State of Alabama v. Travis German Henry, alias

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REL: 06/25/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 CR-09-0667 S t a t e o f Alabama v. Travis Appeal German Henry from Montgomery C i r c u i t (CC-09-648) Court WISE, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e . The unlawful appellee, Travis German Henry, was indicted for possession o f a c o n t r o l l e d substance. He moved t o suppress evidence a law enforcement o f f i c e r seized during patdown s e a r c h . the t r i a l A f t e r conducting a hearing, a court CR-09-0667 g r a n t e d Henry's motion to suppress. T h i s a p p e a l by t h e State followed. D u r i n g the suppression hearing, O f f i c e r C. L i v i n g s t o n t h e Montgomery P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t t e s t i f i e d 17, 2008, he turn. v e h i c l e and, into a service s t a t i o n and e v e n t h o u g h L i v i n g s t o n was b e h i n d him, Henry got out stopped his a p p r o x i m a t e l y one car of h i s v e h i c l e and w a l k i n g away f r o m i t t o w a r d a c o n v e n i e n c e s t o r e . testified that, as that he he told walked weapon, t h a t vehicle, and safety. He the go vehicle, also his vehicle Henry k e p t fumbling he started testified patting that, while his Henry he hands on down was was a fumbling, weapon and at before that he a s k e d H e n r y i f t h e r e was time." completed (R. the 7.) patting him of that the Livingston a n y t h i n g he n e e d e d t o know. 2 his his Because patdown, a for down, H e n r y " k e p t m o v i n g h i s l e f t h a n d t o make me b e l i e v e it and d i d n o t know i f H e n r y had i n s t r u c t e d Henry t o p l a c e that Livingston run. t e s t i f i e d t h a t he he back to started He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t h o u g h t H e n r y g e t t i n g ready to Livingston Henry to toward with h i s l e f t pocket. was December stopped Henry's v e h i c l e f o r f a i l i n g to s i g n a l a Henry p u l l e d length t h a t , on of At that CR-09-0667 p o i n t , Henry s a i d , "'[M]an, I a i n ' t g o i n g t o l i e . dope i n my p o c k e t . ' " ( R . 4.) a p p e a r e d t o be c o c a i n e I g o t some L i v i n g s t o n t h e n r e t r i e v e d what from Henry's p o c k e t and p l a c e d Henry under a r r e s t . At t h e end o f t h e s u p p r e s s i o n hearing, the following occurred: "THE COURT: "THE WITNESS: Why were y o u p a t t i n g h i m down? F o r my s a f e t y . "THE COURT: So how does i n t e r f e r e w i t h your s a f e t y ? dope i n h i s pocket "THE WITNESS: B e c a u s e as he was w a l k i n g b a c k t o w a r d t h e v e h i c l e where I was a t , he was s t e a d y reaching i n t o h i s pocket. "THE COURT: I know, b u t i f you h a d p a t t e d h i s p o c k e t , y o u w o u l d have d i s c o v e r e d w h a t ? "THE WITNESS: I d i d n ' t f i n i s h p a t t i n g h i m down. I was p a t t i n g -- I d i d n ' t p a t h i s w h o l e b o d y . I didn't get t o that pocket j u s t yet. "THE COURT: I'm s a y i n g i f y o u h a d p a t t e d t h a t p o c k e t , do y o u t h i n k y o u w o u l d have f e l t s o m e t h i n g l i k e a weapon? "THE WITNESS: pocket, yes. "THE COURT: "THE WITNESS: Y e s . I f I w o u l d have p a t t e d t h a t What weapon w o u l d you have Anything 3 found? t h a t c o u l d harm me. CR-09-0667 "THE COURT: weapon? "THE WITNESS: "THE COURT: "THE WITNESS: "THE COURT: "THE WITNESS: "THE COURT: your I'm j u s t saying. I didn't finish D i d he have a t h e p a t down. A n d I'm s a y i n g , why d i d n ' t Why d i d n ' t I ? Right. B e c a u s e I was -¬ I t h o u g h t y o u were c o n c e r n e d a b o u t safety. "THE WITNESS: Correct. "THE COURT: So seem l i k e t o me concerned about your safety, you c o m p l e t e d t h e p a t down. Am I r i g h t ? "THE WITNESS: (R. you? i f y o u were would have Correct." 8-9.) The State argues t h a t t h e t r i a l court erroneously Henry's motion officers seized t o suppress during the evidence a patdown search. law enforcement Specifically, i t c o n t e n d s t h a t L i v i n g s t o n was j u s t i f i e d i n c o n d u c t i n g search granted f o r weapons a n d t h a t , once H e n r y a d m i t t e d a patdown t h a t he h a d drugs i n h i s p o c k e t , L i v i n g s t o n had p r o b a b l e cause t o s e a r c h him and a r r e s t him f o r u n l a w f u l substance. 4 possession of a c o n t r o l l e d CR-09-0667 I n S t a t e v. H i l l , 690 So. 2d 1 2 0 1 , 1203-04 ( A l a . 