Wilson Lamar Frazier v. Core Industries, Inc.

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REL: 12/04/2009 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1060016 Wilson Lamar Frazier v. Core I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . Appeal MURDOCK, from M o b i l e C i r c u i t (CV-05-2151) Court Justice. This case i n v o l v e s claims by Wilson Lamar F r a z i e r a g a i n s t C o r e I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . ( " C o r e " ) , u n d e r t h e J o n e s A c t , 46 U.S.C. 1060016 § 688, and a l s o 1 entails consideration Harbor Workers' Compensation seq. Frazier 2 Mobile Court I. which trial Frazier A c t ("LHWCA"), 3 3 U.S.C. § 9 0 1 e t a p p e a l s f r o m a summary j u d g m e n t Circuit The o f t h e Longshore and i n favor Facts court does of Core. and P r o c e d u r a l made We e n t e r e d by t h e affirm. History the following factual findings, not dispute: "1. Core i s i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f o f f l o a d i n g o r u n l o a d i n g m a t e r i a l s and equipment from barges and s h i p s t o l a n d . [ F r a z i e r ] began w o r k i n g f o rCore i n l a t e - 2 0 0 3 , e a r l y - 2 0 0 4 . [ F r a z i e r ] t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was h i r e d d i r e c t l y b y M o r g a n M y l e s a n d J o h n W a t s o n , employees o f Core. [ F r a z i e r ] a l s o c l a i m s t h a t he was an employee o f P i n n a c l e Management Services ('Pinnacle'). The r e c o r d s on f i l e indicate that Core l e a s e d t h e s e r v i c e s o f [ F r a z i e r ] from P i n n a c l e and that [Frazier] received h i s paycheck from Pinnacle. Core h i r e d [ F r a z i e r ] t o w o r k as a w e l d e r and paid him s k i l l e d welder's pay, which was c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r t h a n what Core p a i d t h e crews t h a t r e g u l a r l y worked i n i t s o f f l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n . "2. [Frazier's] first j o b f o r Core was '[p]utting a tail on a b a r g e ' b y w e l d i n g t w o sections of a barge together. The b a r g e that I n 2 0 0 6 , t h e J o n e s A c t was amended a n d r e n u m b e r e d U.S.C. § 3 0 1 0 4 . 1 a s 46 "The Jones A c t p r o v i d e s t o r t remedies t o sea-based maritime workers, while t h e LHWCA provides workers' compensation t o land-based maritime employees." Stewart v. D u t r a C o n s t r . C o . , 5 4 3 U.S. 4 8 1 , 488 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . " T h e LHWCA a n d the Jones A c t a r e ' m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e ' " c o m p e n s a t i o n schemes. H a r b o r T u g & B a r g e C o . v . P a p a i , 5 2 0 U.S. 5 4 8 , 5 5 3 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . 2 2 1060016 [ F r a z i e r ] was w o r k i n g o n was ' d o c k e d up t o t h e s i d e of t h e d o c k ' i n t h e Theodore I n d u s t r i a l Canal. The b a r g e was a n c h o r e d s o i t w o u l d n o t s h i f t o r move i n the water. [ F r a z i e r ] w o r k e d on t h i s p r o j e c t f o r s i x to e i g h t weeks. "3. During the barge c o n s t r u c t i o n project, [ F r a z i e r ] w o u l d go home e v e r y n i g h t a f t e r w o r k a n d w o u l d come b a c k i n t h e m o r n i n g . [Frazier] d i d not e a t o r s l e e p on t h e b a r g e . The b a r g e d i d n o t h a v e a b a t h r o o m o r l i v i n g q u a r t e r s , i t was ' j u s t a p l a i n barge.' [ F r a z i e r ] c o u l d g e t on a n d o f f t h e b a r g e s i m p l y by u s i n g a walkway t h a t c o n n e c t e d t h e barge to t h e dock. The b a r g e d i d n o t h a v e an e n g i n e , n a v i g a t i o n a l e q u i p m e n t , o r a n y means o f p r o p u l s i o n . "4. [ F r a z i e r ] c l a i m s t h a t w h i l e he was w o r k i n g on t h i s b a r g e , he s l i p p e d w h i l e c a r r y i n g a p i e c e o f s t e e l onto the barge. [ F r a z i e r ] a l l e g e s t h a t he h u r t h i s b a c k w h e n he s l i p p e d a n d f e l l on t h e b a r g e . [ F r a z i e r ] d i d not seek m e d i c a l treatment f o l l o w i n g the a c c i d e n t and c o n t i n u e d t o work f o r Core. "5. After the barge construction project, [ F r a z i e r ' s ] n e x t p r o j e c t f o r C o r e was t o r e p a i r a c r a n e t h a t h a d ' r u s t e d o u t . ' T h i s r e p a i r j o b was done on land. During this same time frame, [Frazier] also helped Core install certain e q u i p m e n t , i n c l u d i n g a c o n v e y o r , on t h e b a r g e t h a t he h a d h e l p e d b u i l d . When he was i n s t a l l i n g t h e c o n v e y o r , t h e b a r g e was ' s p u d d e d down a n d t i e d [ t o the dock].' During t h i s time, [Frazier] was s t i l l w o r k i n g d u r i n g t h e day and r e t u r n i n g t o h i s house e v e r y n i g h t . [ 3 ] Spuds a r e v e r t i c a l s t e e l s h a f t s that a barge t o hold i t i n place. 3 3 c a n be l o w e r e d f r o m 1060016 "6. [ F r a z i e r ' s ] n e x t j o b f o r C o r e was b u i l d i n g a hopper. [ F r a z i e r ] h e l p e d b u i l d t h e h o p p e r on Core's dock i n Theodore, which i s 'on l a n d . ' This project t o o k a p p r o x i m a t e l y a month and a half. [ F r a z i e r ] t h e n b u i l t a new s e t o f s p u d s f o r t h e b a r g e t h a t he h a d w o r k e d on w h e n he f i r s t started w i t h Core. T h i s p r o j e c t was a l s o d o n e on l a n d . It t o o k [ F r a z i e r ] a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e weeks t o c o m p l e t e the spuds. [ 4 ] "7. [ F r a z i e r ' s ] n e x t j o b f o r C o r e was w e l d i n g new l e g s on a h o p p e r , w h i c h was a l s o d o n e on l a n d . [ F r a z i e r ] c l a i m s t h a t he s u f f e r e d a s e c o n d a c c i d e n t while he was w e l d i n g t h e l e g s on t h e h o p p e r . [ F r a z i e r ] c l a i m s t h a t he h a d f i n i s h e d w i t h h i s w e l d and was l o o k i n g f o r a chipping hammer when he a c c i d e n t a l l y stepped o f f t h e end of a s c a f f o l d board and f e l l t o t h e g r o u n d . [Frazier] continued working t h a t day and d i d n o t s e e k m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n as a result of the accident. [ F r a z i e r ] c l a i m s t h a t he i n j u r e d h i s back and l e g i n t h i s a c c i d e n t . "8. [ F r a z i e r ' s ] n e x t j o b f o r C o r e was c h a n g i n g p i p e s , h o s e s , a n d h y d r a u l i c l i n e s on a c r a n e t h a t was on a b a r g e . The b a r g e was a n c h o r e d a t C o r e ' s Saraland f a c i l i t y . This j o b took four or f i v e days. "9. A f t e r w o r k i n g on t h e c r a n e , [ F r a z i e r ] n e x t b u i l t r a m p s t h a t w o u l d a l l o w dump t r u c k s t o p u l l up to t h e b a r g e s f o r ease o f l o a d i n g . [Frazier] built the ramps i n C o r e ' s m e c h a n i c shop i n Saraland. [ F r a z i e r ] s p e n t t h r e e weeks b u i l d i n g t h e ramps. "10. [Frazier] claims that while he was b u i l d i n g t h e r a m p s , he h a d t o h e l p s h i f t o n e b a r g e down the bank at Core's facility i n Saraland. [ F r a z i e r ] t e s t i f i e d t h a t Core employees used a crane t o move t h e b a r g e a n d he h e l p e d s e c u r e t h e b a r g e According to the t r i a l court's order, r e p o r t e d t o be a f u n n e l - s h a p e d r e c e p t a c l e m a t e r i a l such as g r a i n o r c o a l . " 4 4 " [ a ] hopper i s f o r delivering 1060016 when i t was m o v e d t o t h e p r o p e r p o s i t i o n . The b a r g e t h a t was m o v e d d i d n o t h a v e a n e n g i n e o r a n y f o r m o f p r o p u l s i o n , d i d n o t have r u d d e r s o r k e e l s , and d i d not have n a v i g a t i o n a l lights. "11. [ F r a z i e r ] o r d i n a r i l y w o r k e d f r o m 6:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. f o r C o r e , w i t h an h o u r f o r lunch. [ F r a z i e r ] d i d n o t o r d i n a r i l y t a k e h i s m e a l s on a b o a t a n d w o u l d r e t u r n t o h i s home e v e r y n i g h t a f t e r work. "12. While [Frazier] s p e n t some t i m e o n b a r g e s f o r Core d o i n g w e l d i n g t a s k s s u c h as r e p a i r i n g ramps o r f i x i n g h o p p e r s , he was n e v e r o n a b a r g e when i t was being pushed by a towboat a n d was only o c c a s i o n a l l y o n b a r g e s when t h e y w e r e m o v e d w i t h cranes. The farthest distance [Frazier] ever t r a v e l e d when a b a r g e was b e i n g m o v e d b y a c r a n e was a r o u n d 500 y a r d s , w h i c h t o o k a p p r o x i m a t e l y an h o u r t o move. [5] " 1 3 . W h i l e [ F r a z i e r ] t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i d some ' d e c k h a n d ' w o r k f o r C o r e , he d e f i n e d a d e c k h a n d a s a ' l a b o r e r . ' A s a l a b o r e r , [ F r a z i e r ] s a i d he w o u l d 'run a s h o v e l , ' g r e a s e a c r a n e , o r 'whatever needs t o be d o n e . ' E v e n when [ F r a z i e r ] was p e r f o r m i n g 'deckhand' duties ( a s he d e s c r i b e d t h e m ) , he was arriving at the job site i n the morning and r e t u r n i n g t o h i s home a t n i g h t . [Frazier] never r o d e on a b a r g e o u t o f town a n d t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e barges he worked on were not designed f o r n a v i g a t i o n , t h e y were work p l a t f o r m s . "14. On o n e o c c a s i o n , [ F r a z i e r ] h a d t o r e p a i r t h e c o n v e y o r o n a b a r g e t h a t was i n D e s t i n . To do t h i s , he l o a d e d h i s own t r u c k w i t h e q u i p m e n t and drove to D e s t i n . He d i d n o t s p e n d t h e n i g h t o n t h e F r a z i e r made a p p r o x i m a t e l y 40 " t r i p s " on C o r e b a r g e s t h a t were p u l l i n g t h e m s e l v e s a l o n g t h e s h o r e l i n e u s i n g a c r a n e d u r i n g h i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 18 m o n t h s o f e m p l o y m e n t w i t h C o r e . T h e s e " t r i p s " l a s t e d b e t w e e n 30 m i n u t e s a n d a n h o u r e a c h . 