Anthony Lee Stanley v. State of Alabama
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04/29/2011
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ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM,
2010-2011
CR-06-2236
Anthony Lee S t a n l e y
v.
State
Appeal
JOINER,
Judge.
Anthony
o f Alabama
from C o l b e r t C i r c u i t
(CC-05-608)
Court
1
L e e ("Tony")
Stanley
was c o n v i c t e d
of capital
m u r d e r f o r t h e i n t e n t i o n a l murder o f H e n r y S m i t h b y s t a b b i n g
T h i s c a s e was o r i g i n a l l y a s s i g n e d t o a n o t h e r member o f
t h i s C o u r t . I t was r e a s s i g n e d t o J u d g e J o i n e r on M a r c h 1 ,
2011.
1
CR-06-2236
him d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e
of a f i r s t - d e g r e e robbery,
40(a)(2),
Ala.
Code
1975.
Stanley's
trial,
the
that
Stanley
be
possibility
During
a vote
j u r y , by
the
o f 8 t o 4,
sentenced
to
parole.
of
life
After
phase
imprisonment without
a
aggravating
circumstances,
a motion
appeals
circumstances
the
presentence-
a sentencing
and
hearing,
f o r a new
evidence
On
Saturday,
in
an
trial,
which the
wife, Shelly.
J u n e 20,
The
court
c o n v i c t i o n and
introduced
J u n e 18,
apartment
at
trial
c r i m e was
that
Stanley
filed
Stanley
sentence of
death.
showed t h e f o l l o w i n g .
Stanley
stabbed to
shared
death
with
on t h e a p a r t m e n t d o o r .
Dorothy
("Dot")
Stanley,
apartment from Swanie, t h a t her
had
left
town and
his
d i s c o v e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g Monday,
He
because h i s mother, Swanie B e r r y h i l l ,
Shelly,
mitigating
denied.
2005, H e n r y S m i t h was
i n Tuscumbia
the
that
2005, when t h e l a n d l o r d ' s s o n , R o n a l d B e r r y h i l l ,
the padlock
by
the
sentenced Stanley to death.
his capital-murder
The
outweighed
of
recommended
c o u r t overrode the j u r y ' s recommendation, f i n d i n g
the
told
penalty
receiving
i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t and c o n d u c t i n g
trial
see § 13A-5-
who
son,
accessed
the
apartment
t h e l a n d l o r d , had
actually
Stanley,
and
cut
leased
been
the
his wife,
t h a t s e v e r a l dogs r e m a i n e d i n s i d e
2
CR-06-2236
the apartment.
Dr.
The m e d i c a l e x a m i n e r and f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g i s t ,
E m i l y Ward,
testified
that
Smith
m u l t i p l e s t a b wounds and s e v e r e h e a d
Shelly
using
Stanley t e s t i f i e d
illegal
narcotics,
that
died
as
a
result
of
injuries.
she
including
and
S t a n l e y had
crack
been
cocaine
and
OxyContin, f o r s e v e r a l days, i n c l u d i n g F r i d a y evening i n t o the
early
morning
exhausted
hours
their
of Saturday, June
s u p p l y o f money and
18,
drugs,
2005.
When t h e y
Stanley directed
h e r t o t e l e p h o n e S m i t h , an i n d i v i d u a l t h e y knew t o c a r r y
and
pills.
She
g o i n g t o pay
called
Smith
him
f o r the p i l l s
f r o m him t h a t F r i d a y n i g h t .
t o r o b and k i l l
apartment,
for
Smith
Smith.
2
under
the guise that
she and
she
was
S t a n l e y had o b t a i n e d
S t a n l e y t o l d h e r t h a t he p l a n n e d
When S m i t h a r r i v e d a t t h e
Stanleys'
S h e l l y , w h i l e s t a n d i n g away f r o m t h e d o o r ,
t o come i n s i d e .
cash
As
Smith
entered the
called
apartment,
S t a n l e y a t t a c k e d him w i t h an a l u m i n u m b a s e b a l l b a t ,
striking
him i n t h e f a c e , t h e l e g , and o t h e r p a r t s o f h i s b o d y numerous
times.
3
S t a n l e y knocked
Shelly also
acts f o r drugs.
2
Smith
testified
that
to
the
she
floor,
often
took
a
steak
exchanged s e x u a l
Some t e s t i m o n y s u g g e s t e d t h a t S t a n l e y u s e d two b a s e b a l l
b a t s t o s t r i k e S m i t h . The t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e d t h a t one was a
3
3
CR-06-2236
knife
his
from t h e t o p o f a c h i n a c a b i n e t ,
knees
on t h e f l o o r ,
and r e p e a t e d l y
back, w h i l e Smith begged f o r h i s l i f e .
bent,
straddled
Stanley got another steak k n i f e
Smith
with
stabbed him i n t h e
When t h e s t e a k k n i f e
4
and c o n t i n u e d t o s t a b
Smith.
S h e l l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t , w h i l e S t a n l e y was s t a b b i n g S m i t h ,
she moved S m i t h ' s t r u c k , w h i c h S m i t h h a d l e f t
the
not
S t a n l e y s ' a p a r t m e n t , b e h i n d t h e l a u n d r o m a t s o t h a t i t was
visible
apartment,
wallet.
clothes,
from
the road.
she and S t a n l e y
When
she
searched
returned
Smith's
to the
pockets
and
B e c a u s e t h e y f o u n d no c a s h o r d r u g s , S t a n l e y c h a n g e d
padlocked
t h e apartment
door,
S m i t h ' s a p a r t m e n t f o r money a n d p i l l s .
a p a r t m e n t , t a k i n g c a s h , change j a r s ,
returned to their
up
running outside
truck,
which
and l e f t
to search
They r a n s a c k e d S m i t h ' s
and OxyContin p i l l s , and
a p a r t m e n t t o g e t a 1987 maroon T o y o t a p i c k ¬
had
been
loaned
to
them
by
another
a c q u a i n t a n c e , J o n a t h a n P a t t e r s o n , who t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l
that
f u l l - s i z e d a l u m i n u m b a s e b a l l b a t a n d t h e o t h e r was a s m a l l e r sized memorabilia-type bat.
The t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e d t h a t S t a n l e y responded
k i l l i n g S m i t h a t t h a t p o i n t was a "mercy k i l l i n g . "
4
4
that
CR-06-2236
he was
addicted
from the
9:00
pick-up
Tuscumbia
and
a.m.
on
truck
abandoned
to Muscle
Western h o t e l .
Mart
that
he
often
Saturday
into
it.
borrowed p i c k - u p t r u c k .
drove
and
purchased
the
morning,
Colbert
Shelly
5
Stanley
Heights
followed
him
area
in
checked
i n t o a room a t t h e B e s t
with
the proceeds
from the s a l e
body t o p r e v e n t t h e s e v e r a l dogs t h a t were i n t h e
granddaughter
awhile
goodbye
the
Smith's
apartment
A r o u n d noon t h a t day, S h e l l y v i s i t e d
daughter, Jenna M i t c h e l l ,
for
of
K¬
Sometime t h a t day, S h e l l y r e t u r n e d t o
t h e i r a p a r t m e n t i n T u s c u m b i a and p u t a c o m f o r t e r o v e r
from d i s t u r b i n g i t .
of
their
They a l s o p u r c h a s e d s u p p l i e s f r o m a n e a r b y
discount store
gone
took
A f t e r abandoning Smith's t r u c k , they
S h o a l s and
s t o l e n OxyContin p i l l s .
be
pills
Stanleys.
Around
Smith's
t o drugs
and
and t o l d h e r t h a t she was
needed
before
she
to
tell
left.
6
her
her
going to
and
According
her
to
P a t r i c i a S t a n f i e l d , who l i v e d n e a r b y , t e s t i f i e d t h a t she
r e c a l l e d seeing a red-colored older-model Chevrolet pick-up
t r u c k i n t h e a r e a on S a t u r d a y .
S e v e r a l days l a t e r , a f t e r
l o c a l t e l e v i s i o n news s t a t i o n s showed a p h o t o g r a p h o f t h e
t r u c k , S t a n f i e l d ' s son s p o k e w i t h t h e p o l i c e and i n f o r m e d them
t h a t a s i m i l a r t r u c k h a d b e e n n e a r t h e i r house on o r a r o u n d
Saturday.
5
6
Stanley
i s Mitchell's stepfather.
5
CR-06-2236
Mitchell,
S t a n l e y was
h e r m o t h e r was
not w i t h her mother t h a t a f t e r n o o n ,
visibly
u p s e t and
next
morning,
Sunday,
checked
out
The
Shelly
of
the
crying.
June
hotel
apartment t o pack t h e i r b e l o n g i n g s .
Smith's body t o the f l o o r
covered
7
19,
and
2005,
Stanley
returned
the b l o o d s t a i n e d f l o o r w i t h another
loaned
to
the
Stanleys.
carpet.
When t h e y
d i d not
door, P a t t e r s o n , u s i n g h i s e x t r a s e t o f keys,
They
now
were
without
transportation,
according to S h e l l y , panicked,
come p i c k
them up.
Dot
Stanley's
sister's
house.
m o r n i n g , June 20,
t h r o u g h o u t Sunday
On
2005.
They
According
moved
and
Jonathan
truck
answer
he
the
took h i s t r u c k .
and
Stanley,
who,
h i s mother, Dot,
them up
and
stayed
there
drove
until
them
to
to
Monday
to S h e l l y , they used drugs
evening.
Monday m o r n i n g , Dot
Colbert Heights
telephoned
picked
their
s i d e o f t h e i r bed
P a t t e r s o n k n o c k e d on t h e d o o r t o r e t r i e v e t h e p i c k - u p
had
and
to
While there, they
on t h e o t h e r
and
drove
Stanley
and
Shelly to
the
a r e a n e a r where t h e y had l e f t S m i t h ' s t r u c k on
M i t c h e l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t she knew t h a t h e r m o t h e r was a
d r u g a d d i c t and t h a t she o f t e n b o u g h t O x y C o n t i n p i l l s f r o m
S m i t h . M i t c h e l l had w i t n e s s e d h e r m o t h e r and g r a n d m o t h e r use
d r u g s on o c c a s i o n .
7
6
CR-06-2236
Saturday.
Stanley
and
Shelly
drove
Smith's
truck
a
f r i e n d ' s house i n R u s s e l l v i l l e ,
where t h e y l e f t
b a g s t h e y had p a c k e d on Sunday.
While d r i v i n g back to Muscle
Shoals that afternoon,
informed
him
that
apartment t h a t
had
been l e f t
the
cooler
Berryhills
planned
to
enter
because they b e l i e v e d
the
their
Stanleys
had
apartment.
i n the
drove back to
the
abandoned the t r u c k a second t i m e ,
and
The
Stanleys
n e x t s e v e r a l d a y s h i d i n g i n t h e woods w i t h
containing
toothbrushes.
their
cellular
telephones,
only
wallets,
to
success.
locate
When
her
she
father
drove
on
by
Saturday
her
and
father's
Sunday
She
second
time
and
r e a l i z e d something
later
that
day
and
was
wrong.
apartment
noticed
She
the
early
returned
door
she
without
Sunday m o r n i n g , she n o t i c e d t h a t n e i t h e r he n o r h i s t r u c k
there.
a
8
C h r i s t i e Smith, the v i c t i m ' s daughter, t e s t i f i e d t h a t
tried
she
t h e y were c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e dogs t h a t
Colbert Heights area,
spent the
duffel
S t a n l e y t e l e p h o n e d h i s m o t h e r , and
afternoon
l e f t town and
their
to
to
was
a
the
Dot turned the c o o l e r over to the p o l i c e s h o r t l y a f t e r
S t a n l e y and S h e l l y t u r n e d t h e m s e l v e s i n t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s .
The
c o o l e r was
introduced
i n t o evidence.
However,
the
t e s t i m o n y r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e S t a n l e y s ' c e l l phones were n e v e r
located.
8
7
CR-06-2236
apartment
ajar.
Berryhill,
a f a m i l y f r i e n d who
a p a r t m e n t and
While
discovered
Christie
had
waited
outside,
Janice
d a t e d S m i t h , went i n t o t h e
t h a t the p l a c e
had
been
ransacked.
On Sunday e v e n i n g , C h r i s t i e f i l e d a m i s s i n g - p e r s o n
w i t h the Tuscumbia P o l i c e Department.
C h r i s t i e encountered Patterson,
report
June
because
16,
stolen.
sold
h i s h o u s e had
2005, and
her
father,
Patterson
also
was
also f i l i n g
among o t h e r
a police
or
things,
around
had
been
t o l d C h r i s t i e t h a t he b e l i e v e d S h e l l y
Smith,
told
the
shotgun
Christie
that
f a t h e r on F r i d a y n i g h t a r o u n d 11:00
o f f at his
At the p o l i c e s t a t i o n ,
b e e n b u r g l a r i z e d on
a shotgun,
Patterson
who
report
taken
he
p.m.
from
last
his
saw
had
house.
Christie's
when he
dropped
him
w o r k e d o u t o f town as an e n g i n e e r f o r
the
apartment.
Patterson,
who
T e n n e s s e e V a l l e y A u t h o r i t y ("TVA"), t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t
believed
S h e l l y had
during
the
before
when he
b r o k e n i n t o h i s h o u s e sometime
week o f t h e m u r d e r , b e c a u s e she
was
away.
t o l d him
t h a t he
had
Stanleys
at
house
Patterson
his
confronted
In
had
seen the t r u c k P a t t e r s o n
during
Shelly
the
on
8
or
week he
around
had
was
earlier,
done so
addition, Patterson's
once
neighbor
loaned
away.
Friday,
he
June
the
When
17,
CR-06-2236
2005,
she d e n i e d
items.
Later
telephone
locate
that
she had s t o l e n t h e shotgun and
that evening,
a r o u n d 9:00 p.m.
the
Stanleys
Patterson
other
s p o k e t o S m i t h on t h e
and Smith had agreed t o h e l p him
because,
during
their
conversation,
P a t t e r s o n and Smith r e a l i z e d t h a t S h e l l y had s o l d P a t t e r s o n ' s
m i s s i n g shotgun t o Smith f o r $50.
for
the Stanleys
until
around
Smith rode w i t h him t o l o o k
11:00 p.m.,
dropped Smith o f f a t h i s apartment.
when
Patterson
9
On Monday m o r n i n g , C h r i s t i e met a n d t a l k e d w i t h C a p t . J i m
Heffernan
o f t h e Tuscumbia P o l i c e Department a t her f a t h e r ' s
apartment r e g a r d i n g
the missing-person
report.
a l s o a f a m i l y f r i e n d , accompanied her.
Heffernan
officers
had a r o l l - c a l l
and
informed
r e p o r t regarding Smith.
officers
that
he
was
meeting
L a t e r t h a t day, Capt.
with
the o f f i c e r s
the on-duty p o l i c e
of the
Capt. Heffernan
looking
Doug Hendon,
missing-person
also t o l d the p o l i c e
f o r Shelly
f o r questioning
P a t t e r s o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t S h e l l y t o l d h i m , more t h a n o n c e ,
i n S t a n l e y ' s p r e s e n c e , t h a t she p l a n n e d t o r o b S m i t h because
she knew he c a r r i e d a l o t o f c a s h a n d p i l l s . P a t t e r s o n n e v e r
t o l d S m i t h a b o u t S h e l l y ' s s t a t e m e n t s b e c a u s e he d i d n o t
b e l i e v e t h e y were c r e d i b l e .
At t r i a l , S h e l l y denied
ever
d i s c u s s i n g w i t h P a t t e r s o n any p l a n s t o r o b Smith. S h e l l y a l s o
t e s t i f i e d t h a t S t a n l e y gave h e r P a t t e r s o n ' s s h o t g u n t o s e l l t o
Smith.
9
9
CR-06-2236
c o n c e r n i n g a s e p a r a t e i n c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g a shotgun and o t h e r
i t e m s t h a t had been s t o l e n f r o m P a t t e r s o n ' s house.
the
officers
routine
person
5:30 p.m.
patrol,
report
Stuart
on S m i t h
10
f o rthe Stanleys.
on Monday,
Setliff,
one o f t h e o f f i c e r s
the individuals
from h i s daughter,
might
on a
who h a d t a k e n t h e m i s s i n g -
gathered o u t s i d e t h e S t a n l e y s ' apartment.
of
told
t h a t S m i t h a n d t h e S t a n l e y s were a c q u a i n t a n c e s .
C a p t . H e f f e r n a n i s s u e d a BOLO
Around
He
saw t h r e e p e o p l e
T h i n k i n g t h a t one
be one o f t h e S t a n l e y s o r S m i t h ,
O f f i c e r S e t l i f f stopped, approached t h e apartment, and l e a r n e d
t h a t t h e t h r e e p e o p l e t h e r e were Swanie B e r r y h i l l ,
t h e owner
of t h e apartment, h e r son R o n a l d B e r r y h i l l , and Dot, S t a n l e y ' s
mother.
As n o t e d , t h e B e r r y h i l l s h a d c a l l e d D o t b e c a u s e
they
w a n t e d t o g e t i n t o t h e a p a r t m e n t b a s e d on t h e i r c o n c e r n
that
S t a n l e y a n d S h e l l y h a d l e f t dogs u n a t t e n d e d i n t h e a p a r t m e n t .
O f f i c e r S e t l i f f c a l l e d Capt. H e f f e r n a n , i n f o r m i n g him t h a t t h e
landlord
was g o i n g
apartment.
t o c u t t h e p a d l o c k on t h e d o o r
of the
1 1
A BOLO i s a " b e - o n - t h e - l o o k o u t " message i s s u e d b y l a w
enforcement.
10
The e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t D o t was p r e s e n t b e c a u s e s h e
a c t u a l l y r e n t e d t h e apartment from Swanie, and p a i d t h e
11
had
10
CR-06-2236
Ronald
testified
that
he
had
learned
S h e l l y w e r e l e a v i n g town b e c a u s e S h e l l y had
arrest.
on
and he had
earlier
i n the
day
h e a r d dogs b a r k i n g .
and Dot
have
key
a w a r r a n t f o r her
to
the
on M o n d a y , w i t h no
informed
apartment.
went t o g e t b o l t c u t t e r s .
the
accompanied
padlock
him
into
them t h a t she
Ronald
a p a r t m e n t w i t h O f f i c e r S e t l i f f , who
cut
and
had
left
them
the
the
door,
apartment.
did
not
at
the
r e c e n t l y a r r i v e d , and
When he r e t u r n e d t o t h e
on
answer,
A f t e r R o n a l d drove h i s mother
t o t h e a p a r t m e n t , Dot
he
Stanley
R o n a l d s t a t e d t h a t he had a l r e a d y k n o c k e d on t h e d o o r
Sunday and
a
that
apartment,
and
Officer
Setliff
1 2
Officer
Setliff
r e n t a l amount o f $150 a month, a l t h o u g h S t a n l e y and S h e l l y
l i v e d t h e r e . Dot had a g r e e d t o accompany t h e B e r r y h i l l s t h a t
day and t o t a k e t h e dogs w i t h h e r .
T h e t e s t i m o n y was
c o n f l i c t i n g as t o w h e t h e r R o n a l d
requested
that
Officer
Setliff
accompany him
into
the
a p a r t m e n t . R o n a l d t e s t i f i e d t h a t O f f i c e r S e t l i f f a s k e d him i f
i t w o u l d be o k a y i f he e n t e r e d t h e a p a r t m e n t w i t h him.
Ronald
i n d i c a t e d t h a t he a g r e e d and s t a t e d t h a t O f f i c e r S e t l i f f d i d
n o t open t h e d o o r n o r t e l l h i m t o open t h e d o o r .
(R.
471.)
On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , R o n a l d e x p l a i n e d t h a t he t o l d O f f i c e r
S e t l i f f t h a t he " d i d n ' t c a r e one way o r t h e o t h e r " w h e t h e r
O f f i c e r S e t l i f f e n t e r e d t h e S t a n l e y s ' a p a r t m e n t w i t h him.
(R.
491.)
O f f i c e r S e t l i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i d a s k R o n a l d i f he
c o u l d e n t e r t h e a p a r t m e n t w i t h him and t h a t he d i d n o t i n f o r m
him t h a t he n e e d e d t o e n t e r t h e a p a r t m e n t .
(R. 500.)
During
h i s t e s t i m o n y a t t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g and l a t e r a t t r i a l ,
O f f i c e r S e t l i f f i n d i c a t e d t h a t R o n a l d r e q u e s t e d t h a t he e n t e r
t h e S t a n l e y s ' a p a r t m e n t w i t h him.
(R. 102, 108-09, 113,
501.)
12
11
CR-06-2236
testified
t h a t he had i n f o r m e d R o n a l d b e f o r e he c u t t h e
t h a t a m i s s i n g - p e r s o n r e p o r t had b e e n f i l e d on S m i t h .
lock
Ronald
testified
t h a t he h a d a l r e a d y l e a r n e d f r o m C h r i s t i e on Sunday
that
father
her
Setliff
was
missing.
According to Ronald,
Officer
a l s o i n f o r m e d him t h a t a w a r r a n t had b e e n i s s u e d f o r
Stanley.
When R o n a l d and
Officer
Setliff
entered the
apartment,
t h e y saw a c o m f o r t e r r o l l e d up n e a r t h e b e d , and t h e y
the
apartment.
on
Officer
O f f i c e r S e t l i f f c a l l e d Capt. H e f f e r n a n .
Setliff's
call,
Stanleys's apartment.
1 3
Ronald
Setliff
and
Heffernan,
testified
arrived
Officer
who
to
at
exited
also
scene
Heffernan
drove
to
Capt. H e f f e r n a n a r r i v e d s h o r t l y
exited
s e r v e d as
smelling
the
Capt.
Based
the
of
the
apartment.
Colbert
the
odor
and
approached
County
decomposition
the
doorway
the
after
Capt.
Coroner,
when
of
he
the
apartment.
At the s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g , Capt. H e f f e r n a n t e s t i f i e d t h a t i f
a l a n d l o r d r e q u e s t s a s s i s t a n c e w i t h a r e n t e d p r e m i s e , i f an
o f f i c e r i s a v a i l a b l e , the o f f i c e r p r o v i d e s that a s s i s t a n c e .
T h e e v i d e n c e was i n c o n s i s t e n t r e g a r d i n g w h e t h e r
Heffernan drove t o the apartment a f t e r O f f i c e r S e t l i f f ' s
o r s e c o n d t e l e p h o n e c a l l t o him.
13
12
Capt.
first
CR-06-2236
Officer
lifted
up
Setliff,
a
corner
upon
of
direction
the
from
comforter
Capt.
on
the
floor,
r e v e a l e d a d e a d b o d y l y i n g f a c e down w i t h a k n i f e
and s e v e r a l g a s h wounds on i t s h e a d .
know t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e b o d y .
apartment
Setliff
Dot,
left
to
t a p e d o f f and
who
At
and
was
crying,
around
9:00
p.m.
searched the apartment.
knife,
crime
Setliff
The
He
scene.
out of the
warrant.
Officer
Ronald
drove
house.
and
Capt.
additional
Heffernan
personnel
and
R o n a l d and Doug Hendon i d e n t i f i e d t h e
C a p t . H e f f e r n a n d i s c o v e r e d t h a t S m i t h had a
a
machete
Capt. H e f f e r n a n a l s o found a bent
covered
p a r a p h e r n a l i a i n the apartment.
evidence.
search
on Monday e v e n i n g ,
k n i f e embedded i n h i s b a c k .
steak
Capt. H e f f e r n a n d i d not
secured the crime scene.
returned w i t h a search warrant
b o d y as S m i t h ' s .
a
which
i n i t s back
He o r d e r e d e v e r y o n e
obtain
to her
Heffernan,
and
Officer
During
the
in
blood,
and
drug
Capt. H e f f e r n a n c o l l e c t e d
R i c k y Joe
search
of
Little
the
photographed
apartment,
the
the
Officer
and O f f i c e r L i t t l e were c a l l e d t o D o t ' s h o u s e t w i c e .
second
t i m e t h e o f f i c e r s were c a l l e d t o h e r h o u s e ,
were t o l d t h a t S t a n l e y and
h i s w i f e c o u l d be
C o l b e r t Heights area of Tuscumbia.
13
located
they
i n the
CR-06-2236
Tuscumbia p o l i c e o f f i c e r s began l o o k i n g f o r the
l a t e Monday e v e n i n g , J u n e 20,
2005.
Stanleys
Law-enforcement
officers
f o u n d S m i t h ' s t r u c k e a r l y T u e s d a y m o r n i n g on V a l l e y V i e w Road
in
the
Colbert
H e i g h t s area of Tuscumbia.
dusted f o r f i n g e r p r i n t s but
T h u r s d a y , J u n e 23,
Smith's t r u c k
r e v e a l e d no m a t c h e s .
2005, S t a n l e y
and
was
Finally,
S h e l l y came o u t
of
on
the
woods and t r a v e l e d t o D o t ' s h o u s e w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t a k i n g
D o t ' s c a r and
l e a v i n g town.
When f a m i l y members saw
Dot's house, however, t h e y d e c i d e d t o s u r r e n d e r
The
retired
Chief
them n e a r
to the p o l i c e .
o f P o l i c e o f T u s c u m b i a , Wayne B u r n s ,
p i c k e d them up a t D o t ' s h o u s e a t t h e i r r e q u e s t and
transported
them t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n , where t h e y were a r r e s t e d f o r
murder of
Smith.
During
1 4
the
r i d e to
the
the
station, Retired
C h i e f B u r n s t e s t i f i e d t h a t he a d v i s e d them o f t h e i r r i g h t s
and
n o t i f i e d t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t h a t he was
the
station.
Chief
Burns
stated
c l o t h e s were c r u m p l e d and
that
b r i n g i n g them t o
Stanley's
d i r t y l i k e t h e y had
They i n d i c a t e d t o C h i e f B u r n s t h a t t h e y had
days.
According
to
Shelly's
s l e p t i n them.
s l e p t i n t h e woods
for
several
but
S h e l l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had w a n t e d t o t u r n h e r s e l f i n ,
S t a n l e y had r e f u s e d t o t u r n h i m s e l f i n .
1 4
14
Chief
and
Burns,
while
being
CR-06-2236
t r a n s p o r t e d , S t a n l e y t o l d S h e l l y t h a t l a w e n f o r c e m e n t was
going
the
t o p l a y them a g a i n s t e a c h o t h e r .
station,
officers
photographed
Once t h e y
them.
The
a r r i v e d at
photographs
i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l showed t h a t t h e y b o t h s u f f e r e d f r o m
c a u s e d by
poison
oak.
Stanley
b a c k and what a p p e a r e d t o be
The
evidence
at
trial
a l s o had
not
rashes
a l a c e r a t i o n on
his
a " c a r p e t b u r n " on h i s k n e e .
revealed
that
Smith
suffered
36
s t a b w o u n d s ; h i s i n t e r n a l o r g a n s were damaged by
s t a b wounds
to
and
the
abdomen.
Samples t a k e n
m a t c h e d S m i t h ' s DNA.
Dr.
Emily
from the
knives
Ward, m e d i c a l
the Alabama Department of F o r e n s i c
machete
examiner
testified
Sciences,
with
that
t h e f o u r v i s i b l e l a c e r a t i o n s on t h e t o p o f S m i t h ' s h e a d c o u l d
have b e e n c a u s e d by
or a machete.
his
u p p e r and
She
the
t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s n o s e was
lower jaws.
r i g h t t h i g h and
At
s e v e r a l blows from e i t h e r a b a s e b a l l
of
renewed h i s m o t i o n
to
testimony
but
He
had
s t a b wounds on h i s b a c k
also
the
State's
suppress
renewed
the
case-in-chief,
evidence
h i s motion
on t h e g r o u n d t h a t h e r t e s t i m o n y
coerced.
b r o k e n , as were
and
d e f e n s i v e wounds on h i s h a n d s .
close
apartment.
He
bat
to
was
taken
S t a n l e y a l s o moved f o r a j u d g m e n t o f
15
from
strike
not
Stanley
his
Shelly's
voluntary,
acquittal
CR-06-2236
on
the capital-murder
charge,
f a i l e d t o prove a prima
Additionally,
defense
counsel
arguing
f a c i e case
before
t h e S t a t e had
of robbery.
Stanley
requested
that
presented
to allow
him t o
e s t a b l i s h matters
f o rthe r e c o r d o u t s i d e the presence
of the
jury.
defense
Stanley's
counsel,
locate
the t r i a l
counsel
and i n v e s t i g a t o r s
Zack Jackson,
counsel
informed
judge
h i s case, h i s
stated
h a d made
that
he, h i s c o -
numerous
attempts
an a l l e g e d m a t e r i a l w i t n e s s .
the court
that
officers
from
to
Defense
the Colbert
County S h e r i f f ' s Department had been l o o k i n g f o r J a c k s o n f o r
more t h a n a week t o s e r v e h i m w i t h a s u b p o e n a f o r t r i a l a n d t o
a r r e s t h i m on an o u t s t a n d i n g w a r r a n t .
When t h e j u d g e i n q u i r e d
w h e t h e r c o u n s e l was a s k i n g t h e j u d g e t o t a k e a n y a c t i o n on t h e
matter,
record
defense
counsel
to reflect
indicated
t h a t he s i m p l y w a n t e d t h e
that a l l efforts
h a d b e e n made t o l o c a t e
Jackson.
The
State
called
about t h e e f f o r t s
that
he f i r s t
defense
Jackson's
arrest
Deputy
t o locate Jackson.
became
counsel
Chief
aware
T r a v i s Long
Deputy Long
on Monday, A p r i l
was l o o k i n g f o r J a c k s o n .
testify
testified
2, 2007,
that
The w a r r a n t f o r
was i s s u e d on F r i d a y , A p r i l
16
to
6, 2007.
He
CR-06-2236
testified
several
that
the s h e r i f f ' s
addresses
department
counsel
who
primarily,
her
that
presented
testified
responsible
k i l l i n g of Smith.
that
the
on A p r i l
physically
9, 2007.
testimony
Shelly
to
of
several
equally,
was
f o r the p l o t
According
i f not
kill
and
to Shelly's cellmate,
she r e n t e d
the
a p a r t m e n t h e r s o n and d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w s h a r e d f r o m S w a n i e .
Dot
Smith.
knifes
and
Shelly told
the
to k i l l
the steak
f o r the
used
machete
she u s e d
with
a t t h o s e a d d r e s s e s b u t had been u n a b l e
t o l o c a t e J a c k s o n by t h e time o f t r i a l
witnesses
supplied
f o r J a c k s o n and h a d r e p e a t e d l y
searched the residences
Defense
was
Dot t e s t i f i e d
Stanley
that
s t a t e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h she d r o v e them t o and d r o p p e d them o f f
in
the Colbert
Heights
area,
she d i d n o t d r o p
d a u g h t e r ' s h o u s e t h a t weekend.
contact
with
discovered
them
on
Monday,
i n t h e i r apartment.
carried while
were a r r e s t e d .
them
at her
She s t a t e d t h a t she was n o t i n
the
day
Smith's
body
was
She t u r n e d t h e c o o l e r t h e y h a d
i n h i d i n g over t o the p o l i c e s h o r t l y a f t e r they
I t contained
Stanley's
the
p a d l o c k on t h e a p a r t m e n t .
she
d i d n o t know a n y t h i n g
allegedly i n that
key r i n g w i t h a key t o
She t e s t i f i e d ,
however,
that
a b o u t t h e i r c e l l p h o n e s , w h i c h were
cooler.
17
CR-06-2236
On
r e b u t t a l , the State
Janice B e r r y h i l l .
1 5
called
Ronald
and h i s s i s t e r ,
R o n a l d t e s t i f i e d t h a t he a n d h i s m o t h e r ,
Swanie,
picked
because
t h e y assumed s h e h a d a k e y t o t h e a p a r t m e n t
she h a d l e a s e d
D o t up on t h e a f t e r n o o n
t h e apartment
o f Monday, June 20,
from Swanie.
because
When Dot i n f o r m e d
them t h a t s h e d i d n o t h a v e a key, R o n a l d a s k e d i f he c o u l d u s e
bolt
c u t t e r s t o c u t t h e p a d l o c k a n d g e t t h e dogs o u t o f t h e
apartment.
Dot t o l d h i m t h a t s h e d i d n o t want t o go i n t o t h e
apartment
but that
retrieve
t h e dogs.
he
could
When
cut the lock
Ronald
left
and e n t e r
t h e apartment,
i n f o r m e d h i s m o t h e r a n d Dot t h a t S m i t h ' s body h a d b e e n
and Dot t h e n a s k e d R o n a l d t o d r i v e h e r home.
that
Dot i n f o r m e d h e r s h e h a d s p o k e n
and
Janice
to Stanley
he
found
testified
a n d he h a d
s t a t e d he a n d S h e l l y h a d n o t s e e n S m i t h s i n c e F r i d a y e v e n i n g .
According
to Janice,
packing t o leave
Dot s a i d t h a t
town b e c a u s e
Stanley
and S h e l l y
were
a w a r r a n t had been i s s u e d f o r
Shelly's arrest.
Both
jury
sides
rested,
on t h e a p p l i c a b l e
and t h e t r i a l
law.
court
The j u r y
instructed the
returned
a verdict
J a n i c e B e r r y h i l l i d e n t i f i e d h e r s e l f as J a n i c e H a r b i n a t
trial.
( R . 1 0 1 0 . ) F o r p u r p o s e s o f t h i s o p i n i o n , we r e f e r t o
h e r as J a n i c e B e r r y h i l l .
1 5
18
CR-06-2236
finding Stanley g u i l t y
of
capital
m u r d e r , as
charged i n
Stanley's
trial,
the
indictment.
During
the
daughters
and
testified
penalty
phase
Smith's
close
concerning
Smith's
of
friend,
Janice
character
and
State
submitted
evidence
of
Berryhill,
the
Stanley's
impact
the
S m i t h ' s d e a t h on h i s f r i e n d s , h i s f a m i l y , and
The
Smith's
community.
prior
of
felony
c o n v i c t i o n f o r f i r s t - d e g r e e robbery.
Stanley
presented
S t a n l e y had w i t n e s s e d
from
his
father,
testified
affairs
was
that Stanley's
an
f a t h e r had
t h a t he was
After
Those
Stanley
the
abuse
witnesses
o f t e n absent d u r i n g h i s
S t a n l e y ' s mother t e s t i f i e d t h a t S t a n l e y
to
a l c o h o l at
around nine
years
sides
rested
and
the
j u r y recommended, by
be
sentenced
possibility
of p a r o l e .
to
The
life
trial
trial
19
a vote
age
and
judge
had
penalty-phase
o f 8 t o 4,
imprisonment
court
of
was
age.
i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on t h e l a w a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e
proceeding,
that
engaged i n e x t r a m a r i t a l
i n t r o d u c e d t o d r u g s a t an e a r l y
both
testified
n e g l e c t , and
alcoholic.
and t h a t S t a n l e y ' s m o t h e r was
introduced
who
and e n d u r e d p o v e r t y ,
who
developing years.
also
several witnesses
without
overrode the
that
the
jury's
CR-06-2236
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n and s e n t e n c e d S t a n l e y t o d e a t h .
which
i s automatic
followed.
See
in a
case
involving
§ 13A-5-53, A l a . Code
the
T h i s appeal,
death p e n a l t y ,
1975.
Standard of Review
On
appeal
from
his
conviction
and
sentence,
Stanley
r a i s e s 19 i s s u e s , many o f w h i c h he d i d n o t r a i s e i n t h e
court.
trial
Because S t a n l e y has been s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h , however,
t h i s C o u r t must r e v i e w t h e l o w e r - c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s f o r p l a i n
error.
See R u l e 45A,
A l a . R. App.
P.,
16
which
states:
" ' P l a i n e r r o r i s d e f i n e d as e r r o r
that
has
"adversely affected
the
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of the a p p e l l a n t . "
The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n r e v i e w i n g a
c l a i m under the p l a i n - e r r o r d o c t r i n e
i s s t r i c t e r than the s t a n d a r d used i n
r e v i e w i n g an i s s u e t h a t was p r o p e r l y
raised
i n the
trial
court or
on
appeal.
As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme
Court
stated
i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. C t . 1038, 84
L. Ed. 2d 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , t h e p l a i n - e r r o r
d o c t r i n e a p p l i e s only i f the e r r o r i s
" p a r t i c u l a r l y e g r e g i o u s " and i f i t
"In
a l l c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y has b e e n
i m p o s e d , t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s s h a l l n o t i c e any p l a i n
e r r o r or d e f e c t i n the p r o c e e d i n g s under r e v i e w , whether or
n o t b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and t a k e
a p p r o p r i a t e a p p e l l a t e a c t i o n by r e a s o n t h e r e o f , w h e n e v e r s u c h
e r r o r has o r p r o b a b l y has a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e s u b s t a n t i a l
r i g h t of the a p p e l l a n t . "
16
20
CR-06-2236
"seriously
a f f e c t [ s ] the f a i r n e s s ,
integrity
or p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n
of
j u d i c i a l proceedings."
See Ex p a r t e
P r i c e , 725 So. 2d 1063 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) ,
c e r t . d e n i e d , 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.
C t . 1809, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1012 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . ' "
Ex
parte
Brown, 11 So. 3d 933, 935-36
( A l a . 2008)
(quoting
H a l l v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 113, 121-22 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1999)).
See Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 972 So. 2d 737, 742 ( A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) ; Ex p a r t e
Trawick,
So.
of
698 So. 2d 162, 167
2d 199, 209
plain
error,
the claimed
a defendant's
have
an
unfair
error
must
not only
impact
seriously
b u t i t must
on
the
also
jury's
See a l s o H a r r i s v. S t a t e , 2 So. 3d 880, 896
C r i m . App. 2007) ( q u o t i n g H a l l v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 113,
121-22 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) ) .
Although Stanley's
object at t r i a l w i l l not preclude
i twill
makes on a p p e a l .
2, 2010]
Dill
778
("To r i s e t o t h e l e v e l
'substantial rights,'
prejudicial
deliberations.").
issue,
1 9 9 7 ) ; Hyde v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1998)
affect
(Ala.
(Ala.
v.
weigh a g a i n s t
State,
t h i s C o u r t f r o m r e v i e w i n g an
any c l a i m
See D o t c h v. S t a t e ,
So. 3d
600
,
So.
failure to
of prejudice
[Ms. CR-07-1913,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2010)
2d
343
Further,
21
( A l a . Crim.
App.
he
now
April
(citing
1991)).
CR-06-2236
"'"the p l a i n e r r o r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e contemporaneous
o b j e c t i o n r u l e i s t o be 'used s p a r i n g l y , s o l e l y i n
those
circumstances
i n which a m i s c a r r i a g e of
j u s t i c e would otherwise r e s u l t . ' " '
Whitehead v.
S t a t e , [777 So. 2d 7 8 1 ] , a t 794, [ ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 9 9 ) ] , q u o t i n g B u r t o n v . S t a t e , 651 So. 2d 641, 645
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , a f f ' d , 651 So. 2d 659 ( A l a .
1 9 9 4 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 514 U.S. 1115 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . "
Centobie
v. S t a t e ,
861 So. 2d 1 1 1 1 , 1118 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
2001).
Guilt-phase
Issues
I.
Stanley, a Caucasian
male, argues t h a t t h e S t a t e used i t s
peremptory challenges t o exclude
violation
of Batson
female p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s i n
v. Kentucky,
476 U.S.
J.E.B. v . A l a b a m a , 511 U.S. 127 (1994) .
79
(1986),
Stanley
and
claims the
r e c o r d r a i s e s an i n f e r e n c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e
struck
10 f e m a l e s
o u t o f 23 p o t e n t i a l
defense counsel only s t r u c k 4 females.
8
females
sentencing
and
order,
4
males.
the t r i a l
female
jurors,
while
The j u r y c o n s i s t e d o f
Specifically,
i n i t swritten
court stated:
"The make-up o f t h e j u r y was as f o l l o w s : T h r e e (3)
w h i t e men, one (1) b l a c k man, f i v e (5) w h i t e women
and t h r e e (3) b l a c k women."
(C. 273.) S t a n l e y m a i n t a i n s t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d remand t h e c a s e
for
a
Batson
hearing.
Stanley
22
d i d not raise
a
Batson
CR-06-2236
objection at t r i a l .
A c c o r d i n g l y , we r e v i e w h i s a r g u m e n t u n d e r
the p l a i n - e r r o r standard.
With
Batson or
the
regard
to
J.E.B.,
prosecutor
(Ala.
1987)."
C r i m . App.
"the
was
discrimination.'
a
R u l e 45A,
finding
plain
r e c o r d must s u p p l y
App.
error
an
P.
pursuant
inference
'engaged
Ex
i n the
parte
Watkins,
509
So.
2d
p r a c t i c e of
State,
So.
3d
397,
425
7
purposeful
1076
(Ala.
Plain error i s
" e r r o r t h a t i s so o b v i o u s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o n o t i c e
i t would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t the f a i r n e s s or i n t e g r i t y
of the j u d i c i a l proceedings.
Ex p a r t e T a y l o r , 666
So. 2d 73 ( A l a . 1995) .
The p l a i n e r r o r s t a n d a r d
a p p l i e s o n l y where a p a r t i c u l a r l y e g r e g i o u s
error
o c c u r r e d a t t r i a l and t h a t e r r o r has o r p r o b a b l y has
s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e j u d i c e d the defendant.
Taylor."
Ex p a r t e
Trawick,
698
So.
2d a t
167.
" I n B a t s o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d
t h a t b l a c k v e n i r e m e m b e r s c o u l d n o t be s t r u c k f r o m a
b l a c k defendant's j u r y because of t h e i r race.
In
Powers v. O h i o , 499 U.S.
400, 111 S. C t . 1364,
113
L.
Ed.
2d
411
(1991),
the
court extended i t s
d e c i s i o n i n Batson to apply a l s o to white defendants
.... The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n G e o r g i a v.
M c C o l l u m , 505 U.S.
42, 112 S. C t . 2348, 120 L. Ed.
2d 33 ( 1 9 9 2 ) , h e l d t h a t t h e p r o t e c t i o n s o f B a t s o n
were a l s o a v a i l a b l e t o d e f e n s e c o u n s e l i n c r i m i n a l
trials.
The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has h e l d t h a t t h e
p r o t e c t i o n s of Batson apply to the s t r i k i n g of white
prospective jurors.
White C o n s o l i d a t e d I n d u s t r i e s ,
I n c . v. A m e r i c a n L i b e r t y I n s u r a n c e , Co., 617 So. 2d
657 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) . "
23
to
that
1074,
B l a c k m o n v.
2003).
of
A l a . R.
CR-06-2236
Grimsley
v. S t a t e ,
1995).
"J.E.B.
progeny
t o gender
2d 488, 490
678
extends
So. 2d 1194, 1195
the p r i n c i p l e s
( A l a . Crim.
of Batson
App.
and i t s
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " Weaver v. S t a t e , 682 So.
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1996).
"A p a r t y m a k i n g a ... J.E.B. c h a l l e n g e b e a r s t h e
burden
of
proving
a
prima
facie
case
of
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and, i n t h e absence o f such p r o o f ,
the p r o s e c u t i o n i s not r e q u i r e d t o s t a t e i t s reasons
f o r i t s p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e s . Ex p a r t e B r a n c h , 526
So. 2d 609 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ; Ex p a r t e B i r d , 594 So. 2d
676 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) .
In Branch, t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d a
number o f r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s a d e f e n d a n t c o u l d s u b m i t
i n attempting t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e case of
r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; those f a c t o r s are l i k e w i s e
a p p l i c a b l e i n the case of a defendant seeking t o
establish
gender
discrimination i n
the
jury
s e l e c t i o n process.
Those f a c t o r s , s t a t e d i n a
manner a p p l i c a b l e t o g e n d e r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , a r e as
f o l l o w s : (1) e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e j u r o r s i n q u e s t i o n
s h a r e d o n l y t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f g e n d e r and w e r e i n
a l l o t h e r r e s p e c t s as h e t e r o g e n o u s as t h e community
as a w h o l e ; (2) a p a t t e r n o f s t r i k e s a g a i n s t j u r o r s
o f one g e n d e r on t h e p a r t i c u l a r v e n i r e ; (3) t h e p a s t
conduct of the s t a t e ' s a t t o r n e y i n u s i n g peremptory
c h a l l e n g e s t o s t r i k e members o f one g e n d e r ; (4) t h e
type
a n d manner o f t h e s t a t e ' s q u e s t i o n s
and
s t a t e m e n t s d u r i n g v o i r d i r e ; (5) t h e t y p e a n d manner
of questions
d i r e c t e d to the challenged
juror,
including
a lack
of questions;
(6) d i s p a r a t e
t r e a t m e n t o f members o f t h e j u r y v e n i r e who h a d t h e
same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o r who a n s w e r e d a q u e s t i o n i n
t h e same manner o r i n a s i m i l a r manner; a n d (7)
separate
e x a m i n a t i o n o f members
of the venire.
A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e c o u r t may c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e
S t a t e u s e d a l l o r most o f i t s s t r i k e s
against
members o f one g e n d e r . "
24
CR-06-2236
Ex p a r t e T r a w i c k ,
993
So. 2 d 907,
State,
(Ala.
698 So. 2d a t 167-68.
927 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2008) .
[Ms. CR-07-1913, A p r i l
Crim.
See S h a r i f i v . S t a t e ,
See a l s o D o t c h v .
2, 2010]
So. 3d
,
App. 2 0 1 0 ) .
G u i d e d b y t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s o f l a w , we c o n s i d e r
Stanley's
Batson claims i n t u r n .
A.
