Casey A. McWhorter v. State of Alabama
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REL: 09/30/2011 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter of Decisions, Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 CR-09-1129 Casey A. McWhorter v. State Appeal JOINER, Judge. from M a r s h a l l C i r c u i t (CC-93-77.60) Court 1 C a s e y A. M c W h o r t e r his petition o f Alabama appeals thecircuit for postconviction relief filed court's denial of pursuant t o Rule T h i s c a s e w a s o r i g i n a l l y a s s i g n e d t o a n o t h e r member o f t h i s Court. I t w a s r e a s s i g n e d t o J u d g e J o i n e r o n M a r c h 1, 2 0 1 1 , a n d was o r a l l y a r g u e d o n May 1 7 , 2 0 1 1 . 1 CR-09-1129 32, A l a . R. Crim. P. We affirm. I n M a r c h 1 9 9 4 , M c W h o r t e r was c o n v i c t e d of c a p i t a l murder i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the death of Edward Lee W i l l i a m s because i t was committed during the course See § 13A-5-40(a)(2), A l a . Code of a first-degree 1975. F o l l o w i n g the p e n a l t y p h a s e , t h e j u r y , by a v o t e o f 10-2, recommended be s e n t e n c e d to death. recommendation This on Crim. Court affirmed S o . 2 d 330 Supreme 16, On timely 1999) McWhorter 32 death. State, I"). ("McWhorter and 781 sentence So. The A l a b a m a 2d 257 Supreme 532 in and the Evans, 2 U.S. review 976 through who Circuit sentence. did on April (2001). counsel, Marshall death 781 and the U n i t e d S t a t e s certiorari McWhorter, petition David II"), denied v. Alabama, 2002, Judge to conviction v. ("McWhorter his conviction to McWhorter McWhorter subsequently Rule McWhorter C o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t , Ex p a r t e M c W h o r t e r , ( A l a . 2000) 11, that court accepted the j u r y ' s McWhorter's See this April attacking assigned App. Court 2001. affirmed appeal. (Ala. circuit and s e n t e n c e d Court direct The robbery. not The filed a Court, case preside was over CR-09-1129 McWhorter's trial a n d who retired i n 2007. The 2 State filed an a n s w e r a n d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s M c W h o r t e r ' s p e t i t i o n . several filed years of l i t i g a t i o n , t h e amended R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n appeal, in asserted in his original the State claims filed in order, amended an answer and expanded 32 p e t i t i o n . and a amended 2005, 27, 2005, October dismissing petition and Judge motion On to the May and several on i n s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded, the and f i l e d of the grounds 11, McWhorter held on issued an on N o v e m b e r 1, claims that in the w e r e m e r i t l e s s on t h e i r 2005, certain was subsequently this claims dismiss petition, Evans 19, 2006, McWhorter that i s the s u b j e c t of reasserted Rule 28, A postconviction evidentiary hearing dated summarily he McWhorter's responded. September which on F e b r u a r y After 2006, McWhorter's claims were f a c e , or were Judge William C. Gullahorn, J r . , presided over McWhorter's capital-murder trial. McWhorter's Rule 32 p e t i t i o n and amended p e t i t i o n were a s s i g n e d t o J u d g e D a v i d Evans. As i n d i c a t e d i n t h e main o p i n i o n , Judge Evans g r a n t e d t h e S t a t e ' s m o t i o n f o r p a r t i a l summary d i s m i s s a l , d i s m i s s i n g c e r t a i n c l a i m s o f M c W h o r t e r ' s amended p e t i t i o n . Judge Evans subsequently retired i n e a r l y 2007. The case remained s t a g n a n t u n t i l J u d g e L i l e s C. B u r k e , t h e n a M a r s h a l l C o u n t y d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u d g e , was s p e c i a l l y a p p o i n t e d t o p r e s i d e i n t h e summer o f 2 0 0 8 . 2 3 CR-09-1129 procedurally barred. McWhorter and the State also filed d i s c o v e r y t h a t w e r e n o t r u l e d on b e f o r e 2007. was as on A f t e r Judge then the circuit the remaining summarily court discovery postconviction Judge Liles C. judge, motions. Burke, who was appointed a n d he c o n s i d e r e d and r u l e d Judge evidentiary hearing Burke conducted on A u g u s t 2 6 - 2 8 , a 2009, on c l a i m s i n McWhorter's p e t i t i o n t h a t had not been dismissed. Following brief f o r the 2010, the the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n hearing, circuit circuit in subsequently which retired, Judge Evans r e t i r e d i n a M a r s h a l l County d i s t r i c t court judge, a special petition Evans several motions f o r a court's court lengthy, McWhorter consideration. denied 77-page McWhorter's written court denied. This appeal March a 29, postconviction order. f i l e d an o b j e c t i o n t o t h e c i r c u i t the c i r c u i t On filed McWhorter court's order, followed. Background This detailed Court's account decision of the on facts 4 direct of appeal McWhorter's provides crime a as CR-09-1129 originally order. not repeat those state by See M c W h o r t e r issues the set out now circuit h e r e , where this In a d d i t i o n State, On taken judicial 607 So. appeal McWhorter 2d 626, 629 2d 369, 371 from raises of n.1 of presented, of t h i s a l l of proceeding. ( A l a . Crim. the d e n i a l claims claim section notice to McWhorter's previous So. in failing v. 1998); v. App. mitigating further evidence; postconviction hearing Hull 1992). of h i s p o s t c o n v i c t i o n juror i n f a i l i n g to object to opinion. See N e t t l e s App. ( A l a . Crim. misconduct improper and exclusion present of on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t 5 claims, during to the sentencing investigate they i t s records s e l e c t i o n and d e l i b e r a t i o n ; i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e phase counsel to the to the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n to the will f u r t h e r f a c t s a r e n e c e s s a r y and r e l e v a n t Court 731 T h u s , we we This State, sentencing facts of Court. be s e t o u t i n t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g relating in i t s I , 781 S o . 2 d a t 2 6 5 - 6 6 . will has court f a c t s , many o f w h i c h a r e n o t r e l e v a n t before resolution the of penaltyorder and additional evidence i t was jury at hearsay the or CR-09-1129 was not set forth violation for mitigation counsel in i n t h e amended the State's evidence; in failing and Rule 32 alleged failure ineffective to o b j e c t to McWhorter's being originally 32 p e t i t i o n . IV, V(B), The circuit V(C), conducted an misconduct) X, evidentiary and c l a i m s XI. hearing on IX(A) and X I I counsel) before the penalty-phase denying proceeding, i n mitigation that difficult childhood a n d was with wrong McWhorter at McWhorter was worker. 3 Van crowd. the Food one of Reid, who B r a d y v. M a r y l a n d , a "good Vonnie World the those grocery who had store, bag U.S. 6 83 jury. boys (1963). Rule claims I- court V(A)(juror assistance attorneys' had became had employed McWhorter 373 transported claims. McWhorter k i d " who Salee, better claims McWhorter's evidence trial circuit (ineffective presented the of i n h i s amended The 3 disclose summarily dismissed and Brady i n view of the 12 c l a i m s court VI-VIII, of penalty-phase At presented a to assistance and out o f t h e c o u r t r o o m i n h a n d c u f f s McWhorter petition; had a involved worked with testified that and was a hard as a b u s b o y at CR-09-1129 his restaurant, described dependable worker. testified that he that lived McWhorter with mother believed stated proved a very bright, had difficult a Elsie McWhorter was a good k i d and G a r r i s o n , McWhorter's p a t e r n a l was h e r when he as 2 when h i s p a r e n t s he was using t o be f a l s e . 16 y e a r s drugs, which Garrison intelligent, childhood. Carolyn divorced belief young man Rowland, shortly to moved Rowland, because McWhorter father and moved stepfather, David they moved back to father was Rowland, was to Marshall Tommy that he he did stepfather. not County sometime McWhorter. have had remarried According to Rowland d e s c r i b e d believed h i s father. when to that his She s t a t e d that McWhorter was five shortly thereafter that h i s According McWhorter matured i n age, h i s b i o l o g i c a l that who was s o y o u n g when s h e d i v o r c e d h i s Tennessee y e a r s o l d a n d he was t o l d Tennessee. Garrison McWhorter's McWhorter's f a t h e r , and and h e r nephew as mother, s t a t e d t h a t she d i v o r c e d thereafter, aunt, o l d because h i s described compassionate a listen to to Rowland, as f a t h e r i n s t r u c t e d him David Rowland, his McWhorter as a good, r e s p e c t f u l 7 CR-09-1129 kid until around he b e c a m e i n v o l v e d w i t h t h e w r o n g c r o w d when he was 16 y e a r s o l d . In i t s sentencing aggravating order, the circumstance--that trial the court one offense capital found was c o m m i t t e d w h i l e M c W h o r t e r was e n g a g e d i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f o r an a t t e m p t t o commit to a commit or f l i g h t committing The trial court mitigating circumstances: (1) that significant history McWhorter's offense. trial court was prior only found that divorce and a s u b s t a n t i a l l y jury's outweighed circumstances I , 781 S o . 2 d a t 3 3 0 . advisory that the good the verdict one of statutory statutory and s e n t e n c e d and 8 two s t a t u t o r y had no activity, and (2) of the circumstances, had "a the difficult h i s parents, a good record f o r a person h i s After also considering death, the aggravating nonstatutory McWhorter attempting o l d a t the time had of or McWhorter mitigating McWhorter the found criminal 18 y e a r s to nonstatutory McWhorter concluded of following reputation, the age--he As childhood age." robbery. after to death. trial judge circumstance mitigating CR-09-1129 Specifically, this the on follows in court's sentencing order and mitigating direct appeal, as constitutionally to the aggravating of stated circumstances: the considering Court, the trial circumstance "In the p r e s e n t c a s e , the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a sentencing order specifically setting out the s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and s t a t e d t h a t i t had t h o r o u g h l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d a l l s t a t u t o r y and n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g circumstances t h a t r e a s o n a b l y p e r t a i n e d to the case, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t a t t r i a l , as w e l l as t h e e v i d e n c e of m i t i g a t i n g circumstances p r e s e n t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g p h a s e . The t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s a g e - - h e was 18 years o l d at the time of the offense-¬ c o n s t i t u t e d a m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e , but t h a t the statutory mitigating circumstance concerning the a p p e l l a n t ' s c a p a c i t y to a p p r e c i a t e the criminality of h i s conduct or to conform h i s conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the o f f e n s e d i d not exist. The trial court f u r t h e r found, as nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, that the a p p e l l a n t had 'a f a r l e s s t h a n p e r f e c t c h i l d h o o d following the divorce of his parents, a good r e p u t a t i o n w i t h at l e a s t some i n d i v i d u a l s and a substantially good work r e c o r d f o r a p e r s o n his age.' The s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t t h e trial court carefully weighed the one existing s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance, i . e . , t h a t the c a p i t a l o f f e n s e was committed w h i l e the a p p e l l a n t was e n g a g e d i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f o r an a t t e m p t to commit or f l i g h t a f t e r c o m m i t t i n g or a t t e m p t i n g t o commit a robbery, against the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. The trial court a l s o c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d the j u r y ' s a d v i s o r y recommendation of death, and found that the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance outweighed the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d 9 as CR-09-1129 that the t r i a l court abused i t s discretion in arriving at this determination and, because of the lack of evidence presented by the appellant concerning h i s possible i n t o x i c a t i o n , the trial court's finding that that mitigating circumstance d i d n o t e x i s t was n o t i m p r o p e r . " McWhorter I , 781 S o . 2 d a t 3 1 0 . Postconviction As Evidentiary to the juror-misconduct c l a i m s , McWhorter p r e s e n t e d a t the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g L.B. a n d A . S . , who b o t h s e r v e d claims did that the testimony of Jurors on M c W h o r t e r ' s j u r y . voir asked dire victim make the venire i f anyone of a crime. ability any c h a l l e n g e s McWhorter We jurors. 4 McWhorter had d e a t h when on a j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e a family He a s s e r t s that t o use h i s peremptory Regarding 4 L.B. c o m m i t t e d j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t b e c a u s e she not d i s c l o s e the story of her father's counsel the Juror Hearing member who and are using during had been the the misconduct denied him strikes effectively and t o f o r cause. the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel presented defense the testimony initials o f Thomas to protect 10 claims, E. M i t c h e l l a n d the anonymity of the CR-09-1129 James R. Berry, testified t h a t he was McWhorter. had McWhorter's appointed He s t a t e d t h a t , been practicing approximately 10 appointed of law approximately murder case i n which As to requested the he and James 10 j u r y t r i a l s , represent had Berry, he handled was at the that, who time law f o r 4 years one b e i n g a and capital- r e c e i v e d a sentence the p o s s i b i l i t y jurors. allowed of l i f e of p a r o l e . process, which or anyone recalled Mitchell the on a l i m i t e d questionnaire, family years testified the defendant to Mitchell and Berry a j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e a n d an i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e o f judge dire 11 trials. jury-selection prospective court voir without the for Mitchell of h i s appointment, he h a d b e e n p r a c t i c i n g had h a n d l e d imprisonment as l e a d c o u n s e l as c o c o u n s e l , h i s appointment, attorneys. at the time murder to serve trial juror basis. asked, you following that questionnaire the and circuit individual A s t o q u e s t i o n 21 on t h e "Have know e v e r up stated with 11 you been any o r a n y member the v i c t i m prospective of a of juror your crime?" jurors who CR-09-1129 answered that challenged were 21. stated that penalty-phase that they M e l i s s a Rowland. 6 three so together and interview, questions and their d i d not preparation, that response disagree Garrison, could each he with to any that Background development; topics his medical such Berry his and his half-sister mother they interviewed (R. [their] 164.) as a It such included as early living relationship information; and McWhorter's p o s t c o n v i c t i o n 1. (R. 4 2 - 4 3 . ) 5 mental-health evidentiary McWhorter's materials to this i n t e r v i e w as t h e " t r i p l e i n t e r v i e w . " 6 12 Court the document McWhorter's environment, the heads During completed Information." i s s u e s , and h i s t o r y and he and and a l l "[put] other." testified on Mitchell McWhorter to M i t c h e l l , they o f f of answers conditions, medical education that Mitchell "Client No. he interviewed According play entitled childhood stated j u r o r s f o r cause a f t e r they concerning Rowland, h i s aunt E l s i e together He 5 challenges. Regarding Carolyn questioned Berry Mitchell's testified affirmatively. some o f t h e p r o s p e c t i v e individually question of question history; hearing refer his and Exhibit to this CR-09-1129 his substance-abuse h i s t o r y , history. anybody his Mitchell except mother or criminal testified those that or "[w]e that witnesses h i s aunt history, e i t h e r Mr. his sister and didn't family interview McWhorter recommended t o us or as p e o p l e t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e d t h a t c o u l d and would o f f e r t e s t i m o n y favorable t o him." McWhorter's friends with family were M i t c h e l l and B e r r y informed involved murder testimony. (R. 153.) and them i n gang would was (R. 182.) Mitchell Both family a big thing and of o r were provide None o f M c W h o r t e r ' s the "divorce most activity not that that stated that McWhorter's also helpful charged mitigation indicated to M i t c h e l l i n Mr. Berry McWhorter's testified life." that they b e l i e v e d that testimony about h i s f a t h e r ' s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y or his family's alcohol abuse and p h y s i c a l and e m o t i o n a l abuse would not have been h e l p f u l i n m i t i g a t i o n . Mitchell and B e r r y stated that they decided an i n v e s t i g a t o r f o r t h e p e n a l t y - p h a s e p r e p a r a t i o n could formulate McWhorter's and investigator. they hired a strategy his family's M i t c h e l l and Dr. Douglas for Berry Robbins, 13 the penalty assistance, testified, a not to h i r e because they phase without however, neuropsychologist, with an that to CR-09-1129 e v a l u a t e McWhorter f o r any mental d i s e a s e , any evidence of psychopathology. Robbins's such to evaluation A c c o r d i n g t o M i t c h e l l , Dr. p r o v i d e d no u s e f u l as e v i d e n c e o f d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y influence there was from no McWhorter's freon indicated that that stated that Mitchell indication "huffing" injury others. alleged of alcohol never would brain abuse, or gasoline. he mental disorder, or suffered result susceptibility and B e r r y damage also stated resulting testified brain i n mental he d i d n o t b e l i e v e or of evidence from drug use, or i n g e s t i n g Both 7 mitigation that that damage McWhorter o r any impairment. alcoholism or brain Mitchell or drug abuse b y M c W h o r t e r o r h i s f a m i l y members w o u l d h a v e b e e n h e l p f u l i n m i t i g a t i o n because t h e r e w e r e no r e s u l t i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s any (R. 2 0 5 . ) use o r abuse. Mitchell records from and B e r r y an incident stated i n which suicide. Mitchell testified that Department the investigated an of that, Human allegation "Huffing" i s inhaling intoxicating effect. 7 that of they McWhorter had hospital attempted a l t h o u g h t h e y were Resources physical volatile 14 obtained ("DHR") from had aware once abuse involving substances for their CR-09-1129 McWhorter, they d i d not request those discussed allegation with McWhorter's both o f whom d i s c r e d i t e d i t . Additionally, that they indicated the records because they had documentation decided man, t o McWhorter's t r i a l and aunt, Mitchell of McWhorter's h e h a d a n IQ o f 88 a t t h e t i m e According mother IQ of had stated scores, which testing. attorneys' testimony, they t h a t b e c a u s e M c W h o r t e r was a c l e a n - c u t , h a n d s o m e y o u n g they would present show d u r i n g the penalty the death p e n a l t y . testimony a "good boy, wrong phase crowd" s t r a t e g y t o t h a t McWhorter d i d not deserve M i t c h e l l t e s t i f i e d that they presented of four witnesses (McWhorter's mother), during Garrison the p e n a l t y phase: (McWhorter's a u n t ) , the Rowland Reid (the owner o f a r e s t a u r a n t where McWhorter had been e m p l o y e d ) , and Salee (a c a s h i e r a t a g r o c e r y knew been they McWhorter McWhorter's testimony that had C o u n s e l s e l e c t e d Rowland and G a r r i s o n because employed). trial pleaded and, was counsel was a "good crowd, p a r t i c u l a r l y guilty. Mitchell McWhorter said, "obvious." would evoke sympathy McWhorter wrong well s t o r e where their Counsel from the j u r y . k i d " who had 15 that hoped Both fallen the codefendants, stated pain Reid who and over their testified i n with had the already Salee were CR-09-1129 selected to testify because they knew M c W h o r t e r worker. M i t c h e l l i n d i c a t e d t h a t S a l e e was she described was as " v e r y t o be a good also chosen because likable." At the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , McWhorter presented about the his testimony background of several and l a y witness childhood, including McWhorter's aunt; Tiffany Long, girlfriend; David Rowland, McWhorter's Evans, McWhorter's Frank Baker, uncle; Michael McWhorter's McWhorter's Battle friends. childhood her of and Abraham Garrison and explained house and C a r o l y n 8 and McWhorter, described again her that a t t h e age brother, of and high-school Larry science was coach; teacher; McWhorter's McWhorter cousin; basketball McWhorter's and D a v i d Garrison, stepfather; middle-school Barnes, testify Evans, McWhorter's Kenneth Burns, McWhorter's m i d d l e - s c h o o l Amy to also and high-school development shuffled and between R o w l a n d ' s h o u s e a r o u n d t h e age 16. She explained McWhorter's that biological Tommy father, a b a n d o n e d M c W h o r t e r a t an e a r l y a g e , n e v e r r e a l l y a c k n o w l e d g e d his s o n , a n d was a c r i m i n a l a n d an a l c o h o l i c . 16 Michael Evans CR-09-1129 and Larry Evans indicated that violence during h i s adolescent the weekends explained were at that members and grandparents' They stated a known a l c o h o l i c , testified gasoline years that and f r e o n olduntil David Rowland gasoline old. stated along on o c c a s i o n he r e a c h e d ingesting He they, also from a r o u n d 10 y e a r s o l d . house. They family that McWhorter's and c h i l d r e n . with McWhorter, t h e time McWhorter was 8 t h e age o f 14. testified that he caught McWhorter McWhorter (R. 3 6 3 . ) became "unruly" when David Rowland t e s t i f i e d Rowland's t r u c k occasion. mother stated that They sniffed when M c W h o r t e r was a r o u n d 1 6 , he s t o l e He during o n e t i m e when M c W h o r t e r was a b o u t 14 that to committed a homicide r e g u l a r l y p h y s i c a l l y abused h i s wife also exposed mother's of McWhorter's a l c o h o l i c s and a d d i c t s . maternal grandfather, was y e a r s when he s p e n t t i m e h i s maternal many McWhorter McWhorter's years he was that, on o n e a n d he d i d n o t l i k e McWhorter spending time w i t h Marcus C a r t e r , D a n i e l Minor, and Lee W i l l i a m s , during his senior year who of high were McWhorter's school 17 just codefendants, before the commission of CR-09-1129 the crime. Abraham that Barnes, McWhorter's crime was k i n d and used loyal of with their that she were testified crime. that She over their times in break the had weeks and terminal that McWhorter tried was a he around the age played 8 months that alcoholic i n the to the fall cancer. the t h a t M c W h o r t e r and stated McWhorter before learned shortly before often several testified of was Long testified before every he time beverages. extremely reconcile crime. of 1992 with Long that McWhorter's was they Long the distraught her several testified his 16. "roulette" up w i t h M c W h o r t e r s h o r t l y b e f o r e that up he She consumed broke stated McWhorter had father she for 1993. they and at Battle t h e y were d r i n k i n g . McWhorter together declined beginning while i n February Amy testified McWhorter pistols dated state and Barnes t e s t i f i e d a l l types that Long, Battle friend. stated arrested emotional committed. drugs Barnes Tiffany that biological middle-school B a r n e s e x p l a i n e d t h a t " r o u l e t t e " was w h e r e t h e y w o u l d p u t a b u l l e t i n t h e chamber o f a gun, s p i n i t , p u t t h e gun to t h e i r heads and p u l l t h e t r i g g e r . (R. 510.) 8 18 CR-09-1129 teachers student testified who Dr. worked Ralph that Tarter, a clinical could served the significance his behavior. mitigation testified State prepared a clinical expert kid he and an psychologist testified witnesses testified average believed family the and to e x p l a i n to the jury that testimony neuropsychologist, of of who Janet they McWhorter history and a b o u t how medical she i n numerous c a p i t a l has cases. was served Dr. affected substance Dr. history Douglas examined on as a Tarter by abuse. his The Robbins, McWhorter a and a report. Standard McWhorter According sole good o f M c W h o r t e r ' s f a m i l y and presented clinical as specialist dysfunctional a s o c i a l worker, Vogelsang that was hard. Vogelsang, have he to burden evidence." initiated Rule 32.3, "Preponderance of 32.3, the Review this postconviction A l a . R. o f p l e a d i n g and Rule of Crim. proof Ala. R. evidence" 19 "by Crim. P., proceeding. McWhorter a preponderance P. i s defined (emphasis as has the of the added). CR-09-1129 "[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not n e c e s s a r i l y e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e g r e a t e r number o f w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f y i n g t o a f a c t b u t by e v i d e n c e t h a t has t h e most c o n v i n c i n g f o r c e ; s u p e r i o r e v i d e n t i a r y weight t h a t , though not s u f f i c i e n t to f r e e the mind wholly from a l l reasonable doubt, is still s u f f i c i e n t t o i n c l i n e a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l mind t o one s i d e o f t h e i s s u e r a t h e r t h a n t h e o t h e r . " Black's Law Dictionary 1220 (8th ed. 2004). I t i s important, however, to d i s t i n g u i s h between McWhorter's burden and h i s burden of p l e a d i n g of p r o v i n g . "[A]t t h e p l e a d i n g s t a g e o f R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g s , a Rule 32 p e t i t i o n e r does not have the burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, at the pleading stage, a p e t i t i o n e r m u s t p r o v i d e o n l y 'a c l e a r a n d specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought.' R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P." F o r d v. State, The burden State, 950 v. 32.6(b), that a 831 So. So. 2d 344, Crim. constitutional of law 2003), we P., 644 356 (Ala. Crim. states has not be App. i s a heavy (Ala. Crim. right shall further proceedings." App. 641, of p l e a d i n g , however, A l a . R. conclusions Crim. 2d that been App. "[a] In Boyd v. S t a t e , one. Hyde 2006). Rule bare allegation violated sufficient 913 to So. 2001). and mere warrant 2d 1113 (Ala. explained: "'Rule 32.6(b) r e q u i r e s t h a t the p e t i t i o n 20 any itself CR-09-1129 d i s c l o s e t h e f a c t s r e l i e d upon i n s e e k i n g r e l i e f . ' B o y d v . S t a t e , 746 S o . 2 d 3 6 4 , 406 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1999). In other words, i t i s not the p l e a d i n g of a conclusion 'which, i f true, entitle[s] the p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . ' L a n c a s t e r v . S t a t e , 638 S o . 2 d 1370 , 1 3 7 3 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) . I t i s the allegation of facts i n p l e a d i n g which, i f true, e n t i t l e a p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . A f t e r facts are pleaded, which, i f true, e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r to relief, the p e t i t i o n e r i s then entitled t o an o p p o r t u n i t y , a s p r o v i d e d i n R u l e 3 2 . 9 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., to present evidence proving those alleged facts." 913 S o . 2 d a t 1 1 2 5 . This Court has f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d : " C o n c l u s i o n s unsupported by s p e c i f i c f a c t s w i l l not satisfy the requirements of Rule 32.3 a n d Rule 32.6(b). The f u l l f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h e c l a i m m u s t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e p e t i t i o n i t s e l f . I f , assuming e v e r y f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n i n a R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n t o b e true, a court cannot determine whether the p e t i t i o n e r i s e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f , t h e p e t i t i o n e r has n o t s a t i s f i e d t h e b u r d e n o f p l e a d i n g u n d e r R u l e 32.3 and R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) . S e e B r a c k n e l l v . S t a t e , 883 S o . 2 d 724 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 3 ) . " Hyde, 950 S o . 2 d a t 3 5 6 . 32 a p p l y e q u a l l y has to capital been imposed." 1, 2 0 1 0 ] If "The p l e a d i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s So. 3d cases i n which T a y l o r v. S t a t e , , pleading facts that, i f true, 32.7(d), Crim. Ala. disposition R. the death penalty [Ms. C R - 0 5 - 0 0 6 6 , October ( A l a .Crim. a postconviction petitioner App. 2010) . h a s n o t met h i s b u r d e n e n t i t l e him to r e l i e f , P., of a postconviction 21 of Rule provides claim: for the then of Rule summary CR-09-1129 "If the court determines that the p e t i t i o n i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c , o r i s p r e c l u d e d , o r f a i l s t o s t a t e a c l a i m , o r t h a t no m a t e r i a l i s s u e o f f a c t or law e x i s t s which would e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r t o r e l i e f u n d e r t h i s r u l e a n d t h a t no p u r p o s e w o u l d b e s e r v e d by any f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s , the court may e i t h e r dismiss the p e t i t i o n or grant leave to f i l e an amended p e t i t i o n . L e a v e t o amend s h a l l b e f r e e l y granted. Otherwise, the court s h a l l d i r e c t that the proceedings c o n t i n u e and s e t a date f o r h e a r i n g . " Regarding summary d i s m i s s a l , t h i s Court has s t a t e d : " [ A ] c i r c u i t c o u r t may, i n some circumstances, summarily dismiss a postconviction petition based on t h e m e r i t s of the claims raised therein. Rule 32.7(d), A l a . R. C r i m . P., provides: "'If the court determines that the petition i s not sufficiently specific, or i s precluded, or f a i l s to state a c l a i m , o r t h a t no m a t e r i a l i s s u e of f a c t or law e x i s t s which would e n t i t l e the petitioner to r e l i e f under this rule and that no p u r p o s e w o u l d be s e r v e d b y any further proceedings, the court may e i t h e r d i s m i s s t h e p e t i t i o n o r g r a n t l e a v e t o f i l e an amended petition. L e a v e t o amend s h a l l be f r e e l y granted. Otherwise, the court s h a l l d i r e c t t h a t the proceedings continue and s e t a date f o r h e a r i n g . ' "'"Where a simple reading of the p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f shows t h a t , a s s u m i n g every allegation of the p e t i t i o n t o be true, i t i s obviously without merit or i s precluded, the c i r c u i t court [may] summarily dismiss that petition.'" 22 CR-09-1129 B i s h o p v . S t a t e , 608 S o . 2 d 3 4 5 , 3 4 7 - 4 8 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) ( q u o t i n g B i s h o p v . S t a t e , 592 S o . 2 d 6 6 4 , 667 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1991) (Bowen, J . , dissenting)). See also Hodges v. State, [Ms. CR-04-1226, M a r c h 23, 2007] So. 3d , ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 7 ) (a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n c l a i m i s 'due t o be summarily dismissed [when] i t i s m e r i t l e s s on i t s f a c e ' ) . " B r y a n t v. S t a t e , , 502 ( A l a .Crim. So. 2d procedural equal 666 bars So. been 2d 91, 32.7(d), a 2011). 32[.2, 93 State, "'In addition, "[t]he A l a . R. including imposed."'" App. ( A l a . Crim. R. Crim. App. v. State, 1995), with the death 962 has met he is then So. v. quoting ( A l a .Crim. [however,] P., apply i n which so as t o a v o i d summary d i s p o s i t i o n Ala. P.] (quoting Brownlee 629 S o . 2 d 1 4 , 19 petitioner, Crim. those Burgess 2005) So. 3d See a l s o Moore v. ( A l a . 1986). of Rule v. T a r v e r , pleading 820 ( A l a . Crim. "Once App. to a l l cases, has 277 State 819, force penalty 272, [Ms. C R - 0 8 - 0 4 0 5 , F e b r u a r y 4, 2 0 1 1 ] App. 2d State, in turn 1993)). h i s burden pursuant entitled of to Rule to an o p p o r t u n i t y to present evidence i n order to s a t i s f y h i s burden of p r o o f " pursuant So. made 2d a t 644. by the to Rule 3 2 . 9 , A l a . R. Furthermore, circuit court this at 23 Crim. P. Ford, 831 Court, i n regard to findings an evidentiary hearing in CR-09-1129 postconviction proceedings, has e x p l a i n e d : "'The r e s o l u t i o n o f ... f a c t u a l i s s u e [ s ] required the t r i a l judge t o weigh the credibility of the witnesses. His determination i s e n t i t l e d to great weight on a p p e a l . . . . "When t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y a s t o a f a c t u a l m a t t e r ... , t h e question of the credibility of the w i t n e s s e s i s w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f the trier of fact. His factual determinations are e n t i t l e d to great weight and w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s clearly contrary to the evidence."'" " C a l h o u n v . S t a t e , 4 60 S o . 2 d 2 6 8 , 2 69-70 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 4 ) ( q u o t i n g S t a t e v . K l a r , 400 S o . 2 d 6 1 0 , 613 ( L a . 1 9 8 1 ) ) . " Brooks v. State, 92 9 So. 2d 4 91 , 495-96 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2005). "'When petition, this standard.'" App. 2008) (Ala. Crim. So. questions a circuit Court court's applies an d e n i a l of a Rule 32 abuse-of-discretion S h o u l d i s v . S t a t e , 38 S o . 3 d 7 5 3 , 7 6 1 ( A l a . C r i m . (quoting 2 d 191 undisputed reviewing Whitman v. State, App. 2004), citing ( A l a . Crim. App. 2 0 0 3 ) ) . a n d an appellate 903 S o . 