1996), t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o standards of review t o be applied c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a m o t i o n t o when reviewing a suppress: "As a p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r , we n o t e t h a t t h e r e h a s b e e n some d e b a t e r e g a r d i n g t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d of a p p e l l a t e review. I n i t s u n p u b l i s h e d memorandum, t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s showed g r e a t d e f e r e n c e to the t r i a l court's d e c i s i o n t o suppress the e v i d e n c e o f t h e c o c a i n e and m a r i j u a n a . I t stated: " ' [ A ] t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s i t i s "palpably contrary t o the weight of the evidence." P a t t e r s o n v . S t a t e , 659 So. 2d 1014 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 9 5 ) . The t r i a l c o u r t i s i n a f a r b e t t e r [ s i c ] than t h i s court t o r u l e on t h e m e r i t s o f a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s . S u l l i v a n v . S t a t e , 23 A l a . App. 464, 127 So. 256 ( 1 9 3 0 ) . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g [on] the motion t o suppress was n o t p a l p a b l y wrong.' "The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d e f e r e n c e o f t h e Court o f C r i m i n a l Appeals t o t h e judgment o f t h e trial c o u r t was u n w a r r a n t e d . I t c l a i m s t h a t an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h o u l d r e v i e w de novo t h e t r i a l court's finding that 'reasonable s u s p i c i o n ' was l a c k i n g , because t h e f a c t s i n t h e case a r e n o t i n dispute. We a g r e e . "The t r i a l j u d g e made h i s r u l i n g f o l l o w i n g a h e a r i n g a t w h i c h he h e a r d o r a l t e s t i m o n y o n l y f r o m O f f i c e r B a i l e y . We s t a t e d i n Ex p a r t e Agee, 669 So. 2d 102 ( A l a . 1995) : "'Where e v i d e n c e i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l court ore tenus i n a nonjury case, a 5 trial CR-09-0667 p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s as t o t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s on i s s u e s o f f a c t ; i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t , or a g a i n s t the g r e a t weight of the evidence. Odom v. H u l l , 658 So. 2d 442 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) . However, when t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y a p p l i e s t h e law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's judgment. Ex parte Board of Zoning A d j u s t m e n t o f t h e C i t y o f M o b i l e , 636 So. 2d 415 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) . ' "669 So. 2d a t 104. 'Where t h e e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t was u n d i s p u t e d t h e o r e t e n u s r u l e i s inapplicable, and t h e Supreme C o u r t w i l l s i t i n j u d g m e n t on t h e e v i d e n c e de novo, i n d u l g i n g no presumption in favor of the trial court's a p p l i c a t i o n of the law t o those f a c t s . ' S t i l e s v. Brown, 380 So. 2d 792, 794 ( A l a . 1980) (citations omitted). " (Emphasis added.) I n R.W. 2005), this v. State, court 913 So. addressed 2d the 505, issue 512-13 of (Ala. Crim. patdown searches follows: " ' [ I ] n T e r r y v . O h i o , [391 U.S. 1 (1968)], the U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t a l i m i t e d s e a r c h f o r w e a p o n s was p a r t i a l l y justified by the need to protect the arresting officer from assault with a c o n c e a l e d weapon. " I n determining whether a p o l i c e o f f i c e r had a b a s i s f o r i n i t i a t i n g a frisk, there are two matters to be considered: whether the o f f i c e r had a sufficient degree of s u s p i c i o n t h a t the p a r t y f r i s k e d was a r m e d a n d d a n g e r o u s ; a n d 6 App. as CR-09-0667 w h e t h e r t h e o f f i c e r was r i g h t f u l l y i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e p a r t y f r i s k e d so as t o be endangered i f that person was armed." L a F a v e , S e a r c h & S e i z u r e §9.4(a) ( 2 d e d . 