Stanley
strikes
a s s e r t s t h a t t h e r e was a p a t t e r n o f p u r p o s e f u l
against
women b e c a u s e
the State
used
s t r i k e s t o e l i m i n a t e females from t h e p a n e l .
10 o f i t s 14
In particular,
S t a n l e y f o c u s e s h i s a r g u m e n t on t h e number o f women t h e S t a t e
stuck
and argues
prosecution's
The
that
first
i t was s i g n i f i c a n t
that
four
of the
f i v e s t r i k e s were u s e d a g a i n s t women.
s t r i k e l i s t shows t h a t S t a n l e y ' s j u r y was s t r u c k f r o m
69 p o t e n t i a l
jurors,
31 m a l e s a n d 38 f e m a l e s .
A male
juror
and f e m a l e j u r o r who were n o t o r i g i n a l l y on t h e j u r y l i s t were
added t o t h e v e n i r e .
males
a n d 13 f e m a l e s ,
Twenty-two members o f t h e j u r y p o o l , 9
were
either
absent
or excused.
t r i a l c o u r t e x c u s e d 5 j u r o r s , 3 o f whom were f e m a l e ,
a
male
juror
who d i d n o t l i v e
female
juror
who
showed
up
i n Colbert
after
25
being
The
dismissed
County,
added a
contacted
by t h e
CR-06-2236
sheriff's
department,
whom were
females.
and excused
During j u r y
3 jurors
o f 14 p o s s i b l e s t r i k e s , s t r u c k 10 m a l e s .
petit
2 of
selection, the prosecution
s t r u c k 14 j u r o r s , 10 o f whom were f e m a l e s .
Stanley's
f o r cause,
The d e f e n s e , o u t
As m e n t i o n e d
above,
j u r y was composed o f 8 women a n d 4 men.
An e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e v o i r d i r e p r o c e e d i n g s shows
Stanley
f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h an i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n
struck
j u r o r s b a s e d s o l e l y on t h e i r g e n d e r .
Stanley references
only
numbers, a n d t h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t numbers o r p e r c e n t a g e s
alone w i l l
context.
App.
2005)
not s u b s t a n t i a t e a case o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h i s
Banks v. S t a t e ,
("[S]tatistics
919 So. 2 d 1223, 1230 ( A l a . C r i m .
and o p i n i o n
prima f a c i e case o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
a l o n e do n o t p r o v e
See J o h n s o n v. S t a t e 823
So.
2d 1 ( A l a .
So.
2d 5 3 1 , 533 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1997) ( " ' [ E ] v e n
that
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) . " ) ; A r m s t r o n g
[a] p a r t y h a d s t r u c k a h i g h
v. S t a t e , 710
a
showing
percentage of s t r i k e s
a g a i n s t a m i n o r i t y was n o t enough a l o n e .
698 So. 2 d 162, 168 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) ,
a
I n Ex p a r t e
used
Trawick,
t h e A l a b a m a Supreme
Court
h e l d , " W i t h o u t more, we do n o t f i n d t h a t t h e number o f s t r i k e s
this
prosecutor
used
t o remove
26
women
from
the venire i s
CR-06-2236
sufficient
to
establish
a
prima
facie
case
of
gender
discrimination."'").
The
and
r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e S t a t e s t r u c k a l l j u r o r s ,
f e m a l e , who
death
indicated that
penalty.
"Mixed
t h e y had
f e e l i n g s or
a problem
reservations
male
with
the
regarding
i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y are v a l i d r a c e - n e u t r a l reasons
f o r peremptory
988
( A l a . C r i m . App.
3d 453
197
strikes...."
2000).
( A l a . C r i m . App.
( A l a . C r i m . App.
A c k l i n v. S t a t e , 790 So. 2d
See a l s o M a s h b u r n v. S t a t e , 7 So.
2 0 0 7 ) , and H o c k e r v. S t a t e , 840 So.
2002).
cause,
his
[or her]
n o t be s u f f i c i e n t
view
may
for a
constitute a
challenge
reasonable
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the e x e r c i s e of a peremptory s t r i k e . "
v. S t a t e , 620 So. 2d 679, 696
other grounds,
The
first
620
So.
five
2d 705
( A l a . C r i m . App.
Johnson
1992), r e v ' d
j u r o r s the p r o s e c u t i o n
s t r u c k were j u r o r
their
no.
A l l these j u r o r s i n d i c a t e d during v o i r d i r e
e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e y had
penalty.
on
( A l a . 1993).
no. 53, a m a l e , and j u r o r s no. 100, no. 143, no. 106, and
95, a l l f e m a l e s .
2d
"Although a j u r o r ' s r e s e r v a t i o n s
a b o u t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y may
for
975,
a problem
with
imposing the
I n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e of these f i v e j u r o r s
v i e w s on t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y o c c u r r e d
27
death
regarding
i n t h e same o r d e r .
CR-06-2236
A d d i t i o n a l l y , although
jurors
no.
48
and
juror
indicates
v i e w s on
f o r cause.
that
j u r o r s who
penalty
no.
their
conducted concerning
were s t r u c k
an i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n
the
During
1 7
prosecution
i n d i c a t e d t h a t they
i n the
voir dire.
146,
exact
order
Thus, we
who
the
female,
uniformly
had
was
death penalty,
jury selection,
struck
the
they
record
these
five
a problem w i t h the
i n which
f i n d no
were
of
e a c h had
e r r o r , p l a i n or
spoken
death
during
otherwise.
B.
Stanley
gender
claims
he
demonstrated
discrimination.
demonstrated
B r a n c h and
several
Ex p a r t e
of
In
so
the
a
prima
arguing,
factors
set
facie
he
forth
case
of
contends
he
i n Ex
parte
Trawick f a c t o r s .
1.
Stanley
question
the
submits
that
the
State
female veniremembers.
p r o s e c u t i o n s t u c k f e m a l e j u r o r s no.
88,
dire
no.
79,
and
questioning.
no.
141,
with
failed
Stanley
27,
little
More p a r t i c u l a r l y ,
no.
to
no
to
meaningfully
claims
121,
no.
that
the
130,
no.
individual
Stanley
contends
voir
that
T h e s e two j u r o r s were s t r u c k f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e t h e y
i n d i c a t e d t h a t " u n d e r no c i r c u m s t a n c e c o u l d [ t h e y ] impose t h e
death penalty."
(R. 318-19, 324-25, 332-35.)
17
28
CR-06-2236
the
State's
striking
of
juror
no.
130,
who
background i n f o r m a t i o n during v o i r d i r e ,
meaningful
The
provided
only
i n d i c a t e s a l a c k of
questioning.
strike
prosecution
of
one
d i d not
engage
T a y l o r v. S t a t e , 808
(holding
that
questioning
veniremember
So.
there
or
juror
was
veniremembers
the
who
i n d i v i d u a l l y by
1164
"no
any
prove
( A l a . C r i m . App.
meaningful
struck
were
of
four
not
The
the
a
of
See
2000)
lack
questioning
where
the p r o s e c u t i o n ) .
that
questioning.
indication
prosecution"
were
not
i n meaningful
2d 1148,
a l a c k of
by
does
of
the
asked
of
any
black
questions
r e c o r d shows t h a t
the
p r o s e c u t i o n c o n d u c t e d a t h o r o u g h q u e s t i o n i n g o f t h e j u r y as a
whole
and
examination
then
male
conducted
individual
voir
The
and
r e c o r d a l s o shows t h a t t h e S t a t e
female
jurors
alike
on
questioned
numerous
issues,
i n c l u d i n g w h e t h e r any j u r o r s had k n o w l e d g e o f t h e f a c t s o f
case,
whether
any
jurors
knew
any
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c a s e , w h e t h e r any
of
the
j u r o r s had
involvement i n the c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n process,
the
jurors
dire
f o r c e r t a i n v e n i r e m e m b e r s b a s e d on t h e i r r e s p o n s e s
to questions.
both
later
had
individual
opinions
29
on
the
individuals
any
and
topics
previous
whether
such
as
CR-06-2236
reasonable
doubt
prosecution's
and t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y .
striking
of a
male
A d d i t i o n a l l y , the
juror,
no.
6,
who
also
provided only general background i n f o r m a t i o n during v o i r d i r e ,
nullifies
solely
Stanley's
based
Accordingly,
argument t h a t
on
gender.
(R.
we do n o t f i n d
j u r o r no. 130 was
177-78,
struck
202-03,
340.)
a lack of meaningful v o i r
dire
d i r e c t e d a t t h e female veniremembers.
2.
Stanley alleges that the State treated prospective jurors
who
answered
manner.
voir
dire
questions
Disparate treatment
similarly
in a
disparate
o c c u r s when " j u r o r s g i v e
a n s w e r s t o t h e same q u e s t i o n s ,
similar
y e t one g r o u p i s s t r u c k on t h e
b a s i s o f t h a t a n s w e r w h i l e a n o t h e r i s n o t . " See T a y l o r , 808
So.
2d a t 1164 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000) ( c i t i n g Ex p a r t e B r a n c h ,
526
So. 2d 609, 624
voir
(Ala. 1987)).
d i r e proceedings
A thorough review
of the
demonstrates that the s e l e c t e d
female
and
male j u r o r s S t a n l e y
compares a r e n o t s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d
and
t h a t t h e r e was no d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t
i n this
For example, S t a n l e y c i t e s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s
juror
no.
100, a
female,
who
indicated
case.
s t r i k i n g of
she had
a
close
r e l a t i v e who h a d b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f a c r i m e , b u t d i d n o t s t r i k e
30
CR-06-2236
jurors
no.
63
personally
relative
and
had
who
prospective
no.
been
had
58,
males,
charged
been
with
convicted
j u r o r because
who
i n d i c a t e d they
a
of
crime
a
or
had
crime.
either
a
close
"'Striking
a member o f t h e j u r o r ' s f a m i l y
a
has
been c o n v i c t e d of a c r i m e i s a v a l i d r a c e - n e u t r a l r e a s o n under
Batson.'
L e w i s v. S t a t e , 741 So. 2d 452, 456
1999)."
Gobble
So. 3d
State,
v. S t a t e ,
,
43
So.
3d
who
2010).
12
App.
7,
790
( A l a . Crim.
So.
2d
arrests
( A l a . C r i m . App.
975,
988
See J o h n s o n
2009)
App.
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1992)
(same);
T h e r e i s no d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t i n t h i s c a s e
s i t u a t e d under
claimed
by
Miller-El
Stanley.
616
(same);
(same).
and j u r o r s no.
2d
( A l a . Crim.
63 and no.
no.
App.
58 a r e n o t
v. D r e t k e , 545
Juror
v.
2000)
v.
100
So.
have
2006) (same); A c k l i n v.
Jackson
j u r o r no.
549
v.
(upholding
c o n v i c t i o n s ) ; Brown
( A l a . Crim.
Thomas v. S t a t e , 611 So. 2d 416
State,
or
App.
2010]
j u r o r s who h a v e c o n v i c t i o n s o r who
have p r i o r
S t a t e , 982 So. 2d 565
State,
[Ms. CR-05-0225, F e b r u a r y 5,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
s t r i k e s of p r o s p e c t i v e
relatives
( A l a . Crim.
100
U.S.
231
stated
1989)
because
similarly
(2005),
that
as
her
m o t h e r - i n - l a w had been found g u i l t y of m u r d e r i n g her husband.
J u r o r no. 63 s t a t e d t h a t he had a
31
driving-under-the-influence
CR-06-2236
charge
i n 1987 a n d j u r o r no. 58 i n d i c a t e d t h a t
charged
with
256.)
In l i g h t
1 8
relative,
d r i v i n g under
the influence
of the f a c t s of t h i s
he h a d b e e n
and a s s a u l t .
case,
a juror
even by m a r r i a g e , has been found g u i l t y
does n o t a p p e a r
t o be s i m i l a r l y
been charged w i t h
Juror
less serious
(R.
whose
o f murder
s i t u a t e d t o j u r o r s who
have
offenses.
no. 100 a l s o s t a t e d , as m e n t i o n e d
a b o v e , t h a t she
had a p r o b l e m w i t h i m p o s i n g t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y .
Additionally,
she s t a t e d t h a t she knew t h e p r i m a r y i n v e s t i g a t o r i n t h e c a s e
and t h a t s h e h a d r e a d t h e n e w s p a p e r s t o r y a b o u t
the morning
209,
220
penalty
j u r y s e l e c t i o n began.
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996)
is a
prospective
valid
C l i c k v. S t a t e ,
695 So. 2d
(a j u r o r ' s v i e w on t h e d e a t h
race-neutral
reason
for striking
the
665 So. 2d 953 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 1994) ( f a c t t h a t p r o s p e c t i v e
j u r o r knows w i t n e s s i s
race-neutral
Caputo,
reason
f o r removing
the j u r o r ) ;
J e l k s v.
607 So. 2d 177, 178 ( A l a . 1992) ( f a c t t h a t j u r o r r e a d
a newspaper a r t i c l e
for
Temmis
on
v. S t a t e ,
valid
juror);
the t r i a l
about
the case
i s a race-neutral
reason
s t r i k i n g the j u r o r ) .
J u r o r no. 58 a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h e he h a d r e a d t h e a r t i c l e
a b o u t S t a n l e y ' s t r i a l on t h e m o r n i n g j u r y - s e l e c t i o n b e g a n .
He, h o w e v e r , s e r v e d as an a l t e r n a t e .
1 8
32
CR-06-2236
Stanley
j u r o r no.
also claims
79, a f e m a l e , was
similarly
however,
situated
shows
males
juror
no.
p r o s e c u t i o n b e c a u s e he,
enforcement.
jurors
male,
disparate
Stanley
because
both
prosecution
a
only
J u r o r no.
counsel
that
had
he
before
Stanley
f e m a l e s , and
treated
and
88,
male,
a
and
of
and
Juror
the
by
the
The
treatment
j u r o r no.
defense
record,
of
8,
counsel,
8 were n o t
88 s t a t e d t h a t she was
family.
record,
struck
disparate
88 and j u r o r no.
his
other
79, knew someone i n l a w
88.
defense counsel
The
was
female,
j u r o r no.
r e t a i n e d one
Stanley's
professional
a
struck.
of the defense counsel
f a m i l y of the other
defense
98,
not
relationship with
struck
t h e w i f e o f one
were
further claims
i n d i c a t e s t h a t j u r o r no.
situated.
s t r u c k by t h e S t a t e , and y e t
l i k e j u r o r no.
j u r o r no.
had
t r e a t m e n t o f j u r o r s where
a
the
however,
similarly
an a c q u a i n t a n c e o f
and
t h a t she
attended
no.
knew
church
8 simply
defense attorneys
the
with
stated
11
years
t r i a l and d i d n o t know him o t h e r t h a n i n t h a t
capacity.
also
asserts
j u r o r no.
differently,
knew C a p t . H e f f e r n a n ,
that
jurors
84, a m a l e who
even though
no.
100
and
no.
s e r v e d on t h e j u r y , were
they
a l l stated
that
the primary i n v e s t i g a t o r f o r the
33
121,
they
State.
CR-06-2236
Jurors
no.
100
and
no.
121,
however,
a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Capt. Heffernan
j u r o r no.
he h a d
who
84, who
indicated
through t h e i r
worked i n the f u n e r a l b u s i n e s s ,
as c o u n t y
close
families,
but
stated that
o n l y a p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Capt.
served
a
Heffernan,
coroner.
Thus, t h e e x a m p l e s o f f e r e d by S t a n l e y do n o t s u p p o r t
claims
that
disparately.
inference
similarly
of
Crim.
jurors
purposeful
App.
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on
See,
2005)
e.g.,
(finding
that
similarly
the
B l a c k m o n , 7 So.
no
inference
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n v i o l a t i o n of J.E.B.).
indicates
were
treated
C o n s e q u e n t l y , S t a n l e y ' s c l a i m does n o t r a i s e
disparate treatment.
(Ala.
situated
his
situated
j u r o r s were t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y by
Nothing
female
the
ground
an
of
3d a t 425-26
of
purposeful
i n the
jurors
record
and
male
prosecution.
3.
S t a n l e y a r g u e s t h a t t h e 10 women s t r u c k by t h e S t a t e were
a
heterogeneous
characteristic.
"This
as
group
As
indicia
who
shared
only
their
t h i s C o u r t e x p l a i n e d on t h i s
o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n has
been
gender
issue:
described
"'"[e]vidence
t h a t the
'jurors i n
question
share[d]
only
this
one
characteristic--their
membership i n t h e g r o u p - - a n d t h a t i n a l l o t h e r
34
as
CR-06-2236
respects
they
[were]
as h e t e r o g e n e o u s
as t h e
community as a w h o l e . '
[ P e o p l e v.] W h e e l e r , 22
C a l . 3d [258,] a t 280, 583 P.2d [748,] a t 764, 148
Cal. Rptr.
[890,] a t 905 [ ( 1 9 7 8 ) ] .
For instance
' i t may be s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e p e r s o n s c h a l l e n g e d ,
a l t h o u g h a l l b l a c k , i n c l u d e b o t h men a n d women a n d
are a v a r i e t y o f ages, o c c u p a t i o n s , and s o c i a l o r
economic c o n d i t i o n s , '
W h e e l e r , 22 C a l . 3d a t 280,
583 P.2d a t 764, 148 C a l . R p t r . a t
905, n. 27,
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t r a c e was t h e d e c i d i n g f a c t o r . " '
Brown v . S t a t e , [Ms. CR-07-1332, June 25, 2010]
o.
3d
,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) . "
M c M i l l a n v. S t a t e ,
3d
,
[Ms. CR-08-1954, November 5, 2010]
So.
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2010) .
A l t h o u g h t h e f e m a l e p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s may i n i t i a l l y
appear
t o share o n l y t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f gender, " t h e i n f o r m a t i o n
provided
here,
b y them d u r i n g
as w e l l
voir
d i r e examination
as i n e v a l u a t i n g
whether
d i f f e r e n t l y f r o m p o t e n t i a l [male] j u r o r s . "
3d a t
they
i s pertinent
were
treated
McMillan,
So.
. A l t h o u g h t h e f e m a l e j u r o r s who were s t r u c k v a r i e d
i n age a n d some f e m a l e j u r o r s w o r k e d a n d some d i d n o t , t h e s e
j u r o r s d i d not share o n l y t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of gender.
Ex
parte
"evidence
Trawick,
that
characteristic
698 So. 2d a t 167-68
the
jurors
o f gender
( c o u r t s may
i n question
shared
a n d were i n a l l o t h e r
h e t e r o g e n e o u s as t h e community as a w h o l e . " ) .
during
voir
dire
indicate
that
35
many
See
consider
only
respects
the
as
The r e s p o n s e s
of the jurors
shared
CR-06-2236
similar
backgrounds
and
viewpoints
concerning
criminal
prosecutions.
As s t a t e d a b o v e , j u r o r s no.
143
95, no.
shared
would have
the
view
that
they
v o t i n g f o r the death p e n a l t y .
141
had
p r e v i o u s l y read
the
n e w s p a p e r , as
100
indicated that
charged w i t h
no.
100
J u r o r s no.
information
d i d j u r o r no.
they
had
100,
100.
close
criminal offenses.
close
Accordingly,
we
not
find
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of
and
difficult
no.
88,
J u r o r s no.
relatives
J u r o r s no.
sufficient
t h a t t h e f e m a l e v e n i r e m e m b e r s who
106,
79,
time
no.
case i n
79
who
no.
and
about S t a n l e y ' s
f r i e n d s , or witnesses
do
a
27,
knew l a w - e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s , who
relatives,
no.
and
had
no.
no.
been
88,
and
were e i t h e r t h e i r
i n Stanley's
evidence
trial.
indicating
were s t r u c k s h a r e d
only
the
gender.
4.
Stanley next maintains
Attorney's
O f f i c e has
its jury selection.
t h a t the
C o l b e r t County
a h i s t o r y of gender d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n
S t a n l e y c i t e s t h r e e cases from the e a r l y
1990s i n w h i c h t h e C o l b e r t C o u n t y D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ' s
was
found
to
have
selecting juries.
District
engaged
in
racial
Office
discrimination
in
These somewhat r e m o t e i n s t a n c e s , h o w e v e r ,
36
CR-06-2236
are
not
sufficient
discrimination.
sufficient
C l a r k v.
to
establish
Although
"[o]ne
a
history
instance
of
...
S t a n l e y has
896
So.
2d
584,
617
( A l a . C r i m . App.
J.E.B.
was
no
See
Clark,
896
So.
plain
error
on
a
appellant alleged r a c i a l
and
only
district
one
c a s e where t h e
2d
at
J.E.B.
2000),
617
(holding
claim,
a t t o r n e y was
Sharifi,
of
discriminatory
a
long
strikes
Dotch,
993
So.
2d a t 928
use
of
has
that
where
the
cited
found to
have
Gender d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s
n o t r e f l e c t e d i n o r i n d i c a t e d by t h e r e c o r d i n S t a n l e y ' s
See
has
office
gender d i s c r i m i n a t i o n but
engaged i n gender d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) .
prosecutor
not
not c i t e d even a s i n g l e case i n which a c o u r t
found t h a t the C o l b e r t County D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ' s
there
is
t o e s t a b l i s h a h i s t o r y of gender d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , "
State,
violated
gender
(no i n f e r e n c e f r o m t h e
peremptory
challenges
case.
record
by
the
d e s p i t e S h a r i f i ' s argument t h a t Madison County
h i s t o r y of
used
So.
by
violating
the
3d a t
State
.
Batson
and
that
the
indicated prejudice).
Stanley presented
females.
37
number
See
of
also
no e v i d e n c e t h a t
t h e p r o s e c u t o r had a h i s t o r y o f m i s u s i n g p e r e m p t o r y
so as t o d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t
has
challenges
CR-06-2236
5.
Stanley
stereotypes
asserts
that
the prosecution
during the guilt-phase
c l o s i n g arguments and a l s o
during
the penalty-phase arguments.
cites
the prosecutor's
argument
used gender-based
1 9
Specifically,
during
the
Stanley
guilt-phase
r e b u t t a l c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t , where he s t a t e d as f o l l o w s :
it
"[PROSECUTOR]: ....
o r Tony d i d i t ?
I s i t more l i k e l y s h e d i d
"The one t h i n g t h a t i s so c o n v i n c i n g t o me i n
t h i s c a s e -- A n d I want t o a s k y o u t h i s i n t h e f o r m
of a q u e s t i o n :
Do y o u t h i n k a 115-pound woman d i d
t h i s t o Henry Smith?
"(Counsel d i s p l a y s several p i c t u r e s t o jury.)
"[PROSECUTOR]: Look a t t h i s .
t h i n k ? I s t h a t what y o u r e a l l y
115-pound woman d i d t h i s ?
did
I s t h a t what y o u
b e l i e v e : That a
"...
Think S h e l l y Stanley d i d that?
t h a t b y h e r s e l f , 115-pound woman?
Think she
"Look a t t h o s e g a s h e s i n t h a t h e a d f r o m t h a t
machete.
Look a t t h a t .
You t h i n k s h e d i d t h a t ?
Those k n i f e wounds, l o o k a t a l l t h o s e s t a b wounds.
38 o f them, I t h i n k s h e t e s t i f i e d t o . Look a t t h a t .
They want y o u t o b e l i e v e S h e l l y S t a n l e y d i d t h a t b y
h e r s e l f . R i d i c u l o u s t o b e l i e v e something l i k e that.
S t a n l e y a l s o p r e s e n t s t h i s i d e n t i c a l c l a i m when a r g u i n g
t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r engaged i n i m p r o p r i e t y .
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
I s s u e V I I , A., p p . 70-72.)
1 9
38
CR-06-2236
"Now, D r . Ward t o l d y o u i t was a t r e m e n d o u s
blow, tremendous blow t h a t broke h i s f a c e .
Who i s
more l i k e l y t o d e l i v e r t h a t t r e m e n d o u s b l o w : T h i s
115-pound woman o r Tony S t a n l e y ?
Just use your
common s e n s e .
Human n a t u r e ,
a man a n d a woman
t h e r e , who i s g o i n g t o do i t ? B a c k up s o y o u d o n ' t
g e t h i t . A man d e l i v e r e d t h a t . No woman d e l i v e r e d
that l i c k .
Broke h i s f a c e . "
(R. 1055-56.)
Stanley
also submits, during the penalty-phase
c l o s i n g argument, t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s
f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t : "You
know, i t d o e s n ' t -- u s e y o u r common s e n s e .
o f a man o r woman?"
It
I s t h a t t h e work
(R. 1191.)
i s well s e t t l e d that
" ' [ d ] u r i n g c l o s i n g argument, t h e p r o s e c u t o r , as w e l l
as d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ,
has a r i g h t t o p r e s e n t h i s
impressions
from t h e e v i d e n c e , i f reasonable, and
may a r g u e e v e r y l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e . '
R u t l e d g e v.
S t a t e , 523 So. 2d 1087, 1100 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 7 ) ,
r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 523 So. 2d 1118 ( A l a . 1988)
( c i t a t i o n omitted).
Wide d i s c r e t i o n i s a l l o w e d t h e
t r i a l c o u r t i n r e g u l a t i n g t h e arguments o f c o u n s e l .
R a c i n e v . S t a t e , 290 A l a . 225, 275 So. 2d 655
(1973).
'In evaluating
allegedly
prejudicial
r e m a r k s b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r i n c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t , ...
e a c h c a s e must be j u d g e d on i t s own m e r i t s , '
Hooks
v. S t a t e , 534 So. 2d 329, 354 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 7 ) ,
a f f ' d , 534 So. 2d 371 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 488
U.S.
1050, 109 S . C t . 883, 102 L . E d . 2 d 1005 (1989)
( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ( q u o t i n g B a r n e t t v. S t a t e , 52
A l a . A p p . 260, 264, 291 So. 2d 353, 357 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) , a n d
t h e r e m a r k s must be e v a l u a t e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e
w h o l e t r i a l , D u r e n v . S t a t e , 590 So. 2d 360 ( A l a .
C r . App. 1 9 9 0 ) , a f f ' d , 590 So. 2d 369 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) .
'In o r d e r t o c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r , improper
a r g u m e n t must be p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i s s u e s a t t r i a l o r
its
n a t u r a l t e n d e n c y must be t o i n f l u e n c e t h e
39
CR-06-2236
f i n d i n g o f t h e j u r y . ' M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e , 480 So. 2d
1254,
1257-58
( A l a . C r . App.
1985)
(citations
omitted).
'To
justify
r e v e r s a l because
of
an
a t t o r n e y ' s a r g u m e n t t o t h e j u r y , t h i s c o u r t must
c o n c l u d e t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e has r e s u l t e d . '
T w i l l e y v. S t a t e , 472 So. 2d 1130, 1139 ( A l a . C r .
App. 1985) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . "
C o r a l v. S t a t e ,
628
So.
2d 954,
985
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1992).
Stanley's defense s t r a t e g y i n v o l v e d arguing to the
that
his wife,
Shelly,
murdered
c u l p a b l e i n t h e m u r d e r t h a n was he.
Smith
alone
or
was
defense
of
the m e d i c a l examiner,
counsel e l i c i t e d
more
Stanley's defense counsel
f i r s t p r e s e n t e d t h i s t h e o r y d u r i n g opening arguments.
cross-examination
jury
Dr.
During
E m i l y Ward,
t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g whether
i t was
p o s s i b l e t h a t a woman c o u l d have c a u s e d t h e i n j u r i e s t o S m i t h
that
resulted
arguments,
the
i n h i s death.
Additionally,
during
closing
defense counsel r e p e a t e d l y asserted that S h e l l y
more c u l p a b l e o f t h e
was
two.
In response t o defense c o u n s e l ' s t h e o r y t h a t S h e l l y a l o n e
murdered Smith, d u r i n g r e b u t t a l ,
the p r o s e c u t o r argued
that
S h e l l y a l o n e c o u l d not have p h y s i c a l l y murdered Smith based
facts i n evidence.
murder i n which
testified
on
The e v i d e n c e showed t h a t t h i s was a b r u t a l
S m i t h was
s t a b b e d numerous t i m e s .
t h a t a t r e m e n d o u s amount o f f o r c e w o u l d
40
Dr.
Ward
have been
CR-06-2236
necessary
to
break
Smith's
r e v e a l e d S h e l l y weighed
murder
and
Stanley
were
Smith
seen
each
around
weighed
and S h e l l y
facial
The
evidence
120 pounds a t t h e t i m e o f t h e
over
pounds.
Additionally,
together after
were s e e n
driving
bones.
236
t h e m u r d e r and
a different
pick-up
truck.
Thus,
c o n t r a r y t o S t a n l e y ' s c o n t e n t i o n , a l e g i t i m a t e argument b a s e d
on
the facts
counsel's
i n evidence
claim
that
before the jury
Shelly
acted
completely alone
m u r d e r o f S m i t h o r was t h e more c u l p a b l e
This
r e b u t t e d defense
Court's review of the c l o s i n g
i n the
party.
arguments
indicates
t h a t i n t h e c o m p l a i n e d - o f r e m a r k s t h e p r o s e c u t o r was r e p l y i n g
i n k i n d t o d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s argument t h a t S h e l l y a c t e d a l o n e
in k i l l i n g
(Ala.
Smith.
Crim.
App.
See B r o a d n a x
2000)
v . S t a t e , 825 So. 2d 134, 183
(finding
no p l a i n
error
where t h e
p r o s e c u t o r was r e p l y i n g i n k i n d t o d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s argument
that
the defendant
State,
d i d n o t commit t h e m u r d e r s ) ;
615 So. 2d 100, 110
C h a n d l e r v.
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1992)
(stating
t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r h a s a r i g h t t o comment on s t a t e m e n t s made
by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l i n c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t ) .
v.
State,
781
So.
2d
257
( A l a . Crim.
See a l s o M c W h o r t e r
App.
1999)
(same);
B a l l a r d v . S t a t e , 767 So. 2d 1123, 1135 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999)
41
CR-06-2236
("A p r o s e c u t o r
has a r i g h t t o r e p l y i n k i n d t o t h e argument o f
defense counsel.
This
' r e p l y - i n - k i n d ' d o c t r i n e i s b a s e d on
f u n d a m e n t a l f a i r n e s s . " ) ; H a r r i s , 2 So. 3d a t 920 (same); Brown
v. S t a t e , 11 So. 3d 866,
the
comments
Stanley
so i n f e c t e d
was
denied
DeChristoforo,
thoroughly
the
903 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) .
a
the t r i a l
fair
with
trial.
unfairness
See
Donnelly
416 U.S. 637 (1974) . M o r e o v e r , t h e t r i a l
i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on more t h a n one o c c a s i o n
arguments o f c o u n s e l
that
v.
court
that
were n o t e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e .
presume t h a t t h e j u r y f o l l o w e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s
See
None o f
We
instructions.
T a y l o r v. S t a t e , 666 So. 2d 36 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 4 ) .
In
after
summary, r e g a r d i n g
thoroughly
examination
the Batson
reviewing
and c o n s i d e r i n g
a n d J.E.B.
the record
and t h e v o i r
the factors
p a r t e B r a n c h a n d Ex p a r t e T r a w i c k ,
challenge,
dire
e s t a b l i s h e d b y Ex
we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e c o r d
does n o t r a i s e an i n f e r e n c e o f any i n t e n t i o n a l o r p u r p o s e f u l
discrimination.
We c o n c l u d e
only
that
the prosecutor
many o f h i s s t r i k e s t o remove women f r o m t h e v e n i r e .
more,
we
do
not f i n d
that
t h e number
of
used
"Without
strikes
this
p r o s e c u t o r u s e d t o remove women [ o r b l a c k s ] f r o m t h e v e n i r e i s
sufficient
t o e s t a b l i s h a prima
42
facie
case
o f gender [or
CR-06-2236
r a c i a l ] d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " Ex p a r t e T r a w i c k , 698 So. 2 d a t 168;
Ex p a r t e B r a n c h , 526 So. 2d a t 622-23.
See B u r g e s s v. S t a t e ,
827 So. 2d 134, 150 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1998) ( h o l d i n g on p l a i n error
review that
where
the only
used
there
was no i n f e r e n c e
e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d was t h a t
11 o u t o f 15 s t r i k e s
Clark,
jury);
App.
used
v. S t a t e ,
the jury);
( f i n d i n g no p l a i n
9 o f 14 s t r i k e s
Whitehead
the prosecution
t o remove women f r o m
896 So. 2d a t 616-17
prosecutor
of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
t o remove
error
women
were
from t h e
777 So. 2d 7 8 1 , 804 ( A l a . C r i m .
1999) ( h o l d i n g on p l a i n - e r r o r r e v i e w t h a t t h e r e
was no
i n f e r e n c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n where 17 o u t o f 20 v e n i r e m e m b e r s
s t r u c k were women, b u t 9 women r e m a i n e d
Cooper v. S t a t e ,
2005)
strikes
on j u r y ) .
912 So. 2 d 1150, 1156-57
(holding that
t o remove
the State's
women
from
See a l s o
( A l a . C r i m . App.
u s e o f 12 o f 15 p e r e m p t o r y
venire
was
insufficient
to
e s t a b l i s h prima f a c i e case o f gender d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) ; Minor v.
State,
other
780 So. 2 d 707, 765 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) ,
grounds,
capital-murder
of
11
of
established
780 So. 2d 796
( A l a . 2000)
r e v ' d on
(finding
that
defendant f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t State's use
i t s 17
prima
strikes
facie
to
showing
43
remove
women
o f gender
from
venire
discrimination,
CR-06-2236
where p r o s e c u t o r
examination,
indicated
c o n d u c t e d t h o r o u g h and
nothing
intent
i n prosecutor's
to
discriminate
meaningful v o i r d i r e
questions
based
on
that prosecutor
had
no
e v i d e n c e was
h i s t o r y of
we
127
( A l a . C r i m . App.
f i n d no
hearing
that
state
by
or
than
presented i n d i c a t i n g
discriminating against
when u s i n g p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e s ) ;
2d 115,
comments
gender
f e m a l e v e n i r e m e m b e r s were t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y
m a l e v e n i r e m e m b e r s , and
or
1999)
P r e s s l e y v. S t a t e , 770
(same).
e r r o r , p l a i n or o t h e r w i s e ,
i s not w a r r a n t e d i n t h i s
women
Therefore,
So.
because
a remand f o r a
Batson
case.
II.
Stanley
him
asserts
a fair
(Stanley's
vested
trial
brief,
with
that
and
an
the
trial
court
improperly
impartial jury i n several
Issue
X I I , pp.
conduct
of
a
court
is
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s w i l l not i n t e r f e r e w i t h the e x e r c i s e of
that
i t clearly
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . "
(Ala.
dire
trial
C r i m . App.
1992).
the
trial
and
unless
in
"A
respects.
trial,
discretion
discretion
100-08.)
denied
appears t h a t
C a r d e n v.
State,
Furthermore,
examination remains w i t h i n the
court."
S t a t e v. W a t t s , 35 So.
44
there
621
"the
So.
has
2d
process
been
342,
of
an
346
voir
sound d i s c r e t i o n of
the
3d 1, 5 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
CR-06-2236
2009).
Applying
these
principles,
Stanley's
we
address
each
of
a s s e r t i o n s below.
A.
Stanley
remove two
not
be
claims
c o u r t e r r e d by
and
juror
no.
impartial.
25
More
should
have
particularly,
been
b e c a u s e he knew t h e v i c t i m ' s d a u g h t e r .
no.
failing
to
j u r o r s f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e , he s a y s , t h e j u r o r s c o u l d
fair
contends
t h a t the t r i a l
He
removed
Stanley
for
also alleges juror
90 s h o u l d have b e e n removed f o r c a u s e b e c a u s e she
t h e c a s e on t e l e v i s i o n and
cause
i n the newspapers.
followed
Stanley
never
moved t h a t t h e s e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s be removed f o r c a u s e b a s e d
on
any
a l l e g e d b i a s on
the
jurors' part.
Therefore,
we
are
l i m i t e d to d e t e r m i n i n g whether p l a i n e r r o r occurred.
See
45A,
exercise
Ala.
R.
App.
P.
Stanley
did,
however,
p e r e m p t o r y s t r i k e s t o remove b o t h j u r o r no.
90
from the
jury.
(C. 263-65; R.
25
and
juror
340-42.)
"The
S i x t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d
States
C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s , i n p a r t : 'In a l l c r i m i n a l
p r o s e c u t i o n s , the accused s h a l l enjoy the r i g h t to
a s p e e d y and p u b l i c t r i a l , by an i m p a r t i a l j u r y o f
t h e S t a t e and d i s t r i c t w h e r e i n t h e c r i m e s h a l l have
been committed
'
' I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d that the
Sixth
and
Fourteenth
Amendments
guarantee
a
d e f e n d a n t on t r i a l f o r h i s l i f e t h e r i g h t t o an
i m p a r t i a l j u r y . ' R o s s v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85,
108 S. C t . 2273, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80 ( 1 9 8 8 ) .
'[T]he
45
Rule
no.
CR-06-2236
r i g h t to j u r y t r i a l guarantees to the c r i m i n a l l y
a c c u s e d a f a i r t r i a l by
a p a n e l of
impartial,
" i n d i f f e r e n t " j u r o r s . ' I r v i n v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717,
722,
81 S. C t . 1639,
6 L. Ed. 2d 751
(1961).
A
d e f e n d a n t i s ' e n t i t l e d t o be t r i e d by 12, n o t 9 o r
e v e n 10 i m p a r t i a l and u n p r e j u d i c e d j u r o r s . '
Parker
v. G l a d d e n , 385 U.S.
363,
366,
87 S.Ct.
468,
17
L.Ed.2d 420
(1966).
Section
6 of the
Alabama
C o n s t i t u t i o n g i v e s a defendant the r i g h t to a t r i a l
'by an i m p a r t i a l j u r y o f t h e c o u n t y o r d i s t r i c t i n
w h i c h t h e o f f e n s e was c o m m i t t e d . '
A r t i c l e I , § 6,
A l a . C o n s t . 1901."
Ex p a r t e K i l l i n g s w o r t h ,
[Ms.
So.
2010).
3d
,
(Ala.
The
set
statutory
out
in
§
for
Ala.
Code
Killingsworth,
1975.
are
also
cause
inconsistent
So.
3d
There
with
the
statute.
.
The
fact
at
p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r knows t h e v i c t i m o r members o f t h e
f a m i l y does n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y
for
App.
cause.
2007);
C r i m . App.
B e l i s l e v.
Harris
1992).
v.
State,
v o i r d i r e t h a t h i s or her
victim's
family
that
Ex
a
victim's
d i s q u a l i f y the p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r
11
State,
Unless the
are
a veniremember f o r
challenging
when t h o s e g r o u n d s a r e n o t
parte
2010]
c h a l l e n g e s f o r c a u s e u n d e r A l a b a m a law
12-16-150,
common-law g r o u n d s
1090589, December 30,
632
So.
So.
3d
256,
2d
287
503,
(Ala.
Crim.
519-21
(Ala.
prospective juror indicates
relationship with
w o u l d p r e v e n t him
or her
the v i c t i m or
the
from b e i n g f a i r
and
i m p a r t i a l , a c h a l l e n g e f o r c a u s e s h o u l d be d e n i e d .
46
on
D u n n i n g v.
CR-06-2236
State,
659
So.
Furthermore,
newspaper
2d
the
mere
articles
disqualify
the
995,
997
fact
about
(Ala.
that
a
the
prospective
case
juror
Crim.
App.
prospective
does
not
f o r cause
1994).
juror
read
automatically
when
the
juror
a s s u r e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t he o r she c o u l d s e t a s i d e what he
or
she h a d
r e a d and b a s e
instructed.
App.
h i s or her d e c i s i o n
Pace v. S t a t e ,
2003);
Peraita
v.
C r i m . App.
2003); Oryang
C r i m . App.
904
State,
So.
897
v. S t a t e ,
2d 331,
So.
642
2d
on t h e l a w
341
as
( A l a . Crim.
1161,
1218
So. 2d 979,
(Ala.
987 ( A l a .
1993).
J u r o r no. 25 s t a t e d t h a t he knew S m i t h ' s d a u g h t e r
because
h i s s i s t e r - i n - l a w and S m i t h ' s d a u g h t e r were c l o s e f r i e n d s .
He
i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h a d a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s s i s t e r - i n l a w and t h a t she t o l d h i m a b o u t a c c o m p a n y i n g
to the Stanleys'
that
she
murdered
ex-wife.
had
Smith.
apartment
informed
him
Smith's
a f t e r t h e body was
that
she
daughter
discovered
believed
Stanley
He s t a t e d t h a t h i s w i f e w o r k e d w i t h
and
had
Smith's
J u r o r no. 25, h o w e v e r , s t a t e d t h a t he c o u l d b a s e h i s
v e r d i c t on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d and n o t on what he had h e a r d
from h i s s i s t e r - i n - l a w .
(R. 231,
47
233-34.)
CR-06-2236
J u r o r no. 90 s t a t e d t h a t she h a d f o l l o w e d t h e e v e n t s i n
news r e p o r t s
on t h e t e l e v i s i o n
and i n t h e newspapers.
She
a l s o s t a t e d s h e h a d r e a d an a r t i c l e a b o u t t h e c a s e t h e m o r n i n g
of v o i r d i r e examination.
When a s k e d i f she c o u l d s e t a s i d e
h e r o p i n i o n a n d b a s e h e r v e r d i c t on t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e ,
however, t h e f o l l o w i n g exchange
occurred:
"[JUROR NO. 9 0 ] : Y e s , I t h i n k
d i d h a v e an o p i n i o n . B u t l i k e I s a y ,
e v e r y t h i n g I read i n t h e newspaper.
an o p i n i o n .
But I t h i n k t h a t I can
t h a t I can. I
I don't b e l i e v e
But I d i d form
do t h a t .
"[PROSECUTOR]: Do y o u t h i n k y o u c a n s e t t h a t
o p i n i o n a s i d e b a s e d on what y o u -- i f y o u h a d an
o p i n i o n c o m i n g i n b a s e d on -- Can y o u s e t t h a t a s i d e
and l i s t e n t o t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t ' s p r e s e n t e d a n d o n l y
make y o u r v e r d i c t on w h a t ' s p r e s e n t e d h e r e i n c o u r t ?
Not what y o u ' v e r e a d o r n o t what y o u ' v e h e a r d , b u t
b a s e d on what comes o u t r i g h t h e r e i n t h i s t r i a l ?
"[JUROR NO.
90]:
"[PROSECUTOR]:
"[JUROR NO.
Can y o u do
90]:
"[PROSECUTOR]:
you c a n .
Yes, I t h i n k I can.
that?
I t h i n k I can.
You t h i n k you c a n .
"[JUROR NO. 9 0 ] :
with t h i s before.
Well,
Or y o u know
I've never been
faced
"[PROSECUTOR]: B u t y o u ' r e t e l l i n g me y o u f e e l
l i k e y o u c a n p u t t h a t a s i d e a n d be f a i r i n t h i s
case.
48
CR-06-2236
Yes,
"[JUROR NO. 9 0 ] : I w i l l l i s t e n t o t h e e v i d e n c e .
I would.
"[PROSECUTOR]:
trial?
Will
you g i v e
[Stanley]
a fair
"[JUROR NO. 9 0 ] : Y e s .
"[PROSECUTOR]: W i l l y o u make us p r o v e t h a t he i s
guilty?
"[JUROR NO. 9 0 ] : Y e s . "
(R.
241-42.)
Although
j u r o r no. 90 i n d i c a t e d t h a t
she had
r e a d a b o u t t h e c a s e i n t h e n e w s p a p e r a n d h a d s e e n news r e p o r t s
a b o u t i t on t e l e v i s i o n a n d h a d f o r m e d an o p i n i o n , s h e a s s u r e d
t h e c o u r t t h a t s h e c o u l d s e t a s i d e what s h e h a d r e a d ,
to
the evidence,
We
sua
find
and g i v e S t a n l e y a f a i r
no p l a i n
sponte d i s m i s s
Trawick,
trial.
error i n the t r i a l
court's
t h e two j u r o r s f o r c a u s e .
698 So. 2d a t 174.
failure to
See Ex
parte
Moreover, i f e r r o r occurred, the
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e
juror
listen
t o remove a
f o r c a u s e i s h a r m l e s s when t h a t j u r o r i s removed b y a
peremptory s t r i k e .
B e t h e a v. S p r i n g h i l l Mem'l Hosp., 833 So.
2d 1 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ; s e e a l s o Ex p a r t e B r o w n f i e l d ,
48-50
( A l a . 2010).
2009)
(erroneous
multiple
B u t s e e Ex p a r t e C o l b y ,
denial
j u r o r s may
of
strikes
n o t be h a r m l e s s ) .
49
44 So. 3d 43,
41 So. 3d 1
f o r cause
(Ala.
involving
Therefore,
to the
CR-06-2236
extent
that these j u r o r s should
h a v e b e e n removed f o r c a u s e ,
any
s u c h e r r o r was r e n d e r e d h a r m l e s s b y t h e i r
use
of peremptory
removal by t h e
strikes.
B.
Stanley
contends the p r e t r i a l death q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the
jury violated h i s right to a f a i r t r i a l .
that
Stanley
d i d not f i l e
a pretrial
The r e c o r d
motion
object to death-qualifying the prospective
reflects
or
jurors.
otherwise
Therefore,
t h i s Court reviews t h i s i s s u e under t h e p l a i n - e r r o r
See
R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App. P.
that
Although Stanley
standard.
acknowledges
death-qualification i s constitutionally permissible i n
capital-murder
(1986),
prone
he
to
cases,
maintains
convict
fundamental
see L o c k h a r t
that
and
right
death-qualified
that
t o have
v. M c C r e e ,
this
an
476 U.S.
jurors
162
a r e more
procedure
violated his
impartial jury
determine h i s
guilt.
