Radford Dawson, alias v. State of Alabama

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REL: 06/25/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 CR-09-0266 Radford Dawson v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal WISE, P r e s i d i n g The Ala. of thirty Radford Dawson, criminal trespass, Code 1975. days Court Judge. appellant, second-degree from Montgomery C i r c u i t (CC-09-1560) The t r i a l entered a guilty a violation of § plea to 13A-7-3, court sentenced him t o serve i n the county j a i l . After a term conducting a CR-09-0266 restitution $644.70 hearing, in restitution. During on May there without to enter that a 2009, he Road, t h a t guilty This court appeal was on the property the State was asserted be was rear window repaired requesting of the house a n d h a d t o be $664.70 and a s s e r t e d trespass rather than that time, in that on a n d t h a t he fenced, property was A f e r Dawson entered t h a t Dawson h a d a t t e m p t e d the t r i a l had been district, damaged; that, t h e window could r e p l a c e d ; and t h a t restitution. Dawson criminal Dawson h a d n o t a d m i t t e d case real that, t h e v i c t i m ' s h o u s e t h a t was l o c a t e d on t h e p r o p e r t y ; objected At t o pay Dawson a d m i t t e d t h e homeowner's p e r m i s s i o n . plea, Dawson followed. someone's b e c a u s e t h e h o u s e was i n a h i s t o r i c not ordered the g u i l t y plea proceedings, 11, Lexington his the t r i a l was mischief the Defense charged with or burglary t h a t he h a d t r i e d to enter c o u r t gave the p a r t i e s victim counsel criminal and that the house. time to provide l a w on t h e i s s u e . Subsequently, the trial conducted witnesses saw D a w s o n b r e a k a n y t h i n g ; t h a t t h e w i t n e s s case Dawson i n the backyard 2 counsel restitution During was defense a hearing. said the hearing, court argued that no i n this of the p r o p e r t y ; that CR-09-0266 Dawson was originally tools; that the case only and thing that charged went they can prove Dawson trespassing. was with through possession i s he t r e s p a s s e d indicted in question; that the question, day in granddaughter from about trying back someone around open the h a d a man the back; that to break that, that Dawson when he the person up his a telephone call h i s house; that saw w h e r e pick day; that law he went enforcement the o f f i c e r s took him someone had t r i e d to pry had broken the frame across that t h e window was not like h i s house. argues t h e window. to got back, that the t r i a l court when i t o r d e r e d h i m t o p a y $ 6 4 4 . 7 0 to left he r e c e i v e d he t h a t he l i v e d i n a t the house e v e r y he into o f t h e w i n d o w ; and when he l e f t was in a vehicle; the window; that bottom he school; that to h i s house; officers of (R. 2 8 . ) house on property"; f o r the misdemeanor offense the v i c t i m t e s t i f i e d that, and " t h e on t h e During the hearing, the burglar's jury, the grand of Specifically, he abused i t s discretion in restitution contends that f o r damage the criminal c o n d u c t f o r w h i c h he was c o n v i c t e d was n o t t h e p r o x i m a t e cause o f t h e damage t o t h e w i n d o w a n d t h a t he d i d n o t a d m i t other 3 to CR-09-0266 criminal the window. In App. as c o n d u c t t h a t was t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e damage t o Best v. S t a t e , 895 So. 2 d 1 0 5 0 , 1 0 5 4 - 5 6 2004), t h i s court d i s c u s s e d ( A l a . Crim. the imposition of r e s t i t u t i o n follows: " S e c t i o n 1 5 - 1 8 - 6 5 , A l a . Code pertinent part: 1975, s t a t e s , i n "'[I]t i s essential t o be fair and impartial i n the administration of j u s t i c e , that a l l perpetrators of criminal a c t i v i t y o r c o n d u c t be r e q u i r e d t o f u l l y c o m p e n s a t e a l l v i c t i m s of such conduct or a c t i v i t y f o r a n y p e c u n i a r y l o s s , damage o r i n j u r y a s a direct or i n d i r e c t r e s u l t thereof.' "(Emphasis added.) S e c t i o n 1 5 - 1 8 - 6 6 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975, d e f i n e s ' c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y ' as ' [ a ] n y offense with respect t o which the defendant i s convicted or any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant.' " I n S t r o u g h v . S t a t e , 501 So. 2 d 4 8 8 , 491 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1986), t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t '[b]efore a d e f e n d a n t c a n be h e l d l i a b l e f o r damages, i t must be established that his criminal a c t was t h e proximate cause of the injury sustained by t h e victim.' " I n Day v . S t a t e , Crim. App. 1989), t h i s 557 S o . 