r a n d t h e S i x y e a r S t a t u t e s o f L i m i t a t i o n s , 49 A l a . L. R e v . 1 0 4 9 ( S p r i n g
1998).
1
57
1090966
806
the
( A l a . 1980)]. J u s t i c e Jones s u c c i n c t l y
case f o r ending the c o n f u s i o n :
summed up
"'Whatever v e s t i g e
of the
outmoded
direct/indirect
distinction
between
t r e s p a s s a n d t r e s p a s s on t h e c a s e
still
e x i s t s i n A l a b a m a , I w o u l d now a b a n d o n a n d
a d o p t i n s t e a d t h e more modern t o r t c o n c e p t
of m e a s u r i n g t h e cause of a c t i o n i n terms
of t h e d e g r e e of c u l p a b i l i t y o f t h e a l l e g e d
w r o n g f u l c o n d u c t . Wanton c o n d u c t , as t h a t
t e r m i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y u s e d and u n d e r s t o o d
in
the
jurisprudence
of
our
State,
signifies
the
intentional
doing of,
or
f a i l i n g t o d o , an a c t , o r d i s c h a r g e a d u t y ,
w i t h the l i k e l i h o o d of i n j u r y to the person
or
p r o p e r t y o f a n o t h e r as a r e a s o n a b l y
foreseeable
consequence.
Such
conduct,
resulting
in injury,
i s actionable
in
trespass
and
governed
by
the
six-year
s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , i n my o p i n i o n .
"'The
r a t i o n a l e f o r my v i e w
comports
with
the
fundamental
concepts
of
our
f a u l t - b a s e d s y s t e m o f t o r t l a w . One
who
i n j u r e s a n o t h e r , o r a n o t h e r ' s p r o p e r t y , as
a r e s u l t of conduct i n t e n t i o n a l l y committed
should
be
held
to
a h i g h e r degree
of
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t h a n one who i n j u r e s a n o t h e r
t h r o u g h a s i m p l e l a c k o f due c a r e . J u s t a s
the f o r m e r , b e c a u s e of i t s h i g h e r degree o f
culpability,
carries
a
potential
for
p u n i t i v e damages, so s h o u l d i t a l s o c a r r y
a longer p e r i o d w i t h i n which to enforce
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r such i n t e n t i o n a l wrong.
One
who
knowingly sets
into motion,
by
i n t e n t i o n a l l y d o i n g ( o r f a i l i n g t o do) an
act,
a sequence
of events r e s u l t i n g
in
reasonably foreseeable i n j u r y to another,
whether the r e s u l t i n g i n j u r y i s immediate
or
consequential, in
my
opinion,
has
committed
a
trespass
within
the
58
1090966
contemplation
limitations.
of
the
six-year
statute
of
"'Indeed, I have s e a r c h e d i n v a i n f o r
possible alternative policy considerations
f o r l i m i t i n g the p e r i o d of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y
i n c e r t a i n t o r t c a s e s t o one y e a r a n d
in
o t h e r cases to s i x years. I submit t h a t the
only
logical,
as
well
as
the
only
defensible, basis for this difference i s
the e x t e n t of the wrong or the degree of
culpability.'
" S t r o z i e r , 380
So.
2d a t 8 0 9 - 1 0
f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) . We e m b r a c e t h i s
887
So.
2d
The
that
at
870.
essential rationale
wantonness
intentionally
likely
to
is
of
injury
engages
in
r e s u l t in that
McKenzie
caused
conduct
injury.
contradicts
that
generalized
i n t e n t i o n a l conduct,
intentional
conduct
no
intentional
believe
that
e x a m i n a t i o n of
law
are
drops
a
rationale
as
the
the
by
was
another
that
he
Today,
or
the
asserting
i s as
the
I
that
distinct
respectfully
distinction
should
be
recognition
by
one
who
she
knows
is
majority
i t i s from negligence,
conduct.
applied.
loaded
(emphasis added;
reasoning today."