1987). By c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e o f f i c e r had sufficient articulable s u s p i c i o n t o make t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p , we a l s o conclude that the o f f i c e r was r i g h t f u l l y i n t h e presence of the a p p e l l a n t , being the party frisked. Moreover, the United States Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n T e r r y v. Ohio, supra: "'"The officer need not be absolutely certain that the i n d i v i d u a l i s armed; t h e i s s u e i s whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted i n the b e l i e f that h i s s a f e t y o r t h a t o f o t h e r s was i n danger. C f . B e c k v . O h i o , 379 U.S. 8 9 , 91 [85 S. C t . 2 2 3 , 2 2 4 , 13 L. Ed. 2d 142] (1964); B r i n e g a r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 33 8 U.S. 160, 174-176 [69 S. C t . 1302, 1 3 1 0 - 1 3 1 1 , 93 L. E d . 1 8 7 9 ] ( 1 9 4 9 ) ; S t a c e y v . E m e r y , 97 U.S. 6 4 2 , 645 [24 L. E d . 1 0 3 5 ] ( 1 8 7 8 ) . And i n determining whether the o f f i c e r a c t e d r e a s o n a b l y i n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , due w e i g h t must be g i v e n , n o t t o h i s i n c h o a t e and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s w h i c h he i s e n t i t l e d t o draw from t h e f a c t s in l i g h t of h i s experience. Cf. B r i n e g a r v. U n i t e d S t a t e s supra." "'392 U.S. a t 2 7 , 88 S. C t . a t 1 8 8 3 . 7 CR-09-0667 "'"We merely hold today that where a p o l i c e o f f i c e r observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably t o conclude i n light of h i s experience that criminal a c t i v i t y may b e a f o o t a n d t h a t the persons with whom he i s dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; ... h e i s entitled f o r the protection of h i m s e l f and o t h e r s i n t h e area t o conduct a carefully limited search of the outer c l o t h i n g of such persons i n an a t t e m p t t o d i s c o v e r weapons w h i c h m i g h t be used t o a s s a u l t him." " ' T e r r y v. Ohio, at 1884.' _ j_ - r> r> /I 1 392 U.S. a t 3 0 , 88 S. C t . I " S t a t e v. R i c h a r d s o n , Crim. App. 1993). 616 S o . 2 d 4 0 0 , 4 0 2 - 0 3 ( A l a . "Here, Officer Drummer and other officers r e c e i v e d a d i s p a t c h r e g a r d i n g an anonymous caller who reported that s e v e r a l y o u n g men w e r e using illegal drugs on t h e p o r c h of a residence i n southwest Birmingham. The r e s i d e n c e was i n a h i g h - c r i m e a r e a s p e c i f i c a l l y known a s a n a r e a w h e r e i l l e g a l drug a c t i v i t y took p l a c e ; there had a l s o b e e n s e v e r a l r e c e n t b u r g l a r i e s i n t h e a r e a . When O f f i c e r Drummer a n d t h e o t h e r o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d , t h e y saw s e v e r a l y o u n g men o n t h e f r o n t p o r c h of the r e s i d e n c e as t h e anonymous c a l l e r d e s c r i b e d . A l l o f t h e men, i n c l u d i n g R.W., w e r e f i d g e t i n g a n d a p p e a r e d nervous, a n d R.W., a t one p o i n t , h a d h i s hands inside h i s s h i r t . While conducting interviews with t h e men, o n e o f f i c e r discovered a 'roach' in a flowerbed near the porch. Considering the t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e was reasonable suspicion that R.W. was i n v o l v e d i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y a n d t h a t R.W. may h a v e b e e n a r m e d 8 CR-09-0667 so as t o j u s t i f y t h e T e r r y s t o p a n d f r i s k . Although O f f i c e r Drummer t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i d n o t b e l i e v e , when he i n i t i a t e d t h e p a t d o w n , t h a t R.W. was armed, O f f i c e r Drummer's s u b j e c t i v e b e l i e f s a r e i r r e l e v a n t in determining reasonable suspicion. 'Reasonable s u s p i c i o n , l i k e p r o b a b l e c a u s e , i s m e a s u r e d u s i n g an objective standard.' W i l l i a m s , 716 So. 2d a t 756. C o n s i d e r i n g the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a reasonably prudent p e r s o n i n O f f i c e r Drummer's p o s i t i o n w o u l d h a v e b e e n j u s t i f i e d i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t h i s s a f e t y as w e l l as t h e s a f e t y o f h i s f e l l o w o f f i c e r s was i n danger. S e e , e . g . , H a l l v . S t a t e , 897 So. 2d 410 (Ala. Crim. App. 2 0 0 3 ) , a n d S m i t h v . S t a t e , 884 So. 2d 3 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2003). See also Hilliard v. C o m m o n w e a l t h , 17 V a . A p p . 