2 d 1 3 1 8 , 1 3 1 9 ( A l a . Court stated: "'In the instant case, appellant was ordered t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n t o Patterson after being convicted of the attempted m u r d e r o f J o h n s o n , a n o f f e n s e w h i c h was n o t alleged i n the indictment or proven a t 4 CR-09-0266 trial t o be the cause of Patterson's injury. " B e f o r e a d e f e n d a n t c a n be held l i a b l e f o r damages, i t must be e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t h i s c r i m i n a l a c t was t h e p r o x i m a t e cause of the i n j u r y s u s t a i n e d . . . . " Strough v . S t a t e , 5 0 1 S o . 2 d 4 8 8 , 491 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 6 ) . W h i l e t h e r e was some e v i d e n c e in the record tending to show that a p p e l l a n t d i d c a u s e P a t t e r s o n ' s i n j u r y , he was n o t on t r i a l here f o r causing her injury, nor had he been convicted of causing her i n j u r y . ... " ' I f i t c o u l d be s a i d t h a t P a t t e r s o n ' s injury arose from a p p e l l a n t ' s attempted murder of Johnson, f o r which he was convicted, then she could properly be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a v i c t i m , and r e s t i t u t i o n t o h e r w o u l d be p r o p e r . However, when one s u f f e r s a l o s s which r e s u l t e d from conduct t h a t was n o t t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s prosecution and f o r which a subsequent p r o s e c u t i o n w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e the d e f e n d a n t ' s c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y , i f any, we h o l d t h a t a n o r d e r o f r e s t i t u t i o n t o t h a t p e r s o n i s no more a p p r o p r i a t e than w o u l d be t h e s e n t e n c i n g o f t h e d e f e n d a n t t o a term of imprisonment without first affording him the basic constitutional g u a r a n t e e s o f a t r i a l a n d v e r d i c t on t h o s e charges. A p p e l l a n t s h o u l d not have been ordered t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n t o P a t t e r s o n . ' "In B r o t h e r s v. S t a t e , 531 So. 2 d 317, (Ala. C r i m . App. 1988), t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d : 318-19 "'The appellant was indicted for b u r g l a r y i n the t h i r d degree, theft of p r o p e r t y i n t h e f i r s t degree, and a r s o n i n the second degree. He p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o b u r g l a r y i n t h e t h i r d degree and t h e f t of property i n the f i r s t degree, w i t h the 5 CR-09-0266 arson charge being continued under t h e condition that the charge would be dismissed i f the appellant pleaded g u i l t y to t h e other offenses and d i d not appeal. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to the Habitual F e l o n y O f f e n d e r A c t a n d was o r d e r e d t o p a y r e s t i t u t i o n f o r the f u l l replacement value of t h e house and i t s c o n t e n t s w h i c h were destroyed i n the f i r e resulting from the arson. "'I "'The a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h a t t h e t r i a l court erred i n ordering him t o pay restitution f o r damage t o t h e property c a u s e d b y a r s o n when he was n o t c o n v i c t e d of arson and d i d not admit that h i s c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y r e s u l t e d i n t h e damage w h i c h was c a u s e d b y t h e a r s o n " ' " " "'The State a r g u e s t h a t t h e damage caused by t h e arson was an "indirect result" of the appellant's criminal activity. II I "'The appellant did not admit c o m m i t t i n g a r s o n , n o r was h e c o n v i c t e d o f committing arson. This case i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m E x p a r t e C l a r e , 456 So. 2 d 357 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) . The a p p e l l a n t i n C l a r e was o r d e r e d t o p a y r e s t i t u t i o n f o r m o n i e s e m b e z z l e d i n an amount g r e a t e r t h a n that involved i n the indictment. However, she admitted embezzling monies which r i g h t f u l l y b e l o n g e d t o h e r e m p l o y e r a n d was convicted of embezzling. 