The t r i a l
panel,
This
court d i d not e r r i n d e a t h - q u a l i f y i n g the j u r y
and d o i n g
argument
adversely
App.
so d i d n o t r e s u l t i n a d e a t h - p r o n e
has
been
addressed
previously
and
jury.
decided
to Stanley:
" I n D a v i s v. S t a t e , 718 So. 2d 1148 ( A l a . C r i m .
1995) ( o p i n i o n on r e t u r n t o r e m a n d ) , a f f ' d , 718
50
CR-06-2236
So.
2d 1166
1179, 119 S.
^
A
. 4- ^
^
(Ala. 1998), c e r t .
C t . 1117, 143 L. Ed.
d e n i e d , 525
U.S.
2d 112 ( 1 9 9 9 ) , we
.
"'A
jury
composed
exclusively
of
j u r o r s who
have b e e n d e a t h - q u a l i f i e d
in
accordance w i t h the t e s t e s t a b l i s h e d
in
W a i n w r i g h t v. W i t t , 469 U.S.
412, 105
S.
Ct.
844,
83 L. Ed.
2d 841
(1985), i s
c o n s i d e r e d t o be i m p a r t i a l e v e n t h o u g h i t
may
be
more
conviction
prone
than
a
non-death-qualified
jury.
Williams
v.
State,
710
So.
2d 1276
( A l a . Cr.
App.
1996).
See L o c k h a r t v. M c C r e e , 476
U.S.
162,
106 S. C t . 1758,
90 L. Ed. 2d
137
(1986) . N e i t h e r t h e f e d e r a l n o r t h e s t a t e
c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s t h e s t a t e f r o m ...
death-qualifying jurors i n c a p i t a l cases.
I d . ; W i l l i a m s ; Haney v. S t a t e , 603 So.
2d
368, 391-92 ( A l a . C r . App.
1991), a f f ' d ,
603 So. 2d 412 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d ,
507 U.S.
925, 113 S. C t . 1297,
122 L. Ed.
2d 687
(1993).'
"718 So. 2d a t 1157.
T h e r e was no e r r o r i n a l l o w i n g
the State to death q u a l i f y the p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s . "
Brown, 11
bare
but
So.
3d
allegations
he
has
not
a t 891.
We
regarding
point
the
out
that
in this
has
death-qualification
supported those a l l e g a t i o n s .
no p l a i n e r r o r
Stanley
made
process,
Thus, t h e r e
was
regard.
C.
Stanley
m o t i o n f o r an
that
alleges
the
trial
court
improperly
i n d i v i d u a l l y sequestered v o i r d i r e .
because of
this denial
he
51
was
unable to
denied
He
learn
his
claims
whether
CR-06-2236
prospective
The
trial
court's
individually
review.
j u r o r s had
(C.
b e e n a f f e c t e d by
d e n i a l of S t a n l e y ' s
sequestered
138-42.)
a f t e r conducting
voir
The
pretrial
p r e t r i a l motion f o r
d i r e preserved
trial
a hearing.
publicity.
court
(R. 54-58; C.
this
denied
issue
the
L a n d , 678
So.
2d 224,
242
170.)
( A l a . 1996).
"'[T]here
i s no r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a d e f e n d a n t be
allowed
to
question
each
prospective
juror
i n d i v i d u a l l y during v o i r d i r e examination.
This
r u l e a p p l i e s t o c a p i t a l c a s e s , and t h e g r a n t i n g o f
a request f o r i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y
w i t h the t r i a l c o u r t . '
C o r a l v. S t a t e , 628 So. 2d
954, 968 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , a f f ' d , 628 So. 2d
1004
( A l a . 1993).
F i n a l l y , i t i s w i t h i n the t r i a l
c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n t o g r a n t o r deny a m o t i o n t o
s e q u e s t e r t h e j u r y . See C e n t o b i e v. S t a t e , 861 So.
2d 1111 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) . "
Sneed v.
State,
1 So.
3d
104,
135
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2007).
" ' T h i s d i s c r e t i o n i s l i m i t e d , h o w e v e r , by
the
r e q u i r e m e n t s o f due
process.
United
States
v.
H a w k i n s , 658 F.2d 279
( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) ; W a l d r o p v.
S t a t e [ , 462 So. 2d 1021
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1984),
52
for
motion,
"A t r i a l c o u r t i s v e s t e d w i t h g r e a t d i s c r e t i o n
i n d e t e r m i n i n g how v o i r d i r e e x a m i n a t i o n w i l l
be
conducted,
and
that
court's
decision
on
how
extensive a v o i r d i r e examination i s required w i l l
n o t be
overturned
e x c e p t f o r an a b u s e o f
that
discretion.
F l e t c h e r v. S t a t e , 291 A l a . 67, 277 So.
2d 882 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; Lane v. S t a t e , 644 So. 2d 1318 ( A l a .
C r . App.
1 9 9 4 ) ; H a r r i s v. S t a t e , 632 So. 2d
503
( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , a f f i r m e d , 632 So. 2d 543 ( A l a .
1 9 9 3 ) , a f f i r m e d , 513 U.S. 504, 115 S. C t . 1031,
130
L. Ed. 2d 1004
(1995)."
Ex p a r t e
an
CR-06-2236
c e r t . d e n i e d , 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S. C t . 3483, 87 L.
Ed. 2d 618 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ] .
I n d i v i d u a l q u e s t i o n i n g may be
n e c e s s a r y u n d e r some c i r c u m s t a n c e s
t o ensure t h a t
a l l p r e j u d i c e has been exposed.
U n i t e d S t a t e s v.
H u r l e y , 746 F.2d 725 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) . ' "
W a l k e r v. S t a t e , 932 So. 2d 140, 156-57 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2004)
( q u o t i n g Haney v. S t a t e , 603 So. 2d 368, 402 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1991)).
In t h i s case,
questions
to
prosecution
entire
venire
qualification
allowed
both
the
extensive
voir
dire
q u e s t i o n i n g when n e e d e d .
of
o f media
voir
impartiality.
dire
See H a r d y
was
t o conduct
S t a n l e y has
that the p r e t r i a l
coverage
was
so e x t e n s i v e
inadequate
to
v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999) ( d e n y i n g
request
and
t o conduct
no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g
knowledge
method
c o u r t gave g e n e r a l
Furthermore, the t r i a l court allowed the p a r t i e s
conduct i n d i v i d u a l
presented
and
the
and t h e defense
examination.
to
the t r i a l
that the
ensure
juror
804 So. 2d 247, 288-89
a capital-murder
individually
publicity
sequestered
defendant's
voir
dire
to
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r any v e n i r e m e m b e r ' s i m p a r t i a l i t y was a f f e c t e d
by
pretrial
defense
venire
p u b l i c i t y was n o t an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n ,
counsel
as w h o l e
was
granted
wide
latitude
and i n i n d i v i d u a l l y
53
where
i n questioning
questioning
individual
CR-06-2236
veniremembers).
See a l s o W h i t e h e a d , 777 So. 2d a t 798 (same).
T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t S t a n l e y was p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e way
the
trial
court
conducted
the v o i r
dire
examination.
See
F e r g u s o n v. S t a t e , 814 So. 2d 925, 938 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) .
The
trial
court
d i d n o t abuse
i t s discretion
S t a n l e y ' s m o t i o n f o r an i n d i v i d u a l v o i r d i r e
i n denying
examination.
D.
Stanley
argues the t r i a l
c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n
denying h i s motion requesting
that the t r i a l
c o u r t use j u r y
questionnaires.
that the juror
questionnaires
He m a i n t a i n s
would have a l l o w e d
him t o l e a r n
more a b o u t
j u r o r s ' backgrounds and a t t i t u d e s ,
make more i n f o r m e d
choices
the prospective
w o u l d have a l l o w e d h i m t o
i n selecting
the jury,
and "would
have p r o v i d e d i n f o r m a t i o n v i t a l t o t h e e x e r c i s e o f p e r e m p t o r y
challenges
and s t r i k e s f o r cause, and would have
the heightened
trial."
to
constitutional
The
r e l i a b i l i t y t h a t was r e q u i r e d f o r [ h i s ] c a p i t a l
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , p. 107.)
failure
allow
juror
According
questionnaires
to Stanley, the
violated
his
rights.
record r e f l e c t s that Stanley f i l e d
requesting
safeguarded
t h e use of j u r o r
questionnaires
54
a pretrial
motion
and a t t a c h e d
to
CR-06-2236
that
motion
a
proposed
juror
questionnaire.
(C.
110-19.)
A f t e r a h e a r i n g , the t r i a l c o u r t denied
the motion.
(R. 47-48;
C.
trial
is
170.)
I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t "[a]
with great d i s c r e t i o n i n determining
w i l l be c o n d u c t e d , and
a
voir
how
t h a t c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on how
d i r e examination
i s required
2d
at
242.
"[T]he
method
of
vested
v o i r d i r e examination
will
not
e x c e p t f o r an abuse o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . "
So.
court
voir
extensive
be
overturned
Ex p a r t e
Land,
d i r e examination
w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t [ . ] " Hodges v.
856
So.
and
t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t have r e p e a t e d l y
"trial
2d
875,
courts
913
are
questionnaires,
So.
2d 1, 51
678
So.
5,
2010]
v.
State,
Lee
v.
( A l a . C r i m . App.
not
required
( A l a . C r i m . App.
3d
So.
3d a t 885;
898
1999).
M o r r i s v. S t a t e ,
So.
State,
2001).
allow
even i n c a p i t a l c a s e s . "
2d a t 242;
11
to
So.
,
2d
See
[Ms.
790,
854
Court
recognized
the
use
is
State,
Both t h i s
that
of
jury
M a p l e s v. S t a t e ,
a l s o Ex p a r t e
758
Land,
CR-07-1997, F e b r u a r y
( A l a . C r i m . App.
Sneed v.
678
State,
2 0 1 0 ) ; Brown
1 So.
3d a t
( A l a . C r i m . App.
135;
2001).
As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d v o i r d i r e
e x a m i n a t i o n i n i t i a l l y as a g r o u p b u t
then allowed
the p a r t i e s
to
examination
of
conduct
individual
voir
dire
55
certain
CR-06-2236
prospective
shows
j u r o r s when i t t h o u g h t i t n e c e s s a r y .
the
parties
questioning
were
not
of prospective
individual
voir
dire.
limited
jurors,
i n any
either
Furthermore,
The
way
in
during
Stanley
has
record
their
group
failed
or
to
i n d i c a t e what, i f any, i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s he
was
unable
to
discover
without
juror
questionnaires.
A c c o r d i n g l y , S t a n l e y has n o t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e t r i a l
abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n
juror
i n denying h i s motion
court
f o r t h e use of
questionnaires.
E.
Stanley asserts that the t r i a l court erred i n denying h i s
motion seeking d i s c l o s u r e
o f any and a l l i n f o r m a t i o n
i n the
S t a t e ' s p o s s e s s i o n r e g a r d i n g p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s t h a t may
been f a v o r a b l e t o t h e d e f e n s e .
denial
of
his
prospective
motion
jurors
hampered
during
jury
B r a d y v. M a r y l a n d , 373 U.S.
his
83
his
ability
selection,
that
to
court's
assess
i t violated
( 1 9 6 3 ) , and t h a t i t d e n i e d h i m
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o due p r o c e s s , a f a i r t r i a l , and an
impartial
the
He c o n t e n d s t h e t r i a l
have
State
jury.
Stanley
to reveal
any
filed
a pretrial
exculpatory
56
motion to r e q u i r e
information
about
the
CR-06-2236
prospective
hearing.
It
jurors,
which
the t r i a l
(C. 129-31, 170; R.
i s well
settled
that
court
denied
State
has
after
a
50-51.)
"'[t]he
no d u t y
to
d i s c l o s e information concerning prospective j u r o r s . ' "
McGowan
v. S t a t e , 990 So. 2d 931, 967
(quoting
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2003)
M c G r i f f v. S t a t e , 908 So. 2d 961, 981 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) ,
rev'd
on o t h e r
grounds,
M c C r a y v. S t a t e ,
3d
,
908 So. 2d 1024
( A l a . 2004)).
[Ms. CR-06-0360, December 17, 2010]
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ; V a n p e l t
CR-06-1539,
See
December
18, 2009]
So. 3d
So.
v. S t a t e ,
,
[Ms.
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 9 ) ; Brown v. S t a t e , 982 So. 2d a t 585; M a p l e s v.
S t a t e , 758 So. 2d a t 5 0 - 5 1 ; W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 654 So. 2d 74,
76
(Ala.
465-66
C r i m . App. 1 9 9 4 ) ; C o o p e r v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . Crim.
App.
1992).
r e c e n t l y e x p l a i n e d i n Doster
30,
2010]
So. 3d
Moreover,
v. S t a t e ,
611 So. 2d 460,
as
this
[Ms. CR-06-0323,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2010):
"'The
traditional
common-law
rule
t h a t , absent a s t a t u t e or r u l e of p r a c t i c e
providing
otherwise,
or
(in
some
jurisdictions)
other
exceptional
circumstance, defense counsel i n a c r i m i n a l
c a s e h a s no r i g h t o f a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n
i n the possession of the prosecution i s
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h most o f t h e d e c i s i o n s
involving prosecution information regarding
prospective jurors.
Thus, i n most o f t h e
57
Court
July
CR-06-2236
jurisdictions
i n which
the
issue
has
a r i s e n , t h e c o u r t s have h e l d t h a t a t l e a s t
i n the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances
presented,
disclosure
to
defense
counsel
of
prosecution
information
regarding
prospective
jurors
was
not
required,
whether the i n f o r m a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n r e l a t e d
to a prospective j u r o r ' s experience
or
voting
record
on
prior
juries,
to
a
prospective
juror's criminal record
or
o t h e r p r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d from the
r e c o r d or i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t s o f a law
enforcement agency, or t o m i s c e l l a n e o u s or
unspecified information.'"
So.
in
3d a t
Criminal
Information
(1978)).
( q u o t i n g J e f f r e y F. G h e n t , R i g h t o f D e f e n s e
Prosecution
Regarding
to
Disclosure
Prospective
Jurors,
of
86
Prosecution
A.L.R.3d
571
Furthermore,
"'the
s t a t e has
no
duty
to
disclose
information
that
i s a v a i l a b l e to
the
a p p e l l a n t from another source.
H u r s t v.
S t a t e , 469 So. 2d 720 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 5 ) .
H e r e , t h e a p p e l l a n t c o u l d have
procured
t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n from the veniremembers
themselves during v o i r d i r e .
See
also
C l i f t o n [ v. S t a t e , 545 So. 2d 173
(Ala.
C r i m . App.
1988)] ( n o n d i s c l o s u r e d i d n o t
prejudice appellant's defense).'"
A r t h u r v. S t a t e , 711
So.
2d 1031,
( q u o t i n g K e l l e y v. S t a t e , 602
So.
1992)).
58
1080
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2d 473,
478
(Ala. Crim.
1996)
App.
CR-06-2236
Nothing
prevented
jurors
in
from
the
discovering
during voir
above, the
latitude
record
dire
indicates
information
examination.
may
about
Instead,
in their
voir
dire
questioning.
State's
possession
was
prospective
as
mentioned
wide
Thus, S t a n l e y
has
c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n
d e n y i n g h i s m o t i o n f o r d i s c l o s u r e o f any
the
Stanley
r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s were g i v e n
f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h the t r i a l
in
that
regarding
have been f a v o r a b l e t o the
and
in
a l l information
prospective
jurors
that
denying
his
defense.
III.
Stanley
motion
to
discovered
his
claims
the
trial
suppress
the
evidence
the
R o n a l d was
Fourth
law-enforcement
says,
the
Amendment.
He
maintains
officers
search
search
that,
not
although
t h u s , he
search
and t h a t t h e r e was
so as t o
obviate
no v a l i d c o n s e n t t o
a s s e r t s t h a t the evidence recovered
59
the
t o the door of the apartment,
a private-citizen
the need f o r a w a r r a n t ,
of
that
on t h e s c e n e b e f o r e law e n f o r c e m e n t and s e c u r e d
s e a r c h was
search;
in
i l l e g a l warrantless
b o l t c u t t e r s and c u t t h e p a d l o c k
the
erred
i n h i s a p a r t m e n t b e c a u s e , he
a p a r t m e n t c o n s t i t u t e d an
violated
court
must
be
CR-06-2236
s u p p r e s s e d as
brief,
Issue
the
"fruit
IV, pp.
Stanley preserved
motion
to
conducting
Stanley
trial
o f an
search."
(Stanley's
48-56.)
t h i s i s s u e by r a i s i n g i t i n a
suppress,
which
a hearing
at
the
which
renewed h i s m o t i o n
court also
illegal
to
trial
court
pretrial
denied
several witnesses
testified.
suppress
which
at
trial,
denied.
" I n r e v i e w i n g a t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a m o t i o n t o
suppress,
t h i s Court reviews
the t r i a l
court's
findings
of
fact
under
an
abuse-of-discretion
s t a n d a r d of review.
'When e v i d e n c e i s p r e s e n t e d o r e
tenus t o the t r i a l c o u r t , the c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of
f a c t b a s e d on t h a t e v i d e n c e a r e p r e s u m e d t o be
c o r r e c t , ' Ex p a r t e P e r k i n s , 646 So. 2d 46, 47 ( A l a .
1 9 9 4 ) ; '[w]e i n d u l g e a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e t r i a l
c o u r t p r o p e r l y r u l e d on t h e w e i g h t and
probative
f o r c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e , ' B r a d l e y v. S t a t e , 494 So. 2d
750, 761 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 5 ) , a f f ' d , 494 So. 2d
772
( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) ; and we make ' " a l l t h e
reasonable
i n f e r e n c e s and c r e d i b i l i t y c h o i c e s s u p p o r t i v e o f t h e
d e c i s i o n of the t r i a l c o u r t . " '
Kennedy v. S t a t e ,
640 So. 2d 22, 26 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g
B r a d l e y , 494 So. 2d a t 761.
'[A]ny c o n f l i c t s i n the
testimony
or c r e d i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s
during
a
s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g i s a m a t t e r f o r r e s o l u t i o n by
the
trial
court
Absent
a
gross
abuse
of
d i s c r e t i o n , a t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n of
[such]
conflict[s]
should
n o t be
reversed
on
appeal.'
S h e e l y v. S t a t e , 629 So. 2d 23, 29 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1993)
(citations omitted).
However, ' " [ w ] h e r e t h e
e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t was u n d i s p u t e d
the
o r e t e n u s r u l e i s i n a p p l i c a b l e , and t h e [ a p p e l l a t e ]
C o u r t w i l l s i t i n j u d g m e n t on t h e e v i d e n c e de novo,
i n d u l g i n g no p r e s u m p t i o n i n f a v o r o f t h e
trial
c o u r t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n of the law t o those
facts."'
60
after
the
CR-06-2236
S t a t e v . H i l l , 690 So. 2d 1 2 0 1 , 1203 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ,
q u o t i n g S t i l e s v. Brown, 380 So. 2d 792, 794 ( A l a .
1980).
'"' [W]hen t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y a p p l i e s
t h e l a w t o t h e f a c t s , no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s
e x i s t s as t o t h e c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t . ' " '
Ex p a r t e
J a c k s o n , 886 So. 2d 155, 159 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , q u o t i n g
H i l l , 690 So. 2d a t 1203, q u o t i n g i n t u r n Ex p a r t e
Agee, 669 So. 2d 102, 104 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) .
A trial
c o u r t ' s u l t i m a t e l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n on a m o t i o n t o
s u p p r e s s b a s e d on a g i v e n s e t o f f a c t s i s a q u e s t i o n
o f l a w t h a t i s r e v i e w e d de novo on a p p e a l .
See
S t a t e v . S m i t h , 785 So. 2d 1169 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
2000). "
S t a t e v. H a r g e t t ,
935 So. 2d 1200, 1203-04
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2005).
A search or s e i z u r e conducted
n o t i m p l i c a t e t h e F o u r t h Amendment.
447
U.S. 649
by a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n
W a l t e r v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
(1980).
"'A p r i v a t e c i t i z e n ' s
acts
cannot
c o n s t i t u t e a search or seizure w i t h i n the
c o n t e x t o f t h e F o u r t h Amendment u n l e s s t h e
c i t i z e n i s a c t i n g as an a g e n t o r i n s t r u m e n t
of t h e government.
In order f o r a p r i v a t e
s e a r c h t o be c o n s i d e r e d a c t i o n b y t h e
g o v e r n m e n t , t h e p r i v a t e a c t o r must be
r e g a r d e d as h a v i n g a c t e d as an i n s t r u m e n t
or agent of the s t a t e .
C o o l i d g e v. New
H a m p s h i r e , 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S. C t .
2022, 2049, 29 L. E d . 2d 564 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .
The
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h i s a g e n c y must be made
on a c a s e - b y - c a s e b a s i s a n d i n l i g h t o f a l l
of
the
circumstances.
I t i s the
defendant's
burden
to establish
by a
preponderance
of the evidence
that
a
private
party
acted
as
a
government
instrument o r agent.
U.S. v. F e f f e r , 831
61
does
CR-06-2236
F.2d 734, 739 ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) .
See a l s o ,
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931
( 9 t h C i r . 1994)
("The d e f e n d a n t has t h e
burden of showing government
action.").'
" U n i t e d S t a t e s v. S m i t h , 210 F. Supp. 2d
1096,
1102-03 (D. Neb. 2 0 0 1 ) . A t w o - p r o n g e d t e s t i s u s e d
t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n i s a c t i n g as
an a g e n t f o r t h e p o l i c e : (1) t h e p o l i c e must h a v e
instigated,
encouraged,
or p a r t i c i p a t e d
i n the
s e a r c h ; and (2) t h e i n d i v i d u a l must have e n g a g e d i n
the s e a r c h w i t h the i n t e n t of a s s i s t i n g the p o l i c e
in their investigation.
Ex p a r t e H i l l e y , 484 So. 2d
485, 490 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) . "
Hyde v. S t a t e ,
13 So. 3d 997,
1017
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2007).
C o n s i d e r i n g a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c a s e , we
conclude
that
instigated
the
the
Berryhills
search
i s no
search
with
the
the
Officer
Police
the
as
Department
Stanleys'
officers
apartment;
the
e n t r y i n t o the S t a n l e y s ' apartment,
and
that
intent
of
i n s t r u m e n t s or agents
the
of
indication
investigation.
enter
of
were n o t a c t i n g
State i n the i n i t i a l
there
Tuscumbia
cannot
the B e r r y h i l l s
assisting
the
engaged
police
i n the
in
their
I n s t e a d , the B e r r y h i l l s had a l r e a d y p l a n n e d t o
Stanleys'
Setliff
apartment
arrived
t o get
the
and
accompanied
testified
that
animals out
Ronald
when
into
the
at
the
apartment.
Officer
Setliff
he
stopped
a p a r t m e n t i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r one o f t h e p e o p l e
62
was
CR-06-2236
Shelly,
whom
Capt.
Heffernan had informed
law-enforcement
o f f i c e r s t h a t d a y i n a d e p a r t m e n t a l m e e t i n g he w a n t e d
about
an u n r e l a t e d m a t t e r , o r S m i t h , who h a d b e e n
missing.
When he a r r i v e d , O f f i c e r S e t l i f f
t o see
reported
learned that
Swanie
owned t h e a p a r t m e n t , a n d t h a t , a l t h o u g h Dot, t h e l e s s e e , d i d
not
have
t h e keys
actually
t o t h e apartment
l e a s e d t h e apartment
but had allowed
Stanley
a t the time,
f r o m Swanie
and S h e l l y
and p a i d
to live
she had
the rent
there.
Officer
S e t l i f f i n d i c a t e d t h a t because the B e r r y h i l l s had l e a r n e d t h a t
the
Stanleys
Stanleys'
many
dogs
had l e f t
apartment,
town,
t h e y wanted
because
the Stanleys
t h e y were
had l e f t
t o get inside the
concerned about t h e
behind
i n the apartment.
O f f i c e r S e t l i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t R o n a l d i n v i t e d h i m t o accompany
h i m i n t o t h e S t a n l e y s ' a p a r t m e n t a s , t h e t e s t i m o n y showed, was
often
the practice
o f Tuscumbia
police
officers
l a n d l o r d s upon r e q u e s t f o r p r o t e c t i v e p u r p o s e s .
Around
the time
they
entered
Heffernan a r r i v e d a t t h e scene.
still
to assist
2 0
t h e apartment,
Capt.
When C a p t . H e f f e r n a n a r r i v e d ,
n o t k n o w i n g t h a t S m i t h ' s body was i n t h e a p a r t m e n t , he
noticed
20
a foul
odor
similar
t o t h e odor
S e e s u p r a n o t e 12.
63
of decomposition.
CR-06-2236
A f t e r the o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d the apartment, O f f i c e r S e t l i f f , a t
the
direction
comforter,
of Capt.
revealing
Heffernan, l i f t e d
a
dead
body
a portion
of the
underneath.
After
d i s c o v e r i n g t h e body, Capt. H e f f e r n a n and O f f i c e r S e t l i f f
the
apartment,
secured
t h e scene,
and o b t a i n e d
a
left
search
warrant.
S t a n l e y has p o i n t e d t o n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u g g e s t
t h a t R o n a l d was a c t i n g on b e h a l f o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t .
initial
Thus, t h e
e n t r y i n t o t h e S t a n l e y s ' a p a r t m e n t was a p r i v a t e a c t ,
n o t a g o v e r n m e n t a c t . " [ T ] h e F o u r t h Amendment p r o s c r i b e s
governmental
seizure,
even
individual
the
action,
and
an u n r e a s o n a b l e
not acting
p a r t i c i p a t i o n o r knowledge
to
one, e f f e c t e d
a
by
search
a
or
private
o f any governmental o f f i c i a l . "
I n t h i s c a s e , t h e B e r r y h i l l s were i n
p r o c e s s o f e n t e r i n g t h e S t a n l e y s ' a p a r t m e n t when O f f i c e r
Setliff
arrived.
encourage
police
the
not apply
as an a g e n t o f t h e Government o r w i t h
W a l t e r , 447 U.S. a t 662.
the
does
only
Officer
the search.
to the Stanleys'
Stanleys'
apartment
Setliff
d i d not
The B e r r y h i l l s
apartment.
under
instigate
had not c a l l e d
The p o l i c e
surveillance.
or
the
d i d n o t have
In fact,
Capt.
H e f f e r n a n had i n s t r u c t e d O f f i c e r S e t l i f f o n l y e a r l i e r t h a t day
64
CR-06-2236
t o p a t r o l n e a r t h e S t a n l e y s ' a p a r t m e n t b e c a u s e he had
all
the
officers
missing
and
unrelated
police
that
the
a
The
meeting
wanted
Berryhills
for
to
retrieve
t h e e n t r y w i t h Dot.
that
not
they
the
Smith
questioning
were
i n v e s t i g a t i o n because
apartment
coordinated
department
S h e l l y was
matter.
in their
enter
at
informed
was
in
assisting
had
dogs
the
planned
and
had
and
contrary
had
to
left
dogs
Stanley's
in
They were m e r e l y p r o t e c t i n g
the
apartment.
contention,
mere
286
(Ala. Crim.
App.
See
S m i t h v.
1997).
"[D]e
left
Furthermore,
contact
between
p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l and t h e p o l i c e does n o t make t h e
an a g e n t o f t h e p o l i c e .
to
even
t h e i r p r o p e r t y a f t e r t h e y u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e t e n a n t s had
town
an
S t a t e , 908
minimis
a
individual
So.
or
2d
273,
incidental
c o n t a c t s b e t w e e n t h e c i t i z e n and
law enforcement agents p r i o r
to
search
or
during
the
course
of
a
or
seizure
2d a t 287
657
( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 2 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. W a l t h e r ,
652
F.2d
burden
of
(9th C i r . 1981)).
establishing that
agents of the S t a t e .
Stanley
the
Instead,
65
failed
Berryhills
688
908
So.
788
( q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v. M i l l e r ,
not
Smith,
s u b j e c t t h e s e a r c h t o f o u r t h amendment s c r u t i n y . "
will
F.2d
652,
t o meet h i s
were
acting
as
t h e B e r r y h i l l s were a c t i n g as
CR-06-2236
private
citizens.
occurred.
Therefore,
no
F o u r t h Amendment
violation
2 1
IV.
Stanley
his
motion
contends
that the
to d i s c l o s e
the
prosecution witnesses.
100.)
After
trial
court erred i n
grand-jury
testimony
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
Stanley
was
requesting
information
grand-jury
indicted,
proceedings.
h e a r i n g on h i s m o t i o n s ,
and
42-44,
of s e v e r a l
I s s u e X I , pp.
he
filed
transcripts
(C.
denying
two
motions
pertaining
the
During
47-49.)
to
the
the prosecutor s t a t e d t h a t the
grand-
j u r y p r o c e e d i n g s were u s u a l l y n o t r e c o r d e d and t r a n s c r i b e d
that
he
did
proceedings
of
not
have
any
i n f o r m a t i o n from
to p r o v i d e to defense
Stanley's
proceedings
cross-examine
argument
were
and
b e f o r e the grand
not
is
that
recorded
he
counsel.
was
(R. 6.)
the
unable
impeach seven w i t n e s s e s
j u r y who
the
because
also testified
who
at
94¬
to
had
and
grand-jury
The
crux
grand-jury
adequately
testified
trial.
B e c a u s e we have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e i n i t i a l e n t r y was a
p r i v a t e s e a r c h and have f o u n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s
d e n i a l o f t h e m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s , we n e e d n o t a d d r e s s w h e t h e r
Dot had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o c o n s e n t t o t h e s e a r c h o f h e r son and
daughter-in-law's
apartment.
21
66
CR-06-2236
This
State,
Court
addressed
a
similar
question
1 So. 3d 104 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) ,
i n Sneed
as f o l l o w s :
" B e f o r e an a c c u s e d may d i s c o v e r g r a n d
jury
t e s t i m o n y he must e s t a b l i s h a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d n e e d
for the information.
I n B l a c k m o n v . S t a t e , 7 So. 3d
397, 409-10 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) , we s t a t e d :
"'Alabama
has l o n g
protected the
secrecy of grand-jury proceedings.
See §
12-16-214, A l a . Code 1975. "The l o n g t i m e
r u l e , s a n c t i o n e d by our c o u r t s , i s t h a t t h e
proceedings
before
a
grand
jury
are
essentially secret."
S t e w a r d v. S t a t e , 55
A l a . App. 238, 240, 314 So. 2d 313, 315
(Ala.
Crim.
App. 1 9 7 5 ) .
However,
a
defendant
may
be
allowed
to
inspect
grand-jury proceedings i f the defendant
meets t h e t h r e s h o l d t e s t o f s h o w i n g a
" p a r t i c u l a r i z e d need" f o r b r e a c h i n g t h e
secrecy of those proceedings.
As t h i s
C o u r t s t a t e d i n M i l l i c a n v. S t a t e , 423 So.
2d 268 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) :
"'"Before
a defendant
is
allowed to inspect a t r a n s c r i p t
of
a
State's
witness
who
t e s t i f i e d b e f o r e t h e grand j u r y
... a t r i a l j u d g e s h o u l d c o n d u c t
an i n camera i n s p e c t i o n o f s u c h
t e s t i m o n y , see Palermo [v. U n i t e d
S t a t e s , 360 U.S. 343 (1959),] a n d
P a t e [ v . S t a t e , 415 So. 2d 1140
(Ala.
1981)],
the
defendant
s h o u l d a t l e a s t and a t a v e r y
minimum make some o f f e r o f p r o o f
(1) t h a t t h e m a t t e r s c o n t a i n e d i n
the w i t n e s s ' grand j u r y testimony
were
relevant
to the subject
m a t t e r o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ; (2)
and
that
there
exists
an
67
v.
CR-06-2236
i n c o n s i s t e n c y between grand j u r y
t e s t i m o n y and t r i a l
testimony.
Unless defense counsel i s merely
g o i n g on a f i s h i n g e x p e d i t i o n , he
w i l l have some i n f o r m a t i o n as t o
the p a r t i c u l a r i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n
the
defendant's testimony.
In
t h i s c a s e no s u c h s h o w i n g
was
made and t h e e x i s t e n c e o f any
inconsistency
between
the
witness' t r i a l
and g r a n d
jury
t e s t i m o n y was n e v e r e v e n a l l e g e d .
Cooks [v. S t a t e , 50 A l a . App. 49,
276 So. 2d 634 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1973)].
Also,
t h e r e was
no
showing t h a t the w i t n e s s ' grand
j u r y t e s t i m o n y , i f a v a i l a b l e , was
'of s u c h n a t u r e t h a t w i t h o u t i t
the
defendant's t r i a l would
be
f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n f a i r . ' C o o k s , 50
A l a . App. a t 54, 276 So. 2d 634.
See a l s o H u s c h v. S t a t e , 211 A l a .
274, 276,
100 So. 321
(1924).
('Moreover, i f t h e s o l i c i t o r h a d
had
such
a
statement
in his
p o s s e s s i o n , d e f e n d a n t c o u l d have
r e q u i r e d i t s p r o d u c t i o n by a r u l e
o f t h e c o u r t i f he t h o u g h t i t was
f a v o r a b l e t o him.')
"'"In
laying
the
proper
p r e d i c a t e f o r examination of a
witness' grand j u r y testimony, i t
s h o u l d a l s o be e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t
the w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d b e f o r e t h e
grand
jury
and
that
such
t e s t i m o n y was r e c o r d e d o r r e d u c e d
to w r i t i n g , u n l e s s a grand j u r o r
w i l l be c a l l e d t o d i s c l o s e t h e
testimony
of
the
witness.
Alabama
Code
1975,
Section
12-16-201.
68
CR-06-2236
"'"'When t h e d e f e n d a n t ,
i n e f f e c t , asks f o r t h e
State D i s t r i c t Attorney
t o p r o d u c e a document,
he
should
at
least
establish
that
this
S t a t e o f f i c i a l has such
document
or
a
copy
thereof
i n
h i s
possession
before the
t r i a l c o u r t w i l l be p u t
in error. '
S t r a n g e v.
State,
43 A l a . App.
599,
606, 197 So. 2d
437
[(1966)],
cert.
dismissed,
280 A l a .
718,
197 So. 2d 447
(196[7]).
"'"Once t h e d e f e n d a n t
has
l a i d a proper p r e d i c a t e f o r the
impeachment
of a witness
who
t e s t i f i e d before the grand j u r y ,
t h e t r i a l j u d g e s h o u l d c o n d u c t an
i n camera i n s p e c t i o n as o u t l i n e d
in
Palermo,
supra,
and Pate,
supra, t o determine
(1) w h e t h e r
t h e s t a t e m e n t made b y t h e w i t n e s s
b e f o r e t h e grand j u r y
'differed
i n any r e s p e c t s from
statements
made t o t h e j u r y d u r i n g t r i a l , '
P a t e , s u p r a , a n d (2) w h e t h e r t h e
grand j u r y testimony requested by
the defendant
'was o f s u c h a
nature
that
without
i t the
defendant's
trial
would
be
fundamentally
unfair.'
Pate,
supra.
This procedure w i l l best
preserve
and
protect
the
legislative
determination
that
' i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e f a i r and
impartial
administration
of
69
CR-06-2236
justice
that
a l l grand
jury
p r o c e e d i n g s be s e c r e t and t h a t
the s e c r e c y of such p r o c e e d i n g s ,
remain i n v i o l a t e . '
A l a b a m a Code
1975, S e c t i o n s 12-16-214 t h r o u g h
226.'
"'423
So.
2d a t 270-71.
" ' N o n e t h e l e s s , A l a b a m a has no s t a t u t e
that requires that grand-jury proceedings
be r e c o r d e d o r o t h e r w i s e m e m o r i a l i z e d .
In
S t a l l w o r t h v. S t a t e , 868 So. 2d 1128 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , t h e d e f e n d a n t a r g u e d t h a t
the c i r c u i t court e r r e d i n denying
her
motion
to
transcribe
the
grand-jury
testimony.
In
upholding
the
circuit
c o u r t ' s r u l i n g , we s t a t e d :
" ' " ' I n A l a b a m a t h e r e i s no
statute r e q u i r i n g that testimony
b e f o r e a g r a n d j u r y be r e c o r d e d .
"A G r a n d J u r y i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o
c o m p i l e r e c o r d s and t h e t e s t i m o n y
in
the
absence
of
a statute
requiring
p r e s e r v a t i o n of
the
proceedings.
State
ex r e l .
B a x l e y v. S t r a w b r i d g e , 52 A l a .
App. 685, 296 So. 2d 779
[(Ala.
C r i m . App. 1 9 7 4 ) ] .
T h e r e i s no
such
statute in this
state."
S o m m e r v i l l e v. S t a t e , 361 So. 2d
386, 388
( A l a . Cr. App.), c e r t .
denied,
361
So.
2d 389
(Ala.
1978), c e r t .
denied,
439
U.S.
1118, 99 S. C t . 1027, 59 L. Ed.
2d 78 ( 1 9 7 9 ) .
See a l s o G a i n e s v.
S t a t e , 52 A l a . App. 29, 30,
288
So. 2d 810, 812, c e r t . d e n i e d ,
292 A l a . 720,
288
So.
2d
813
( 1 9 7 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 419
U.S.
851, 95 S. C t . 92, 42 L. Ed. 2d
70
CR-06-2236
82 ( 1 9 7 4 ) .
B e c a u s e t h e r e was no
l e g a l requirement t h a t the grand
jury
proceedings
be
recorded,
this
contention
is
without
merit.'"
"'Stallworth,
868 So. 2d a t 1139, q u o t i n g
H a r d y v. S t a t e , 804 So. 2d 247, 287 ( A l a .
C r i m . App.
1 9 9 9 ) , a f f ' d , 804 So. 2d 298
(Ala. 2000).
See a l s o S t e w a r d v. S t a t e ,
supra.
" ' A t t h e p r e t r i a l h e a r i n g on
this
m o t i o n , t h e p r o s e c u t o r s t a t e d t h a t i t was
the p o l i c y
of the d i s t r i c t
attorney's
office
to
not
record
the
grand-jury
p r o c e e d i n g s and t h a t he h a d no k n o w l e d g e
t h a t t h e g r a n d - j u r y p r o c e e d i n g s had b e e n
recorded
in this
case.
Neither
did
B l a c k m o n show a " p a r t i c u l a r i z e d n e e d " t o
breach
the
secrecy
of
the
grand-jury
proceedings.
B a s e d on t h e c a s e s
cited
a b o v e , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t
c o m m i t t e d no e r r o r i n d e n y i n g t h i s m o t i o n
made a f t e r B l a c k m o n had b e e n i n d i c t e d . ' "
1 So.
stated
3d a t 133-35.
that
the
Similarly,
grand-jury
the prosecutor i n t h i s
proceedings
were
not
usually
r e c o r d e d , S t a n l e y d i d not r e q u e s t the i n f o r m a t i o n u n t i l
he had b e e n i n d i c t e d ,
"particularized
proceedings.
and S t a n l e y has
case
after
f a i l e d to demonstrate a
need" t o b r e a c h the s e c r e c y of the g r a n d - j u r y
Consequently,
S t a n l e y i s due
claim.
71
no r e l i e f on
this
CR-06-2236
V.
Stanley
argues
that
the t r i a l
court erred i n allowing
C a p t . H e f f e r n a n , t h e l e a d i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r , t o be p r e s e n t
in
the courtroom,
witnesses
testified.
Stanley's defense
a
over the defense's
witness
to
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
judge
courtroom
be
excluded
from
ruled
Capt.
2 2
the
115).
courtroom
Heffernan
could
After
requires
during
the record r e f l e c t s
remain
the
that the
in
the
d u r i n g the testimony of other witness at both the
s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g and t h e t r i a l .
This
p.
while other
counsel invoked "the r u l e , " which
testimony of other witnesses,
trial
objection,
Court
has
previously
decided i t adversely to Stanley.
So. 2d 1128
(R.
92-93.)
addressed
this
issue
I n S t a l l w o r t h v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) ,
t h i s Court
and
868
said:
" R u l e 615, A l a . R. E v i d . , and R u l e 9 . 3 ( a ) , A l a . R.
C r i m . P., g o v e r n t h e e x c l u s i o n o f w i t n e s s e s . R u l e
615, A l a . R. E v i d . , s t a t e s , i n p a r t :
"'At t h e r e q u e s t of a p a r t y t h e c o u r t
may o r d e r w i t n e s s e s e x c l u d e d so t h a t t h e y
cannot
hear
the
testimony
of
other
w i t n e s s e s and i t may make t h e o r d e r o f i t s
own m o t i o n .
T h i s r u l e does n o t a u t h o r i z e
Rule
9 . 3 ( a ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P.,
requires that a l l
w i t n e s s e s who t e s t i f y on t h e S t a t e ' s b e h a l f be removed f r o m
the courtroom.
See a l s o R u l e 615, A l a . R. E v i d .
2 2
72
CR-06-2236
e x c l u s i o n o f (1) a p a r t y who i s a n a t u r a l
p e r s o n , (2) an o f f i c e r o r e m p l o y e e o f a
party
which
i s not a n a t u r a l
person
designated
as i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e by i t s
a t t o r n e y , (3) a p e r s o n whose p r e s e n c e i s
shown b y a p a r t y t o be e s s e n t i a l t o t h e
p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p a r t y ' s c a u s e , o r (4)
a v i c t i m of a c r i m i n a l offense or the
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a v i c t i m who i s u n a b l e t o
a t t e n d , when t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e has b e e n
selected
by
the v i c t i m , the v i c t i m ' s
guardian, or the v i c t i m ' s family.'
"We a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e i n L i v i n g v. S t a t e , 796 So.
2d 1121, 1142-43
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , c e r t .
d e n i e d , 796 So. 2d 1121 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) .
I n L i v i n g we
stated:
"'"Alabama a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h a v e t i m e and
again
refused
t o h o l d i t an a b u s e o f
d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t
to
allow
a
sheriff,
police
chief
or
s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d p e r s o n who w i l l
later
t e s t i f y t o remain i n the courtroom d u r i n g
trial."
C a r r o l l v. S t a t e , 599 So. 2d 1253,
1261 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1992) . I n S t e w a r t v.
S t a t e , 601 So. 2d 491 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 9 2 ) , t h i s C o u r t a d d r e s s e d an i s s u e v e r y
s i m i l a r t o t h e one i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . I n
S t e w a r t , a p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t o r was e x c e p t e d
from the r u l e r e q u i r i n g e x c l u s i o n of a l l
witnesses
from
the courtroom
and
was
allowed to s i t at the prosecution's t a b l e .
"'In a d d i t i o n to being allowed tos i t
at the prosecutor's
table, the p o l i c e
i n v e s t i g a t o r i n S t e w a r t was a l l o w e d
to
t e s t i f y from the p r o s e c u t o r ' s t a b l e . I d .
a t 501.
This Court h e l d i n Stewart that
the
appellant
was
not
prejudiced
by
a l l o w i n g t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r t o t e s t i f y from
t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s t a b l e and n o t e d t h a t " t h e
73
CR-06-2236
j u r y knows t h a t p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i n v e s t i g a t e
c a s e s and a s s i s t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . "
Id.
"'Because the t e s t i m o n y of o f f i c e r s
from
the
prosecutor's
table
does
not
p r e j u d i c e a d e f e n d a n t , c l e a r l y an o f f i c e r ' s
mere p r e s e n c e a t t h e t a b l e c a n n o t be deemed
so p r e j u d i c i a l as t o c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e
error.'"
868
So.
2d a t
The
the
trial
lead
1146.
c o u r t d i d not abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n a l l o w i n g
investigating officer
d u r i n g the testimony
to
remain
of other witnesses.
in
We
the
courtroom
therefore find
no
error.
VI.
Stanley
asserts
s p e c i f i c testimony,
b e c a u s e , he
brief,
says,
Issues
V,
the
trial
court
erred
c e r t a i n p h o t o g r a p h s , and
in
admitting
several
they
were h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l .
XIV,
and
XVI
pp.
56-63;
letters
(Stanley's
111-12;
114-15.)
B e c a u s e S t a n l e y f a i l e d t o r a i s e some o f t h e s e a r g u m e n t s a t
the
trial
the
court
level,
p l a i n - e r r o r standard.
counsel,
we
examine
See
R u l e 45A,
those
pursuant
A l a . R. App.
to
P.
Defense
h o w e v e r , f i l e d p r e t r i a l m o t i o n s on some, and
were o b j e c t e d
particular
t o by
defense
i n s t a n c e s as we
counsel
at t r i a l .
a d d r e s s them.
74
We
others
note
the
CR-06-2236
R u l e 401, A l a . R. E v i d . ,
provides:
" ' R e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e ' means e v i d e n c e h a v i n g any
t e n d e n c y t o make t h e e x i s t e n c e o f any f a c t t h a t i s
of consequence t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n
more p r o b a b l e o r l e s s p r o b a b l e t h a n i t w o u l d be
without the evidence."
R u l e 402, A l a . R. E v i d . ,
provides:
" A l l r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e i s a d m i s s i b l e , e x c e p t as
o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s o r t h a t o f t h e S t a t e o f Alabama, by s t a t u t e ,
by t h e s e r u l e s , o r b y o t h e r r u l e s a p p l i c a b l e i n t h e
courts
of this
State.
Evidence which i s not
relevant i s not admissible."