2 d 1 5 2 , 154 i n t u r n M c G a h e e v . S t a t e , 885 court "[W]hen the facts are i s presented o f law, [however,] t h a t c o u r t ' s r e v i e w 24 with pure i n a Rule 32 CR-09-1129 p r o c e e d i n g i s de n o v o . " (Ala. 2001) 1996)). (citing Ex p a r t e W h i t e , S t a t e v. H i l l , "Moreover, i s correct 1149 0 3 - 1 9 0 2 , May 2009)). we f o r any (Ala. Crim. plain-error 2009) 200 9] Lastly, reviewed petition, reason.'" App. 2 9, So. we may Lee v. 3d , record standard of for review 3d 418, Guided in 424 by ( A l a . Crim. App. these p r i n c i p l e s , (Ala. rulings a ruling i f So. State, 3d 1145, [Ms. "[o]n direct error; not proceeding a t t a c k i n g a death sentence." So. 44 1098 (Ala. Crim. plain does 1203 court's affirm ( q u o t i n g Bush v. So. 2d 1 0 9 7 , 2d 1 2 0 1 , State, i n a death-penalty case, the So. 'when r e v i e w i n g a c i r c u i t made i n a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n it 690 792 CRApp. appeal however, apply Ferguson to a the Rule 32 v. S t a t e , 13 2008). we review McWhorter's c l a i m s turn. I. McWhorter argues his rights to a fair i m p a r t i a l j u r y , to the f r e e e x e r c i s e of peremptory and t o due Juror L.B. p r o c e s s were v i o l a t e d He claims that by by an challenges, the a l l e g e d misconduct the c i r c u i t 25 trial court erred i n of denying CR-09-1129 and dismissing V(B) his juror-misconduct i n McWhorter's V(A), McWhorter evidentiary amended R u l e asserts hearing material failure that information t h a t her brief, p. 25.) sufficiently entitled pleaded to Court juror-misconduct and a has proved Juror Claim at L.B. V(B), meritorious postconviction p. (Claims petition.) the failed disclose prejudiced Regarding him he 32 about h e r s e l f d u r i n g t o so (McWhorter's b r i e f , This that claims. he on As V(A) to and Claim postconviction to disclose jury selection him. and (McWhorter's alleges that i t s face evidentiary and i t was thus hearing. 38.) articulated the following in claims: "'In [Ex p a r t e ] D o b y n e , [805 So. 2d 763 ( A l a . 2001),] t h i s Court e x p l a i n e d the s t a n d a r d f o r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l b a s e d o n a j u r o r ' s f a i l u r e to answer q u e s t i o n s on voir dire truthfully: "'"The p r o p e r s t a n d a r d for determining whether juror m i s c o n d u c t w a r r a n t s a new trial, as set out by this Court's precedent, is whether the m i s c o n d u c t might have p r e j u d i c e d , not whether i t actually did p r e j u d i c e , t h e d e f e n d a n t . See Ex parte Stewart, 659 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 1993).... The 26 reviewing CR-09-1129 'might-have-been-prejudiced ' standard, of course, casts a ' l i g h t e r ' b u r d e n on t h e d e f e n d a n t than the actual-prejudice standard. See T o m l i n v . S t a t e , supra, 695 So. 2d [157] 170 [ ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996)].... "'"It i s true that the p a r t i e s i n a case are e n t i t l e d t o t r u e and honest answers t o t h e i r questions on v o i r d i r e , s o t h a t they may exercise their peremptory strikes wisely However, not every failure to respond properly to questions propounded during voir dire 'automatically entitles [the defendant] t o a new trial or r e v e r s a l o f t h e c a u s e on a p p e a l . ' Freeman v. H a l l , 286 A l a . 1 6 1 , 166, 238 S o . 2 d 3 3 0 , 3 3 5 ( 1 9 7 0 ) As s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y , t h e proper standard to apply i n determining whether a p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l i n t h i s circumstance i s 'whether the defendant might have been prejudiced by a veniremember's failure to make a proper response.' Ex p a r t e Stewart, 659 So. 2d a t 124. Further, the determination of whether a p a r t y might have been p r e j u d i c e d , i . e . , whether there was probable prejudice, i s a matter w i t h i n the t r i a l court's discretion " ' " ' T h e determination of whether the complaining p a r t y was p r e j u d i c e d b y 27 CR-09-1129 a juror's failure to answer voir dire questions i s a matter within the discretion of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and will n o t be reversed unless the court has abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . Some of the factors that this Court has approved f o r using t o determine whether there was p r o b a b l e p r e j u d i c e include: "temporal remoteness of the matter i n q u i r e d about, the ambiguity of the question propounded, the p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r ' s i n a d v e r t e n c e or w i l l f u l n e s s i n falsifying or failing t o answer, t h e f a i l u r e of the juror to recollect, and the materiality of the m a t t e r i n q u i r e d about."' " ' " U n i o n M o r t g a g e Co. v . B a r l o w , 595 So. 2d [1335] a t 1342-43 [ ( A l a . 1992)] "'"The form of prejudice that would e n t i t l e a party to r e l i e f f o r a juror's nondisclosure or f a l s i f i c a t i o n i n v o i r d i r e w o u l d be i t s e f f e c t , i f any, t o cause t h e p a r t y t o f o r g o c h a l l e n g i n g t h e j u r o r f o r cause or exercising a peremptory challenge to strike the juror. 28 CR-09-1129 Ex p a r t e L e d b e t t e r , 404 So. 2d 731 ( A l a . 1981) .... If the party establishes that the j u r o r ' s d i s c l o s u r e of the t r u t h would have caused the party either to (successfully) challenge the j u r o r f o r cause or to exercise a peremptory challenge to s t r i k e the juror, t h e n t h e p a r t y h a s made a p r i m a f a c i e showing of p r e j u d i c e . Id. S u c h p r e j u d i c e c a n be e s t a b l i s h e d by the o b v i o u s t e n d e n c y of the t r u e f a c t s t o b i a s t h e j u r o r , as i n L e d b e t t e r , s u p r a , or by d i r e c t testimony of t r i a l counsel that the true facts would have prompted a challenge against the j u r o r , as i n S t a t e v. Freeman, 605 So. 2 d 1258 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)." " ' D o b y n e , 805 So. omitted; emphasis "Dixon 2010)]. [v. State, 55 2d a t 771-73 added).' So. 3d 1257, (footnote 1260-61 (Ala. " ' W h i l e we a g r e e ... t h a t a j u r o r ' s s i l e n c e during voir d i r e c o u l d be a basis for g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , we m u s t s t r e s s t h a t the initial d e c i s i o n on this issue is w i t h i n the t r i a l c o u r t ' s sound d i s c r e t i o n . H a y e s v . B o y k i n , 271 A l a . 5 8 8 , 126 So. 2d 91 (1960). Further, the trial court's decision on this matter will not be d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l u n l e s s t h e appellant establishes that the decision was a r b i t r a r i l y entered i n t o o r was clearly erroneous. Id.' "Carter v. Henderson, 598 29 So. 2d 1350, 1354 (Ala. CR-09-1129 1992). '[N]ot every f a i l u r e of a venireman t o respond c o r r e c t l y t o a v o i r dire question will e n t i t l e t h e l o s i n g p a r t y t o a new t r i a l . ' Wallace v . C a m p b e l l , 4 7 5 S o . 2 d 5 2 1 , 522 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) . "'It i s n o t "any f a i l u r e o f any prospective j u r o r t o respond properly t o any q u e s t i o n r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e e x c u s e o r circumstances [that] automatically e n t i t l e s a p a r t y t o new t r i a l o r r e v e r s a l o f t h e c a u s e on a p p e a l . " F r e e m a n v . H a l l , 286 Ala. 1 6 1 , 1 6 6 , 238 S o . 2 d 330 (1970) (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . ' " W a s h i n g t o n v. S t a t e , 539 So. 2d 1089, 1095 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1988). '[T]he f a c t s i n each case must be c o n s i d e r e d i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d much w i l l r e m a i n i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l judge.' P a r i s h v. S t a t e , 480 S o . 2 d 2 9 , 32 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 5 ) . " Albarran v. S t a t e , , [Ms. C R - 0 7 - 2 1 4 7 , J u l y 2 9 , 2 0 1 1 ] ( A l a . C r i m . App. In light allegations of the So. 3d 2011). foregoing, of j u r o r misconduct we address McWhorter's separately. A. McWhorter discretion first argues i n denying that the c i r c u i t h i s claim that Juror court L.B. abused i t s committed j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t because she d i d n o t d i s c l o s e t h e s t o r y o f h e r father's venire d e a t h when d e f e n s e counsel on a j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e 30 asked t h e members o f t h e and d u r i n g v o i r d i r e i f anyone CR-09-1129 had a family claims that member who had been the misconduct denied peremptory s t r i k e s e f f e c t i v e l y cause. The that Juror that L.B. State L.B.'s Juror L.B.'s father that pleaded father amended p e t i t i o n , him the a b i l i t y had been her father the v i c t i m was i n h i s amended had been McWhorter failed 32 of a crime that In his alleged: "61. During v o i r dire, several jurors f a i l e d to answer accurately defense counsel's direct and unambiguous q u e s t i o n s , b o t h o r a l and w r i t t e n . This f a i l u r e d e p r i v e d Mr. M c W h o r t e r o f t h e e f f e c t i v e u s e of h i s r i g h t t o s t r i k e a p e t i t j u r y from a p a n e l of fair-minded, impartial prospective jurors; h i s right t o have q u e s t i o n s a n s w e r e d t r u t h f u l l y by p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s so t h a t h i s c o u n s e l c o u l d e x e r c i s e p e r e m p t o r y strikes and c h a l l e n g e j u r o r s f o r c a u s e ; and h i s r i g h t s t o due p r o c e s s , a f a i r t r i a l , a n d a r e l i a b l e sentencing, a l l protected by the F i f t h , Sixth, Eighth, and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , and Alabama law. "62. A defendant is entitled to receive t r u t h f u l and a c c u r a t e answers from j u r o r s during voir dire, a n d when a juror fails to respond accurately during voir dire, reversible error occurs. The S i x t h A m e n d m e n t g u a r a n t e e s a c r i m i n a l 31 or crime. petition the v i c t i m of a crime. specifically for to e s t a b l i s h a v i c t i m of a Rule He t o use h i s a n d t o make a n y c h a l l e n g e s responds t h a t McWhorter believed McWhorter the v i c t i m of a crime. CR-09-1129 defendant a fair trial by a panel of i m p a r t i a l jurors. I r v i n v . Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). T h i s r i g h t i s v i o l a t e d a n d a new t r i a l i s r e q u i r e d when a j u r o r d e l i b e r a t e l y d e c e i v e s t h e c o u r t a b o u t a matter which, i f f u l l y explored, would c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d b a s i s f o r a c h a l l e n g e f o r cause a g a i n s t t h a t juror. M c D o n o u g h P o w e r E q u i p m e n t v . G r e e n w o o d , 464 U.S. 5 4 8 , 556 (1984). See a l s o C l a r k v . S t a t e , 551 So. 2d 1091 ( A l a . 1991) (where j u r o r f a i l e d to d i s c l o s e t h a t he h a d served on a p r e v i o u s case, r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r o c c u r r e d ) ; Ex p a r t e L e d b e t t e r , 404 So. 2d 731 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) ; T o m l i n v . S t a t e , 695 So. 2d 157 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996) (new t r i a l r e q u i r e d when j u r o r f a i l e d t o d i s c l o s e on v o i r d i r e t h a t he had b e e n a v i c t i m o f c r i m e ) ; A b e r c r o m b i e v. S t a t e , 574 So. 2d 879 ( A l a . C r i m , App. 1990) (where j u r o r d i d not disclose that she had an interest in the c o n v i c t i o n of the d e f e n d a n t , p r o b a b l e p r e j u d i c e was s h o w n , a n d t h e c o n v i c t i o n h a d t o be r e v e r s e d ) ; S t a t e v . G i l b e r t , 568 So. 2d 876 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1990 ) ( w h e r e j u r o r d i d n o t d i s c l o s e t h a t s h e knew s o m e o n e who had been s e x u a l l y abused, and evidence was presented a t a R u l e 20 h e a r i n g [the p r e c u r s o r to R u l e 32] t h a t t h e j u r o r d i d , i n f a c t , know s o m e o n e who had been s e x u a l l y a b u s e d , the c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c e h a d t o be reversed). "63. One p a r t i c u l a r j u r o r , [ h e r e a f t e r L.B.], f a i l e d t o d i s c l o s e t h a t h e r f a t h e r was m u r d e r e d when s h e was twelve. She w i t h h e l d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i n s p i t e o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l [ ' s ] q u e s t i o n s on t h e j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e a n d on i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e d e s i g n e d s p e c i f i c a l l y to e l i c i t such i n f o r m a t i o n . Question 21 o f t h e j u r y q u e s t i o n n a i r e a s k e d , 'Have y o u , any member o f y o u r f a m i l y o r a n y o n e y o u know e v e r b e e n the v i c t i m of a c r i m e ? ' ( S u p p . R. 55) (emphasis added) The q u e s t i o n n a i r e w e n t on t o a s k , ' I f yes, who a n d w h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p ? , ' 'What was t h e crime?,' 32 CR-09-1129 'Was a n y o n e a r r e s t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e crime?,' and 'Was anyone c o n v i c t e d of the crime?' (Id.) L.B. a n s w e r e d t h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n ' y e s , ' b u t s h e w e n t on to s t a t e t h a t the supposed 'victim' was her 'brother-in-law,' t h e c r i m e was ' d r u g s , ' and that someone had b e e n a r r e s t e d and convicted. (Id.) Q u e s t i o n 22 o f t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e a s k e d , 'Have y o u , a n y member o f y o u r f a m i l y o r a n y o n e y o u know e v e r been a c c u s e d of a crime' (Id.) J u r o r L.B. answered that her 'brother-in-law' had been accused of 'drugs' eighteen months ago, was prosecuted in Marshall County, and 'was on probation.' (Id.) (emphasis added) In essence, Juror L.B. gave i d e n t i c a l answers to the 'crime v i c t i m ' q u e s t i o n and the 'accused of a crime' q u e s t i o n . The additional i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y J u r o r L.B. i n her answer to Q u e s t i o n 22 w o u l d l e a d a r e a s o n a b l e reader to i n f e r t h a t J u r o r L . B . ' s b r o t h e r - i n - l a w was n o t , i n f a c t , a c r i m e v i c t i m , b u t a p e r s o n who had been a c c u s e d o f , and p r o s e c u t e d for, a drug-related crime. "64. J u r o r L.B. w r o t e i n r e s p o n s e t o Q u e s t i o n 20 t h a t s h e thought her f a t h e r - i n - l a w might have a p p e a r e d as a w i t n e s s i n t h e ' K a t h y P a d g i t t [sic]' case. (Id.) K a t h y P a d g e t t was the v i c t i m i n a h i g h l y p u b l i c i z e d c a p i t a l murder t r i a l t h a t o c c u r r e d in Marshall County only two years before Mr. McWhorter's t r i a l . J u r o r L.B.'s answer to Q u e s t i o n 20 s u g g e s t e d t h a t s h e knew K a t h y P a d g e t t , a fact t h a t she f a i l e d t o d i s c l o s e i n Q u e s t i o n 21. "65. The r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t d e f e n s e counsel had serious concerns about Juror L.B.'s c o n t r a d i c t o r y and c o n f u s i n g a n s w e r s , and t h e y t r i e d h a r d t o c l a r i f y w h e t h e r J u r o r L.B. had any close connection t o a p e r s o n who had been a v i c t i m of a crime. Defense counsel s p e c i f i c a l l y requested, and the trial judge granted, individual follow-up 33 CR-09-1129 q u e s t i o n i n g o f J u r o r L.B. (R. 414) First, defense c o u n s e l a s k e d q u e s t i o n s t o c o n f i r m , and d i d c o n f i r m , t h a t J u r o r L.B.'s b r o t h e r - i n - l a w had been c o n v i c t e d o f a c r i m e ( a n d was n o t a c r i m e v i c t i m ) , and that t h e c o n v i c t i o n w o u l d n o t a f f e c t h e r a b i l i t y t o be a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r o r i n t h i s case. (R. 415) S e c o n d , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l i n q u i r e d as t o t h e e x t e n t o f J u r o r L.B.'s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h K a t h y P a d g e t t . (R. 417) In answer to defense c o u n s e l ' s q u e s t i o n , J u r o r L.B. s t a t e d , ' I h a d j u s t m o v e d up h e r e . And I - - d i d n o t know h e r t h a t w e l l . I knew h e r j u s t b y b e i n g i n t h e c h u r c h a n d t h a t ' s - - t h a t ' s a l l I knew a b o u t h e r . ' (Id.) Defense c o u n s e l d i d not stop h i s q u e s t i o n i n g t h e r e , but w e n t on t o c o n f i r m that Juror L.B.'s connection to Kathy Padgett was 'strictly some s l i g h t k n o w l e d g e ' t h a t w o u l d n o t 'make i t d i f f i c u l t a t a l l ' f o r h e r t o be i m p a r t i a l i f s h e w e r e c h o s e n as a j u r o r . (R. 4 1 7 - 1 8 ) "66. Defense counsel had no way to obtain t h r o u g h i n d e p e n d e n t means t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t J u r o r L.B.'s father was a murder victim. Had Mr. M c W h o r t e r known t h i s f a c t , he w o u l d h a v e c h a l l e n g e d J u r o r L.B, f o r c a u s e , as he d i d p r o s p e c t i v e juror V.W., who was e x c u s e d f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e h i s n e p h e w was k i l l e d d u r i n g an a r m e d r o b b e r y . (R. 8 8 5 , 892) Defense counsel also challenged and removed six other j u r o r s who had connections to v i c t i m s of crime. (R. 7 4 3 , 744, 752, 881-82, 888-89, 894, 9 0 6 - 0 7 ; S u p p . R. 106, 115, 118, 184, 205, 208) B e c a u s e of J u r o r L.B.'s e x p e r i e n c e as t h e d a u g h t e r o f a m u r d e r v i c t i m , Mr. M c W h o r t e r was e n t i t l e d to s t r i k e her f o r cause. And i f she w e r e n o t e x c u s e d for cause, Mr. McWhorter would have used a peremptory strike to remove her, had he been a c c u r a t e l y a d v i s e d of her h i s t o r y . "67. Juror L.B.'s f a i l u r e 34 to d i s c l o s e that her CR-09-1129 f a t h e r was m u r d e r e d d e n i e d M r . M c W h o r t e r h i s r i g h t to free e x e r c i s e of h i s peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . In a d d i t i o n , J u r o r L . B . ' s p r e s e n c e on t h e j u r y d e p r i v e d Mr. M c W h o r t e r o f h i s r i g h t s t o d u e p r o c e s s , a d e q u a t e v o i r d i r e , and a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y under t h e F i f t h , S i x t h , E i g h t h , and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o the United States Constitution, the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , and Alabama l a w . " (C. 494-97.) The circuit hearing and claim. during how allowed Juror details court conducted a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n e v i d e n t i a r y McWhorter testified L.B. to present that of her father's voir d i r e examination her father investigated service death died. Juror A and had d i s c o v e r e d a c c i d e n t a l drowning. was e v e r charged with d i d not because her of a crime" who father's that share the was know a law student, death before her father her had d i e d or had jury i n an J u r o r L . B . e x p l a i n e d t h a t b e c a u s e no o n e a crime r e l a t e d to her father's and, t h e r e f o r e , f a t h e r ' s d e a t h when a s k e d during voir this she d i d n o t r e a l l y much l e s s c o n v i c t e d , t h a t s h e d i d n o t c o n s i d e r victim of on t h e j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e friend, L.B.'s she evidence death, her father "the d i d not t e l l the story of on t h e j u r o r q u e s t i o n n a i r e d i r e w h e t h e r a f a m i l y member h a d b e e n 35 and "the v i c t i m CR-09-1129 of a crime." testified, At the in pertinent evidentiary part, as hearing, Juror follows: "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL:] [Juror L.B.], once again, could you tell us what happened t o your f a t h e r , a n d c o u l d y o u i n d i c a t e , y o u know, w h a t , i f anything, i s b a s e d on t h i n g s y o u saw and what i s b a s e d on w h a t y o u h e a r d ? "[JUROR L.B.:] Okay. a n d I w e r e woke up one the morning. "This is still My m o t h e r a n d my two brothers m o r n i n g a b o u t 2:00 o ' c l o c k i n hard for " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] me. I understand. "[JUROR L.B.:] A n d we was t o l d t h a t my f a t h e r and two o t h e r men were at a r o c k mine pond. And my m o t h e r went and got my uncle up, w h i c h was my daddy's b r o t h e r . A n d he t o o k us up t h e r e . And t h e y w o u l d n o t l e t us go down t h e r e . "And a b o u t 11:00 o'clock that morning, a p o l i c e o f f i c e r came t o o u r h o u s e a n d t o l d us t h a t t h e y w e r e f i x i n g t o b l o w t h e dam, and t h a t t h e y b e l i e v e d t h a t my f a t h e r w a s - - h a d r u n . T h e r e was a n o t h e r man that was k i l l e d t h e r e t h a t d a y . He was b e a t t o d e a t h . "And so t h e y t o l d us t h a t t h e y w e r e g o i n g to s e n d a d i v e r down one m o r e t i m e a n d i f t h e y d i d n ' t f i n d a n y t h i n g t h e n t h e y were g o i n g to blow the dam. When t h e y s e n t a d i v e r down, t h e y f o u n d my father. A n d he was d e a d , n a t u r a l l y . "We w e r e t o l d t h a t t h e r e w e r e b r u i s e s a r o u n d h i s n e c k , b u t when t h e a u t o p s y came b a c k i t was said 36 L.B. CR-09-1129 t h a t he was d r o w n e d . The o t h e r man was b e a t e n t o death. A n d t h e r e was a t r i a l . The o t h e r man t h a t was t h e r e , he w e n t a n d g o t t h e - - h i s f a m i l y a n d t h e n went t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n and g o t them and b r o u g h t them back. Or t h e y w e n t o u t t o t h e s c e n e i s a l l I know. " I h a d j u s t a l w a y s t h o u g h t t h a t my f a t h e r was k i l l e d b e c a u s e t h e o t h e r man was k i l l e d , a n d he was g o o d f r i e n d s w i t h h i m , s o I t h o u g h t t h a t he h a d b e e n killed. And b e i n g a k i d you always t h i n k t h a t . You d o n ' t e v e r know. A n d s o t h a t ' s why I a l w a y s t h o u g h t my f a t h e r was k i l l e d . "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL:] Now, you s a i d that s o m e o n e t o l d y o u t h a t y o u r f a t h e r h a d b r u i s e s on h i s neck. Who t o l d y o u t h a t ? "[JUROR L.B.:] My u n c l e s . My daddy's " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] Now, w e r e a b o u t 12 y e a r s o l d , r i g h t ? "[JUROR L.B.:] at the time, you Yes. " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] happened to your father traumatic, something that's about, i s n ' t i t ? "[JUROR L.B.:] brothers. Your memories o f what were and still are h a r d f o r you t o t a l k Yes. " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] And i s n ' t i t t r u e t h a t a t some p o i n t a l o n g t h e way y o u h a v e g o t e m o t i o n a l c l o s u r e when s o m e o n e t o l d y o u t h a t he w o r k e d on t h e case, and even though he c o u l d n ' t g e t enough 37 CR-09-1129 e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e y o u r f a t h e r was m u r d e r e d , h a v i n g w o r k e d o n t h e c a s e he d i d b e l i e v e i t ? "[JUROR L.B.:] Believe o r t h a t he d r o w n e d ? "[POSTCONVICTION murdered? "[JUROR L.B.:] "[POSTCONVICTION that COUNSEL:] No. my father That that was m u r d e r e d your father was You g o t i t b a c k w a r d s . COUNSEL:] Okay. Well, you w e r e - - a t t h e t i m e t h a t y o u - - i n 1994 , a t t h e t i m e t h a t y o u s e r v e d on t h e j u r y i n C a s e y M c W h o r t e r ' s case, d i d you b e l i e v e t h a t your f a t h e r had been murdered? "[JUROR L.B.:] No. " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] "[JUROR L.B.:] You d i d n o t ? No. "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL:] What was i t , i f a n y t h i n g , t h a t happened between t h e t i m e you were a t t r i a l , when y o u s a y y o u d i d [ s i c ] b e l i e v e he was murdered, and t h e time o f Casey McWhorter's trial t h a t l e d you t o change your mind? "[JUROR L.B.:] I d a t e d a g u y t h a t was g o i n g t o l a w s c h o o l , a n d he l o o k e d i n t o t h e c a s e o f my f a t h e r , a n d he t o l d me t h a t my f a t h e r h a d d r o w n e d ; t h a t t h e a u t o p s y h a d s h o w e d t h a t my f a t h e r h a d d r o w n e d . " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] Y e s . A n d d i d he e x p l a i n t h a t b e c a u s e t h e a u t o p s y showed t h a t y o u r f a t h e r h a d d r o w n e d t h e y w e r e u n a b l e t o p r o v e t h a t he h a d b e e n murdered? 38 CR-09-1129 "[JUROR L.B.:] No. " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] And i s n ' t i t t r u e t h a t t h e man w e ' r e t a l k i n g a b o u t , t h e l a w y e r , s a i d t h a t because the autopsy couldn't prove the murder because i t s a i d d r o w n e d , t h a t he s t i l l believed, b a s e d on a l l t h e e v i d e n c e he knew a b o u t , t h a t i t was a murder? "[JUROR L.B.:] (R. No." 46-48, 52-54.) On cross-examination, Juror L.B. testified: "[STATE:] A n d do y o u r e m e m b e r t h a t Q u e s t i o n N u m b e r 21 he s h o w e d y o u , t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t s a y s , ' [ W ] e r e you o r a n y b o d y i n y o u r f a m i l y a v i c t i m o f a c r i m e ' ? "[JUROR L.B.:] Uh-huh. Right. "[STATE:] And you d i d not answer t h a t was a v i c t i m o f a c r i m e , r i g h t ? "[JUROR L.B.:] Right. your father Did not. "[STATE:] I s i t f a i r t o say t h a t you d i d not answer t h a t y o u r f a t h e r was a v i c t i m o f a c r i m e b e c a u s e no one, i n f a c t , had been c h a r g e d w i t h a c r i m e i n t h e death of your f a t h e r ? "[JUROR L.B.:] That's right. " [ S T A T E : ] A n d no o n e h a d e v e r b e e n c o n v i c t e d death of your f a t h e r , c o r r e c t ? "[JUROR L.B.:] That's right. 39 i n the CR-09-1129 "[STATE:] And you had p e r s o n a l a u t o p s y o f f i c i a l l y s a i d t h a t he "[JUROR L.B.:] knowledge drowned? that the Right. "[STATE:] A n d t h a t t h e r e was no i n d i c a t i o n o t h e r t h a n what you had j u s t h e a r d t h r o u g h f a m i l y rumors t h a t he a c t u a l l y h a d b e e n m u r d e r e d ? "[JUROR L.B.:] Yes. "[STATE:] So f a r a s y o u being completely honest answered that question? "[JUROR L.B.:] were and c o n c e r n e d , you truthful when were you Y e s , I was. fl "[STATE:] J u s t t o be c l e a r , [ J u r o r L . B . ] , you d i d not d e l i b e r a t e l y h i d e the s t o r y of your father's death when you were answering the jury questionnaire? "[JUROR L.B.:] No. "[STATE:] The way t h e q u e s t i o n was w o r d e d on t h e jury questionnaire was, were you o r any o f y o u r f a m i l y members t h e v i c t i m o f a c r i m e , n o t j u s t a victim? "[JUROR L.B.:] Right, yes. "[STATE:] A n d t h a t t h e r e m u s t h a v e -- w i t h o u t a criminal charge, without a criminal conviction, e v e n , t h a t y o u c a n n o t h a v e a f a m i l y member who was a v i c t i m of a crime? 40 CR-09-1129 "[JUROR L.B.:] (R. Yes." 116-17; 123-24.) In a d d i t i o n , J u r o r postconviction L.B. t e s t i f i e d to the f o l l o w i n g at the proceeding: "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL:] D i d y o u -- b u t y o u believed, a f t e r h e a r i n g what e v e r y t h i n g t h a t you heard about the i n c i d e n t , t h a t your f a t h e r had been k i l l e d , d i d n ' t you? "[JUROR L.B.:] Yes. "[JUROR L.B.:] Okay. Is because I had always been t o l d a s a c h i l d t h a t my f a t h e r was k i l l e d b y h i s f a m i l y because t h e y were t h e b i g bad boys, okay? A n d I ' d a l w a y s b e l i e v e d t h a t . Y o u know, b e c a u s e y o u d o n ' t t h i n k o f y o u r f a t h e r as d r o w n i n g . You j u s t don't t h i n k of t h a t . And I j u s t always t h o u g h t t h a t my f a t h e r was k i l l e d . I knew t h e man, a n d I knew h i s f a m i l y , j u s t t h o u g h t t h a t i f he k i l l e d o n e , h e ' d k i l l " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] t h o u g h t i n 1994 a t t h e t i m e jury? And that and I both. i s t h a t what you y o u s e r v e d on t h e "[JUROR L.B.:] I s t i l l b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e man h a d s o m e t h i n g t o do w i t h my f a t h e r ' s d e a t h . W h e t h e r he d i r e c t l y k i l l e d h i m o r n o t , I do n o t know. O n l y God knows t h a t . B u t I t h i n k he h a d s o m e t h i n g i n d i r e c t l y t o do w i t h i t , y e s . 41 CR-09-1129 " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] You do. s t r o n g f e e l i n g on y o u r p a r t ? "[JUROR L.B.:] A n d was that a Yes. fl "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL:] [Juror L.B.], can you tell us what you said to your fellow jurors r e g a r d i n g the death of your f a t h e r ? "[JUROR L.B.:] T h a t t h e man t h a t h a d k i l l e d my f a t h e r - - I thought t h a t had k i l l e d my f a t h e r a n d a n o t h e r man d i d n o t s e r v e t h e f u l l t i m e t h a t he was in there. I d o n ' t e v e n know how many y e a r s t h a t he gave him. I t h o u g h t i t was t e n a n d he o n l y served l i k e t h r e e o r f o u r a n d t h a t he s h o u l d h a v e served more. fl ""[JUROR L . B . ] : No. I d i d n ' t t h i n k he h a d k i l l e d my f a t h e r . I t h i n k he h a d s o m e t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e d e a t h o f my f a t h e r . W h e t h e r o r n o t he i n d i v i d u a l l y k i l l e d h i m , I do n o t know. " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] W e l l , d i d you b e l i e v e t h a t h e , t o g e t h e r w i t h someone e l s e , p l a y e d a p a r t in the k i l l i n g ? "[JUROR L.B.:] W e l l , when y o u s a y k i l l i n g , t h e o t h e r man was k i l l e d . My f a t h e r was d r o w n e d . Now, w h e t h e r o r n o t he was d r o w n e d on p u r p o s e , I do n o t know. "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL.:] Q. "[JUROR But L.B.:] I do 42 know Did you-that he d i d play a CR-09-1129 p a r t i n t h e o t h e r d e a t h b e c a u s e he t o l d He p l e d g u i l t y t o t h e o t h e r d e a t h . h i m he d i d . " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] And d i d you b e l i e v e a t t h a t t i m e t h a t t h e r e was t h a t i t ' s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t your f a t h e r had been i n t e n t i o n a l l y drowned? "[JUROR L.B.:] Yes. He c o u l d " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] at t h a t t i m e i n 1994? "[JUROR life. L.B.:] Well, "[POSTCONVICTION your life a n d up t h r o u g h "[JUROR L.B.:] (R. b e e n my belief belief a l l my So y o u b e l i e v e d i ta l l and i n c l u d i n g t h e trial? Yeah." 5 1 , 60, 112, 113.) Additionally, the A n d t h a t was y o u r that's COUNSEL:] have been. time of Juror trial, A . S . , who was testified, and known a s J u r o r the following A.K. a t exchange occurred: " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] D u r i n g t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s on t h e s e n t e n c i n g p h a s e was t h e r e something that [ J u r o r L.B.] s a i d a b o u t h e r f a t h e r o r o t h e r r e l a t i v e being murdered? "[JUROR A.S.:] Y e s . " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] What d i d s h e fl 43 say? CR-09-1129 "THE COURT: L e t me h e l p j u s t a l i t t l e b i t . We r e a l l y j u s t w a n t t o know e x a c t l y w h a t t h e j u r o r t o l d about her f a t h e r . " [ J U R O R A . S . ] : [ J u r o r L.B.] was standing, and s h e s t a r t e d t e l l i n g a s t o r y a b o u t how y e a r s b e f o r e - ¬ I'm not e x a c t l y s u r e how long before, but years b e f o r e , h e r f a t h e r had b e e n m u r d e r e d , and t h a t , t o my b e s t r e c o l l e c t i o n , he w a s n ' t - - I ' m n o t s u r e i f he w e n t t o j a i l o r he d i d n ' t go t o j a i l , b u t s h e now h a d t o w a l k a r o u n d i n t h e same t o w n w h e r e t h i s man was t h a t k i l l e d h e r f a t h e r . A n d s h e was crying. "[STATE]: O b j e c t i o n , Your Honor. It i s going beyond the scope of your q u e s t i o n at t h i s p o i n t . "THE relevant COURT: I t p r o b a b l y i s , b u t for that purpose. I do " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] A n d d i d s h e e l s e on t h i s v e r y same s u b j e c t ? think i t ' s say anything "[JUROR A.S.:] She had made a comment that, b a s i c a l l y , y o u j u s t d o n ' t know how i t f e e l s t o h a v e t o w a l k a r o u n d a n d be a r o u n d t h i s p e r s o n t h a t has done t h i s . " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] Referring to whom? "[JUROR A.S.:] R e f e r r i n g to the person t h a t had k i l l e d her f a t h e r . And i t j u s t c h a n g e d e v e r y t h i n g . " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL:] Nothing further. Thank you very much. "[STATE]: Move t o s t r i k e t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t i t changed e v e r y t h i n g . That's s p e c u l a t i o n . 