6 CR-09-0266 "'The burning of the v i c t i m ' s house was n o t a n i n d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e t h e f t o r b u r g l a r y u n d e r § 13A-2-5, Code o f A l a b a m a (1975) II I "'Clearly the appellant's acts of b r e a k i n g and e n t e r i n g and c o m m i t t i n g t h e f t were not the cause of the b u r n i n g of the victim's house; rather, the act of committing arson was the cause. The b u r n i n g of the house would not have been w i t h i n the contemplation of the appellant in committing burglary or theft. Therefore, the trial court erred in o r d e r i n g the a p p e l l a n t t o pay restitution f o r t h e p r o p e r t y damaged by t h e arson.' " I n L a m a r v . S t a t e , 803 So. 2 d 576 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001), t h i s Court reversed the t r i a l court's r e s t i t u t i o n award o f $25,000 t o R o s a l y n S e l l e r s and her son for injuries t h e y had sustained in an automobile accident. Lamar had entered a guilty p l e a to the offense of l e a v i n g the scene of an a c c i d e n t , a v i o l a t i o n o f § 3 2 - 1 0 - 1 , A l a . Code 1975, and he a r g u e d on a p p e a l t h a t 'the c i r c u i t court i m p r o p e r l y o r d e r e d him t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n b e c a u s e , he a r g u e [ d ] , t h e i n j u r i e s t h e v i c t i m s s u s t a i n e d w e r e not " p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d " by h i s l e a v i n g t h e s c e n e . ' L a m a r , 803 So. 2 d a t 5 7 7 . In our o p i n i o n r e v e r s i n g the trial court's restitution award, t h i s Court stated: "'The t e r m " c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s " i s d e f i n e d i n § 15-18-66, A l a . Code 1975, as "[a]ny offense w i t h respect to which the defendant i s c o n v i c t e d o r any o t h e r c r i m i n a l conduct admitted by the defendant." "However, before there can be any recovery, the criminal a c t i v i t y m u s t be the proximate cause of the p e c u n i a r y loss, damage, o r 7 CR-09-0266 injury." M o o r e v . S t a t e , 706 S o . 2 d 2 6 5 , 267 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996). Therefore, u n d e r A l a b a m a ' s r e s t i t u t i o n s t a t u t e , Lamar c o u l d be o r d e r e d t o p a y r e s t i t u t i o n t o t h e v i c t i m s o f h i s c r i m e o n l y i f one o f two conditions existed: (1) his victims s u f f e r e d any d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t pecuniary l o s s e s as a r e s u l t of the a c t i v i t y f o r w h i c h h e h a s b e e n c o n v i c t e d o r , (2) L a m a r admitted t o other c r i m i n a l conduct during these proceedings t h a t was t h e p r o x i m a t e cause o f any i n j u r i e s t o t h e v i c t i m s . II I "'... T h e c r i m e o f " l e a v i n g t h e s c e n e " does not r e q u i r e t h a t t h e defendant cause t h e a c c i d e n t ; i t r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t he be involved i n the accident The trial c o u r t c o u l d o r d e r Lamar t o p a y r e s t i t u t i o n only f o r the pecuniary losses h i s victims s u s t a i n e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e o f f e n s e t o w h i c h he p l e a d e d g u i l t y Lamar's p l e a o f g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e d e f i n e d i n §§ 32-10-1 and 32-10-2 d i d n o t r e s u l t i n a conviction f o r causing the accident that r e s u l t e d i n t h e i n j u r i e s t o S e l l e r s and h e r son, and, t h e r e f o r e , h i s g u i l t y p l e a c o u l d not a u t h o r i z e the t r i a l court t o sentence him to pay restitution for injuries s u s t a i n e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e a c c i d e n t . See Day v . S t a t e , 557 S o . 