Rue
403, A l a . R. E v i d . ,
provides:
" A l t h o u g h r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e may be e x c l u d e d i f
i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by
the danger o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e , c o n f u s i o n o f t h e
i s s u e s , o r m i s l e a d i n g t h e j u r y , o r by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
of
undue
delay,
waste
of time,
or
needless
presentation of cumulative
evidence."
Also,
"'"[t]he admission or e x c l u s i o n of evidence i s
a m a t t e r w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l
court."
T a y l o r v. S t a t e , 808 So. 2d 1148, 1191
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 808 So. 2d 1215 ( A l a .
2001).
"The q u e s t i o n o f a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e
i s generally l e f t t o the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l
c o u r t , a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n on t h a t
q u e s t i o n w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d e x c e p t upon a c l e a r
s h o w i n g o f abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . "
Ex p a r t e L o g g i n s ,
771 So. 2d 1093, 1103 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . " ' "
Harris,
907,
2 So. 3d a t 927 ( q u o t i n g G a v i n v. S t a t e ,
963 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
2003)).
75
891 So. 2d
CR-06-2236
M i n d f u l of the above-stated
l a w , we now
address
Stanley's
s p e c i f i c claims of e r r o r .
A.
Stanley
argues
victim-impact
the
trial.
victim's
that
evidence to the
Stanley
first
daughter during
she had had
the
the
State
improperly
j u r y d u r i n g the g u i l t phase
refers
guilt
to
the
XIV,
a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h her
prohibit
and
pp.
the
111-12.)
State
f o r the t r i a l
from
filed
of
effect
f a t h e r and
a pretrial
(C. 188-91, 240-41; R.
court denied
78-80.)
"'It
is
well
settled
that
v i c t i m - i m p a c t statements "are
admissible
d u r i n g the g u i l t phase of a c r i m i n a l t r i a l
only i f the statements are r e l e v a n t to a
material
issue
of
the
guilt
phase.
T e s t i m o n y t h a t has no p r o b a t i v e v a l u e on
any m a t e r i a l q u e s t i o n o f f a c t o r i n q u i r y i s
i n a d m i s s i b l e . " Ex p a r t e Crymes, 630 So. 2d
125, 126
( A l a . 1993), c i t i n g C h a r l e s
W.
Gamble, M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a E v i d e n c e , § 21.01
(4th
ed.
1 9 9 1 ) . However,
"when,
after
c o n s i d e r i n g t h e r e c o r d as a w h o l e ,
the
reviewing
court
i s convinced
that
the
jury's
verdict
was
based
on
the
76
she
brief,
motion
introducing victim-impact
which the t r i a l
the
that
(Stanley's
of
that
to
testimony
c o u r t t o p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on
r o l e of such testimony,
hearing.
Stanley
testimony
phase to the
had t a l k e d w i t h o r saw him a l m o s t e v e r y d a y .
Issue
introduced
the
after
a
CR-06-2236
o v e r w h e l m i n g e v i d e n c e o f g u i l t and was n o t
b a s e d on any p r e j u d i c e t h a t m i g h t h a v e b e e n
engendered by t h e improper v i c t i m - i m p a c t
testimony, the a d m i s s i o n of such t e s t i m o n y
i s harmless e r r o r . "
Crymes, 630 So. 2d a t
126.'
" J a c k s o n v. S t a t e ,
App. 2 0 0 0 ) . "
Gissendanner
2006).
the
791 So. 2d 979, 1011
v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . Crim.
949 So. 2d 956, 965
( A l a . Crim.
App.
"[T]he i n t r o d u c t i o n of v i c t i m impact evidence d u r i n g
guilt
phase
of
a
reversible
error
i f the record
distracted
t h e j u r y and kept i t from p e r f o r m i n g i t s d u t y o f
determining the g u i l t
the
capital
663
judgment
So.
of
conclusively
2d
999,
that
that
result
i t probably
review
law."
( A l a . 1995).
be
upheld
phase of t h e t r i a l
on
Ex p a r t e
However,
i f
in
the
"a
record
d i d not
impact
affect
or otherwise p r e j u d i c e a s u b s t a n t i a l
r i g h t of the defendant."
thorough
can
the admission of the v i c t i m
outcome o f t h e t r i a l
A
1006
can
evidence during the g u i l t
the
indicates
and t h e a p p l i c a b l e
conviction
shows
trial
or innocence of the defendant based
admissible evidence
Rieber,
murder
663 So. 2d a t 1005.
of the daughter's
testimony
reveals
t h a t t h e r e was no i m p r o p r i e t y , t h a t she d i d n o t d e s c r i b e t h e
impact
of
the
crime
on
her
life,
77
and
that
she
made
no
CR-06-2236
statement amounting to v i c t i m - i m p a c t
evidence d u r i n g the
phase.
the
(R.
399-401.)
background i n f o r m a t i o n
explain
the
events
f a t h e r ' s body.
23,
(finding
to introduce
that
See
2007]
Rather,
led
up
3d
"testimony
her
a witness
and
the
discovery
[Ms.
CR-04-1226, M a r c h
(Ala.
o f f e r e d by
the
evidence,
Crim.
victim's
b u t was
of
App.
sister
her
2007)
was
o f t h e m u r d e r and when she
last
family,
contact
with
the
e s t a b l i s h i n g when t h e c r i m e was
824
So.
2d
804,
812
testimony
by
that
she
had
planned
testimony
and
was
does n o t
to
Crim.
App.
1999)
as
home was
to the
went
Because
not
objected
amount t o v i c t i m - i m p a c t
also objects
we
to
not
the
to during
evidence,
78
and
we
that
stating
victim-impact
victim's
See
complained-of
the g u i l t
a photograph of
State i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g the testimony
State,
death occurred).
find
was
toward
(stating
t i m i n g of the
t o e x p l a i n where t h e
w h i c h was
Stanley
i t
c o m m i t t e d " ) ; G r a y s o n v.
return
relevant
Gissendanner.
testimony,
and
the v i c t i m ' s mother i d e n t i f y i n g her
d e a t h as w e l l as
also
(Ala.
not
o f f e r e d t o show t h e
v i c t i m ' s a c t i v i t i e s on t h e day
in
to
to
,
o f f e r e d as v i c t i m - i m p a c t
as
provided
State,
Hodges v.
So.
testimony
guilt
find
the
no
phase,
error.
victim
the
of the v i c t i m ' s daughter
CR-06-2236
because
he
claims
evidence.
i t amounted
However,
we
improper
victim-impact
introduced
at the beginning
i d e n t i f y i n g the v i c t i m .
improper
likewise
constitute
2d a t 946
to
find
that
victim-impact
i t
did
evidence because
of the t r i a l
not
i t
f o r the purpose
See, e.g., F e r g u s o n v. S t a t e , 814
( f i n d i n g no p l a i n e r r o r i n t h e a d m i s s i o n ,
was
of
So.
during the
g u i l t phase, of a photograph of the v i c t i m s i n f r o n t of t h e i r
b o a t b e c a u s e i t was r e l e v a n t t o show, among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t
t h e y were a l i v e b e f o r e
2d 36,
66
t h e o f f e n s e ) ; T a y l o r v. S t a t e , 666
( A l a . C r i m . App.
the admission,
1994)
(finding
error i n
d u r i n g the g u i l t phase, of a photograph of the
v i c t i m s i n f r o n t of a Christmas tree) .
So. 3d a t
no p l a i n
So.
.
See a l s o M c M i l l a n ,
H e r e , t h e p h o t o g r a p h o f S m i t h was r e l e v a n t t o
t h e i s s u e o f i d e n t i t y and was t h e r e f o r e a d m i s s i b l e .
a l s o f i n d no e r r o r i n t h i s
Thus,
we
regard.
B.
Stanley
contends
the
trial
court
erred
in
admitting
p h o t o g r a p h s o f t h e v i c t i m ' s b o d y as i t a p p e a r e d a t t h e c r i m e
s c e n e and p h o t o g r a p h s o f t h e a u t o p s y .
X V I , pp.
114-15.)
The
record
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
shows t h a t
Stanley's
Issue
counsel
f i l e d a p r e t r i a l motion to suppress photographs of the crime
79
CR-06-2236
scene
and t h e a u t o p s y .
motion, the t r i a l
of
photographs
After
c o n d u c t i n g a h e a r i n g on t h e
j u d g e o r d e r e d t h e S t a t e t o l i m i t t h e number
and
to
provide
defense
counsel
photographs i t p l a n n e d t o use d u r i n g t r i a l .
R.60-68.)
2 3
with
the
(C. 183-84, 240;
S t a n l e y ' s counsel d i d not o b j e c t t o the photographs
he now t a k e s i s s u e w i t h when t h e y were a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e .
A l a b a m a c o u r t s have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t p h o t o g r a p h s
depicting
t h e c r i m e s c e n e a n d t h e wounds o f t h e v i c t i m s a r e r e l e v a n t and
admissible.
See
Stallworth
( q u o t i n g L a n d v. S t a t e ,
1995))
that
State,
868
678 So. 2d 201, 207
("'The c o u r t s o f t h i s
photographs
v.
accurately
So.
2d a t
( A l a . C r i m . App.
s t a t e have r e p e a t e d l y h e l d
depict
1151
the crime
scene
that
and t h e
n a t u r e o f t h e v i c t i m ' s wounds a r e a d m i s s i b l e d e s p i t e t h e f a c t
t h a t t h e y may be gruesome o r c u m u l a t i v e . ' " ) . See a l s o
v.
State,
(Ala.
photographs
at
[Ms. CR-06-0741, Aug.
Crim.
App.
2010)
27, 2010]
(applying
So. 3d
law
t o crime-scene photographs); Vanpelt,
(same); Hyde, 13 So. 3d a t 1016
Miller
on
,
autopsy
So. 3d
(same).
We n o t e o r i g i n a l l y t h e r e were o v e r 300 p h o t o g r a p h s .
The
p r o s e c u t i o n i n t r o d u c e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 71 p h o t o g r a p h s , a l l o f
w h i c h were a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e .
23
80
CR-06-2236
" ' G e n e r a l l y photographs are a d m i s s i b l e
into
evidence i n a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n " i f they tend t o
p r o v e o r d i s p r o v e some d i s p u t e d o r m a t e r i a l i s s u e ,
t o i l l u s t r a t e o r e l u c i d a t e some o t h e r r e l e v a n t f a c t
o r e v i d e n c e , o r t o c o r r o b o r a t e o r d i s p r o v e some
o t h e r e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d o r t o be o f f e r e d , a n d t h e i r
a d m i s s i o n i s w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e
t r i a l judge."'
B a n k h e a d v. S t a t e , 585 So. 2d 97,
109
( A l a . Crim.
App. 1 9 8 9 ) , remanded on o t h e r
g r o u n d s , 585 So. 2d 112 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , a f f ' d on r e t u r n
t o remand, 625 So. 2d 1141 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) ,
r e v ' d , 625 So. 2d 1146 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g Magwood
v. S t a t e , 494 So. 2d 124, 141 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 8 5 ) , a f f ' d , 494 So. 2d 154 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) , c e r t .
d e n i e d , 479 U.S. 995, 107 S. C t . 599, 93 L. E d . 2d
599 ( 1 9 8 6 ) .
'Photographic e x h i b i t s are admissible
e v e n t h o u g h t h e y may be c u m u l a t i v e , d e m o n s t r a t i v e o f
u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s , o r g r u e s o m e . ' W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e ,
506
So. 2d 368, 371
( A l a . Crim.
App. 1986)
(citations
omitted).
In addition,
'photographic
e v i d e n c e , i f r e l e v a n t , i s a d m i s s i b l e even i f i t has
a tendency t o i n f l a m e t h e minds o f t h e j u r o r s . '
Ex
p a r t e S i e b e r t , 555 So. 2d 780, 784 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) .
'This c o u r t has h e l d t h a t autopsy
photographs,
a l t h o u g h gruesome, a r e a d m i s s i b l e t o show t h e e x t e n t
of a v i c t i m ' s i n j u r i e s . '
F e r g u s o n v . S t a t e , 814 So.
2d 925, 944 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 814 So.
2d
970
( A l a . 2001).
'"[A]utopsy
photographs
d e p i c t i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r a n d l o c a t i o n o f wounds on a
v i c t i m ' s body a r e a d m i s s i b l e even i f t h e y a r e
gruesome, c u m u l a t i v e , o r r e l a t e t o an u n d i s p u t e d
matter."'
J a c k s o n v . S t a t e , 791 So. 2d 979, 1016
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , q u o t i n g P e r k i n s v. S t a t e ,
808 So. 2d 1041 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , a f f ' d , 808
So. 2d 1143 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , j u d g m e n t v a c a t e d on o t h e r
g r o u n d s , 536 U.S. 953, 122 S. C t . 2653, 153 L. Ed.
2d 830 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , on remand t o , 851 So. 2d 453 ( A l a .
2002)."
B r o o k s v. S t a t e , 973 So. 2d 380, 393 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) .
81
CR-06-2236
All
the photographs
introduced
into
during
testimony
the
about which
evidence
of
i n the
the
Stanley complains
guilt
phase
investigating
of
the
officer,
Each photograph
witness.
In
addition,
was
the
identified
medical
i n j u r i e s d e p i c t e d i n the photographs
the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the i n j u r i e s .
the photographs,
by
trial
who
a l s o t h e c o r o n e r , and t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Dr. Ward, t h e
examiner.
were
was
medical
the r e s p e c t i v e
examiner
detailed
the
and e x p l a i n e d t o t h e j u r y
We h a v e c a r e f u l l y
examined
as w e l l t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s ,
we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p h o t o g r a p h s
properly admitted into
and
were r e l e v a n t , p r o b a t i v e , and
evidence.
"The p h o t o g r a p h s were a d m i s s i b l e b e c a u s e t h e y
were r e l e v a n t t o show t h e c r i m e s c e n e and
the
injuries
[ t h e ] v i c t i m s u f f e r e d , and b e c a u s e t h e y
h e l p e d t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e t e s t i m o n y g i v e n by t h e
i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r s c o n c e r n i n g the crime scene,
as w e l l as t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e
c o r o n e r c o n c e r n i n g t h e t y p e and e x t e n t o f t h e wounds
t h a t caused the v i c t i m [ ' s ] death."
M a x w e l l v. S t a t e , 828
See
So. 2d 347,
a l s o Ex p a r t e S i e b e r t ,
The t r i a l c o u r t c o m m i t t e d
and a u t o p s y p h o t o g r a p h s
555
363
So.
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2d 780,
783
( A l a . 1989).
no e r r o r i n a l l o w i n g t h e c r i m e
t o be r e c e i v e d i n t o
82
2000).
evidence.
scene
CR-06-2236
C.
S t a n l e y a s s e r t s the t r i a l court e r r o n e o u s l y admitted
e v i d e n c e two
were
each
brief,
l e t t e r s he a l l e g e d l y w r o t e t o h i s w i f e w h i l e
in
Issue
jail
V,
grounds i n support
I n Moore v.
on
pp.
capital-murder
56-63.)
of t h i s
He
charges.
lists
R. E v i d . , and
c o l l a t e r a l bad
several
different
assertion.
S t a t e , 49
So.
3d 228,
232
(Ala. Crim.
App.
404(b),
addressed the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence of
acts:
"Rule 404(b),
they
(Stanley's
2009), t h i s Court s t a t e d the f o l l o w i n g r e g a r d i n g Rule
Ala.
into
provides:
"'Evidence of o t h e r c r i m e s , wrongs, or a c t s
i s not a d m i s s i b l e t o prove the c h a r a c t e r of
a person
i n order
to
show a c t i o n i n
c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e w i t h . I t may, h o w e v e r , be
admissible
f o r other purposes, such
as
proof
of
motive,
opportunity,
intent,
p r e p a r a t i o n , p l a n , knowledge, i d e n t i t y , or
absence of m i s t a k e or a c c i d e n t
'
"The
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has
'held that
the
exclusionary r u l e prevents
the S t a t e from u s i n g
e v i d e n c e of a d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r bad a c t s t o p r o v e
t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s b a d c h a r a c t e r and, t h e r e b y , p r o t e c t s
the defendant's r i g h t to a f a i r t r i a l . '
Ex p a r t e
D r i n k a r d , 777 So. 2d 295, 302 ( A l a . 2000) ( c i t i n g Ex
p a r t e C o f e r , 440 So. 2d 1121,
1123
(Ala. 1983)).
T h i s c o u r t has e x p l a i n e d t h a t ' [ o ] n t h e t r i a l f o r
the
a l l e g e d commission of
a particular
crime,
evidence of the accused's h a v i n g committed another
a c t or crime i s not a d m i s s i b l e i f the o n l y p r o b a t i v e
83
CR-06-2236
f u n c t i o n of such evidence i s t o prove bad c h a r a c t e r
and t h e a c c u s e d ' s c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e w i t h . '
L e w i s v.
S t a t e , 889 So. 2d 623, 661 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2003)
( q u o t i n g C. Gamble, M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a E v i d e n c e §
69.01(1) ( 5 t h e d . 1 9 9 6 ) ) .
"'"This exclusionary rule i s
simply
an a p p l i c a t i o n
of the
character r u l e which f o r b i d s the
S t a t e t o prove the accused's bad
c h a r a c t e r by p a r t i c u l a r
deeds.
The b a s i s f o r t h e r u l e l i e s i n
the
b e l i e f that the p r e j u d i c i a l
e f f e c t of p r i o r crimes w i l l f a r
o u t w e i g h any p r o b a t i v e v a l u e t h a t
m i g h t be g a i n e d f r o m them.
Most
agree t h a t such evidence of p r i o r
c r i m e s h a s a l m o s t an i r r e v e r s i b l e
i m p a c t upon t h e m i n d s o f t h e
jurors.'"
"Ex p a r t e J a c k s o n , 33 So. 3d 1279, 1284-85 ( A l a .
2009) ( q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e A r t h u r , 472 So. 2d 665, 668
(Ala.
1985), q u o t i n g i n t u r n M c E l r o y ' s s u p r a , §
69.01(1))."
Furthermore,
t h e A l a b a m a Supreme
p a r t e J a c k s o n , 33 So. 3d 1279
Court provided i n
( A l a . 2009):
"'The
well-established
exceptions
to
the
e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e i n c l u d e : (1) r e l e v a n c y t o p r o v e
identity;
(2) r e l e v a n c y t o p r o v e r e s g e s t a e ; (3)
r e l e v a n c y t o p r o v e s c i e n t e r ; (4) r e l e v a n c y t o p r o v e
i n t e n t ; (5) r e l e v a n c y t o show m o t i v e ; (6) r e l e v a n c y
t o p r o v e s y s t e m ; (7) r e l e v a n c y t o p r o v e m a l i c e ; (8)
relevancy
to rebut
special
defenses;
and
(9)
r e l e v a n c y i n v a r i o u s p a r t i c u l a r c r i m e s . W i l l i s v.
S t a t e , 449 So. 2d 1258, 1260 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) ;
S c o t t v. S t a t e , 353 So. 2d 36 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1977).
However, t h e f a c t t h a t e v i d e n c e o f a p r i o r
b a d a c t may f i t i n t o one o f t h e s e e x c e p t i o n s w i l l
84
Ex
CR-06-2236
not alone j u s t i f y i t s admission.
"'Judicial inquiry
does n o t e n d w i t h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e
of a n o t h e r crime i s r e l e v a n t and p r o b a t i v e o f a
necessary element of t h e charged o f f e n s e .
I t does
not s u f f i c e s i m p l y t o see i f t h e e v i d e n c e i s capable
o f b e i n g f i t t e d w i t h i n an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e .
Rather,
a b a l a n c i n g t e s t must be a p p l i e d .
The
e v i d e n c e o f a n o t h e r s i m i l a r c r i m e must n o t o n l y be
r e l e v a n t , i t must a l s o be r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y t o
t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s c a s e , a n d i t must be p l a i n , c l e a r ,
and c o n c l u s i v e , b e f o r e i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e w i l l be
held
to
outweigh
i t s potential
prejudicial
e f f e c t s . ' " A v e r e t t e v. S t a t e , 469 So. 2d 1371, 1374
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 1 9 8 5 ) , q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v.
Turquitt,
[557 F.2d 464] a t 468-69
[(5th C i r .
1977)].'"
33 So. 3d a t 1285 ( q u o t i n g R o b i n s o n v. S t a t e , 528 So. 2d 343,
347
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1986)).
Even i f t h e e v i d e n c e o f a c o l l a t e r a l bad a c t f i t s
exception
to the general
exclusionary rule,
i n t o an
the t r i a l
court
must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e e v i d e n c e i s r e l e v a n t a n d p r o b a t i v e ,
Rule
the
401, A l a . R. E v i d . , a n d w h e t h e r t h e p r o b a t i v e
evidence
i s substantially
outweighed
by
value
of
t h e danger
of
u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e , R u l e 403, A l a . R. E v i d .
1.
Stanley
letters
case
alleges the t r i a l
b e c a u s e , he s a y s ,
and c o n t a i n e d
court
the l e t t e r s
information
erred
i n admitting the
b o l s t e r e d the State's
as t o p r e j u d i c i a l
a c t s , w h i c h he a l l e g e s v i o l a t e d R u l e 4 0 4 ( b ) ,
85
prior
A l a . R.
bad
Evid.,
CR-06-2236
and
did
not
fall
under
any
exception
to
the
general
exclusionary rule.
More p a r t i c u l a r l y , he c o n t e n d s t h e
were
because
inadmissible
they
referenced
letters
"scuffles
f i g h t s " and o n l y s e r v e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t S t a n l e y was
a-- "
who
57.)
"would
(C.
prejudicial
discourage
they
always
369-79;
R.
because
his wife
take
no
sh--."
781-86 .)
He
24
they
showed
from t e s t i f y i n g
S h e l l y ' s testimony,
she
the
attempt
by
a c t s by
and
The
her,
and
she
p o r t i o n s of
J u l y 2,
read p o r t i o n s of the
the
2005, a r e as
first
letter
letters
that
she
2 5
identified
into
read
to
because
Stanley.
r e c o g n i z e d and
p.
are
Stanley
S t a n l e y ' s h a n d w r i t i n g and t h e l e t t e r s as t h e ones he had
to
"bad
letters
a g a i n s t him
c o n t a i n d i s c u s s i o n s of p r i o r bad
During
a
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
claims
an
and
sent
evidence.
from,
dated
follows:
S t a n l e y d i d not o b j e c t t o the a d m i s s i o n i n t o evidence of
the l e t t e r s .
His counsel
d i d , however, o b j e c t t o
the
p r o s e c u t i o n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of a statement i n the second
l e t t e r , d a t e d J u l y 12, 2005, a b o u t w h i c h S t a n l e y now
complains
on a p p e a l .
( S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t s 55 and 56, C. 369-79; R.
783,
786.)
2 4
We n o t e t h a t t h e S t a t e gave t h e d e f e n s e n o t i c e o f t h e
404(b) a c t s i t i n t e n d e d t o u s e .
The l e t t e r s , h o w e v e r , were
n o t i n c l u d e d i n i t s n o t i c e . The p r o s e c u t i o n d i d p r o v i d e t h e
defense w i t h copies of the l e t t e r s p r i o r to t r i a l .
25
86
CR-06-2236
"A:
'Have you s p o k e n w i t h y o u r l a w y e r ?
Say
nothing.
I haven't yet.
We n e e d t o a s k f o r b o n d
r e d u c t i o n and a m o t i o n o f d i s c o v e r y .
Find
out
e x a c t l y what t h e y c l a i m t o have on u s .
That's a l l
we
need t o
say:
Bond r e d u c t i o n ,
a motion
of
d i s c o v e r y , and n o t h i n g e l s e . I t ' s s c a r y . B u t s t i c k
w i t h t h a t . Okay? L e t me know a n y t h i n g I m i g h t n e e d
t o on a n y t h i n g l i k e t h i s s u b j e c t w i t h o u t
saying
a n y t h i n g o u t and o u t u n l e s s i t d o e s n ' t m a t t e r t h a t
d e t a i l s are s a i d . '
"
"A:
'Baby, y o u ' v e g o t t o t r u s t s e n d i n g
my
l e t t e r s t o o r t h r o u g h my mom.
Okay? Do l i k e t h a t ,
Shelly.
And s a y no d e t a i l s on a n y t h i n g .
L e t me
know o r my mom i f and when you see -- Say n o t h i n g t o y o u r a t t o r n e y b e c a u s e I s t i l l h a v e n ' t saw m i n e .
"'Lower b o n d s and m o t i o n f o r d i s c o v e r y a r e a l l
e want t o s p e a k a b o u t t o a n y o n e .
My a t t o r n e y i s
w
one o f , i f n o t , t h e c r a p p i e s t a t t o r n e y i n C o l b e r t
County.
T h e y ' r e t r y i n g t o s c r e w me.
I feel i t .
Don't l e t them s c r e w me, S h e l l y . Beg y o u r a t t o r n e y
t o t a k e my c a s e .
They want t o g i v e me t h e d e a t h
penalty.
No s h - - , S h e l l y . They want you t o l i e on
me and g i v e me t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y on c a p i t a l m u r d e r .
T h a t ' s what t h e y ' r e g o i n g t o s h o o t f o r w i t h u s , me.
I'm g o i n g t o t a k e a b r e a k t o see i f I can l i g h t e n up
somewhat.'"
(R.
782.)
After
that
first
letter
was
admitted
into
S h e l l y read the f o l l o w i n g p o r t i o n s of a l e t t e r dated
evidence,
July
2005:
"A:
'When I'm p u t i n t h e one I was i n w i t h
t h r e e o t h e r d u d e s , I h e a r d a r o u n d t h e b a r s on t h e
o p p o s i t e s i d e of the c e l l from the door I e n t e r e d a
87
12,
CR-06-2236
couple of v o i c e s next c e l l , drunk tank, s a y i n g ,
" A i n ' t no way I c o u l d w a l k a r o u n d i n my h o u s e t h r e e
or f o u r d a y s l o o k i n g a t somebody I h a c k e d up w i t h a
machete."
My b l o o d p r e s s u r e s h o t up.
B u t I was
cool.
I d i d n ' t say a word. T h i n k i n g back, I s h o u l d
have.
I r e a l l y s h o u l d have.
"'These p e o p l e i n h e r e t h i n k I'm some k i n d o f
s p i n e l e s s , cowardly, k i l l i n g t h i e f .
I w i s h someone
could
tell
them
besides
me
about
a l l the
s t r a i g h t - u p , no s u c k e r - p u n c h
s c u f f l e s and
fights
I've b e e n i n and how I t r u l y f a r e d i n them.
They
d o n ' t know me, and t h e y t h i n k t h e y do.
" ' I c a n ' t g e t i n t o a f i g h t and n o t h u r t my b o n d
or o u r c a s e .
B u t I c a n ' t t a k e a l o t more e i t h e r .
I n e e d f o r you t o r e m i n d me i n y o u r l e t t e r s what a
b a d a-- , s t r a i g h t - u p p e r s o n I was and how I w o u l d
a l w a y s t a k e no s h - - and t a k e a b e e f o r
problem
s t r a i g h t t o a person's f a c e , not b e h i n d t h e i r back
and n o t use a weapon and n o t be i n t i m i d a t e d i f t h e y
p i c k e d up a weapon o r c r o w b a r -- l i k e when [ s i c ] h i t
me w i t h my b a c k t u r n e d w i t h t h a t c r o w b a r and k i c k e d
his
a s s a f t e r he b u s t e d my h e a d and I
grabbed
nothing.
"'How
I h a d you c l e a r my v i s i o n a f t e r I g o t my
eye b u s t e d , went b a c k , and t h e y were gone.
I've
a l w a y s b e e n s t r a i g h t up and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .
And
now, a l l t h e s u d d e n , I'm t h e c o w a r d and a punk c a u s e
t h e s e p e o p l e have f o u n d me g u i l t y o f some k i n d o f
c o w a r d l y deed w i t h o u t a t r i a l .
I n e e d you t o r e m i n d
me who I am on t h e i n s i d e , t h e s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d n e s s
we know."
(R. 783-85.)
A f t e r S h e l l y read p o r t i o n s of the second
t h e p r o s e c u t i o n q u e s t i o n e d h e r as
"Q:
follows:
He w a n t e d you t o r e m i n d h i m
a-- .
88
letter,
t h a t he's
bad
CR-06-2236
"A:
Yes, s i r .
"Q:
T h a t ' s what he
"A:
Yes, s i r .
a s k i n g you
to
do.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Y o u r Honor, I w o u l d o b j e c t
t o c o u n s e l c h a r a c t e r i z i n g . The l e t t e r s t a n d s f o r
itself.
"THE
COURT:
I ' l l
motion to s t r i k e . "
(R.
sustain
that
and
grant
a
785.)
Initially,
we
question
whether
the
letters
constitute
" o t h e r c r i m e s , wrongs, or a c t s " g e n e r a l l y e x c l u d e d under
Rule
404 ( b ) , b e c a u s e t h e l e t t e r s h e r e f a i l t o c o n t a i n r e f e r e n c e s t o
specific
i n c i d e n t s when S t a n l e y was
involved in altercations
and do n o t d e s c r i b e any p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s , c h a r g e s ,
involving
Stanley.
Instead,
demonstrate Stanley's
extent
of
and
letters
in
Shelly's
the
crime.
relative
The
See,
e.g.,
M a r c h 11, 2005]
rev'd
on
October
other
6,
So.
J o h n s o n v.
3d
grounds,
2006]
So.
,
Johnson
3d
89
S h e l l y and
letters
culpability
S t a n l e y ' s d e f e n s e t h e o r y t h a t S h e l l y was
the murder.
were a d m i t t e d
c o n t i n u i n g c o n t r o l over
involvement
Stanley's
the
or a r r e s t s
and
the primary
State,
[Ms.
State,
(Ala.
his
showed
rebutted
actor i n
CR-99-1349,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
v.
to
2005),
[Ms.
1041313,
2006)
("[T]hat
CR-06-2236
evidence,
was
although not d i r e c t l y l i n k e d to the i n s t a n t o f f e n s e ,
relevant
and
m a t e r i a l because
i t helped
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c o - c o n s p i r a t o r s
nature
of
J o h n s o n ' s c o n d u c t as
to
the
illustrated
and
explain
the
a c a t a l y s t i n the
The
S t a t e c o r r e c t l y s u b m i t s t h a t t h i s e v i d e n c e was
as
Rule
404(b)
demonstrate
influence
even
evidence,
that
and
after
Stanley
give
their
conclude t h a t the
relevant
rebut
and
was
arrest."
letters
offered
attempting
(State's
to
defense,
case,
still
was
during
brief,
show r e l a t i v e
despite
p.
"to
to
exert
mail,
62.)
We
because they
were a d m i s s i b l e
s h o u l d have b e e n p r e c l u d e d
In t h i s
rather,
not o f f e r e d
i n s t r u c t i o n s to S h e l l y through the
probative
Stanley's
but
murder.").
were
culpability
Stanley's
claim
under Rule 404(b),
that
A l a . R.
opening statements,
both
and
to
they
Evid.
attorneys
f o r t h e S t a t e and f o r S t a n l e y e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e S t a n l e y s knew
Smith, the v i c t i m , because they o f t e n purchased p i l l s from
and
he
carried
Stanley's
defense
counsel
statement,
that
fact"
knew
that
i n the
Stanley
murder
of
was
substantial
argued,
merely
Smith.
(R.
amounts
during
an
a r g u e d t h a t S t a n l e y d i d n o t commit t h e m u r d e r .
90
his
"accessory
366.)
of
him
cash.
opening
after
Defense
Rather,
the
counsel
Shelly
CR-06-2236
acted
over
alone.
He c l a i m e d
i t was S h e l l y who e x e r t e d
control
S t a n l e y and d e v i s e d t h e p l a n t o m u r d e r S m i t h i n o r d e r t o
o b t a i n more d r u g s a n d money.
The
prosecution
support
i t s theory
master"
who
introduced
and a d m i t t e d
o f t h e c a s e t h a t S t a n l e y was t h e " p u p p e t
instigated
e x e r t e d c o n t r o l over
and c a r r i e d
presented
indicating
control
from
this
that,
even
evidence,
while
testifying
against
S h e l l e y were
shortly
their
To s u p p o r t
along
in jail,
before
drug
Smith's
supply
of drugs,
carried p i l l s
and cash,
him.
In
404(b)
involvement
over
murder
addicts.
murder,
they
evidence,
the
other
Stanley
evidence
to
to discourage her
to
The e v i d e n c e
the Stanleys
they
they
continued
addition
and because
and
i t s theory, the
counsel's
a l s o t e s t i f i e d that both
Stanley
showed
had
knew
that,
exhausted
Smith
summoned h i m t o t h e i r
e a r l y on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e m u r d e r .
Rule
with
a n d t o i n f l u e n c e S h e l l y and t r i e d
arguments, s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s
and
out Smith's
S h e l l y d u r i n g t h e murder and a f t e r
turned themselves i n t o the p o l i c e .
State
the l e t t e r s to
often
apartment
Thus, e v e n i f c o n s i d e r e d
letters
evidencing
Stanley's
i n t h e m u r d e r - - e . g . , w h e t h e r he e x e r c i s e d c o n t r o l
S h e l l y - - a n d S t a n l e y ' s and S h e l l y ' s r e l a t i v e
91
culpability
CR-06-2236
concerned c o n t e s t e d i s s u e s , and e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y
rule
would
therefore
CR-06-1723, December
C r i m . App. 2009)
intent
See
Baker
18, 2009]
v.
State,
So. 3d
,
t o kidnap
defendant's
violence
a n d c a p i t a l - m u r d e r v i c t i m was a d m i s s i b l e
was
contested issue);
McGowan
S t a t e , 990 So. 2d 931, 961-62 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2003)
of
[Ms.
(Ala.
(evidence of p r i o r a c t of domestic
i n v o l v i n g defendant
because
apply.
v.
(evidence
u s e o f c o c a i n e was r e l e v a n t a t g u i l t p h a s e o f
c a p i t a l - m u r d e r t r i a l where d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h a t i f he r a t h e r
than
accomplice
killed
the v i c t i m s ,
then
h i s use of c r a c k
c o c a i n e p r e v e n t e d him from f o r m i n g t h e i n t e n t t o k i l l ,
and h i s
use o f c r a c k c o c a i n e p r o v i d e d a m o t i v e f o r t h e m u r d e r s , i . e . ,
o b t a i n i n g money f r o m t h e v i c t i m s
cocaine).
Additionally,
evidence
fails
to
evidence
requiring
rise
so he c o u l d buy more c r a c k
we
note
that
to
the
level
reversal
2010]
So. 3d
Stanley
evidence
outweighed
also
of
by
his
the
argues
bad-acts
the Rule
404(b)
33 So. 3d
[Ms. 1090554, December
( A l a . 2010).
that
collateral
danger
of
i n Ex p a r t e J a c k s o n ,
1279 ( A l a . 2009) a n d Ex p a r t e B i l l u p s ,
30,
the alleged
the probative value
bad
of
92
acts
unfair
was
of the
substantially
prejudice.
Although
CR-06-2236
evidence
offered
a g a i n s t a defendant
at t r i a l
i s generally
p r e j u d i c i a l , the p r o b a t i v e value of evidence i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y
outweighed
by
i t s prejudice only
unfairly prejudicial.
78,
81-82
therein;
App.
i t i s unduly
App.
a n d I r v i n v. S t a t e ,
and t h e cases
2006),
and
the cases
quoted
we f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l
value of this
p r e j u d i c i a l impact.
a
quoted
940 So. 2d 3 3 1 , 346 ( A l a . C r i m .
therein.
f i n d t h e e v i d e n c e t o be u n d u l y a n d u n f a i r l y
probative
H e r e , we do n o t
p r e j u d i c i a l , and
court's determination that the
evidence
was n o t o u t w e i g h e d
by i t s
Only a b r i e f r e f e r e n c e t o S t a n l e y ' s b e i n g
"bad a - - " was made, no undue e m p h a s i s was p l a c e d on
e v i d e n c e , and t h e t r i a l
did
place
an
and
See, e . g . , H u r l e y v. S t a t e , 971 So. 2d
( A l a . Crim.
2005),
when
emphasis
court struck the only testimony
on
this
evidence.
2 6
Under
this
that
these
A l t h o u g h t h e b e t t e r c o u r s e would have been f o r t h e t r i a l
court t o give a l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n immediately after the
c o m p l a i n e d - o f c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n by t h e p r o s e c u t o r , S t a n l e y d i d
n o t a s k f o r s u c h an i n s t r u c t i o n , a n d as t h i s C o u r t h a s s a i d ,
t h e f a i l u r e t o g i v e s u c h an i n s t r u c t i o n g e n e r a l l y i s p l a i n
e r r o r o n l y i n t h o s e c a s e s where t h e d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d a n d
the evidence of p r i o r
misconduct
i s being admitted f o r
impeachment p u r p o s e s a n d n o t as s u b s t a n t i v e e v i d e n c e o f g u i l t :
2 6
" ' I n Ex p a r t e M i n o r , 780 So. 2d 796
( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h e l d
t h a t i t was p l a i n e r r o r where t h e t r i a l
c o u r t f a i l e d t o sua sponte i n s t r u c t t h e
93
CR-06-2236
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , evidence about S t a n l e y ' s c o n t r o l over
was r e l e v a n t
to the contested issue
Shelly,
of Stanley's i n t e n t t o
m u r d e r a n d t o r o b t h e v i c t i m , was n o t a d m i t t e d s i m p l y t o p r o v e
S t a n l e y ' s b a d c h a r a c t e r , a n d was more p r o b a t i v e on t h e i s s u e
of
guilt
t h a n i t was p r e j u d i c i a l t o h i s d e f e n s e .
In finding
no e r r o r , much l e s s p l a i n e r r o r , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e
j u r y that evidence of the defendant's p r i o r
convictions
i n t r o d u c e d f o r impeachment
purposes
could
n o t be
c o n s i d e r e d as
substantive evidence of the defendant's
g u i l t o f t h e c r i m e f o r w h i c h he was now on
trial.
See a l s o S n y d e r v . S t a t e , 893 So.
2d 482 ( A l a . 2001) . However, t h e h o l d i n g s
i n M i n o r and Snyder have been r e p e a t e d l y
h e l d t o apply o n l y t o those cases i n which
the defendant t e s t i f i e d and t h e e v i d e n c e o f
prior
convictions
was
admitted
for
impeachment
purposes,
and
then
on
a
case-by-case b a s i s .
See, e . g . , J o h n s o n v .
S t a t e , [Ms. 1041313, O c t . 6, 2006]
So.
[3]d
( A l a . 2 0 0 6 ) ; Ex p a r t e M a r t i n , 931
So. 2d 759 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) ; Key v. S t a t e , 891
So. 2d 353 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) . ' "
"Floyd
2007]
v.
State,
So. 3d
G o b b l e v. S t a t e ,
[Ms. CR-05-0935, S e p t e m b e r 28,
,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) . "
So. 3d a t
.
We n o t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t gave an i n s t r u c t i o n d u r i n g
i t s o r a l c h a r g e t o t h e j u r y d i r e c t i n g j u r o r s t h a t "what t h e
l a w y e r s have s a i d , b o t h f o r t h e S t a t e and f o r t h e Defendant,
i s n o t any e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e
what t h e y s a y i s n o t
evidence."
(R. 1067-68.)
94
CR-06-2236
in
q u e s t i o n was
material,
to
the
case,
State's
exception to
was
not
the
i t clearly
exclusionary
o u t w e i g h e d by
Furthermore,
harmless.
See
r e v e r s e d or
the
the
reasonably
fell
rule,
error,
aside,
c r i m i n a l c a s e on
and
within
and
at
necessary
least
i t s probative
one
value
i t s prejudicial effect.
R u l e 45,
set
relevant,
i f any,
Ala.
nor
R.
App.
new
trial
in
P.
i t s admission
("No
j u d g m e n t may
g r a n t e d i n any
ground of m i s d i r e c t i o n
of the
civil
jury,
was
be
or
the
g i v i n g or r e f u s a l of s p e c i a l charges or the improper a d m i s s i o n
or
r e j e c t i o n of
evidence,
nor
for error
p l e a d i n g or procedure, u n l e s s i n the
which
the
appeal
examination
error
of
the
complained
substantial
i s taken
entire
of
has
r i g h t s of the
"The
or
to
matter
of
court
to
i s made, a f t e r
an
opinion
application
cause,
as
i t should
probably
any
of the
appear
injuriously
parties.").
A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has
stated:
"'"[B]efore
the
reviewing
c o u r t can a f f i r m a judgment b a s e d
upon t h e ' h a r m l e s s e r r o r ' r u l e ,
t h a t c o u r t must f i n d c o n c l u s i v e l y
t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s e r r o r d i d
not
a f f e c t the
outcome o f
the
trial
or o t h e r w i s e p r e j u d i c e
a
substantial
right
of
the
d e f e n d a n t . " Ex p a r t e Crymes, 630
So.
2d
125,
126
(Ala.
1993)
95
that
the
affected
CR-06-2236
( e m p h a s i s o m i t t e d ) . "'The
basis
f o r the [ e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e ] l i e s
in
the
belief
that
the
prejudicial
effect
of
prior
crimes
will
f a r outweigh
any
p r o b a t i v e v a l u e t h a t might
be
g a i n e d f r o m them. M o s t a g r e e t h a t
s u c h e v i d e n c e o f p r i o r c r i m e s has
almost
an
irreversible
impact
upon t h e m i n d s o f j u r o r s . ' " Ex
p a r t e C o f e r , 440 So. 2d
1121,
1123
( A l a . 1983),
quoting
C.
Gamble,
McElroy ' s
Alabama
Evidence,
§
69.01(1)(3d
ed.
1 9 7 7 ) , a l s o q u o t e d i n Hobbs v.
State,
669
So.
2d 1030,
1032
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 5 ) . '
"Ex p a r t e
2 0 0 4)."
Casey,
889
So.
2d
615,
T u r n e r v. S t a t e , 929 So. 2d 1041, 1043
Here,
the
letters
contain
no
621-22
(Ala.
( A l a . C r i m . App.
references to
2005).
specific
i n c i d e n t s o r t i m e s when S t a n l e y e n g a g e d i n a l t e r c a t i o n s and do
not prove or i n d i c a t e a p r i o r
o f f e n s e o r b a d a c t by
Stanley
s u c h t h a t i t m i g h t have a f f e c t e d one o f S t a n l e y ' s s u b s t a n t i a l
rights.
3d
June
J o h n s o n v. S t a t e ,
,
25,
[Ms. 1041313, O c t . 6, 2006]
( A l a . 2 0 0 6 ) ; Brown v.
2010]
So.
3d
,
State,
[Ms.
CR-07-1332,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
("[T]he e v i d e n c e as t o Brown's g u i l t was
r e v i e w i n g t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d as a w h o l e ,
So.
overwhelming.
2010)
After
' i s i t c l e a r beyond
a
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e j u r y w o u l d have r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t
96
CR-06-2236
of
guilty'
even
without
statement
t o Mobbs.
510,
S.
103
Ct.
the
(1967).
1974,
76
L.
Ed.
18,
2d
96
Washington's
(1983).
87 S. C t . 824,
Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , any
a d m i s s i o n o f t h e l e t t e r s was
App.
of
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. H a s t i n g , 461 U.S.
Chapman v. C a l i f o r n i a , 386 U.S.
2d 705
admission
harmless.
See
also
17 L.
Ed.
error
i n the
See R u l e 45, A l a . R.
P.").
" ' " ' A f t e r f i n d i n g e r r o r , an
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t may s t i l l a f f i r m
a c o n v i c t i o n on t h e g r o u n d t h a t
t h e e r r o r was h a r m l e s s , i f i n d e e d
i t was.'
G u t h r i e v. S t a t e ,
616
So. 2d 914, 931 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1993),
citing
Chapman
v.
C a l i f o r n i a , 386 U.S.
18, 87 S.
C t . 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 ( 1 9 6 7 ) .
'The h a r m l e s s e r r o r r u l e a p p l i e s
in
c a p i t a l cases.'
Knotts
v.
S t a t e , 686 So. 2d 431, 469 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 1 9 9 5 ) , o p i n i o n a f t e r
remand, 686
So.
2d 484
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 1 9 9 5 ) , a f f ' d , 686 So.
2d 486 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d ,
520 U.S. 1199, 117 S. C t . 1559,
137 L. Ed. 2d 706 ( 1 9 9 7 ) , c i t i n g
Ex p a r t e W h i s e n h a n t , 482 So. 2d
1241 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) . ' I n o r d e r f o r a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r t o be deemed
h a r m l e s s u n d e r Chapman, t h e s t a t e
must p r o v e b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e
doubt t h a t
the e r r o r d i d not
contribute
to the v e r d i c t . In
o r d e r f o r t h e e r r o r t o be deemed
h a r m l e s s u n d e r R u l e 45, t h e s t a t e
must e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e e r r o r d i d
97
499,
CR-06-2236
not
injuriously
affect
the
appellant's substantial rights.'
C o r a l v. S t a t e , 628 So. 2d 954,
973
( A l a . Crim.
App.
1992),
o p i n i o n a f t e r remand, 628 So. 2d
988
( A l a . Crim.
App.
1992),
aff'd,
628 So. 2d 1004 ( A l a .
1993), c e r t . denied,
511
U.S.
1012, 114 S. C t . 1387, 128 L. Ed.
2d 61 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 'The p u r p o s e o f t h e
harmless e r r o r r u l e i s to avoid
s e t t i n g aside
a c o n v i c t i o n or
sentence
f o r small
errors
or
d e f e c t s t h a t h a v e l i t t l e , i f any,
l i k e l i h o o d of changing the r e s u l t
of
the t r i a l
or
sentencing.'
D a v i s v. S t a t e , 718 So. 2d 1148,
1164
( A l a . Crim.