44 CR-09-1129 "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: I don't b e l i e v e t h e witness was talking about changed the jury deliberations. I believe s h e was t a l k i n g about [ J u r o r L.B.] s a i d i t c h a n g e d e v e r y t h i n g i n h e r l i f e . "THE COURT: "[STATE]: T h a t was t h e way I t o o k i t . Okay. "THE COURT: I w i l l not consider changed t h e j u r y ' s o p i n i o n of h e r . "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: i t that i t Okay. Nothing further." (R. 465-67.) After held, t o prove hearing victim that Juror McWhorter L.B. b e l i e v e d and t h a t A l a . R. C r i m . P. denying that by a preponderance of a crime 32.3, order testimony at the hearing, i n a d e t a i l e d order, burden See lengthy McWhorter's the c i r c u i t failed her father she d i d n o t d i s c l o s e The c i r c u i t claim, court, referenced t e s t i m o n y on b o t h d i r e c t a n d c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . the circuit court t o meet h i s of the evidence that court that at the was t h e belief. i n i t s detailed Juror L.B.'s Specifically, found: "She e x p l a i n e d t h a t s h e d i d n o t know how h e r f a t h e r died. I t was a p p a r e n t f r o m [ J u r o r L . B . ' s ] t e s t i m o n y 45 CR-09-1129 why s h e d i d n o t a n s w e r i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e when a s k e d w h e t h e r s h e h a d a f a m i l y member who h a d b e e n t h e ' v i c t i m o f a c r i m e . ' [ J u r o r L.B.] t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f r i e n d , a law s t u d e n t , i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e death and f o u n d an a u t o p s y r e p o r t t h a t a t t r i b u t e d h e r f a t h e r ' s d e a t h t o drowning, and she t e s t i f i e d t h a t , because no o n e e v e r was c h a r g e d w i t h a c r i m e r e l a t e d t o h e r f a t h e r ' s d e a t h , much l e s s c o n v i c t e d o f o n e , t h a t h e r f a t h e r c o u l d n o t have been 'the v i c t i m o f a c r i m e . ' " B e c a u s e [ J u r o r L . B . ] knew t h a t h e r f a t h e r ' s a u t o p s y r e p o r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t he d i e d b y d r o w n i n g a n d b e c a u s e s h e knew t h a t no o n e e v e r h a d b e e n charged with any crime r e l a t e d to her father's d e a t h , she r e a s o n a b l y d i d n o t d i s c l o s e t h e s t o r y o f her f a t h e r ' s death i n response to the defense's q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r s h e o r a member o f h e r f a m i l y had been t h e ' v i c t i m o f a c r i m e . ' Thus, [Juror L.B.] d i d n o t c o m m i t j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t . " (C. 1130, 1136.) The not that record indicate her indicated she on h e r j u r o r father was a at a l l times could evidentiary L.B. on d i r e c t a p p e a l be fair hearing, extensively questionnaire victim when and reveals of Juror or during crime. She, L.B. d i d voir impartial. her father's 46 At the that postconviction counsel questioned death. dire however, s h e was q u e s t i o n e d a t t r i a l postconviction about a that Although Juror at times CR-09-1129 Juror L.B. appeared postconviction his on L.B. the as failed juror voir L.B.'s testimony dire knew h e r that she based circuit claim not court because 32.3, indicated on abused d e a t h was R. he this above, by L.B. to was Crim. the resolution of factual credibility of witnesses, prove this to the by a of say trial light posed counsel of Juror that a drowning a crime. conclude denying of juror misconduct. in the McWhorter's preponderance Furthermore, and Thus, that regard and the assessment Court has explained: "'The r e s o l u t i o n o f ... factual issue[s] required the trial judge to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. His determination i s e n t i t l e d to great weight on a p p e a l "When t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y as t o a f a c t u a l m a t t e r ... , t h e 47 that established r e s u l t of in to about question in that cannot guilty issues cannot a v i c t i m of Court P. we especially was responses McWhorter's its discretion failed Juror Ala. her or seemed c o n f u s e d cross-examination facts, he and examination, believe these evidence that Rule in to respond t r u t h f u l l y father's did on we questionnaire during she waver counsel's questioning questioning, Juror to of the See to the CR-09-1129 question of the credibility of the w i t n e s s e s i s w i t h i n the sound d i s c r e t i o n of the trier of fact. His factual determinations are e n t i t l e d to great weight a n d w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s clearly contrary to the evidence."' " C a l h o u n v . S t a t e , 460 S o . 2 d 2 6 8 , 2 69-70 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 4 ) ( q u o t i n g S t a t e v . K l a r , 400 S o . 2 d 6 1 0 , 613 ( L a . 1 9 8 1 ) ) . " Brooks v. State, 92 9 So. 2d 4 91 , 495-96 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2005). Therefore, postconviction because proceeding assess the c r e d i b i l i t y gives the c i r c u i t great weight that the on court's court conclude abused 3d factual , capital-murder i s no i t s discretion voir ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) 48 and Court assessment indication denying L.B.'s answers examination. Dec. 18, 2009] ( g r a n t i n g no claims failed to in dire [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 0 9 9 6 , postconviction at the issues i n that there and d u r i n g misconduct because the p e t i t i o n e r court and because t h i s on h i s c l a i m r e l a t e d t o J u r o r e . g . , Dunaway v. S t a t e , So. resolve determination we her j u r o r questionnaire See, on to of the witnesses appeal, circuit McWhorter r e l i e f on i t i s f o r the c i r c u i t relief involving juror t o meet h i s b u r d e n ) ; CR-09-1129 Hooks v. S t a t e , (same). 21 S o . 3d 7 7 2 , 7 8 0 - 8 1 ( A l a .Crim. App. 2008) 9 Furthermore, the c i r c u i t court could have denied relief on t h i s c l a i m b e c a u s e M c W h o r t e r f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h p r e j u d i c e . To p r e v a i l o n a c l a i m o f j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t , t h e p e t i t i o n e r m u s t establish failure dire. t h a t he " m i g h t h a v e b e e n p r e j u d i c e d " b y t h e j u r o r s ' to respond See Ex p a r t e truthfully Stewart, to a question posed 659 S o . 2 d 1 2 2 , 124 on voir ( A l a . 1993) . "'We are mindful of the heavy r e s p o n s i b i l i t y p l a c e d on t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o maintain the s t a t u t o r y r i g h t which p a r t i e s M c W h o r t e r r e l i e s o n E x p a r t e D i x o n , 55 S o . 3 d 1 2 5 7 ( A l a . 2010). Ex p a r t e D i x o n , however, i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h i s c a s e , a n d M c W h o r t e r ' s r e l i a n c e on i t i s m i s p l a c e d . In Ex p a r t e D i x o n , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t a p p l i e d t h e Ex p a r t e D o b y n e , 805 S o . 2 d 763 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , f a c t o r s a n d c o n c l u d e d t h a t "the t r i a l court exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying Dixon's m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l b a s e d o n [ j u r o r ] L . A . ' s f a i l u r e t o d i s c l o s e i n r e s p o n s e t o a q u e s t i o n on v o i r d i r e t h a t c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s w e r e p e n d i n g a g a i n s t h e r . " 55 S o . 3 d a t 1 2 6 1 . It f u r t h e r h e l d t h a t most o f t h e f a c t o r s i n d i c a t e d " t h a t D i x o n was p r e j u d i c e d b y [ j u r o r ] L . A . ' s f a i l u r e t o r e s p o n d . " Id. 9 I n Ex p a r t e Dixon, the t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t make a n y w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s o f f a c t o r i n d i c a t e on t h e r e c o r d i t s b a s i s f o r i t s d e c i s i o n t o d e n y D i x o n ' s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l a s t o j u r o r L.A.'s f a i l u r e t o r e s p o n d t o a v o i r d i r e q u e s t i o n . 55 So. 3d a t 1260. I n t h i s case, however, the c i r c u i t court c o n s i d e r e d t h e Dobyne f a c t o r s a n d e n t e r e d a d e t a i l e d o r d e r e x p l a i n i n g why J u r o r L . B . ' s " r o l e a s a j u r o r l i k e l y was n o t a f f e c t e d by her f a t h e r ' s death." (C. 1137-39.) 49 CR-09-1129 have t o a f u l l and t r u t h f u l d i s c l o s u r e by j u r o r s on v o i r d i r e . H o w e v e r , we m u s t a l s o be aware o f i n a d v e r t e n t c o n c e a l m e n t a n d failure to recollect on the part of prospective jurors.'" "Freeman v. H a l l , 336 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . " Albarran, So. 3d a t Additionally, So. 2d 413, interests juror's dire 2 8 6 A l a . 1 6 1 , 1 6 7 , 238 S o . 2 d 3 3 0 , a as t h i s 468-69 court failure prejudiced . C o u r t n o t e d i n Smith v. S t a t e , ( A l a .Crim. must balance App. when 2002), regarding determining to disclose material information a the whether during defendant: "'[T]he problem of jurors failing to disclose material information during voir d i r e i s n e i t h e r a r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t n o r an unusual occurrence. I n 1965 D a l e B r o e d e r published h i s seminal study on juror dishonesty during voir dire. The a r t i c l e i n c l u d e d many c a s e s t u d i e s d e t a i l i n g why j u r o r s f a i l t o respond honestly during v o i r dire. F o r some j u r o r s , the questions seemed too t r i v i a l to merit an h o n e s t response. Other j u r o r s were s i m p l y t o o nervous t o volunteer information during voir dire. For s t i l l others, the desire to serve outweighed the d e s i r e t o t e l l the truth. One particular juror viewed s e l e c t i o n as an h o n o r a n d i n t e n d e d t o u s e his jury experiences as a s u b j e c t of b a r r o o m c o n v e r s a t i o n . More r e c e n t r e s e a r c h indicates that approximately twenty-five percent of jurors f a i l to reveal material information during voir dire. 50 838 a voir CR-09-1129 "'Given the high frequency with which jurors fail to disclose material i n f o r m a t i o n , i t s h o u l d come a s no s u r p r i s e that a showing o f j u r o r dishonesty, made a f t e r t h e t r i a l , does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d to the granting o f a new trial. As Professor D a v i d Crump h a s n o t e d , courts must balance two s t r o n g and competing i n t e r e s t s : f a i r n e s s and f i n a l i t y . In the c r i m i n a l c o n t e x t , f a i r n e s s means t h e r i g h t to impartial jurors, the right to the i n t e l l i g e n t use o f peremptory s t r i k e s , and t h e r i g h t t o be f r e e f r o m j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t . Courts w i l l consider some c o m b i n a t i o n o f these r i g h t s i n d e c i d i n g whether t o grant a new t r i a l . ' "When Jurors Lie: Differing Trials, 22 Am. J . Crim. L. (footnotes omitted)." 838 Standards f o r New 733, 734-35 (1995) So. 2d a t 439. Specifically, found as as t o a l l e g e d prejudice, the c i r c u i t follows: "Even i f [ J u r o r L . B . ] ' s f a i l u r e t o d i s c l o s e t h e story of her father's death constitutes juror misconduct, McWhorter has failed to establish prejudice. This claim is denied, i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r that reason. "Under Alabama l a w , t h e s t a n d a r d f o r d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t w a r r a n t s a new t r i a l i s 'whether t h e m i s c o n d u c t might have p r e j u d i c e d , n o t whether i t a c t u a l l y d i d p r e j u d i c e , the defendant.' Ex p a r t e D o b y n e , 805 S o . 2 d 7 6 3 , 771 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . '[T]he q u e s t i o n whether the j u r y ' s d e c i s i o n might 51 court CR-09-1129 have been a f f e c t e d i s answered n o t by a bare showing o f j u r o r m i s c o n d u c t , b u t r a t h e r b y an e x a m i n a t i o n o f the circumstances p a r t i c u l a r t o the case.' Ex p a r t e A p i c e l l a , 809 S o . 2 d 8 6 5 , 871 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ( e m p h a s i s in original). "In determining whether a c r i m i n a l defendant might have been p r e j u d i c e d by a veniremember's f a i l u r e to respond a p p r o p r i a t e l y to a question, the Supreme C o u r t o f A l a b a m a and t h e A l a b a m a C o u r t o f Criminal Appeals have looked at the following f a c t o r s : 'temporal remoteness of the matter i n q u i r e d about, the ambiguity of the q u e s t i o n propounded, the prospective j u r o r ' s inadvertence or w i l l f u l n e s s i n f a l s i f y i n g or f a i l i n g t o answer, t h e f a i l u r e of t h e juror to recollect, and t h e m a t e r i a l i t y of the matter i n q u i r e d about.' D o b y n e , 805 S o . 2 d a t 7 7 2 ; T o m l i n v . S t a t e , 695 S o . 2 d 157 , 170 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 19 9 6 ) . " [ J u r o r L . B . ] was u n e q u i v o c a l t h a t h e r f a t h e r ' s death d i d not a f f e c t her role as a j u r o r i n McWhorter's c a p i t a l murder t r i a l . The following testimony occurred during the State's crossexamination of [Juror L.B.]: "ASSISTANT is i tfair voted for based that ATTORNEY GENERAL: [ J u r o r L . B . ] , t o s a y t h a t w h e n - - t h a t when y o u guilty f o r Mr. M c W h o r t e r you on t h e e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l ? "[JUROR L . B . ] : Yes. " A S S I S T A N T ATTORNEY GENERAL: A n d when y o u voted f o r death, y o u b a s e d t h a t on t h e evidence presented d u r i n g the g u i l t phase? "[JUROR L . B . ] : Yes, s i r , I d i d . 52 CR-09-1129 "This Court b e l i e v e s [Juror L.B.]; therefore. M c W h o r t e r c a n n o t show t h a t [ J u r o r L . B . ] ' s d e c i s i o n s as a juror 'might have been affected' by h e r father's death. " L o o k i n g t o t h e f a c t o r s l i s t e d i n Dobyne, [ J u r o r L . B . ] ' s r o l e a s a j u r o r l i k e l y was n o t a f f e c t e d b y her father's death. First, as to 'temporal r e m o t e n e s s , ' [ J u r o r L . B . ] was a n 1 1 - y e a r - o l d child when h e r f a t h e r d i e d , b u t M c W h o r t e r ' s t r i a l d i d n o t t a k e p l a c e u n t i l s h e was a n a d u l t , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 years l a t e r . (E.H. 77, 118.) S e c o n d , as f o r ' t h e ambiguity of the question propounded,' the question itself was straightforward enough, but [Juror L . B . ] ' s l a c k o f c e r t a i n t y o v e r how h e r f a t h e r d i e d made t h e s t o r y o f h i s d e a t h l e s s l i k e l y t o h a v e a f f e c t e d h e r r o l e as a j u r o r . T h i r d , as t o [ J u r o r L.B.]'s 'inadvertence or w i l l f u l n e s s i n f a l s i f y i n g or f a i l i n g t o answer,' she a f f i r m e d t h a t h e r f a t h e r was n o t ' a t a l l i n h e r m i n d ' when s h e a n s w e r e d t h e questionnaire a n d t h a t s h e ' d i d n o t h a v e an a x t o g r i n d ' o r want t o ' v i n d i c a t e t h e d e a t h o f h e r f a t h e r through t h i s t r i a l . ' (E.H. 116, 119.) " [ J u r o r L.B.]'s testimony during the e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g e s t a b l i s h e s n o t o n l y t h a t she d i d n o t commit j u r o r misconduct by f a i l i n g t o respond a p p r o p r i a t e l y to questions asked by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l during voir d i r e b u t a l s o t h a t she b a s e d h e r d e c i s i o n s as a j u r o r i n t h i s c a s e s o l e l y on t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t e d , a n d n o t a t a l l on h e r f a t h e r ' s d e a t h . As s u c h , t h i s claim i s denied." (C. 1136-39; Here, that emphasis Juror L.B. added.) testified she b a s e d h e r v e r d i c t at the evidentiary on t h e t e s t i m o n y 53 presented hearing a n d on CR-09-1129 the trial that on the events her case. We, surrounding like the that i s due penalty-phase father verdict court, was find relief dire on t h i s in no she said bearing McWhorter's indication by J u r o r a victim or to a v o i r no importantly, h e r f a t h e r ' s d e a t h h a d no circuit her questionnaire McWhorter or More might have been p r e j u d i c e d respond juror instructions. guilt-phase McWhorter to court's of L.B.'s a failure crime question. that on the Accordingly, claim. B. Secondly, in McWhorter summarily d i s m i s s i n g which he evidence" alleged during exceeded could summarily dismissed 32.2(a)(3) claims the jury i t s discretion raised barred. and the c i r c u i t court erred c l a i m V(B) o f h i s amended p e t i t i o n i n that not have been Rule that deliberations. court procedurally argues He asserts because, at t r i a l Thus, considered he he "extraneous that says, o r on a p p e a l says, the the circuit his claim a n d was circuit not court h i s c l a i m f o r the wrong r e a s o n p u r s u a n t t o ( 5 ) , A l a . R. t h a t J u r o r L.B.'s Crim. information 54 P. Alternatively, about her f a t h e r s ' s he death CR-09-1129 was "extraneous evidence" d e n y i n g c l a i m V(B) failed to raise by of a material or admissible that law Crim. because, he suffered circuit dismissed could P. have law. court concluding of The fact State failed i t says, circuit to or that law erred his in claim pursuant to responds that claim state a material issue McWhorter "failed to plead prejudice." court, McWhorter's a p p e a l and the e v i d e n c e or e v i d e n c e t h a t , i f t r u e , would e s t a b l i s h The or issue of McWhorter's p e t i t i o n fact that alternatively R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. V(B) and been, but Judge claim was Rule on originally alternate not, because i t f a i l e d See Evans, raised at grounds trial ( a ) ( 5 ) , and because or to r a i s e a m a t e r i a l 32.2(a)(3), summarily on direct i s s u e of 32.7(d). i t fact Although J u d g e B u r k e r e i t e r a t e d J u d g e E v a n s ' s summary d i s m i s s a l g r o u n d s in the his final order, he circumstances also found surrounding that her Juror L.B.'s father's death " e x t r a n e o u s e v i d e n c e " under Alabama law. essence, the on merits, the circuit court given dismissed the the testimony 55 story was not In appears t h a t , c l a i m but i t also considered of in ruled on CR-09-1129 McWhorter's claim Specifically, V(A). Judge Burke's order found as follows: "Judge Evans's order of October 19, 2006, a l t e r n a t i v e l y d i s m i s s e d t h i s c l a i m because i t f a i l e d to state a material issue of fact or law, in v i o l a t i o n of Rule 32.7(d) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Judge Evans's order d i d not specify why this claim failed to meet the requirements of Rule 32.7(d). However, t h i s C o u r t finds t h a t M c W h o r t e r was p e r m i t t e d to i n t r o d u c e t e s t i m o n y from J u r o r [L.B.] i n s u p p o r t of C l a i m V(A) at the e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . Both t h i s c l a i m and Claim V(A) are based on the same so-called extraneous evidence: J u r o r [L.B.]'s s t o r y of the circumstances surrounding her f a t h e r ' s death. But Juror [ L . B . ] ' s s t o r y was not extraneous evidence under Alabama law. See E x p a r t e A r t h u r , 835 So. 2 d 981, 984, n.2 ( A l a . 2002) (quoting Sharrief v. Gerlach, 798 So. 2d 646, 653 ( A l a . 2001 ) ("An extraneous f a c t i s one ' o b t a i n e d by t h e j u r y or i n t r o d u c e d t o i t b y some p r o c e s s o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e of the t r i a l . ' " ) ; see a l s o , B e t h e a v. Springhill M e m o r i a l H o s p . , 833 So. 2 d 1, 8 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t the d i s c u s s i o n s between j u r o r s about p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s o r k n o w l e d g e , s u c h as o c c u r r e d i n t h i s c a s e , do n o t c o n s t i t u t e ' e x t r a n e o u s e v i d e n c e ' a n d , thus, are i n a d m i s s i b l e under Rule 606(b) of the Alabama Rules of E v i d e n c e . ) . As s u c h , t h i s claim raises no material issue of fact or law and t h e r e f o r e was d i s m i s s e d c o r r e c t l y by Judge Evans under Rule (C. 32.7(d)." 1124-25.) In this case, the circuit 56 court alternatively dismissed CR-09-1129 McWhorter's that i t raised 32.7(d). on juror-misconduct no This material f o r any reason. their d e l i b e r a t i o n s are because jurors and the 2001). law Sharrief "Rule 'distinction, sufficient to discussions of the J a c k s o n v. 3d 2d at without a "affidavit[s [Ms. to 2d 646, or and debates and propriety Sharrief, testimony] 798 showing 57 lack So. 2d that may be 'debates and from i n q u i r y . ' " 2009] So. S h a r r i e f , 798 SO. discussions or facts," jurors the (quoting (Ala. important "extraneous jury of their 653 the up Alabama deliberating So. verdict, 2009) i f i t is discussions recognizes a rulings jurors bring and between by Rule 1149. C R - 0 6 - 1 0 2 6 , November 13, their facts." or court's j u r y , ' which are p r o t e c t e d "[T]he regard extraneous 798 basis See improper under while Evid., which ( A l a . C r i m . App. 652). make the ruling at debates Gerlack, impeach State, , not under Alabama law, of 3d on law. a circuit So. simply 6 0 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. consideration or "matters t h a t the they v. fact a f f i r m the 44 protects statements decision." of may Lee, i s well s e t t l e d that law, the issue petition, It in ( c l a i m V(B)) C o u r t , when r e v i e w i n g a postconviction correct claim of the thereof, at are 653. extraneous jury, not Thus, facts CR-09-1129 influenced the jury's deliberations affidavits concerning 'thedebates by the jury this while exception." 41 ( A l a . 1995) 2d 5 5 1 , 557 In deliberating [are] a d m i s s i b l e ; and d i s c u s s i o n s thereon' CSX T r a n s p . , (quoting Alabama terms of this claim of extraneous not facts. qualify information." made b y J u r o r juror may h a v e h a d o n t h e j u r y Rule 659 S o . 2 d 3 5 , 575 So. (Ala. 1991)). statements 1 0 within Power Co. v . T u r n e r , allegedly does of t h e case not f a l l I n c . v. Dansby, statements not do however, under See R u l e 606(b) Juror the L.B. and t h e i m p a c t those i n i t s deliberations L.B.'s the misconduct, story exception 6 0 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. E v i d . o f t h e Alabama Rules about her for "extraneous 1 0 father But see of Evidence Taite provides: "(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an i n q u i r y i n t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f a v e r d i c t o r i n d i c t m e n t , a j u r o r may n o t t e s t i f y i n impeachment o f t h e v e r d i c t o r i n d i c t m e n t as t o any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of a n y t h i n g upon t h a t o r any o t h e r j u r o r ' s mind o r emotions as i n f l u e n c i n g t h e j u r o r t o a s s e n t t o o r d i s s e n t from t h e v e r d i c t o r i n d i c t m e n t o r c o n c e r n i n g the juror's mental processes i n connection -I- Vs ^ i^^T.TT -l-Vs ^^^^^T-N-l- -|-"^-^-^-|- -^ T m /-M^ rvi -^ T T -- ^ | -- T - F I T | /-NT-S -|-VS ^ question whether e x t was i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o t h e j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n o r w h e t h e r a n y o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e was i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o b e a r upon any j u r o r . N o r may a j u r o r ' s a f f i d a v i t 58 are CR-09-1129 v. State, is i n s u l a t e d from i n q u i r y and c a n n o t form t h e b a s i s claim 48 So. 3d 1 ( A l a . C r i m . App. for postconviction As Jones v. this Court State, 753 relief stated So. 2d 2009). under Rule i n addressing 1174 a 1 1 Therefore, of a i t valid 32. similar issue ( A l a . C r i m . App. in 1999): "[W]e r e j e c t J o n e s ' s c l a i m t h a t h i s ' d e a t h s e n t e n c e was t h e r e s u l t o f c o e r c i v e i n f l u e n c e s b r o u g h t i n t o the j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n s which were o u t s i d e the scope of t h e e v i d e n c e and j u d i c i a l c o n t r o l . ' (Appellant's b r i e f a t p . 97.) S p e c i f i c a l l y , he a r g u e s t h a t a j u r o r ' s statement that ' i f we g i v e h i m l i f e that m a y b e i n a f e w y e a r s t h a t h e w o u l d b e up f o r p a r o l e ' improperly persuaded others to sentence him to death. (R. 2 7 5 - 7 6 . ) " T e s t i m o n y a t t h e R u l e 32 h e a r i n g i n d i c a t e d t h a t before reaching i t s 12-0 advisory verdict recommending a sentence of death, the j u r y v o t e d several times. S e v e r a l b a l l o t s r e s u l t e d i n a 10-2 determination t o recommend d e a t h . One o f t h e t w o individuals who initially voted against death t e s t i f i e d t h a t she changed h e r v o t e i n f a v o r of death after J.M. made the statement regarding or e v i d e n c e o f any s t a t e m e n t by t h e j u r o r c o n c e r n i n g a m a t t e r a b o u t w h i c h t h e j u r o r w o u l d be precluded f r o m t e s t i f y i n g be received f o r these purposes. Nothing h e r e i n precludes a j u r o r from t e s t i f y i n g i n support of a v e r d i c t or indictment." I n T a i t e v . S t a t e , 48 S o . 3 d 1 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2009), a j u r o r ' s statement during d e l i b e r a t i o n s that the defendant h a d b e e n p r e v i o u s l y i n c a r c e r a t e d was c o n s i d e r e d p r e j u d i c e a s a m a t t e r o f law and a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h e c o n v i c t i o n was r e v e r s e d a n d t h e c a s e was r e m a n d e d f o r a new trial. 1 1 59 CR-09-1129 parole. "'A juror e x p l a i n i n g why her d e c i s i o n . ' ( A l a . C r . App. c a n n o t i m p e a c h h i s v e r d i c t by later o r how the j u r o r a r r i v e d at h i s or A d a i r v . S t a t e , 641 So. 2 d 3 0 9 , 313 1993). " M o r e o v e r , R u l e 6 0 6 ( b ) , A l a . R. in pertinent part: Evid., provides, " ' U p o n an i n q u i r y i n t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f a verdict or indictment, a j u r o r may not t e s t i f y i n impeachment of the v e r d i c t or i n d i c t m e n t as t o a n y m a t t e r o r statement o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g the course of the jury's deliberations or the e f f e c t of anything upon t h a t o r any other j u r o r ' s mind or e m o t i o n s as i n f l u e n c i n g t h e j u r o r as to assent to or d i s s e n t from the v e r d i c t or i n d i c t m e n t or c o n c e r n i n g the j u r o r ' s mental processes i n connection therewith, except t h a t a j u r o r may t e s t i f y on t h e question whether extraneous p r e j u d i c i a l information was improperly brought to the jury's a t t e n t i o n o r w h e t h e r any o u t s i d e influence was i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t to b e a r upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any s t a t e m e n t by the juror c o n c e r n i n g a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.' "We f i n d no m e r i t t o J o n e s ' s c l a i m b e c a u s e i t was b a s e d on p r o h i b i t e d t e s t i m o n y . A consideration of the c l a i m would d e s t r o y the i n t e g r i t y of the j u r y system, encourage the introduction of unduly influenced juror testimony after trial, and discourage jurors from freely deliberating, and i n h i b i t their reaching a verdict without fear of p o s t - t r i a l harassment, p u b l i c i t y , or s c r u t i n y . See Ex parte Neal, 731 So. 2d 621 (Ala. 1999); and B a r b o u r v . S t a t e , 673 So. 2 d 4 6 1 , 4 6 9 - 4 7 0 ( A l a . C r . 60 CR-09-1129 App. 1 9 9 4 ) , a f f ' d , 673 d e n i e d , 518 U.S. 1020, 2d 753 1074 So. So. 2 d 473 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , c e r t . 116 S. C t . 2 5 5 6 , 135 L. Ed. (1996)." 2d at 1203-04 consideration of (footnote this omitted). claim of debate juror and b a s e d e n t i r e l y on the "would d e s t r o y the i n t e g r i t y of the discourage their 1204. a verdict p u b l i c i t y , or Therefore, fact or dismissal law was Further, required that from reaching harassment, of jurors by Juror fails L.B.'s jurors' v o t e s but votes, what story, or their whether 32.3 and story the inhibit post-trial 753 So. 2d a material could be Instead, deliberations allege were story state at issue granted, he hearing anything to alleged changed which j u r o r s before had 61 the and 32.7(d). 32.6(b). to votes to is trial, meet h i s b u r d e n o f p l e a d i n g during failed of Jones, relief McWhorter d i d not fear and a jury-- juror testimony after scrutiny." which the j u r y system, encourage without proper under Rule Rules of freely deliberating, this claim upon misconduct--which deliberations i n t r o d u c t i o n of unduly i n f l u e n c e d and S i m i l a r l y , here, do with only several changed Juror as their L.B.'s their CR-09-1129 changing court's We their vote. d e n i a l of t h i s also feel i n h i sbrief sentence argument. find no e r r o r i n t h e c i r c u i t claim. compelled presents that T h u s , we 1 2 to address a claim and i n h i s r e p l y t o t h i s McWhorter argues that McWhorter Court i n a two- " i t was apparent [thec i r c u i t court] adopted the State's proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t , almost verbatim ... o n l y f i v e p h r a s e s d i f f e r e d way f r o m t h e S t a t e ' s p r o p o s e d o r d e r . " i n any (McWhorter's b r i e f , p. We n o t e , a s m e n t i o n e d a b o v e i n t h i s o p i n i o n , t h a t J u r o r A.S., who was known a s J u r o r A.K. when she s e r v e d on McWhorter's j u r y , t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s : 12 "THE W I T N E S S : [ L . B . ] was s t a n d i n g , and she s t a r t e d t e l l i n g a s t o r y a b o u t how y e a r s b e f o r e I'm n o t s u r e e x a c t l y how l o n g b e f o r e , b u t y e a r s before h e r f a t h e r h a d b e e n m u r d e r e d , a n d t h a t , t o my b e s t r e c o l l e c t i o n , he w a s n ' t - - I ' m n o t s u r e i f he w e n t t o j a i l o r h e d i d n ' t g o t o j a i l , b u t s h e now h a d t o w a l k a r o u n d i n t h e same t o w n w h e r e t h i s man was t h a t k i l l e d her father. A n d s h e was c r y i n g . " "A. S h e h a d made a comment t h a t , b a s i c a l l y , y o u j u s t d o n ' t know how i t f e e l s t o h a v e t o w a l k a r o u n d a n d be a r o u n d t h i s p e r s o n t h a t h a s done t h i s . " (R. 4 6 2 - 6 7 . ) The S t a t e d o e s n o t a d d r e s s h e r t e s t i m o n y i n i t s b r i e f , and t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t d i d n o t d i s c u s s h e r t e s t i m o n y i n i t s order. (C. 1 1 1 5 - 9 2 . ) I n r u l i n g o n t h e d i s c o v e r y m o t i o n s , t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t a l l o w e d J u r o r A.S. t o t e s t i f y on a l i m i t e d basis. 62 CR-09-1129 18.) He adopting, order appears order argue that his McWhorter was Rule 32 circuit petition. asserts "largely a that to and deference (McWhorter's r e p l y , p. Both McWhorter the the and the State postconviction previously submitted McWhorter t h a t the c i r c u i t c o u r t had action State, Crim. of the in his circuit court's State's the i t was not claim. proposed petition, court an an o r d e r denying adopting order, filed orders. the with State's only o b j e c t i o n on the minor grounds adopted the State's proposed overruled by notation on order, the case summary. This v. proposed juror-misconduct submitted proposed modifications. circuit in 9.) McWhorter's the State's of law" S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , the c i r c u i t court entered which erred of adoption conclusions on court Specifically, because wholesale proposed f i n d i n g s of f a c t s entitled the w i t h only minor m o d i f i c a t i o n s , the denying reply, to App. Court [Ms. r e c e n t l y addressed C R - 0 8 - 1 4 1 3 , J u l y 8, 2011), caselaw i n which t h i s i n regard to "'"While adopting the the a similar 2011] Court So. s e t out adoption claim in the (Ala. development of p r o p o s e d the practice of state's proposed 63 3d Miller orders: CR-09-1129 findings and conclusions i s subject to c r i t i c i s m , the general r u l e i s t h a t e v e n when t h e c o u r t adopts proposed findings verbatim, the f i n d i n g s are those o f t h e c o u r t a n d may b e r e v e r s e d only i f clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer C i t y , N.C., 470 U.S. 5 6 4 , 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; H u b b a r d v . S t a t e , 584 S o . 2d 895 ( A l a . C r . App. 1991); Weeks v . S t a t e , 568 S o . 2 d 864 (Ala. Cr. App. 1989), cert. d e n i e d , [ 4 9 8 ] U . S . [ 8 8 2 ] , 498 U.S. 8 8 2 , 111 S. C t . 2 3 0 , 112 L. E d . 2 d 184 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; M o r r i s o n v . S t a t e , 551 S o . 2 d 435 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 495 U.S. 9 1 1 , 110 S. C t . 1 9 3 8 , 109 L. E d . 2 d 3 0 1 (1990)." " ' B e l l v . S t a t e , 593 S o . 2 d 1 2 3 , 126 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) . See a l s o Dobyne v . S t a t e , 805 S o . 2 d 7 3 3 , 741 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) ; J o n e s v . S t a t e , 753 S o . 2 d 1 1 7 4 , 1 1 8 0 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999). " ' M o r e r e c e n t l y i n H y d e v . S t a t e , 950 So. 2 d 344 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 200 6 ) , we stated: "'"[T]his Court has repeatedly upheld the practice of adopting the State's proposed order when denying a Rule 32 petition for postconviction relief. See, e.g., Coral v. State, 900 S o . 2 d 1 2 7 4 , 1288 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2004), o v e r r u l e d on other grounds, Ex parte Jenkins, 972 S o . 2 d 159 ( A l a . 64 CR-09-1129 2005), and the cases cited therein. 'Alabama courts have c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t e v e n when a t r i a l court adopts verbatim a party's proposed order, the f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and conclusions of law are those of the trial c o u r t and t h e y may be reversed only i f they are clearly erroneous.' McGahee v. State, 885 So. 2d 191, 229-30 (Ala. Crim. "'950 So. App. 2d at 2003)." 