5 5 1060016 barge. When [ F r a z i e r ] was w o r k i n g on e q u i p m e n t o n a b a r g e t h a t was i n a n o f f l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n , t h e b a r g e w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y b e a n c h o r e d down w i t h t h e s p u d s i n t h e down p o s i t i o n , a n d t h e b a r g e w o u l d a l s o be m o o r e d o r t i e d t o t h e d o c k . "15. [ F r a z i e r ] does not hold any maritime licenses. [ F r a z i e r ] has n e v e r worked as a c a p t a i n o r a p i l o t , a n d h a s n e v e r w o r k e d a s a d e c k h a n d on a boat i n n a v i g a t i o n . [ F r a z i e r ] has never r e c e i v e d any n a v i g a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g o r man-overboard t r a i n i n g . [ F r a z i e r ] h a s n e v e r w o r k e d on b a r g e t h a t h a s b e e n o p e r a t e d b y some k i n d o f p r o p u l s i o n , o t h e r t h a n a c r a n e m o v i n g a b a r g e down t h e s h o r e l i n e . Other than the barge that he b u i l t when he f i r s t started w o r k i n g f o r C o r e , [ F r a z i e r ] was n o t a s s i g n e d t o a n y one b a r g e . "16. [ F r a z i e r ] would n o r m a l l y r e p o r t t o work a t C o r e ' s mechanic shop i n S a r a l a n d . [Frazier] carried some o f h i s own e q u i p m e n t w h e n he w o r k e d f o r C o r e , w h i c h i n c l u d e d hand t o o l s , hammers, c h i s e l s , s a f e t y g l a s s e s , a welding hood, burning goggles, gloves, wrenches, and plyers [sic]. Core furnished [ F r a z i e r ] w i t h a w e l d i n g m a c h i n e , w e l d i n g r o d s , and a t o r c h and g a s . "17. [Frazier] c l a i m s t h a t he h a d a t h i r d a c c i d e n t w h i l e w o r k i n g f o r C o r e when he was i n G u l f S h o r e s h e l p i n g a c o - w o r k e r c h a n g e o u t a b u c k e t on a crane. Before changing out the b u c k e t , [Frazier] was h e l p i n g t h e c o - w o r k e r , who was o p e r a t i n g t h e c r a n e , p u t t h e s p u d s on t h e b a r g e i n t o t h e down position. [ F r a z i e r ] s a i d t h a t when he was p u l l i n g on a r o p e t o g e t t h e b a r g e i n t o p o s i t i o n t o d r o p t h e s p u d s , he s l i p p e d a n d h u r t h i s b a c k . After the spuds were put into place, [Frazier] and t h e [ 6 ] F r a z i e r and t h e coworker were a t t e m p t i n g t o p u l l t h e b a r g e u p a g a i n s t a d o c k a n d w e r e a f e w f e e t f r o m t h e d o c k when Frazier slipped. 6 6 1060016 c o - w o r k e r c h a n g e d o u t t h e b u c k e t s on l a n d . [ F r a z i e r ] s a i d he was o n t h e b a r g e f o r a b o u t 35 m i n u t e s . "18. [ F r a z i e r ' s ] work c o n s i s t e d p r i m a r i l y o f barge r e p a i r and c o n s t r u c t i o n and r e l a t e d w e l d i n g services. [Frazier] t e s t i f i e d that i n addition to barge c o n s t r u c t i o n and r e p a i r , t h e r e were occasions w h e r e he h a d t o m a n e u v e r a n d moor b a r g e s . [ F r a z i e r ] also t e s t i f i e d that i n h i s e s t i m a t i o n , he s p e n t approximately s i x t y - f i v e percent of h i s time working on b a r g e s . "19. [Frazier] claims t h a t he s u f f e r e d three s u c c e s s i v e i n j u r i e s w h i l e w o r k i n g f o r C o r e , two o f which occurred w h i l e h e was w o r k i n g o n o r a r o u n d barges. [Frazier] filed a Longshore and Harbor W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t ( h e r e i n a f t e r 'LHWCA' o r 'longshore') claim against Pinnacle Management S e r v i c e s r e l a t i n g t o t h e same t h r e e a c c i d e n t s that are at issue i n this case. [Frazier] recently s e t t l e d h i s longshore c l a i m a g a i n s t P i n n a c l e and i s now r e c e i v i n g l o n g s h o r e b e n e f i t s f r o m P i n n a c l e . " 7 The r e c o r d on a p p e a l c o n t a i n s a l e t t e r f r o m an a t t o r n e y f o r P i n n a c l e M a n a g e m e n t S e r v i c e s c o n c e r n i n g F r a z i e r ' s LHWCA claim against Pinnacle. I n the l e t t e r , Pinnacle confirmed t h a t i t was i n i t i a t i n g t h e p a y m e n t o f b e n e f i t s t o F r a z i e r u n d e r t h e LHWCA a n d t h a t i t w a s a g r e e i n g f o r t h e m a t t e r t o b e "remanded from t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e b a c k t o t h e [ U n i t e d S t a t e s ] Department o f L a b o r . " I n h i s a p p e l l a t e b r i e f , Frazier refers to this letter as t h e agreement whereby P i n n a c l e a c c e p t e d h i s LHWCA c l a i m . F r a z i e r s t a t e s t h a t " [ t ] h e a g r e e m e n t was l a t e r m e m o r i a l i z e d i n a C o u r t o r d e r b y J u d g e L e e Romero, o f t h e O f f i c e o f A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e s , a f t e r t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l [ i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e ] was f i l e d . " ( F r a z i e r ' s b r i e f , a t 14.) I n a n o t h e r p a r t o f h i s b r i e f , F r a z i e r s t a t e s t h a t LHWCA " [ b ] e n e f i t s w e r e a w a r d e d a n d [ h e ] i s c u r r e n t l y r e c e i v i n g t h e same." ( F r a z i e r ' s b r i e f , a t 11.) 7 The p a y m e n t o f b e n e f i t s u n d e r t h e LHWCA d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e a person from f i l i n g a c l a i m under t h e Jones Act. 7 1060016 "It i s b y now ' u n i v e r s a l l y accepted' that an e m p l o y e e who r e c e i v e s v o l u n t a r y p a y m e n t s u n d e r t h e LHWCA w i t h o u t a f o r m a l a w a r d i s n o t b a r r e d from s u b s e q u e n t l y s e e k i n g r e l i e f under t h e Jones A c t . This i s so, q u i t e o b v i o u s l y , because t h eq u e s t i o n o f coverage has never a c t u a l l y been l i t i g a t e d . The LHWCA c l e a r l y d o e s n o t c o m p r e h e n d s u c h a p r e c l u s i v e e f f e c t , as i t s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e s t h a t a n y amounts p a i d t o a n e m p l o y e e f o r t h e same i n j u r y , d i s a b i l i t y , or d e a t h p u r s u a n t t o t h e Jones A c t s h a l l be c r e d i t e d a g a i n s t a n y l i a b i l i t y i m p o s e d b y t h e LHWCA." Southwest Marine, I n c . v. G i z o n i , 5 0 2 U.S. 8 1 , 9 1 - 9 2 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ; e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ; s e e a l s o 33 U.S.C. § 914(a) ( p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e payment o f c o m p e n s a t i o n under t h e LHWCA " w i t h o u t a n a w a r d , e x c e p t where liability t o pay c o m p e n s a t i o n i s c o n t r o v e r t e d b y t h e e m p l o y e r " ) ; 33 U.S.C. § 933(b)("[T]he term 'award' w i t h respect t o a compensation o r d e r means a f o r m a l o r d e r i s s u e d b y t h e d e p u t y c o m m i s s i o n e r , an administrative law judge, or [ t h e Benefits Review] B o a r d . " ) ; a n d 33 U.S.C. § 9 1 9 ( e ) ( n o t i n g t h a t a " c o m p e n s a t i o n o r d e r " i s " [ t ] h e order r e j e c t i n g t h e c l a i m o r making t h e award"). T h e r e i s d i s a g r e e m e n t among t h e f e d e r a l c i r c u i t s w h e t h e r a p a r t y may p u r s u e a J o n e s A c t c l a i m a f t e r a " f o r m a l " a w a r d o f b e n e f i t s under t h e LHWCA. Compare F i g u e r o a v . C a m p b e l l I n d u s . , 45 F . 3 d 3 1 1 , 3 1 5 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t , a l t h o u g h the LHWCA a n d t h e J o n e s A c t " a r e ' m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e , ' some m a r i t i m e w o r k e r s may b e J o n e s A c t s e a m e n who a r e i n j u r e d w h i l e a l s o p e r f o r m i n g a j o b s p e c i f i c a l l y e n u m e r a t e d u n d e r t h e LHWCA, and, t h e r e f o r e , a r e e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r y under b o t h s t a t u t e s , a l t h o u g h d o u b l e r e c o v e r y o f a n y damage e l e m e n t i s p r e c l u d e d " ) , w i t h S h a r p v . J o h n s o n B r o s . C o r p . , 973 F . 2 d 4 2 3 , 426-27 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) ( " T h e LHWCA w a s n o t d e s i g n e d t o c r e a t e a m e r e s a f e t y net, g u a r a n t e e i n g w o r k e r s a minimum award as t h e y s e e k g r e a t e r rewards i n court. Rather, i t has a b e n e f i t t o employers,t o o , g i v i n g them l i m i t e d a n d p r e d i c t a b l e l i a b i l i t y i n exchange f o r their giving up t h e i r ability t o defend tort actions. P e r m i t t i n g a Jones A c t p r o c e e d i n g a f t e r a formal compensation 8 1060016 The third findings In "accident" referred occurred June against Core. alleged that i n March 2005, court's factual 2005. Frazier In count to i n the t r i a l filed a one, s t y l e d h e was " a n a b l e bodied four-count "Negligence," seaman" complaint Frazier a n d t h a t he h a d been "injured on o r a b o u t March 11, 2005, when h e attempted t o secure and dock by hand a barge t o w h i c h he h a d b e e n a s s i g n e d . W h i l e p u l l i n g on a d o c k rope, [ F r a z i e r ] s l i p p e d and f e l l . As a r e s u l t o f a w a r d h e r e w o u l d d e f e a t t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e LHWCA, a s w e l l a s work u n f a i r n e s s , because, as here, employers o f t e n have d i f f e r e n t insurance c a r r i e r s f o r workers' compensation claims and t o r t c l a i m s , so t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n i n s u r e r , b y g u a r a n t e e i n g a minimum award, n e c e s s a r i l y w o u l d r e d u c e t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e tort insurer to effect a settlement." (citations omitted)). A l t h o u g h F r a z i e r ' s b r i e f r e f e r s t o an o r d e r from t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l a w judge " m e m o r i a l i z i n g " h i s agreement w i t h Pinnacle a n d a l t h o u g h he s t a t e s t h a t b e n e f i t s have been "awarded" t o h i m , t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l does n o t c o n t a i n t h e order o r orders r e f l e c t i n g these events, which occurred a f t e r F r a z i e r f i l e d h i s n o t i c e o f appeal i nt h epresent case. Thus, we a r e n o t p r i v y t o t h e t e r m s o f t h e o r d e r o r o r d e r s , a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , we h a v e n o i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g w h e t h e r t h e " a w a r d " w a s c o n d i t i o n a l o r o t h e r w i s e made r e f e r e n c e t o t h e present case. F u r t h e r , Core has n o t argued i n i t s a p p e l l a t e b r i e f t h a t t h e "award" o f b e n e f i t s t o F r a z i e r renders h i s c l a i m s m o o t . B