App.
1997),
aff'd,
718 So. 2d 1166 ( A l a .
1998), c e r t . denied,
525
U.S.
1179, 119 S. C t . 1117, 143 L. Ed.
2d 112
(1999)."
"'McNabb v. S t a t e , 887 So. 2d 929, 976-77
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) . '
" S a l e v. S t a t e , 8 So. 3d 330, 347 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
2 0 0 8 ) . See a l s o Ex p a r t e Brown, 11 So. 3d 933 ( A l a .
2008) ( h o l d i n g t h a t t h e a l l e g e d i m p r o p e r a d m i s s i o n
of evidence i n a c a p i t a l t r i a l
was
harmless);
C o t h r e n v. S t a t e , 705 So. 2d 849 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1997) ( h o l d i n g t h a t t h e i m p r o p e r a d m i s s i o n o f t h e
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o e r c e d c o n f e s s i o n was h a r m l e s s i n l i g h t
of the overwhelming evidence e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t the
defendant committed the c a p i t a l o f f e n s e ) . "
Ex p a r t e
Brownfield,
In the present
properly
admitted.
44 So. 3d 43, 48
( A l a . 2009).
c a s e , t h e l e t t e r s were r e l e v a n t and were
Moreover,
98
the probative
value
of the
CR-06-2236
l e t t e r s was
letters
not outweighed
by t h e i r
were p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d
harmless.
and
prejudicial
any
error
effect.
was,
The
at
most,
2 7
2.
Stanley
admitted
maintains
because,
he
that
says,
the
letters
were
improperly
the p r o s e c u t i o n f a i l e d
c h a i n o f c u s t o d y as t o t h e l e t t e r s .
to
prove
S t a n l e y d i d not o b j e c t t o
t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e l e t t e r s on c h a i n - o f - c u s t o d y g r o u n d s .
therefore
Ala.
review
R. App.
This
decided
claim for plain
error.
See
Rule
45A,
issue
and
P.
Court
has
previously considered
i t adversely to Stanley.
, this
court
this
We
Court addressed
erred
In V a n p e l t ,
So.
3d
a c l a i m by V a n p e l t t h a t t h e
i n allowing into
w r i t t e n b e c a u s e , he a r g u e d ,
this
evidence
"no
letters
Vanpelt
witness t e s t i f i e d
t h e c h a i n o f c u s t o d y o f any o f t h e l e t t e r s . "
at
trial
had
concerning
Vanpelt,
So.
We n o t e t h a t a l t h o u g h S t a n l e y c i t e s Ex p a r t e M i n o r , 780
So. 2d 796 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , and o t h e r c a s e s i n s u p p o r t o f h i s
c l a i m , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t i n J o h n s o n v. S t a t e ,
So.
3d a t
, d i s t i n g u i s h e d these cases
from the
present
situation,
because i n those
cases,
the
prior-conviction
e v i d e n c e was b e i n g i n t r o d u c e d t o i m p e a c h t h e
defendant's
credibility.
27
99
CR-06-2236
3d a t
.
This Court h e l d that the l e t t e r s
were p r o p e r l y
a d m i t t e d and reasoned:
"The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t i n Ex p a r t e H o l t o n ,
590
So.
2d
918
( A l a . 1991),
addressed
the
requirements f o r a chain of custody:
" ' P r o o f o f [an] u n b r o k e n c h a i n o f c u s t o d y
is
required
in
order
to
establish
s u f f i c i e n t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i t e m and
c o n t i n u i t y o f p o s s e s s i o n , so as t o a s s u r e
the a u t h e n t i c i t y of the item.
Id.
In
order to e s t a b l i s h a proper chain, the
State
must
show
to
a
"reasonable
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e o b j e c t i s i n t h e same
condition
as,
and
not
substantially
different
from,
i t s condition
at the
commencement o f t h e c h a i n . "
M c C r a y v.
S t a t e , 548 So. 2d 573, 576 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1988). '
"590 So. 2d a t 919-20. I n H a l e v. S t a t e , 848 So. 2d
224 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) , t h e Supreme C o u r t r e e x a m i n e d i t s
h o l d i n g i n H o l t o n a f t e r t h e 1995 c o d i f i c a t i o n o f §
12-21-13, A l a . Code 1975. The Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d :
"'Section
provides:
12-21-13, A l a . Code
1975,
"'"Physical
evidence
connected w i t h or c o l l e c t e d i n
the
investigation
of a
crime
shall
not
be
excluded
from
c o n s i d e r a t i o n by a j u r y o r c o u r t
due t o a f a i l u r e t o p r o v e t h e
chain of custody of the evidence.
Whenever a w i t n e s s i n a c r i m i n a l
t r i a l identifies a physical piece
of
evidence connected w i t h or
c o l l e c t e d i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of
a c r i m e , t h e e v i d e n c e s h a l l be
100
CR-06-2236
submitted t o the jury or court
f o r whatever weight the j u r y or
c o u r t may deem p r o p e r .
The t r i a l
c o u r t i n i t s charge t o t h e j u r y
s h a l l e x p l a i n any b r e a k i n t h e
chain of custody concerning the
p h y s i c a l evidence."'
" ' ( E m p h a s i s added.)
T h i s s t a t u t e , by i t s
terms, a p p l i e s o n l y t o " [ p ] h y s i c a l evidence
connected
with
or
collected
i n the
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f " the charged crime.
To
invoke the s t a t u t e the proponent of the
e v i d e n c e must f i r s t e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e
p r o f f e r e d p h y s i c a l evidence i s i n f a c t the
very evidence "connected w i t h or c o l l e c t e d
in the investigation."
Moreover,
" ' " [ i ] n L a n d v. S t a t e , 678
So. 2d 201 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 5 ) ,
aff'd,
678 So. 2d 224 ( A l a .
1996), a case which appears t o
r e l y on § 12-21-13, t h i s c o u r t
r u l e d t h a t where a w i t n e s s c a n
specifically
identify
the
e v i d e n c e , and i t s c o n d i t i o n i s
n o t an i s s u e i n t h e c a s e , t h e n
the
State i s not required t o
establish
a complete
chain of
custody i n order f o rthe evidence
t o be a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e .
We
stated:
'The
eyeglasses
were
admissible without establishing a
c h a i n of custody because [the
t e s t i f y i n g o f f i c e r ] was a b l e t o
s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f y them, a n d
t h e i r c o n d i t i o n was n o t an i s s u e
i n the case.'
L a n d , 678 So. 2d
a t 210
"848 So. 2d a t 228
citations omitted).
(emphasis
101
i n original
a n d some
CR-06-2236
"Here,
each
of
the
e x h i b i t s was
physical
e v i d e n c e t h a t was c o l l e c t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Sandra's murder.
F u r t h e r , each
e x h i b i t was p r o p e r l y i d e n t i f i e d by a w i t n e s s and t h e
condition
of
the
e x h i b i t s was
not
in
issue.
A c c o r d i n g l y , p u r s u a n t § 12-21-13, A l a . Code
1975,
t h e e x h i b i t s were p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d . "
Vanpelt,
So.
3d a t
CR-06-1577, May
App.
28,
.
See a l s o P h i l l i p s v. S t a t e ,
2010]
So.
3d
,
(Ala. Crim.
2010).
Stanley
does
not
assert
that
the
letter
e x h i b i t s were
a c t u a l l y tampered w i t h , a l t e r e d , or contaminated.
seems t o s u g g e s t t h a t b e c a u s e no w i t n e s s
the
[Ms.
chain
of
custody
inadmissible.
for
the
testified
letters,
E a c h l e t t e r , h o w e v e r , was
Instead,
the
he
regarding
letters
were
i d e n t i f i e d by S h e l l y
as h a v i n g b e e n w r i t t e n t o h e r by S t a n l e y w h i l e t h e y were b o t h
incarcerated.
The
c o n d i t i o n o f t h e l e t t e r s was
because
is
no
contested
there
this
from
e x h i b i t s were i m p r o p e r l y
Accordingly,
the
indication
letters
we
into
find
no
and
claim.
102
record
at
issue
that
the
tampered w i t h or a l t e r e d .
e r r o r i n the
evidence,
the
not
trial
Stanley
court's
i s due
no
allowing
relief
on
CR-06-2236
3.
S t a n l e y a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he
authored
the l e t t e r s .
on t h i s g r o u n d .
See
Rule
45A,
Rule
opinion
S t a n l e y d i d not o b j e c t t o the
Thus, we
A l a . R.
App.
901(b)(2),
testimony
handwriting
and
review
claim for plain
R.
Evid.,
i t relates
contemplates
to
governs
the
of h a n d w r i t i n g
opinion
[must be]
f o r purposes of the
requires
that
i n f e r e n c e be
b a s e d on
clear
a
that a l a y witness
Rule
to statements
determination
about
t h a t are
t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l
of
Rule
Rule
701
an
acquired
Rule
opinion
"(a)
testimony
and
Rule
or
rationally
(b) h e l p f u l
701,
701
A l a . R.
901,
or
to a
the
Evid.
Shelly
t h a t she h a d b e e n m a r r i e d t o S t a n l e y f o r a
number o f y e a r s so she was
both
and
witness's
of a f a c t i n i s s u e . "
satisfaction
identified
the
an
genuineness
901(b)(2).
testimony
offer
of
This rule requires
b a s e d upon f a m i l i a r i t y n o t
litigation."
of
can
as t o t h e
the p e r c e p t i o n of the w i t n e s s
understanding
In
[testimony]
layperson's
limited
lay-witness
identification
o p i n i o n on t h e g e n u i n e n e s s o f h a n d w r i t i n g .
that "[n]on-expert
error.
P.
Ala.
as
this
letters
letters
familiar with his handwriting;
Stanley
103
had
sent
to
her;
and
she
she
CR-06-2236
s t a t e d t h a t t h e l e t t e r s were w r i t t e n t o h e r by S t a n l e y .
e.g.,
See,
U n i t e d S t a t e s v. A p p e r s o n , 441 F.3d 1162, 1200-01 ( 1 0 t h
C i r . 2006) ( f i n d i n g s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y as
t o t h e a u t h e n t i c a t i o n o f h a n d w r i t i n g on a l e t t e r b y t e s t i f y i n g
that
"based
appellant],
States
upon
h i s long-standing
he was
v.
Tipton,
familiar
964
with
F.2d
association with
h i s handwriting");
650,
654-55
[the
United
( 7 t h C i r . 1992)
( s t a t i n g t h a t w i t n e s s c o u l d a u t h e n t i c a t e documents p u r p o r t e d l y
written
with
by t h e a p p e l l a n t b e c a u s e
the witness
[the a p p e l l a n t ] ' s handwriting
of observing
States
v.
"was
familiar
a n d s i g n a t u r e as a
result
... documents [ t h e a p p e l l a n t ] p r e p a r e d " ) ;
United
Barker,
735
F.2d
1280,
1283
( 1 1 t h C i r . 1984)
( p r o v i d i n g t h a t w i t n e s s e s who were c o w o r k e r s o f t h e a p p e l l a n t
could
they
authenticate writing
" t e s t i f i e d they
handwriting
similar
were
on c h e c k s as a p p e l l a n t ' s b e c a u s e
familiar
and s t a t e d i n t h e i r
to the handwriting
C a r r i g e r , 592 F.2d 312, 315
with
the [appellant]'s
opinions
i t m a t c h e d o r was
on t h e c h e c k s " ) ;
U n i t e d S t a t e s v.
( 6 t h C i r . 1979)
(holding that the
"requirement of the i l l u s t r a t i o n i n Rule
Evid.,]
... was
clearly
s a t i s f i e d by
901(b)(2)[,Fed.
the testimony
R.
of the
w i t n e s s who was f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e h a n d w r i t i n g a n d s i g n a t u r e s "
104
CR-06-2236
of
the
writer).
The
2 8
9 0 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) , A l a . R.
A d v i s o r y Committee's
Evid.,
explain
that
Notes
to
Rule
" l a y o p i n i o n s may
be
b a s e d upon f a m i l i a r i t y g a i n e d by s e e i n g t h e p e r s o n w r i t e ,
by
e x c h a n g i n g c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , o r o t h e r means.
Farm B u r e a u Mut.
So.
2d
787
purported
(1937)
Alabama
C a s u a l t y I n s . Co. v. Wood, 227 A l a . 624,
(1965)
author
handwriting);
See, e.g.,
(witness t e s t i f i e s that
write
and
G i l l i l a n d v.
(authenticating
purported author).
would
recognize
Dobbs, 234
witness
he
had
has
seen
that
A l a . 364,
the
person's
174
corresponded
173
So.
784
with
the
See g e n e r a l l y C. Gamble, M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a
E v i d e n c e § 111.01(1)
( 4 t h ed.
no e r r o r i n a d m i t t i n g t h i s
1991)."
This Court thus
finds
testimony.
VII.
Stanley
claims that
the t r i a l
the testimony of h i s w i f e ,
VI,
pp.
63-68.)
He
Shelly.
contends
that
court erred i n admitting
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
Shelly's
waiver
Issue
of
the
R u l e 9 0 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) , A l a . R. E v i d . , i s i d e n t i c a l t o i t s
f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t , R u l e 9 0 1 ( b ) , Fed. R. E v i d .
"[C]ases
i n t e r p r e t i n g the F e d e r a l Rules of Evidence w i l l c o n s t i t u t e
a u t h o r i t y f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Alabama R u l e s of E v i d e n c e . "
A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e ' s N o t e s , R u l e 102, A l a . R. E v i d .
See a l s o
Ex p a r t e B i l l u p s , [Ms. 1090554, December 30, 2010]
So. 3d
,
n.4 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) .
2 8
105
CR-06-2236
s p o u s a l p r i v i l e g e was i n v o l u n t a r y b e c a u s e she was
with the death penalty.
threatened
He a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t h e r a c c o m p l i c e
t e s t i m o n y was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d
b e c a u s e , he s a y s ,
no e v i d e n c e o t h e r t h a n h e r t e s t i m o n y c o n n e c t e d h i m t o S m i t h ' s
murder.
A.
Stanley
District
asserts
Attorney's
involuntary.
that
Office
He moved
Shelly's
plea
renders
to strike
agreement
her decision
her testimony
with
to
the
testify
at t r i a l
as
v i o l a t i v e o f t h e s p o u s a l p r i v i l e g e a n d a l l e g e d e r r o r on t h i s
basis
i n h i s m o t i o n f o r a new
We
f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e a d m i s s i o n o f S h e l l y ' s
because the t e s t i m o n i a l
trial
trial.
i s personal
exemption o f a spouse i n a c r i m i n a l
t o t h e s p o u s e w i t n e s s a n d may be w a i v e d b y
the
spouse f o r whatever r e a s o n .
455
So. 2d 85, 87
See, e . g . , P a u l s o n v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1984).
The m a r i t a l - p r i v i l e g e s t a t u t e as i t p e r t a i n s
cases
i s codified
provides:
against
at
"The h u s b a n d
each
testimony
other
c o m p e l l e d so t o d o . "
§
12-21-227,
and w i f e
may
i n criminal
Furthermore,
106
A l a . Code
testify
cases,
but
to criminal
1975,
and
either
f o r or
shall
not
be
CR-06-2236
" [ u ] n d e r our s t a t u t e , i t i s the w i t n e s s - s p o u s e ' s
p r i v i l e g e , and t h e d e f e n d a n t - s p o u s e c a n i n no way
compel
or
prevent
her
from
exercising
such
privilege.
"The d e f e n d a n t - s p o u s e c a n n o t as a m a t t e r o f l a w
r e q u i r e h e r t o t e s t i f y i n h i s b e h a l f n o r can t h e
S t a t e r e q u i r e h e r t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t him.
"This s t a t u t e d e a l i n g with m a r i t a l p r i v i l e g e i s
drawn i n s u c h a way t o p r e v e n t t h e c o e r c i o n
by
o t h e r s which c o u l d d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y push the
husband or w i f e i n t o the w i t n e s s box."
Holyfield
1978).
v.
See
State,
also
( A l a . C r i m . App.
claimed
that
testifying
365
So.
Morrison
1980)
h i s wife
2d
v.
State,
122
382
( A l a . Crim.
So.
2d
had
been
the
coerced or i n t i m i d a t e d
witness-spouse
s t a t e d t h a t she w o u l d t e s t i f y a g a i n s t
t h e n s a i d t h a t she was
1189
appellant
was
though
her husband,
u n s u r e and w o u l d r a t h e r n o t and, a f t e r
some d i s c u s s i o n , f i n a l l y d e c i d e d i n f a v o r o f t e s t i f y i n g ) .
Arnold
v.
State,
353
So.
2d
524
Supreme C o u r t i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s
Alabama
Legislature
into
properly
a d v i s e d o f h e r p r i v i l e g e and t e s t i f i e d v o l u n t a r i l y even
she f i r s t
App.
1187,
( h o l d i n g , i n a c a s e where t h e
that
i n court,
108,
abolished
( A l a . 1977),
s t a t u t e and
the
rule
of
the
In
Alabama
stated that
incompetency
"the
and
adopted the p r e s e n t s t a t u t o r y language which a l l o w s the spouse
to t e s t i f y v o l u n t a r i l y . "
353
So. 2d a t
107
526.
CR-06-2236
Nothing
i n t h e r e c o r d s u g g e s t s t h e manner i n w h i c h S h e l l y
w o u l d t e s t i f y , b u t o n l y t h a t she w o u l d w a i v e h e r p r i v i l e g e
testify
as
a witness
Shelly
surrendered
h u s b a n d , t h a t she was
capital
jail
murder
awaiting
pleaded
to
case.
trial,
to
imprisonment without
a g r e e m e n t , d a t e d May
The
e v i d e n c e showed
law-enforcement
a r r e s t e d , and
i n connection
guilty
Attorney's
i n the
with
t h a t she was
the
23,
and
her
was
possibility
2006, e n t e r e d
Office, provided,
that
with
her
charged with
Smith's death.
S h e l l y waived
murder,
officers
and
While
spousal
privilege,
sentenced
of p a r o l e .
in
2 9
to
life
Her
plea
i n t o w i t h the
District
in pertinent part:
"11.
S h e l l y S t a n l e y a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t she has
b e e n a d v i s e d o f h e r s p o u s a l t e s t i m o n i a l p r i v i l e g e as
s e t o u t i n T i t l e 12-21-227 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a ,
1975.
"12.
S h e l l y S t a n l e y u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t she
t e s t i f y a g a i n s t her husband, Anthony S t a n l e y ,
may n o t be c o m p e l l e d t o do s o .
may
but
"13.
S h e l l y S t a n l e y k n o w i n g l y and v o l u n t a r i l y
w a i v e s h e r s p o u s a l t e s t i m o n i a l p r i v i l e g e , and a g r e e s
to t e s t i f y a g a i n s t her husband, Anthony S t a n l e y , at
any t i m e r e q u e s t e d by t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a . "
(C.
422,
presence
2 9
434.)
Shelly
of
counsel
her
signed
and
this
stated
D e f e n d a n t ' s e x h i b i t s no.
108
7 and
plea
at
no.
agreement
that
8.
time
(C.
in
the
that
no
420-40.)
CR-06-2236
t h r e a t s , f o r c e , o r o t h e r p r o m i s e s had been used t o i n d u c e h e r
to plead
guilty.
Attorney's
The a g r e e m e n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t
Office
could
bring
and
the D i s t r i c t
reinstate
"any a n d
a l l
c h a r g e s t h a t c o u l d have b e e n b r o u g h t b y t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a "
i f S h e l l y f a i l e d t o a b i d e by t h e terms o f t h e p l e a agreement.
(C.
423, 435.)
See P a u l s o n ,
the v o l u n t a r i n e s s
get
455 So. 2d a t 87-88
(upholding
o f a s p o u s e ' s t e s t i m o n y where s h e h o p e d t o
a more l e n i e n t
sentence).
A t t r i a l , S h e l l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o
m u r d e r a n d was s e n t e n c e d t o l i f e
imprisonment.
were w i t h
her plea,
testify
h e r when s h e e n t e r e d
truthfully
f o r the
agreement.
(R. 745-46, 832-33.)
by d e f e n s e
counsel,
State
testify
i n Stanley's
capital
murder.
the
that
she b e l i e v e d
case,
counsel
and she a g r e e d t o
exchange
she c o u l d
that,
f o r the
still
i f she d i d n o t
be c h a r g e d
with
She, h o w e v e r , a l s o s t a t e d t h a t t h i s was n o t
Shelly's
testimony
at
(R. 828-29.)
trial
and
after
defense
moved t o s t r i k e h e r t e s t i m o n y on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e
p l e a a g r e e m e n t was g i v e n u n d e r d u r e s s , t h e t r i a l
recess
attorneys
She s t a t e d , when q u e s t i o n e d
o n l y r e a s o n s h e was t e s t i f y i n g .
After
in
Her
and h e a r d
testimony
from
109
court took a
one o f S h e l l y ' s
attorneys,
CR-06-2236
o u t s i d e the presence of the j u r y , r e g a r d i n g the v o l u n t a r i n e s s
of her p l e a .
at t r i a l
the
and
(R.
her
arguments
motion
to
840-44.)
After hearing
attorney's
of
counsel,
strike
testimony,
the
Shelly's
trial
and
after
judge
testimony.
c a r e f u l l y e x a m i n e d t h e r e c o r d and
Shelly's
(R.
testimony
considering
denied
Stanley's
844.)
We
have
are of the o p i n i o n t h a t
the
t r i a l court properly determined that S h e l l y v o l u n t a r i l y wished
to
testify
full
and
t h a t such a v o l u n t a r y
explanation
h u s b a n d , was
of
her
right
not
a c t on h e r p a r t ,
to
testify
after
against
her
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h § 12-21-227, A l a . Code
1975.
Moreover, nothing i n the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t S h e l l y d i d
not
f r e e l y and v o l u n t a r i l y t e s t i f y a t t r i a l a b o u t b o t h h e r and
her
husband's i n v o l v e m e n t i n Smith's murder.
See
and
error
Morrison,
court's
denial
testimony.
supra.
of
Thus, we
Stanley's
find
no
motion
to
Paulson,
strike
i n the
his
supra,
trial
wife's
3 0
We n o t e t h a t S t a n l e y ' s c o u n s e l p o i n t s t o q u o t a t i o n s f r o m
a l e t t e r t h a t S h e l l y w r o t e h e r h u s b a n d w h i l e t h e y were b o t h i n
prison.
S p e c i f i c a l l y , he r e f e r e n c e s where she e m p h a s i z e d h e r
f e a r o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y : "I'm s c a r e d . I d o n ' t want t o d i e .
I ' l l be t h e s e c o n d woman e v e r p u t t o d e a t h h e r e . " (C.
418.)
"I'm j u s t s c a r e d . I had a b a d b r e a k d o w n t o d a y .
I t h r e w up 3
t i m e s , c o u l d n ' t e a t , and now c a n ' t s l e e p . " (C. 419.)
These
q u o t e s f a i l t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t S h e l l y ' s p l e a was n o t f r e e l y
and v o l u n t a r i l y g i v e n .
See, e.g., P a u l s o n and M o r r i s o n .
30
110
CR-06-2236
B.
Stanley
him
contends
t o the crime
claims
that
other
there
than
that her testimony
was
Shelly's
the t r i a l court improperly
connecting
testimony.
was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y
u n d e r § 12-21-222, A l a . Code 1975.
necessity
no e v i d e n c e
Stanley
corroborated
S t a n l e y a l s o argues
that
f a i l e d t o c h a r g e t h e j u r y as t o t h e
for corroboration
of
accomplice
testimony.
He
a r g u e s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o do so c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .
Stanley
announced
court's
charge
1088.)
Ala.
that
he
had
no
exceptions
to the j u r y at the g u i l t
to the
phase.
trial
(R. 1086,
Thus, we r e v i e w t h i s c l a i m f o r p l a i n e r r o r .
R u l e 45A,
R. App. P.
U n d e r § 12-21-222, A l a . Code 1975, a f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n
"cannot
be
had
corroborated
defendant
by
with
on
the testimony
other
the
evidence
commission
c o r r o b o r a t i v e evidence,
addressing
corroborate
whether
accomplice
an
accomplice
tending
of
the
to
unless
connect
offense,
and
the
such
i f i t m e r e l y shows t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f
the offense or the circumstances
In
of
the
thereof, i s not s u f f i c i e n t . "
evidence
testimony
111
was
i n Ex p a r t e
sufficient
to
CR-06-2236
McCullough,
Court
21 So. 3d 758
( A l a . 2009),
t h e A l a b a m a Supreme
stated:
" I n Ex p a r t e H a r d l e y , 766 So. 2d 154 ( A l a .
1999), t h i s Court addressed t h e t e s t f o r d e t e r m i n i n g
the
sufficiency
of
evidence
corroborating
an
accomplice's testimony:
" ' D i s c u s s i n g § 12-21-222, a t § 3 0 0 . 0 1 ( 5 ) ,
C. Gamble, M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a E v i d e n c e ( 5 t h
-^d. 1 9 9 6 ) , P r o f e s s o r Gamble n o t e s :
"'"Nonaccomplice evidence of
the
defendant's
guilt,
t o be
s u f f i c i e n t corroboration of the
accomplice's testimony to take
t h e c a s e t o t h e j u r y , must t e n d
to connect the defendant w i t h the
crime or p o i n t t o the defendant,
as
distinguished
from
another
p e r s o n , as t h e p e r p e t r a t o r o f t h e
crime.
Nonaccomplice
evidence
w h i c h m e r e l y c o n f i r m s t h e way a n d
manner i n w h i c h t h e c r i m e was
committed, b u t which i s c o l o r l e s s
and
neutral
insofar
as
the
defendant's connection w i t h the
crime
i s concerned,
i s not
sufficient
corroboration
to
warrant submission of the case t o
the j u r y . " '
"766 So. 2d a t 157.
" T h i s C o u r t h a s e l a b o r a t e d on t h i s
test:
"'Under § 12-21-222, A l a . Code 1975,
a f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n " c a n n o t be h a d on t h e
testimony
of
an
accomplice
unless
c o r r o b o r a t e d by o t h e r e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o
connect t h e defendant w i t h t h e commission
112
CR-06-2236
of the o f f e n s e ,
and s u c h
corroborative
e v i d e n c e , i f i t m e r e l y shows t h e c o m m i s s i o n
of
the
offense
or
the
circumstances
thereof, i f not s u f f i c i e n t . "
(Emphasis
added.)
In
reviewing
a
claim
of
insufficient
corroboration,
t h e Alabama
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have s t a t e d t h a t
"'"[t]he
test
for
determining
whether
there
is
sufficient
c o r r o b o r a t i o n of the testimony of
an
accomplice
consists
of
e l i m i n a t i n g the testimony
given
by t h e a c c o m p l i c e and e x a m i n i n g
the
remaining
evidence
to
determine i f there i s s u f f i c i e n t
evidence tending t o connect the
defendant w i t h the commission of
the o f f e n s e . "
"'Andrews v. S t a t e , 370 So. 2d 320, 321
( A l a . C r i m . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 370 So. 2d
323 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) , c i t i n g M i l l e r v S t a t e , 290
Ala.
248, 275 So. 2d 675 ( 1 9 7 3 ) .
The
evidence corroborating
the accomplice's
t e s t i m o n y and c o n n e c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t t o
t h e o f f e n s e c a n be p u r e l y c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
evidence.
M a t h i s v. S t a t e , 414 So. 2d 151
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) .
B u t , ' " [ i ] t must
be o f a s u b s t a n t i v e c h a r a c t e r , must be
i n c o n s i s t e n t with the innocence of the
a c c u s e d , and must do more t h a n r a i s e a
suspicion of g u i l t
S o r r e l l v. S t a t e ,
249 A l a . 292, [ 2 9 3 ] , 31 So. 2d 82, 83
[(1947)]."
Ex p a r t e B e l l , 475 U.S. 1038,
106 S . C t . 607, 88 L.Ed. 2d 585
(1985).'
"Ex p a r t e
2000).
Bullock,
770
So.
113
2d
1062,
1067 ( A l a .
CR-06-2236
" F u r t h e r m o r e , i n Ex p a r t e S t e w a r t , 900 So. 2d
475 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , t h i s C o u r t , q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e Hunt,
744 So. 2d 851, 858-59 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) , n o t e d :
"'"The C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s h a s ...
added t h e f o l l o w i n g c a v e a t s t o t h e r u l e
[regarding
corroboration of
accomplice
testimony]:
"'"'"The
tendency
of
the
c o r r o b o r a t i v e evidence t o connect
[the] a c c u s e d w i t h t h e c r i m e , o r
w i t h t h e c o m m i s s i o n t h e r e o f , must
be i n d e p e n d e n t , a n d w i t h o u t t h e
aid
o f any t e s t i m o n y
of the
accomplice;
the c o r r o b o r a t i v e
e v i d e n c e may n o t d e p e n d f o r i t s
w e i g h t a n d p r o b a t i v e v a l u e on t h e
t e s t i m o n y o f t h e a c c o m p l i c e , and
i t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t i f i t tends t o
connect
[the] accused w i t h the
o f f e n s e o n l y when g i v e n d i r e c t i o n
or i n t e r p r e t e d by, and r e a d i n
conjunction with the testimony of
the
accomplice."
23
C.J.S.
Criminal
Law,
Section
812
(b)(1961).'
"'"Mills
92."
v.
S t a t e , 408 So. 2d [ 1 9 7 ] , 191-
[E]vidence
which
merely
raises
a
conjecture,
surmise,
s p e c u l a t i o n ,
or
suspicion
that
[the]
accused
i s the g u i l t y
person
^
not
s u f f i c i e n t l y
corroborative
of
the
testimony
of
an
accomplice t o warrant a
114
CR-06-2236
conviction.'
23 C . J . S .
Criminal
Law,
Section
12(5)(b)."
S t a t o n v.
S t a t e , 397 So. 2d 227,
232
( A l a . Crim.
App.
1981).'
" ' " S t e e l e v. S t a t e , 512 So. 2d 142, 143-44
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 7 ) . " '
"900 So. 2d a t 477-78
21 So. 3d a t 761-62.
December
17, 2010]
(emphasis
added).
See W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e ,
So. 3d
See
a l s o G r e e n v. S t a t e ,
So.
3d
the
corroborating
[Ms. CR-09-0633,
( A l a . Crim.
App.
2010).
[Ms. CR-08-0352, May 28, 2010]
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 1 0 ) .
evidence
I t i s well settled
need o n l y
be
slight
that
a n d c a n be
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l - - i t d o e s n o t have t o be s t r o n g enough b y i t s e l f
to
warrant
accused w i t h
a
conviction—but
t h e commission
i t must
tend
of the crime.
t o connect
the
See McGowan, 990
So. 2d a t 987 ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t a l t h o u g h e v i d e n c e
corroborating
an a c c o m p l i c e ' s t e s t i m o n y n e e d o n l y be s l i g h t , i t must t e n d t o
connect
the
the defendant
defendant's
1174,
1182
t o t h e c r i m e a n d be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
innocence);
(Ala.
Crim.
Stoinski
App.
v.
2006)
State,
956
(providing
" [ c ] o r r o b o r a t i o n n e e d o n l y be s l i g h t t o s u f f i c e " ) ;
State,
911 So. 2d 2 1 , 28
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2004)
115
So.
2d
that
S t e e l e v.
(explaining
CR-06-2236
that
accomplice
circumstantial
testimony
evidence);
that corroborating
to
sustain
a
particular
e v i d e n c e by
evidence
f a c t nor
accomplice.");
Gavin,
conviction);
("Corroborative
may
go
Arthur,
be
891
So.
itself
not
2d
814
So.
976
by
(stating
sufficient
So.
2d
at
952
confirm
directly
to every m a t e r i a l
711
at
n e e d n o t be
Ferguson,
need
corroborated
any
f a c t s t a t e d by
2d a t 1059-60
the
(providing
that
s u f f i c i e n t to corroborate
the
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e may
be
t e s t i m o n y o f an a c c o m p l i c e ) ;
Dykes v. S t a t e , 30 A l a . App.
133,
1 So.
2d
754,
756-57
(1941)
(explaining that
129,
" [ i ] t has
b e e n r e p e a t e d l y h e l d , and a d v i s e d l y s o , t h a t t h e
corroboration
of
go
the
testimony
of
an
accomplice
m a t e r i a l f a c t t o w h i c h he t e s t i f i e s .
o f s u c h f a c t s t h e j u r y may
to
need
not
to
I f corroborated
i n some
b e l i e v e t h a t he s p e a k s t h e t r u t h as
all.").
"Whether s u c h c o r r o b o r a t i v e e v i d e n c e e x i s t s i s a
o f l a w t o be
and
every
r e s o l v e d by t h e t r i a l
s u f f i c i e n c y being
State,
418
So.
2d
168,
questions
170
court, i t s probative
f o r the
jury."
( A l a . C r i m . App.
omitted).
116
question
1981)
force
Caldwell
v.
(citations
CR-06-2236
Guided by these
p r i n c i p l e s o f law and a p p l y i n g t h e r u l e
that
r e q u i r e s us t o s u b t r a c t S h e l l y ' s t e s t i m o n y
the
remaining
evidence
The
evidence,
sufficiently
evidence
showed
S t a n l e y s ' apartment.
(Ala.
we
conclude
connected
that
that
Stanley
Smith's
body
and examine
the
remaining
t o Smith's
was
found
1998) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o x i m i t y t o t h e
an a c c o m p l i c e ' s
t h e murder and even s t a y e d
night
victim's
o f t h e murder.
truck
i n a Best
The
together
W e s t e r n h o t e l on
They w e r e a l s o s e e n d r i v i n g t h e
i n the Colbert
S t a n l e y had c a r p e t
authorities
whether
t e s t i m o n y was s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d ) .
e v i d e n c e r e v e a l e d t h a t S t a n l e y a n d S h e l l y were s e e n
the
i n the
See Ex p a r t e S c o t t , 728 So. 2d 172, 178
crime scene i s a r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g
after
murder.
Heights
area.
Additionally,
b u r n on h i s k n e e s when he s u r r e n d e r e d
and t h e e v i d e n c e
indicated that
to
Smith had been
s t a b b e d r e p e a t e d l y w i t h two s t e a k k n i v e s i n t h e b a c k w h i l e he
l a i d f a c e down on t h e c a r p e t .
Even a f t e r s u b t r a c t i n g S h e l l y ' s
accomplice
was
testimony,
there
ample
connect S t a n l e y w i t h Smith's murder.
merit
amply
to Stanley's
claim.
evidence
117
to
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e r e i s no
S h e l l y ' s accomplice
corroborated.
tending
testimony
was
CR-06-2236
Regarding
instruct
222,
a
the t r i a l
court
erred
t h e j u r y on a c c o m p l i c e t e s t i m o n y ,
i n failing
"section
to
[12-21¬
A l a . Code 1975] m e r e l y c r e a t e s a s t a t u t o r y r u l e , a n d n o t
constitutional right."
458,
497
whether
A l e x a n d e r v. S t a t e ,
204 So. 2d 488, 489 (1967) .
So. 2d 587, 589
281 A l a . 457,
See a l s o W o o d b e r r y v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 6 ) .
Moreover, t h e
f a i l u r e t o g i v e s u c h an i n s t r u c t i o n c a n be h a r m l e s s .
"'"The c o u r t s h o u l d have i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y
c o n c e r n i n g t h e need f o r c o r r o b o r a t i v e e v i d e n c e o f
McCants's testimony.
However, t h e f a i l u r e t o do s o
does n o t mean t h a t t h i s c a u s e must a u t o m a t i c a l l y be
reversed.
A u t o m a t i c r e v e r s a l e x i s t s o n l y when t h e
error ' n e c e s s a r i l y renders a t r i a l
fundamentally
u n f a i r . ' Rose v. C l a r k , 478 U.S. 570, [ 5 7 7 ] , 106 S.
C t . 3 1 0 1 , 3106, 92 L. E d . 2d 460 ( 1 9 8 6 ) .
Alabama
has a p p l i e d t h e h a r m l e s s e r r o r a n a l y s i s i n a c a s e
i n v o l v i n g the death penalty t o the f a i l u r e of the
c o u r t t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e p r i n c i p l e o f
accomplice corroboration.
G u r l e y v . S t a t e , 639 So.
2d 557 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 3 ) ; F r a z i e r v . S t a t e , 562
So. 2d 543, 558 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r
g r o u n d s , 562 So. 2d 560 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) . " ' "
J a c k s o n v. S t a t e ,
(finding
that
corroborate
836 So. 2d 915, 946 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999)
because
there
the accomplice's
was
sufficient
testimony,
evidence
the t r i a l
to
court's
f a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e n e c e s s i t y o f c o r r o b o r a t i n g
accomplice testimony
" d i d not r i s e t o the l e v e l of p l a i n e r r o r
118
CR-06-2236
and was,
a t most, h a r m l e s s
error.
See R u l e 45, A l a . R.
App.
P.").
"'[T]he e r r o r of f a i l i n g to i n s t r u c t
t h e j u r y on t h e n e e d f o r c o r r o b o r a t i v e
e v i d e n c e i s h a r m l e s s when t h e t e s t i m o n y o f
an
accomplice
has
in
fact
been
c o r r o b o r a t e d . F r a z i e r v. S t a t e , 562 So. 2d
543, 558 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , r e v e r s e d on o t h e r
g r o u n d s , 562 So. 2d 560 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) . A c c o r d
P e o p l e v. B r u n n e r , 797 P.2d 788, 790 ( C o l o .
App. 1 9 9 0 ) ; S t a t e v. Brown [187 Conn. 6 0 2 ] ,
447 A. 2d 734, 740 (Conn. 1 9 8 2 ) ; A l i ^
U n i t e d S t a t e s , 581 A.2d 368, 377-78 (D.C.
App. 1 9 9 0 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 502 U.S. 893, 112
S. C t . 259
[116 L. Ed. 2d 213]
(1991);
S t r o n g v. S t a t e [261 Md. 3 7 1 ] , 275
A.2d
491,
495
(Md.
1 9 7 1 ) , v a c a t e d on o t h e r
g r o u n d s , 408 U.S. 939 [92 S. C t . 2872, 33
L. Ed. 2d 760]
( 1 9 7 2 ) ; S t a t e v. E n g l a n d ,
409 N.W.2d 262, 265 (Minn. App.
1987).'"
B u r t o n v.
State,
651
So.
2d 641,
654
( A l a . C r i m . App.
( q u o t i n g G u r l e y v. S t a t e , 639 So. 2d 557, 561
1993)).
1991),
1993)
( A l a . Crim.
App.
See a l s o Ex p a r t e B a n k h e a d , 585 So. 2d 112, 119 ( A l a .
r e v ' d on
(holding
that
o t h e r grounds,
because
625
there
was
So.
2d
1146
sufficient
(Ala.
1993)
evidence
corroborate the accomplice's testimony, the t r i a l
to
court did
n o t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r i n n o t i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y on t h e
n e e d f o r c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f a c c o m p l i c e t e s t i m o n y ) ; H u t c h e r s o n v.
S t a t e , 677 So. 2d 1174,
other grounds,
1200
( A l a . C r i m . App.
677 So. 2d 1205
( A l a . 1996)
119
1 9 9 4 ) , r e v ' d on
( h o l d i n g t h a t even
CR-06-2236
i f t h e w i t n e s s was
" t h e r e was
an a c c o m p l i c e
more t h a n
and t e s t i f i e d f o r t h e S t a t e ,
sufficient
evidence
to corroborate
his
t e s t i m o n y ; t h e r e f o r e , no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r w o u l d h a v e o c c u r r e d .
Burton
v.
v.
State,
S t a t e , 562
562
So.
S t a t e , 651
639
So.
In
this
evidence
2d
So. 2d 543
2d 560
So.
557
( A l a . C r . App.
( A l a . Cr.
App.
1993);
1993);
Gurley
Frazier
v.
( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s ,
(Ala.
case,
2d 641
1989)").
as
mentioned
to corroborate
above,
there
S h e l l y ' s testimony.
was
ample
Therefore,
the
t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y as t o t h e n e c e s s i t y
of c o r r o b o r a t i n g accomplice
t e s t i m o n y d i d not a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t
Stanley's
substantial rights.
199,
( A l a . Crim.
was
221
App.
1998)
corroborating evidence,
result
of the
accomplice
trial
Hyde v.
there
was
no
charging
B a s e d on t h e
regarding this
S t a t e , 778
So.
( h o l d i n g t h a t because
c o u r t ' s not
testimony).
reversal exists
See
plain
the
error
jury
2d
there
as
a
regarding
f o r e g o i n g , no b a s i s f o r
claim.
VIII.
S t a n l e y argues t h a t the t r i a l
e l i c i t improper hearsay testimony.
court allowed the State to
More p a r t i c u l a r l y ,
c i t e s t h r e e d i f f e r e n t i n s t a n c e s of testimony
120
he
Stanley
a l l e g e s were
CR-06-2236
hearsay.
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
I s s u e V I I , pp.
68-70.)
Because
S t a n l e y f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o t h e t e s t i m o n y he now c h a l l e n g e s ,
o u r r e v i e w i s l i m i t e d t o an e x a m i n a t i o n f o r p l a i n e r r o r .
R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App.
Stanley
Janice
Stanleys
were
P.
challenges
Berryhill,
and
leaving
See
instances
Jenna
where
Ronald
Berryhill,
Mitchell
testified
(R. 467,
491-92,
town.
that
1011,
the
703.)
B o t h R o n a l d and J a n i c e t e s t i f i e d t h a t Dot t o l d them on Sunday,
June 19, 2005, t h a t h e r s o n and d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w were
town
that
Shelly's
Shelly,
evening
arrest.
because
Mitchell
a
warrant
testified
v i s i t e d h e r on S a t u r d a y ,
had
that
been
leaving
issued
for
when h e r m o t h e r ,
J u n e 18, 2005, S h e l l y
told
h e r t h a t she was g o i n g t o be l e a v i n g t h e a r e a f o r a l o n g t i m e
and t h a t s h e w a n t e d t o s e e h e r b e f o r e she l e f t
" R u l e 8 0 1 ( c ) , A l a . R. E v i d . ,
town.
reads:
"'"Hearsay" i s a statement, other than
one made by t h e d e c l a r a n t w h i l e t e s t i f y i n g
at
the t r i a l
or hearing, o f f e r e d i n
evidence t o prove the t r u t h of the matter
asserted.'
" R u l e 802, A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s t h a t
"'[h]earsay i s not a d m i s s i b l e except
as p r o v i d e d by t h e s e r u l e s , o r b y o t h e r
r u l e s a d o p t e d by t h e Supreme
Court of
A l a b a m a o r by s t a t u t e . ' "
121
CR-06-2236
Ex p a r t e B a k e r , 906
The
was
record
i t was
2d 277,
presented
testimony
to provide
t o go
to the
was
being
Stanleys'
been l e f t
stated,
r e a s o n f o r a c t i o n o r c o n d u c t by
not
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1986), q u o t i n g
132
So.
Likewise,
mother
told
(Ala.
2d 134
as
her
for
Crim.
(Ala.
leaving
Ronald
"to
prove
the
testimony
emotional
v.
State,
testimony
on
44
not
the
day
So.
3d
to
be
122
of
r a t h e r to e s t a b l i s h the
State,
502
Grayson,
824
2d 846,
849
State,
474
So.
i n t u r n T u c k e r v.
App.
1984),
rev'd
on
other
as
what
her
was
not
1985)).
for
awhile,
offered to describe
condition
Brownfield
(finding
was
This
truth
to
i t also
o f f e r e d to prove the t r u t h of the matter a s s e r t e d .
the
and
a p a r t m e n t on Monday t o
M i t c h e l l ' s testimony
about
matter
testimony,
o f why
the w i t n e s s . ' "
( q u o t i n g Edwards v.
g r o u n d s , 474
alleges
there unattended.
'but
2d a t 813
131,
Stanley
Janice's
an e x p l a n a t i o n
offered
w h a t e v e r f a c t s m i g h t be
2d
testimony
R a t h e r , r e g a r d i n g R o n a l d ' s and
r e t r i e v e t h e dogs t h a t had
So.
( A l a . 2004).
not e l i c i t e d t o prove the t r u t h of the
Swanie d e c i d e d
So.
283
i n d i c a t e s t h a t the
h e a r s a y was
asserted.
So.
of
1,
Shelly's physical
the
20
Instead,
murder.
and
See,
e.g.,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2007)
inadmissible
hearsay
but
to
CR-06-2236
e x p l a i n why t h e a u t h o r i t i e s were t e l e p h o n e d ) ;
State,
R o b i t a i l l e v.
971 So. 2d 43, 57 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) ; S t a l l w o r t h ,
868 So. 2d a t 1153.
Consequently, the complained-of
testimony
was
n o t h e a r s a y , a n d we f i n d no e r r o r , p l a i n o r o t h e r w i s e , i n
its
admission
into
evidence.
IX.
S t a n l e y contends t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed s e v e r a l e r r o r s
in
i t s jury
i n s t r u c t i o n s i n the g u i l t
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
to
his
Ala.
Issues
I I I a n d IX.)
any o f t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r s a t t r i a l .
phase
of the t r i a l .
Stanley d i d not object
Therefore,
assertions pursuant t o the p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e .
we
review
R u l e 45A,
R. App. P.
"'When
reviewing
a
trial
court's
jury
i n s t r u c t i o n s , we m u s t v i e w t h e m a s a w h o l e , n o t i n
b i t s a n d p i e c e s , a n d as a r e a s o n a b l e
j u r o r would
have i n t e r p r e t e d them.'
J o h n s o n v . S t a t e , 820 S o .
2 d 8 4 2 , 874 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) .