371. "'However, t h e A l a b a m a Supreme Court has a d m o n i s h e d t h a t ' a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s must be careful to evaluate a claim that a prepared o r d e r d r a f t e d by t h e prevailing party and adopted by the trial court v e r b a t i m does not r e f l e c t the i n d e p e n d e n t and i m p a r t i a l f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . ' Ex p a r t e I n g r a m , 51 So. 3d 1 1 1 9 , 1124 (Ala. 2010). "'In Ingram , t h e Supreme C o u r t held t h a t the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s adoption of the State's proposed order denying postconviction relief was erroneous because, i t s a i d , the order s t a t e d t h a t i t was b a s e d i n p a r t on t h e p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e a n d o b s e r v a t i o n s o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e when t h e j u d g e who a c t u a l l y s i g n e d the order d e n y i n g t h e p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n was n o t the same judge who had presided over Ingram's capital-murder trial. "[T]he p a t e n t l y e r r o n e o u s nature of the statements regarding the trial judge's 'personal knowledge' and observations of Ingram's capital-murder trial undermines any c o n f i d e n c e t h a t the t r i a l judge's f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law are the 65 CR-09-1129 product of the t r i a l judge's independent judgment I n g r a m , 51 S o . 3 d a t 1 1 2 5 . "'Our first opportunity to consider this issue after t h e Supreme Court's d e c i s i o n i n I n g r a m came i n J a m e s v . S t a t e , 61 S o . 3 d 357 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2010) ( o p i n i o n on a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g ) . We upheld a c i r c u i t court's order, adopted v e r b a t i m from the S t a t e ' s proposed o r d e r , over a c l a i m that i n adopting the State's order t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t had v i o l a t e d Ingram and the United States Supreme Court's o p i n i o n i n J e f f e r s o n v. Upton, U.S. , 130 S. C t . 2 2 1 7 , 176 L. E d . 2 d 1 0 3 2 ( 2 0 1 0 ) . We s t a t e d : "'"The main concerns the Supreme C o u r t f o u n d o b j e c t i o n a b l e i n Ingram a r e not p r e s e n t i n t h i s case; here, the same judge p r e s i d e d over b o t h James's t r i a l and the Rule 32 proceedings. A l s o , a s we n o t e d i n o u r p r e v i o u s opinion i n t h i s case, the c i r c u i t court allowed both 'parties to submit proposed o r d e r s . ' "'"In Jefferson v. Upton, [ U.S. , 130 S. C t . 2 2 1 7 (2010),] the United States Supreme Court remanded Jefferson's habeas corpus proceedings to the lower court for that court to determine whether the s t a t e c o u r t ' s f a c t u a l findings warranted a presumption of correctness. The Supreme Court i n granting r e l i e f stated: have "'"'Although stated that 66 we a CR-09-1129 court's "verbatim a d o p t i o n of f i n d i n g s of fact prepared by prevailing parties" should be treated as f i n d i n g s of the court, we h a v e a l s o c r i t i c i z e d that p r a c t i c e . Anderson [v. C i t y of Bessemer, 470 U.S. [564] at 572, 105 S. C t . 1 5 0 4 , 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 [(1985)]. And we have not c o n s i d e r e d the lawfulness o f , nor the application of the habeas s t a t u t e t o , the use of s u c h a p r a c t i c e where (1) a judge solicits the proposed f i n d i n g s ex p a r t e , (2) does not provide the opposing party an o p p o r t u n i t y to criticize the findings or to submit h i s own, or (3) a d o p t s f i n d i n g s that contain internal evidence suggesting t h a t t h e j u d g e may not have read them. Cf. id., a t 568, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. E d . 2d 5 1 8 ; Ga. Code of Judicial C o n d u c t , Canon 3(A)(4) (1993) ( p r o h i b i t i n g ex p a r t e j u d i c i a l communications)."' "'James v. rehearing). State, 61 67 So. 3d at 385 (on CR-09-1129 " ' H e r e , t h e c i r c u i t j u d g e who signed t h e o r d e r d e n y i n g p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f was t h e same j u d g e who p r e s i d e d over Ray's g u i l t and p e n a l t y p r o c e e d i n g s - - t h e judge who s e n t e n c e d R a y t o d e a t h . None o f t h e concerns the Supreme C o u r t stressed in Ingram are p r e s e n t i n t h i s case. Moreover, for the reasons d e t a i l e d i n t h i s o p i n i o n , we h o l d t h a t t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s are not " c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . " ' "Ray [v. S t a t e , So. 3d [Ms. at C R - 0 6 - 2 1 4 3 , F e b r u a r y 4, 2 0 1 1 ] ] , [ ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 1 ) ] . "Shortly after this C o u r t r e l e a s e d Ray, the A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t r e l e a s e d i t s o p i n i o n i n Ex p a r t e S c o t t , [Ms. 1 0 9 1 2 7 5 , M a r c h 18, 2 0 1 1 ] So. 3d ( A l a . 2011). I n S c o t t , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme Court held that a c i r c u i t court's order summarily dismissing a Rule 32 petition, which adopted v e r b a t i m t h e S t a t e ' s a n s w e r t o t h e R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n , v i o l a t e d the requirement that the order r e f l e c t the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s i n d e p e n d e n t f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s of law. "In S c o t t , a f t e r the S t a t e f i l e d i t s answer to Scott's Rule 32 petition, the circuit court r e q u e s t e d a n d r e c e i v e d an e l e c t r o n i c c o p y o f t h e State's answer. The circuit court subsequently issued a w r i t t e n order summarily denying Scott's Rule 32 petition. The circuit court's order e s s e n t i a l l y adopted v e r b a t i m the S t a t e ' s answer to t h e R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . " S c o t t f i l e d an o b j e c t i o n t o t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s order, which the c i r c u i t c o u r t denied. This Court a f f i r m e d the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s order denying S c o t t ' s R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . S c o t t v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 2 2 3 3 , M a r c h 26, 2010] So. 3d (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). The A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t g r a n t e d S c o t t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i and h e l d t h a t t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s a d o p t i o n of the S t a t e ' s answer to 68 CR-09-1129 t h e R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n c o n f l i c t e d w i t h i t s d e c i s i o n i n Ex p a r t e I n g r a m , 51 S o . 3 d 1 1 1 9 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) . The Court reasoned: "'Scott argues that the t r i a l court's o r d e r c o n t a i n s t h e same c i t a t i o n t o c a s e l a w t h a t h a d b e e n o v e r r u l e d b y t h i s C o u r t two years before the entry of the t r i a l court's o r d e r a n d t h e same t y p o g r a p h i c a l e r r o r s a s c o n t a i n e d i n the S t a t e ' s answer. Moreover, Scott contends that because the t r i a l court adopted n e a r l y v e r b a t i m t h e S t a t e ' s answer as i t s o r d e r , t h e o r d e r i s i n f e c t e d w i t h the adversarial zeal of the State's c o u n s e l . Thus, S c o t t argues t h a t t h e t r i a l court's order cannot reflect the independent and i m p a r t i a l f i n d i n g s o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t a n d c a n n o t be t h e p r o d u c t o f the t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n d e p e n d e n t j u d g m e n t . As for Scott's c l a i m that the presence i n the trial court's order of the same typographical errors contained i n the S t a t e ' s answer i s e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e t r i a l court's order i s not a product of the i n d e p e n d e n t j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , we note t h a t S c o t t has d i r e c t e d t h i s Court t o o n l y two e x a m p l e s o f s u c h typographical errors appearing i n the approximately 58 pages o f t e x t t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e S t a t e ' s answer and t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r . This C o u r t r e c o g n i z e d i n E x p a r t e I n g r a m [ , 51 So. 3 d 1 1 1 9 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) , ] t h a t s o m e t i m e s m i n o r e r r o r s f i n d t h e i r way i n t o orders d r a f t e d b y t r i a l c o u r t s . We do n o t c o n s i d e r the few t y p o g r a p h i c a l e r r o r s a t i s s u e here, by t h e m s e l v e s , as s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e upon which t o base a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the t r i a l court's order i s not a product of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n d e p e n d e n t j u d g m e n t . The f a c t t h a t t h e same t y p o g r a p h i c a l e r r o r s a p p e a r i n t h e same l o c a t i o n s i n b o t h t h e S t a t e ' s a n s w e r and t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r d o e s , h o w e v e r , 69 CR-09-1129 bolster this Court's conclusion reached i n f r a t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s order i s not a p r o d u c t o f i t s i n d e p e n d e n t j u d g m e n t . We a l s o n o t e t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s a n s w e r and the t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r a r e b o t h 58 p a g e s i n length. Again, although t h i s fact alone is i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e upon w h i c h to base a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the order i s not a product of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s independent judgment, i t b o l s t e r s t h i s Court's conclusion reached i n f r a t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s order i s not a product of i t s independent judgment. "'Further, Scott notes that in a d o p t i n g the S t a t e ' s answer the t r i a l c o u r t repeated i n i t s order the S t a t e ' s c i t a t i o n t o a n d r e l i a n c e u p o n W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 783 So. 2 d 108 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000), a case that had been overruled by this Court approximately two years b e f o r e the trial c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r i n t h i s c a s e . I n Ex p a r t e T a y l o r , 10 So. 3d 1075 (Ala. 2005), t h i s C o u r t by implication overruled the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in W i l l i a m s t h a t " ' a f i n d i n g o f no manifest i n j u s t i c e under the " p l a i n e r r o r " standard on a d i r e c t a p p e a l s e r v e s t o e s t a b l i s h a f i n d i n g o f no p r e j u d i c e u n d e r t h e t e s t f o r i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel provided i n S t r i c k l a n d v . W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. C t . 2 0 5 2 , 80 L. E d . 2 d 674 (1984)."' W i l l i a m s , 783 So. 2d a t 133 ( q u o t i n g S t a t e v . C l a r k , 913 S.W. 2d 399, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) ) . The trial c o u r t d i d not c i t e W i l l i a m s f o r purposes of that holding; rather, i t is clear that W i l l i a m s was c i t e d i n s u p p o r t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t S c o t t had f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y h i s burden of p l e a d i n g under Rule 3 2 . T h e r e i s no e r r o r i n c i t i n g a n d r e l y i n g upon a case f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n of l a w when t h a t c a s e h a s b e e n r e v e r s e d on a 70 CR-09-1129 ground other than the s p e c i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n o f l a w b e i n g r e l i e d u p o n . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s c i t a t i o n to W i l l i a m s i n t h i s case does not r i s e t o t h e l e v e l o f a m a t e r i a l and o b v i o u s e r r o r as c o n t e m p l a t e d b y t h e h o l d i n g i n Ex p a r t e I n g r a m , s u p r a . A c c o r d i n g l y , we do n o t consider the trial court's citation to W i l l i a m s as e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s order i s not a product of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s independent judgment. "'More t r o u b l i n g i s S c o t t ' s c o n t e n t i o n that because the trial court adopted v e r b a t i m t h e S t a t e ' s a n s w e r as i t s o r d e r , the order is infected with the same a d v e r s a r i a l z e a l o f t h e S t a t e ' s c o u n s e l as is the answer. Scott contends that, a l t h o u g h an o r d e r p r e p a r e d b y a p a r t y f o r t h e p r o p o s e d a d o p t i o n by t h e t r i a l court purports to be disinterested, the a d v e r s a r i a l z e a l of counsel a l l too o f t e n infects the adopted order of the trial court, which is supposed to contain d i s i n t e r e s t e d f i n d i n g s . See C u t h b e r t s o n v. B i g g e r s B r o s . , I n c . , 702 F . 2 d 454 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) . S c o t t c o n t e n d s t h a t an a n s w e r i s a p l e a d i n g that never i s prepared with the pretense of impartiality. We agree. As Scott contends, an a n s w e r , by i t s very n a t u r e , i s a d v e r s a r i a l and s e t s f o r t h one party's p o s i t i o n i n the litigation. It makes no claim of being an impartial c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e f a c t s and l a w ; r a t h e r , i t i s a work of advocacy t h a t e x h o r t s one party's perception of the law as i t p e r t a i n s t o t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s . The Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals acknowledged the nature of the S t a t e ' s answer i n t h i s case, s t a t i n g t h a t "the p l e a d i n g c l e a r l y advocated and s o u g h t summary d i s m i s s a l o f t h e m a j o r i t y o f S c o t t ' s c l a i m s . " S c o t t v. S t a t e , So. 3d at . 71 CR-09-1129 " ' T h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n Ex p a r t e I n g r a m t h a t t h e " a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s m u s t be c a r e f u l to e v a l u a t e a c l a i m t h a t a p r e p a r e d order d r a f t e d by t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y and a d o p t e d by the trial court verbatim does not reflect the independent and impartial findings and conclusions of the trial c o u r t . " Ex p a r t e I n g r a m , 51 So. 3d a t 1124 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . H e r e , we do n o t e v e n h a v e the benefit of an order proposed or " p r e p a r e d " by a p a r t y ; r a t h e r t h e o r d e r i s a judicial incorporation of a party's p l e a d i n g as t h e " i n d e p e n d e n t a n d i m p a r t i a l findings and conclusions of the trial c o u r t . " I d . a t 1124. The f i r s t and most fundamental requirement of the reviewing c o u r t i s to determine " t h a t the order and t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s i n s u c h o r d e r are i n f a c t those of the t r i a l c o u r t . " Id. at 1124. The trial court's verbatim a d o p t i o n of the S t a t e ' s answer to S c o t t ' s Rule 32 petition as i t s order, by i t s n a t u r e , v i o l a t e s t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n Ex p a r t e I n g r a m . A c c o r d i n g l y , we m u s t r e v e r s e the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals' judgment i n s o f a r as i t a f f i r m s t h e t r i a l court's adoption of the State's answer as i t s o r d e r , a n d we r e m a n d t h e c a s e t o t h e C o u r t of Criminal Appeals with d i r e c t i o n s to remand the case to the t r i a l c o u r t f o r t h a t court to reverse i t s order dismissing S c o t t ' s R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n a n d t o e n t e r a new order i n l i g h t of t h i s o p i n i o n . ' " So. Miller, 06-2143, Feb. 3d So. 4, at 3d ." at 2011] . See So. 3d 2011). 72 a l s o Ray , v. State, [Ms. (Ala. Crim. CRApp. CR-09-1129 Here, the f a c t situations case, did i n both i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the I n g r a m and Ex p a r t e denied denying McWhorter's of McWhorter's case trial did counsel. however, i n the court knowledge of the performance Further, p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n upon t h e S t a t e ' s i n i t i a l answer to the after the McWhorter's briefs. orders, McWhorter Rule Both and order 32 State McWhorter order. Instead, claims, the of and The submitted their his post-hearing Consequently, numerous evidentiary allowed McWhorter submitted object the after the court a circuit circuit court's court proposed both orders pleadings, hearing on submission of submitted proposed post-hearing i n his post-hearing u n t i l s e v e r a l weeks a f t e r had order postconviction d i d not possibility proposed petition. i t s the c i r c u i t court i n McWhorter's and base the denying postconviction not S c o t t . In t h i s postconviction petition t o have p e r s o n a l fact McWhorter's p o s t c o n v i c t i o n d i d not p r e s i d e at McWhorter's t r i a l ; not p r o f e s s this Ex p a r t e t h e c i r c u i t j u d g e who petition order situation adopting d i d not brief the issue the State brief. and and McWhorter to the State's i t s final McWhorter had filed conclude that brief. in light of these 73 facts, we CR-09-1129 the circuit court's unexamined State. the order adoption of a is its proposed Moreover, f o r the reasons juror-misconduct Mcwhorter findings raises are not on own claims and appeal, "clearly order not merely submitted an by the s e t f o r t h above i n r e g a r d below we and as to the h o l d t h a t the other circuit to claims court's erroneous." II. McWhorter to effective (Claim XII McWhorter investigate attorneys' p e n a l t y and counsel amended alleges and his constitutional at the Rule that present 32 penalty his counsel Before by ineffective of the 466 ineffective 668 assistance (1) that More did not and during the deficient a d d r e s s i n g McWhorter's set f o r t h the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of principles U.S. phase. evidence mitigation was right Petition.) ineffective-assistance-of-counsel Washington, establish: of sentencing phases. Allegations governed denied performance s p e c i f i c a r g u m e n t s , we regarding was i n McWhorter's adequately his he assistance particularly, that argues set (1 9 8 4 ) . of To counsel, counsel's of in prevail the performance 74 claims. assistance forth law counsel Strickland v. on of a claim petitioner was are deficient must and CR-09-1129 (2) that the performance. 1370, 1372 petitioner 466 (Ala. U.S. at was prejudiced 687 ; Ex parte by the Lawley, deficient 512 So. 2d 1987). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's p e r f o r m a n c e m u s t be h i g h l y d e f e r e n t i a l . I t is a l l too tempting f o r a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after c o n v i c t i o n o r a d v e r s e s e n t e n c e , and i t i s all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after i t has proved u n s u c c e s s f u l , to conclude that a p a r t i c u l a r act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. C f . E n g l e v . I s a a c , 456 U.S. 1 0 7 , 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 102 S. C t . 1 5 5 8 , 71 L . E d . 2d 783 (1982). A f a i r assessment of a t t o r n e y p e r f o r m a n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t be made t o e l i m i n a t e t h e d i s t o r t i n g e f f e c t s o f h i n d s i g h t , to r e c o n s t r u c t the circumstances of counsel's challenged c o n d u c t , and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's p e r s p e c t i v e at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the e v a l u a t i o n , a c o u r t must i n d u l g e a s t r o n g presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that i s , the d e f e n d a n t must overcome t h e presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' See Michel v. L o u i s i a n a , [350 U.S. 9 1 ] , a t 101 [(1955)]. There are countless ways to provide effective a s s i s t a n c e i n any given case. Even the best c r i m i n a l defense attorneys would not defend a p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t i n the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68 9 (citations 75 omitted). As the CR-09-1129 United States Supreme C o u r t further stated: "[S]trategic choices made after thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f law and f a c t s relevant to plausible options are v i r t u a l l y u n c h a l l e n g e a b l e ; a n d s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e s made a f t e r l e s s than complete i n v e s t i g a t i o n are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on i n v e s t i g a t i o n . In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations o r t o make a r e a s o n a b l e d e c i s i o n t h a t makes p a r t i c u l a r investigations unnecessary. In any i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s case, a p a r t i c u l a r decision not to investigate must be directly assessed f o r reasonableness i n a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a p p l y i n g a heavy measure o f deference t o counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. a t 6 9 0 - 9 1 . W i t h r e g a r d t o an a t t o r n e y ' s d u t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e , said: "While counsel has a duty to investigate i n an attempt to locate evidence favorable to the defendant, 'this duty only requires a reasonable investigation.' S i n g l e t o n v . T h i g p e n , 847 F.2d 6 6 8 , 669 ( 1 1 t h C i r . ( A l a . ) 1 9 8 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 488 U.S. 1 0 1 9 , 109 S . C t . 8 2 2 , 102 L.Ed. 2 d 812 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . S e e S t r i c k l a n d [ v . W a s h i n g t o n ] , 466 U.S. [ 6 6 8 ] a t 6 9 1 , 104 S . C t . [ 2 0 5 2 ] a t 2 0 6 6 , 80 L . E d . 2d 674 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] ; M o r r i s o n v . S t a t e , 5 5 1 So. 2 d 435 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 98 9 ) , cert. d e n i e d , 495 U.S. 9 1 1 , 110 S. C t . 1 9 3 8 , 109 L.Ed. 2d 301 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . Counsel's o b l i g a t i o n i s to conduct a ' s u b s t a n t i a l investigation into each of the plausible lines of 76 we h a v e CR-09-1129 defense.' S t r i c k l a n d , 466 U.S. a t 6 8 1 , 104 S.Ct. a t 2061 (emphasis added). 'A s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s j u s t what t h e term implies; i t does n o t demand t h a t counsel discover every shred of evidence but that a reasonable inquiry into a l l p l a u s i b l e d e f e n s e s b e made.' I d . , 466 U.S. a t 6 8 6 , 104 S . C t . a t 2 0 6 3 . " "'The r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f c o u n s e l ' s actions may be determined or s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are u s u a l l y b a s e d , q u i t e p r o p e r l y , on i n f o r m e d s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e s made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In p a r t i c u l a r , what investigation decisions are r e a s o n a b l e d e p e n d s c r i t i c a l l y on such i n f o r m a t i o n . ' "Id., Jones, 466 U.S. a t 6 9 1 , 104 S . C t . a t 2 0 6 6 . " 753 S o . 2 d a t 1 1 9 1 . "The p u r p o s e o f i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s r e v i e w i s n o t t o g r a d e c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . See S t r i c k l a n d [ v . W a s h i n g t o n ] , [ 4 6 6 U.S. 6 6 8 , ] 104 S . C t . [ 2 0 5 2 ] a t 2 0 6 5 [ 1 9 8 4 ) ] ; s e e a l s o W h i t e v . S i n g l e t a r y , 972 F . 2 d 1218, 1221 (11th C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) ('We a r e n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n grading lawyers' performances; we are interested i n whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.'). We recognize that ' [ r ] e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s an a r t , a n d an a c t o r o m i s s i o n t h a t i s u n p r o f e s s i o n a l i n one c a s e may b e s o u n d o r e v e n b r i l l i a n t i n a n o t h e r . ' S t r i c k l a n d , [ 4 6 6 U.S. a t 6 9 3 , ] 104 S. C t . at 2067. D i f f e r e n t l a w y e r s have d i f f e r e n t 77 CR-09-1129 gifts; this fact, as w e l l as differing c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m c a s e t o c a s e , means t h e range of what might be a reasonable a p p r o a c h a t t r i a l m u s t be b r o a d . To s t a t e the obvious: the t r i a l lawyers, i n every c a s e , c o u l d h a v e done s o m e t h i n g more o r something different. So, omissions are inevitable. B u t , t h e i s s u e i s n o t what i s possible or 'what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.' Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 7 7 6 , 107 S. C t . 3 1 1 4 , 3 1 2 6 , 97 L . E d . 2 d 638 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . " Chandler 2000) v. United (footnote what 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. omitted). "As t h e S u p r e m e of States, Court explained investigation decisions i n Strickland, are reasonable critically' on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s Secretary, Dep't of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, the issue 'depends Cummings v . 1357 (11th 2009). Moreover, "there i s no reason for a court deciding an i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e claim t o approach the i n q u i r y i n t h e same o r d e r o r e v e n t o a d d r e s s b o t h c o m p o n e n t s of the inquiry i f the defendant makes an i n s u f f i c i e n t s h o w i n g on one. I n p a r t i c u l a r , a c o u r t n e e d n o t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e was d e f i c i e n t b e f o r e examining the p r e j u d i c e s u f f e r e d by the defendant as a result of the alleged d e f i c i e n c i e s . The o b j e c t o f an i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s c l a i m i s not t o grade counsel's performance. If i ti s e a s i e r t o d i s p o s e o f an i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s c l a i m on t h e ground of l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t p r e j u d i c e , which we 78 Cir. CR-09-1129 expect w i l l o f t e n be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s c l a i m s not become so burdensome t o defense counsel t h a t the e n t i r e c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e s y s t e m s u f f e r s as a r e s u l t . " Strickland, 466 U.S. at a c o u r t must c o n s i d e r whether B u e h l v. In States the the "It is firmly 166 F.3d Wiggins v. Supreme Court 163, Smith, m i t i g a t i o n evidence. 539 The ineffective investigate and present bleak s u b s t a n t i a l p h y s i c a l and deficiencies. The been (3d C i r . U.S. a 510 satisfied." 1999). (2003), claim that the Court because counsel evidence that upbringing, that sexual a b u s e , and counsel's failed had suffered t h a t he had to a from mental stated: " P e t i t i o n e r t h u s h a s t h e k i n d o f t r o u b l e d h i s t o r y we have d e c l a r e d r e l e v a n t t o a s s e s s i n g a d e f e n d a n t ' s moral c u l p a b i l i t y . P e n r y v . L y n a u g h , 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) ('"[E]vidence about the defendant's b a c k g r o u n d and c h a r a c t e r i s r e l e v a n t b e c a u s e o f t h e b e l i e f , l o n g h e l d by t h i s s o c i e t y , t h a t d e f e n d a n t s who c o m m i t c r i m i n a l a c t s t h a t a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e t o a d i s a d v a n t a g e d b a c k g r o u n d ... may be l e s s c u l p a b l e t h a n d e f e n d a n t s who h a v e no s u c h e x c u s e " ' ) ; s e e a l s o Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) 79 was present Wiggins he United counsel Wiggins Court found that was and has that deciding t o a d e q u a t e l y i n v e s t i g a t e and performance dysfunctional prong 172 addressed for failing established s t r e n g t h of the evidence i n Strickland prejudice Vaughn, ineffective 697. CR-09-1129 (noting t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the offender's life h i s t o r y i s a '"part of the process of i n f l i c t i n g the p e n a l t y o f d e a t h " ' ) ; L o c k e t t v . O h i o , 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (invalidating Ohio law that did not permit c o n s i d e r a t i o n of aspects of a defendant's background)." 539 U.S. at 535. The Court further stated: "In f i n d i n g t h a t [ t r i a l c o u n s e l ' s ] i n v e s t i g a t i o n d i d n o t meet S t r i c k l a n d ' s p e r f o r m a n c e s t a n d a r d s , we emphasize t h a t S t r i c k l a n d does not r e q u i r e c o u n s e l to i n v e s t i g a t e e v e r y c o n c e i v a b l e l i n e of m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e no m a t t e r how u n l i k e l y t h e e f f o r t w o u l d b e to a s s i s t the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present m i t i g a t i n g evidence at sentencing i n every case. Both conclusions would interfere with the ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d independence of counsel' a t t h e h e a r t o f S t r i c k l a n d , 466 U.S., a t 689. We base our conclusion on the much more limited p r i n c i p l e t h a t ' s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e s made a f t e r less than complete i n v e s t i g a t i o n are reasonable' only to the e x t e n t t h a t 'reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l judgments s u p p o r t t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on i n v e s t i g a t i o n . ' I d . , a t 690-691. A d e c i s i o n n o t t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h u s 'must be d i r e c t l y a s s e s s e d f o r r e a s o n a b l e n e s s i n a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ' I d . , a t 691. "Counsel's investigation into Wiggins' background d i d not r e f l e c t reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment. T h e i r d e c i s i o n t o end t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n when t h e y d i d was neither consistent with the p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d a r d s t h a t p r e v a i l e d i n 1989, nor reasonable in light of the evidence counsel uncovered i n the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s records--evidence t h a t would have l e d a r e a s o n a b l y competent a t t o r n e y to i n v e s t i g a t e f u r t h e r . " 539 U.S. In at 533-34. W i l l i a m s v. Taylor, 529 80 U.S. 362 (2000), the United CR-09-1129 States Supreme deficient because mitigation "failed Court found that counsel evidence until counsel's did a not week begin before performance to trial was investigate and counsel t o c o n d u c t an i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t w o u l d h a v e uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish childhood, because they to such not because of incorrectly records." 529 any thought U.S. at strategic calculation t h a t s t a t e law b a r r e d but access 395. "The U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t has h e l d t h a t t r i a l counsel's f a i l u r e to i n v e s t i g a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of m i t i g a t i n g evidence i s , per se, d e f i c i e n t performance. See H o r t o n v. Zant, 941 F . 2 d 1449, 1462 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1991) ('our case law rejects the notion that a "strategic" d e c i s i o n c a n be r e a s o n a b l e w h e n t h e a t t o r n e y has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them'), c e r t . denied, 503 U.S. 9 5 2 , 112 S. C t . 1 5 1 6 , 117 L. E d . 2 d 652 (1992); s e e , a l s o , J a c k s o n v . H e r r i n g , 42 F . 3 d 1 3 5 0 , 1 3 6 6 - 6 8 (11th C i r . ) ('Although counsel need not " i n v e s t i g a t e every e v i d e n t i a r y l e a d , " he must g a t h e r enough knowledge of the p o t e n t i a l m i t i g a t i o n evidence to a r r i v e a t an "informed judgment" i n making [the d e c i s i o n not to p r e s e n t such evidence] [A] legal d e c i s i o n to forgo a m i t i g a t i o n presentation cannot be reasonable i f i t i s unsupported by sufficient investigation.') (emphasis added; c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) , c e r t . d i s m i s s e d , 515 U.S. 1189, 116 S. C t . 3 8 , 132 L. E d . 2 d 919 (1995)." Ex parte Land, 775 on other grounds So. by 2d State 847, 853-54 v. Martin, 81 (Ala. 2000), [Ms. overruled 1091450, Jan. 7, CR-09-1129 2011] So. In United 3d , ( A l a . 2011) . J a c k s o n v. H e r r i n g , States Court of 42 F . 3 d Appeals 1350 for (11th C i r . 1995), the Eleventh the Circuit stated: "In cases where s e n t e n c i n g c o u n s e l d i d not conduct enough investigation to formulate an a c c u r a t e l i f e p r o f i l e o f a d e f e n d a n t , we h a v e h e l d the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n beneath p r o f e s s i o n a l l y competent standards. See, e.g., B l a n c o [v. S i n g l e t a r y ] , 943 F.2d [1477] 1501-03 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 1 ) ] (counsel's performance d e f i c i e n t where h i s s o l e attempt to p r o c u r e m i t i g a t i o n w i t n e s s e s f o r p e n a l t y p h a s e was to l e a v e messages f o r t h e w i t n e s s e s and a w a i t t h e i r responses, and he thus ultimately conducted no i n t e r v i e w s ) ; H a r r i s [ v . D u g g e r ] , 874 F . 