e c a u s e we c a n n o t c o n c l u d e b a s e d o n t h e s t a t e o f the r e c o r d and t h e arguments b e f o r e us t h a t F r a z i e r has r e c e i v e d a f o r m a l a w a r d o f LHWCA b e n e f i t s , we n e e d n o t , a n d i n d e e d c a n n o t , a d d r e s s w h e t h e r s u c h an a w a r d w o u l d moot h i s claims a g a i n s t Core. 9 1060016 the n e g l i g e n c e of [Core] and/or t h e u n s e a w o r t h i n e s s of the v e s s e l i n q u e s t i o n , [ F r a z i e r ] was c a u s e d t o s u f f e r i n j u r i e s and damage[] t o h i s b a c k . " Frazier as a alleged result medical In all of count suffered slip pain two, and damage i n e x c e s s fall, including of $50,000 lost wages, and s u f f e r i n g , and m e n t a l Frazier entitled clause" relevant he the expenses, allegations suitors that him to alleged recover that under anguish. the the foregoing "savings to o f t h e J o n e s A c t , 46 U.S.C. § 6 8 8 ( a ) , w h i c h a t times stated: "Any s e a m a n who s h a l l s u f f e r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y i n t h e course o f h i s e m p l o y m e n t may, at h i s e l e c t i o n , m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n f o r d a m a g e s at law, with the right of t r i a l by j u r y , and i n such a c t i o n a l l s t a t u t e s of the United States modifying or extending t h e common-law r i g h t o r remedy i n c a s e s o f p e r s o n a l i n j u r y to r a i l w a y employees s h a l l apply." In count three, styled "Seaworthiness," Frazier alleged that "[t]he vessel upon which [ h e ] was injured was u n s e a w o r t h y i n t h a t t h e owner o f s a i d v e s s e l f a i l e d to i n s u r e t h a t p r o p e r a p p u r t e n a n c e s and equipment were a t t a c h e d t o s a i d v e s s e l i n o r d e r t o s a f e l y dock t h e same. Inadequate or improperly t r a i n e d servants were a b o a r d s a i d v e s s e l a n d made t h e v e s s e l i n question unseaworthy. S e r v a n t s of t h e v e s s e l were provided i n a p p r o p r i a t e or improper procedure and/or p o l i c y f o r s a f e l y d o c k i n g t h e v e s s e l i n q u e s t i o n and as a result caused [Frazier's] injuries and damage[]." 10 1060016 We note that the shipowner's vessel and use."'" (Ala. F.3d in "[t]he 'unseaworthiness' doctrine a b s o l u t e and appurtenances E x p a r t e CSX turn 601 reasonably f i t for their Transp., ( 6 t h C i r . 1998) Mitchell (1960)). The seamen, but v. I n c . , 735 v. (Moore, See Yamaha M o t o r n.6 Corp., who are U.S.A. v . 2d a intended 476, n.3 Co., Transp. 480 154 J., dissenting), quoting Trawler Racer, employees So. Columbia I n c . , 362 duty to provide a seaworthy not upon nondelegable duty to "furnish 1999)(quoting Szymanski 591, i s 'based U.S. covered Calhoun, 550 i s a duty ship 539, owed under in count four, F r a z i e r adopted the first three counts that "[t]he act and/or of and/or was punitive entitled to of [Core] reckless." on w h i c h Core Frazier's trade, he was filed a claims. i s not a allegedly motion Core Jones for 208 We he alleged [the] vessel alleged note that on w h i c h F r a z i e r that he i t is worked injured. a argued Act and/or Frazier damages. u n d i s p u t e d t h a t C o r e owned t h e v e s s e l s and 199, the a l l e g a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d h i s c o m p l a i n t , and action owner were wanton U.S. LHWCA. (1996). In 516 the summary that seaman 11 and judgment Frazier, "a as to a l l welder by his work-related tort 1060016 claims or arebarred t h e Alabama Workers' brief opposing from Compensation A c t . " Core's motion. Frazier's deposition Frazier also After court as b y t h e e x c l u s i v i t y p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e [LHWCA] submitted conducting entered Each p a r t y i n support Frazier filed 8 submitted a judgment i n f a v o r to a l l Frazier's claims. excerpts of h i s or i t s p o s i t i o n ; c e r t a i n documentary a hearing a evidence. on C o r e ' s motion, the t r i a l o f Core and a g a i n s t The judgment Frazier stated: "Core i s entitled t o summary judgment f o rthe f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s : (1) [ F r a z i e r ] d o e s n o t m e e t t h e t e s t f o r seaman s t a t u s u n d e r t h e J o n e s A c t a n d t h e c l a i m s i n h i s c o m p l a i n t d e p e n d upon p r o o f t h a t he i s a seaman e n t i t l e d t o p r o t e c t i o n u n d e r t h e J o n e s A c t ; (2) [Frazier's] claims are barred by the e x c l u s i v e - r e m e d y p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e LHWCA; (3) a n d , [ F r a z i e r ] i s b a r r e d f r o m r e c o v e r i n g u n d e r 3 3 U.S.C. § 9 0 5 ( b ) o f t h e LHWCA, a s s u m i n g t h a t s u c h a c l a i m had i n f a c t been pled, because [he] r e g u l a r l y p e r f o r m e d s h i p - b u i l d i n g and s h i p - r e p a i r work w h i l e working f o r Core." [9] 8 See A l a . Code 1975, § 25-5-1 e t s e q . The trial court concluded that C o r e was F r a z i e r ' s " b o r r o w i n g e m p l o y e r " f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e LHWCA, s e e C o o k s v . B e n d e r S h i p b u i l d i n g & R e p a i r Co., 833 So. 2 d 631 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , a n d t h a t F r a z i e r w a s a n LHWCA e m p l o y e e , n o t a J o n e s A c t seaman. Thus, F r a z i e r ' s c l a i m s were s u b j e c t t o t h e e x c l u s i v e - r e m e d y p r o v i s i o n s s e t f o r t h i n 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 5 ( a ) . 9 12 1060016 The LHWCA p r o v i d e s prescribed in place that i n s e c t i o n 904 o f t h i s of a l l other employee." 33 "employee" as including 905(a). "any person engaged longshoring operations, repairman, shipbuilder, include vessel," ... i.e., The employer LHWCA i n maritime other person to the defines an employment, engaged i n and any harbor-worker i n c l u d i n g a ship (G) a a seaman 902 (3) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . or o f an employer s h a l l be e x c l u s i v e and o f such § longshoreman liability title liability U.S.C. any not "[t]he and ship-breaker, b u t such term master o r member of a crew under t h e Jones Act. 33 U.S.C. See S t e w a r t v. D u t r a C o n s t r . does o f any § Co., 543 U.S. 4 8 1 , 488 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; s e e a l s o W i l s o n v . Z a p a t a O f f - S h o r e C o . , 939 F . 2 d 2 6 0 , 266 n.10 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 9 1 ) ( " T h e t e s t t o d e t e r m i n e 'member o f a crew' 'employee' under 'seaman' s t a t u s Section injury that status under the [exception t h e ] LHWCA i s t h e same under t h e Jones Act."). 9 0 5 ( b ) o f t h e LHWCA d i s c u s s e s "caused by t h e negligence the injured as t o t h e term the test f o r claims b a s e d on an o f a v e s s e l , " and i t provides party "may b r i n g a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t s u c h v e s s e l a s a t h i r d party i n accordance with the provisions of section 933 o f t h i s t i t l e , a n d t h e e m p l o y e r s h a l l n o t be l i a b l e t o t h e v e s s e l f o r s u c h damages d i r e c t l y o r 13 1060016 i n d i r e c t l y and any agreements o r w a r r a n t i e s t o t h e c o n t r a r y s h a l l be v o i d . ... I f s u c h p e r s o n was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or b r e a k i n g s e r v i c e s a n d s u c h p e r s o n ' s e m p l o y e r was t h e owner, owner p r o hac v i c e , agent, operator, or c h a r t e r e r o f t h e v e s s e l , no s u c h a c t i o n s h a l l b e permitted, i n whole or i n part or d i r e c t l y or indirectly, against the i n j u r e d person's employer ( i n any c a p a c i t y , i n c l u d i n g as t h e v e s s e l ' s owner, owner p r o hac v i c e , a g e n t , o p e r a t o r , o r c h a r t e r e r ) or a g a i n s t the employees of the employer. The l i a b i l i t y of the v e s s e l under t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t be b a s e d upon t h e w a r r a n t y o f s e a w o r t h i n e s s o r a breach thereof at the time the i n j u r y occurred. The r e m e d y p r o v i d e d i n t h i s subsection shall be e x c l u s i v e of a l l other remedies against the v e s s e l except remedies a v a i l a b l e under t h i s c h a p t e r . " (Emphasis added.) Frazier holding is a He argues (1) i n C h a n d r i s , I n c . v. L a t s i s , "seaman" based the appeals. f o r purposes upon t h e h o l d i n g benefits provided U.S.C. § 9 0 5 ( b ) of that 515 U.S. the Jones 347 upon the ( 1 9 9 5 ) , he A c t , and (2) that i n S t e w a r t , s u p r a , he i s "entitled to under pursuant 33 the Jones Act o f t h e " LHWCA, s p e c i f i c a l l y i s deemed a l o n g s h o r e m a n or a seaman. to t h a t he c a n p u r s u e a n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m a g a i n s t C o r e , as t h e v e s s e l he based owner, whether 1 0 Core argues i n i t s a p p e l l a t e b r i e f t h a t F r a z i e r conceded a t t h e h e a r i n g o n i t s s u m m a r y - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n t h a t h e "was a l o n g s h o r e m a n , n o t a Jones A c t seaman." ( C o r e ' s b r i e f , a t 14.) A s C o r e n o t e s , h o w e v e r , t h e r e i s no t r a n s c r i p t o f t h e h e a r i n g . F r a z i e r c o n t e n d s i n h i s r e p l y b r i e f on a p p e a l t h a t he c l a i m e d t h a t h e was a s e a m a n , b u t h e a l s o a r g u e d t h a t e v e n i f h e was 1 0 14 1060016 II. The well standard Standard by which we of Review review a summary judgment i s settled: " T h i s C o u r t r e v i e w s a s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t de n o v o . T u r n e r v . W e s t h a m p t o n C o u r t , L . L . C . , 903 S o . 2 d 8 2 , 87 (Ala. 2004). We s e e k t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e m o v a n t h a s made a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t there e x i s t s no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t a n d h a s demonstrated that t h e movant i s entitled to a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . T u r n e r , supra." Muller v. Seeds, 56(c) (3), genuine 919 S o . 