"'A t r i a l c o u r t h a s b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n
when f o r m u l a t i n g
i t s jury
instructions.
See W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 611 S o . 2 d 1 1 1 9 ,
1123
( A l a . C r . App. 1992).
When r e v i e w i n g
a t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s , "'the c o u r t ' s
c h a r g e must be t a k e n as a w h o l e , a n d t h e
p o r t i o n s c h a l l e n g e d a r e n o t t o be i s o l a t e d
therefrom
or taken
out o f context, but
rather
considered
together.'"
Self
v.
S t a t e , 620 S o . 2 d 1 1 0 , 113 ( A l a . C r . A p p .
1992)
( q u o t i n g P o r t e r v . S t a t e , 520 S o . 2 d
235,
237 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) ) ; s e e a l s o
123
CR-06-2236
B e a r d v . S t a t e , 612 S o . 2 d 1 3 3 5 ( A l a . C r .
A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ; A l e x a n d e r v . S t a t e , 601 S o . 2 d
1130 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) . '
" W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e ,
App. 1999)."
Vanpelt,
S o . 3d a t
795
.
S o . 2 d 7 5 3 , 780
See a l s o R e y n o l d s v. S t a t e ,
CR-07-0443, O c t o b e r 1, 2010]
App.
( A l a . Crim.
So. 3d
,
( A l a . Crim.
2010).
"In the c o n t e x t of c h a l l e n g e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
the
plain-error
doctrine
has
been
applied
as
follows.
"'"'In
setting
out
the
standard f o r plain error
review
of j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
the court
i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C h a n d l e r , 996
F . 2 d 1 0 7 3 , 1 0 8 5 , 1097 ( 1 1 t h C i r .
1993), c i t e d Boyde v. C a l i f o r n i a ,
4 94 U.S.
370 , 380 , 110 S. C t .
1190,
108 L. E d . 2 d 316
(1990),
for
the p r o p o s i t i o n
that
"an
e r r o r o c c u r s o n l y when t h e r e i s a
reasonable
likelihood
that
the
jury applied the i n s t r u c t i o n i n
an i m p r o p e r m a n n e r . "
W i l l i a m s v.
State,
710
So.
2d
1276,
1306
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 1996),
aff'd,
710
So.
2d
1350
( A l a . 1997),
c e r t . d e n i e d , 524 U.S. 9 2 9 , 118
S. C t . 2 3 2 5 , 141 L. E d . 2d 699
(1998).'"
" ' B r o a d n a x v . S t a t e , 825 S o . 2 d 1 3 4 , 196
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , q u o t i n g P i l l e y v.
S t a t e , 789 S o . 2 d 8 7 0 , 8 8 2 - 8 3 ( A l a . C r i m .
A p p . 19 9 8 ) . ' "
124
[Ms.
CR-06-2236
Harris,
2 So.
Gobble,
2d 842,
Boyd,
3d a t 910.
So.
874
715
objection
3d a t
See
in
2d
a
852
case
11 So.
3d a t
( q u o t i n g Johnson v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
So.
also Belisle,
(Ala.
2000), quoting
1998))
i n v o l v i n g the
death
820
i n t u r n Ex
("'"The
absence
penalty
308;
parte
of
does
p r e c l u d e r e v i e w of the i s s u e ; however, the d e f e n d a n t ' s
So.
an
not
failure
t o o b j e c t does w e i g h [ ] a g a i n s t h i s c l a i m o f p r e j u d i c e . " ' " ) .
Moreover,
"An a c c u s e d has t h e r i g h t t o h a v e t h e j u r y
c h a r g e d on
'"any
material hypothesis
which
the
evidence i n h i s favor tends to e s t a b l i s h . " '
Ex
p a r t e S t o r k , 475 So. 2d 623, 624 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) .
'In
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r an i n s t r u c t i o n was s u p p o r t e d by
t h e e v i d e n c e t h e q u e s t i o n i s n o t w h e t h e r t h e Supreme
Court or Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals b e l i e v e s the
evidence,
but
s i m p l y whether such evidence
was
presented.'
Id.
'[E]very accused i s e n t i t l e d to
have c h a r g e s g i v e n , w h i c h w o u l d n o t be m i s l e a d i n g ,
w h i c h c o r r e c t l y s t a t e t h e law o f h i s c a s e , and w h i c h
are
supported
by
any
evidence,
however
weak,
i n s u f f i c i e n t , o r d o u b t f u l i n c r e d i b i l i t y . ' Ex p a r t e
C h a v e r s , 361 So. 2d 1106, 1107
( A l a . 1978). ' " ' I t
i s a b a s i c t e n e t o f A l a b a m a l a w t h a t "a p a r t y i s
e n t i t l e d t o h a v e h i s t h e o r y o f t h e c a s e , made by t h e
pleadings
and
issues, presented
t o t h e j u r y by
proper i n s t r u c t i o n ,
...
and t h e
[trial]
court's
f a i l u r e to give those i n s t r u c t i o n s i s r e v e r s i b l e
error."'"'
Ex p a r t e M c G r i f f , 908 So. 2d 1024,
1035
( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , q u o t i n g W i n n e r I n t ' l C o r p . v. Common
S e n s e , I n c . , 863 So. 2d 1088,
1091
( A l a . 2003),
quoting i n t u r n other cases.
'In o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e
w h e t h e r t h e e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o n e c e s s i t a t e an
i n s t r u c t i o n and t o a l l o w t h e j u r y t o c o n s i d e r t h e
d e f e n s e , we must v i e w t h e t e s t i m o n y most f a v o r a b l y
125
CR-06-2236
to the defendant.'
Ex p a r t e
1196, 1200 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . "
Williams
v. S t a t e ,
Pettway,
938 So. 2d 440, 444-45
594 So. 2d
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2005).
With
these
principles
i n mind,
we
turn
to
Stanley's
s p e c i f i c claims of error.
A.
Stanley submits the t r i a l
not
instructing
the jury
c o u r t committed p l a i n e r r o r by
on i n t o x i c a t i o n
a n d m a n s l a u g h t e r as
a l e s s e r o f f e n s e b e c a u s e t h e r e was e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t he
had a l o n g h i s t o r y o f d r u g a d d i c t i o n a n d t h a t he was u n d e r t h e
influence
o f d r u g s when he c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e .
b r i e f , I s s u e I I I , p p . 45-48.)
court
instructed
the jury
(Stanley's
The r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e t r i a l
on i n t e n t i o n a l
murder
and f e l o n y
m u r d e r as l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r .
did
not,
however,
request
an
instruction
on
Stanley
voluntary
i n t o x i c a t i o n a n d m a n s l a u g h t e r , a n d he d i d n o t o b j e c t when t h e
trial
court
Stanley's
d i d not give
such charges.
claim f o rplain error.
We t h e r e f o r e
See R u l e 45A, A l a . R. App.
P.
"'A c h a r g e on i n t o x i c a t i o n s h o u l d be
given
i f "'there
i s an
evidentiary
foundation i n the record s u f f i c i e n t for the
126
review
CR-06-2236
j u r y t o e n t e r t a i n a reasonable doubt'" i n
t h e e l e m e n t o f i n t e n t . Coon v. S t a t e , 494
So. 2d 184, 187 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1986)
( q u o t i n g Government o f t h e V i r g i n I s l a n d s
v. Carmona, 422 F. 2d 95, 99 n. 6 (3d C i r .
1970)).
See a l s o P e o p l e v. P e r r y , 61
N.Y.2d 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d 966, 966-67, 462
N.E.2d 143, 143-44 (App. 1984) ("[a] c h a r g e
on i n t o x i c a t i o n s h o u l d be g i v e n i f t h e r e i s
s u f f i c i e n t evidence of i n t o x i c a t i o n i n the
record f o r a reasonable person t o e n t e r t a i n
a d o u b t as t o t h e e l e m e n t o f i n t e n t on t h a t
basis").
An a c c u s e d i s e n t i t l e d t o h a v e
the
jury
consider
the issue
of h i s
intoxication
where
the
evidence
of
i n t o x i c a t i o n i s c o n f l i c t i n g , Owen v . S t a t e ,
611 So. 2d 1126, 1128 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 9 2 ) ; C r o s s l i n v . S t a t e , 446 So. 2d 675,
682
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 3 ) , where t h e
defendant denies t h e commission of t h e
c r i m e , Coon v . S t a t e , 494 So. 2d a t 187;
see Moran v . S t a t e , 34 A l a . A p p . 238, 240,
39 So. 2d 419, 4 2 1 , c e r t . d e n i e d , 252 A l a .
60, 39 So. 2d 421 ( 1 9 4 9 ) , a n d where t h e
evidence o f i n t o x i c a t i o n i s o f f e r e d by t h e
S t a t e , s e e Owen v. S t a t e , 611 So. 2d a t
1127-28."
" P i l l e y v. S t a t e , 930 So. 2d 550, 561-62
App. 2 0 0 5 ) . "
(Ala. Crim.
"However, t h e c o u r t s h o u l d c h a r g e on v o l u n t a r y
intoxication
only
when t h e r e
is a
sufficient
evidentiary foundation i n the record f o ra jury to
e n t e r t a i n a r e a s o n a b l e doubt as t o t h e element o f
intent.
Ex p a r t e M c W h o r t e r , 781 So. 2d 330, 342
(Ala. 2000). I n P i l l e y t h i s Court p r o v i d e d guidance
as t o what e v i d e n c e w o u l d be r e q u i r e d t o f o r m t h a t
evidentiary foundation.
"'The A l a b a m a L e g i s l a t u r e h a s d e f i n e d
" i n t o x i c a t i o n " t o i n c l u d e "a d i s t u r b a n c e o f
127
CR-06-2236
mental or p h y s i c a l c a p a c i t i e s
resulting
f r o m t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f any s u b s t a n c e i n t o
the body."
§ 1 3 A - 3 - 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) , A l a . Code
1975.
Thus, e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t
i n g e s t e d a l c o h o l or drugs, s t a n d i n g alone,
does n o t w a r r a n t a c h a r g e on i n t o x i c a t i o n .
"[T]here
must
be
evidence
that
the
ingestion
caused
a d i s t u r b a n c e of
the
p e r s o n ' s m e n t a l o r p h y s i c a l c a p a c i t i e s and
t h a t t h a t mental or p h y s i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e
existed
at
the
time
the
offense
was
committed."
Lee v. S t a t e , 898 So. 2d 790,
838
( A l a . C r i m . App.
2001)
( o p i n i o n on
r e t u r n t o r e m a n d ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 898 So. 2d
874 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 543 U.S. 924, 125
S. C t . 309, 160 L. Ed. 2d 222 ( 2 0 0 4 ) .
See
a l s o M a p l e s v. S t a t e , 758 So. 2d 1, 23
( A l a . C r i m . A p p . ) , a f f ' d 758 So. 2d 81
(Ala. 1999).
Such a h o l d i n g i s c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h t h i s C o u r t ' s o p i n i o n i n W i n d s o r v.
S t a t e , 683 So. 2d 1027, 1037
( A l a . Crim.
App. 1 9 9 4 ) , a f f ' d , 683 So. 2d 1042 ( A l a .
1 9 9 6 ) , i n w h i c h we s t a t e d :
" ' " I n t h i s c a s e , however, t h e r e
was
no
evidence
that
the
appellant
was
intoxicated.
A l t h o u g h t h e r e was e v i d e n c e t h a t
t h e a p p e l l a n t had been d r i n k i n g
beer
on
the
day
of
the
robbery-murder,
there
was
no
evidence concerning the q u a n t i t y
o f b e e r he consumed t h a t day a t
the t i m e of t h e murder.
Evidence
that
someone was
drinking
an
alcoholic
beverage
is
not
evidence that that person
was
intoxicated.
There
was
no
' r e a s o n a b l e t h e o r y ' t o s u p p o r t an
instruction
on
intoxication
b e c a u s e t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e o f
intoxication.
The c o u r t d i d n o t
128
CR-06-2236
e r r i n not i n s t r u c t i n g the j u r y
on i n t o x i c a t i o n and m a n s l a u g h t e r
where t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t h a t
t h e a p p e l l a n t was i n t o x i c a t e d a t
the
time
the
robbery-murder
occurred."'
"Pilley,
Harris,
Code
930
2 So.
1975,
a
So.
2d a t
563."
3d a t 911.
Thus, " ' [ u ] n d e r
trial
i s not
judge
§ 13A-1-9(b), A l a .
required
to
instruct
on
a
l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d offense "unless there i s a r a t i o n a l basis for
a v e r d i c t c o n v i c t i n g the defendant of the i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e . " ' "
Harris,
550,
2 So.
3d a t 912
( q u o t i n g P i l l e y v.
563
( A l a . C r i m . App.
evidence
that
crack cocaine
showed
Stanley
t h e y had b e e n on a d r u g " b i n g e "
murder.
However,
a r o u n d 3:00
still
the
a.m.
Shelly
T h e r e was
a
2d
no
Stanleys'
they
lasted
time Smith,
a p a r t m e n t a r o u n d 7:30
evidence concerning
the s t a b b i n g
ran
and
that
the e f f e c t s ,
129
out
i f any,
drugs
of the murder
and
20
that Stanley
was
the v i c t i m ,
a.m.
of
the
approximately
only
evidence i n d i c a t i n g
i n t o x i c a t e d at the
ingested
f o r about f o u r days b e f o r e
testified
"high"
Shelly
Shelly testified
S a t u r d a y m o r n i n g , t h e day
typically,
minutes.
and
and O x y C o n t i n t h e n i g h t b e f o r e
e a r l y i n the morning of the s t a b b i n g .
that,
So.
2005)).
The
S t a t e , 930
a r r i v e d at
T h e r e was
also
t h e amount o f
no
crack
CR-06-2236
cocaine
and
b e f o r e and
other
substances
allegedly ingested
the
i n the e a r l y hours of the morning of the murder
on S t a n l e y a t t h e t i m e o f t h e s t a b b i n g .
In f a c t , the
showed t h a t S t a n l e y
cleaned
m u r d e r and
b a s e d on
c h a n g e d c l o t h e s and
t h a t he
the
establish
any
State,
683
an
2d
there
d r i n k i n g b e e r on
foundation
1027,
was
after
of
(Ala.
that
the
the
Rather,
failed
to
i n t o x i c a t i o n that
Windsor
Crim.
App.
appellant
v.
1994)
had
been
r o b b e r y - m u r d e r , t h e r e was
no
t h e q u a n t i t y o f b e e r he consumed t h a t
day
a t the time of the murder.
a l c o h o l i c beverage
of the
Stanley
intoxication.
1037
evidence
t h e day
evidence concerning
intoxicated.").
at t r i a l ,
i n s t r u c t i o n on
So.
up
had
evidence
S h e l l y moved S m i t h ' s t r u c k .
evidentiary
warrant
("Although,
and
evidence presented
would
an
night
E v i d e n c e t h a t someone was
i s not
evidence
Compare F l e t c h e r v.
State,
621
person
So.
2d
was
1010,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
trial
c o u r t d i d n o t i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s
i n t o x i c a t i o n and
invaded the p r o v i n c e
get the impression
(finding plain
that
1018
of
1993)
that
drinking
manslaughter
because
e r r o r where
the
trial
o f t h e j u r y by s t a t i n g t h a t he
from the evidence t h a t
130
judge
" ' d i d not
[the defendant]
so i n t o x i c a t e d t h a t he d i d n ' t know what he was
the
doing.'").
was
The
CR-06-2236
e v i d e n c e was
s u f f i c i e n t to
support a jury's
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t S t a n l e y was
intent
"a
from drug or
of
mental
alcohol
13A-3-2(e)(1), Ala.
instruction
theory
use
or
physical
at
the
that
Shelly
acted
F u r t h e r m o r e , an
alone
in
inconsistent
930
complete
in this
with
So.
i n t o x i c a t i o n i n s t r u c t i o n was
2d
innocence);
case,
the
the
defense's
at
error
563
an
Hunt,
See
3d
Ex
,
in
claim
of
that
an
(holding
w i t h the
appellant's
659
2d
intoxication
So.
instruction
t h e r e i s no p l a i n e r r o r
c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o g i v e s u c h an
plain
appellant's
inconsistent
c o n f l i c t with defense strategy,
the
instruction.").
trial
court's
at
958
would
in
offense.
See
131
S p e n c e r v.
State,
failure
[Ms.
the
Thus,
i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on v o l u n t a r y i n t o x i c a t i o n o r m a n s l a u g h t e r
a lesser-included
§
( l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d - o f f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n b a s e d on
Pilley,
no
with
See
intoxication
So.
innocence);
find
murder.
murder.
was
("Where, as
the
resulting
Smith's
intoxication
of
experiencing
1080350, S e p t e m b e r 3, 2010]
[Ms.
( A l a . 2010)
theory
time of
Code 1975.
was
requisite
capacities"
w o u l d have been i n c o n s i s t e n t
parte M i l l s ,
we
unable to form the
t o commit c a p i t a l m u r d e r , b e c a u s e he
disturbance
trial
f i n d i n g beyond a
to
as
CR-04-
CR-06-2236
2570, A p r i l
4,
2008]
So. 3d
,
( A l a . Crim.
App.
2008).
B.
Stanley maintains
reasonable
498 U.S.
that the t r i a l
court's
instruction
d o u b t v i o l a t e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f Cage v. L o u i s i a n a ,
39
(1990).
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
Issue
I X , pp. 78-82.)
Stanley s p e c i f i c a l l y takes issue with c e r t a i n terminology
by t h e t r i a l
court to describe reasonable
t h a t by s t a t i n g t h a t r e a s o n a b l e
"speculative"
burden
doubt,
of proof
and
shifted
reasonable
doubt.
He c o n t e n d s
court
lessened
the burden
the
of proof
State's
t o him.
S t a n l e y c l a i m s t h a t by e q u a t i n g
d o u b t w i t h "an a b i d i n g c o n v i c t i o n ... a r i s i n g
evidence"
determining
and
by
used
doubt i s not a " p o s s i b l e " o r
the t r i a l
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , pp. 79-80.)
the
on
instructing
the
jury
that,
what t h e t r u e f a c t s a r e , you a r e l i m i t e d
e v i d e n c e t h a t has been p r e s e n t e d
from t h e w i t n e s s
from
"in
to the
stand," the
court m i s l e d the j u r y i n t o t h i n k i n g that i t could not consider
the
lack
of evidence
i n reaching
i t sverdict.
(Stanley's
b r i e f , pp. 80-81.)
A review of the e n t i r e reasonable-doubt i n s t r u c t i o n
by
the t r i a l
court
i n this
case
132
reveals
that
given
i t properly
CR-06-2236
followed
the
legal
guidelines
and
the Alabama
I n s t r u c t i o n s i n i n s t r u c t i n g the j u r y .
t h e j u r y as
Pattern
The t r i a l c o u r t c h a r g e d
follows:
"The S t a t e o f A l a b a m a has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g
the g u i l t of the Defendant beyond a r e a s o n a b l e
doubt.
And
t h i s burden
remains
on t h e S t a t e
t h r o u g h o u t t h e c a s e . The D e f e n d a n t i s n o t r e q u i r e d
to prove h i s innocence.
"The
phrase
'reasonable
doubt'
is
self-explanatory.
And e f f o r t s t o d e f i n e i t do n o t
always c l a r i f y the term.
B u t i t may h e l p you some
to
say
that
the doubt
t h a t would
justify
an
a c q u i t t a l must be a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t and n o t a mere
p o s s i b l e doubt.
A r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i s n o t mere
g u e s s o r s u r m i s e and i s n o t f o r c e d o r c a p r i c i o u s
doubt.
" I f a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l the evidence i n t h i s
c a s e you h a v e an a b i d i n g c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e t r u t h o f
the
charge,
then
you
are
c o n v i n c e d beyond
a
reasonable doubt.
And i t w o u l d be y o u r d u t y t o
c o n v i c t the Defendant.
The r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t w h i c h
e n t i t l e s an a c c u s e d t o an a c q u i t t a l i s n o t a mere
f a n c i f u l , vague, c o n j e c t u r a l , or s p e c u l a t i v e doubt
b u t a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a r i s i n g f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e and
remaining a f t e r a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the
testimony
such
as
r e a s o n a b l e , f a i r - m i n d e d , and
c o n s c i e n t i o u s men and women w o u l d e n t e r t a i n u n d e r
a l l the circumstances.
"You
would
observe
t h a t the S t a t e i s not
r e q u i r e d t o c o n v i n c e you o f t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s
guilt
beyond a l l doubt but s i m p l y beyond a l l r e a s o n a b l e
doubt.
A f t e r c o m p a r i n g and c o n s i d e r i n g a l l o f t h e
e v i d e n c e i n t h i s case your minds a r e l e f t i n such
c o n d i t i o n t h a t you c o u l d n o t s a y t h a t you have an
a b i d i n g c o n v i c t i o n of the Defendant's g u i l t , then
133
Jury
CR-06-2236
you're not c o n v i n c e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt.
And
t h e D e f e n d a n t w o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o an a c q u i t t a l . "
(R. 1062-63.)
In V a n p e l t ,
similar
issue
instruction
and,
So.
3d a t
in
, this
concluding
d i d not i m p r o p e r l y s h i f t
the defendant,
that
Court addressed
the
the burden
complained-of
of p r o o f t o
stated:
"In
Cage,
the
Supreme C o u r t h e l d
that
a
Louisiana t r i a l court's reasonable-doubt i n s t r u c t i o n
impermissibly
s u g g e s t e d a h i g h e r degree of doubt
than i s r e q u i r e d f o r a c q u i t t a l under the r e a s o n a b l e
d o u b t s t a n d a r d o f I n r e W i n s h i p , 397 U.S. 358, 364
36
(1970).
The
i n s t r u c t i o n i n Cage p r o v i d e d , i n
relevant part:
" ' I f you e n t e r t a i n a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t as t o
any f a c t o r e l e m e n t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s t i t u t e
the defendant's g u i l t , i t i s your duty t o
g i v e him t h e b e n e f i t of t h e doubt
and
r e t u r n a v e r d i c t o f n o t g u i l t y . E v e n where
the evidence demonstrates a p r o b a b i l i t y of
g u i l t , i f i t does n o t e s t a b l i s h s u c h g u i l t
b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , you must a c q u i t
the accused.
T h i s d o u b t , h o w e v e r , must be
a r e a s o n a b l e one; t h a t i s one t h a t i s
f o u n d e d upon a r e a l t a n g i b l e s u b s t a n t i a l
basis
and
not
upon mere
caprice
and
conjecture.
I t must be s u c h d o u b t as w o u l d
give r i s e to a grave u n c e r t a i n t y , r a i s e d i n
y o u r m i n d by r e a s o n s o f t h e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y
character
of the evidence or the
lack
thereof.
A r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i s n o t a mere
possible
doubt.
It
is
an
actual
s u b s t a n t i a l doubt.
I t i s a doubt t h a t a
r e a s o n a b l e man
can s e r i o u s l y e n t e r t a i n .
What i s r e q u i r e d i s n o t an a b s o l u t e o r
134
a
CR-06-2236
mathematical
certainty.'
certainty,
but
a
moral
"Cage, 498 U.S. a t 40 (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) .
The
Cage C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h i s
reasonable-doubt
i n s t r u c t i o n i m p e r m i s s i b l y suggested a h i g h e r degree
of doubt than i s r e q u i r e d f o r a c q u i t t a l under the
reasonable-doubt
standard established
i n In
re
W i n s h i p , 397 U.S. 358, 364 ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
Specifically,
t h e Cage c o u r t h e l d t h a t ' [ i ] t i s p l a i n t o us t h a t
t h e words " s u b s t a n t i a l " and " g r a v e , " as t h e y a r e
commonly u n d e r s t o o d , s u g g e s t a h i g h e r d e g r e e
of
doubt than i s r e q u i r e d f o r a c q u i t t a l under the
r e a s o n a b l e - d o u b t s t a n d a r d . ' Cage, 498 U.S. a t 4 1 . "
" I n S m i t h v. S t a t e , t h i s c o u r t
s i m i l a r i s s u e and h e l d as f o l l o w s :
reviewed
"'Although the t r i a l court d i d r e f e r
t o a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t as an " a c t u a l d o u b t , "
i t d i d n o t s t a t e t h a t t h e d o u b t must be
" g r a v e " o r " s u b s t a n t i a l , " as t h e f a u l t y
c h a r g e i n Cage i n s t r u c t e d . See Cage, 498
U.S. a t 40, 111 S.Ct. a t 328 ( h o l d i n g t h a t
t h e t e r m s " g r a v e " and " s u b s t a n t i a l " s u g g e s t
a h i g h e r degree of doubt than t h a t a c t u a l l y
r e q u i r e d to a c q u i t ) . Furthermore, the t r i a l
c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t the doubt c o u l d
n o t be " f a n c i f u l , " " v a g u e , " " s p e c u l a t i v e , "
" a r b i t r a r y , " or "merely p o s s i b l e " f o l l o w s
the language of the Alabama P a t t e r n J u r y
I n s t r u c t i o n : C r i m i n a l on a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t
charge.
The f a c t t h a t t h e t r i a l
court
followed
an
accepted
pattern
jury
i n s t r u c t i o n weighs h e a v i l y a g a i n s t
any
f i n d i n g of e r r o r .
C a r r o l l v. S t a t e , 599
So. 2d 1253 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , a f f ' d ,
627 So. 2d 874 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d ,
510 U.S. 1171, 114 S.Ct. 1207, 127 L.Ed.2d
554 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; D i l l v. S t a t e , 600 So. 2d 343
( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 1 ) , a f f ' d , 600 So. 2d 372
(Ala.
1 9 9 2 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 507 U.S.
924,
135
a
CR-06-2236
113 S.Ct. 1293, 122 L.Ed.2d 684
(1993);
K u e n z e l v. S t a t e , 577 So. 2d 474 ( A l a . C r .
App. 1 9 9 0 ) , a f f ' d , 577 So. 2d 531 ( A l a . ) ,
c e r t . d e n i e d , 502 U.S. 886, 112 S.Ct. 242,
116 L.Ed.2d 197
(1991).
B a s e d on t h e
f o r e g o i n g , t h e r e i s no p l a i n e r r o r i n t h e
trial
c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n on r e a s o n a b l e
doubt.'
" S m i t h v. S t a t e ,
App. 19 9 7 ) . "
Vanpelt,
2d 790,
So.
So.
756
3d a t
So.
.
See
841-42 ( A l a . C r i m . App
2d 1064,
C o u r t has
1069-71
approved
2d
892,
922
(Ala. Crim.
a l s o Lee v. S t a t e ,
898
So.
2 0 0 1 ) ; G r e e n h i l l v. S t a t e ,
746
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1999).
Likewise, this
i n s t r u c t i o n s s i m i l a r t o t h e one
h e r e and c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f was
See
Brown,
Belisle,
In
11
11 So.
So.
3d
at
3d a t 309
K n o t t s v.
State,
o p i n i o n a f t e r remand, 686
we
903;
Harris,
; Stallworth,
686
So.
2d
So.
2d 484
431
2
So.
868
presented
not
3d
So.
shifted.
at
912-14;
2d a t
1164.
( A l a . Crim.
App.),
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1995),
held:
"The
Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment ' p r o t e c t s t h e a c c u s e d a g a i n s t c o n v i c t i o n
e x c e p t upon p r o o f b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f e v e r y
f a c t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e c r i m e w i t h w h i c h he
i s charged.'
I n r e W i n s h i p , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90
S. C t . 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . I n Cage
v. L o u i s i a n a , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t f o u n d
t h a t a j u r y charge t h a t d e f i n e d 'reasonable doubt'
by u s i n g t h e p h r a s e s ' g r a v e u n c e r t a i n t y , '
'actual
s u b s t a n t i a l d o u b t , ' and 'moral c e r t a i n t y ' c o u l d have
136
CR-06-2236
l e d a reasonable j u r o r to i n t e r p r e t the i n s t r u c t i o n s
t o a l l o w a f i n d i n g o f g u i l t b a s e d on a d e g r e e o f
p r o o f b e l o w t h a t r e q u i r e d by t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e .
S u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e C o u r t 'made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e
p r o p e r i n q u i r y i s not whether the i n s t r u c t i o n " c o u l d
h a v e " b e e n a p p l i e d i n an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l manner,
but whether t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t
t h e j u r y d i d so a p p l y i t . '
V i c t o r v. N e b r a s k a , 511
U.S. 1, 6, 114 S. C t . 1239, 1243, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583
(1994) ( q u o t i n g E s t e l l e v. M c G u i r e , 502 U.S. 62, 72¬
73, and n. 4, 112 S. C t . 475, 482 and n. 4, 116 L.
Ed. 2d 385 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . Thus, t h e
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d here i s whether
there i s a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d that the
jury
understood the i n s t r u c t i o n s to allow the c o n v i c t i o n
b a s e d on p r o o f i n s u f f i c i e n t t o meet t h e W i n s h i p
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t s t a n d a r d . V i c t o r v. N e b r a s k a ; Ex
p a r t e K i r b y , 643 So. 2d 587 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d ,
[513] U.S. [ 1 0 2 3 ] , 115 S. C t . 591, 130 L. Ed. 2d 504
( 1 9 9 4 ) ; Cox v. S t a t e , 660 So. 2d 233 ( A l a . C r . App.
1994).
"In r e v i e w i n g t h e r e a s o n a b l e doubt i n s t r u c t i o n ,
we do so i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e c h a r g e as a w h o l e .
V i c t o r v. N e b r a s k a ; B a k e r v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 412 F.2d
1069 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 396 U.S.
1018,
90 S. C t . 583, 24 L. Ed. 2d 509 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ; W i l l i a m s v.
S t a t e , 538 So. 2d 1250 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 8 ) .
So
l o n g as t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f ' r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ' i n t h e
charge c o r r e c t l y conveys the concept of r e a s o n a b l e
doubt,
the
charge
will
not
be
considered
so
p r e j u d i c i a l as t o mandate r e v e r s a l .
Victor
v.
N e b r a s k a ; H o l l a n d v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 348 U.S. 121, 75
S. C t . 127, 99 L. Ed. 150 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . "
686
So.
2d
at
459.
Additionally,
as
this
Court
said
Harris:
"The i n s t r u c t i o n on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e
t r i a l court p r o v i d e d to the j u r y here i n c o r p o r a t e d
the
language found i n t h e Alabama P a t t e r n
Jury
137
in
CR-06-2236
I n s t r u c t i o n s on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
The p a t t e r n j u r y
i n s t r u c t i o n s i n f o r m j u r o r s t h a t t h e i r doubt cannot
be b a s e d on 'a mere g u e s s o r s u r m i s e '
I t also
i n f o r m s j u r o r s t h a t r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t ' e n t i t l e s
an a c c u s e d t o an a c q u i t t a l i s n o t a mere f a n c i f u l ,
vague, c o n j e c t u r a l o r s p e c u l a t i v e doubt.'
Alabama
Pattern Jury I n s t r u c t i o n s : Criminal, Instructions
1.4 a n d 1.5 (3d e d . 1 9 9 4 ) .
'"'A t r i a l
court's
f o l l o w i n g o f an a c c e p t e d p a t t e r n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n
w e i g h s h e a v i l y a g a i n s t any f i n d i n g o f p l a i n e r r o r . ' "
W i l s o n v. S t a t e , 777 So. 2d 856 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 9 9 ) , q u o t i n g P r i c e v . S t a t e , 725 So. 2d 1003, 1058
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 725 So. 2d 1063 ( A l a .
1 9 9 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S . C t . 1809,
143 L . E d . 2 d 1012 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . '
S n y d e r v. S t a t e , 893 So.
2d 488, 550 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 3 ) . "
2 So. 3d a t 913.
We c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n d i d n o t s h i f t t h e b u r d e n
of proof t o Stanley.
at
956.
Further,
See H a r r i s ; McGowan v . S t a t e , 990 So. 2d
the "abiding-conviction"
render the i n s t r u c t i o n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
789
So. 2d 896, 933-34
instruction
language d i d not
See Woods v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999) ( h o l d i n g
that
t h a t p r o o f beyond r e a s o n a b l e doubt r e q u i r e d t h e
j u r o r s t o h a v e an " a b i d i n g c o n v i c t i o n " as t o t h e t r u t h o f t h e
charge c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d t h e State's
as
a
whole,
the t r i a l
court's
burden of p r o o f ) .
instruction i n this
Taken
case
p r o p e r l y conveyed t h e concept o f r e a s o n a b l e doubt t o t h e j u r y ,
and
i t d i d not lessen the State's
burden of proof.
There i s
no r e a s o n a b l e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e j u r y a p p l i e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n
138
CR-06-2236
in
a manner
Therefore,
that
v i o l a t e d Stanley's
constitutional rights.
we f i n d no e r r o r .
C.
Stanley
distinguish
murder
claims
the t r i a l
between
court's
the i n t e n t necessary
and t h e i n t e n t n e c e s s a r y
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
instructions failed to
Issue
t o commit
t o commit
felony
capital
murder.
I X , pp. 82-83.)
We h a v e r e v i e w e d t h e t r i a l
court's
j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on
c a p i t a l murder and f e l o n y murder; t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t r a c k t h e
language i n t h e Alabama
(3d e d . 1 9 9 4 ) .
1999)
Pattern
Jury
See Ex p a r t e Hagood, 777 So. 2d 214, 219 ( A l a .
("It i s t h e p r e f e r r e d p r a c t i c e t o use t h e p a t t e r n
instructions i n a c a p i t a l case.").
held
Instructions: Criminal
that
a trial
court's
Alabama's P a t t e r n J u r y
jury
A l a b a m a c o u r t s have o f t e n
u s e o f an i n s t r u c t i o n t a k e n
from
I n s t r u c t i o n s weighs h e a v i l y a g a i n s t a
f i n d i n g o f p l a i n e r r o r . See, e . g . , P r i c e v . S t a t e , 725 So. 2d
1003, 1058 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) .
C f ^ Ex p a r t e Wood, 715 So.
2d 819, 824 ( A l a . 1998) ( " [ T ] h e r e may be some i n s t a n c e s
using
those
pattern
charges
erroneous.")
139
would
be
misleading
when
or
CR-06-2236
In r e g a r d t o the c a p i t a l - m u r d e r charge, the t r i a l
on more t h a n
convicted
or
one
occasion,
instructed
the jury
court,
that
t o be
o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r t h e a c c u s e d must have a s p e c i f i c
particularized
intent
to
kill.
In
3 1
regard
to
the
felony-murder i n s t r u c t i o n , the t r i a l court i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y
that
the
intent
underlying
court
was
the
intent
to
the
instructed
defendant
the
t o have
jury
that
caused
court accurately
first
the
degree,
intent
physical
defined
including
t o overcome
power
acquiescence
of
trial
murder
the victim's
death
degree,
and
the elements of robbery i n the
the element that
the v i c t i m ' s
resistance
to the taking
the
The
felony
d u r i n g the commission of a robbery i n the f i r s t
the
commit
f e l o n y - - n o t t h e i n t e n t t o commit m u r d e r .
correctly
required
necessary
or
the defendant
physical
the
resistance
intent
of the property
have
or
to
compel
as w e l l
as t h e
i n t e n t t o d e p r i v e t h e owner o f h i s o r h e r p r o p e r t y .
Clearly,
difference
the court
between
instructed
c a p i t a l murder
the jury
and
felony
concerning
the
murder.
The
During
deliberations,
the
jury
requested
to
be
i n s t r u c t e d a g a i n on t h e e l e m e n t s o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r . The t r i a l
c o u r t gave i t t h e c a p i t a l - m u r d e r i n s t r u c t i o n and t h e f e l o n y murder i n s t r u c t i o n a second t i m e .
(R. 1089-98.)
3 1
140
CR-06-2236
instructions
were
not misleading;
rather,
they
properly
a p p r i s e d t h e j u r y o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f c a p i t a l murder a n d f e l o n y
murder.
See S m i t h v. S t a t e ,
908 So. 2d 2 7 3 , 297 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 2 0 0 0 ) ; Freeman v . S t a t e , 555 So. 2d 196, 208 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
1988)
(noting
that
"the t r i a l
judge
extensively
i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n c a p i t a l m u r d e r ,
f e l o n y murder, and i n t e n t i o n a l murder");
D a v i s v. S t a t e , 440
So.
1983)
2d
1 1 9 1 , 1194
instructed
( A l a .Crim.
the jury
App.
on " t h e i n t e n t
required
(trial
for a
court
capital
f e l o n y , on t h e f e l o n y m u r d e r d o c t r i n e a n d on t h e d i s t i n c t i o n
between
the intent
required
for a capital
felony
and t h e
intent required f o r the l e s s e r included offense of non-capital
murder");
App.
Womack v. S t a t e ,
1983)
instructions
trial
court
(holding
"[t]he
on t h e ' i n t e n t t o k i l l
jury
was
given
proper
r e q u i r e m e n t ' " where t h e
"made i t c l e a r t o t h e j u r y t h a t t h e f e l o n y
d o c t r i n e was r e l e v a n t
noncapital
that
435 So. 2d 754, 763 ( A l a . C r i m .
murder
only to the lesser included offense of
murder, and t h a t t h e r e
c o u l d be no c o n v i c t i o n f o r
the c a p i t a l o f f e n s e absent a f i n d i n g beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt
that the appellant possessed the i n t e n t t o k i l l " ) .
141
T h e r e was
CR-06-2236
no
plain
e r r o r as
to
the
trial
j u r y on c a p i t a l m u r d e r and
court's
i n s t r u c t i o n s to
the
f e l o n y murder.
D.
S t a n l e y a l l e g e s t h a t the t r i a l
ensure
court
that
the
reporter.
the jury-charge
proceedings
were
Specifically,
conferences
court erred i n f a i l i n g
fully
Stanley
claims
because
transcribed.
other
bench
conferences
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
Issue
the
e r r o r because
d u r i n g b o t h t h e g u i l t and
p h a s e s were n o t r e c o r d e d o r t r a n s c r i b e d .
error
t r a n s c r i b e d by
to
penalty
Stanley also asserts
were n o t
I X , pp.
recorded
or
76-78.)
S t a n l e y ' s t r i a l c o u n s e l moved t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o " r e q u i r e
a f u l l and c o m p l e t e t r a n s c r i p t i o n o f t h e e n t i r e p r o c e e d i n g s
this
case,
and
i n c l u d i n g , but
hearings
the
trial
court granted
and
j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s and
charge conferences,
the
l i m i t e d to
( i n c l u d i n g bench
[and]
off
not
record.
supplemented
He
with
the motion.
...
chamber
a l l
conferences
conferences)
charge conference,"
(C. 81,
95.)
in
...
and
the
Regarding
the
S t a n l e y n e v e r o b j e c t e d t o what t r a n s p i r e d
a l s o d i d not
a
a t t e m p t t o have t h e
transcript
conferences.
142
of
the
record
complained-of
CR-06-2236
As
(Ala.
t h i s Court
noted
i n C a l h o u n v. S t a t e , 932 So. 2 d 923
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) :
"As we s t a t e d i n Wynn v . S t a t e , 804 So. 2 d 1122,
1143-44 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 804 So. 2 d
1152 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) :
" ' [ I ] t s h o u l d have been apparent t o t h e
defense d u r i n g t h e t r i a l t h a t t h e court
reporter
was
not
recording
certain
sidebars
Defense c o u n s e l c o u l d have
e a s i l y reminded t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t i t had
granted h i s motion f o r f u l l r e c o r d a t i o n of
the p r o c e e d i n g s and remedied t h e o m i s s i o n s
T h e r e f o r e , t h i s e r r o r was
at t h a t time.
i n v i t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t . '
"Moreover, i n d e t e r m i n i n g
whether t h e r e i s
reversible
e r r o r b a s e d on an o m i s s i o n
i n the
t r a n s c r i p t we u s e t h e s t a n d a r d d i s c u s s e d i n I n g r a m
v. S t a t e , 779 So. 2d 1225 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) ,
a f f ' d , 779 So. 2d 1283 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d ,
531 U.S. 1 1 9 3 , 121 S. C t . 1194, 149 L. E d . 2 d 109
(2001).
I n I n g r a m , we s t a t e d :
"'Where
the transcript
or record i s
i n c o m p l e t e , two r u l e s h a v e e v o l v e d .
The
f i r s t a p p l i e s t o t h e s i t u a t i o n where t h e
a p p e l l a n t i s r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l b y t h e
same c o u n s e l t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d h i m a t t r i a l .
In t h a t case, t h e f a i l u r e t o s u p p l y a
complete r e c o r d i s n o t e r r o r p e r se and
w i l l n o t work a r e v e r s a l a b s e n t a s p e c i f i c
showing o f p r e j u d i c e .
I n o t h e r words, i n
s u c h a c a s e , t h e a p p e l l a n t must show t h a t
f a i l u r e t o r e c o r d and p r e s e r v e t h e s p e c i f i c
p o r t i o n of the t r i a l proceedings
complained
of
visits
a
hardship
upon
him and
prejudices h i s appeal.
The s e c o n d a p p l i e s
t o t h e s i t u a t i o n where t h e a p p e l l a n t i s
r e p r e s e n t e d b y new c o u n s e l on a p p e a l . When
143
CR-06-2236
he i s r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l b y c o u n s e l
other than the a t t o r n e y a t t r i a l , the
absence o f a s u b s t a n t i a l and s i g n i f i c a n t
p o r t i o n o f t h e r e c o r d , e v e n a b s e n t any
showing of s p e c i f i c p r e j u d i c e o r e r r o r , i s
s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant r e v e r s a l . '
"779
932
So. 2d a t 1 2 8 0 - 8 1 . "
So. 2d a t 941-42.
892-93
See a l s o Brown v . S t a t e , 11 So. 3d a t
( q u o t i n g G r e e n v . S t a t e , 796 So. 2d 438, 439-40 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n Ex p a r t e G o d b o l t ,
991,
546 So. 2d
997 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . S e l v a ,
559
F.2d 1303, 1305-06
In
same
this
case,
attorneys
(5thC i r . 1977)).
Stanley
who
i s represented
represented
S t a n l e y must make a s p e c i f i c
from
the f a i l u r e
on a p p e a l
him a t t r i a l .
Therefore,
showing o f p r e j u d i c e
t o r e c o r d and p r e s e r v e
by t h e
resulting
the proceedings
c l a i m s s h o u l d have b e e n i n c l u d e d i n t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l .
he
See
Hodges v. S t a t e , 926 So. 2d 1060, 1066 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) .
Stanley f a i l e d to s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l e g e that anything
erroneous,
inflammatory,
unrecorded
or p r e j u d i c i a l
portions of the t r i a l .
in
open
court;
defense
occurred
The u n r e c o r d e d
counsel
during the
proceedings
had a
full
took
place
opportunity to
comment on a n d c h a l l e n g e t h o s e
proceedings;
did
o f a n y t h i n g p r e j u d i c i a l ; and
not object t o the i n j e c t i o n
144
defense
counsel
CR-06-2236
Stanley
has
not
a l l e g e d o r o f f e r e d any
a c t u a l l y p r e j u d i c e d by
Further,
after
transcript
the
lack
reviewing
omission
of
anything
a
the
t h a t was
record
referenced
complete
by
is
missing.
clear
that
no
at
not
on
the
point
Stanley,
See
major
the
each
that
not
adversely
893
are
In the overwhelming m a j o r i t y of the pages c i t e d ,
the
a f t e r the
continues
as i f n o t h i n g
on
i n some i n s t a n c e s
scheduling
discussion
that
occurred
the
3d a t
record
conversation
of
record.
of
Brown, 11 So.
portions
was
conclude
we
t r a n s c r i p t i o n has
affected his substantial rights.
("[I]t
e v i d e n c e t h a t he
was
o f f the
not
transcribed
record.
i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e c o u r t was
Indeed,
involved i n
m a t t e r s or t h a t the o f f - t h e - r e c o r d d i s c u s s i o n
b e t w e e n d e f e n s e c o u n s e l and t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . " ) .
Thus, we
was
find
no p l a i n e r r o r .
X.
Stanley
alleges
misconduct.
several
(Stanley's
instances
brief,
Issue
Because S t a n l e y
d i d not
object
to the
and
in this
regard,
we
See
Rule
the
questioning
plain-error
Regarding
rule.
prosecutorial-misconduct
145
of
prosecutorial
VIII,
pp.
70-76.)
prosecutor's
argument
review these claims
45A,
Ala.
claims,
the
R.
under
App.
role
P.
of
a
CR-06-2236
prosecutor,
evaluating
and
claims
this
Court's
standard
of
review
of p r o s e c u t o r i a l m i s c o n d u c t , t h i s
Court
said:
"'"It
i s , of
course,
the
duty
of
every
prosecutor
to
represent
the
i n t e r e s t s of
the
state zealously, vigorously,
and
earnestly.
His ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
[as] a public prosecutor differs
from t h a t of the u s u a l
advocate;
[his]
duty
is
not
merely
to
c o n v i c t , but a l s o to p r o t e c t
the
innocent.'
E C 7 - 1 3 , A l a b a m a Code
of P r o f e s s i o n a l
Responsibility.
'The p r o s e c u t i n g
a t t o r n e y owes a
duty to e x e r c i s e h i s f u l l powers
i n f u r t h e r a n c e of s o c i e t y ' s v a l i d
and
strong
interest
in
e n f o r c e m e n t of c r i m i n a l laws, not
only
i n seeing
t h a t the
guilty
are
p u n i s h e d but
that
criminal
a c t s by o t h e r s are d i s c o u r a g e d by
example of such punishment.'
" S p r i n k l e v. S t a t e ,
368
So.
2d 554,
(Ala.
C r . App. 1 9 7 8 ) , w r i t q u a s h e d , 368
2d 565
(Ala. 1979)."