2 d [ 7 5 6 ] 763 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1989)] ( c o u n s e l d e f i c i e n t w h e r e he d i d not investigate defendant's family, scholastic, m i l i t a r y and employment b a c k g r o u n d ) ; M i d d l e t o n [v. Dugger], 849 F.2d [491] 493 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1988)] (performance deficient where 'trial counsel conducted almost no background investigation, d e s p i t e d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h M i d d l e t o n concerning the existence of such mitigating evidence' as p s y c h i a t r i c problems, b r u t a l childhood, p h y s i c a l , s e x u a l and d r u g abuse, and low I.Q.); A r m s t r o n g [v. D u g g e r ] , 833 F . 2 d [ 1 4 3 0 ] 1 4 3 3 - 3 4 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) ] (performance deficient where trial counsel's i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e was l i m i t e d t o s i n g l e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h d e f e n d a n t and h i s p a r e n t s , and a n o t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s p a r o l e officer)." 42 F.3d In court at 1367. examining this d e s c r i b e d what ineffectiveness McWhorter's 82 claim, attorneys did the circuit during the CR-09-1129 penalty phase. The court's the testimony of out above, the testimony at the that to prepare interviewed and his attorneys--Mitchell for the halfsister proceeding and Berry. evidentiary hearing penalty phase, As Melinda Rowland. Mitchell They as the "triple completed a interview." document and Berry Garrison, the postconviction During t h i s entitled set interviewed i n what McWhorter r e f e r s t o i n the on indicated McWhorter, h i s mother Rowland, h i s aunt l a t t e r three counsel the f i n d i n g s were b a s e d p r i m a r i l y "Client interview, Background Information," which i n c l u d e d McWhorter's f a m i l y h i s t o r y , h i s medical and mental-health history, h i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y , and investigator was not hired history, his his education f o r the to Mcwhorter's attorneys, be McWhorter with McWhorter's t r i a l neuropsychologist, disease, As attorneys to evaluate mental disorder, stated above, mitigation Counsel Dr. and o r any Robbins's history. penalty-phase because, according formulated substance-abuse his h i r e d Dr. could assistance. Douglas Robbins, McWhorter evidence of evaluation preparation a strategy family's An for any a mental psychopathology. provided no useful evidence. obtained some hospital 83 records. Counsel was CR-09-1129 a w a r e t h a t DHR abuse h a d o n c e i n v e s t i g a t e d an a l l e g a t i o n o f involving counsel had indicated McWhorter. Additionally, documentation he had Mitchell an and IQ of of Berry t e s t i f i e d to c l i m b out judge to pleaded jury guilty, activity. thing" and McWhorter As above, scores, of t h a t they thought which his life. the McWhorter a "deep h o l e " t o p e r s u a d e jury The had had "going two heard f o r him" " a g o o d - l o o k i n g y o u n g man" crowd deserve spare IQ out the codefendants evidence had of gang McWhorter's a t t o r n e y s d e c i d e d t h a t "about the c u t " and wrong McWhorter's set 88. would have had and as physical and the death indicated had made a was who t h a t he had terrible fallen mistake was only "clean in with but the did not penalty. above, counsel presented the testimony of Rowland, G a r r i s o n , R e i d , and Salee d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase. Counsel why each was testified accordance that as to with counsel's strategy. chosen The this s t r a t e g y was a reasonable conducted a reasonable circuit was presented the at above the principles and testify court in found investigation. Considering one to and that counsel the postconviction hearing, 84 evidence we had that consider CR-09-1129 McWhorter's s p e c i f i c trial counsel allegations presented on of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of appeal. A. McWhorter appears t o argue t h a t the have examined penalty his phase as a separate claims. to call of addressed by asserts the "clear that the the the weighed i n the than at as constitute the several t h a t "[e]ven i f the Court--was failure ineffective was whether never i t was a s s i s t a n c e of counsel to f a i l States pp. Supreme that t r i a l i n t r o d u c e - - t h a t i s , the evidence - - m u s t be rather (McWhorter's b r i e f , evidence should ineffectiveness d i d not Hearing United court correct question--which ineffective of them." that claim witness counsel, constitutionally any single of McWhorter argues a particular assistance call allegations circuit 42-43.) Court counsel aggregate." McWhorter has made i t seek to d i d not of counsel's to ineffectiveness (McWhorter's b r i e f , p. 43.) Initially, we McWhorter this effect c l a i m i n h i s postjudgment motion. p r e s e r v a t i o n apply to Rule d i d not argument i s p r o p e r l y before of Court. q u e s t i o n whether t h i s raise "The 32 p r o c e e d i n g s . " 85 his cumulative- general Boyd v. rules State, CR-09-1129 913 So. 2d 1113, 1123 (Ala. Crim. McWhorter d i d a s s e r t a c l a i m at the petition that the cumulative the he circuit d i d not court Regardless, Court, i t is McCollum, for the argue t h i s d i d not effect at the without U.S. merit. , a reviewing the evidence a g a i n s t the evidence p. 43 54).) to evidentiary hearing, and i t i n i t s order. S. Ct. a n a l y s i s of the analysis. The that counsel's cites 447, court should 'consider Porter 453-54 U.S. reliance whether on the totality to , Porter 130 is S. reweigh State deficient prong i n P o r t e r had brief, at misplaced. i n the U n i t e d second Ct. 453¬ The Supreme performance under Strickland already determined i n v e s t i g a t e m i t i g a t i n g evidence 86 of trial, (McWhorter's at counsel's the Supreme C o u r t failure v. (2009), t h a t adduced at i n aggravation." defendant, this " i n c o n s i d e r i n g the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s quoted p o r t i o n from P o r t e r occurs prejudiced entitled McWhorter , 130 Porter, McWhorter's Court's numerous adduced at the habeas proceeding-- and it (quoting his amended him the a v a i l a b l e m i t i g a t i o n evidence--both and of claims address Although even i f t h i s argument i s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e proposition that of counsel 2003). c o n c l u s i o n of h i s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel relief, App. in CR-09-1129 t h a t c a s e was cites the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e f i c i e n t . McWhorter, however, language t h a t a l l the to whether the counsel's other allegations asserting that Dep't of Williams Strickland 560 deficient. F.3d 1252, See as prejudice analysis); court's Scott (same 534, cumulative e f f e c t of prong as 538 holding v. that the v. Cir. of Alabama 2009) Strickland); Cir. F.3d 2008) Allen); 1991) 573, Rodriguez (discussing counsel's a c t i o n s " i n the the a l l d e f i c i e n c y prong 567 to claim Cir. (11th Schiriro, Williams (2d a l l of not fail one (11th 1344 the deficient. McGahee v. 1261-63 1326, evaluated cites assistance F.3d F.2d p e t i t i o n e r had not in 586 v. "the context exhausted remedies). In h i s "the was be must e v a l u a t e 542 928 recently ineffective court Allen, Hoke, state proposition was prong, 2009) his circuit deficiency Cir. the the not (9th of the McWhorter Batson, v. (addressing of counsel Corr., (addressing of performance authorities s u p p o r t h i s argument t h a t the i n support available m i t i g a t i o n evidence should determine Similarly, from P o r t e r r e p l y , McWhorter acknowledges t h a t stated that no cumulative-effect Alabama analysis 87 appellate to this court claims of has Court has applied ineffective CR-09-1129 assistance Oct. 1, of counsel." 2010] Taylor So. 3d , v. State, (Ala. A l t h o u g h McWhorter a s s e r t s t h a t t h e T a y l o r perform a cumulative-effects 13), court we conclude actually that [Ms. C R - 0 5 - 0 0 6 6 , Crim. App. 2010) . court did, i n fact, a n a l y s i s , (McWhorter's r e p l y , p. assertion i s misplaced. As t h e T a y l o r explained: "Taylor also contends that the allegations offered i n support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be considered c u m u l a t i v e l y , a n d he c i t e s W i l l i a m s v . T a y l o r , 529 U.S. 3 6 2 , 120 S. C t . 1 4 9 5 , 1 4 6 L . E d . 2 d 3 8 9 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . However, t h i s C o u r t has n o t e d : 'Other s t a t e s and f e d e r a l c o u r t s a r e n o t i n agreement as t o w h e t h e r the "cumulative effect" analysis applies to S t r i c k l a n d c l a i m s ' ; t h i s Court has a l s o s t a t e d : 'We c a n f i n d no c a s e w h e r e A l a b a m a a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h a v e applied the cumulative-effect analysis to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.' Brooks v. S t a t e , 929 S o . 2 d 4 9 1 , 514 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 5 ) , q u o t e d i n S c o t t v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 2 2 3 3 , M a r c h 2 6 , 2010] So.3d , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2010); see a l s o M c N a b b v . S t a t e , 991 S o . 2 d 3 1 3 , 332 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 7 ) ; a n d H u n t v . S t a t e , 940 S o . 2 d 1041, 1071 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) . More t o t h e point, however, i s the fact that even when a cumulative-effect analysis i s considered, only c l a i m s t h a t a r e p r o p e r l y p l e a d e d and not otherwise due t o b e s u m m a r i l y d i s m i s s e d a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n t h a t analysis. A cumulative-effect a n a l y s i s does n o t eliminate the pleading requirements established i n R u l e 3 2 , A l a . R. C r i m . P. A n a n a l y s i s o f c l a i m s o f ineffective assistance of counsel, including a cumulative-effect a n a l y s i s , i s performed only on properly pleaded claims that are not summarily d i s m i s s e d f o r p l e a d i n g d e f i c i e n c i e s o r on p r o c e d u r a l grounds. Therefore, even i f a cumulative-effect 88 CR-09-1129 a n a l y s i s were r e q u i r e d by Alabama law, t h a t f a c t o r would not e l i m i n a t e Taylor's obligation to plead each c l a i m of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e d i r e c t i v e s o f R u l e 32. "Taylor i s not e n t i t l e d claim of error raised." Taylor, In fails of So. this 3d a t case, that argument collectively. cited for Therefore, McWhorter either i s flawed i n that he allegations f o u n d n o t t o be d e f i c i e n t be d e f i c i e n t when considered an a g g r e g a t e w e i g h i n g i s n o t See T a y l o r , therein. review, nevertheless Further, by Alabama law. on a s e r i e s of i n d i v i d u a l d e f i c i e n t performance--although i n themselves--could relief . McWhorter's to demonstrate to So. 3d a t , and t h e cases even i f p r o p e r l y before i s not e n t i t l e d required t o any this relief Court on this claim. B. McWhorter also consider" or witnesses: Abraham and four argues address Dr. R o b b i n s . in that the c i r c u i t i t s order Barnes, McWhorter witnesses in his brief Initially, we Dr. Ralph the court "failed testimony of Tarter, Kenneth summarizes the testimony to this four Burns, of these Court. note t h a t McWhorter d i d not p l e a d 89 to anything CR-09-1129 in regard though to these these witnesses proceeding. sufficient witnesses i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n , testified Additionally, authority McWhorter provided argument unique McWhorter's and life, postconviction fails to provide court's judgment to consider" the c i t e d S e e R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. A p p . conclusory the to reverse the c i r c u i t on t h e b a s i s t h a t i t " f a i l e d a at that P. "each of significant character, and c i r c u i t court's " f a i l u r e t o address evidence. A l t h o u g h McWhorter 13 these four testimony mental even witnesses concerning health" t h i s evidence makes and ... the violates t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t t h e ' t o t a l i t y o f t h e e v i d e n c e ' be considered," conclusory he does fashion, the nothing else testimony of but simply the witnesses c l a i m s t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r and page from the r e c o r d . one case (McWhorter's b r i e f , f o r a l l four witnesses' was e r r o r f o r t r i a l McWhorter's suicide pp. 44, testimony, that He alleging He m a k e s a c o n c l u s o r y in he citations 47.) counsel not t o present testimony attempt. state, cites that i t regarding argument R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. A p p . P., r e q u i r e s t h a t a r g u m e n t s i n an a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f c o n t a i n " c i t a t i o n s t o t h e c a s e s , s t a t u t e s , o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s , and p a r t s o f t h e r e c o r d r e l i e d on." 1 3 90 CR-09-1129 why h e b e l i e v e s t h e s e w i t n e s s e s ' t e s t i m o n y was r e l e v a n t . Court recently addressed a s i m i l a r issue i n Taylor, This So. 3d "We a r e a w a r e t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n o f R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) t o f i n d a w a i v e r o f a r g u m e n t s i n an a p p e l l a t e b r i e f has been limited to those cases i n which the appellant presents general assertions and propositions of law w i t h f e w o r no c i t a t i o n s t o r e l e v a n t l e g a l a u t h o r i t y , r e s u l t i n g i n an a r g u m e n t consisting of undelineated general propositions unsupported by sufficient legal authority or argument. Although Rule 28(a)(10) i s to be c a u t i o u s l y a p p l i e d , i t has been a p p l i e d r e c e n t l y by t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t a n d b y t h i s C o u r t when appropriate. E . g . , E x p a r t e T h e o d o r o u , 53 S o . 3 d 151 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) ; J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y Comm'n v . E d w a r d s , 32 S o . 3 d 572 ( A l a . 2 0 0 9 ) ; S l a c k v . S t r e a m , 988 S o . 2 d 5 1 6 ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) ; J a m e s v . S t a t e , 61 S o . 3 d 357 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (opinion on remand from Alabama Supreme Court); Scott v. State, [Ms. CR-06-2233, M a r c h 26, 2010] So. 3d (Ala. C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ; B a k e r v. S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 1 7 2 3 , Dec. 18, 2009] So. 3d ( A l a . Crim. App. 2 0 0 9 ) ; L e e v . S t a t e , 44 S o . 3 d 1 1 4 5 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 9 ) ; B u s h v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 3 - 1 9 0 2 , May 2 9 , 2 0 0 9 ] So. 3d ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009); and F r a n k l i n v . S t a t e , 23 S o . 3 d 694 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) . "In Scott v. S t a t e , this Court stated: "'"Recitation of allegations without c i t a t i o n t o any l e g a l a u t h o r i t y and w i t h o u t adequate r e c i t a t i o n of the f a c t s relied upon has b e e n deemed a w a i v e r of the arguments l i s t e d . " Hamm v . S t a t e , 913 S o . 2d 460, 486 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) . "An appellate court w i l l consider only those i s s u e s p r o p e r l y d e l i n e a t e d as s u c h and w i l l not s e a r c h out e r r o r s which have not been 91 CR-09-1129 properly preserved or assigned. This s t a n d a r d has been s p e c i f i c a l l y a p p l i e d t o briefs containing general propositions devoid o f d e l i n e a t i o n and support from a u t h o r i t y o r argument." Ex p a r t e R i l e y , 464 S o . 2 d 9 2 , 94 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ( c i t a t i o n s omitted). "When a n a p p e l l a n t f a i l s t o c i t e any authority f o r an argument on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e , t h i s C o u r t may a f f i r m t h e judgment as t o t h a t issue, f o r i t i s n e i t h e r t h i s Court's duty nor i t s f u n c t i o n t o p e r f o r m an a p p e l l a n t ' s l e g a l r e s e a r c h . " C i t y o f Birmingham v. Business R e a l t y I n v . C o . , 722 S o . 2 d 7 4 7 , 752 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) . ' " S c o t t v. S t a t e , So. 3d a t . S e e a l s o Hamm v . S t a t e , 913 S o . 2 d 4 6 0 , 4 8 6 n . l l ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2002) ('Applying the federal counterpart to Alabama's Rule 2 8 , A l a . R. A p p . P., t h e U n i t e d States Court of Appeals f o r the Eighth Circuit s t a t e d , "[W]e r e g u l a r l y d e c l i n e t o c o n s i d e r c u r s o r y or summary arguments that are unsupported by citations to legal authorities. See U n i t e d S t a t e s v. W a d l i n g t o n , 233 F . 3 d 1067, 1081 ( 8 t h C i r . 2 0 0 0 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Gonzales, 90 F . 3 d 1 3 6 3 , 1 3 6 9 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 9 6 ) ; s e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . D u n k e l , 927 F . 2 d 9 5 5 , 956 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 9 1 ) ( ' J u d g e s a r e n o t l i k e pigs, hunting f o r truffles buried i n briefs.')." U.S. v . S t u c k e y , 255 F . 3 d 528, 531 (8th C i r . 2001).'). "As t h e S t a t e c o r r e c t l y a r g u e s i n i t s b r i e f o n a p p e a l , many ' a r g u m e n t s ' i n T a y l o r ' s b r i e f c o n s i s t o f l i t t l e more t h a n a c u r s o r y summary o f t h e c l a i m s f r o m t h e p e t i t i o n . ... II "Clearly, Taylor's cursory summary of the allegations of the petition--with a c i t a t i o n only to t h e p a r a g r a p h s o f t h e p e t i t i o n i n many a r g u m e n t s o f the b r i e f , and i n other p o r t i o n s o f t h e b r i e f only 92 CR-09-1129 to paragraphs of the p e t i t i o n and undelineated general principles of law--does not comport w i t h Rule 28(a)(10). F o r many o f t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d i n the b r i e f , Taylor presents no d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e facts or the law i n the form o f an argument demonstrating why t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l o f t h e s p e c i f i c c l a i m s was i n e r r o r . A c c o r d i n g l y , we hold that Taylor has waived f o r purposes of a p p e l l a t e review i n t h i s Court those arguments i n his brief ... that fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10)." So. 3d a t Here, of . t o o , we conclude the witnesses' general legal with the of sufficient McWhorter testimony no s p e c i f i c an to argument comply only a court evidence i n i t s order. Moreover, does even as t o why Rule single have to t o comply w i t h claims to this address i n Rule brief Rule i s not Furthermore, Court p. that the "scrap" of 44) i n this 28(a)(10), to or law i n error every (McWhorter's b r i e f , i f McWhorter's the requirements he summary citation 28(a)(10). i n his brief not cursory discussion of the facts with acknowledges circuit satisfy and a u t h o r i t y i s not s u f f i c i e n t 28(a)(10) form t h a t McWhorter's regard d i d h i s argument i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e defense t h e o r y o f t h e case o r would have been otherwise defense cumulative. counsel's strategy The circuit court i n m i t i g a t i o n was 93 found reasonable that and CR-09-1129 that additional hearing trial evidence would have counsel presented to cumulative at been support counsel's with trial regard the c i r c u i t to court found the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n to evidence o r w o u l d have Specifically, strategy been presented presented inconsistent reasonable McWhorter's as with by evidence strategy. trial counsel's follows: "Experienced trial counsel collected the comprehensive background i n f o r m a t i o n r e f l e c t e d i n [ ' C l i e n t B a c k g r o u n d I n f o r m a t i o n ' ] , Dr. Robbins's e v a l u a t i o n , and o t h e r documents, and f o r m u l a t e d a reasonable s t r a t e g y t h a t they b e l i e v e d c o u l d save M c W h o r t e r ' s l i f e : M c W h o r t e r was a g o o d b o y , who f e l l i n w i t h t h e w r o n g c r o w d , a n d he made a t e r r i b l e mistake b u t does not deserve the death penalty. (E.H. 1 8 6 , 5 7 1 . ) The t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t r e f l e c t s t h a t strategy i n the testimony t r i a l counsel presented d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y and s e n t e n c i n g phases." (C. 1163-64.) The c i r c u i t The testimony cumulative case. with Tarter's of these four witnesses would or i n c o n s i s t e n t with the defense's Barnes's the c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s are supported by the r e c o r d . "good testimony wrong (about crowd" strategy. McWhorter's fails to explain in 94 his substance brief inconsistent Likewise, have a l s o been i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t s t r a t e g y . McWhorter been s t r a t e g y of the t e s t i m o n y would have been w h o l l y boy, have how abuse) Dr. would Additionally, or why Dr. CR-09-1129 R o b b i n s ' s t e s t i m o n y would have been h e l p f u l . testimony might cumulative to been helpful, i n many r e s p e c t s . demonstrate specifically order have error address denying these relief assistance-of-counsel i t too would Therefore, because the four based claim. Burns's have McWhorter has circuit witnesses on Although court been failed d i d not i n i t s detailed McWhorter's ineffective- 1 4 C. McWhorter next for argues t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l was f a i l i n g t o i n v e s t i g a t e and t o p r e s e n t evidence ineffective certain mitigation a t the p e n a l t y phase o f h i s c a p i t a l - m u r d e r t r i a l . contends that earlier, should counsel have should spent more have started time He investigating investigating, should h a v e i n t e r v i e w e d more w i t n e s s e s , a n d s h o u l d h a v e o b t a i n e d more records, such as school records, social-services records, j u v e n i l e - o f f e n d e r records, and a d d i t i o n a l medical records. also argues mitigating that evidence trial counsel's failed investigation t o comply with into the American He the Bar We n o t e t h a t t o t h e e x t e n t t h e e v i d e n c e w o u l d h a v e b e e n cumulative or i n c o n s i s t e n t with the m i t i g a t i o n strategy, the circuit court's order addresses the evidence, albeit indirectly. 14 95 CR-09-1129 Association ("ABA") G u i d e l i n e s f o r c o n d u c t i n g investigation into death-penalty we point attorneys' investigation adhered the to counsel's ABA decided Miller, So. 3d t h a t whether into potential G u i d e l i n e s i s not investigation previously out mitigating appropriate cases. Initially, potential an this at was McWhorter's mitigating dispositive reasonable. issue evidence adversely This to of evidence whether McWhorter "'We h a v e h e l d t h a t t h e ABA G u i d e l i n e s may "provide guidance as to what is reasonable in terms of counsel's representation, [but] they are not d e t e r m i n a t i v e . " J o n e s v . S t a t e , 43 So. 3d 1 2 5 8 , 1278 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2007). "'The danger of adopting the ABA G u i d e l i n e s a s d e t e r m i n a t i v e on t h e i s s u e o f a l a w y e r ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s was d i s c u s s e d b y the U n i t e d S t a t e s Court of Appeals f o r the Fourth C i r c u i t : 96 trial Court . "'"[T]o hold defense counsel responsible for performing every t a s k t h a t t h e ABA G u i d e l i n e s s a y he 'should' do is to impose precisely the 'set of detailed r u l e s f o r counsel's conduct' that t h e Supreme C o u r t has l o n g s i n c e rejected as being unable to ' s a t i s f a c t o r i l y take account of the variety of circumstances f a c e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l or t h e in has in CR-09-1129 range of legitimate decisions r e g a r d i n g how b e s t t o r e p r e s e n t a c r i m i n a l defendant.' Strickland, 466 U.S. a t 6 8 8 - 8 9 , 104 S. C t . 2 0 5 2 , 80 L . E d . 2 d 6 7 4 . S u c h a c a t e g o r i c a l h o l d i n g would l e a d to n e e d l e s s and e x p e n s i v e l a y e r s o f process with the unintended e f f e c t of compromising process. ... Recognition of the ABA Guidelines as the minimum prevailing community standard would transform defense lawyers' judgments i n t o mindless defensive r e a c t i o n s t o a p o t e n t i a l habeas claim, divorced from the individualized needs of professional representation. T h o s e n e e d s c a l l f o r more n u a n c e d r e s p o n s e s t h a n c a n be p r o v i d e d b y f o l l o w i n g p r e e s t a b l i s h e d m e c h a n i c a l r u l e s of representation "'"While t h e ABA G u i d e l i n e s provide noble standards f o r l e g a l representation i n capital cases and a r e i n t e n d e d t o i m p r o v e t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , they nevertheless can o n l y be c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t o f the o v e r a l l c a l c u l u s of whether counsel's representation falls b e l o w an o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d o f reasonableness; they s t i l l serve o n l y a s ' g u i d e s , ' S t r i c k l a n d , 466 U.S. a t 6 8 8 , 104 S. C t . 2 0 5 2 , n o t minimum c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standards." " ' Y a r b r o u g h v . J o h n s o n , 520 F. 3 d 3 2 9 , 339 (4th C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) . See a l s o T o r r e s v . S t a t e , 120 P. 3 d 1 1 8 4 , 118 9 ( O k l a . C r i m . App. 97 CR-09-1129 2005) ("W]e w i l l not f i n d that capital counsel was p e r s e i n e f f e c t i v e simply because counsel's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n d i f f e r e d from c u r r e n t c a p i t a l p r a c t i c e customs, even where t h e d i f f e r e n c e s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t . A defendant must still show t h a t he was p r e j u d i c e d by c o u n s e l ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . " ) . We a g r e e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f Appeals f o r the Fourth C i r c u i t . "'Also, the United States Supreme Court i n Wiggins [ v . S m i t h , 5 3 9 U.S. 510 (2003),] s t a t e d : " ' " [ C ] o u n s e l h a s a d u t y t o make reasonable investigations or to make a r e a s o n a b l e d e c i s i o n t h a t makes p a r t i c u l a r investigations unnecessary [A] particular d e c i s i o n n o t t o i n v e s t i g a t e must be directly assessed for reasonableness in a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a p p l y i n g a heavy measure o f d e f e r e n c e t o c o u n s e l ' s judgments. "'"... [O]ur principal concern in deciding whether [counsel] exercised 'reasonable professional judgmen[t]' i s not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case. R a t h e r , we f o c u s o n w h e t h e r t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n supporting counsel's decision not to i n t r o d u c e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e ... was itself reasonable. In a s s e s s i n g c o u n s e l ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , we m u s t c o n d u c t a n objective review of their performance, measured for 'reasonableness under p r e v a i l i n g 98 CR-09-1129 professional norms,' which includes a context-dependent c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the c h a l l e n g e d conduct as s e e n 'from counsel's p e r s p e c t i v e at the time.'" "'539 "Ray, So. The 3d U.S. So. at circuit at 3d 521-23.' at ." . court found as follows ineffective-assistance-of-counsel r e g a r d i n g McWhorter's claim: "As an initial matter, McWhorter's' trial counsel both t e s t i f i e d at l e n g t h to t h e i r s t r a t e g y for t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . The Court s e t s out that s t r a t e g y b e l o w a n d f i n d s i t t o be r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r Strickland. A l l of the remaining independent c l a i m s c o n t a i n e d i n C l a i m X I I o f M c W h o r t e r ' s amended R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n a r e m e r i t l e s s b e c a u s e t h e y c o n t e n d t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l s h o u l d have i n v e s t i g a t e d and p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e t h a t e i t h e r would have been c u m u l a t i v e t o e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d or would have been i n c o n s i s t e n t with evidence presented to support t r i a l counsel's reasonable strategy. In his amended Rule 32 p e t i t i o n , McWhorter f a i l e d to mention, much less c h a l l e n g e , the t r i a l strategy that t r i a l counsel a c t u a l l y used. "The t e s t i m o n y of McWhorter's t r i a l counsel, Thomas M i t c h e l l a n d J a m e s B e r r y , a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y hearing indicates that they rendered effective assistance of counsel during the penalty and s e n t e n c i n g phases of h i s t r i a l . M i t c h e l l and B e r r y both testified that, to prepare McWhorter's mitigation case, they i n t e r v i e w e d McWhorter, h i s mother, C a r o l y n Rowland, h i s aunt, E l s i e G a r r i s o n , and h i s h a l f s i s t e r , M e l i n d a R o w l a n d . (E.H. 139, 1 4 3 , 1 5 4 , 1 7 6 , 1 9 0 - 9 1 , 5 5 3 , 557.) M c W h o r t e r a n d h i s 99 CR-09-1129 family were fully cooperative and a c c o r d i n g to both counsel's testimony. 193, 557.) supportive, (E.H. 191, "During a p r e - t r i a l i n t e r v i e w w i t h McWhorter's f a m i l y , Mr. M i t c h e l l c o m p l e t e d a document titled 'Client Background Information' based on the i n f o r m a t i o n he l e a r n e d f r o m t h a t i n t e r v i e w . (E.H. 145.) The d o c u m e n t was admitted into evidence at t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g as M c W h o r t e r ' s E x h i b i t 7. (E.H. 146.) Exhibit 7 contains questions and answers c o v e r i n g myriad topics, like McWhorter's early childhood development, his environmental f a c t o r s ; such as, l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s , m e d i c a l i s s u e s as a youth, and relationship information; his i n s t i t u t i o n a l d a t a ; such as, e d u c a t i o n h i s t o r y , h i s medical and m e n t a l h e a l t h h i s t o r y , h i s substance abuse h i s t o r y , h i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y , and h i s f a m i l y history. Mr. Mitchell decided not to h i r e an investigator for the penalty-phase preparation b e c a u s e he r e a s o n a b l y c o u l d f o r m u l a t e a s t r a t e g y f o r t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e w i t h o u t an i n v e s t i g a t o r a n d w i t h M c W h o r t e r and h i s f a m i l y ' s a s s i s t a n c e . (E.H. 193.) "In a d d i t i o n to the i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d by M c W h o r t e r and his family, t r i a l counsel hired a neuropsychologist to evaluate McWhorter for any 'mental disease,' 'mental disorder,' or 'any evidence of psychopathology' t o use i n McWhorter's defense. (E.H. 1 5 5 , 171.) T r i a l c o u n s e l h i r e d Dr. Douglas Robbins. Mitchell testified that he specifically was i n t e r e s t e d i n l e a r n i n g from Dr. Robbins whether McWhorter exhibited 'diminished capacity' and 'susceptibility to i n f l u e n c e ' from others. (E.H. 171.) And, i f McWhorter had b r a i n damage, t r i a l c o u n s e l w a n t e d t o use t h a t f a c t i n h i s defense. (E.H. 160.) However, Dr. Robbins's e v a l u a t i o n p r o v i d e d no u s e f u l m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e . (E.H. 1 7 5 , 305.) " T r i a l counsel also considered various records. They o b t a i n e d M c W h o r t e r ' s h o s p i t a l r e c o r d s from h i s 100 CR-09-1129 attempted s u i c i d e . (E.H. 557.) M i t c h e l l testified that he was aware that Garrison once reported Carolyn Rowland t o DHR because Garrison found b r u i s e s on M c W h o r t e r f r o m a ' w h i p p i n g ' that Carolyn R o w l a n d g a v e h i m . ( E . H . 