2 d 1 1 7 4 , 1 1 7 6 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) . A l a . R. issue C i v . P. of material As f o r determining fact exists, this See R u l e whether a Court "must r e v i e w t h e r e c o r d i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e nonmoving p a r t y and r e s o l v e a l l r e a s o n a b l e doubts i n f a v o r o f t h e nonmovant. The m o v i n g p a r t y has t h e b u r d e n o f m a k i n g a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t he o r s h e i s e n t i t l e d t o a s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . I fthe a l o n g s h o r e m a n he c o u l d s t i l l u n d e r 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 5 ( b ) . pursue a claim against Core Core argues t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment " s p e c i f i c a l l y acknowledges and memorializes [Frazier's] concession." ( C o r e ' s b r i e f , a t 14.) A l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t n o t e d i n i t s j u d g m e n t t h a t F r a z i e r c o n c e d e d t h a t h e was a l o n g s h o r e m a n who was r e c e i v i n g LHWCA b e n e f i t s , t h i s s t a t e m e n t a p p e a r s a f t e r i t s d e t a i l e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and a n a l y s i s o f t h e i s s u e whether F r a z i e r q u a l i f i e d f o r seaman s t a t u s . The j u d g m e n t d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t F r a z i e r c o n c e d e d h e was o n l y a l o n g s h o r e m a n a n d t h a t he c o u l d n o t q u a l i f y f o r seaman s t a t u s ; such a c o n c e s s i o n w o u l d have r e n d e r e d u n n e c e s s a r y most o f t h e t r i a l court's extensive f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and i t s d i s c u s s i o n o f why F r a z i e r was n o t a s e a m a n . 15 1060016 movant s a t i s f i e s this burden of production, the nonmovant then bears the burden of producing s u b s t a n t i a l evidence c r e a t i n g a genuine issue of material fact." Rentz v. Grant, 934 American Gen. L i f e 807, ( A l a . 2004) 811 So. 2d 372 (Ala. 200 6) & A c c . I n s . Co. v . U n d e r w o o d , (citations III. A. As 368, 886 S o . 2 d omitted))." Analysis Seaman t h e Supreme C o u r t (citing noted status in Chandris: "The f e d e r a l c o u r t s h a v e s t r u g g l e d o v e r t h e y e a r s t o articulate generally applicable criteria to d i s t i n g u i s h among t h e many v a r i e t i e s o f m a r i t i m e workers, often developing detailed multipronged t e s t s f o r seaman s t a t u s . Since t h e 1950's, this Court l a r g e l y has l e f t d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e Jones Act's scope t o t h e lower c o u r t s . Unfortunately, as a result, '[t]he p e r i l s of the sea, which mariners s u f f e r a n d s h i p o w n e r s i n s u r e a g a i n s t , h a v e met t h e i r match i n t h e p e r i l s o f j u d i c i a l r e v i e w . ' O r , as one c o u r t p a r a p h r a s e d D i d e r o t i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s body o f l a w : '"We h a v e made a l a b y r i n t h a n d g o t l o s t i n it. We m u s t f i n d o u r way o u t . " ' " 515 U.S. Freight a t 356 Lines (citations v. M a r s h a l l , p r e - C h a n d r i s case n o t i n g a crew' [under determining opinions, see a l s o so that Sound 1942)(a " [ t ] h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f 'member o f of a worker, many Puget 125 F . 2 d 8 7 6 , 878 ( 9 t h C i r . t h e LHWCA] a n d t h e t e s t s the status are omitted); and applied in as s e t f o r t h i n d i f f e r e n t varied 16 t o be that any attempt at 1060016 reconciliation would be futile"). Taking into account s t a t u t o r y and c a s e l a w h i s t o r y t h a t gave r i s e t o t h e however, and resolution under the In 337 of Jones more the (1991), the issue Act McDermott recent Supreme whether i s clear. Supreme C o u r t Frazier He International, Court labyrinth, precedents, might be the a the seaman i s not. Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. stated: "As h a d t h e l o w e r f e d e r a l c o u r t s b e f o r e the J o n e s A c t , t h i s C o u r t c o n t i n u e d t o c o n s t r u e 'seaman' broadly after the Jones Act. In International S t e v e d o r i n g Co. v . H a v e r t y , 272 U.S. 50 ( 1 9 2 6 ) , t h e Court held that a stevedore i s a 'seaman' c o v e r e d u n d e r t h e A c t when e n g a g e d i n m a r i t i m e e m p l o y m e n t . H a v e r t y was a l o n g s h o r e w o r k e r i n j u r e d w h i l e s t o w i n g f r e i g h t i n the h o l d of a docked v e s s e l . The C o u r t recognized that 'as the word i s commonly used, s t e v e d o r e s a r e not "seamen."' I d . , a t 52. 'But words are flexible We cannot believe that Congress w i l l i n g l y would have a l l o w e d the p r o t e c t i o n t o men e n g a g e d u p o n t h e same m a r i t i m e d u t i e s t o v a r y with t h e a c c i d e n t o f t h e i r b e i n g employed by a s t e v e d o r e r a t h e r t h a n by t h e s h i p . ' Ibid. [ 1 1 ] " C o n g r e s s w o u l d , and d i d , however. Within six months of the d e c i s i o n i n H a v e r t y , Congress passed t h e L o n g s h o r e and H a r b o r Workers' C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t (LHWCA), 44 S t a t . ( p a r t 2) 1 4 2 4 , as a m e n d e d , 33 U.S.C. §§ 9 0 1 - 9 5 0 . The A c t p r o v i d e s r e c o v e r y f o r injury to a broad range of land-based maritime workers, but e x p l i c i t l y e x c l u d e s from i t s coverage 'a m a s t e r o r member o f a c r e w o f a n y v e s s e l . ' 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 2 ( 3 ) ( G ) . This Court r e c o g n i z e d the A s t e v e d o r e i s one ships. 11 of employed i n t h e l o a d i n g and 17 unloading 1060016 d i s t i n c t i o n , a l b e i t b e l a t e d l y , i n Swanson v . M a r r a B r o t h e r s , I n c . , 328 U.S. 1 ( 1 9 4 6 ) , c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e J o n e s A c t a n d t h e LHWCA a r e m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . The LHWCA p r o v i d e s r e l i e f f o r l a n d - b a s e d maritime workers, and t h e Jones Act i s restricted t o 'a m a s t e r o r member o f a c r e w o f a n y v e s s e l ' : 'We m u s t take i tthat the e f f e c t of these p r o v i s i o n s ofthe [LHWCA] i s t o c o n f i n e t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e J o n e s A c t t o t h e members o f t h e c r e w o f a v e s s e l p l y i n g i n n a v i g a b l e waters and t o s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e r i g h t o f r e c o v e r y r e c o g n i z e d by t h e Haverty case o n l y such r i g h t s t o c o m p e n s a t i o n a s a r e g i v e n b y t h e [LHWCA].' I d . , a t 7. ' [ M ] a s t e r o r member o f a c r e w ' i s a r e f i n e m e n t o f t h e t e r m 'seaman' i n t h e J o n e s A c t ; i t e x c l u d e s f r o m LHWCA c o v e r a g e t h o s e p r o p e r l y c o v e r e d under t h e Jones A c t . Thus, i t i s odd b u t t r u e t h a t the key requirement f o r Jones A c t coverage now appears i n another s t a t u t e . "With t h e passage o f t h e LHWCA, Congress e s t a b l i s h e d a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between land-based and s e a - b a s e d m a r i t i m e w o r k e r s . The l a t t e r , who owe t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e t o a v e s s e l and n o t s o l e l y t o a l a n d - b a s e d e m p l o y e r , a r e seamen. I r o n i c a l l y , on t h e same d a y t h a t t h e C o u r t d e c i d e d S w a n s o n i t h a n d e d down S e a s S h i p p i n g C o . v . S i e r a c k i , 328 U.S. 85 (1946). With reasoning remarkably s i m i l a r t o that in Haverty, the Court extended to a stevedore the t r a d i t i o n a l seamen's remedy o f u n s e a w o r t h i n e s s i n t h o s e c a s e s where t h e s t e v e d o r e ' i s d o i n g a seaman's work a n d i n c u r r i n g a seaman's h a z a r d s . ' 328 U.S., a t 99. I t t o o k C o n g r e s s a b i t l o n g e r t o r e a c t t h i s time. I n 1 9 7 2 , C o n g r e s s a m e n d e d t h e LHWCA t o b a r longshore and harbor workers from recovery f o r breach of the duty of seaworthiness. S e e 86 S t a t . 1263, 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 5 ( b ) ; M i l e s v . A p e x Marine C o r p . , 498 U.S. 1 9 , 28 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . Whether under t h e J o n e s A c t o r g e n e r a l m a r i t i m e l a w , s e a m e n do n o t include land-based workers." 498 U.S. a t 3 4 6 - 4 8 . The C o u r t 18 continued: 1060016 "We now r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e LHWCA i s o n e o f a pair of mutually exclusive remedial statutes that distinguish between land-based and sea-based maritime employees. The LHWCA restricted the d e f i n i t i o n o f 'seaman' i n t h e J o n e s A c t o n l y t o t h e extent that 'seaman' h a d b e e n t a k e n to include land-based employees. T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e J o n e s A c t , t h e LHWCA, o r e l s e w h e r e , t h a t C o n g r e s s has excluded from Jones A c t remedies those t r a d i t i o n a l s e a m e n who owe a l l e g i a n c e t o a v e s s e l a t sea " 498 U.S. a t 3 5 3 - 5 4 ; Warner see a l s o [v. G o l t r a , Chandris, 2 9 3 U.S. 155 5 1 5 U.S. a t 3 5 5 ( " I n (1934)], we stated s e a m a n i s a m a r i n e r o f a n y d e g r e e , o n e who l i v e s the sea.' 321 U.S. 5 6 5 , 572 entitled times Id., a t 157. welfare Buena (1944), to theprivilege contributes Similarly, to we his l i f e that '"every o f a s e a m a n who, l i k e 243 upon about one i s seamen, a t a l l the operation o f t h e s h i p when s h e i s u p o n a v o y a g e . " ' Ventura, 'a i n N o r t o n v. Warner Co., suggested the labors that and ( q u o t i n g The F. 7 9 7 , 799 (SDNY 1916))." which the t r i a l court relied (emphasis added)). In Chandris, judgment further vessel i n the present clarify what i n navigation case, t h e Supreme C o u r t r e l a t i o n s h i p a worker i n order to qualify for 19 upon in its was a s k e d t o must have "seaman" to a status 1060016 under t h e Jones Chandris Court Act. 5 1 5 U.S. a t 3 5 0 . As t o t h a t issue the noted: " C o n g r e s s p r o v i d e d some c o n t e n t f o r t h e J o n e s Act requirement i n 1 9 2 7 when i t enacted the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation A c t (LHWCA), w h i c h p r o v i d e s s c h e d u l e d c o m p e n s a t i o n ( a n d t h e e x c l u s i v e remedy) f o r i n j u r y t o a b r o a d range o f land-based maritime workers but