2 d 1 3 1 8 , 1 3 1 9 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1989) ( h o l d i n g t h a t an o r d e r o f restitution i s inappropriate for injuries the v i c t i m s u f f e r s as a r e s u l t o f "conduct t h a t was n o t t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s prosecution and f o r which a subsequent p r o s e c u t i o n w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y " ) . "'The trial court could also have o r d e r e d Lamar t o p a y r e s t i t u t i o n f o r "any o t h e r c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t " he a d m i t t e d d u r i n g 8 CR-09-0266 these proceedings t h a t was t h e p r o x i m a t e cause of the v i c t i m s ' i n j u r i e s . See § 15-18-66. H o w e v e r , a t no p o i n t d u r i n g t h e plea colloquy, the sentencing hearing, or the restitution hearing d i d Lamar ever admit to having caused the accident resulting in the victims' injuries. A l t h o u g h e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g b o t h the sentencing and r e s t i t u t i o n hearings t h a t Lamar h a d c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t b e c a u s e h e was s p e e d i n g a n d he s t r u c k a t u r n i n g v e h i c l e , L a m a r h i m s e l f n e v e r made s u c h a n admission. Under t h e p l a i n language o f § 15-18-66, r e s t i t u t i o n c a n be o r d e r e d only for "other criminal conduct" that i s a d m i t t e d by t h e defendant. T h i s c o u r t has previously held that an admission, as d e f i n e d i n § 1 5 - 1 8 - 6 6 , r e q u i r e s "a j u d i c i a l admission sufficient to support a conviction before restitution can be ordered." Day v . S t a t e , s u p r a , a t 1 3 1 9 . T h e r e f o r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a d no s t a t u t o r y authorization to order Lamar to pay r e s t i t u t i o n t o S e l l e r s and h e r son f o r t h e injuries they sustained during the a c c i d e n t , b e c a u s e Lamar n e v e r a d m i t t e d any conduct that could be s a i d t o be t h e proximate cause of t h e i r injuries.' "Lamar, 803 S o . 2 d a t 5 7 7 - 7 9 (footnote omitted). "In the present case, B e s t was c o n v i c t e d o f receiving stolen property, i . e . , Garrick's 1988 Dodge p i c k u p t r u c k . T h e r e w e r e no a l l e g a t i o n s o r proof that Best ever had possession of Garrick's personal property. I n f a c t , as p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , G a r r i c k a d m i t t e d a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g t h a t he 'really [ d i d n ' t ] know i f M r . B e s t e v e r h a d those items' i n h i s possession. (R. 181.) At the sentencing hearing, Best stated that '[t]he truck was g i v e n t o [ h i m ] f o r d r u g s ... [ t h a t he] gave [ G a r r i c k ' s ] w i f e drugs t o use t h e t r u c k ' and t h a t 9 CR-09-0266 'on t h i s d a t e , F e b r u a r y t h e 7 t h , [ h e ] g a v e h e r some crack cocaine f o r the truck.' (R. 1 8 6 - 8 7 . ) "In l i g h t of the foregoing, the t r i a l court improperly ordered Best t o pay restitution to G a r r i c k i n t h e amount o f $3,300 f o r h i s m i s s i n g personal property." (Emphasis added.) In degree this case, criminal Dawson entered a guilty plea to second- trespass. "A p e r s o n i s g u i l t y o f c r i m i n a l t r e s p a s s i n t h e s e c o n d d e g r e e i f he k n o w i n g l y enters or remains u n l a w f u l l y i n a b u i l d i n g o r upon r e a l p r o p e r t y which is fenced or enclosed i n a manner d e s i g n e d to exclude i n t r u d e r s . " § 1 3 A - 7 - 3 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975. property was n o t an e l e m e n t Causing of the offense criminal trespass. Also, factual basis Dawson's allegations for that Additionally, Dawson t h e damage damage t o t h e v i c t i m ' s neither the guilty h a d damaged of second-degree indictment plea included the victim's entering t o t h e w i n d o w was n o t c a u s e d b y t h e the victim's fenced property. subsequent p r o s e c u t i o n would have been n e c e s s a r y whether Dawson v i c t i m ' s window. was any property. c o n d u c t t h a t was t h e s u b j e c t o f D a w s o n ' s p r o s e c u t i o n Dawson nor the criminally Therefore, liable -- i . e . , Rather, a to determine f o r damage to the Dawson's c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t i n t h i s 10 CR-09-0266 c a s e was n o t t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e damage t o t h e v i c t i m ' s window. Further, proceedings, window. Dawson Therefore, to order case d i d n o t , a t any time during the a d m i t t h a t h e c a u s e d t h e damage t o t h e v i c t i m ' s pay Accordingly, this Dawson the t r i a l restitution we r e v e r s e f o r the t r i a l i n this court for the t r i a l court erred damage court's when to the to set aside i t s restitution REMANDED. W e l c h , Windom, K e l l u m , and Main, 11 window. judgment and remand case. R E V E R S E D AND i t ordered J J . , concur.

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