wantonness,
firearm
i f one
that
who
is in
which
involves
disagree,
apparent
discharges
59
a
and
as
from s p e c i f i c
crowd
and
from
s i t u a t i o n s i n which these concepts
Thus,
simply
of
I
any
tort
accidently
injures
another,
1090966
the
actionable
tort
is
intentionally
discharges
another,
actionable
person
and
the firearm
tort
intentionally fires
the t o r t
battery,
intentional
period
i s the
"trespass"
concept
the
becomes a s s a u l t
t o cause
Accordingly,
was
Court's
i f that
and b a t t e r y .
injury.
period
the
governed
and b a t t e r y .
c o r r e c t l y decided
This
by
assault
That
proper
i s why
a n d why
is, in
there i s
limitations
the
concept
with the
I believe
the majority
of
that
errs i n
today.
note f u r t h e r the p a r t i c u l a r l y
policy
And
i n § 6 - 2 - 3 4 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , i n c o n c e r t
opinion
I
i n t o a crowd and i n j u r e s
and t h e a s s a u l t and b a t t e r y ,
six-year
of a s s a u l t
McKenzie
its
conduct.
person
i n b o t h wantonness and
i s intent
b o t h t h e wanton s h o o t i n g
that
the firearm at a p a r t i c u l a r person
of negligence,
there
If
i s wantonness.
i n j u r e s that person the t o r t
Unlike
and
the
negligence.
willingness
of stare
d i s t r e s s i n g problem
to disregard
decisis.
As
noted
the c r i t i c a l
i n McKenzie,
with
judicial
the law i n
A l a b a m a c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o p e r l e g a l a n a l y s i s o f w a n t o n n e s s was
not
settled
and
was
in
fact
based
on
confusing
i n c o n s i s t e n t discussions of c a u s a l i t y rather than
McKenzie
represented
a thorough
60
and p e r s u a s i v e
and
culpability.
discussion
of
1090966
t h e p r o p e r l e g a l p o l i c y t o be
the Court s t a t e s t h a t the
be
of the
of s t a r e d e c i s i s ,
following
1236,
test
1245
years.
f r o m Ex
(Ala.
seven years
limitations period
w i l l henceforth
doctrine
two
a p p l i e d ; now,
With respect
parte
f o r wanton
torts
to the a p p l i c a t i o n
t h i s C o u r t has
First
later,
Alabama
employed
Bank,
883
the
So.
2d
2003):
" J u s t i c e Houston, w r i t i n g s p e c i a l l y i n Southern
S t a t e s F o r d , I n c . v . P r o c t o r , 541 So. 2 d 1081
(Ala.
1989), embraced a u s e f u l standard f o r w e i g h i n g the
need f o r change a g a i n s t the advantages of
settled
principles
of
law
under
the
doctrine
of
stare
d e c i s i s . He p o s e d t h e q u e s t i o n a s f o l l o w s :
whether
the
ratio
decidendi
of
earlier
precedent
would
'"hypothetically
be
consented
to
today
by
the
conscience
and
the
feeling
of
justice
of
the
m a j o r i t y o f a l l t h o s e whose o b e d i e n c e i s r e q u i r e d by
[that] r u l e of law?"' Southern States Ford,
Inc.,
541 So. 2 d a t 1093
( q u o t i n g L a u n , S t a r e D e c i s i s , 25
V a . L. R e v . 12, 2 2
(1938))."
See
also
Prattville
(Ala.
2008).
So,
State
approve
this
Mem'l
would
Chapel
the
Court's
decision
the
crowd to the
same p e r i o d a s one
truly
an
accident?
I
Parker,
judiciary
determining
is
liability
v.
of
one
who
and
to
not.
limit
fires
I
So.
citizenry
whose d i s c h a r g e
think
10
the
of
as
its
composition
changes
61
undermines
of the
its
this
of
into
a
firearm
that
C o u r t ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o change i t s b a s i c pronouncements of
law
546
period
blindly
believe
3d
this
the
judicial
1090966
authority
and
equates
the
legislature"
to the detriment
I
Court
dissent.
therefore
with
of a l l the
62
some
courts
sort
of
in this
"other
State.
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