which also e x p l i c i t l y e x c l u d e s f r o m i t s c o v e r a g e 'a m a s t e r o r member o f a c r e w o f a n y v e s s e l . ' 44 S t a t . ( p a r t 2) 1 4 2 4 , a s a m e n d e d , 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 2 ( 3 ) ( G ) . " 515 U.S. a t 3 5 5 . employees include As n o t e d above, t o whom C o n g r e s s "any the "land-based" directed longshoreman or coverage other under person l o n g s h o r i n g o p e r a t i o n s , and any harbor-worker repairman, 902(3) (emphasis The task shipbuilder, Chandris activity injury, and s h i p - b r e a k e r Court then A c t coverage i n which t h e worker nevertheless best principles engaged i n 33 U.S.C. § added). Jones goals." t h e LHWCA including a ship "undert[ook] t h e ... of developing a status-based standard that, determines maritime a t t h e time t h e Jones The C o u r t the definition although i t regard to the precise i s engaged furthers 5 1 5 U.S. a t 3 5 8 . regarding without difficult noted of a Act's remedial "several seaman. '[w]hether under t h e Jones A c t o r g e n e r a l m a r i t i m e law, 20 ofthe basic First, seamen 1060016 do n o t i n c l u d e l a n d - b a s e d w o r k e r s . ' [McDermott I n t ' l , Wilander, [ 4 9 8 U.S. 3 3 7 ] a t 3 4 8 [ ( 1 9 9 1 ) ] . " (emphasis added). The C h a n d r i s Court further I n c . v.] 5 1 5 U.S. a t 3 5 8 noted: "In addition to recognizing a fundamental distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime employees, our cases a l s o emphasize t h a t Jones A c t coverage, like the jurisdiction of a d m i r a l t y over causes o f a c t i o n f o rmaintenance and cure for injuries r e c e i v e d i n the course of a seaman's employment, depends 'not on t h e p l a c e where t h e i n j u r y i s i n f l i c t e d ... b u t o n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s e a m a n ' s s e r v i c e , h i s s t a t u s a s a member o f t h e v e s s e l , and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p as such t o t h e v e s s e l and i t s o p e r a t i o n i n n a v i g a b l e w a t e r s . ' Swanson [ v . M a r r a B r o s . , I n c . , 3 2 8 U.S. 1, 4 ( 1 9 4 6 ) ] . Thus, m a r i t i m e w o r k e r s who o b t a i n s e a m a n s t a t u s d o n o t l o s e t h a t p r o t e c t i o n a u t o m a t i c a l l y when on s h o r e a n d may r e c o v e r u n d e r t h e J o n e s A c t w h e n e v e r t h e y a r e injured i n the service of a vessel, regardless of w h e t h e r t h e i n j u r y o c c u r s on o r o f f t h e s h i p . " 515 U.S. a t 3 5 9 - 6 0 . The Chandris Court continued: "Our LHWCA c a s e s a l s o r e c o g n i z e t h e c o n v e r s e : Land-based maritime workers injured w h i l e on a v e s s e l i n n a v i g a t i o n r e m a i n c o v e r e d b y t h e LHWCA, which e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e s compensation for injuries to c e r t a i n workers engaged i n 'maritime employment' t h a t a r e i n c u r r e d 'upon t h e n a v i g a b l e w a t e r s o f t h e United States,' 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 3 ( a ) . Thus, i n D i r e c t o r , O f f i c e o f Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N o r t h R i v e r A s s o c i a t e s , 4 5 9 U.S. 2 9 7 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , we h e l d t h a t a w o r k e r i n j u r e d w h i l e ' w o r k i n g on a b a r g e i n a c t u a l n a v i g a b l e w a t e r s ' o f t h e H u d s o n R i v e r , i d . , a t 3 0 0 , n . 4, c o u l d b e c o m p e n s a t e d u n d e r t h e LHWCA, i d . , a t 3 2 4 . S e e a l s o P a r k e r v . M o t o r Boat Sales, I n c . , 314 U.S. 2 4 4 , 2 4 4 - 2 4 5 (1941) 21 1060016 (upholding LHWCA c o v e r a g e f o r a worker testing o u t b o a r d m o t o r s who 'was d r o w n e d w h e n a m o t o r b o a t i n w h i c h h e was r i d i n g c a p s i z e d ' ) . T h e s e d e c i s i o n s , w h i c h r e f l e c t o u r l o n g s t a n d i n g v i e w o f t h e LHWCA's scope, i n d i c a t e t h a t a m a r i t i m e worker does not b e c o m e a 'member o f a c r e w ' a s s o o n a s a v e s s e l l e a v e s the dock. " I t i s t h e r e f o r e w e l l s e t t l e d a f t e r decades of j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t the Jones A c t i n q u i r y i s fundamentally status based: Land-based maritime w o r k e r s do n o t b e c o m e s e a m e n b e c a u s e t h e y h a p p e n t o be w o r k i n g on b o a r d a v e s s e l when t h e y a r e i n j u r e d , a n d s e a m e n do n o t l o s e J o n e s A c t p r o t e c t i o n w h e n t h e course of t h e i r service t o a v e s s e l t a k e s them ashore. In s p i t e of t h i s background, r e s p o n d e n t and J u s t i c e STEVENS s u g g e s t t h a t a n y m a r i t i m e w o r k e r who i s a s s i g n e d t o a v e s s e l f o r the d u r a t i o n of a voyage -and whose d u t i e s contribute to the vessel's m i s s i o n -- s h o u l d b e c l a s s i f i e d a s a s e a m a n f o r purposes of i n j u r i e s incurred during that voyage. S e e B r i e f f o r R e s p o n d e n t 1 4 ; p o s t , a t 2194 (opinion concurring i n judgment). Under such a 'voyage t e s t , ' w h i c h r e l i e s p r i n c i p a l l y upon t h i s C o u r t ' s statements that the Jones A c t was designed to p r o t e c t m a r i t i m e w o r k e r s who are exposed to the 'special hazards' and 'particular perils' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f w o r k on v e s s e l s a t s e a , s e e , e . g . , [ M c D e r m o t t I n t ' l , I n c . v . ] W i l a n d e r , [498 U.S. 337] a t 354 [ ( 1 9 9 1 ) ] , t h e w o r k e r ' s a c t i v i t i e s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n j u r y w o u l d be c o n t r o l l i n g . "The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h r e s p o n d e n t ' s a r g u m e n t , as t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n makes c l e a r , i s t h a t t h e LHWCA r e p u d i a t e d t h e [ I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t e v e d o r i n g Co. v . ] H a v e r t y [ , 272 U.S. 50 ( 1 9 2 6 ) , ] l i n e o f c a s e s a n d e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a w o r k e r i s no l o n g e r c o n s i d e r e d t o be a seaman s i m p l y b e c a u s e he i s d o i n g a seaman's work a t the time of the i n j u r y . Seaman s t a t u s i s n o t c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h seamen's r i s k s . 22 1060016 "... In evaluating the employment-related connection o f a maritime worker t o a v e s s e l i n n a v i g a t i o n , c o u r t s s h o u l d n o t e m p l o y 'a " s n a p s h o t " test f o r seaman status, inspecting only the s i t u a t i o n as i t e x i s t s a t t h e i n s t a n t o f i n j u r y ; a more e n d u r i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p i s c o n t e m p l a t e d i n t h e jurisprudence.' Easley [v. Southern Shipbuilding C o r p . , 9 6 5 F . 2 d 1, 5 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) ] . Thus, a w o r k e r may n o t o s c i l l a t e b a c k a n d f o r t h between J o n e s A c t c o v e r a g e a n d o t h e r r e m e d i e s d e p e n d i n g on t h e a c t i v i t y i n w h i c h t h e w o r k e r was e n g a g e d while injured. Reeves v. M o b i l e D r e d g i n g & Pumping Co., 26 F . 3 d 1 2 4 7 , 1 2 5 6 (CA3 1 9 9 4 ) . Unlike Justice S T E V E N S , s e e p o s t , a t 2 1 9 4 , we d o n o t b e l i e v e t h a t any m a r i t i m e w o r k e r on a s h i p a t s e a as p a r t o f h i s e m p l o y m e n t i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y a member o f t h e c r e w o f the vessel within t h e meaning of the statutory terms. Our r e j e c t i o n o f t h e voyage t e s t i s a l s o consistent with t h e i n t e r e s t s of employers and m a r i t i m e w o r k e r s a l i k e i n b e i n g a b l e t o p r e d i c t who w i l l be c o v e r e d b y t h e J o n e s A c t ( a n d , p e r h a p s more importantly f o r purposes o f the employers' workers' c o m p e n s a t i o n o b l i g a t i o n s , who w i l l b e c o v e r e d b y t h e LHWCA) b e f o r e a p a r t i c u l a r w o r k d a y b e g i n s . "To say that our cases have recognized a distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers that precludes a p p l i c a t i o n o f a v o y a g e t e s t f o r seaman s t a t u s , h o w e v e r , i s not to say t h a t a m a r i t i m e employee must work o n l y on b o a r d a v e s s e l t o q u a l i f y a s a seaman u n d e r t h e J o n e s A c t . I n S o u t h w e s t M a r i n e , I n c . v . G i z o n i , 5 0 2 U.S. 81 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , d e c i d e d o n l y a f e w m o n t h s a f t e r W i l a n d e r , we concluded that a worker's status as a ship repairman, one of t h e enumerated occupations encompassed w i t h i n t h e term 'employee' under t h e LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 2 ( 3 ) , d i d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e s t r i c t t h e w o r k e r t o a remedy under t h a t s t a t u t e . We e x p l a i n e d that, ' [ w ] h i l e i n some c a s e s a s h i p r e p a i r m a n may l a c k t h e r e q u i s i t e c o n n e c t i o n t o a v e s s e l i n n a v i g a t i o n t o q u a l i f y f o r seaman s t a t u s , not a l lship repairmen lack the requisite 23 1060016 c o n n e c t i o n as a m a t t e r o f l a w . T h i s i s so b e c a u s e " [ i ] t i s not the employee's p a r t i c u l a r job t h a t i s d e t e r m i n a t i v e , but the employee's connection to a vessel."' G i z o n i , s u p r a , a t 89 ( q u o t i n g W i l a n d e r , 498 U.S., a t 354) (footnote omitted). Thus, we c o n c l u d e d , t h e J o n e s A c t r e m e d y may b e a v a i l a b l e t o m a r i t i m e w o r k e r s who a r e e m p l o y e d b y a s h i p y a r d a n d who s p e n d a p o r t i o n o f t h e i r t i m e w o r k i n g o n s h o r e but spend the r e s t of t h e i r time at sea." 515 U.S. With Chandris for a t 360-64 the Court (emphasis foregoing then added). basic articulated determining whether principles the a particular established, following employee two-part is a test seaman: " [ T ] h e e s s e n t i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r seaman s t a t u s a r e twofold. First, a s we emphasized in [McDermott I n t ' l , I n c . v . ] W i l a n d e r , [498 U.S. 337 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , ] 'an e m p l o y e e ' s d u t i e s must " c o n t r i b u t [ e ] t o t h e f u n c t i o n of the v e s s e l or to the accomplishment of i t s mission."' 