561
So.
" ' I n i t i a l l y , we
observe t h a t the t r i a l
court
i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t comments of c o u n s e l were
not e v i d e n c e i n the c a s e .
A l s o , we h a v e
repeatedly
s t a t e d t h a t , "'Statements of c o u n s e l i n argument to
t h e j u r y m u s t be v i e w e d as h a v i n g b e e n made i n t h e
h e a t o f t h e d e b a t e , and s u c h s t a t e m e n t s a r e u s u a l l y
v a l u e d by t h e j u r y a t t h e i r t r u e w o r t h . ' "
Stephens
v . S t a t e , 580
So. 2d 1 1 , 22
( A l a . C r . App.
1990),
a f f ' d , 580 So. 2d 26 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 502
U.S.
146
when
has
CR-06-2236
859,
112 S. C t . 1 7 6 , 116 L. E d . 2 d 138
(1991),
q u o t i n g H a r r i s v . S t a t e , 539 S o . 2 d 1 1 1 7 , 1123 ( A l a .
C r . App. 1 9 8 8 ) .
Moreover, a p r o s e c u t o r i s free to
argue h i s i m p r e s s i o n s of the evidence.
Freeman,
supra.'"
Stallworth,
So.
868 S o . 2 d a t 1 1 5 3 - 5 4
2 d 8 5 1 , 853
( A l a . C r i m . App.
( q u o t i n g D a v i s v. S t a t e ,
1986)).
"'The p r o s e c u t o r ' s d u t y i n a c r i m i n a l
prosecution
i s to
seek
justice,
and
although the prosecutor should prosecute
w i t h v i g o r , he o r she s h o u l d n o t u s e
i m p r o p e r methods c a l c u l a t e d t o p r o d u c e a
w r o n g f u l c o n v i c t i o n . ' S m i t h v. S t a t e , [Ms.
CR-97-1258, December 22, 2000]
So. 3d
,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d i n
p e r t i n e n t p a r t , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s ,
[Ms. 1010267, M a r c h 14, 2003]
So. 3d
(Ala. 2003).
'In r e v i e w i n g a l l e g e d l y
i m p r o p e r p r o s e c u t o r i a l comments, c o n d u c t ,
and q u e s t i o n i n g o f w i t n e s s e s , t h e t a s k o f
t h i s Court i s t o c o n s i d e r t h e i r impact i n
the c o n t e x t o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l , and
not t o view the a l l e g e d l y improper a c t s i n
the a b s t r a c t . '
B a n k h e a d v. S t a t e , 585 So.
2d 97, 106 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 9 ) , remanded
on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 585 So. 2d 112 ( A l a .
1 9 9 1 ) , a f f ' d on r e t u r n t o remand, 625 So.
2d 1141 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , r e v ' d on
o t h e r g r o u n d s , 625 So. 2d 1146 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) .
' " P r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct i s a b a s i s f o r
r e v e r s i n g an a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n o n l y
i f , i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e e n t i r e t r i a l and
i n l i g h t o f any c u r a t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e
misconduct
may
have
prejudiced
the
substantial
rights
of
the
accused."'
C a r r o l l v. S t a t e , 599 So. 2d 1253, 1268
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , a f f ' d , 627 So. 2d
874 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v.
Reed, 887 F.2d 1398, 1402 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 9 ) .
147
494
CR-06-2236
The
relevant
question
i s whether
the
p r o s e c u t o r ' s c o n d u c t 'so i n f e c t e d t h e t r i a l
with unfairness
as t o make t h e r e s u l t i n g
conviction
a
denial
of
due
process.'
D o n n e l l y v. D e C h r i s t o f o r o , 416 U.S. 637,
643
(1974)."
M i n o r v. S t a t e ,
In
914 So. 2d 372, 415
(Ala.
C r i m . App.
addition:
"'In
judging
a
prosecutor's
closing
argument,
the standard
i s whether the
argument
"so i n f e c t e d
the t r i a l
with
unfairness
as
to
make
the
resulting
conviction
a d e n i a l o f due
process."'
B a n k h e a d [ v . S t a t e ] , 585 S o . 2 d [ 9 7 , ] 107
[ ( A l a . Crim. App. 1989),] q u o t i n g Darden v.
Wainwright,
477 U.S. 1 6 8 , 1 8 1 , 106 S. C t .
2 4 6 4 , 2 4 7 1 , 91 L. E d . 2 d 144 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ( q u o t i n g
D o n n e l l y v . D e C h r i s t o f o r o , 416 U.S. 6 3 7 , 94
S. C t . 1 8 6 8 , 40 L. E d . 2 d 4 3 1 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) .
'A
prosecutor's statement
must be v i e w e d i n
the
context
of
a l l of
the
evidence
presented
and i n t h e c o n t e x t
of the
complete c l o s i n g arguments t o t h e j u r y . '
Roberts
v . S t a t e , 735 S o . 2 d 1 2 4 4 , 1 2 5 3
(Ala.
C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 735 S o . 2 d
1270
( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 538 U.S. 9 3 9 ,
120 S. C t . 3 4 6 , 145 L. E d . 2 d 2 7 1 ( 1 9 9 9 ) .
Moreover,
'statements
of
counsel
in
a r g u m e n t t o t h e j u r y must be v i e w e d as
delivered
i n the heat
of debate;
such
statements
a r e u s u a l l y v a l u e d by t h e j u r y
at t h e i r t r u e w o r t h and a r e n o t e x p e c t e d t o
become f a c t o r s
i n the formation
of the
verdict.'
B a n k h e a d , 585 So. 2d a t 106.
'Questions o f t h e p r o p r i e t y o f argument o f
counsel
are largely
within
the
trial
c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n , McCullough v. S t a t e ,
357 S o . 2 d 397 , 3 9 9 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 7 8 ) ,
and t h a t c o u r t i s g i v e n b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n i n
148
2004).
CR-06-2236
d e t e r m i n i n g what i s p e r m i s s i b l e argument.'
B a n k h e a d , 585 So. 2 d a t 1 0 5 .
We w i l l
not
r e v e r s e the judgment of the t r i a l
court
unless
t h e r e has
b e e n an a b u s e o f
that
discretion.
Id."
Ferguson,
814
concluded
t h a t the f a i l u r e
arguments
...
should
the
on
the
merits
not
consider
claim
defense
So.
did
2d
at
945-46.
be
Moreover,
weighed
because
the
(Ala.
1990)
(quoting
(11th
Cir.
F.2d
623,
629
Mindful
addresses
n.6
of
each
the
of
as
part
of
v.
our
evaluation
i t s suggestion
in
Johnson
that
question
S t a t e , 577
has
So.
of
the
to
be
489
Wainwright,
v.
2d 4 7 4 ,
778
1985)).
above-stated
Stanley's
of
comments
Kuenzel
App.
court
to object to improper p r o s e c u t o r i a l
p a r t i c u l a r l y harmful.'"
Crim.
"'[t]his
principles,
arguments
this
Court
in turn.
A.
S t a n l e y contends t h a t the p r o s e c u t i o n i m p r o p e r l y appealed
to gender s t e r e o t y p e s d u r i n g the
both
the
Stanley
during
guilt
cites
the
phase
error
rebuttal
rebuttal
and
the
penalty
when
the
prosecutor
closing
"[PROSECUTOR]: ...
woman d i d t h i s t o H e n r y
"(Counsel displays
phase.
argument of
Do you
Smith?
several
149
closing
think
pictures
guilt
a
at
Specifically,
argued
the
argument
as
follows,
phase:
115-pound
to
jury.)
CR-06-2236
"[PROSECUTOR]: ... I s t h a t what y o u t h i n k ? I s
t h a t what y o u r e a l l y b e l i e v e : T h a t a 115-pound woman
did this?
"...
woman?
T h i n k s h e d i d t h a t b y h e r s e l f , 115-pound
" . . .
"...
Who
i s more
tremendous blow: T h i s
S t a n l e y ? ... "
likely
to deliver
115-pound woman o r
that
Tony
(R. 1055-56.) S u b s e q u e n t l y , d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y - p h a s e
closing
argument, t h e p r o s e c u t o r
sense.
I s t h a t t h e work o f a man o r woman?"
Stanley
discussed
violated
presented
i n Issue
Batson
said:
virtually
this
I.B.5 a b o v e ,
when
"[U]se
a n d J.E.B.
stereotypes into thet r i a l .
by
rebuttal
your
(R. 1191.)
identical
arguing
allegedly
common
the
injecting
Contrary t o Stanley's
issue,
State
gender
contention,
however, t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s g u i l t - p h a s e r e b u t t a l
c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t c i t e d was n o t i m p r o p e r g e n d e r s t e r e o t y p i n g ;
rather, the prosecutor's
r e m a r k s were a p r o p e r argument t h a t
the f a c t s o f t h e case d i d not support
Stanley's claim that h i s
w i f e was more c u l p a b l e t h a n he was o r t h a t s h e a c t e d a l o n e i n
murdering Smith.
the
defense's
closing
"The p r o s e c u t i o n
strategy,'
argument
pointing
i s entitled to 'spotlight
and a p r o s e c u t o r ' s
out the flaws
150
remarks
during
i n the defense's
CR-06-2236
theory
o f t h e case
do
not c o n s t i t u t e improper
argument."
R e e v e s v. S t a t e , 807 So. 2d 18, 45 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000) .
Even i f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s
r e m a r k s c o u l d be c h a r a c t e r i z e d
as i n v o k i n g g e n d e r s t e r e o t y p e s , t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e
prosecutor's
of
trial
a r g u m e n t made i n r e b u t t a l d u r i n g t h e g u i l t
was p e r m i s s i b l e
as a
"reply
i n kind"
t o defense
counsel's
argument.
entirety,
d u r i n g b o t h t h e g u i l t phase and t h e p e n a l t y
it
i s clear
that
In reviewing the State's r e b u t t a l i n i t s
t h e comments
S h e l l y was more c u l p a b l e
were
to
similar
whether
t h a n he was o r a c t e d
door i s opened by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s
w i d e , a n d a number o f a r e a s b a r r e d
w o u l d s u d d e n l y be s u b j e c t
855.
" I ti s axiomatic
responses
phase,
c l o s i n g argument r e g a r d i n g
r e m a r k s made i n S t a n l e y ' s
the
phase
"When
argument, i t swings
t o p r o s e c u t o r i a l comment
to reply."
that
alone.
Davis,
a prosecutor
494 So. 2d a t
may
legitimately
argue f a c t s i n e v i d e n c e and, f u r t h e r , t h a t a p r o s e c u t o r
has a
r i g h t b a s e d on f u n d a m e n t a l f a i r n e s s t o r e p l y i n k i n d t o t h e
argument o f d e f e n s e
599,
D e B r u c e v. S t a t e ,
609 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , a f f ' d ,
1994)."
and
counsel.
H a r r i s , 2 So. 3d a t 921.
statements
651 So. 2d 624 ( A l a .
A prosecutor's
"'must be e x a m i n e d i n [ t h e i r ]
151
651 So. 2d
arguments
context
and i n
CR-06-2236
light
o f what h a d
argument
of
transpired,
defense
that
counsel,
a r g u m e n t [ s were] an a n s w e r . ' "
11,
21
1991)
( A l a . Crim.
App.
is in light
to
which
prosecutor's
S t e p h e n s v. S t a t e ,
1990),
aff'd,
( q u o t i n g H e n d e r s o n v. S t a t e ,
C r i m . App.
the
of p r e c e d i n g
460
580
So.
So.
580
2d
So.
2d
(Ala.
333
2d 331,
26
(Ala.
1984)).
I n l i g h t o f t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h t h e a r g u m e n t s were made
and
what
defense
counsel
had
argued,
the
prosecutor's
a r g u m e n t s were n o t o f s u c h a n a t u r e t h a t t h e y "so i n f e c t e d t h e
trial
w i t h u n f a i r n e s s as t o make t h e r e s u l t i n g
denial
o f due
(1986).
process."
A l s o , the t r i a l
that the evidence
the
witness
D a r d e n v . W a i n w r i g h t , 477
and
168
court r e p e a t e d l y i n s t r u c t e d the
jury
c a s e came f r o m t h e t e s t i m o n y
from
the
exhibits
jury
f o l l o w e d the t r i a l
from
introduced
e v i d e n c e and n o t f r o m t h e a t t o r n e y s ' s t a t e m e n t s .
t h a t the
a
U.S.
i n this
stand
conviction
We
into
presume
court's instructions.
See
T a y l o r , 666 So. 2d 36
( A l a . C r i m . App.
1994).
After reviewing
the
context
entire
proceedings,
comments
i n the
of
the
we
c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e comments d i d n o t i m p r o p e r l y a p p e a l t o g e n d e r
stereotypes
and
that
t h e y were n o t
152
of
such
a nature
as
to
CR-06-2236
inflame
not
the
passions
f i n d any
of the
jury.
plain error in this
For
these
r e a s o n s , we
do
regard.
B.
Stanley
jury
"to
do
asserts
e r r o r because the
[ i t s ] duty"
and
return
prosecutor
a verdict
of
urged
the
guilty
of
of
c a p i t a l murder.
Stanley
r e f e r s t o a s t a t e m e n t made by one
the
at
close
prosecutors
arguing
verdict
to the
of
prosecutor
the
jury that
guilty
s t a t e d as
of
i t was
capital
of
his
the
guilt-phase
argument,
j u r y ' s duty to return
murder.
Specifically,
follows:
" I a s k you as t h e D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y o f C o l b e r t
C o u n t y and on b e h a l f o f t h e p e o p l e o f t h e s t a t e o f
A l a b a m a t o go i n t h e r e and do y o u r d u t y and r e t u r n
a v e r d i c t of c a p i t a l murder because t h a t ' s e x a c t l y
what i t i s . "
(R.
1058.)
"'Generally,
the
prosecutor
is in
e r r o r by e x h o r t i n g t h e j u r y t o "do w h a t ' s
right,"
or
to
"do
i t s job,"
i f that
e x h o r t a t i o n " i m p l [ i e s ] t h a t , i n o r d e r t o do
s o , i t can o n l y r e a c h a c e r t a i n v e r d i c t ,
regardless
of
i t s duty
to
weigh
the
evidence
and
follow
the
court's
i n s t r u c t i o n s on
the
law."'
McNair
v.
S t a t e , 653 So.2d 320, 339-40 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
1 9 9 2 ) , a f f ' d , 653 So. 2d 353
(Ala.
1 9 9 4 ) , q u o t i n g A r t h u r v. S t a t e , 575 So. 2d
1165,
1185
(Ala.
Crim.
App.
1990) .
However,
i t
is
not
improper
for
a
prosecutor
to argue to the j u r y t h a t a
153
a
the
CR-06-2236
defendant i s g u i l t y or t o urge t h e j u r y t o
f i n d the defendant g u i l t y of the crime
c h a r g e d so l o n g as t h a t a r g u m e n t i s b a s e d
on t h e e v i d e n c e ; i n f a c t , t h a t i s e x a c t l y
what a p r o s e c u t o r i s s u p p o s e d t o do d u r i n g
c l o s i n g argument.
See G a l l o w a y v. S t a t e ,
484 So. 2d 1199 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 6 ) , a n d
the a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d t h e r e i n .
See a l s o
B r o a d n a x v . S t a t e , 825 So. 2d 134, 183
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 825 So. 2d
233 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , a n d M e l s o n v . S t a t e , 775
So. 2d 857, 889-90 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) ,
aff'd,
775
So. 2d
904
( A l a . 2000).
Moreover,
' " t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y may
c h a r a c t e r i z e the accused or h i s conduct i n
language which, a l t h o u g h i t c o n s i s t s o f
i n v e c t i v e or opprobrious terms, accords
w i t h t h e evidence o f t h e case."' Henderson
v. S t a t e , 584 So. 2d 841, 857 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 1 9 8 8 ) , remanded on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 584
So. 2d 862 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , on remand t o , 587
So.
2d 1071
( A l a . Crim.
App.
1991),
remanded on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 616 So. 2d 348
( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) , on r e t u r n t o remand, 616 So.
2d 352 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g
N i c k s v . S t a t e , 521 So. 2d 1018, 1023 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 1 9 8 7 ) , a f f ' d , 521 So. 2d 1035
(Ala. 1988).
See a l s o H a n d l e y v. S t a t e ,
214 A l a . 172, 175, 106 So. 692, 695 (1925)
(argument, '"She i s a m u r d e r e r ; s h e i s a
m u r d e r e r . She i s n o t some one who h a s
c o m m i t t e d some o f t h e l o w e r o f f e n s e s o f
h o m i c i d e " - - d i d n o t t r a n s c e n d t h e bounds o f
l e g i t i m a t e a r g u m e n t ' ) ; M a p l e s v. S t a t e , 758
So. 2d 1, 58 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . ) , a f f ' d , 758
So. 2d 81 ( A l a . 1999) ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment
that the defendant
' " i s a murderer; a
capital
murderer"'
was
not improper);
M e l s o n , 775 So. 2d a t 889 ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s
reference
to
the
defendant
as
a
'"cold-blooded
murderer"'
with
'"no
r e m o r s e " ' was n o t i m p r o p e r ) ; Thomas v .
154
CR-06-2236
S t a t e , 766 So. 2d 860, 933-34 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 1 9 9 8 ) , a f f ' d , 766 So. 2d 975 ( A l a .
2000) ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e f e r e n c e s t o d e f e n d a n t
as
a
'"street
punk,"'
'"criminal,"'
'"thug,"' '"murderer,"' and ' " m a n i p u l a t o r " '
were n o t i m p r o p e r ) ; and K i n a r d v. S t a t e ,
495 So. 2d 705, 711 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1986)
( p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e f e r e n c e t o d e f e n d a n t as
'"an u n m i t i g a t e d l i a r and m u r d e r e r " ' was
not i m p r o p e r ) .
The p r o s e c u t o r ' s comments
were s u p p o r t e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c a s e
and were n o t i m p r o p e r . "
Minor,
914
So.
2d
at
420
(finding
no
plain
error
p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment a s k i n g t h e j u r y " ' t o f i n d t h a t man
o f t h e m u r d e r o f h i s son'") .
See M o r r i s ,
in
guilty
So. 3d a t
;
B r o o k s v. S t a t e , 973 So. 2d a t 395-99.
Additionally,
prosecutor's
perform
Crim.
1003,
1033
Stanley
improper
appeal
App.
is
to the jury
i t s duty.'"
(Ala.
comments
"'[t]here
has
Freeman v. S t a t e ,
1999)
within
failed
(quoting Price
the
range
to establish
or t h a t they
t h a t he was d e n i e d
impropriety
for justice
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) ) .
fell
no
so i n f e c t e d
due p r o c e s s .
155
in
a
and t o p r o p e r l y
776 So. 2d 160,
v. S t a t e ,
186
725 So. 2d
Because the p r o s e c u t o r ' s
of
permissible
that
these
the t r i a l
See D a r d e n .
argument,
comments
were
with unfairness
Therefore,
no
CR-06-2236
plain
error
relief.
occurred,
and S t a n l e y
i s not e n t i t l e d
t o any
3 2
C.
S t a n l e y a r g u e s t h e p r o s e c u t o r m i s l e d t h e j u r y on t h e l a w
and
the
facts
instances.
our
App.
review
during
closing
arguments
i n two
separate
These i n s t a n c e s were a l s o n o t o b j e c t e d t o ; t h u s ,
i s limited to plain error.
See R u l e
45A, A l a . R.
misstated
t h e l a w and
P.
Stanley
lowered
contends
the State's
the prosecutor
burden of proof
when he a s k e d
the jury
d u r i n g c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t : " I s i t more l i k e l y t h a t she d i d i t o r
Tony d i d i t ? " (R. 1005.)
When c o n s i d e r e d
i n the context of
the e n t i r e c l o s i n g argument, t h e p r o s e c u t o r
the
law or i m p r o p e r l y
See
Broadnax,
improperly
closing
825
shift
So.
2d
the burden of proof
at
184-85
s h i f t the burden of proof
arguments
in
d i d not misstate
the
p r o s e c u t i o n , where p r o s e c u t o r
guilt
to Stanley.
(prosecutor
d i d not
t o the defendant
phase
of
during
capital-murder
d i d not suggest t h a t defendant
S t a n l e y c i t e d G u t h r i e v. S t a t e , 616 So. 2d 913, 932
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s c l a i m .
However,
the c o m p l a i n e d - o f argument o c c u r r e d i n t h e g u i l t - p h a s e c l o s i n g
argument.
Guthrie addressed p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct during
the s e n t e n c i n g phase of a t r i a l .
3 2
156
CR-06-2236
had
obligation
to
produce
any
evidence
or
to
prove
his
innocence, but asked the j u r y to c o n s i d e r evidence presented
and t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t
as t o d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t ) .
2d
393,
440-42
See a l s o B a r b e r v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . Crim.
App.
2005)
(burden
952
So.
was
not
i m p r o p e r l y s h i f t e d where t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t e m e n t t h a t
the
d e f e n d a n t w o u l d n o t want t o t a l k a b o u t h i s c o n f e s s i o n b e c a u s e
all
he w o u l d have t o s a y i s t h a t he was
914
So.
2d a t 420-21
closing
argument
of
intoxicated);
Minor,
( p r o s e c u t o r ' s comments d u r i n g r e b u t t a l
guilt
phase
of
capital
trial
did
not
i m p e r m i s s i b l y s h i f t t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f b u t were a l e g i t i m a t e
comment
theory);
during
on
the
lack
Reeves,
rebuttal
807
of
evidence
So.
2d
closing
at
to
support
45-46
argument
at
the
defense's
( p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment
guilt
phase
did
not
s p o t l i g h t d e f e n s e ' s s t r a t e g y and a r g u e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d i d
not
support defense's
afterthought'").
as
to
the
theory that
S t a t e ' s burden
jurors
r o b b e r y was
a
"'mere
Further, the t r i a l court i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y
of
proof
innocence a f f o r d e d a defendant.
reasonable
the
would
not
have
and
T h e r e f o r e , we
presumption
conclude
of
that
c o n s t r u e d t h e argument
mean t h a t S t a n l e y h a d any b u r d e n o f p r o o f .
157
the
A c c o r d i n g l y , we
to
do
CR-06-2236
not
f i n d t h a t t h e r e was any e r r o r , much l e s s p l a i n e r r o r , i n
this
regard.
Regarding
h i s second
contention
that
the
prosecutor
m i s s t a t e d t h e f a c t s d u r i n g c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t , we l i k e w i s e f i n d
no
error.
Stanley
complains
Jenna M i t c h e l l ' s t e s t i m o n y
stated that Stanley
and
"Your Mom
Mitchell's
told
that
when d u r i n g
this.
misstated
c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s he
Jenna M i t c h e l l
doesn't deserve
testimony
the prosecutor
that
" I deserve i t "
I deserve
it."
Jenna
was as f o l l o w s :
"Q:
What d i d he s a y t o you?
"A:
S a i d t h a t my mom s h o u l d n ' t h a v e t o t a k e t h e
b l a m e f o r i t a n d t h a t s h e d i d n ' t have n o t h i n g
t o do w i t h i t .
"Q:
What e l s e d i d he s a y ?
"A:
That i t wasn't h e r f a u l t .
"Q:
What e l s e ?
"A:
A n d t h a t he s h o u l d
take
t h e blame f o r i t . "
(R. 707.)
The
inferences
prosecutor's
drawn
from
statements
here
the evidence
were
a n d were
reasonable
not of such
a
n a t u r e t h a t t h e y " ' s o i n f e c t e d t h e t r i a l w i t h u n f a i r n e s s as t o
make
the r e s u l t i n g
conviction
158
a
denial
o f due
process.'"
CR-06-2236
Darden.
The t r i a l
the statements
court repeatedly i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y
o f t h e a t t o r n e y s were n o t e v i d e n c e
should consider only those
statements
the
that
evidence.
We
presume
court's instructions.
App.
1994).
and t h a t i t
t h a t were s u p p o r t e d
the j u r y
followed the
See T a y l o r , 666 So. 2d 36
Accordingly,
we
find
that
no
by
trial
( A l a . Crim.
error,
plain
or
o t h e r w i s e , i n t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s s t a t i n g h i s i m p r e s s i o n s o f what
i n f e r e n c e s c o u l d be drawn f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e .
See L e e , 898 So.
2d a t 851-52.
D.
In
suggests
a cursory
argument p r e s e n t e d
i n his brief,
t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n i s due t o be r e v e r s e d b e c a u s e t h e
"prosecutor
made
extensive
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , p. 74.)
use
of
leading
specifically
cites
questions."
He t h e n r e f e r e n c e s 62 p l a c e s i n t h e
r e c o r d where t h i s " e g r e g i o u s " c o n d u c t s u p p o s e d l y
also
Stanley
instances during
occurred.
Shelly's
He
testimony
and c l a i m s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r b a d g e r e d D o t , S t a n l e y ' s m o t h e r ,
on
cross-examination.
Stanley
objected
the p r o s e c u t o r ' s
t o o n l y two o f t h e c i t e d
purportedly
leading questions.
instances of
On b o t h
of
those i n s t a n c e s , the t r i a l judge i n s t r u c t e d the p r o s e c u t o r not
159
CR-06-2236
to
l e a d the w i t n e s s .
n o t move t o s t r i k e
(R.
the
said
presented
729-28.)
Defense counsel
a l l e g e d l y i m p r o p e r q u e s t i o n s , as
i n Broadnax,
in his brief
"[b]ecause
to t h i s
o f t h e way
Court,
we
His
string
issue i s
seriously
question
P.
Likewise,
825
So. 2d a t
c i t a t i o n t o numerous p a g e s f r o m t h e
does n o t meet t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
Stanley
fails
record
o f R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R.
to
s p e c i f y which
questions
App.
were
a l l e g e d l y improper,
o r how
improper questions.
We w i l l n o t c r e a t e S t a n l e y ' s argument f o r
him.
Egbuonu v. S t a t e , 993
2007).
v.
he was
this
this
[ S t a n l e y ' s ] s i n c e r i t y i n making t h i s argument."
170.
did
answers.
As t o t h e r e m a i n i n g
Court
483,
See R e y n o l d s ,
S t a t e , 932
stated
as
So.
2d
So.
p r e j u d i c e d by t h e a l l e g e d l y
2d 35,
38-39 ( A l a . C r i m .
So. 3d a t
923
( A l a . Crim.
follows regarding
.
F u r t h e r , i n Calhoun
App.
2005), t h i s
leading questions
in a
Court
capital
case:
" R u l e 6 1 1 ( c ) , A l a . R.
leading questions, states:
Evid.,
which
addresses
" ' L e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s s h o u l d n o t be u s e d on
the d i r e c t examination of a w i t n e s s , except
when j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e y be a l l o w e d .
Leading
questions
are
permitted
on
cross-examination.
When a p a r t y c a l l s a
h o s t i l e w i t n e s s , an a d v e r s e p a r t y , o r a
160
App.
CR-06-2236
w i t n e s s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h an a d v e r s e p a r t y ,
i n t e r r o g a t i o n may be b y l e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s . '
"Alabama h a s n e v e r e n f o r c e d an a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d
ban
on l e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s
by a p r o s e c u t o r
during
d i r e c t examination.
' E v e r y q u e s t i o n may be s a i d i n
some s e n s e t o be l e a d i n g
D o n n e l l v . J o n e s , 13
A l a . 490, 507 ( 1 8 4 8 ) .
As we s t a t e d i n W i l l i a m s v.
A
stated
S t a t e , 568
568 So. 2d 354
354, 356-57 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 990):
1nnn \ .
"'"Any q u e s t i o n e x p r e s s l y o r i m p l i e d l y
assuming a m a t e r i a l f a c t not t h e r e t o f o r e
t e s t i f i e d t o , s o t h a t t h e answer may a f f i r m
s u c h f a c t , i s l e a d i n g . S m i t h v . S.H. K r e s s
& Co., 210 A l a . 436, 98 So. 378 [ ( 1 9 2 3 ) ] . "
Ray v. S t a t e , 32 A l a . App. 556, 559, 28 So.
2d 116, 118 ( 1 9 4 6 ) .
"'[T]he t r i a l judge
has
d i s c r e t i o n to allow
some
leading
questions, e s p e c i a l l y since p r i o r testimony
is
simply
being
repeated.'
Brown
M e c h a n i c a l C o n t r a c t o r s , I n c . v. C e n t e n n i a l
I n s . Co., 431 So. 2d 932, 944 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) .
'Whether t o a l l o w o r d i s a l l o w a l e a d i n g
question i s within the d i s c r e t i o n of the
trial
court
and e x c e p t f o r a f l a g r a n t
v i o l a t i o n there w i l l
n o t be r e v e r s i b l e
error.'
B r a d f o r d v . S t a n l e y , 355 So. 2d
328, 331 ( A l a . 1 9 7 8 ) . " L y n n v. S t a t e , 543
So.
2d 704, 707 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 7 ) ,
a f f i r m e d , 543 So. 2d 709 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) , c e r t .
d e n i e d , [493] U.S. [ 9 4 5 ] , 110 S. C t . 3 5 1 ,
107 L. E d . 2d 338 ( 1 9 8 9 ) .
Thus, l e a d i n g
questions
may
be
allowed
on
direct
e x a m i n a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g on t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
of t h e p a r t i c u l a r case.
Certain subjects
are e s p e c i a l l y c o n d u c i v e t o a l e a d i n g form,
" ' e l s e t h e c o u n s e l a n d w i t n e s s c a n n o t be
made t o u n d e r s t a n d e a c h o t h e r , ' " among them
" ' [ p ] r o o f o f ... p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y . ' " C.
Gamble,
McElroy's
Alabama
Evidence
§
1 2 1 . 0 5 ( 2 ) (3d e d . 1 9 7 7 ) . '
161
CR-06-2236
"See a l s o E v a n s v . S t a t e , 794 So. 2d 415 ( A l a . C r i m .
App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a n d James v . S t a t e , 788 So. 2d 185 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) .
We h a v e r e f u s e d t o f i n d e r r o r
when a c i r c u i t c o u r t h a s a l l o w e d l e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s
on p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r s t h a t a r e n o t d i s p u t e d , s e e
Womble v . S t a t e , 44 A l a . App. 416, 211 So. 2d 881
( 1 9 6 8 ) ; when a w i t n e s s i s h o s t i l e , s e e D e n n i s v .
S t a t e , 584 So. 2d 548 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 1 ) ; when
a w i t n e s s i s i m m a t u r e , s e e M c C u r l e y v. S t a t e , 455
So. 2d 1014 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) ; when a w i t n e s s ' s
memory h a s f a i l e d , s e e G a r t h v . S t a t e , 536 So. 2d
173
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 8 ) ; a n d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e
p r e d i c a t e f o r a d m i s s i o n o f a c o n f e s s i o n , see Jones
v. S t a t e , 292 A l a . 126, 290 So. 2d 165 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . "
932
So. 2d a t 963.
Nevertheless,
our
plain-error
review
necessarily
e n c o m p a s s e d t h e p a g e s r e f e r e n c e d b y S t a n l e y , a n d we f i n d
p l a i n e r r o r i n the prosecutor's questions.
So.
3d a t
See J o h n s o n ,
; L e e v . S t a t e , 898 So. 2d a t 827.
Regarding
defense
no
h i s argument t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r b a d g e r e d t h e
w i t n e s s , D o t , on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ,
"'A p a r t y i s g i v e n w i d e l a t i t u d e on
cross-examination
to test
a
witness's
p a r t i a l i t y , bias, intent, c r e d i b i l i t y , or
p r e j u d i c e , o r t o impeach, i l l u s t r a t e , o r
test
the accuracy
of
the
witness's
t e s t i m o n y o r r e c o l l e c t i o n as w e l l as t h e
e x t e n t o f h i s knowledge.
W e l l s v. S t a t e ,
292
A l a . 256, 292 So. 2d 471
(1973);
Housing A u t h o r i t y o f C i t y o f Decatur v.
D e c a t u r L a n d Co., 258 A l a . 607, 64 So. 2 d
594 ( 1 9 5 3 ) ; Hooper v. S t a t e , 585 So. 2d 142
( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 1 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 503
U.S. 920, 112 S. C t . 1295, 117 L. E d . 2d
162
CR-06-2236
517 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; C. Gamble, [ M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a
E v i d e n c e , § 136.01 ( 4 t h ed. 1 9 9 1 ) ] .
The
range of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n r e s t s l a r g e l y i n
t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and t h a t
c o u r t ' s r u l i n g w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s
i t c l e a r l y a p p e a r s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was
p r e j u d i c e d by t h e r u l i n g . Hooper v. S t a t e .
However, "where t h e w i t n e s s ' t e s t i m o n y i s
important
to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of
the
issues being t r i e d , there i s l i t t l e , i f
any,
d i s c r e t i o n i n the t r i a l court to
disallow
cross-examination."
Wells
v.
S t a t e , 292 A l a . a t 258, 292 So. 2d a t 473.'
" W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 710 So. 2d 1276, 1327-28 ( A l a .
C r . App. 1 9 9 6 ) , a f f ' d , 710 So. 2d 1350 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) ,
c e r t . d e n i e d , 524 U.S. 929, 118 S. C t . 2325, 141 L.
Ed. 2d 699
(1998)."
Ballard,
767
Stanley
prosecutor
So.
2d a t
makes
a
badgered
1140-41.
blanket
h i s mother
argument
on
the
on
appeal
stand.
that
However,
the
he
f a i l s t o p o i n t t o s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s and f a i l s t o d e m o n s t r a t e
t h a t he was
on
one
substantially prejudiced.
occasion
Stanley's
grounds of badgering
Dot.
asked
That
Dot
r e c o r d shows t h a t
counsel
objected
on
to the p r o s e c u t o r ' s cross-examination
occasion
the
defense
The
happened
first
shortly
question
after
on
the
the
of
prosecutor
cross-examination.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , we h a v e r e v i e w e d t h e e n t i r e c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n o f
Dot and c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r d i d n o t s t e p o u t s i d e t h e
163
CR-06-2236
range
of propriety
present case.
or badger
any d e f e n s e
witness
i n the
Thus, we f i n d no e r r o r .
E.
F i n a l l y , S t a n l e y argues t h a t the cumulative e f f e c t of the
alleged
fair
prosecutorial
trial
misconduct
i n this
and r e l i a b l e s e n t e n c i n g
his conviction
and s e n t e n c e .
case
denied
and w a r r a n t s
him a
reversal of
T h i s C o u r t has c o n s i d e r e d
each
of t h e c l a i m s o f p r o s e c u t o r i a l m i s c o n d u c t i n d i v i d u a l l y and has
found
that
none
After
thoroughly
of the claims
reviewing
of error
the record
require
reversal.
and c o n s i d e r i n g
a l l e g a t i o n s of p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct cumulatively,
no
prosecutorial
impropriety,
any
alleged
Stanley's
See,
2001)
misconduct,
t h i s Court
errors
finds
that
d i d not
substantial
rights
but
even
i f
there
probably
injuriously
a n d does n o t r e q u i r e
rule i s that, while,
s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l to require
accumulated
errors
had
was
the cumulative e f f e c t of
affect
reversal.
(Ala.
under t h e f a c t s o f a
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , no s i n g l e e r r o r among m u l t i p l e
the
we f i n d
e . g . , Ex p a r t e Woods, 789 So. 2d 941, 942-43 n.1
("The c o r r e c t
the
e r r o r s may be
r e v e r s a l u n d e r R u l e 45, i f
'probably
injuriously
affected
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s , ' then the cumulative e f f e c t
164
CR-06-2236
o f t h e e r r o r s may
i s without
In
accordance with
conviction
Stanley's
45A,
Therefore,
this
claim
merit.
searched the
defect
require reversal.") .
Rule
record with
for
any
45A,
respect
error
that
Ala.
R.
App.
to Stanley's
may
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s and
have
P.,
App.
have
capital-murder
adversely
affected
have f o u n d no p l a i n e r r o r
i n the g u i l t - p h a s e p r o c e e d i n g s of the t r i a l .
A l a . R.
we
See
or
Rule
P.
Penalty-Phase
Issues
XI.
I n a o n e - p a r a g r a p h argument i n h i s b r i e f t o t h i s
Stanley
maintains
that
'substantially similar'
R e e s , 553
U.S.
35
constitutes
(Stanley's
B r i e f , Issue
adversely
issue
t o K e n t u c k y ' s and
(2008),] i s not
sentence
This
"Alabama's
has
to Stanley.
cruel
is
therefore
not
Baze
[v.
c o n t r o l l i n g " and h i s
and
X V I I I , pp.
previously
protocol
Court,
unusual
"death
punishment."
115-16.)
been
addressed
I n G o b b l e v. S t a t e ,
So.
and
decided
3d a t
t h i s Court wrote:
"Gobble
argues
that
evolving
standards
of
d e c e n c y have r e n d e r e d A l a b a m a ' s method o f p e r f o r m i n g
l e t h a l i n j e c t i o n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . She
cites
the
article,
Leonidas
G.
Koniaris,
Inadequate
165
,
CR-06-2236
A n a e s t h e s i a i n L e t h a l I n j e c t i o n f o r E x e c u t i o n , 3 65
L a n c e t 1412
(2005), t o s u p p o r t her argument.
This
s t u d y was b a s e d on t h e i m p r o p e r a d m i n i s t e r i n g o f t h e
first
drug-sodium t h i o p e n t a l - - w h i c h
acts
as
an
anaesthesia.
The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c i t e d
t h i s s t u d y i n B a z e v. R e e s , 553 U.S. 35, n.2, 128 S.
C t . 1520,
170 L. Ed. 2d 420
(2008).
Alabama's
method o f p e r f o r m i n g l e t h a l i n j e c t i o n , a t h r e e - d r u g
protocol,
is substantially
similar
to
the
one
c o n s i d e r e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n
B a z e v. R e e s .
"The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t i n Ex p a r t e B e l i s l e ,
11 So. 3d 323
( A l a . 2008), h e l d t h a t Alabama's
method of p e r f o r m i n g
lethal
i n j e c t i o n does
not
c o n s t i t u t e c r u e l and u n u s u a l p u n i s h m e n t .
The C o u r t
stated:
"'The E i g h t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d
States C o n s t i t u t i o n provides:
"Excessive
b a i l s h a l l n o t be r e q u i r e d , n o r e x c e s s i v e
fines
imposed,
nor
cruel
and
unusual
punishments i n f l i c t e d . "
"Punishments are
c r u e l when t h e y
i n v o l v e t o r t u r e or
a
l i n g e r i n g death;
but the punishment of
death i s not c r u e l w i t h i n the meaning of
t h a t w o r d as u s e d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t
implies
there
something
inhuman
and
b a r b a r o u s , - - s o m e t h i n g more t h a n t h e mere
extinguishment of l i f e . "
I n r e Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 447, 10 S. C t . 930, 34 L. Ed.
519 ( 1 8 9 0 ) .
However, as t h e Supreme C o u r t
of the U n i t e d States r e c e n t l y s t a t e d i n
B a z e v. R e e s , 553 U.S. 35, 128 S. C t . 1520,
170 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2008) :
"'"Our c a s e s r e c o g n i z e t h a t
subjecting i n d i v i d u a l s to a r i s k
of
future
harm--not
simply
actually
inflicting
pain--can
qualify
as
cruel
and
unusual
punishment.
To e s t a b l i s h t h a t
166
CR-06-2236
such exposure v i o l a t e s t h e E i g h t h
Amendment,
however,
the
conditions
presenting
the r i s k
must be ' s u r e o r v e r y l i k e l y t o
cause
serious
illness
and
needless
s u f f e r i n g , ' and
give
rise
to 'sufficiently
imminent
dangers.'
H e l l i n g v. M c K i n n e y ,
509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35, 113 S.
C t . 2475, 125 L. E d . 2d 22 (1993)
(emphasis
added).
We
have
e x p l a i n e d t h a t t o p r e v a i l on s u c h
a
claim
there
must
be
a
'substantial
risk
of
serious
harm,'
an
'objectively
i n t o l e r a b l e r i s k o f harm' t h a t
prevents prison o f f i c i a l s
from
pleading
that
they
were
'subjectively
blameless
for
purposes
of
the
Eighth
Amendment.'
Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, a n d n.9,
114 S. C t . 1970, 128 L. E d . 2d
811
(1994)."'
"'553
U.S. a t
, 128 S. C t . a t 1530-31.
"'In
Baze,
two d e a t h - r o w
inmates
c h a l l e n g e d Kentucky's use of t h e three-drug
protocol,
arguing
"that
there
is a
s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k that the procedures w i l l
n o t be p r o p e r l y f o l l o w e d - - i n p a r t i c u l a r ,
t h a t t h e s o d i u m t h i o p e n t a l w i l l n o t be
properly
administered
to achieve i t s
intended e f f e c t - - r e s u l t i n g i n severe pain
when t h e o t h e r c h e m i c a l s a r e a d m i n i s t e r e d . "
553
U.S. a t
, 128 S. C t . a t 1530.
B e l i s l e ' s c l a i m , l i k e t h e c l a i m s made b y
the
inmates
i n Baze,
"hinges
on t h e
improper a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the f i r s t drug,
sodium t h i o p e n t a l . "
B a z e , 553 U.S. a t
128 S. C t . a t 1533.
r
167
CR-06-2236
"'The
Supreme
Court
upheld
the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f K e n t u c k y ' s method o f
e x e c u t i o n , B a z e , 553 U.S. a t
, 128 S.
C t . a t 1538, and n o t e d t h a t " [ a ] S t a t e w i t h
a lethal injection protocol substantially
s i m i l a r t o t h e p r o t o c o l we u p h o l d t o d a y
w o u l d n o t c r e a t e a r i s k t h a t meets t h i s
standard."
B a z e , 553 U.S.
at
, 128
S.Ct.
at
1537.
J u s t i c e Ginsburg
and
J u s t i c e Souter
d i s s e n t e d from the main
o p i n i o n , arguing t h a t "Kentucky's p r o t o c o l
l a c k s b a s i c s a f e g u a r d s u s e d by o t h e r S t a t e s
t o c o n f i r m t h a t an i n m a t e i s u n c o n s c i o u s
b e f o r e i n j e c t i o n o f t h e s e c o n d and t h i r d
d r u g s . " B a z e , 553 U.S. a t
, 128 S. C t .
a t 1567
(Ginsburg, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) .
The
dissenting Justices recognized,
however,
that
Alabama's
procedures,
along
with
procedures used i n M i s s o u r i , C a l i f o r n i a ,
and I n d i a n a " p r o v i d e a d e g r e e o f a s s u r a n c e ¬
- m i s s i n g from Kentucky's p r o t o c o l - - t h a t the
f i r s t d r u g had b e e n p r o p e r l y a d m i n i s t e r e d . "
B a z e , 553 U.S. a t
, 128 S. C t . a t 1571
(Ginsburg, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) .
"'The S t a t e a r g u e s , and we a g r e e , t h a t
B e l i s l e , l i k e the inmates i n Baze, cannot
meet h i s b u r d e n o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g
that
Alabama's l e t h a l - i n j e c t i o n p r o t o c o l poses
a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k o f harm by a s s e r t i n g t h e
mere p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s o m e t h i n g may
go
w r o n g . " S i m p l y b e c a u s e an e x e c u t i o n method
may r e s u l t i n p a i n , e i t h e r by a c c i d e n t o r
as an i n e s c a p a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e o f
death,
does n o t e s t a b l i s h t h e s o r t o f ' o b j e c t i v e l y
i n t o l e r a b l e r i s k o f harm' t h a t q u a l i f i e s as
c r u e l and u n u s u a l . "
B a z e , 553 U.S.
at
, 128
S.
Ct.
a t 1531.
Thus,
we
c o n c l u d e t h a t A l a b a m a ' s use
of
lethal
i n j e c t i o n as a method o f e x e c u t i o n does n o t
v i o l a t e t h e E i g h t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d
States C o n s t i t u t i o n . '
168
CR-06-2236
"11
So.
3d a t 338-39.
Alabama's
performing
lethal
injection
i s not
unusual."
Gobble,
So. 3d a t
v. S t a t e ,
method o f
cruel
and
(footnote omitted).
See a l s o R e v i s
[Ms. CR-06-0454, J a n u a r y 13, 2011]
(Ala.
Crim.
App.
2011);
Reynolds,
So. 3d a t
Phillips,
So. 3d a t
Vanpelt,
So. 3d
;
;
So.
; Doster,
; Morris,
So. 3d a t
3d a t
So. 3d a t
McCray,
,
So. 3d a t
;
; S a u n d e r s v. S t a t e , 10 So. 3d 53,
77 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) ; L e w i s v. S t a t e , 24 So. 3d 480, 536¬
37
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 6 ) ;
747-48
B r y a n t v. S t a t e ,
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2003)
( a l l addressing challenges to
A l a b a m a ' s method o f p e r f o r m i n g l e t h a l
Consequently,
this
claim
951 So. 2d 732,
injection).
S t a n l e y i s not e n t i t l e d
because Alabama's
method
of
t o any r e l i e f
execution
on
i s not
unconstitutional.
XII.
Stanley
violation
argues
of the S i x t h
b r i e f , p. 83.)
vacated
that
h i s "death
s e n t e n c e was
imposed i n
a n d E i g h t h Amendments."
(Stanley's
He c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s d e a t h s e n t e n c e s h o u l d be
pursuant
to
the
United
States
d e c i s i o n s i n A p p r e n d i v. New J e r s e y , 530 U.S.
169
Supreme
Court's
466 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , a n d
CR-06-2236
R i n g v. A r i z o n a , 536 U.S.
States
Supreme
Court
s e n t e n c e above t h e
584
held
(2002).
that
any
Stanley
t h a t was
i t s holding
r a i s e d the
in
raises
constitutionally
doubt.