2 3 , 26, 434 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1993) ( ' S u s p i c i o n of i l l e g a l drug possession and d i s t r i b u t i o n i s a c i r c u m s t a n c e w h i c h g i v e s r i s e t o an i n f e r e n c e o f d a n g e r o u s n e s s . ' ) . " This court has also held that "'not a l l stops c a l l f o r a f r i s k . ' 3 LaFave § 9.4, p. 1 1 5 . A p o l i c e o f f i c e r may conduct a reasonable s e a r c h o f a p e r s o n f o r w e a p o n s ' w h e r e he h a s r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t he i s d e a l i n g w i t h an a r m e d and d a n g e r o u s i n d i v i d u a l , r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r he has p r o b a b l e cause to a r r e s t the i n d i v i d u a l f o r a crime. The o f f i c e r n e e d n o t be a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n t h a t t h e individual is armed; the issue is whether a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t man i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w o u l d be w a r r a n t e d i n the b e l i e f t h a t h i s s a f e t y or t h a t of o t h e r s was i n d a n g e r . ' T e r r y , 392 U.S. a t 2 7 , 88 S. Ct. at 1883. two "In determining f a c t o r s m u s t be whether a f r i s k considered: is justified, "'In determining whether a p o l i c e o f f i c e r had a b a s i s f o r i n i t i a t i n g a f r i s k , there are two m a t t e r s t o be considered. One concerns whether the officer had a sufficient degree of s u s p i c i o n t h a t the 9 CR-09-0667 p a r t y f r i s k e d was a r m e d a n d d a n g e r o u s , and the other whether the officer was r i g h t f u l l y i n the presence of the p a r t y frisked s o as t o be e n d a n g e r e d i f that p e r s o n was a r m e d . ' 3 L a F a v e a t § 9 . 4 ( a ) , p . 109." W o r t h y v. State, 473 So. 2d 634, 638 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). Finally, "[w]hether t h e r e i s p r o b a b l e cause to m e r i t a w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h a n d s e i z u r e i s t o be determined by t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I l l i n o i s v. G a t e s , 462 U.S. 2 1 3 , 103 S. C t . 2 3 1 7 , 76 L. E d . 2 d 527 (1983). ' P r o b a b l e cause e x i s t s where a l l the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are s u f f i c i e n t to warrant a person of r e a s o n a b l e c a u t i o n t o c o n c l u d e t h a t an o f f e n s e h a s been or i s b e i n g c o m m i t t e d and t h a t c o n t r a b a n d w o u l d be f o u n d i n t h e p l a c e t o be s e a r c h e d . ' S h e r i d a n v. S t a t e , 591 So. 2d 1 2 9 , 130 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1991)." State v. Stallworth, 645 So. 2d 323, 325 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Based away from on his Henry's vehicle, p o c k e t , L i v i n g s t o n had and actions and Therefore, patdown s e a r c h for officer g r a n t the not trial court motion to complete the his got out continued of and fumbling r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t H e n r y was dangerous. The when he he was in his armed i n performing a safety. appears to s u p p r e s s on patdown justified walked have the search 10 based i t s decision fact that Livingston and its conclusion to did that, CR-09-0667 therefore, he must n o t have b e e n t r u l y However, L i v i n g s t o n continued t o fumble w i t h h i s p o c k e t d u r i n g the patdown i f t h e r e was and anything before that retrieved he the had drugs admission because completed drugs from that in the his Henry's he had his Henry search, a weapon, he a s k e d H e n r y he n e e d e d t o know a b o u t . Livingston admitted Henry's t h i n k he had that, about safety. as i f t r y i n g t o make him testified concerned At that p o i n t , patdown pocket, pocket drugs search, and and in Henry Livingston arrested him. pocket gave his L i v i n g s t o n p r o b a b l e cause t o reach i n t o the p o c k e t to r e t r i e v e the drugs. For See the Stallworth, reasons supra. set forth herein, Livingston r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n t o conduct a patdown s e a r c h officer safety. search, that suspicion retrieve them. When H e n r y he had ripened the into d r u g s and Therefore, the motion to suppress. judgment drugs and consistent with in his probable trial this opinion. 11 pocket, of Henry f o r that that for erred we reasonable Henry's the t r i a l proceedings to possessing i n granting reverse for patdown Livingston for unlawfully court case during cause a r r e s t him Accordingly, remand this admitted, had court's that are CR-09-0667 REVERSED AND REMANDED. W e l c h , Windom, K e l l u m , a n d M a i n , 12 J J . , concur.

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