498 U.S., a t 355 ( q u o t i n g [ O f f s h o r e Co. v . ] R o b i s o n , 266 F . 2 d [ 7 6 9 ] , 779 [ ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 5 9 ) ] ) . The Jones Act's protections, like the other a d m i r a l t y p r o t e c t i o n s f o r seamen, o n l y e x t e n d to t h o s e m a r i t i m e e m p l o y e e s who do t h e s h i p ' s w o r k . But t h i s t h r e s h o l d r e q u i r e m e n t i s v e r y b r o a d : ' A l l who work at sea i n the s e r v i c e of a s h i p ' are e l i g i b l e f o r seaman s t a t u s . 498 U.S., a t 354. "Second, and most i m p o r t a n t f o r our purposes h e r e , a seaman must have a c o n n e c t i o n t o a v e s s e l i n navigation ( o r t o an i d e n t i f i a b l e group of such v e s s e l s ) t h a t i s s u b s t a n t i a l i n terms of b o t h i t s d u r a t i o n a n d i t s n a t u r e . The f u n d a m e n t a l p u r p o s e o f t h i s s u b s t a n t i a l connection requirement i s to give full effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and to separate the sea-based maritime e m p l o y e e s who a r e e n t i t l e d t o J o n e s A c t p r o t e c t i o n from those land-based workers who have only a 24 the 1060016 t r a n s i t o r y or s p o r a d i c connection to a v e s s e l i n n a v i g a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e whose employment does n o t r e g u l a r l y e x p o s e them t o the p e r i l s of the sea." 515 U.S. at Further, 368 (emphasis commenting added). on the "temporal" of a m a r i t i m e employee's c o n n e c t i o n the Chandris Court 1 2 aspect to a v e s s e l i n (duration) navigation, stated: "Generally, the Fifth Circuit seems to have identified an appropriate r u l e o f thumb f o r the ordinary case: A w o r k e r who spends l e s s than about 30 p e r c e n t o f h i s t i m e i n t h e s e r v i c e o f a v e s s e l i n n a v i g a t i o n s h o u l d n o t q u a l i f y as a s e a m a n u n d e r t h e Jones Act. T h i s f i g u r e o f c o u r s e s e r v e s as no m o r e t h a n a g u i d e l i n e e s t a b l i s h e d by y e a r s o f experience, a n d d e p a r t u r e f r o m i t w i l l c e r t a i n l y be j u s t i f i e d i n appropriate cases. As we h a v e s a i d , ' [ t ] h e i n q u i r y i n t o seaman s t a t u s i s o f n e c e s s i t y f a c t s p e c i f i c ; i t In his reply brief, F r a z i e r r e l i e s on a q u o t e from Chandris that i s quoting a s i m i l a r two-part t e s t a r t i c u l a t e d by the U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t of A p p e a l s f o r the F i f t h C i r c u i t i n O f f s h o r e Co. v . R o b i s o n , 266 F . 2 d 769, 779 (5th C i r . 1959). 515 U.S. a t 366. F r a z i e r does not a t t r i b u t e the quote to R o b i s o n , h o w e v e r , a n d he a p p a r e n t l y d o e s n o t a p p r e h e n d t h a t e l e m e n t one o f t h e R o b i s o n t e s t i s s i m i l a r t o e l e m e n t two of t h e C h a n d r i s t e s t a n d t h a t e l e m e n t two o f t h e R o b i s o n t e s t i s similar to e l e m e n t one of the Chandris test. This is i m p o r t a n t because F r a z i e r ' s argument from the Robison t e s t emphasizes what i s e s s e n t i a l l y the f i r s t element of the t e s t announced i n Chandris. As d i s c u s s e d i n f r a i n t h i s opinion, h o w e v e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y f o u n d t h a t an i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t e d a s t o w h e t h e r e l e m e n t one f r o m C h a n d r i s was s a t i s f i e d ; a f i n d i n g Core does not d i s p u t e . The issue t h a t we m u s t d e c i d e i s w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d w h e n i t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e r e was no g e n u i n e i s s u e r e g a r d i n g F r a z i e r ' s f a i l u r e t o s a t i s f y e l e m e n t two o f t h e C h a n d r i s t e s t . 1 2 25 1060016 will d e p e n d on t h e n a t u r e o f t h e v e s s e l a n d the employee's precise relation to i t . ' [McDermott Int'l, I n c . v.] W i l a n d e r , 4 98 U.S. [337], at 356 [(1991)]." 515 U.S. at intended 371. to p r o t e c t allegiance to not." at Id. In genuine the the Court concluded: "[T]he Jones Act s e a - b a s e d m a r i t i m e w o r k e r s , who a vessel, and not land-based owe employees, was their who do 376. present issue satisfied second The of material first element, case, the court fact existed element of however, trial the the as concluded to Chandris trial court whether test. 1 3 that a Frazier As determined to the that Frazier The t r i a l c o u r t s t a t e d , t h a t the " ' c o n t r i b u t e t o the function of the vessel' prong has been given broad c o n s t r u c t i o n by t h e c o u r t s and the C o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e i s a t l e a s t an i s s u e o f f a c t a s t o w h e t h e r [ F r a z i e r ' s ] w o r k c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e f u n c t i o n o f C o r e ' s b a r g e s and o f f l o a d i n g operation." Core does not dispute the trial court's c o n c l u s i o n t h a t an i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t s e x i s t s c o n c e r n i n g whether F r a z i e r " c o n t r i b u t e d to the f u n c t i o n of a v e s s e l " f o r purposes of the Jones Act. See, e.g., Cook v. B e l d e n C o n c r e t e Prods., Inc., 472 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1 9 7 3 ) ( " C o n v e n t i o n a l s h i p s a n d b a r g e s .. . w h i c h a r e d e s i g n e d for navigation and commerce are vessels within general m a r i t i m e and J o n e s A c t j u r i s d i c t i o n and r e t a i n s u c h s t a t u s even w h i l e moored, d r y - d o c k e d , or o t h e r w i s e i m m o b i l i z e d and s e c u r e d t o l a n d . " ) ; s e e a l s o S t e w a r t , 543 U.S. at 488-95; H o l m e s v . A t l a n t i c S o u n d i n g Co., 437 F . 3 d 4 4 1 , 448 (5th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ) ; a n d A l l e n v . M o b i l e I n t e r s t a t e P i l e d r i v e r s , 475 So. 2d 530 ( A l a . 1985) . 1 3 26 1060016 " p e r f o r m e d t h e b u l k o f h i s w o r k e i t h e r on l a n d o r on s p u d b a r g e s t h a t w e r e a l m o s t a l w a y s s p u d d e d down a n d tied off. [Frazier's] connection to a v e s s e l in n a v i g a t i o n , i f a n y , was s p o r a d i c a n d e x t r e m e l y s h o r t i n d u r a t i o n , not s u b s t a n t i a l i n d u r a t i o n or n a t u r e . [ F r a z i e r ] was n o t ' e x p o s e d t o t h e p e r i l s o f t h e s e a ' as r e q u i r e d b y Chandris. fi " H e r e , [ F r a z i e r ] was not a sea-based m a r i t i m e employee whose d u t i e s r e g u l a r l y t o o k him to sea. Instead, [ F r a z i e r ] a r r i v e d a t work e v e r y day by v e h i c l e a n d w e n t home e v e r y n i g h t t o s l e e p i n h i s own bed. [ F r a z i e r ] d i d n o t t a k e h i s m e a l s on the b o a t a n d d i d n o t s l e e p on t h e b o a t . [ F r a z i e r ] was n o t a member o f t h e c r e w s t h a t r e g u l a r l y o f f l o a d e d t h e b a r g e s a n d was n o t p a i d l i k e t h e m . He r e g u l a r l y did welding w o r k on i t e m s t h a t w e r e on t h e land w h i l e he was on l a n d . H i s b a s e o f o p e r a t i o n was a m e c h a n i c s h o p on l a n d . The w o r k t h a t [ F r a z i e r ] d i d on a b a r g e was a l m o s t a l w a y s done w h i l e the b a r g e was moored, s p u d d e d down, o r completely out of operation. He was n e v e r on a v e s s e l i n n a v i g a t i o n w h i l e w o r k i n g f o r C o r e , a n d t h e o n l y t i m e he was on a b a r g e t h a t was m o v i n g was when t h e b a r g e was being moved s h o r t distances along the s h o r e l i n e by a crane. These ' t r i p s ' were i n f r e q u e n t and g e n e r a l l y t o o k b e t w e e n t h i r t y m i n u t e s a n d an h o u r . The w o r k t h a t he a c t u a l l y d i d w h i l e he was on a b a r g e , w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of o c c a s i o n a l l y h a n d l i n g l i n e s , was done there only because the item that he was r e p a i r i n g was l o c a t e d on t h e v e s s e l . " Based concluded on i t s judgment, (1) that the Frazier did "in navigation" and (2) "in navigation" was not that trial not court work on appears barges Frazier's connection "substantial in duration 27 to have that were to and barges nature" 1060016 for purposes vessel of the Jones i s considered Act. As to the issue " i n navigation," the o f when Chandris Court stated: "Under o u r p r e c e d e n t and t h e l a w p r e v a i l i n g i n the Circuits, i t i s generally accepted that 'a v e s s e l d o e s n o t c e a s e t o b e a v e s s e l when s h e i s n o t voyaging, but i s at anchor, berthed, or at dockside,' DiGiovanni v . T r a y l o r B r o s . , I n c . , 959 F.2d 1 1 1 9 , 1 1 2 1 (CA1) ( e n b a n c ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 506 U.S. 827 ( 1 9 9 2 ) , e v e n when t h e v e s s e l i s u n d e r g o i n g repairs. S e e ... [2 M. N o r r i s , Law o f Seamen § 3 0 . 1 3 , ] a t 364 [ ( 4 t h e d . 1 9 8 5 ) ] ( ' [ A ] v e s s e l i s i n n a v i g a t i o n ... when i t r e t u r n s f r o m a v o y a g e a n d i s taken t o a drydock or s h i p y a r d t o undergo r e p a i r s i n p r e p a r a t i o n t o making a n o t h e r t r i p , and l i k e w i s e a v e s s e l i s i n n a v i g a t i o n , a l t h o u g h moored t o a dock, if i t remains i n readiness f o r another voyage' (footnotes omitted)). A t some p o i n t , however, r e p a i r s become s u f f i c i e n t l y significant that the v e s s e l c a n no l o n g e r b e c o n s i d e r e d i n navigation. I n W e s t v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 361 U.S. 118 ( 1 9 5 9 ) , we held that a shoreside w o r k e r was n o t e n t i t l e d t o recover f o r u n s e a w o r t h i n e s s b e c a u s e t h e v e s s e l on w h i c h he was i n j u r e d was u n d e r g o i n g an o v e r h a u l f o r the purpose o f making h e r seaworthy and t h e r e f o r e had been w i t h d r a w n f r o m n a v i g a t i o n . We explained t h a t , i n s u c h c a s e s , ' t h e f o c u s s h o u l d be upon t h e s t a t u s o f t h e s h i p , t h e p a t t e r n o f t h e r e p a i r s , and the e x t e n s i v e n a t u r e o f t h e work c o n t r a c t e d t o be done.' I d . , a t 1 2 2 . ... The g e n e r a l r u l e among t h e Courts of Appeals i s that vessels undergoing repairs or spending a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t p e r i o d o f time i n drydock are s t i l l considered t o be ' i n n a v i g a t i o n ' whereas ships being transformed through 'major' overhauls or renovations are not." 515 U.S. a t 373-74. 