1 5 8 ; M c W h o r t e r ' s E x h i b i t 7, p a g e 5.) T r i a l counsel a l s o had documentation of M c W h o r t e r ' s I Q s c o r e s , w h i c h i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h a s an I Q o f 88. (E.H. 140, 181.) "As Berry explained during the evidentiary h e a r i n g , McWhorter w o u l d have had t o c l i m b from a 'deep h o l e ' t o p e r s u a d e t h e j u d g e a n d j u r y t o s p a r e his l i f e . (E.H. 571-72.) Two c o d e f e n d a n t s a l r e a d y h a d p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o c h a r g e s s t e m m i n g f r o m t h e same crime. (Ibid.) The j u r y h a d h e a r d e v i d e n c e o f g a n g activity. (E.H. 573.) T r i a l c o u n s e l b e l i e v e d t h a t McWhorter had v e r y l i t t l e i n h i s f a v o r going into the p e n a l t y phase. ' A b o u t t h e o n l y t h i n g we h a d going f o r Casey was a young man. He was a g o o d - l o o k i n g y o u n g man. A n d h i s y o u t h was b a s i c a l l y t h e o n l y t h i n g we h a d g o i n g f o r u s , ' s a i d B e r r y . (E.H. 576.) M i t c h e l l ' s testimony reflected a similar opinion. Mitchell thought the main circumstances McWhorter had i n h i s f a v o r were h i s y o u t h , t h a t he was ' c l e a n c u t , ' a n d t h a t 'he l o o k e d like O p i e grown up a l i t t l e b i t from t h e Andy Griffith Show.' Mitchell a l s o remembered first m e e t i n g M c W h o r t e r a n d how he t h o u g h t t h a t M c W h o r t e r must have been ' c r a z y ' t o commit t h e c r i m e with w h i c h he was c h a r g e d . (E.H. 185-86.) Mitchell hoped t h a t t h a t t h e j u r y would t h i n k t h a t , t o o , t h o u g h he k n e w t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a mitigation case based on McWhorter's mental d i s o r d e r s b e c a u s e McWhorter had none. (Ibid.) "Both counsel previously had represented d e f e n d a n t s a t c a p i t a l murder t r i a l s . (E.H. 170, 544.) Mitchell, who s e r v e d as M c W h o r t e r ' s lead c o u n s e l , had e x t e n s i v e r e l e v a n t experience over h i s 11-year legal career. (E.H. 169.) Mitchell t e s t i f i e d t h a t he h a d r e p r e s e n t e d d e f e n d a n t s d u r i n g approximately 25 f e l o n y j u r y t r i a l s , 8 t o 10 o f 101 CR-09-1129 w h i c h were murder trials, prior to representing McWhorter. (E.H. 169-70.) The overwhelming m a j o r i t y of Berry's p r a c t i c e around the time of M c W h o r t e r ' s t r i a l was c r i m i n a l w o r k , a n d M i t c h e l l testified that about h a l f of h i s p r a c t i c e was c r i m i n a l a r o u n d 1994. (E.H. 169, 566.) "Experienced trial counsel collected the comprehensive background information r e f l e c t e d i n M c W h o r t e r ' s E x h i b i t 7, D r . R o b b i n s ' s e v a l u a t i o n , a n d other documents, and formulated a reasonable s t r a t e g y t h a t they b e l i e v e d c o u l d save McWhorter's l i f e : M c W h o r t e r was a g o o d b o y , who f e l l i n w i t h t h e w r o n g c r o w d , a n d he made a t e r r i b l e m i s t a k e b u t d o e s not deserve the death penalty. (E.H. 186, 571.) The t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t r e f l e c t s t h a t s t r a t e g y i n t h e testimony t r i a l counsel presented during the penalty and s e n t e n c i n g p h a s e s . " A f t e r c o n d u c t i n g a r e a s o n a b l e i n v e s t i g a t i o n and forming a reasonable t r i a l strategy, t r i a l counsel decided to present the testimony of four witnesses d u r i n g the p e n a l t y p h a s e : C a r o l y n Rowland, Elsie Garrison, Van Reid, and Vonnie Salee. Carolyn Rowland, McWhorter's mother, and G a r r i s o n , h i s aunt, were s e l e c t e d b e c a u s e t h e y knew M c W h o r t e r w e l l and because t h e i r pain f e l t over McWhorter's capital m u r d e r t r i a l was ' o b v i o u s , ' a n d t r i a l c o u n s e l h o p e d to evoke sympathy from the j u r y . (E.H. 190.) Garrison testified d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase that M c W h o r t e r o n c e was w r o n g l y a c c u s e d o f u s i n g d r u g s , so s h e h a d h i m d r u g t e s t e d . The t e s t c o n f i r m e d t h a t there were no d r u g s i n M c W h o r t e r ' s system. (R. 1782.) She also testified that McWhorter was ' c o m p a s s i o n a t e , ' b u t t h a t he g o t c a u g h t up w i t h t h e wrong crowd, i n c l u d i n g D a n i e l M i n e r , a c o d e f e n d a n t in t h i s case. (R. 1 7 8 4 - 8 5 . ) C a r o l y n Rowland a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t M c W h o r t e r h a d b e e n a 'good k i d ' until he s t a r t e d spending time w i t h D a n i e l Miner, Lee Williams, and Marcus Carter, a l l o f whom were codefendants i n t h i s case. (R. 1 7 9 2 - 9 3 . ) 102 CR-09-1129 "Garrison recommended Van R e i d . (E.H. 189.) R e i d knew M c W h o r t e r a r o u n d t h e t i m e o f t h e m u r d e r because McWhorter w o r k e d as a b u s b o y a t Reid's r e s t a u r a n t , a n d R e i d knew M c W h o r t e r t o be a y o u n g man who d i d h i s j o b w e l l . ( E . H . 1 9 0 ; R. 1176-77.) V o n n i e S a l e e was p i c k e d t o t e s t i f y p a r t l y b e c a u s e s h e was ' v e r y l i k a b l e . ' (E.H. 188.) Salee, like R e i d , a l s o knew M c W h o r t e r t o be a g o o d w o r k e r . (R. 1772. ) McWhorter bagged g r o c e r i e s at the grocery s t o r e w h e r e S a l e e was a cashier. (Ibid.) She recalled that McWhorter once had rubbed the shoulders o f a n o l d e r l a d y c a s h i e r who complained that her shoulders and b a c k were h u r t i n g . (R. 1773. ) "Trial counsel's 'good boy, wrong crowd' s t r a t e g y a l s o was a p p l i e d t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g phase before Judge G u l l a h o r n . Trial counsel presented additional testimony from Garrison and Carolyn Rowland, along w i t h J a n i c e M i l l e r , McWhorter's aunt by marriage. The trial transcript and the evidentiary hearing t r a n s c r i p t show that trial counsel presented meaningful testimony during the p e n a l t y and s e n t e n c i n g p h a s e s t h a t was consistent with their strategy, and they refrained from presenting additional evidence that would have d e t r a c t e d from t h e i r s t r a t e g y . " (C. 1159-65.) Specifically, as to the "triple interview, " and timeliness of the m i t i g a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the primary on w h i c h M c W h o r t e r 945 relies (9th C i r . 2008), Crim. App. 2010). from t h i s case. are C o r r e l l and S t a t e Those v. Ryan, v. Gamble, cases are Although the " t r i p l e 103 539 F.3d the cases 938, 63 S o . 3 d 707 ( A l a . clearly distinguishable interview" i n Correll i s CR-09-1129 somewhat Correll put similar to during a single witness, evidence. counsel evidence. trial witnesses penalty called of in the counsel to the spent evidence a total case, counsel call case, indicating of five regarding his trial in Correll. counsel Likewise, the minutes mitigation introduced above and d i d s u b s t a n t i a l l y As mentioned capital-murder above, in more than Gamble, to t e s t i f y trial and as d i s c u s s e d w i t h McWhorter the records and h i s m e d i c a l relief on t h e s e records of McWhorter's during no that documenting their failed family 104 to trial McWhorter's history, meet family the c i r c u i t f o r s e v e r a l reasons. McWhorter's McWhorter to phase and h i s f a m i l y . and s c h o o l r e c o r d s , claims attorneys the penalty adhered r e l a t e d t o h i s f a t h e r , and s o c i a l - s e r v i c e s found this were c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y i n Gamble's b e h a l f d u r i n g t h e Regarding denied was defendant i n C o r r e l l several witnesses strategy there Correll described phase. his history in a n d he w a i v e d t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f m i t i g a t i n g I n McWhorter's evidence did interview" the p e n a l t y phase--he d i d not Additionally, interviewing the "triple i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e because i n t h a t case t r i a l o n no e v i d e n c e trial the First, the records, the court as records the court specificity CR-09-1129 requirements failed of Rule 32.6(b), Ala. t o i d e n t i f y what r e c o r d s R. counsel Crim. P., should because have Regarding h i s p a r e n t s ' d i v o r c e records, the c i r c u i t concluded records that would also denied his McWhorter have proved." "only (C. in regard to about on his court claim the that penalty-phase he and court was claims, "xiii. family and the history, information records. The circuit claim, found, McWhorter by his Specifically, postconviction court had failed trial the when d e n y i n g relief stated: The Claim That T r i a l Counsel Should Have Obtained Records Documenting McWhorter's Family H i s t o r y claim i s denied 105 because i t fails to to counsel's "McWhorter's c l a i m t h a t h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l were ineffective for failing to obtain records documenting his family history i s contained in p a r a g r a p h 193 o f h i s a m e n d e d R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . "This was the r e c o r d s - r e l a t e d - t o - h i s - f a t h e r prejudiced performance. t o meet performance r e l i e f on t h e e d u c a t i o n a l - r e c o r d s claim, because, his father, i n h i s e d u c a t i o n a l and m e d i c a l medical-records these information information court also denied establish those circuit The counsel's also what r e l i e f because, i t found, McWhorter f a i l e d specifically, contained obtained. court vaguely 1181.) burden of proving t h a t h i s t r i a l deficient on pleaded he meet CR-09-1129 Rule 32.6(b)'s 'clear and s p e c i f i c ' pleading requirement. McWhorter f i r s t does n o t i d e n t i f y what r e c o r d s t r i a l c o u n s e l a l l e g e d l y was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g t o obtain other than 'divorce records.' As for the divorce records, McWhorter pleads only vaguely what those records would have proved, s t a t i n g those r e c o r d s would have ' c o r r o b o r a t e d t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f C a s e y ' s p a r e n t s ' u n i o n a n d Tommy McWhorter's subsequent two marriages.' But M c W h o r t e r d o e s n o t p l e a d how h e w a s p r e j u d i c e d w h e n it i s c l e a r from t h e p l e a d i n g i t s e l f that these records only would have 'corroborated' some unidentified witness's testimony. As such, this claim i s denied because i t i s insufficiently pleaded. "In the alternative, this claim i s denied because McWhorter failed t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f proof. Concerning divorce records, t r i a l counsel conducted an interview o f McWhorter's mother, C a r o l y n Rowland, where t h e y l e a r n e d o f McWhorter's parents' divorce. T h e r e was no n e e d f o r t r i a l counsel to obtain documentation v e r i f y i n g the d i v o r c e when C a r o l y n R o w l a n d , f o r e x a m p l e , c o u l d a n d did testify to facts related to the divorce. Carolyn Rowland told trial counsel during that p r e - t r i a l I n t e r v i e w w i t h McWhorter's f a m i l y t h a t h e r divorce with Tommy M c W h o r t e r was n o t ' b i t t e r . ' (E.H. 181-82.) She t e s t i f i e d t o t h a t f a c t d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase, t o o . (R. 1 7 8 9 . ) Because records were n o t n e c e s s a r y to establish facts relevant to McWhorter's p a r e n t s ' d i v o r c e , t r i a l c o u n s e l were n o t i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g t o o b t a i n them. As such, t h i s claim i s denied. "xiv. The C l a i m T h a t T r i a l C o u n s e l Should Have O b t a i n e d E d u c a t i o n a l R e c o r d s "McWhorter's c l a i m t h a t h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l were ineffective for failing to obtain educational r e c o r d s i s c o n t a i n e d i n p a r a g r a p h s 194 t h r o u g h 1 9 5 o f h i s a m e n d e d R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . 106 CR-09-1129 "This c l a i m i s d e n i e d because McWhorter f a i l e d to meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r o o f . McWhorter a s s e r t s i n his p e t i t i o n t h a t e d u c a t i o n a l r e c o r d s would have shown s c h o o l t r a n s f e r s and h i s ' d e c l i n i n g a c a d e m i c performance.' As discussed at length above, McWhorter's f a m i l y , i n c l u d i n g h i s mother and aunt, fully cooperated with t r i a l counsel's mitigation investigation. T r i a l counsel d i d not need to o b t a i n educational records in order to show that M c W h o r t e r ' s g r a d e s w e r e p o o r a t t i m e s o r t h a t he transferred schools. In fact, Elsie Garrison t e s t i f i e d to McWhorter's h i g h s c h o o l t r a n s f e r s . (R. 1786-87.) McWhorter does n o t a l l e g e what a d d i t i o n a l information educational records would have uncovered. T r i a l counsel's performance, t h e r e f o r e , was not d e f i c i e n t , and McWhorter d i d not suffer prejudice. As s u c h , t h i s c l a i m i s d e n i e d . "xv. The Claim That T r i a l Have O b t a i n e d M e d i c a l Counsel Records Should "McWhorter's c l a i m t h a t h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e for f a i l i n g to obtain medical records i s contained i n paragraphs 196 through 198 of his a m e n d e d R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . "This c l a i m i s d e n i e d because McWhorter f a i l e d to meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r o o f . McWhorter a s s e r t s i n his petition that medical records would have e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t ' b e f o r e age t h r e e , C a s e y h a d an unusually high number of a c c i d e n t s and medical p r o b l e m s , ' t h a t he was i n v o l v e d i n a l i f e [ s i c ] . "McWhorter's c l a i m t h a t h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g t o o b t a i n DHR records i s contained i n paragraphs 199 through 202 of his a m e n d e d R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n . " T h i s c l a i m i s d e n i e d b e c a u s e i t f a i l s t o meet Rule 32.6(b)'s 'clear and specific' pleading requirement. McWhorter first does not plead 107 CR-09-1129 s p e c i f i c a l l y w h a t t h e DHR r e c o r d s w o u l d c o n t a i n . Instead, the petition states, 'Most l i k e l y , from what c o u n s e l have l e a r n e d , t h e document r e l a t e s t o an allegation that Petitioner was a n a b u s e d o r neglected child.' ( P e t . a t p a r a . 200.) Because McWhorter does not plead w h a t w a s i n t h e DHR records, t h i s claim i s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y pleaded. "In the alternative, this claim i s denied because McWhorter failed t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f proof. Though McWhorter a s s e r t s , i n conclusory f a s h i o n , t h a t t h e DHR r e c o r d s c o n t a i n t h a t h e w a s a n 'abused o r n e g l e c t e d c h i l d , ' t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d at the e v i d e n t i a r y hearing d i d not support that allegation. P l u s , t r i a l counsel d i d n o t need t o o b t a i n t h e r e c o r d s f r o m DHR b e c a u s e G a r r i s o n , who c o o p e r a t e d f u l l y w i t h t r i a l c o u n s e l , f i l e d t h e DHR r e p o r t on C a r o l y n R o w l a n d f o r l e a v i n g b r u i s e s on McWhorter a f t e r 'whipping' him. (McWhorter's E x h i b i t 7, p a g e 5.) G a r r i s o n ' s c o m p l a i n t was t h e o n l y document i n t h e DHR records presented at the evidentiary hearing. ( M c W h o r t e r ' s E x h i b i t 1 1 . ) No further a c t i o n was t a k e n b y DHR. (McWhorter's E x h i b i t 7, p a g e 5 ; E.H. 1 5 8 . ) DHR r e c o r d s w o u l d n o t have changed t r i a l c o u n s e l ' s r e a s o n a b l e m i t i g a t i o n strategy. T r i a l counsel's performance, therefore, was not deficient, and McWhorter d i d n o t s u f f e r prejudice. As such, t h i s c l a i m i s denied. "xvii. The C l a i m T h a t T r i a l C o u n s e l Should H a v e O b t a i n e d R e c o r d s R e l a t e d To Tommy McWhorter "McWhorter's c l a i m t h a t h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e for f a i l i n g t o obtain records related t o his father, Tommy McWhorter, i s contained i n paragraphs 2 0 3 t h r o u g h 2 0 4 o f h i s a m e n d e d R u l e 32 petition. " T h i s c l a i m i s d e n i e d b e c a u s e i t f a i l s t o meet Rule 32.6(b)'s 'clear and s p e c i f i c ' pleading requirement. McWhorter does n o t p l e a d s p e c i f i c a l l y 108 CR-09-1129 what agency's r e c o r d s trial counsel should have obtained. Therefore, this claim i s insufficiently pleaded. "In the alternative, this claim i s denied because McWhorter failed t o meet h i s b u r d e n o f proof. T r i a l counsel d i d n o t need records t o l e a r n o f Tommy M c W h o r t e r ' s p a s t . T r i a l counsel discussed with McWhorter's family facts r e l a t e d t o Tommy McWhorter. But, according t o McWhorter's f a m i l y , McWhorter and h i s father ' d i d n o t have much contact.' (E.H. 181.) C a r o l y n R o w l a n d a l s o t o l d t r i a l c o u n s e l t h a t h e r d i v o r c e w i t h Tommy M c W h o r t e r was n o t ' b i t t e r . ' (E.H. 181-82.) She t e s t i f i e d t o t h a t f a c t d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e , t o o . (R. 1 7 8 9 . ) Trial counsel, therefore, decided that Tommy McWhorter's l i f e d i d n o t impact McWhorter enough t o be p e r t i n e n t t o t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . " I n a d d i t i o n , t h e f a c t s t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l knew a b o u t Tommy M c W h o r t e r w o u l d h a v e b e e n i n c o n s i s t e n t with their mitigation strategy. T r i a l c o u n s e l knew t h a t Tommy M c W h o r t e r w a s a v i o l e n t a l c o h o l i c a n d a criminal, but they d i d n o t want those facts presented t o t h e j u r y because they feared that the j u r y would i n f e r that 'the apple doesn't f a l l f a r f r o m t h e t r e e ' a n d t h a t M c W h o r t e r , t h e r e f o r e , was a 'bad seed.' (E.H. 158-59, 579-80.) Plus, trial counsel thought t h e j u r y w o u l d be i n t e r e s t e d i n hearing m i t i g a t i o n evidence r e l a t e d t o McWhorter's life, and not h i s f a t h e r ' s . (E.H. 579-80.) Strategic decisions are 'virtually unassailable, especially when they a r e made by experienced criminal defense attorneys,' like McWhorter's counsel. Williams, 185 F . 3 d a t 1242 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1999). " T h u s , Tommy M c W h o r t e r ' s r e c o r d s w o u l d n o t h a v e changed trial counsel's reasonable mitigation strategy. T r i a l counsel's performance, therefore, was n o t d e f i c i e n t , a n d M c W h o r t e r d i d n o t s u f f e r prejudice. As such, t h i s c l a i m i s denied." 109 CR-09-1129 (C. 1181-87.) The and law. circuit court's findings McWhorter's claim adequately present mitigating that h i s attorneys evidence. should As t h i s C o u r t has a r e supported by t h e that h i s attorneys failed evidence i s e s s e n t i a l l y a have presented more "'"[F]ailure to investigate possible m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s and f a i l u r e t o p r e s e n t mitigating evidence at sentencing can constitute ineffective assistance of c o u n s e l u n d e r t h e S i x t h Amendment." C o l e m a n [ v . M i t c h e l l ] , 244 F. 3 d [ 5 3 3 ] a t 5 4 5 [ ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 1 ) ] ; see a l s o R o m p i l l a v. B e a r d , 545 U.S. 3 7 4 , 125 S . C t . 2 4 5 6 , 162 L . E d . 2 d 360 ( 2 0 0 5 ) ; W i g g i n s v . S m i t h , 5 3 9 U.S. 5 1 0 , 123 S . C t . 2 5 2 7 , 156 L . E d . 2 d 4 7 1 ( 2 0 0 3 ) . Our c i r c u i t ' s p r e c e d e n t h a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d between counsel's complete failure to conduct a m i t i g a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t i o n , where we are likely to find deficient performance, and counsel's failure to c o n d u c t an a d e q u a t e i n v e s t i g a t i o n where t h e presumption of reasonable performance i s more d i f f i c u l t t o o v e r c o m e : 110 to claim mitigating stated: "'"[T]he cases where t h i s c o u r t has g r a n t e d t h e w r i t f o r f a i l u r e of counsel to investigate potential mitigating evidence have been limited to those situations in which defense c o u n s e l have t o t a l l y failed to conduct such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . In contrast, i f a habeas claim does n o t i n v o l v e a failure to investigate but, rather, record CR-09-1129 petitioner's dissatisfaction with the degree of h i s attorney's i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the presumption o f reasonableness imposed by Strickland will be hard to overcome." " ' C a m p b e l l v . C o y l e , 260 F . 3 d 5 3 1 , 552 ( 6 t h Cir. 2001) ( q u o t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) (emphasis a d d e d ) ; s e e a l s o M o o r e v . P a r k e r , 425 F . 3 d 250, 255 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) . I n t h e p r e s e n t case, defense counsel d i d not completely fail t o conduct an investigation f o r mitigating evidence. Counsel spoke with Beuke's p a r e n t s p r i o r t o p e n a l t y phase o f t r i a l ( a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s some q u e s t i o n a s t o how much t i m e c o u n s e l s p e n t p r e p a r i n g Beuke's p a r e n t s t o t e s t i f y ) , and p r e s e n t e d his parents' testimony at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel a l s o asked the probation department to conduct a presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n and a p s y c h i a t r i c evaluation. While these investigatory e f f o r t s f a l l f a r s h o r t o f an e x h a u s t i v e s e a r c h , t h e y do n o t q u a l i f y a s a c o m p l e t e failure to investigate. See M a r t i n v. M i t c h e l l , 280 F . 3 d 5 9 4 , 613 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) (finding that defense counsel d i d not c o m p l e t e l y f a i l t o i n v e s t i g a t e where t h e r e was "limited contact between defense counsel and family members," "counsel requested a presentence report," and counsel "elicited the testimony of [ p e t i t i o n e r ' s ] mother and grandmother"). Because Beuke's a t t o r n e y s d i d n o t e n t i r e l y abdicate their duty to investigate for mitigating evidence, we must closely evaluate whether they e x h i b i t e d s p e c i f i c d e f i c i e n c i e s t h a t were u n r e a s o n a b l e under prevailing p r o f e s s i o n a l standards. See D i c k e r s o n v . B a g l e y , 453 F . 3 d 6 9 0 , 701 ( 6 t h Cir. 2006).' 111 CR-09-1129 " B e u k e v . Houk, 537 F . 3 d 6 1 8 , 643 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) . '[A] p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n n o t t o i n v e s t i g a t e m u s t b e directly assessed f o r reasonableness i n a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a p p l y i n g heavy measure o f d e f e r e n c e to counsel's judgments.' Wiggins, 5 3 9 U.S. a t 521-22. 'A d e f e n s e attorney i s not required to investigate a l l leads Bolender v. S i n g l e t a r y , 16 F . 3 d 1 5 4 7 , 1 5 5 7 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 4 ) . 'A l a w y e r c a n a l m o s t a l w a y s do s o m e t h i n g more i n e v e r y c a s e . B u t the C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s a good d e a l l e s s than maximum p e r f o r m a n c e . ' A t k i n s v . S i n g l e t a r y , 965 F . 2 d 9 5 2 , 960 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) . 'The a t t o r n e y ' s d e c i s i o n n o t t o i n v e s t i g a t e must n o t be e v a l u a t e d w i t h t h e benefit of hindsight, but accorded a strong p r e s u m p t i o n o f r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . ' M i t c h e l l v . Kemp, 762 F . 2 d 8 8 6 , 8 8 9 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 5 ) . "'The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic c h o i c e s made b y t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d on i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d b y the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable d e p e n d s c r i t i c a l l y on s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n . ' " S t r i c k l a n d v. Washington, 4 6 6 U.S. a t 6 9 1 . 'The reasonableness of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n involves "not only t h e quantum of evidence a l r e a d y known t o c o u n s e l , b u t a l s o w h e t h e r t h e known e v i d e n c e w o u l d lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further."' St. A u b i n v . Q u a r t e r m a n , 470 F . 3 d 1 0 9 6 , 1 1 0 1 ( 5 t h Cir. 2 0 0 6 ) , q u o t i n g i n p a r t W i g g i n s , 5 3 9 U.S. a t 527 ." Ray, So. 3d a t . In addition, "'[W]e "must r e c o g n i z e t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l is afforded broad a u t h o r i t y i n determining what evidence will be offered in 112 CR-09-1129 m i t i g a t i o n . " S t a t e v. F r a z i e r (1991), 61 O h i o S t . 3 d 2 4 7 , 2 5 5 , 574 N.E. 2 d 4 8 3 . We also reiterate that post-conviction proceedings were designed to redress denials or infringements of basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s and were n o t i n t e n d e d as an a v e n u e f o r s i m p l y r e t r y i n g t h e c a s e . [ L a u g e s e n ] v . S t a t e , [ ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 11 O h i o M i s c . 10, 227 N.E. 2 d 6 6 3 ] ; S t a t e v . L o t t , [(Nov. 3, 1 9 9 4 ) , C u y a h o g a A p p . N o s . 6 6 3 3 8 , 6 6 3 8 9 , 66390]. Further, the f a i l u r e to present evidence which i s merely cumulative to that w h i c h was p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l i s , g e n e r a l l y speaking, not i n d i c a t i v e of ineffective a s s i s t a n c e o f t r i a l c o u n s e l . S t a t e v . Combs ( 1 9 9 4 ) , 100 O h i o A p p . 3 d 9 0 , 1 0 5 , 652 N.E. 2d 2 0 5 . ' "Jells 2008). v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478 , 48 9 (6th "'"[C]ounsel i s not required to present a l l m i t i g a t i o n evidence, even i f the a d d i t i o n a l m i t i g a t i o n evidence would not have been i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h counsel's strategy. C o u n s e l m u s t be p e r m i t t e d t o w e e d o u t some a r g u m e n t s t o s t r e s s o t h e r s and advocate e f f e c t i v e l y . " H a l i b u r t o n v. Sec'y f o r t h e Dep't o f C o r r . , 342 F . 3 d 1233, 1243-44 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2003) ( q u o t a t i o n marks and c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ; see H e r r i n g v . S e c ' y , D e p ' t o f C o r r . , 397 F . 3 d 1338 , 1348-50 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2005) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where defendant's mother was only m i t i g a t i o n witness and c o u n s e l d i d not introduce evidence from h o s p i t a l records i n counsel's p o s s e s s i o n s h o w i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s b r a i n damage and m e n t a l r e t a r d a t i o n o r c a l l p s y c h o l o g i s t who e v a l u a t e d d e f e n d a n t p r e - t r i a l a s h a v i n g dull normal intelligence); Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F . 3 d 1 2 4 5 , 1254 n . 1 6 , 1 2 6 0 113 Cir. CR-09-1129 (11th C i r . 2003) ( s t a t i n g t h i s C o u r t h a s "consistently held that there i s 'no a b s o l u t e d u t y ... t o i n t r o d u c e m i t i g a t i n g or c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e ' " and r e j e c t i n g c l a i m t h a t c o u n s e l were i n e f f e c t i v e i n f a i l i n g t o present h o s p i t a l records showing defendant was in "borderline mentally retarded range") (brackets omitted) (quoting Chandler [v. U n i t e d States], 218 F . 3 d [1305] a t 1319 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2 0 0 0 ) ] ) . ' "Wood v . A l l e n , 542 F . 3 d 1281 , 1 3 0 6 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) . 'The d e c i s i o n o f w h a t m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e t o p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y phase of a c a p i t a l case i s g e n e r a l l y a matter of t r i a l s t r a t e g y . ' H i l l v. M i t c h e l l , 400 F. 3 d 3 0 8 , 3 3 1 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) . " Dunaway, So. 3d a t . Likewise, "'When claims of i n e f f e c t i v e assistance of counsel involve the penalty phase o f a c a p i t a l murder t r i a l t h e focus is o n " w h e t h e r ' t h e s e n t e n c e r ... w o u l d have concluded that the balance of a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g circumstances did not warrant death.'" Jones v. S t a t e , 753 S o . 2 d 1174 , 11 97 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) , q u o t i n g S t e v e n s v . Z a n t , 968 F . 2 d 1076, 1081 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) . See a l s o W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 7 8 3 S o . 2 d 108 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2000). An attorney's p e r f o r m a n c e i s n o t p e r se i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g to present m i t i g a t i n g evidence at the p e n a l t y phase o f a c a p i t a l t r i a l . See S t a t e v . R i z z o , 2 6 6 C o n n . 1 7 1 , 833 A . 2 d 3 6 3 (20 0 3 ) ; H o w a r d v . S t a t e , 853 S o . 2 d 7 8 1 ( M i s s . 2 0 0 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 540 U.S. 1 1 9 7 (20 0 4 ) ; B a t t e n f i e l d v . S t a t e , 95 3 P. 2 d 1123 ( O k l a . Crim. App. 1998); Conner v. Anderson, 2 5 9 F. S u p p . 2 d 7 4 1 ( S . D . I n d . 114 CR-09-1129 2 0 0 3 ) ; S m i t h v . C o c k r e l l , 311 F . 3 d 661 ( 5 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) ; D u c k e t t v . M u l l i n , 306 F . 3 d 982 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 123 S.Ct. 1911 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ; H a y e s v . W o o d f o r d , 301 F. 3 d 1054 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) ; a n d H u n t v . L e e , 291 F . 3 d 284 ( 4 t h C i r . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 537 U.S. 1045 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . ' " A d k i n s v . S t a t e , 930 So. 2 d 5 2 4 , 536 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2001) ( o p i n i o n on r e t u r n t o t h i r d r e m a n d ) . As we a l s o s t a t e d i n M c W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 8 97 So. 2 d 437, 453-54 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2004): "'"Prejudicial ineffective assistance of c o u n s e l under Strickland cannot be established on the general claim that additional witnesses should have been c a l l e d i n m i t i g a t i o n . See B r i l e y v . B a s s , 750 F . 2 d 1 2 3 8 , 1248 ( 4 t h C i r . 1984 ) ; s e e a l s o B a s s e t t e v . T h o m p s o n , 915 F . 2 d 932, 941 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) . Rather, the d e c i d i n g factor i s whether additional witnesses would h a v e made a n y difference i n the m i t i g a t i o n phase of t h e t r i a l . " S m i t h v. Anderson, 104 F . S u p p . 2 d 7 7 3 , 809 (S.D. O h i o 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 348 F. 3 d 177 ( 6 t h C i r . 2003). "There has n e v e r been a c a s e where a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s c o u l d not have been called." S t a t e v . T a r v e r , 629 So. 2 d 14, 21 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1993).'" Hunt v. State, 940 So. 2d 1041, 1067-68 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). In this McWhorter was either theory or case, offered the at trial the inconsistent would have court found postconviction with been the the evidentiary "good cumulative 115 that to boy, wrong evidence evidence hearing crowd" already CR-09-1129 offered d u r i n g the p e n a l t y phase. 3d (Ala. Crim. 707 relies, this Court App. 2010), specifically I n S t a t e v. a case on Gamble, which distinguished 63 So. McWhorter both types of cases: "This i s not a case i n which the omitted m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e was c u m u l a t i v e t o e v i d e n c e t h a t was p r e s e n t e d , s e e F e r g u s o n v . S t a t e , 13 So. 3d 418 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008), or in which counsel i n v e s t i g a t e d a n d made an i n f o r m e d s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n not to present evidence concerning Gamble's u p b r i n g i n g , s e e W a l d r o p v . S t a t e , 987 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Here, counsel's i n v e s t i g a t i o n was s o i n a d e q u a t e t h a t t h e y f a i l e d t o d i s c o v e r any m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e t o p r e s e n t a t t h e penalty phase--although the Rule 32 evidentiary h e a r i n g c l e a r l y s h o w e d t h a t t h e r e was a p l e t h o r a o f e v i d e n c e t h a t c o u l d h a v e b e e n p r e s e n t e d on G a m b l e ' s behalf." Gamble, In 63 two So. 3d 721. sentences citing G a m b l e , he failed to h i r e p . 52.) at also in McWhorter's this Court, claims e r r o r because h i s t r i a l counsel a mitigation brief specialist. (McWhorter's Gamble, however, i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e regard to the h i r i n g counsel failed penalty phase. conducted an presented the of a m i t i g a t i o n to present 63 So. interview testimony any 3d 721. with of In McWhorter four 116 from t h i s investigator. mitigation at to and witnesses, case i n In Gamble, evidence this brief, during the case, counsel his family, and hired a CR-09-1129 n e u r o p s y c h o l o g i s t t o e v a l u a t e McWhorter f o r any mental or disease disorder. Moreover, childhood that i s indeed trial additional 1118 although counsel evidence. ( A l a . Crim. the disturbing, was evidence App. 2009), McWhorter's i t does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y ineffective This Court about for failing i n Davis stated mean to offer the v . S t a t e , 44 S o . 3 d the following in evaluating a similar claim a l l e g i n g the i n e f f e c t i v e assistance of counsel: "'As a m a t t e r o f t r i a l s t r a t e g y , c o u n s e l c o u l d w e l l d e c i d e n o t t o c a l l f a m i l y members as w i t n e s s e s b e c a u s e f a m i l y members c a n be e a s i l y i m p e a c h e d f o r bias.' B e r g m a n v . M c C a u g h t r y , 65 F . 3 d 1 3 7 2 , 1380 (7th C i r . 1995). "'Once counsel conducts a reasonable investigation of law and facts in a p a r t i c u l a r case, h i s s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n s are "virtually unchallengeable." [ S t r i c k l a n d v . W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 6 6 8 ] a t 6 9 0 , 104 S. C t . 2 0 5 2 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] . T a c t i c a l o r reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l judgments are not d e f i c i e n t but a f a i l u r e to investigate a m a t e r i a l m a t t e r d u e t o i n a t t e n t i o n may b e deficient. When t h e c l a i m i s t h a t c o u n s e l f a i l e d to present a s u f f i c i e n t mitigating case d u r i n g s e n t e n c i n g , the i n q u i r y " i s not whether c o u n s e l s h o u l d have p r e s e n t e d a mitigation case" but "whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not t o i n t r o d u c e m i t i g a t i n g evidence ... was i t s e l f reasonable." See W i g g i n s [v. S m i t h ] , 539 U.S. [ 5 1 0 ] a t 5 2 3 , 123 S. C t . 