Apprendi
to
a p p l i c a t i o n of Ring
properly denied
Stanley
fact
that
s t a t u t o r y maximum must be
j u r y and p r o v e n b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e
extended
In A p p r e n d i , the
of
by
the t r i a l
several
increases
presented
a
to
In Ring, the
death-penalty
a
Court
cases.
i n a p r e t r i a l motion,
court.
claims
Alabama's
United
challenging
capital-sentencing
the
scheme.
A l t h o u g h " [ b ] o t h t h i s C o u r t and t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t have
repeatedly rejected i d e n t i c a l
So.
3d
at
, see
c h a l l e n g e s [ , ] " M c C r a y v.
also Revis
, and R e y n o l d s v. S t a t e ,
cited
therein,
individually
this
Court
So.
will
v.
State,
3d a t
address
State,
So.
3d
, and t h e
each
of
the
at
cases
claims
below.
A.
Stanley
claims
that
the
trial
court
erred
in
not
d i s m i s s i n g h i s i n d i c t m e n t , w h i c h he s a y s f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e
with
a d e q u a t e n o t i c e b e c a u s e , he
the aggravating
rely.
circumstances
(Stanley's
brief,
says,
i t d i d not
set
him
forth
upon w h i c h t h e S t a t e i n t e n d e d
Issue
170
XV,
pp.
112-13.)
He
filed
to
a
CR-06-2236
motion to dismiss
73-74.)
the
i n d i c t m e n t b a s e d on
A f t e r conducting
a hearing,
Stanley's motion to dismiss.
We
State,
addressed
1 So.
and
(R.
the
this
trial
ground.
judge
(R.
denied
109.)
r e j e c t e d a s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t i n Sneed v.
3d a t 143,
as f o l l o w s :
" ' S t a l l w o r t h a l s o argues, i n r e l a t i o n
t o t h e R i n g i s s u e , t h a t h i s i n d i c t m e n t was
v o i d because i t f a i l e d to i n c l u d e i n the
indictment the a g g r a v a t i n g
circumstances
the S t a t e i n t e n d e d to prove.
I n P o o l e v.
S t a t e , 846 So. 2d 370
(Ala. Crim.
App.
2 0 0 1 ) , we
held that, although
Apprendi
r e q u i r e d t h a t the f a c t s t h a t i n c r e a s e d a
s e n t e n c e above t h e s t a t u t o r y maximum must
be s u b m i t t e d t o a j u r y , t h o s e f a c t s d i d n o t
have t o be
a l l e g e d i n the
indictment.
R e c e n t l y , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t a d o p t e d
our h o l d i n g i n P o o l e .
See H a l e v. S t a t e ,
848 So. 2d 224 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) .
" ' A l s o , t h e h o l d i n g s i n P o o l e and H a l e
are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r i o r caselaw,
which
h o l d s t h a t a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s do n o t
have t o be a l l e g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t .
See
Ex p a r t e L e w i s , 811 So. 2d 485 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ,
and D o b a r d v. S t a t e , 435 So. 2d 1338 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) . S t a l l w o r t h ' s argument i s
n o t s u p p o r t e d by A l a b a m a l a w . '
"(Footnote
1 So.
omitted.)"
3d a t 142-43
See B r y a n t ,
( q u o t i n g S t a l l w o r t h , 868
951 So. 2d a t 749
So.
2d a t
1186).
( r e j e c t i n g an i d e n t i c a l argument
b e c a u s e t h e " i n d i c t m e n t r e t u r n e d a g a i n s t B r y a n t a d v i s e d him
171
of
CR-06-2236
the
crime
w i t h w h i c h he was c h a r g e d - - t h e
murder d u r i n g k i d n a p p i n g ,
Ala.
Code 1975--and
in violation
[thus]
capital
of §
offense of
13A-5-40(a)(1),
[i]ncluded i n the indictment
was
the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance of kidnapping i n the f i r s t degree
...").
2d
See a l s o S h a r i f i ,
993 So. 2d a t 940; B a r b e r ,
393; B e n j a m i n v. S t a t e ,
2005); Walker,
without
940 So. 2d 371
932 So. 2d 140.
952 So.
( A l a . Crim.
App.
Thus, S t a n l e y ' s argument i s
merit.
B.
Stanley
contends
the
jury
never
determined
that
the
s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance e x i s t e d beyond a reasonable
doubt o r t h a t i t outweighed the m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
c l a i m s t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e j u r y recommended t h a t he be
to
life
imprisonment without
the p o s s i b i l i t y
He
sentenced
of parole, i t
c l e a r l y found t h a t the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances outweighed the
aggravating
sentence
circumstances.
should
be
Thus,
vacated
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , pp. 83-86.)
he
because
submits,
his
i t violates
death
Ring.
He a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e A l a b a m a
Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d 1024
(Ala.
2004),
reliability
i s contrary
of the c a p i t a l
t o t h e law and
sentencing
172
"undermines
process
and
the
unfairly
CR-06-2236
skews s e n t e n c i n g t o w a r d
Adams v. T e x a s ,
the i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y .
448 U.S. 38, 46-47 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . "
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
p. 86.)
Applying Ring
i n Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p ,
t h e Alabama
Supreme
Court h e l d :
" B e c a u s e t h e j u r y c o n v i c t e d W a l d r o p o f two
c o u n t s o f murder d u r i n g a r o b b e r y i n t h e f i r s t
degree,
a
violation
o f A l a . Code
1975, §
13A-5-40(a)(2),
the
statutory
aggravating
circumstance of committing a c a p i t a l offense while
e n g a g e d i n t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a r o b b e r y , A l a . Code
1975, § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 4 ) , was ' p r o v e n b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e
d o u b t . ' A l a . Code 1975, § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( e ) ; A l a . Code
1975, § 13A-5-50. O n l y one a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e
must e x i s t i n o r d e r t o i m p o s e a s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h .
A l a . Code 1975, § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( f ) . Thus, i n W a l d r o p ' s
case, t h e j u r y , and n o t t h e t r i a l judge, determined
the
existence of the 'aggravating
circumstance
necessary f o r i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y . ' Ring
[v. A r i z o n a ] , 536 U.S. [584,]
609, 122 S. C t .
[2428,] 2443, 153 L. E d . 2d 556 [ ( 2 0 0 2 ) ] . T h e r e f o r e ,
the f i n d i n g s r e f l e c t e d i n the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t alone
e x p o s e d W a l d r o p t o a r a n g e o f p u n i s h m e n t t h a t h a d as
i t s maximum t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . T h i s i s a l l R i n g a n d
A p p r e n d i [ v . New J e r s e y , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. C t .
2348, 147 L. E d . 2d 435 (2000)] r e q u i r e . "
859
So. 2d a t 1188.
The d e c i s i o n
i n Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p h a s b e e n
f o l l o w e d and u p h e l d .
See, e . g . , M i t c h e l l v. S t a t e [Ms. CR-06-
0827, A u g u s t 27, 2010]
2010);
Spencer,
consistently
So. 3d
So. 3d a t
173
,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
; Yeomans v . S t a t e , 898 So.
CR-06-2236
2d 878,
903
( A l a . Crim.
App.
2d 998,
1005-06 ( A l a . 2004) .
2 0 0 4 ) ; Ex p a r t e McNabb, 887
So.
F u r t h e r , t h i s c o u r t i s b o u n d by
t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t .
As
we
stated i n
Reynolds:
"Reynolds a l s o c h a l l e n g e s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y
o f t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n Ex p a r t e
W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d 1881 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) . He c l a i m s t h a t
the d e c i s i o n ' i m p e r m i s s i b l y eased the S t a t e ' s burden
o f p r o v i n g t h a t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i s a p p r o p r i a t e by
ensuring
that
the
jury
was
unaware
that i t s
g u i l t - i n n o c e n c e phase f i n d i n g a u t h o r i z e d the t r i a l
judge t o impose the death p e n a l t y w i t h o u t a d d i t i o n a l
p r o c e s s , ' and t h a t t h e W a l d r o p d e c i s i o n ' u n d e r m i n e s
the r e l i a b i l i t y of the c a p i t a l sentencing
process
and u n f a i r l y skews s e n t e n c i n g t o w a r d t h e i m p o s i t i o n
of
the
death
penalty.'
(Reynolds's
brief,
at
111-12.)
'However, t h i s
Court
i s b o u n d by
the
d e c i s i o n s o f t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t and has no
a u t h o r i t y t o r e v e r s e o r m o d i f y t h o s e d e c i s i o n s . See
§ 12-3-16, A l a . Code 1975.' D o s t e r [ v. S t a t e ] , [Ms.
CR-06-0323, J u l y 30, 2 0 1 0 ] ,
So. 3d [
,]
n.13
So.
[ ( A l a . Crim.
3d a t
.
App.
See
2010)]."
also Revis,
Moreover, c o n t r a r y to S t a n l e y ' s
settled
that
aggravating
"[t]he
circumstance
p a r t e McNabb, 887
jury's
So.
contentions,
unanimous
.
i t is well
finding
of
one
i s s u f f i c i e n t to s a t i s f y Ring."
So. 2d a t 1006.
During the g u i l t phase,
j u r y unanimously found beyond a reasonable
committed a robbery
3d a t
d u r i n g the course
the
doubt t h a t S t a n l e y
of committing
a murder.
Because the j u r y c o n v i c t e d S t a n l e y of murder d u r i n g the
174
Ex
course
CR-06-2236
of a f i r s t - d e g r e e
Ala.
Code
committing
of
robbery,
a violation
1975, t h e s t a t u t o r y
doubt."
13A-5-50, A l a . Code 1975.
exist
i n order
13A-5-45(f),
judge,
circumstance
for
circumstance
§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, was
beyond a reasonable
trial
aggravating
13A-5-40(a)(2),
of
a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e w h i l e engaged i n t h e commission
a robbery,
must
of §
A l a . Code
Stanley.
impose
1975.
determined
necessary
§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( e ) , A l a . Code 1975; §
O n l y one a g g r a v a t i n g
to
"prov[en]
a
sentence
Thus,
of
the jury,
the existence
circumstance
of the
death.
and n o t t h e
"aggravating
f o r i m p o s i t i o n of the death
See R i n g ,
536 U.S.
a t 609.
§
penalty"
Therefore,
f i n d i n g s r e f l e c t e d i n the j u r y ' s g u i l t y v e r d i c t alone
the
exposed
S t a n l e y t o a r a n g e o f p u n i s h m e n t t h a t h a d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y as
i t s maximum.
Thus, t h e r e i s no R i n g v i o l a t i o n i n t h i s
Likewise,
"Ring
d i d not i n v a l i d a t e
v e s t s the u l t i m a t e sentence
Alabama's
regard.
law t h a t
d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h e hands o f t h e
t r i a l judge and n o t a j u r y . "
T u r n e r v. S t a t e , 924 So. 2d 737,
785
See, e.g., Ex p a r t e Hodges, 856
So.
( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) .
2d
936
( A l a . 2003);
Ex
parte
Waldrop;
Brownfield;
B l a c k m o n , 7 So. 3d a t 417; H a r r i s ; Eatmon v. S t a t e , 992 So. 2d
64
( A l a . Crim.
App.
2007);
Barber.
175
"'The
determination
CR-06-2236
whether t h e a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances
circumstances
offense.
i s not a f i n d i n g
Consequently,
outweigh the m i t i g a t i n g
of fact
o r an e l e m e n t o f t h e
R i n g and A p p r e n d i
do n o t r e q u i r e t h a t
a j u r y weigh the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances
circumstances.'"
Ex p a r t e Hodges, 856 So. 2d a t 943 ( q u o t i n g
Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d a t 1 1 9 0 ) .
Lewis,
and t h e m i t i g a t i n g
24 So. 3d a t 533
(wherein
See a l s o B r o w n f i e l d ;
Lewis
argued
among
other
s p e c i f i c grounds t h a t Alabama's d e a t h - p e n a l t y s t a t u t e v i o l a t e s
R i n g b e c a u s e " i t does n o t r e q u i r e a u n a n i m o u s f i n d i n g b y t h e
j u r y as t o w h e t h e r t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s
e x i s t beyond
a reasonable
circumstances
doubt and whether t h e a g g r a v a t i n g
outweigh
the mitigating
doubt");
Blackmon
v.
circumstances
State,
beyond
7 So. 3d a t 417.
a
reasonable
Therefore,
S t a n l e y i s e n t i t l e d t o no r e l i e f .
C.
Stanley asserts the t r i a l court u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
on an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e
reasonable
relied
n o t found by t h e j u r y beyond a
doubt, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,
the aggravating
circumstance
t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was " e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s , a t r o c i o u s , o r c r u e l "
when compared t o o t h e r
capital
offenses.
He f u r t h e r c l a i m s
e r r o r b e c a u s e he s u b m i t s t h e t r i a l c o u r t was r e q u i r e d p u r s u a n t
176
CR-06-2236
t o R i n g t o a c c e p t any
jury to e x i s t .
infirmities
verdict
As
mitigating
He a p p e a r s
circumstances
f o u n d by
the
t o argue t h a t both of these
alleged
c o u l d h a v e b e e n r e s o l v e d by t h e u s e o f a
special
form.
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , pp.
86-88.)
s t a t e d above, o n l y a j u r y ' s unanimous f i n d i n g of
aggravating circumstance i s required to s a t i s f y Ring.
1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( f ) , A l a . Code 1975;
Ex p a r t e McNabb.
one
See
In t h i s
§
case,
because the j u r y c o n v i c t e d S t a n l e y of murder d u r i n g the c o u r s e
of
a
first-degree
40(a)(2),
Ala.
robbery,
Code
an
offense defined i n §
1975,
the
statutory
13A-5-
aggravating
c i r c u m s t a n c e of c o m m i t t i n g a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e w h i l e engaged i n
the commission
was
of a robbery,
§ 13A-5-49(4),
"prov[en] beyond a reasonable doubt."
Code
1975;
§
13A-5-50,
A l a . Code
1975.
A l a . Code
1975,
§ 13A-5-45(e),
Ala.
Because
only
one
a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e must e x i s t i n a c a p i t a l c a s e i n o r d e r
to
impose a s e n t e n c e
case,
and
not
existence
of
imposition
pursuant
of
the
of death
trial
and
judge,
the
"aggravating
the
death
because the
in
this
unanimously
determined
the
circumstance
necessary
for
p e n a l t y , " i t i s of
to Ring or Apprendi
jury
no
consequence
t h a t the j u r y here
recommended
177
CR-06-2236
that
S t a n l e y be
sentenced
life
imprisonment without
See R i n g , 536 U.S.
p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e .
to
a t 609.
the
Moreover,
" [ t ] h e Supreme C o u r t has h e l d , i n numerous c a s e s ,
t h a t the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t f i n d i n g a defendant g u i l t y
of c a p i t a l murder d u r i n g t h e g u i l t phase of h i s
t r i a l i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e j u r y had u n a n i m o u s l y f o u n d
a p r o f f e r e d aggravating circumstance included w i t h i n
t h e § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e
p a r t i c u l a r c a p i t a l - m u r d e r o f f e n s e charged
i n the
indictment.
See, e.g., Ex p a r t e Hodges, 856 So. 2d
936 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ; Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d 1181
(Ala.
2 0 0 2 ) ; S t a l l w o r t h v. S t a t e , 868 So. 2d
1128
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 2001)
( o p i n i o n on r e t u r n t o s e c o n d
r e m a n d ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 868 So. 2d 1189 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) .
B u t see Ex p a r t e M c G r i f f , 908 So. 2d 1024,
1039
(Ala.
2004)
( a u t h o r i z i n g p r o s p e c t i v e use
of
a
penalty-phase s p e c i a l i n t e r r o g a t o r y ) . "
Bryant,
951
because
So.
the
jury
circumstances
Ring
and
exceeding
to
2d a t 750-51.
i s not
L i k e w i s e , as m e n t i o n e d a b o v e ,
required to
weigh
the
and
the
mitigating
circumstances
Apprendi
and
S t a n l e y was
not
aggravating
pursuant
exposed "to a p e n a l t y
t h e maximum he w o u l d r e c e i v e i f p u n i s h e d
according
the f a c t s r e f l e c t e d i n the j u r y v e r d i c t alone," Ring,
U.S.
a t 602,
and b e c a u s e t h e j u r y f o u n d him g u i l t y o f
m u r d e r - r o b b e r y , we
that
the
trial
circumstances
find
no
c o u r t was
Stanley
Ring
e r r o r as
required to
claims
178
are
to
capital
to Stanley's
accept
inherent
the
in
536
claim
mitigating
the
jury's
CR-06-2236
a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t of l i f e imprisonment without
of
the
possibility
parole.
D.
Stanley,
1975),
citing
maintains
violates
T e d d e r v.
that
"evolving
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , pp.
of
Ring,
against
88-92.)
of
322
So.
2d
908
advisory-jury
decency"
c r u e l and
Stanley
"standardless"
and
(Fla.
override
the
Eighth
unusual punishment.
claims
light
the
a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of the death p e n a l t y i n v i o l a t i o n of
the
Sixth, Eighth,
b r i e f , pp.
92-94.)
and
override
that, i n
results in
Fifth,
Alabama's
Alabama's
standards
Amendment r e s t r i c t i o n s
State,
Fourteenth
Amendments.
(Stanley's
However, t h e s e a r g u m e n t s have p r e v i o u s l y
been d e t e r m i n e d a d v e r s e l y
to Stanley.
In Doster,
this
Court
stated:
"Doster a l s o argues t h a t Alabama's s e n t e n c i n g
scheme i s ' s t a n d a r d l e s s ' and v i o l a t e s t h e
Eighth
Amendment and t h e E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n C l a u s e o f t h e
Constitution.
"Alabama's d e a t h - p e n a l t y s e n t e n c i n g scheme
repeatedly withstood c o n s t i t u t i o n a l attacks.
"'The
appellant maintains
that
the
j u r y o v e r r i d e p r o v i s i o n o f A l a . Code 1975,
§
1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . He
claims
that
the
statute
contains
no
g u i d e l i n e s f o r the sentencing
judge to
f o l l o w and t h a t t h e s t a t u t e v i o l a t e s t h e
179
has
CR-06-2236
E i g h t h Amendment, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a c a s e
where,
as h e r e ,
the j u r y
unanimously
recommends a s e n t e n c e o f l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t
without parole.
"'Sentencing
by
a
jury
is
not
constitutionally
required.
Spaziano
v.
F l o r i d a , 468 U.S. 447, 104 S. C t . 3154, 82
L. Ed. 2d 340 (1984) . P r o f f i t t v. F l o r i d a ,
428 U.S.
242, 251-52, 96 S. C t . 2960,
2966-67, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , and §
13A-5-47(e) s e t " o u t a s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w
f o r j u r y o v e r r i d e t h a t meets c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r e q u i r e m e n t s . " M c M i l l i a n v. S t a t e , 594 So.
2d 1253, 1272-73 ( A l a . C r . App.
1991),
remanded on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 594 So. 2d 1288
(Ala.
1 9 9 2 ) . The argument t h a t t h e j u r y
o v e r r i d e p r o v i s i o n o f § 13A-5-47(e) i s
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n f i r m because i t allows
for
the
" a r b i t r a r y and
standardless"
i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h has
been r e p e a t e d l y r e j e c t e d by t h e a p p e l l a t e
c o u r t s o f t h i s s t a t e . See, e.g., Ex p a r t e
J o n e s , 456 So. 2d 380, 381-83 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) ,
c e r t . d e n i e d , 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S. C t .
1779, 84 L. Ed. 2d 838 ( ( 9 8 5 ) ; M c M i l l i a n v.
S t a t e , 594 So. 2d a t 1272; P a r k e r v. S t a t e ,
587 So. 2d 1072, 1098 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 1 ) .
See a l s o Ex p a r t e G i l e s , 632 So. 2d 577
( A l a . 1193) ( h o l d i n g t h a t A l a . C o n s t . § 11
"does n o t p r e c l u d e j u d i c i a l o v e r r i d e o f t h e
jury's
sentencing
recommendation
in a
c a p i t a l case").
"'The t r i a l c o u r t ' s s e n t e n c i n g
order
r e f l e c t s the f a c t that the court
gave
" c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o the recommendation of the
jury i n i t s advisory v e r d i c t that the
d e f e n d a n t be s e n t e n c e d t o l i f e
without
p a r o l e . " R. 65. The c o u r t , h o w e v e r , a f t e r
i n d e p e n d e n t l y w e i g h i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and
m i t i g a t i n g circumstances,
determined that
180
CR-06-2236
the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance outweighed the
m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and c h o s e n o t t o
accept
the
jury's
recommendation.
Constitutional
and
statutory
provisions
r e q u i r e no more.'
" C a r r v. S t a t e , 640 So. 2d 1064, 1073-74 ( A l a . C r i m .
App.
1 9 9 4 ) . M o r e o v e r , as we s t a t e d i n Sneed v.
S t a t e , 1 So. 3d 104 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) :
"'The a p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s t h a t ,
i n l i g h t o f R i n g [v. A r i z o n a , 536 U.S.
584,
122
S. C t . 2428, 153
L. Ed.
2d
556
(2002)], Alabama's s t a n d a r d l e s s o v e r r i d e
r e s u l t s i n the a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of the
death p e n a l t y i n v i o l a t i o n of the F i f t h ,
S i x t h , E i g h t h , and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments
and
the Equal
Protection
Clause.
"The
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n R i n g d i d n o t
i n v a l i d a t e i t s e a r l i e r h o l d i n g i n H a r r i s v.
A l a b a m a , 513 U.S. 504, 115 S. C t . 1031, 130
L. Ed. 2d 1004
(1995), which u p h e l d §
13A-5-47(e),
A l a . C o d e 1975
-commonly
referred
to
as
the
judicial-override
s t a t u t e -- a g a i n s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a t t a c k . "
T o m l i n v. S t a t e , 909 So. 2d 213, 282 ( A l a .
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s ,
909 So. 2d 283 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . T h e r e f o r e , t h e
a p p e l l a n t ' s argument i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . '
"1 So.
Doster,
this
3d a t 143-44."
So.
3d a t
.
T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s no m e r i t t o
claim.
XIII.
Stanley a s s e r t s the "aggravating circumstances
the
judge
fail
to
adequately
181
narrow
the
class
found
of
by
death
CR-06-2236
eligible
offenders."
(Stanley's
brief,
p a r t i c u l a r l y , he c l a i m s e r r o r b e c a u s e :
trial
court's
aggravating
"double
counting"
circumstance
p.
109.)
More
(1) he a l l e g e s t h a t t h e
of the robbery
f o r purposes
of
as b o t h
an
determining
his
s e n t e n c e a n d as an e l e m e n t t o e l e v a t e t h e m u r d e r t o a c a p i t a l
offense
i s improper;
and,
(2) he
court's
a p p l i c a t i o n of the aggravating circumstance
m u r d e r was e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s ,
to
other
overbroad
case.
capital
on
offenses
i t s face
i s s u e i s due
Rule
45A, A l a . R. App.
Both
adversely
of
Issue X I I I ,
t i m e on a p p e a l ;
McMillan,
So.
2d
and
this
Stanley
therefore,
under the p l a i n - e r r o r
claims
The
have
previously
Alabama
Supreme
683 So. 2d 1042, 1060
p a r t e Woodward, 631 So. 2d 1065, 1069-70
698
of
pp. 109-111.)
been
Court
C o u r t have r e j e c t e d numerous c h a l l e n g e s t o " d o u b l e
Trawick,
that the
rule.
P.
to Stanley.
See Ex p a r t e W i n d s o r ,
trial
i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague
to evaluated
these
the
a t r o c i o u s , o r c r u e l as compared
claims f o r the f i r s t
this
that
and as a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
r a i s e s these
contends
at
So. 3d a t
178;
McCray,
; Reynolds,
182
decided
and
this
counting."
( A l a . 1996);
Ex
( A l a . 1993; Ex p a r t e
So.
3d
at
;
So. 3d a t
;
CR-06-2236
Morris,
v.
So. 3d a t
State,
[Ms.
at
7 So.
3d 453
2006); Barber,
a t 996,
State,
So.
2d
903,
952 So. 2d a t 458-59;
on t h i s
counting
required,
issue.
See
3d
M a s h b u r n v.
2007); H a r r i s ,
928
2 So.
(Ala.
is
Crim.
So. 2d a t
is constitutionally
Stanley
not
murder
was
entitled
heinous,
a t r o c i o u s , or
965.
to
§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( e ) , A l a . Code
especially
2d
permitted
any
1975.
L i k e w i s e , challenges to the aggravating circumstance
the
3d
McGowan, 990 So.
and t h e c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n ; C o r a l , 628
statutorily
relief
946
; Newton
So.
3d a t 929;
( A l a . C r i m . App.
Thus, b e c a u s e d o u b l e
and
2009]
2 0 0 9 ) ; Brown, 11 So.
926-27; J o n e s v.
App.
So. 3d a t
CR-05-1517, O c t o b e r 2,
( A l a . C r i m . App.
State,
; Vanpelt,
that
cruel
as
compared t o o t h e r c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s under § 13A-5-49(8), A l a .
Code 1975,
have b e e n r e j e c t e d by t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t
t h i s Court.
Ex p a r t e D e a r d o r f f , 6 So.
3d 1235,
2 0 0 8 ) ; Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d a t 1190;
3d a t
; Baker,
41-42, and
the
cases
So. 3d a t
cited
and
1238-40 ( A l a .
Mitchell,
So.
; B r o w n f i e l d , 44 So. 3d a t
therein;
Sharifi,
993
So.
2d
at
944.
The
e s p e c i a l l y heinous,
circumstance
"appl[ies]
to
a t r o c i o u s , or c r u e l
only
183
those
aggravating
conscienceless
or
CR-06-2236
pitiless
homicides which are
victim."
citing
Ex
parte
unnecessarily
399
So.
D i x o n , 283
S t a t e v.
Kyzer,
So.
2d
2d
1
330,
torturous
to
334
1981),
(Ala.
the
( F l a . 1973).
"'There are t h r e e f a c t o r s g e n e r a l l y
recognized
i n d i c a t i n g that a c a p i t a l offense i s e s p e c i a l l y
as
h e i n o u s , a t r o c i o u s , o r c r u e l : (1) t h e i n f l i c t i o n on
the
victim
of
physical
violence
beyond
that
necessary
or
sufficient
to
cause
death;
(2)
appreciable
s u f f e r i n g by
the
victim after
the
a s s a u l t t h a t u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l t e d i n d e a t h ; and
(3)
the
infliction
of p s y c h o l o g i c a l
t o r t u r e on
the
victim.'"
Saunders,
10
So.
417-18, c i t i n g
C r i m . App.
The
order
3d
at
108
(quoting
i n t u r n N o r r i s v.
Brooks,
State,
793
973
So.
2d
So.
2d
847
at
(Ala.
1999)).
circuit
finding
atrocious,
court
that
stated
the
as
murder
follows
was
in
its
especially
sentencing
heinous,
or c r u e l :
"The C o u r t f i n d s f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d
b e f o r e t h e J u r y t h a t t h e M u r d e r c o m m i t t e d by
the
D e f e n d a n t , A n t h o n y Lee
Stanley,
was
especially
heinous,
atrocious
or
c r u e l compared t o
other
C a p i t a l Offenses.
T h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t , A n t h o n y Lee
S t a n l e y , r e p e a t e d l y h i t the V i c t i m , Henry Smith, i n
t h e f a c e and body w i t h a b a s e b a l l b a t .
That the
Defendant t h e n r e p e a t e d l y s t a b b e d the v i c t i m , Henry
S m i t h , w i t h a k n i f e t o s u c h an e x t e n t t h a t
the
D e f e n d a n t b e n t one k n i f e and had t o g e t o f f o f t h e
v i c t i m and
r e t r i e v e a second k n i f e , which
the
Defendant used to r e p e a t e d l y stab the V i c t i m
and
t h a t the Defendant l e f t the second k n i f e i n the
V i c t i m ' s b a c k a f t e r k i l l i n g him.
The t e s t i m o n y o f
184
CR-06-2236
Dr. Ward, S t a t e M e d i c a l E x a m i n e r , e l a b o r a t e d on
s u b s t a n t i a l number o f wounds i n f l i c t e d upon
victim.
the
the
"By
any
standard
acceptable
to
civilized
society,
this
c r i m e was
extremely
gruesome
and
barbaric.
I t was
perpetrated with a heartless
i n f l i c t i o n o f b r u t a l i t y and w i t h u t t e r i n d i f f e r e n c e
t o t h e s u f f e r i n g o f t h e v i c t i m and w i t h a t o t a l
d i s r e g a r d o f human l i f e .
The C o u r t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t
a l l c a p i t a l offenses are heinous,
a t r o c i o u s and
c r u e l t o some e x t e n t , b u t t h e d e g r e e o f h e i n o u s n e s s ,
a t r o c i o u s n e s s and c r u e l t y w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h i s
o f f e n s e e x c e e d s t h a t w h i c h i s common t o a l l c a p i t a l
offenses.
"The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h i s i s an a g g r a v a t i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 - ( 8 ) , Code
o f A l a b a m a , as amended, and t h e C o u r t has c o n s i d e r e d
said aggravating circumstance."
(R.
278.)
The
and
the
heinous,
trial
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s are
record
supports
supported
i t s finding
that
by
the
the
record,
especially
a t r o c i o u s , or c r u e l a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance a p p l i e d
to t h i s crime.
the v i c t i m ,
M o r e o v e r , e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l
Smith,
s t o p s t a b b i n g him.
begged f o r h i s l i f e
See
and
Ex p a r t e R i e b e r ,
asked
663
So.
that
Stanley
2d a t
to
1003
("As
t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s p o i n t e d o u t , e v i d e n c e as t o
the
fear
experienced
by
significant
factor
in
aggravating
circumstance
the
victim
determining
that
185
the
the
before
death
existence
murder
was
is
of
a
the
especially
CR-06-2236
heinous,
atrocious,
substantial
heinous,
or
cruel.").
Because
there
e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e m u r d e r o f S m i t h was
atrocious,
or
cruel,
found such i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n
With
regard
to
the
circuit
court
was
especially
correctly
as an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e .
the
constitutional challenge,
s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n M i n o r , 914 So. 2d 372, t h i s C o u r t r e j e c t e d an
i d e n t i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e to the e s p e c i a l l y heinous,
atrocious,
or c r u e l a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance, n o t i n g :
"With
respect
to
Minor's
constitutional
challenge
to the heinous,
atrocious,
or
cruel
a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e i n § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 8 ) , A l a . Code
1975,
this
Court
has
repeatedly upheld
that
c i r c u m s t a n c e a g a i n s t s i m i l a r c h a l l e n g e s . See Duke
v. S t a t e , 889 So. 2d 1 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
2002);
I n g r a m v. S t a t e , 779 So. 2d 1225 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1 9 9 9 ) , a f f ' d , 779 So. 2d 1283 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) ; Freeman
v. S t a t e , 776 So. 2d 160 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
1999),
a f f ' d , 776 So. 2d 203 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) ; B u i v. S t a t e , 551
So. 2d 1094 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 8 ) , a f f ' d , 551 So.
2d 1125
( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) , j u d g m e n t v a c a t e d on o t h e r
g r o u n d s , 499 U.S. 971, 111 S. C t . 1613, 113 L. Ed.
2d 712 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ; and H a l l f o r d v. S t a t e , 548 So. 2d 526
( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 8 ) , a f f ' d , 548 So.2d 547 ( A l a .
1989)."
914
So.
2d a t 437.
v. T h i g p e n ,
that
875
Alabama's
atrocious
or
conscienceless
See a l s o B l a c k m o n , 7 So.
F.2d
1509,
1513-14
construction
cruel
of
the
homicides
186
Lindsey
( 1 1 t h C i r . 1989)
aggravating
or p i t i l e s s
3d 397;
especially
circumstance
that
are
(holding
heinous,
to
those
unnecessarily
CR-06-2236
torturous to the v i c t i m s a t i s f i e s the narrowing requirement of
the
Eighth
Amendment).
arguments a r e c o n t r a r y
offered
this
Court
Therefore,
"[b]ecause
[Stanley's]
to e s t a b l i s h e d precedent,
no
principled
reason
to
a n d he has
question
the
v a l i d i t y o f t h a t p r e c e d e n t , t h e s e i s s u e s do n o t e n t i t l e h i m t o
any
relief."
McCray,
So. 3d a t
.
XIV.
S t a n l e y argues "the t r i a l
court's override of the j u r y ' s
recommendation o f l i f e imprisonment w i t h o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f
p a r o l e was i m p r o p e r a n d must be r e v e r s e d . "
Issue
I I , pp. 24-45.)
claims
as f o l l o w s :
I n so a r g u i n g ,
(1) t h a t
(Stanley's
he p r e s e n t s
"the t r i a l
court
brief,
numerous
failed
to give
reasons f o r o v e r r i d i n g t h e j u r y ' s recommendation"
(Stanley's
brief,
failed
pp.
consider
26-27);
the
circumstance"
(2)
jury's
that
"the t r i a l
recommendation
(Stanley's b r i e f ,
court
as
a t pp. 2 7 - 2 9 ) ;
a
to
mitigation
(3) t h a t " t h e
t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o make f i n d i n g s as t o t h e s u b s t a n t i a l nons t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g evidence presented"
29-35);
(4)
unrebutted
brief,
that
"the t r i a l
court
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , pp.
was
required
non-statutory m i t i g a t i n g circumstances"
pp. 3 5 - 4 0 ) ;
(5) t h a t " t h e t r i a l
187
to
find
(Stanley's
court erred i n f a i l i n g
CR-06-2236
to
treat
Shelly Stanley's plea
m i t i g a t i n g circumstance"
that
"there
i s no
In
and
as
basis
for override i n this
a
(6)
case."
41-45.)
i t s sentencing
specific
sentence
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , pp. 4 0 - 4 1 ) ; and
proper
( S t a n l e y ' s b r i e f , pp.
a g r e e m e n t and
order,
f i n d i n g s of
the
fact
trial
c o u r t made
regarding
the
thorough
existence
or
nonexistence of each s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances.
See
§§
the
13A-5-47(d) and
13A-5-49, A l a . Code 1975.
e x i s t e n c e of t h r e e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
properly
considered
c a p i t a l o f f e n s e was
commission
prior
of
as
had
a robbery,
involving
the
been
use
aggravating
The t r i a l
circumstance
c o m m i t t e d w h i l e S t a n l e y was
conviction for
Stanley
an
I t found
§ 13A-5-49(4);
first-degree
previously
or
convicted
§
of
offenses."
atrocious,
cruel
compared
to
§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 8 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 .
on
his
13A-5-49(2),
another
t h r e a t of v i o l e n c e to the
or
the
engaged i n the
t h a t t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e c o m m i t t e d by S t a n l e y was
heinous,
that
t h a t , based
robbery,
court
felony
person;
and
"especially
other
capital
33
See P a r t X I I I , supra, w i t h r e g a r d t o the
specific
f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e m u r d e r was " e s p e c i a l l y h e i n o u s , a t r o c i o u s ,
or c r u e l compared t o o t h e r c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s . " § 13A-5-49(8),
Ala.
Code 1975.
33
188
CR-06-2236
The
trial
findings
with
circumstances.
(1975) .
and
court
also
regard
See
§§
properly
to
the
13A-5-47(d)
considered
statutory
none
to exist.
made
mitigating
and 13A-5-51, A l a . Code
I t considered a l l statutory m i t i g a t i n g
found
and
(C. 279-81.)
circumstances
Additionally,
the
t r i a l c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t c o n s i d e r e d t h e p l e a and s e n t e n c e
Shelly
received,
circumstance.
Although
considering
and
found
i t not
court
clearly
be
to
a
mitigating
(C. 281.)
the t r i a l
indicated that
the j u r y ' s advisory v e r d i c t ,
i t d i d not
i t was
clearly
p r o v i d e what i t was c o n s i d e r i n g t h e v e r d i c t a s , and t h e w e i g h t
i t was t o be a c c o r d e d .
Instead, i t stated i n i t s sentencing
order t h a t i t had c o n s i d e r e d a l l the matters
presented
to the
court, including:
" t h e t e s t i m o n y h e a r d a t t r i a l and a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g
h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , b o t h i n a g g r a v a t i o n and
m i t i g a t i o n , considering the non-statutory
evidence
o f m i t i g a t i o n o f [ S t a n l e y ' s ] f a m i l y b a c k g r o u n d , and
the recommendation of the J u r y i n i t s recommendation
of l i f e
without
p a r o l e , and a f t e r t a k i n g
into
c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l l o f t h e o t h e r m a t t e r s t h a t were
p r o f f e r e d b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t as h e r e and above s t a t e d
in t h i s Order...."
189
CR-06-2236
(C. 281-82.)
State,
(Ala.
I n a d d r e s s i n g a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n i n S p e n c e r v.
[Ms. CR-04-2570, A p r i l 4, 2008]
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) , t h i s C o u r t
So. 3d
,
said:
"However, w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r ,
a l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t made t h o r o u g h a n d s p e c i f i c
findings of fact regarding the s t a t u t o r y aggravating
circumstances
and
statutory
mitigating
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t d i d n o t make s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s o f
fact regarding the existence or nonexistence of
nonstatutory
mitigating
circumstances
offered
p u r s u a n t t o § 13A-5-52.
Rather, the t r i a l court
s t a t e d i n i t s amended s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r t h a t i t h a d
considered a l l of the matters presented t o the
court, including
"'the t e s t i m o n y heard a t t r i a l and a t t h e
sentencing hearing before t h i s Court, both
i n m i t i g a t i o n and a g g r a v a t i o n , c o n s i d e r i n g
the n o n - s t a t u t o r y evidence o f m i t i g a t i o n o f
the
defendant's
background
and
the
recommendation
of
the
jury
in i t s
recommendation o f l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e , and
a f t e r taking into consideration a l l of the
o t h e r m a t t e r s t h a t were p r o f f e r e d b e f o r e
t h i s C o u r t as h e r e a n d above s t a t e d i n t h i s
order
'
" ( C . 98.) (Emphasis added.)
Thus, a l t h o u g h i t i s
apparent
that
the t r i a l
court
considered the
e v i d e n c e S p e n c e r o f f e r e d as n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g
circumstances,
i t i s not c l e a r from t h e r e c o r d
w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d any o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o
actually constitute nonstatutory mitigation."
Spencer v. S t a t e ,
So. 3d a t
.
" A l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t n e e d n o t l i s t a n d make f i n d i n g s
as
t o each i t e m o f a l l e g e d n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g
190
evidence
CR-06-2236
offered
(Ala.
by a d e f e n d a n t ,
R e e v e s v. S t a t e ,
807 So. 2d 18, 48
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , i t must make a c l e a r f i n d i n g
the
existence
circumstance
1975."
or nonexistence
of
nonstatutory
o f f e r e d by a defendant.
See a l s o Woods v . S t a t e ,
Crim.
App. 2 0 0 7 ) ;
(Ala.
C r i m . App. 2 0 0 4 ) .
mitigating
§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( d ) , A l a . Code
S c o t t v. S t a t e , 937 So. 2d 1065,
2005) .
regarding
1087 ( A l a . C r i m . App.
13 So. 3d 1, 39-40 ( A l a .
Morrow v . S t a t e ,
928 So. 2d 315, 325-27
Alabama's j u d i c i a l - o v e r r i d e s t a t u t e ,
c o d i f i e d a t § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 7 ( e ) , A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s :
" I n d e c i d i n g upon t h e s e n t e n c e ,
the t r i a l
court
shall
determine
whether
the
aggravating
circumstances
i t finds
to exist
outweigh the
m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t f i n d s t o e x i s t , and i n
doing
so t h e t r i a l
court
shall
consider the
recommendation o f t h e j u r y c o n t a i n e d i n i t s a d v i s o r y
verdict, unless
such a v e r d i c t has been w a i v e d
pursuant
to
Section
13A-5-46(a)
or
Section
13A-5-46(g).
While
the
jury's
recommendation
c o n c e r n i n g s e n t e n c e s h a l l be g i v e n c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i t
i s n o t b i n d i n g upon t h e c o u r t . "
Thus, a l t h o u g h
evidence
i t appears t h a t t h e t r i a l
Stanley
circumstances,
trial
a
offered
as
court considered the
nonstatutory
i t i s n o t c l e a r from t h e r e c o r d
mitigating
whether t h e
c o u r t f o u n d any o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o a c t u a l l y c o n s t i t u t e
nonstatutory
court's
reasons
m i t i g a t i n g circumstance,
nor are the
f o r o v e r r i d i n g the jury's
191
advisory
trial
verdict
CR-06-2236
clearly
stated.
for
the t r i a l
its
findings
See S p e n c e r ,
So. 3d a t
c o u r t t o amend i t s s e n t e n c i n g
order to
regarding
nonexistence
the
existence
nonstatutory m i t i g a t i n g circumstances
j u r y ' s recommendation o f l i f e
Ex p a r t e
parte
Taylor,
Carroll,
852
it"
808
So.
progeny i n s t r u c t "the
for
(remanding
trial
of
and j u d i c i a l o v e r r i d e o f
imprisonment without p a r o l e ) .
So. 2d 1215,
2d
or
clarify
833,
836
1219
( A l a . 2001),
( A l a . 2002),
and
judge [to] s t a t e s p e c i f i c
Ex
their
reasons
g i v i n g t h e j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n he gave
and
instruct
recommendation
Further,
Alabama
as
the
a
trial
nonstatutory
i n Ex p a r t e T o m l i n ,
Supreme C o u r t
"In
judge
to
consider
mitigating
909 So. 2d 283
Carroll,
t h i s Court
( A l a . 2003), the
stated:
"'We
take t h i s
opportunity
to f u r t h e r e x p l a i n t h e e f f e c t o f
a j u r y ' s recommendation of l i f e
imprisonment
without
the
p o s s i b i l i t y of p a r o l e .
Such a
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n i s t o be t r e a t e d
as
a mitigating
circumstance.
The
weight
t o be
given
that
mitigating
circumstance
should
d e p e n d upon t h e number o f j u r o r s
recommending t h e s e n t e n c e o f l i f e
i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h o u t p a r o l e , and
a l s o upon t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e
factual
basis
for
such
a
192
jury
circumstance.
explained
[Ex p a r t e ]
a
CR-06-2236
recommendation i n the form of
i n f o r m a t i o n known t o j u r y , s u c h
as
conflicting
evidence
concerning
the i d e n t i t y of the
"triggerman" or recommendation of
l e n i e n c y by t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y ;
t h e j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n may be
o v e r r i d d e n b a s e d upon i n f o r m a t i o n
known o n l y t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t and
not
to
the
jury,
when
such
i n f o r m a t i o n c a n p r o p e r l y be u s e d
to
undermine
a
mitigating
circumstance.'
"852 So. 2d a t 836 ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) .
The S t a t e
u r g e s us t o o v e r r u l e C a r r o l l , ' a t l e a s t i n s o f a r as
i t d e c l a r e d t h a t a recommendation o f l i f e by t h e
jury
" i s to
be
treated
as
a
mitigating
circumstance."'
S t a t e ' s b r i e f a t 36. We d e c l i n e t o
do s o . "
909 So. 2d a t 285.
although
the t r i a l
The A l a b a m a
Supreme C o u r t c o n c l u d e d
that
c o u r t s t a t e d i n i t s o r d e r t h a t i t had
given
" ' s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e unanimous r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e
jury
for
Tomlin,
life
[imprisonment]
909 So. 2d
without
a t 286, i t d i d n o t p r o p e r l y
j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n as a m i t i g a t i n g
In
jury's
this
case,
parole,'"
although
recommendation
that
the t r i a l
Stanley
Ex
parte
consider
the
circumstance.
court
be
referenced
sentenced
to
the
life
imprisonment without p a r o l e , the c i r c u i t court's order d i d not
c l e a r l y s t a t e t h a t i t f o u n d t h e j u r y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t o be a
mitigating
circumstance
and d i d n o t c o n t a i n w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s
193
CR-06-2236
concerning
the
what w e i g h t
reasons
the jury
i t overrode
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was g i v e n o r
t h e j u r y ' s recommendation.
p a r t e T a y l o r , Ex p a r t e C a r r o l l , Ex p a r t e T o m l i n ,
Thus, we remand t h i s
its
sentencing
judicial
(trial
order
override
imprisonment
court
mitigating
case
noted
to clarify
of
without
to the t r i a l
jury's
circumstance,
c o u r t f o r i t t o amend
recommendation
See Sneed,
accorded
jury's advisory verdict).
as
life
nonstatutory
i t moderate
c o n s i d e r e d t h e number o f j u r o r s who v o t e d
the
of
1 So. 3d a t 116
recommendation
and c o n s i d e r e d t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
and Spencer.
i t s findings regarding the
the jury's
parole.
See Ex
f o r each
weight,
sentence,
of the offense i n overriding
On remand, t h e t r i a l
court
s h a l l reweigh t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e m i t i g a t i n g
circumstances
and
resentence
Stanley
and
state
how i t
c o n s i d e r e d t h e j u r y ' s a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t and t h e weight
i t was
a c c o r d e d and, i f i t a g a i n o v e r r i d e s t h e j u r y ' s recommendation,
clearly
s t a t e t h e reasons
amended
sentencing
within
order
60 d a y s o f t h e d a t e
f o r so d o i n g .
shall
The t r i a l
be s u b m i t t e d
of t h i s
to this
court's
Court
opinion.
AFFIRMED AS TO CONVICTION; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS AS TO
SENTENCING.
W e l c h , P . J . , a n d Windom, K e l l u m ,
194
and Burke, J J . , concur.
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