28 a 1060016 In light of the foregoing not been taken Chandris, the was i n j u r e d i n M a r c h 2 0 0 5 a r g u a b l y b a r g e on w h i c h F r a z i e r had out of s e r v i c e purposes of the Jones A c t . to of most involved Frazier's barges of however, of whether working Act the Frazier "was fail determination " i n navigation" for on Core's on a erred vessel no the t r i a l genuine relationship substantial i n nature the Chandris pretermit court to vessels f o r purposes Court barges, which consideration, when i t concluded i n navigation court issue c a n b e made a s " i nnavigation" f o r As h e r e i n a f t e r d i s c u s s e d , because that We the t r i a l Frazier's As work Act. never from The same a r g u m e n t other Jones f o r Core." claims a n d was t h a t m i g h t be c o n s i d e r e d purposes that language was exists in while F r a z i e r ' s Jones correct as to in whether navigation of the Jones A c t . noted: " [ T ] h e q u e s t i o n o f who i s a 'member o f a c r e w , ' a n d t h e r e f o r e who i s a ' s e a m a n , ' i s a m i x e d q u e s t i o n o f law and f a c t . Because s t a t u t o r y terms a r e a t i s s u e , t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a q u e s t i o n o f law and i t i s the c o u r t ' s duty t o d e f i n e the a p p r o p r i a t e standard. [ M c D e r m o t t I n t ' l , I n c . v . ] W i l a n d e r , 498 U.S. [ 3 3 7 ] at 356 [(1991)]. On the other hand, ' [ i ] f reasonable persons, applying the proper legal s t a n d a r d , c o u l d d i f f e r as t o w h e t h e r t h e e m p l o y e e was a "member o f a c r e w , " i t i s a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e jury.' Ibid. ... The j u r y s h o u l d be p e r m i t t e d , when d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a m a r i t i m e e m p l o y e e h a s t h e 29 i t s was 1060016 r e q u i s i t e employment-related connection to a vessel i n n a v i g a t i o n t o q u a l i f y a s a member o f t h e v e s s e l ' s crew, t o c o n s i d e r a l lr e l e v a n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s b e a r i n g on t h e t w o e l e m e n t s o u t l i n e d above." 515 U.S. a t 3 6 9 . The C o u r t c o n t i n u e d : "In our view, 'the t o t a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s employment must be w e i g h e d t o d e t e r m i n e whether he had a sufficient relation to the navigation of vessels and t h e p e r i l s attendant thereon.' W a l l a c e v . O c e a n e e r i n g I n t ' l , 727 F . 2 d 4 2 7 , 432 (CA5 1 9 8 4 ) . The d u r a t i o n o f a w o r k e r ' s connection to a vessel and t h e n a t u r e of the worker's activities, taken together, determine w h e t h e r a m a r i t i m e e m p l o y e e i s a seaman b e c a u s e t h e u l t i m a t e i n q u i r y i s whether the worker i n q u e s t i o n is a member o f t h e v e s s e l ' s crew or simply a l a n d - b a s e d e m p l o y e e who h a p p e n s t o b e w o r k i n g o n t h e vessel at a given time." 515 U.S. a t 370 Although Chandris Frazier's so t h a t his contention was substantial argument added). argument superficially parrots the there appears language i n nature f o r purposes odds with of t h e Jones the fundamental connection" requirement. purpose that Act, h i s of the As t h e C h a n d r i s Court stated: "The fundamental purpose of this substantial connection requirement i s ... to separate the sea-based m a r i t i m e employees who a r e e n t i t l e d t o Jones A c t p r o t e c t i o n from those land-based workers 30 of t o be m e r i t i n t h a t he h a d a c o n n e c t i o n t o C o r e ' s b a r g e s i s at "substantial (emphasis 1060016 ... w h o s e e m p l o y m e n t d o e s n o t to the p e r i l s of the s e a . " 515 U.S. at 368 Perhaps Chandris, (emphasis more the regularly expose them added). i m p o r t a n t l y , subsequent Supreme C o u r t to i t s decision in stated: "For the s u b s t a n t i a l c o n n e c t i o n requirement to serve i t s purpose, the i n q u i r y i n t o the n a t u r e of the e m p l o y e e ' s c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e v e s s e l must c o n c e n t r a t e on w h e t h e r t h e e m p l o y e e ' s d u t i e s t a k e h i m t o s e a . T h i s w i l l g i v e s u b s t a n c e t o t h e i n q u i r y b o t h as t o t h e d u r a t i o n and n a t u r e o f t h e e m p l o y e e ' s c o n n e c t i o n to the v e s s e l and be helpful in distinguishing land-based from sea-based employees." Harbor In for Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555 (1997). P a p a i , t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t P a p a i d i d n o t meet t h e seaman s t a t u s , noting: " P a p a i was q u a l i f i e d u n d e r t h e I B U [ I n l a n d B o a t m a n ' s Union] Deckhands Agreement to p e r f o r m non-seagoing work i n a d d i t i o n to the s e a g o i n g d u t i e s d e s c r i b e d above. H i s a c t u a l d u t y on t h e P t . B a r r o w t h r o u g h o u t the employment i n q u e s t i o n d i d not include any s e a g o i n g a c t i v i t y ; he was h i r e d f o r one d a y t o p a i n t t h e v e s s e l a t d o c k s i d e a n d he was n o t g o i n g t o s a i l w i t h t h e v e s s e l a f t e r he f i n i s h e d p a i n t i n g i t . This is not a case w h e r e t h e e m p l o y e e was hired to perform seagoing work during the employment in q u e s t i o n , h o w e v e r b r i e f , a n d we n e e d n o t c o n s i d e r h e r e t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f s u c h an e m p l o y m e n t . The I B U D e c k h a n d s A g r e e m e n t g i v e s no r e a s o n t o a s s u m e t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e n t a g e o f P a p a i ' s work w o u l d be of a seagoing n a t u r e , s u b j e c t i n g him to the perils of the sea. In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the u n i o n agreement does not advance the a c c u r a c y of the seaman-status inquiry. 31 test 1060016 " P a p a i a r g u e s he q u a l i f i e s as a s e a m a n i f we c o n s i d e r h i s 12 p r i o r e m p l o y m e n t s w i t h H a r b o r Tug over the 2^ months before his injury. Papai t e s t i f i e d a t h i s d e p o s i t i o n t h a t he w o r k e d aboard t h e P t . B a r r o w on t h r e e o r f o u r o c c a s i o n s b e f o r e t h e d a y he was i n j u r e d , the most r e c e n t of w h i c h was more t h a n a week e a r l i e r . Each of these engagements i n v o l v e d o n l y m a i n t e n a n c e work w h i l e the t u g was docked. The n a t u r e o f P a p a i ' s c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e P t . B a r r o w was no m o r e s u b s t a n t i a l f o r seaman-status p u r p o s e s b y v i r t u e o f t h e s e e n g a g e m e n t s t h a n t h e one during which he was injured. Papai does not i d e n t i f y w i t h s p e c i f i c i t y w h a t he d i d f o r H a r b o r Tug t h e o t h e r e i g h t o r n i n e t i m e s he w o r k e d f o r t h e c o m p a n y i n t h e 2^ m o n t h s b e f o r e h i s i n j u r y . The c l o s e s t he comes i s h i s d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y t h a t 70 p e r c e n t o f h i s w o r k o v e r t h e 2 1/4 y e a r s b e f o r e h i s i n j u r y was deckhand work. Coupled w i t h the fact t h a t n o n e o f P a p a i ' s w o r k a b o a r d t h e P t . B a r r o w was o f a s e a g o i n g n a t u r e , i t w o u l d n o t be r e a s o n a b l e t o infer from Papai's testimony that his recent engagements w i t h Harbor Tug i n v o l v e d work of a seagoing nature. I n any event, these discrete e n g a g e m e n t s w e r e s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e one i n q u e s t i o n , which was the sort of 'transitory or s p o r a d i c ' c o n n e c t i o n t o a v e s s e l o r g r o u p o f v e s s e l s t h a t , as we e x p l a i n e d i n C h a n d r i s , d o e s n o t q u a l i f y one f o r seaman s t a t u s . 515 U.S., a t 368." 520 U.S. at 559-60 (references to record omitted; emphasis added). B a s e d on t h e r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d t h e " s u b s t a n t i a l requirement and announced application i n Chandris of t h a t language c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the t r i a l and on the i n P a p a i , we i n nature" interpretation are c l e a r to the c o u r t d i d n o t e r r when i t d e t e r m i n e d 32 1060016 that no genuine Frazier's nature. of a of material fact to Core's barges connection F r a z i e r was nature; he of sea" while Compare, 466-67 the e.g., Richard was v. perils important he facts faced to not was to whether substantial " r e g u l a r l y exposed performing Mike (La. 2 0 0 1 ) ( " R i c h a r d ' s the e x i s t e d as his Hooks, work Inc., 799 So. m u s t be determine considered whether dockside; shore he vessels; on he vessels vessels on the mission; only on land while d i d not eat overnight; he aboard a vessel being on with other with on he was while an some of on dredges i t was the never of 33 the worked were from vessels were s l e p t on keep Hooks's in operation; performing from a land-based moving v e s s e l s of d i d not a member once e v e r y In distance a gangplank's v e s s e l s ; he not duration. which p l a i n t i f f r e p a i r e d ; he the took h i s orders small consider vessels; crew t h a t p e r f o r m e d w e l d i n g worked we n e v e r more t h a n when w o r k i n g partially on was 462, connection[s] his along analysis instance, the Core. time spent aboard Hooks's v e s s e l s this a l l of the 2d and following: not to for defendant's v e s s e l s are s u b s t a n t i a l i n nature particular in a l a n d - b a s e d e m p l o y e e w h o s e w o r k was seagoing perils and issue watch dredge he its never primary f o r e m a n ; he month, the for was short 1060016 durations, canal take where adjacent him to prohibit sea. While of not of that act longshoring "any that and any a s h i p r e p a i r m a n and, a " d e c k h a n d " on o c c a s i o n , what he The an t h o u g h