117 CR-09-1129 2527 [(2003)] omitted).' (internal citations " P o w e l l v . K e l l y , 562 F . 3 d 6 5 6 , 670 ( 4 t h C i r . 2 0 0 9 ) . See a l s o V i l l e g a s v . Q u a r t e r m a n , 274 F e d . A p p x . 3 7 8 , 382 ( 5 t h C i r . 2008). Evidence of a difficult c h i l d h o o d has been c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a 'double-edged' sword. See B a c o n v . L e e , 225 F . 3 d 4 7 0 , 481 ( 4 t h Cir. 2000). '[E]mphasizing a c l i e n t ' s deprived c h i l d h o o d d o e s n o t h a v e a v e r y b e n e f i c i a l i m p a c t on a n o r t h w e s t F l o r i d a j u r y , g i v e n t h e f a c t t h a t many j u r o r s have had d i f f i c u l t l i v e s , b u t have n o t t u r n e d to c r i m i n a l conduct.' C a r d v . D u g g e r , 911 F . 2 d 1494, 1511 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) . What o n e j u r o r f i n d s t o b e m i t i g a t i o n a n o t h e r j u r o r may f i n d a g g r a v a t i n g . ' [ M ] i t i g a t i o n may b e i n t h e e y e o f t h e b e h o l d e r . ' S t a n l e y v . Z a n t , 697 F . 2 d 9 5 5 , 969 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) . See a l s o F o r d v . S c h o f i e l d , 48 8 F. S u p p . 2 d 1258 , 1 3 4 6 (N.D. G a . 2 0 0 7 ) ('The S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s s t a t e d that the reasonableness of counsel's actions should b e e v a l u a t e d b a s e d on " s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e s made b y t h e defendant a n d on information s u p p l i e d by t h e defendant." B u r g e r v . Kemp, 4 8 3 U.S. 7 7 6 , 7 9 5 , 107 S. C t . 3 1 1 4 , 97 L. E d . 2 d 638 (1987) ....'); C a r r o l l v . S t a t e , 815 S o . 2 d 6 0 1 , 615 ( F l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ('By f a i l i n g t o r e s p o n d to counsel's requests to p r o v i d e t r i a l c o u n s e l w i t h t h e names o f w i t n e s s e s who c o u l d a s s i s t i n p r e s e n t i n g m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e , C a r r o l l may n o t now c o m p l a i n t h a t t r i a l counsel's failure to pursue such mitigation was u n r e a s o n a b l e . ' ) ; R o s e v . S t a t e , 617 S o . 2 d 2 9 1 , 2 9 5 (Fla. 1993) ('In l i g h t o f t h e h a r m f u l t e s t i m o n y t h a t c o u l d have been adduced from Rose's b r o t h e r and t h e minimal probative value of the cousins' testimony, we a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e o u t c o m e w o u l d n o t h a v e been d i f f e r e n t had t h e i r t e s t i m o n y been p r e s e n t e d a t the p e n a l t y phase.'). "Copeland t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e made a s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n t o r e l y on a p l e a f o r m e r c y . I t i s clear from both a t t o r n e y s ' testimony t h a t they conducted an investigation and were aware of Davis's 118 CR-09-1129 b a c k g r o u n d and u p b r i n g i n g . C o p e l a n d s t a t e d t h a t he did not b e l i e v e evidence of D a v i s ' s performance i n s c h o o l would have had any v a l u e because of the nature of the murders. Based on the unique c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e we c a n n o t say t h a t c o u n s e l ' s a c t i o n s were u n r e a s o n a b l e . Moreover, t h e t e s t i m o n y a t t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g was n e i t h e r s t r o n g nor c o m p e l l i n g . D a v i s was o v e r t h e age o f 25 a t t h e t i m e o f t h e m u r d e r s . One o f D a v i s ' s b r o t h e r s who t e s t i f i e d a t t h e p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s was 14 years o f age at the time of D a v i s ' s trial. A n o t h e r b r o t h e r who t e s t i f i e d was i n p r i s o n a t t h e time of Davis's trial. Davis's mother p a i n t e d a different picture of Davis's c h i l d h o o d than did D a v i s ' s s i b l i n g s . Many w i t n e s s e s a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e y knew t h a t D a v i s was s e l l i n g d r u g s f r o m h i s home i n Gibbs V i l l a g e . Other w i t n e s s e s had not seen D a v i s for many years. The testimony o f f e r e d at the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g would have been e n t i t l e d to little weight." Davis, 44 So. 3d at Furthermore, trial Porter counsel v. 1141-42. this i s not conducted McCollum, S. Ct. 130 health, f a m i l y background, did obtain certain alluded but 539 to failed counsel U.S. the to to uncover 510 447, evidence and of the counsel a more t h o r o u g h v. Taylor, 119 529 and i n Wiggins v. information that difficult 362 mental problem childhood investigation; U.S. in where defendant's (2003), where c o u n s e l had conduct counsel (2009), serious drinking t r o u b l e d and McWhorter's like 453-54 records; or l i k e defendant's in Williams where investigation failed Smith, situation no counsel not a or (2000), like where CR-09-1129 counsel d i d not begin to i n v e s t i g a t e m i t i g a t i o n evidence a week before about the failed the p a r t i c u l a r l y crime--for to uncover egregious facts example, McWhorter's p l a n n i n g lying creating and critical records defendant. Given weeks, trial until in wait for homemade s i l e n c e r s etc.--and given McWhorter has several and crime and test-firing for methodically them beforehand, t o much o f t h e crime, rendered i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e by not o f f e r i n g t h e additional evidence described and and c a n be helpful i n m i t i g a t i o n but case. deliberate manner testimony preventing difference. court's of a difficult a l c o h o l abuse i s a two-way s t r e e t . defense's expert Evidence that three attorneys above. demonstrate underlying his drug to the hours, t h a t McWhorter admitted failed of the i t can Additionally, in which indicating impulsive that we would the find no counsel's deficient. D. 120 error to the methodical, committed not evidence harmful t h a t McWhorter had decisions Accordingly, conclusion McWhorter Such a l s o be given childhood the crime, difficulty have in made the performance in any circuit was not CR-09-1129 McWhorter finding him. that He gasoline the and argues that counsel's the v i o l e n c e to which f r e o n from he of crime, In erred physical abuse his he sniffing his emotional to l i f e in prejudice been p r e s e n t e d c o u r t , he m i g h t h a v e b e e n s e n t e n c e d without not exposed, and had court did the was a young age, the circuit performance that i f evidence the p e r i o d preceding trial in trial contends suffered, in also state to the imprisonment parole. a s s e s s i n g claims of i n e f f e c t i v e the p e n a l t y phase of a c a p i t a l t r i a l , discussed i n Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. a s s i s t a n c e of we 510 apply the counsel standard (2003): " I n S t r i c k l a n d [ v . W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. 668 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] , we made clear that, to establish prejudice, a 'defendant m u s t show t h a t t h e r e i s a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y that, but f o r counsel's u n p r o f e s s i o n a l e r r o r s , the r e s u l t of the p r o c e e d i n g would have been d i f f e r e n t . A reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y i s a p r o b a b i l i t y s u f f i c i e n t t o undermine c o n f i d e n c e i n the outcome.' Id., a t 694, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L . E d . 2 d 6 7 4 . I n a s s e s s i n g p r e j u d i c e , we r e w e i g h t h e evidence i n aggravation a g a i n s t the totality of available mitigating evidence." 539 U.S. In one at 534. sentencing aggravating McWhorter to death, circumstance--that c o m m i t t e d w h i l e M c W h o r t e r was the the trial capital court found offense engaged i n the commission of 121 was or CR-09-1129 an a t t e m p t to commit Here, t o commit or f l i g h t a robbery. the circuit See court after committing § 13A-5-49(a)(4), found that the C o u r t has a l s o allegedly reviewed failed A l a . Code omitted evidence presented at the postconviction would n o t have outweighed 1975. mitigating evidentiary hearing the aggravating circumstance. the m i t i g a t i n g evidence discover to or attempting present and aggravating circumstances presented. trial This counsel against A f t e r a complete the review, we a r e c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e p o s t c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g b u t o m i t t e d from the p e n a l t y phase of McWhorter's the capital-murder t r i a l w o u l d sentence in this Consequently, his trial McWhorter counsel additional case. was mitigating capital-murder was See due Wiggins, no ineffective evidence h a v e h a d no i m p a c t relief 539 on f o r not U.S. on at 534. his claim that presenting the i n the p e n a l t y phase of h i s trial. III. M c W h o r t e r e s s e n t i a l l y makes f o u r a r g u m e n t s w i t h r e g a r d t o the circuit Rowland, court's Janet exclusion Vogelsang, and of Dr. postconviction evidentiary hearing. 122 the Ralph testimony of David Tarter during the (Claim X I I i n McWhorter's CR-09-1129 amended R u l e exclusion because, he says, that (McWhorter's b r i e f , of asserts pursuant during with both p . 75.) right Initially, argument was improper Second, "relevant Third, on to regard grounds and "[David Rowland]: violated i n h i s favor. McWhorter Dr. During Rowland's t e s t i m o n y t h e f o l l o w i n g "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: [McWhorter] about i t ? trial." Last, P. preserved h i s of hearsay Tarter's exchange Did you evidence testimony. occurred: talk to Yes, I d i d . " [ P O S T C O N V I C T I O N COUNSEL: What d i d y o u s a y t o h i m and w h a t d i d he s a y t o you? "[STATE]: Objection to hearsay, outside these proceedings. 123 his court erred i n excluding to the exclusion Rowland's counsel [his] of 3 2 . 6 , A l a . R. C r i m . q u e s t i o n whether trial McWhorter c l a i m s t h a t t h e hearsay the c i r c u i t t o Rule David evidence to present evidence that we what a t t h e p e n a l t y phase evidence constitutional evidence was not hearsay. evidence t o demonstrate have p r e s e n t e d McWhorter the was grounds that the t r i a l counsel's inadequate i n v e s t i g a t i o n " and t h a t was e n t i t l e d exclusion McWhorter argues on h e a r s a y the testimony contends demonstrate should First, of the testimony McWhorter "he 32 p e t i t i o n . ) what he said CR-09-1129 "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: (R. 365.) further After hearsay McWhorter, circuit objections during bare arguing any s p e c i f i c Dr. T a r t e r ' s impact ruling argument Thus, from the f o r review. brief, p. Vogelsang's testimony; the that " ' [ i ] n 07-0443, of that on h e a r s a y g r o u n d s . failure f o ra p p e l l a t e review.'" 2010) 1, 2 0 1 0 ] (quoting Tarter's Tarter." McWhorter i s a portion of testimony Johnson to rule, v. 124 State, , 542 settled f o ra ruling or there i s nothing Reynolds v. S t a t e , So. 3d was limited I t i swell a request makes ... h a d Dr. court excluded the absence of a r u l i n g , October "ruling c o u r t , however, never e x p r e s s l y objection to the court's preserved court's Dr. McWhorter r a t h e r , McWhorter I t appears 74). during of the c i r c u i t testimony testimony, The c i r c u i t In his brief, adverse r u l i n g the c i r c u i t on Tarter's testimony App. this t h a t , because the c i r c u i t limited. Dr. testified. an a d v e r s e (R. 6 5 9 - 7 2 5 . ) assertion that (McWhorter's Janet Rowland d i d n o t make a n y S t a t e a l s o d i d n o t make a n y h e a r s a y o b j e c t i o n s considerable an to obtain Tarter's testimony. court while d i d not preserve does n o t r e f e r e n c e a objection, the State failing court, The Dr. by this I w i l l withdraw i t . " [Ms. CR- (Ala. So. 2d Crim. 3 4 1 , 345 CR-09-1129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (citations omitted)). Because McWhorter withdrew h i s q u e s t i o n when the State did State not testimony, C o u r t can raises David objected object there review with on i s no to Dr. hearsay hearsay ruling for error. regard R o w l a n d and on the grounds grounds during e x c l u s i o n of are not any the the evidentiary testimony hearing the of Janet Rowland because Dr. this i s s u e s McWhorter testimony for court Vogelsang. of both review. improperly During following transpired: "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: And were there any a c t i v i t i e s t h a t you e n g a g e d i n , i n t h i s c a s e as a c a p i t a l case, t h a t were u n i q u e or u n u s u a l ? "[Janet Vogelsang]: There were. T h e r e was the o p p o r t u n i t y i n t h i s c a s e t o i n t e r v i e w some f a m i l y members w i t h a g r e a t d e a l o f s p a c e i n b e t w e e n . And s o t h a t was t h e o p p o r t u n i t y - - s p a c e o f t i m e . So t h a t was an opportunity to look for consistency of i n f o r m a t i o n over a longer p e r i o d of time than u s u a l . "And t h e o t h e r t h i n g t h a t was u n i q u e , I t h i n k , a b o u t t h e f a m i l y h i s t o r y was t h a t on h i s m o t h e r ' s s i d e of the f a m i l y , going back s e v e r a l g e n e r a t i o n s , t h e s e p e o p l e were m i g r a n t w o r k e r s , and t h e y f o l l o w e d the h a r v e s t . "[STATE]: O b j e c t i o n , Your Honor, t o h e a r s a y . We would object. We h a v e no i d e a w h e r e t h i s i s coming from, t h i s m i g r a n t workers. T h e r e ' s b e e n no 125 the Tarter's court that preserved McWhorter a l s o contends t h a t the c i r c u i t excluded and from the c i r c u i t Accordingly, Tarter to David the CR-09-1129 t e s t i m o n y t h a t anybody's been a m i g r a n t worker i n t h i s case. T h i s i s p u r e h e a r s a y t h a t she i s g e t t i n g f r o m some t h i r d p a r t y . Under Alabama caselaw, i t ' s i m p e r m i s s i b l e a t a R u l e 32 h e a r i n g . "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I w o u l d say under R u l e 703, [ A l a . R. E v i d . , ] under the opinions and t e s t i m o n y of e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s , Ms. V o g e l s a n g as h a v i n g b e e n q u a l i f i e d as an e x p e r t t o render her opinions and findings in her b i o p s y c h o s o c i a l assessment, s h e may r e l y upon the f a c t s o r d a t a i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e u p o n w h i c h an e x p e r t b a s e s h e r o p i n i o n , o r i n f e r e n c e may b e t h o s e p e r c e i v e d b y o r made k n o w n t o t h e e x p e r t a t o r b e f o r e t h e h e a r i n g . She h a s j u s t l i s t e d a l l o f t h e documents t h a t she's r e v i e w e d and t h e p e o p l e t h a t s h e h a s i n t e r v i e w e d a n d t h e p e r s o n s w i t h whom s h e ' s consulted. " [ S T A T E ] : Y o u r H o n o r , we h a v e t h r e e R u l e 3 2 , [ A l a . R. C r i m . P.,] C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s ' c a s e s that stand f o r the proposition I cited. One a c t u a l l y i n v o l v e s Dr. V o g e l s a n g . "THE COURT: L e t me take a look ati t . "[STATE]: T h a t w o u l d b e [ G i l e s v . S t a t e , 90 6 S o . 2 d 963 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 4 ) , Hunt v. S t a t e , 940 S o . 2 d 1 0 4 1 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) ] , and t h e f i n a l o n e i s [ W a l d r o p v . S t a t e , 987 S o . 2 d 1186 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) ] . "[THE COURT]: A l l right. T e l l me how we g e t around Rule 703, which, to me, looks like a prohibition upon h e a r s a y knowledge coming i n , even i f i t ' s r e l i e d upon by t h e e x p e r t . "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: T e l l me how I g e t a r o u n d i t ? B e c a u s e i t i s b a s e d on h e r o p i n i o n , b a s e d on t h e p e o p l e t h a t s h e - - a s an e x p e r t w i t n e s s , s h e ' s 126 CR-09-1129 permitted to t e s t i f y basing her-- about what she r e l i e d upon i n "[THE COURT]: She i s under federal law. Alabama's r u l e a c t u a l l y takes the exact o p p o s i t e of the f e d e r a l r u l e , which i s t h a t i f i t ' s i n a d m i s s i b l e as h e a r s a y , t h e n she c a n n o t t e s t i f y i n h e r o p i n i o n . "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: W e l l , i n terms o f t h e h e a r s a y , we d o n o t i n t e n d t o h a v e Ms. V o g e l s a n g i n d i c a t e who s a i d a n y t h i n g , who i s a t t r i b u t e d t o this. These a r e j u s t h e r i m p r e s s i o n s and f i n d i n g s t h a t a r e b a s e d upon h e r i n t e r v i e w s . So i t ' s n o t hearsay. "[STATE]: Your Honor, that's the very definition of hearsay. They're based on third-party, out-of-court statements. And t h a t ' s just a p e r f e c t example t h a t t h i s family's from migrant workers. T h a t ' s c l a s s i c h e a r s a y , some t h i r d p a r t y t o l d Ms. V o g e l s a n g , a n d s h e j u s t came i n t o c o u r t t o t e l l me t h a t . "[THE C O U R T ] : L e t me r e a d t h e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e r u l e . 'Experts w i t h o u t f i r s t h a n d knowledge g e n e r a l l y may n o t b a s e o p i n i o n s u p o n f a c t s o r d a t a t h a t h a v e not themselves been a d m i t t e d i n t o evidence.' "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: no e v i d e n c e , Y o u r H o n o r . "[THE 703, COURT]: How do we And t h e r e has been cross that threshold? "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: Our copy o f [ R u l e ] Your Honor, i s d i f f e r e n t from Your Honor's. "[THE COURT]: I'm g i v i n g y o u a s t a t e m e n t of the rule. "[POSTCONVICTION "[THE COURT]: COUNSEL]: Yes. 127 May I see i t ? CR-09-1129 "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: Your Honor, h a v e a moment t o t a l k a b o u t t h i s ? c a n we II "[POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL]: For the record, first, we h a d e a r l i e r objected and taken t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e , a t l e a s t as t o h e a r s a y , s h o u l d n o t a p p l y t o t h e m i t i g a t i o n p h a s e.. e I understand the Court ruled that they did. We We reiterate that objection, just for the record. "And, s e c o n d , we s u b m i t t h a t w e ' r e e n t i t l e d t o , u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o make a f u l l a n d complete record o f a l l m i t i g a t i o n f a c t o r s , and that Ms. V o g e l s a n g ' s i n a b i l i t y a n d a n y e x p e r t ' s inability t o t e s t i f y as t o h e a r s a y as an e x p e r t , l i m i t s t h a t r i g h t . A n d we w a n t t o p r e s e r v e t h a t a n d o b j e c t t o i t on t h a t g r o u n d , a s w e l l . "[THE COURT]: sustained." (R. I understand. The o b j e c t i o n i s 522-27.) A. McWhorter f i r s t was of t h e statement from n o t h e a r s a y b e c a u s e i t was n o t b e i n g the matter support State, 693 argues that asserted. h i s argument 2 6 3 S.W.3d 854 ( T e n n . S.W.2d appellate excluded 267 (Mo. courts hearsay Ct. reversed evidence offered for the truth (McWhorter's McWhorter cites 2008), App. when 128 brief, p. 75). two c a s e s - - P y l a n t and Trimble 1985). the t r i a l Vogelsang In both courts i t was b e i n g v. To v. State, cases t h e because offered they t o show CR-09-1129 ineffective not a s s i s t a n c e of counsel because the statements being offered for the truth of the matter McWhorter, however, d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s argument court. "The statement in 526 error So. on g r o u n d s 2d 880, asserted. i n the circuit of s p e c i f i c grounds of o b j e c t i o n a l l grounds not s p e c i f i e d , and t h e t r i a l court w i l l were waives n o t be p u t not a s s i g n e d at t r i a l . " properly before this Frith, ( A l a . 1987). 882 Ex p a r t e argument i s not Court Thus, this f o r review. B. McWhorter also argues, t h e s t a t e m e n t was h e a r s a y evidence phase trial of counsel i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , even i f "he was e n t i t l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e s h o u l d have [his] t r i a l " that because presented "at the what at the penalty penalty phase the e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d c o u l d have i n c l u d e d h e a r s a y . " (McWhorter's brief, law p. 75). [supports] this McWhorter during evidence the do 1101(b)(3), McWhorter argument." correctly penalty not asserts apply that "the (McWhorter's b r i e f , phase A l a . R. inapplicability contends of to Evid. of the rules that trial hearsay because sentencing McWhorter's of evidence 129 p. plainly 75). i s admissible the rules hearings. argument that of Rule the during a sentencing CR-09-1129 hearing allows postconviction conflict 1186 him to present evidentiary w i t h Alabama ( A l a . C r i m . App. hearsay hearing, law. See 2007). As however, W a l d r o p v. this evidence is State, during in direct 987 So. 2d Court s t a t e d i n Waldrop: "Waldrop argues t h a t the c i r c u i t c o u r t e r r e d i n e x c l u d i n g h e a r s a y m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e a t h i s R u l e 32 e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . He a r g u e s t h a t b e c a u s e h e a r s a y evidence i s admissible at a sentencing hearing i n a capital-murder t r i a l , i t i s also admissible at a post-conviction proceeding attacking a death sentence. "However, W a l d r o p ' s argument i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r i o r c a s e s o f t h i s C o u r t . A s we s t a t e d i n H u n t v . S t a t e [940 S o . 2 d 1041 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) ] : "'The A l a b a m a R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e a p p l y t o R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g s . R u l e 8 0 4 , A l a . R. Evid., specifically excludes hearsay e v i d e n c e . We a d d r e s s e d t h i s i d e n t i c a l i s s u e i n G i l e s v . S t a t e , 906 S o . 2 d 963 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2004), o v e r r u l e d on other g r o u n d s , E x p a r t e J e n k i n s , 972 S o . 2 d 159 ( A l a . 2005), and s t a t e d : ' " ' " G i l e s s p e c i f i c a l l y argues that the circuit court erroneously failed to consider the hearsay testimony of two w i t n e s s e s as t o what G i l e s told them about a d r u g relationship between him and Carl Nelson. Giles argues that the circuit court m i s a p p l i e d the e v i d e n t i a r y rules governing capital sentencing because hearsay evidence i s admissible at the sentencing portion of a 130 a CR-09-1129 capital-murder trial."' "'"However, what G i l e s f a i l s to c o n s i d e r i s whether the Rules of Evidence apply to Rule 32 p r o c e e d i n g s . See R u l e 1 0 1 , A l a R. E v i d . , a n d R u l e 1 1 0 1 ( a ) , A l a . R. E v i d . , w h i c h s t a t e s , i n p a r t , 'these r u l e s of evidence apply i n a l l proceedings i n the Courts of Alabama ' Rule 1101(b), A l a . R. E v i d . , l i s t s t h e p r o c e e d i n g s exempt from a p p l i c a t i o n of the Rules of Evidence. Those proceedings include proceedings concerning preliminary questions of f a c t , g r a n d j u r y p r o c e e d i n g s , e x t r a d i t i o n proceedings, preliminary hearings i n criminal cases, sentencing or p r o b a t i o n revocation hearings, proceedings related to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, criminal summonses, or search warrants, bail proceedings, and contempt proceedings. "'"The Rules of Evidence apply to post-conviction proceedings. See DeBruce v. State, 890 So. 2d 1068 (Ala. C r i m . App. 2 0 0 3 ) . R u l e 804, A l a . R. E v i d . , s p e c i f i c a l l y excludes hearsay evidence. The circuit court correctly applied e x i s t i n g law and excluded the hearsay statements presented concerning an alleged drug relationship between Giles and one of the victims. After excluding the hearsay evidence, the circuit c o u r t was left w i t h no lawful 131 CR-09-1129 evidence to support this c o n t e n t i o n . R e l i e f was correctly denied on this ground. See DeBruce, supra." "'906 S o . 2 d a t 9 8 5 - 8 6 . The c i r c u i t c o u r t committed no error in excluding the a f f i d a v i t s and t h e h e a r s a y t e s t i m o n y o f cocounsel.'" Waldrop v. State, 987 So. 2d at 1190. Thus, the rules e v i d e n c e a p p l y t o p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s , and t h e court should exclude Here, the Vogelsang was inadmissible circuit court inadmissible hearsay, and circuit hearsay. determined a t t e m p t i n g to base her that expert the evidence o p i n i o n on, was i t s u s t a i n e d the State's o b j e c t i o n . I n A l a b a m a , h e a r s a y i s d e f i n e d as "a s t a t e m e n t , other than made the by the hearing, offered asserted." Rule inadmissible Rule 802, while i n evidence testifying to prove 8 0 1 ( c ) , A l a . R. unless A l a . R. suspended, Alabama declarant however, when Supreme C o u r t has The Evid. an hearsay expert at trial the t r u t h of the expressly allowed Evid. of Hearsay by rules are not witness or is rule. completely testifies. held: "'"An e x p e r t may give h i s o p i n i o n based upon his own knowledge of the facts, s t a t i n g these f a c t s , then h i s opinion; or, he may give an o p i n i o n based upon a 132 or matter evidence statute one The CR-09-1129 h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n , b a s e d upon f a c t s i n e v i d e n c e . I n e i t h e r c a s e , t h e f a c t s k nown k to the expert or [ h y p o t h e s i z e d ] must be facts i n evidence. Blakeney v. Alabama Power Co., 222 A l a . 3 9 4 , 133 S o . 1 6 , 18 (1931)."' " W e l c h v . H o u s t o n C o u n t y H o s p . B d . , 502 S o . 2 d 3 4 0 , 345 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) , q u o t i n g Thompson v. J a r r e l l , 460 So. 2d 148, 150 ( A l a . 1984) . ( E m p h a s i s added i n Welch). See, also, Romine v. Medicenters of A m e r i c a , I n c . , 476 S o . 2 d 51 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) . " Ex p a r t e Wesley, 575 So. 2d 127, 129 w o r d s , an e x p e r t c a n t e s t i f y b a s e d ( A l a . 1990). In other on h e a r s a y , b u t o n l y i f t h e h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e has been a d m i t t e d d u r i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s . this case, the evidence McWhorter was attempting from V o g e l s a n g had not been a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e ; the c i r c u i t been rules to In elicit therefore, c o u r t c o r r e c t l y h e l d t h a t the e v i d e n c e s h o u l d have excluded; that of evidence McWhorter and ruling is in compliance with both the Waldrop. contends, however, that Waldrop is in direct c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e r e c e n t U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r u l i n g i n Sears v. Upton, McWhorter argues U.S. that the , cases 130 S. conflict Ct. 3259 because Sears (2010). holds that " ' [ t ] h e f a c t t h a t some ... e v i d e n c e may h a v e b e e n "hearsay" does not n e c e s s a r i l y undermine i t s v a l u e - ¬ or i t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y - - f o r p e n a l t y phase purposes,' 133 CR-09-1129 and t h a t ' r e l i a b l e h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e t h a t i s r e l e v a n t to a c a p i t a l defendant's m i t i g a t i o n defense should not be excluded by r o t e a p p l i c a t i o n of a state hearsay r u l e . ' " (McWhorter's 130 r e p l y , p. S. C t a t 3 2 6 3 ) ) . In Sears, a 19 Georgia After court claim hearing that Sears's inadequate under but trial not v. determine Georgia properly and remanded the statement rules, was McWhorter regarding t h a t was to not restate the the the ineffective assistance ruling hearsay that hearing. f o r the The i s always the to the not admissible Thus, Waldrop does not 134 in conflict of the court U.S. inadequate that i t correctly. the Supreme Court's state hearsay Court's The holding for to 668 Strickland test apply standard counsel, Sears's Supreme C o u r t h e l d Court's holding. of 466 a p p l i c a t i o n " of correct Sears. constitutionally whether correctly cites "rote , Georgia was apply court on presented Washington, the Although at assistance the counsel Sears. case hearing ineffective representation prejudiced d i d not a hearing, Strickland i t could court U.S. testimony evidentiary determined held of the postconviction (1984), Sears, McWhorter, however, m i s i n t e r p r e t s postconviction-relief counsel. (quoting determining issue in a with a blanket postconviction Sears. CR-09-1129 Because McWhorter's argument is Court's r u l i n g i n Waldrop, the c i r c u i t discretion hearsay foreclosed t h a t were not this c o u r t d i d not abuse i t s when i t p r e v e n t e d V o g e l s a n g statements by from testifying as to i n evidence. C. McWhorter next testimony violated state argues his rights constitution. exclusion of his hearsay "hearsay rules both that Sears be under the rooted i n the compulsory during again 77-78). Sears As does postconviction stated not his cites to exclude above, abrogate and the that the postconviction defense. Sears. and Here, the that during says, i s process clauses (McWhorter's b r i e f , McWhorter state he To well-recognized right due behalf." rather, evidence cases," which, "defendant's process hearings; federal hearsay stands f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n used p r e s e n t w i t n e s s e s on h i s own of McWhorter argues postconviction hearings i n capital a principle the to p r e s e n t a complete McWhorter cannot exclusion under statements position McWhorter contends the Specifically, hearing violated his right support that misinterprets to pp. Sears. hearsay rules during United States Supreme C o u r t r e i t e r a t e d t h e S t r i c k l a n d t e s t i n Sears and r e v e r s e d t h e 135 CR-09-1129 lower c o u r t ' s judgment that 476 further to properly s u p p o r t h i s argument McWhorter c i t e s Mississippi, U.S. p. 349 U.S. 284 (1986), to present 78). (1973), which, guarantees opportunity brief, 410 683 Constitution U.S. i t failed apply test. To v. because criminal a (2009), which, and he says, hold Kentucky, that a Gardner "the meaningful defense." South that v. hold defendants cites S k i p p e r v. Crane says, complete McWhorter a l s o (1977), he and Chambers (McWhorter's v. Florida, Carolina, a defendant 476 has 430 U.S. the 1 "right to p l a c e before the sentencer relevant evidence i n m i t i g a t i o n of punishment." however, (McWhorter's are also brief, distinguishable p. 78). These from McWhorter's cases, case. In Chambers, a d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t t o c r o s s - e x a m i n e w i t n e s s was d e n i e d by common-law r u l e , own witness. testify court, was to which The what however, hearsay. lower court based prevented a party defendant they heard excluded the The "testimony persuasive the attempted the key from to that the a Mississippi witnesses say; the basis to lower that i t the r e j e c t e d by the t r i a l c o u r t here a s s u r a n c e s o f t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and 136 key impeaching i t s call witness t e s t i m o n y on Supreme C o u r t h e l d on a bore thus CR-09-1129 was w e l l w i t h i n t h e b a s i c r a t i o n a l e o f t h e e x c e p t i o n for d e c l a r a t i o n s a g a i n s t i n t e r e s t . That t e s t i m o n y a l s o was c r i t i c a l t o Chambers' d e f e n s e . In t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , where c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g the ascertainment of g u i l t are i m p l i c a t e d , t h e h e a r s a y r u l e may n o t b e a p p l i e d m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y to d e f e a t the ends of j u s t i c e . " Chambers, In the 410 U.S. Crane, of his physical 302. a defendant environment Part at sought to i n t r o d u c e testimony i n which defense was to tying him believe his confession. To paint a evidence the picture of a his will period. The lower court, any testimony show a secured his that to the because crime the uneducated small, there the no not boy windowless who room from a meaningful opportunity to present a defense, which o p p o r t u n i t y i f the " p e r m i t t e d t o exclude competent, r e l i a b l e to credibility the a held to kept long putting which has the Court for defendant empty Supreme in was took an The environment sought interrogation is place. was should jury however, p r e c l u d e d him about confession. s u p p o r t h i s d e f e n s e , he young, against on in police about the that a complete State were e v i d e n c e b e a r i n g on o f a c o n f e s s i o n when s u c h e v i d e n c e i s c e n t r a l defendant's claim of innocence." 691. 137 Crane, 476 U.S. at CR-09-1129 In During Gardner, the sentencing a presentence to death. did not investigation report report, that the lower disclose must considerations in which In during a visitor that inadmissible. cases the sentencer as hearing The a mitigating factor, contained to the a death the confidential Supreme reviewing sentence 430 U.S. sought from Court of court the i n every case a t 362. to introduce two jailers testimony and a "made a g o o d a d j u s t m e n t " w h i l e court excluded that Court held " n o t be p r e c l u d e d any aspect that in capital from c o n s i d e r i n g , character of the offense d e f e n d a n t p r o f f e r s as a b a s i s f o r a s e n t e n c e l e s s t h a n 138 he irrelevant of a defendant's or r e c o r d and any o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s jail the evidence because of s u c h e v i d e n c e was Supreme should the defendant court Gardner, state rule that provided and to sentence on A d d i t i o n a l l y , the lower the defendant The l o w e r court r e l i e d record to that motivated the defendant murder. Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e r e c o r d disclose sentencing was i n j a i l . a States of d i d not put i n the information i t i s imposed. Skipper, court convicted the lower however, hearing. the The U n i t e d appeal was phase o f t r i a l the sentencing Florida. on defendant The information during the that the death." CR-09-1129 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4. Here, although Vogelsang to certain conversations was she p r e c l u d e d from t e s t i f y i n g had with McWhorter's members b e c a u s e t h e s t a t e m e n t s were h e a r s a y , McWhorter f a m i l y members from calling those the p o s t c o n v i c t i o n proceeding. as an drawn expert, Vogelsang from facts The c o u l d not and data that were remedy t h i s , McWhorter s i m p l y had witnesses into t h a t w o u l d be evidence that would opinion. presented i n Chambers, Crane, Gardner, courts precluded is the in the different and defendants facts to See on evidence postconviction relief Rule 32.3, a l l the court did A l a . R. witnesses not necessary rests Crim. needed infringe on P. the to e n t i t l e on the defense. 139 The a on to present the data her the any burden petitioner petitioner. Because McWhorter d i d not right To situations putting t o meet h i s b u r d e n , his and S k i p p e r , where from squarely from provide evidence with regard to t h e i r respective defenses. of p r e s e n t i n g the that, evidence. to from at conclusions testimony Vogelsang complete lower This allow witnesses to her not to put as court ruled to e l i c i t necessary family nothing precluded circuit testify as put the circuit a complete CR-09-1129 D. F i n a l l y , McWhorter argues t h a t the excluding evidence under McWhorter contends t h a t an e v i d e n t i a r y r u l e ; of evidence." b e c a u s e , he Rule Abraham Barnes friends, and circuit and Specifically, "Rule 32.6(b) i s a p l e a d i n g i t cannot provide the court erred i n 32.6(b). (McWhorter's b r i e f , says, circuit Amy p. court not the b a s i s f o r e x c l u s i o n 81.) He limited Battle, rule, the claims error testimony McWhorter's of high-school Kenneth Burns, McWhorter's middle-school science teacher. Our did not review exclude circuit court witnesses petition. even to of the e v i d e n c e b a s e d on limited to the McWhorter McWhorter's is testimony the identified a s s e r t i o n s i n the refutes the Rule 32.6(b). a l l e g a t i o n s contained Specifically, though not the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t the not court i n the of the i n the on this entitled to relief error. IV. 140 amended R u l e the the testify the this 32 witnesses, could basis. on Instead, Thus, amended p e t i t i o n . claim court complained-of ruled that petition, circuit as record Consequently, assertion of CR-09-1129 McWhorter summarily argues dismissing that the h i s Brady circuit claim court relevant amended R u l e that the informant to mitigation. 32 p e t i t i o n . ) State withheld (Claim Specifically, that had shot l e g , and M i n e r fired the remaining that k i l l e d Williams." This claim procedurally barred and not that McWhorter's "a alleged jailhouse Daniel Miner, t h e v i c t i m , Lee W i l l i a m s [ , ] shots was evidence t o l d the State's prosecutors and h i s t h e n - c o - d e f e n d a n t , the the McWhorter that both McWhorter McWhorter says, he VI(A) i n information named T i m o t h y R i c e in because, State f a i l e d to d i s c l o s e p o t e n t i a l l y exculpatory was erred shots, that said once i n i n c l u d i n g the (McWhorter's b r i e f , pp. 8 4 - 8 5 . ) sufficiently pleaded, and i t 1 5 was because i t c o u l d have been r a i s e d a t t r i a l on a p p e a l b u t was n o t . See R u l e 3 2 . 3 , A l a . R. Crim. P.; We note t h a t McWhorter a l l e g e d s e v e r a l other Brady v i o l a t i o n s i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n b u t d i d n o t r a i s e them i n his b r i e f t o t h i s Court. The c l a i m s M c W h o r t e r p r e s e n t e d i n h i s amended p e t i t i o n b u t does n o t p u r s u e on a p p e a l a r e deemed t o be abandoned. S e e , e . g . , B r o w n l e e v . S t a t e , 666 S o . 2 d 9 1 , 93 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 5 ) ( " ' " [ A ] l l e g a t i o n s ... n o t e x p r e s s l y a r g u e d o n ... a p p e a l ... a r e d e e m e d b y u s t o b e a b a n d o n e d . " U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B u r r o u g h s , 650 F . 2 d 5 9 5 , 598 ( 5 t h C i r . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 454 U.S. 1 0 3 7 , 102 S. C t . 5 8 0 , 70 L. E d . 2 d 4 8 3 (1981).' B u r k s v . S t a t e , 600 S o . 2 d 3 7 4 , 380 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1991). We w i l l n o t r e v i e w i s s u e s n o t l i s t e d a n d a r g u e d i n brief. Burks."). 15 141 CR-09-1129 Rule 32.2(a)(3), In (a)(5), McWhorter's A l a . R.Crim. amended P. petition, he alleged following: "80. D e s p i t e the h e i g h t e n e d o b l i g a t i o n upon the State i n this c a p i t a l proceeding, despite a s p e c i f i c r e q u e s t f r o m d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , and d e s p i t e t h e f a c t that the defense requested and the trial judge granted open f i l e d i s c o v e r y , the S t a t e f a i l e d to provide exculpatory evidence i n i t s possession to the d e f e n s e . D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y Thompson f a i l e d to disclose to defense counsel that less than two months earlier, on January 19, 1994, Assistant District Attorney Jolley took a statement from T i m o t h y R i c e , who a t t h a t t i m e was i n c a r c e r a t e d i n t h e M a r s h a l l C o u n t y J a i l a l o n g w i t h Mr. McWhorter and his codefendants. In exchange for his s t a t e m e n t , Mr. J o l l e y o f f e r e d Mr. R i c e i m m u n i t y f r o m p r o s e c u t i o n on a n y i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s r e v e a l e d i n h i s s t a t e m e n t , so l o n g as t h o s e a c t i v i t i e s d i d n o t i m p l i c a t e Mr. R i c e i n a c r i m e o f v i o l e n c e . Mr. R i c e i n f o r m e d Mr. J o l l e y t h a t he h a d t a l k e d s e p a r a t e l y w i t h Mr. M c W h o r t e r , Mr. M i n e r , a n d Mr. L e e W i l l i a m s , J r . , a b o u t w h a t h a p p e n e d on t h e n i g h t o f t h e c r i m e . I n t h e i r s e p a r a t e c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h Mr. R i c e , b o t h Mr. McWhorter and Mr. Miner stated that Mr. M c W h o r t e r s h o t Mr. W i l l i a m s once i n the l e g , but that Mr. Miner fired the rest of the shots, including the shots that actually killed Mr. Williams. T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was n e v e r d i s c l o s e d t o defense counsel. If the District Attorney had d i s c l o s e d t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n to defense counsel, i t would have provided persuasive support for Mr. M c W h o r t e r ' s d e f e n s e t h e o r y t h a t Mr. M i n e r , a n d not Mr. M c W h o r t e r , was t h e p r i m a r y s h o o t e r , a n d t h a t Mr. M c W h o r t e r d i d n o t i n t e n d t o m u r d e r Mr. W i l l i a m s . " (C. 503.) As this Court said i n Ray, 142 So. 3d at : the CR-09-1129 "The U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t i n B r a d y h e l d t h a t 'the s u p p r e s s i o n by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f e v i d e n c e f a v o r a b l e t o an a c c u s e d u p o n r e q u e s t v i o l a t e s due p r o c e s s where the e v i d e n c e i s m a t e r i a l e i t h e r to g u i l t or to punishment, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the good f a i t h of the p r o s e c u t i o n . ' 373 U.S. a t 87. 'To e s t a b l i s h a Brady v i o l a t i o n , [the p e t i t i o n e r ] must demonstrate: (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) t h a t t h a t e v i d e n c e was favorable to [the defendant] or e x c u l p a t o r y ; and (3) t h a t the e v i d e n c e was m a t e r i a l . ' Ex p a r t e K e n n e d y , 472 So. 2d 1 1 0 6 , 1110 (Ala. 1985)." The State asserted summary d i s m i s s a l because of McWhorter below, as McWhorter's Rule failed to assert r a i s e d h i s Brady c l a i m at t r i a l 3 2 . 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) and that therefore The was circuit regarding (C. 865, In [Ms. court Rice's was appeal, petition he barred proper have d i r e c t appeal. See Rule The State pursuant statement was that not insufficiently summarily dismissed alleged on could C r i m . P. claim procedurally to also argued pleaded Rule 32.7(d). McWhorter's Brady pursuant to and Rule claim 32.7(d). 1126.) considering C R - 0 7 - 0 0 5 1 , May 2009), this Brady 32 that o r on ( a ) ( 5 ) , A l a . R. McWhorter's i t d o e s now that Court the a 1, similar 2009] prosecutor claim So. had in Beckworth 3d v. State, (Ala. Crim. committed a Brady violation, said: "Rule 32.3 states that 143 '[t]he petitioner App. shall CR-09-1129 have the burden of p l e a d i n g and p r o v i n g by a preponderance of the evidence the f a c t s n e c e s s a r y to e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . ' Rule 32.6(b) s t a t e s t h a t ' [ t ] h e p e t i t i o n must c o n t a i n a c l e a r and s p e c i f i c s t a t e m e n t o f t h e g r o u n d s upon w h i c h relief i s sought, i n c l u d i n g f u l l d i s c l o s u r e of the f a c t u a l b a s i s of those grounds. A bare a l l e g a t i o n that a constitutional right has been v i o l a t e d and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to w a r r a n t any f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . ' In Boyd v. S t a t e , 913 So. 2 d 1 1 1 3 , 1125 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 3 ) , this Court stated: "'"Rule 32.6(b) requires that the p e t i t i o n i t s e l f d i s c l o s e t h e f a c t s r e l i e d upon i n s e e k i n g relief." B o y d v . S t a t e , 746 So. 2d 364, 406 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). In o t h e r words, i t i s not the pleading of a conclusion "which, i f t r u e , e n t i t l e [ s ] the p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . " Lancaster v . S t a t e , 638 So. 2d 1 3 7 0 , 1373 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 993). It is the allegation of facts in pleading which, i f true, e n t i t l e a p e t i t i o n e r to r e l i e f . After facts are pleaded, which, i f t r u e , e n t i t l e the p e t i t i o n e r to relief, the p e t i t i o n e r i s then entitled t o an o p p o r t u n i t y , a s p r o v i d e d i n R u l e 32.9, A l a . R. Crim. P., to present evidence proving those a l l e g e d f a c t s . ' App. " I n Hyde v. 2006), t h i s S t a t e , 950 So. 2d Court recognized: 344 ( A l a . Crim. "'The burden of p l e a d i n g under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b) i s a heavy one. C o n c l u s i o n s u n s u p p o r t e d by s p e c i f i c facts w i l l not s a t i s f y the r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule 144 CR-09-1129 32.3 a n d R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) . The full factual b a s i s f o r t h e c l a i m m u s t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e petition itself. I f , assuming every f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n i n a R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n t o be t r u e , a c o u r t c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e whether the p e t i t i o n e r i s e n t i t l e d to r e l i e f , the p e t i t i o n e r has not s a t i s f i e d t h e b u r d e n o f p l e a d i n g u n d e r R u l e 32.3 a n d R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) . See B r a c k n e l l v. S t a t e , 883 So. 2d 724 (Ala. C r i m . App. 2003).' "Hyde v . State, Beckworth, So. 950 3d So. at 2d at 356." . " ' B e c a u s e t h i s B r a d y c l a i m was f i r s t p r e s e n t e d i n a R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n , [ M c W h o r t e r ] c a n o b t a i n r e l i e f o n l y i f i t i n v o l v e s "newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e . " ' P a y n e v . S t a t e , 791 So. 2 d 3 8 3 , 397 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1999). See a l s o W i n d s o r v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 5 - 1 2 0 3 , A u g u s t 7, 200 9] S o . 3d , (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) ('Windsor d i d n o t a l l e g e t h a t h i s B r a d y c l a i m s w e r e b a s e d on n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e o r t h a t any a l l e g e d s u p p r e s s i o n by t h e S t a t e c o n t i n u e d u n t i l s u c h t i m e as t h e c l a i m s c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n r a i s e d a t t r i a l . ' ) ; B u s h v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 3 - 1 9 0 2 , May 2 9, 200 9] So. 3d , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) ( ' [ B ] e c a u s e t h i s a l l e g e d B r a d y v i o l a t i o n i s r a i s e d i n a p o s t c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n , the p e t i t i o n e r must also satisfy the requirements for newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e . ' ) ; D a v i s v . S t a t e , 44 So. 3d 1 1 1 8 , 1144 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) ('Davis f a i l e d t o plead and to prove the requirements for newly discovered evidence.')." Ray, So. Rule 3d at 32.1(e) proceeding on facts which exist the . allows a petitioner grounds require that that 145 to "newly the institute discovered conviction or a Rule 32 material sentence be CR-09-1129 vacated by t h e c o u r t " i f : " ( 1 ) The f a c t s r e l i e d u p o n w e r e n o t known b y t h e p e t i t i o n e r or the p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel at the time of trial or s e n t e n c i n g or i n time to f i l e a p o s t t r i a l m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 24, o r i n t i m e t o be i n c l u d e d i n any p r e v i o u s c o l l a t e r a l p r o c e e d i n g and c o u l d n o t have been d i s c o v e r e d by any o f t h o s e times through the e x e r c i s e of reasonable d i l i g e n c e ; other " ( 2 ) The f a c t s a r e n o t f a c t s t h a t were known; "(3) The facts impeachment e v i d e n c e ; do merely not cumulative merely to amount to " ( 4 ) I f t h e f a c t s h a d b e e n known a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l or of s e n t e n c i n g , the r e s u l t p r o b a b l y would have been d i f f e r e n t ; and " ( 5 ) The f a c t s e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s i n n o c e n t o f t h e c r i m e f o r w h i c h t h e p e t i t i o n e r was c o n v i c t e d or s h o u l d not have r e c e i v e d t h e s e n t e n c e that the p e t i t i o n e r received." Rule 3 2 . 1 ( e ) , A l a . R. Crim. A p o s t c o n v i c t i o n Brady must meet evidence" 791 So. opinions Brady a l l five i n Rule 2d 383, of t h i s claim P. claim raised prerequisites 3 2 . 1 ( e ) , A l a . R. 398 ( A l a . Crim. Court of Crim. App. have h e l d t h a t i n a Rule "newly 32 discovered P. Payne v. State, 1999). Numerous recent a petitioner's i s p r o c e d u r a l l y barred i f the p e t i t i o n e r plead that h i s c l a i m i s based petition Rule 32 fails to on n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e c o u l d not have been r a i s e d a t t r i a l 146 o r on d i r e c t appeal. and See, CR-09-1129 e.g., B r y a n t v. 3d (Ala. Windsor, State, Crim. supra; [Ms. App. September App. Ferguson Crim. App. such time the motion claim or facts r a i s e d at In Hunt v. 2005), t h i s the that on to is procedurally not, State So. 13 3d So. Davis, v. supra; State, Crim. 444-45 418, [Ms. (Ala. 3d So. case, McWhorter f a i l e d as sufficient claim Smith 2008] 2011] supra; supra; State, s t a t e m e n t t a k e n two posttrial was v. facts indicating Rice's 26, Ray, 4, (Ala. 2008). In t h i s any 2011); Beckworth, CR-05-0561, 2008); CR-08-0405, Feb. Court, had State's not appeal. support or on suppression continued been has for petition raised failed relief, i t could to of until in a plead and have been, the but appeal. 2d in considering committed have claim because So. trial T h u s , he his barred 940 alleged months b e f o r e could trial State, the to i n c l u d e i n h i s 1041, the 1058 (Ala. Crim. App. petitioner's claim that a Brady v i o l a t i o n , held: "[T]he c i r c u i t court found t h a t Hunt's Brady c l a i m was precluded b e c a u s e Hunt f a i l e d t o p l e a d or t o p r o v e t h a t t h i s c l a i m was b a s e d on n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d evidence. The c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s r u l i n g i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r i o r h o l d i n g s of t h i s Court. As we s t a t e d i n W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 782 So. 2d 8 1 1 , 818 (Ala. Crim. App. 20 0 0 ) : 147 CR-09-1129 "'The appellant's first argument i s t h a t the State w i t h h e l d e x c u l p a t o r y information i n v i o l a t i o n o f B r a d y v . M a r y l a n d , 373 U.S. 83 ( 1 9 6 3 ) The a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t a s s e r t that this claim was based on newly discovered evidence. Therefore, i t is p r o c e d u r a l l y b a r r e d b e c a u s e he c o u l d h a v e r a i s e d i t a t t r i a l a n d on d i r e c t appeal, but d i d not. See Rule 32.2(a)(3) and ( a ) ( 5 ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P.; B o y d v . State, 746 So. 2d 364 ( A l a . Cr. App. 1999); M a t t h e w s v . S t a t e , 654 So. 2d 66 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 4 ) ; L u n d y v . S t a t e , 568 So. 2 d 399 (Ala. C r . App. 1990).'" See also 2006) Madison (a v. State, postconviction petition must meet the evidence set forth in Because McWhorter did 999 So. Brady claim Rule not alleged statement statement motion did not f o r a new insufficiently indicating occur trial o r an pleaded, Therefore, summary under Rule until that 2000), and cites McGahee v. Ex of Ala. the is Rule Crim. his lapsed, of for parte State, Brady Pierce, 851 Rice's the filing the c l a i m 885 148 So. 2d 191 claim 32 of procedurally this P.). Rule discovery time 32 discovered R. in App. a was barred. 32.7(d). McWhorter dismissal newly the a p p e a l had i t a of the e x i s t e n c e after and in facts any i n d i c a t i n g when he l e a r n e d (Ala. Crim. of 32.1(e), allege 561 raised prerequisites petition or 2d So. 2d was proper 60 6 (Ala. Crim. (Ala. App. CR-09-1129 2003), f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that the newly-discovered-evidence standard of Rule 32.1(e) does b a s e d on a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s rights. Brady McWhorter's claim not apply to Rule of the defendant's argument i s procedurally is because In P i e r c e , Supreme C o u r t h e l d misconduct because the that Rule 32.1(e) d i d not apply claim constitutional went on to preclude preclude or that Pierce's 32.2(a)(5) [forming that Pierce's Pierce's "[a]lthough claim, claim unless the basis 851 was "he So. the issue established 851 So. 2d a t 616. that material still plead claim as d e f i n e d facts Rule that 149 trial stated 32.2(a)(3) and information or i n time to o r on i s based that would Court appeal." on raise does not have t o "newly his claim not Pierce, discovered under Rule 32.1(e)(1)-(5), indicating not n o t known, and c o u l d at t r i a l trial (5) the a however, does and The Thus, a l t h o u g h McWhorter h i s Brady facts" f o r new was have been r a i s e d a t under was juror- claim 32.1(e) 2d a t 614. barred of h i s claim] i n a motion Rule his Alabama to a The C o u r t , 32.2(a)(3) i f i t could Pierce, claim Rule r e a s o n a b l y have been d i s c o v e r e d , prove petitioner's c l a i m under Rule 32.1(a). State on a p p e a l . " the claims constitutional misplaced barred. 32 could he m u s t not have CR-09-1129 been raised at procedurally This trial barred requires concealment or on under McWhorter direct Rule to appeal 32.2(a)(3) plead of R i c e ' s statement that "was So. 2d at 2 d 1113 616. See f o r new also ( A l a . C r i m . App. 05-1203, August 7, trial Hunt, not avoid known, and or i n time to 3d not raise o r on a p p e a l . " P i e r c e , State, 1 6 alleged could and W i n d s o r v. S t a t e , So. being 32.3(a)(5). State's s u p r a , Boyd v. 2003), 2009] and the r e a s o n a b l y have been d i s c o v e r e d , at t r i a l the i s s u e i n a motion to 851 913 So. [Ms. CR- (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). Finally, rights McWhorter supersede the Hunt, Boyd, Windsor, Brady that claims to Rule Rule 32's McWhorter would inadequate District to also appears procedural to argue requirements of his Brady Rule 32. as w e l l as o t h e r c a s e s h a v e a l l s u b j e c t e d 32's procedural requirements. procedural requirements have that to prove vindicate Attorney's Office the that Rule Third prove are unconstitutional, 32 " i s fundamentally substantive of the To rights Judicial involved." District v. The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t ' s l a n g u a g e i n P i e r c e c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e s t h e l a n g u a g e o f R u l e 3 2 . 1 ( e ) (1) . C a s e l a w a p p e a r s t o c o n f l a t e the "newly d i s c o v e r e d " language of Rule 32.1(e) w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f R u l e 3 2 . 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) and 3 2 . 2 ( a ) ( 5 ) by upholding a p e t i t i o n e r ' s f a i l u r e t o p l e a d " n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e " as g r o u n d s f o r p r o c e d u r a l l y b a r r i n g h i s c l a i m u n d e r R u l e 32.2. 1 6 150 CR-09-1129 Osborne, U.S. McWhorter , 129 d o e s n o t make t h i s McWhorter's specificity supporting Brady claim and l a c k e d procedurally was to C t . 2308, 2320 (200 9 ) . in his brief. not pleaded with sufficient d i s c l o s u r e of the f a c t u a l Summary d i s m i s s a l of the c l a i m because the c l a i m o r on a p p e a l , barred. entitled was additionally, raised at t r i a l S. argument a full the claim. have been p r o p e r , been , b u t was McWhorter c l e a r l y basis would could have n o t , and t h u s was f a i l e d t o show t h a t he relief. V. Lastly, failing to object courtroom VIII McWhorter argues t h a t counsel to h i s being i n the presence i n McWhorter's contends petition that the transported of the j u r y amended circuit was i n e f f e c t i v e f o r Rule court 32 i n and out o f t h e i n handcuffs. petition.) erred in his He a l l e g e s t h a t w i t h o u t an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . hearing McWhorter on t h i s argues, he this to this "96. entitled to on i t s f a c e . an evidentiary issue. I n h i s amended p e t i t i o n , regard was McWhorter dismissing c l a i m was s u f f i c i e n t l y p l e a d e d a n d i s m e r i t o r i o u s Thus, (Claim McWhorter a l l e g e d as f o l l o w s i n claim: On e a c h d a y o f t h e t r i a l , 151 the j u r o r s could CR-09-1129 see [McWhorter] being led into the courtroom manacled, in handcuffs. Jurors could see [ M c W h o r t e r ' s ] h a n d c u f f s b e i n g p u t on a n d r e m o v e d . "97. procedure. Trial counsel never objected to this "98. The shackling procedure stripped [McWhorter] o f t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f i n n o c e n c e t h a t i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a f f o r d e d t o a l l d e f e n d a n t s . One o f the 'basic components of a fair trial i s the presumption of innocence.' E s t e l l e v . W i l l i a m s , 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). 'To implement the p r e s u m p t i o n , c o u r t s must be a l e r t t o f a c t o r s t h a t may undermine the f a i r n e s s of the fact-finding process.' Id. Shackling tends not only to undermine the defendant's presumption of innocence, b u t ' i s i t s e l f s o m e t h i n g o f an a f f r o n t t o t h e v e r y d i g n i t y and decorum of j u d i c i a l proceedings t h a t the j u d g e i s s e e k i n g t o u p h o l d . ' I l l i n o i s v . A l l e n , 397 U.S. 3 3 7 , 344 (1970). "99. ' A l l o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s we h a v e s t u d i e d are agreed t h a t t o b r i n g a p r i s o n e r before the bar of j u s t i c e i n h a n d c u f f s o r s h a c k l e s , where t h e r e i s no p r e t e n s e o f n e c e s s i t y , i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o u r n o t i o n o f a f a i r t r i a l , f o r i t c r e a t e s i n the minds o f t h e j u r y a p r e j u d i c e w h i c h w i l l l i k e l y d e t e r them from d e c i d i n g the prisoner's fate impartially.' C l a r k v . S t a t e , 195 S o . 2 d 7 8 6 , 7 8 7 ( A l a . 1 9 6 7 ) . "100. When shackling occurs, i t must be subjected to 'close j u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y , ' to determine i f t h e r e was a n ' e s s e n t i a l s t a t e i n t e r e s t ' f u r t h e r e d by c o m p e l l i n g a d e f e n d a n t t o wear shackles and whether l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e , l e s s p r e j u d i c i a l methods of r e s t r a i n t were c o n s i d e r e d or c o u l d have been employed. E l l e d g e v . D u g g e r , 823 F . 2 d 1 4 3 9 , 1 4 5 1 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1987) (citations omitted). Although ' [ G ] r e a t w e i g h t must be a c c o r d e d t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f the trial court' i n determining what security measures are necessary, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s must 152 CR-09-1129 be m a i n t a i n e d , G o o d w i n v . S t a t e , 495 So. 2 d 7 3 1 , 733 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), by b a l a n c i n g the state interest i n security with the potential f o r p r e j u d i c e t o the defendant. "101. [ M c W h o r t e r ] p o s e d no r i s k t o j u s t i f y h i s being shackled throughout h i s t r i a l . His behavior was n e i t h e r b o i s t e r o u s n o r r e c a l c i t r a n t . In fact, he s a t q u i e t l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e p r o c e e d i n g s . He made no t h r e a t s a t a n y p o i n t d u r i n g t h e t r i a l , o r l e a d i n g up t o i t , a n d t h e r e w a s t h e r e f o r e n o p e r s u a s i v e r e a s o n why h a n d c u f f s c o u l d n o t b e r e m o v e d b e f o r e h e e n t e r e d t h e c o u r t r o o m , o r why h e c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n permitted to exit the courtroom without being shackled. "102. The d e c i s i o n t o e x h i b i t [ M c W h o r t e r ] i n s h a c k l e s , e a c h d a y o f t h e t r i a l , was an u n i n f o r m e d o n e , a n d made w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g l e s s - r e s t r i c t i v e s e c u r i t y measures. I t v i o l a t e d [McWhorter's] r i g h t s to due p r o c e s s , a fair tiial, and a reliable sentencing p r o t e c t e d by t h e F i f t h , S i x t h , E i g h t h and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , and Alabama law. "103. By f a i l i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e s h a c k l i n g procedure, o r t o make a n a p p r o p r i a t e r e c o r d , trial counsel not only f a i l e d t o preserve the issue f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n on d i r e c t a p p e a l , t h e y a l s o f a i l e d t o measure up to an objective standard of reasonableness i n their representation of [McWhorter], i n t h a t they p e r m i t t e d t h e f a i r n e s s o f the t r i a l t o be u n d e r m i n e d and compromised, and permitted [McWhorter's] Alabama and Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o be v i o l a t e d as s e t f o r t h above, w i t h o u t any s t r a t e g i c reason f o r a c t i n g as they d i d . " (C. 509-10.) Judge Evans summarily dismissed 153 the claim pursuant to CR-09-1129 R u l e 3 2 . 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. in the final order Crim. P. J u d g e B u r k e s t a t e d as d e n y i n g M c W h o r t e r ' s amended follows petition: " J u d g e E v a n s ' s o r d e r o f O c t o b e r 19, 2 0 0 6 , d i d not s p e c i f y why this claim failed to state a m a t e r i a l i s s u e of f a c t or law, i n v i o l a t i o n of R u l e 32.7(d). M c W h o r t e r a l l e g e s t h a t j u r o r s saw h i m l e d t o t h e c o u r t r o o m w e a r i n g h a n d c u f f s and t h a t trial counsel d i d not o b j e c t . McWhorter does not plead s p e c i f i c a l l y how t h i s p r e j u d i c e d h i m , s o t h i s c l a i m f a i l s t o meet R u l e 3 2 . 6 ( b ) ' s ' c l e a r and specific' pleading requirement. Also, t h i s Court holds that M c W h o r t e r c a n n o t show p r e j u d i c e b e c a u s e ' i t i s n o t ground f o r m i s t r i a l t h a t the accused appeared before t h e j u r y i n h a n d c u f f s w h e n h i s a p p e a r a n c e was only p a r t o f g o i n g t o and f r o m t h e c o u r t r o o m . ' Dunaway v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 0 9 9 6 , D e c . 18, 2 0 0 9 ] , So. 3d ] ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) (affirming the dismissal of Dunaway's substantially similar [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim for f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t where t e s t i m o n y a t Dunaway's R u l e 32 h e a r i n g o n l y s h o w e d t h a t a n a l t e r n a t e j u r o r saw the handcuffs)." (C. 866, 1128.) In order of counsel, performance severe that t o p r e v a i l on was d e f i c i e n t " and the defendant 466 there reasonable a unprofessional been of ineffective assistance a d e f e n d a n t must d e m o n s t r a t e b o t h t h a t Strickland, is a claim U.S. at that was this deprived 687. "The deficiency of defendant probability that, "counsel's but a fair must for was so trial. show that counsel's e r r o r s , the r e s u l t of the p r o c e e d i n g would have different. A reasonable probability is 154 a probability CR-09-1129 sufficient at t o undermine c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e outcome." 466 U.S. 694. In Alabama, i t has c o n s i s t e n t l y been h e l d that "'[b]ringing a prisoner before the bar of j u s t i c e i n h a n d c u f f s o r s h a c k l e s , w h e r e t h e r e i s no pretense of n e c e s s i t y , i s inconsistent with our notion of a f a i r t r i a l . ' B r o c k v . S t a t e , 555 S o . 2 d 285, 288 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1989), on r e t u r n to r e m a n d , 580 S o . 2 d 1390 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 1 ) . The decision to r e s t r a i n a defendant rests with the trial j u d g e , a n d , a b s e n t an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n , t h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t d i s t u r b h i s r u l i n g on a p p e a l . Id. a t 289. ' U l t i m a t e l y , however, i t i s incumbent upon the defendant to show that less drastic a l t e r n a t i v e s were a v a i l a b l e and t h a t t h e t r i a l judge abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n by not i m p l e m e n t i n g them.' Id. ( i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n and q u o t a t i o n marks o m i t t e d ) . 'It i s not always r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r a defendant t o be h a n d c u f f e d o r s h a c k l e d i n f r o n t o f t h e j u r y . ' P e r k i n s v . S t a t e , 808 S o . 2 d 1 0 4 1 , 1 0 7 9 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999), a f f ' d , 80 8 S o . 2 d 1 1 4 3 , 1 1 4 5 ( A l a . 2 0 01)." McCall v. (holding State, that, 833 So. although 2d 673, 676 the t r i a l ( A l a . Crim. judge failed App. to state h i s r e a s o n s f o r r e q u i r i n g an i n m a t e w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y and prison suffered 285, 289 clothing, defendant any p r e j u d i c e ) . ( A l a . Crim. App. failed See a l s o 1989) 155 to show in that B r o c k v. S t a t e , (holding that, 2001) shackles he had 555 S o . 2 d although the CR-09-1129 facts of that court that reversible brought for case d i d not " e x p l i c i t l y the defendant error would for a trial i n t o the courtroom mistrial that i n d i c a t e a f e a r by t h e attempt court to allow appeared h a n d c u f f s when h i s a p p e a r a n c e was o n l y from v. (Ala. 119, Crim. 121 App. 1990) (quoting f o r purposes courtroom i s left McWilliams v. S t a t e , to of the Cushing t o be ground before 568 the jury being So. 2d 312, v. S t a t e , taken discretion court's of i n of going t o and to and the dismissal may from trial (Ala. Crim. 318 455 S o . 2 d Whether a defendant 640 S o . 2 d 982 a f f i r m the c i r c u i t a defendant a part State, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) ) . handcuffed We Justo i t i s not " ' I t i s not handcuffed"). the accused the courtroom.'" to escape, App. of the be the court. 1991). claims. McWhorter has n o t p r e s e n t e d any f a c t s t o s u p p o r t this the conclusions. claim i s based Consequently, on McWhorter pleading imposed by Rule of 32.6(b), Rule that trial bare has assertions not met either the 32.3 o r t h e s p e c i f i c i t y A l a . R. Crim. counsel's performance P. McWhorter was outside of reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e , " at and 689, n o r has McWhorter shown 156 that claim; burden requirements has not shown "the wide range S t r i c k l a n d , 466 there of i s a U.S. reasonable CR-09-1129 probability the that, handcuffs, different. i f trial the c o u n s e l h a d made a n o b j e c t i o n result of A c c o r d i n g l y , summary the trial dismissal would of t h i s have to been claim was proper. Based is on t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c i r c u i t court affirmed. AFFIRMED. Welch, JJ., recuse P . J . , and Kellum, J . , concur. themselves. 157 Windom and Burke,
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