he in the did as harbor-worker 33 "deckhand" of the conceded that so essentially indicating from the far served that d o c k on barges he as as at his work work was platforms. performed open w a t e r , dockside. the duties i . e . , "duties 34 acted he a and Frazier the barges evidence "deckhand" that his loading i s no as gives to fact, concerned, § Frazier related There for U.S.C. t h a t he In of a engaged that o c c a s i o n a l l y a s s i s t i n g w i t h m a t t e r s r e l a t e d to the unloading was maritime only s p e c i f i c testimony a a including a found testified alone "employee" engaged court not omitted)). ship-breaker." trial a status, Richard (footnote person did facts seaman shows s h i p b u i l d e r , and added). along longshoreman or o t h e r p e r s o n operations, repairman, concerning attaining a seaman." as pipe individual t h e LHWCA s p e c i f i c a l l y d e f i n e s 902(3)(emphasis was dredge his repair duties these together e m p l o y m e n t , i n c l u d i n g any ship moving and from them employee, Further, in in none of employee consideration purposes assisted to Hooks's yard; an land-based he [took] away him to 1060016 sea" where transport the barges cargo. circumstances, See were being Papai, i f Frazier pushed 520 a is U.S. at seaman by 555. for ship during the Northeast Marine (1977), could loading T e r m i n a l Co. be classified and a seamen e x p a n s i v e v i e w o f seaman s t a t u s w o u l d distinction who are "engage[d] § 902(3), any Congress and See, 5:06-CV-00210-R, A p r i l Ky. 2009)(stating workday barges either that were the states he special hazards and hazards that Roberts more was an v. 2009] fleets moored Roberts do or not an employees the who "spent dock": to the [No. (W.D. a l l of h i s work "The level seaman; of on hazards of the they are Therefore, o f t h e LHWCA."). view of Co., repair encounter. expansive 35 2d f a c e d by commonly in , Supp. rise intended beneficiary an n.4 Such Barge performing disadvantages longshoremen 254 well. Ingram F. alongside faced i m p o r t a n t l y , such 249, "member[s] o f a crew i n regard to a welder in see v i r t u a l l y e l i m i n a t e the are Roberts 16, the e m p l o y m e n t , " as i l l u s t r a t e d e m p l o y e e s who e.g., of process, drawn between the t y p e s of i n maritime those vessel." has these work U.S. as to typically unloading v . C a p u t o , 432 as Under purposes J o n e s A c t , t h e n v i r t u a l l y a l l l o n g s h o r e m e n , who on tugboat seaman Perhaps status 1060016 w o u l d remove t h e s a f e h a r b o r workers'-compensation in maritime tort-based reasonable s c h e m e f o r many p e r s o n s employment," l e a v i n g to the t o t a l i t y the jurors who a r e " e n g a g e d them t o n a v i g a t e t h r o u g h t h e s c h e m e s t h e LHWCA was i n t e n d e d Considering presented o f t h e LHWCA's n o - f a u l t m a r i t i m e - to displace. 1 4 of the e v i d e n t i a r y materials trial court, we cannot could differ as to conclude whether that Frazier's Frazier relies upon Stewart, which involved c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e § 9 0 2 ( 3 ) ( G ) e x c e p t i o n ("a m a s t e r o r member o f a c r e w o f a n y v e s s e l " ) . Stewart, however, does n o t a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f what c o n n e c t i o n t o a v e s s e l i n n a v i g a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c o n n e c t i o n t o be c o n s i d e r e d " s u b s t a n t i a l i n d u r a t i o n and nature." S e e 5 4 3 U.S. a t 488 ("We b e g a n c l a r i f y i n g t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f ' s e a m a n ' i n a p a i r o f c a s e s , McDermott I n t ' l I n c . v. W i l a n d e r , s u p r a , and C h a n d r i s , s u p r a , t h a t a d d r e s s e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p a w o r k e r must have t o a v e s s e l i n o r d e r t o b e a ' m a s t e r o f member' o f i t s c r e w . We now t u r n t o t h e o t h e r h a l f o f t h e LHWCA's e q u a t i o n : how t o determine whether a w a t e r c r a f t i s a ' v e s s e l . ' " ) . I n f a c t , on remand f r o m S t e w a r t , when t h e e m p l o y e r a t t e m p t e d t o r a i s e t h e substantial-duration-and-nature issue, theUnited States Court of Appeals f o r the F i r s t C i r c u i t noted t h a t the employer a l r e a d y had conceded t h e i s s u e i n p r i o r proceedings and t h a t i t was t h e r e f o r e p r e c l u d e d f r o m r a i s i n g i t . S t e w a r t , 418 F . 3 d a t 35-36. I n a n y e v e n t , t h e e m p l o y e e i n S t e w a r t was "a m a r i n e e n g i n e e r " who was h i r e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e m e c h a n i c a l s y s t e m s o n a l a r g e d r e d g e a n d who s p e n t 9 9 % o f h i s t i m e o n b o a r d w h i l e t h e d r e d g e was p e r f o r m i n g i t s dredging operations i n Boston Harbor. B y c o n t r a s t , F r a z i e r o f f e r e d no e v i d e n c e indicating t h a t he w o r k e d on C o r e ' s b a r g e s away f r o m t h e s h o r e l i n e w h i l e they were a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m i n g t h e i r work o f t r a n s p o r t i n g c a r g o , w h e r e he m i g h t h a v e b e e n " r e g u l a r l y e x p o s e d t o t h e p e r i l s of the sea." 1 4 36 1060016 connection for to a vessel i nnavigation purposes negligence claim "able-bodied (count for of t h e Jones Act. fails. Likewise, 2) a n d h i s u n s e a w o r t h i n e s s reckless addressing authority claims action based (count 4), the denial of on this support e r r e d by denying t h i s "claim." count i swaived. (Ala. h i s Jones claim (count Core's a ruling Act claim As wanton a n d he that as an 3) f a i l . alleged "claim," or argument cites the t r i a l no court Thus, any argument r e l a t i n g t o Chunn v . W h i s e n a n t , 877 S o . 2 d 5 9 5 , 601 2003). B. Frazier's against liability argument t h e LHWCA i n s t e a d Jones A c t c l a i m s , action Section remaining employee under his Frazier's F r a z i e r m a k e s no s p e c i f i c would that that Accordingly, ( c o u n t 1 ) , w h i c h he b a s e d on h i s s t a t u s seaman," Frazier's was s u b s t a n t i a l i n n a t u r e 905(b) i s that even o f a seaman f o r p u r p o s e s o f he i s e n t i t l e d to maintain Core under t h e § 905(b) e x c e p t i o n found i n § 905(a) i f he i s an o f t h e LHWCA. a negligence to exclusive Section 905(b) states: "In t h e event of i n j u r y to a person covered under t h i s chapter caused by t h e negligence of a vessel, then such person, o r anyone otherwise e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r d a m a g e s b y r e a s o n t h e r e o f , may 37 1060016 b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t s u c h v e s s e l as a t h i r d p a r t y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 933 o f t h i s t i t l e , a n d t h e e m p l o y e r s h a l l n o t be l i a b l e t o t h e v e s s e l f o r s u c h damages d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y and any agreements o r w a r r a n t i e s to the contrary s h a l l b e v o i d . ... I f s u c h p e r s o n was e m p l o y e d t o provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking s e r v i c e s a n d s u c h p e r s o n ' s e m p l o y e r was t h e o w n e r , owner p r o h a c v i c e , a g e n t , o p e r a t o r , o r c h a r t e r e r o f t h e v e s s e l , no s u c h a c t i o n s h a l l b e p e r m i t t e d , i n whole or i n p a r t or d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , against the i n j u r e d person's employer ( i n any c a p a c i t y , i n c l u d i n g as t h e v e s s e l ' s owner, owner p r o h a c v i c e , agent, operator, or charterer) or against the employees of the employer. The l i a b i l i t y o f t h e v e s s e l u n d e r t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t be b a s e d u p o n the w a r r a n t y of s e a w o r t h i n e s s o r a breach t h e r e o f a t the time t h e i n j u r y o c c u r r e d . The r e m e d y p r o v i d e d i n t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l be e x c l u s i v e o f a l l o t h e r remedies against the vessel except remedies a v a i l a b l e under t h i s chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 5 ( b ) ( e m p h a s i s The trial court noted added). i n i t s judgment that " [ F r a z i e r ' s ] counsel argued i n h i s o p p o s i t i o n and a t t h e h e a r i n g t h a t [ F r a z i e r ] h a s a v a l i d u n d e r 33 U.S.C. § 9 0 5 ( b ) o f t h e LHWCA. This was n o t p l e d i n [ F r a z i e r ' s ] C o m p l a i n t and i properly before the Court." Frazier argument t h a t does n o t argue o r p r o v i d e the t r i a l had not pleaded was not properly a claim before court under brief claim claim s not a u t h o r i t y t o s u p p o r t an e r r e d when i t c o n c l u d e d t h a t he § 905(b) the court. 38 and t h a t Thus, such a claim he h a s w a i v e d a n y 1060016 such argument supra. a n d we need not c o n s i d e r i t further. See Chunn, 1 5 IV. Based on the foregoing, Conclusion we a f f i r m t h e summary judgment. AFFIRMED. Cobb, C . J . , and Lyons, Stuart, and B o l i n , J J . , concur. F r a z i e r d i d not r e f e r t o § 905(b) i n h i s c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t C o r e ; he d i d n o t name t h e v e s s e l a s a p a r t y t o h i s a c t i o n ; a n d he d i d n o t c l a i m t h a t he was f i l i n g h i s c l a i m s i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e ( i . e . , a s a s e a m a n a n d / o r a s an e m p l o y e e u n d e r t h e LHWCA). F r a z i e r does not argue t h a t t h e f i r s t c l a i m i n h i s c o m p l a i n t m i g h t be c o n s t r u e d a s a s s e r t i n g a c l a i m u n d e r § 905(b). Nevertheless, t h e t r i a l c o u r t w e n t on t o s t a t e t h a t , e v e n i f F r a z i e r ' s c o m p l a i n t c a n be r e a d as a l l e g i n g a c l a i m under § 905(b), "Core would s t i l l be e n t i t l e d t o s u m m a r y judgment because [ F r a z i e r ] r e g u l a r l y p e r f o r m e d s h i p - b u i l d i n g and s h i p - r e p a i r work f o r Core and i s t h e r e f o r e b a r r e d from r e c o v e r i n g under § 905(b) p u r s u a n t t o t h e e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n s of t h a t s e c t i o n . " 1 5 39

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