Alfonzo Morris v. State of Alabama
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REL: 02/05/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 CR-07-1997 Alfonzo Morris v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal MAIN, from Jefferson Circuit (CC-97-5397) Court Judge. On A p r i l 3, 2 0 0 3 , A l f o n z o Morris was c o n v i c t e d counts o f c a p i t a l murder f o r t h e i n t e n t i o n a l k i l l i n g Rochester during t h ecourse o f two of Miriam of a first-degree burglary, see § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , a n d t h e i n t e n t i o n a l k i l l i n g o f CR-07-1997 Miriam see Rochester vote trial the of jury were A funds On Court, the cause was execution a to h i r e an under the On counts April of held U.S. 2d 431 Eighth court capital 2008, the Morris murder. 2 of test mentally was The denied was therefore a p p l i e d the jury sentence further his not App. rights provided expert. to determine evidence i s not an conducted pursuant (2002), and the (Ala. Crim. he by before for mental-health Amendment hearing that Morris 7, because 304, death, Following remanded So. trial retarded After determined 956 independent 536 the trial fair sentencing c o n v i c t i o n and 2 0 0 7 , a h e a r i n g was mentally Constitution. counsel, State, was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t M o r r i s was and a to death. his A t k i n s v. V i r g i n i a , is sentenced this November 26, Morris hearing to 2005). This Court with sentencing M o r r i s v. process Following a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t of and reversed, due of a f i r s t - d e g r e e robbery, 1975. an M o r r i s was appeal proceedings. and course returned 10-2. c o u r t , and automatic to the §13A-5-40(a)(2), A l a . Code hearing, a during again was not the set whether subject United and to States arguments out to in of Atkins retarded. tried for unable to the reach two a CR-07-1997 verdict, trial and t h e t r i a l began The Miriam had evidence Rochester, who showed was boarder, health. h e r home The two l a d i e s offense, at i l l a n d was b e i n g rescue approximately unit 9:00 and f i r e p.m. R o c h e s t e r . The p a r a m e d i c 201.) that a duplex approximately had testified A sons and had t a k e n elderly 9:30 and i n poor p.m., Rochester truck. arrived were a t t h e house a t shown very neat to Russell by of the rescue unit and o r d e r l y . " (R. testified She t e s t i f i e d that she went outside t o check t h a t s h e saw s o m e o n e " f o o l i n g the doors." a problem (R. 2 0 3 . ) She t h e n asked and i f she c o u l d h e l p 3 the person on h e r around r e s c u e u n i t a c t i n g l i k e h e was l o o k i n g i n t h e w i n d o w s , was Russell to the hospital. engine was in a a n d , on t h e n i g h t who was t h e d r i v e r the "house and Rochester t o inform him that taken and a walker, A f t e r R u s s e l l was a s s e s s e d a n d t h e a m b u l a n c e c a l l e d , t h e paramedic with third 24, 1997, i n h e r home. h a d become f r i e n d s , one o f R u s s e l l ' s A on F e b r u a r y who was a l s o telephoned become that to death into Elizabeth Russell, the a mistrial. 85 y e a r s - o l d , u s e d 92 p o u n d s , was b e a t e n transformed of declared o n M a y 5, 2 0 0 8 . State's weighed court my fooling i f there h i m . T h e man, whom s h e CR-07-1997 identified was go in court h a p p e n i n g and as M o r r i s , w a l k e d up who was i n s i d e t h e h o u s e . The Morris attempted to prevented him and he area there." (R. telling him Morris and saw a m b u l a n c e , she paramedic returned. that the He his a l s o saw back She that Morris crew Morris house, that had a to point but she lived in to "he right stepped doors of informed approximately the her partner a block approximately 10:00 to update her from h i s b r o t h e r the in go alcohol, her what a w a y as p.m., was Russell saw that 4 to the w a l k away. and The through Morris Morris had had been i n s t r u c t e d him saw Morris rescue crew Russell's hour l a t e r , the that she the As out son on R u s s e l l ' s c o n d i t i o n . He a b o u t an she appropriate. partner that the ambulance vehicle testified h a l f of were carrying into The paramedic of f i n a l l y t u r n and leave. call he wanted t h a t a t one understood responses t r o u b l e p r e v i o u s l y , and Rochester and her a s k e d what t h a t he the strongly causing At enter told smelled rescue thereafter opened so. and knew e v e r y b o d y testified paramedic the doing her and 205.) Although paramedic insisted paramedic t e s t i f i e d bypass from that s i c k ; he to her to walk left. telephoned received informing him a that CR-07-1997 the b r o t h e r had r e q u e s t and that been to Rochester's t h e d o o r was house open and have been r a n s a c k e d . B o t h o f R u s s e l l ' s at his mother's t h e house a p p e a r e d sons to t h e n went t o t h e house and w i t h o u t e n t e r i n g d e t e r m i n e d , t h a t t h e house had b e e n vandalized. They attempted to telephone Rochester and then t e l e p h o n e d the p o l i c e . The among police them Russell. Russell the She was and rescue units same paramedic testified that the deceased. arrived who she had around earlier originally midnight, cared believed for that However, b e c a u s e o f t h e number o f p o l i c e o f f i c e r s p r e s e n t , she d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e d e a t h was not believed informed the o f f i c e r s t h a t she h a d b e e n c a l l e d t o t h e h o u s e e a r l i e r on that night also told know to and be due to natural t h a t the house had them a b o u t his name Morris's at that causes. She n o t b e e n i n d i s a r r a y . She presence time and b e h a v i o r . She but gave the d i d not officers his description. The that f i r s t o f f i c e r who had a r r i v e d a t the scene t h e r e were " p r y m a r k s " on e n t r y . (R. 261.) t h e man who had He the door, testified i n d i c a t i n g forced took a d e s c r i p t i o n from the paramedic attempted to gain 5 entry i n t o the house of and, CR-07-1997 a f t e r t h e s c e n e was p r o c e s s e d , at approximately 4:00 a.m. a n d resumed h i s p a t r o l o f t h e a r e a . A t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5:00 a.m., he l e f t he o b s e r v e d a man f i t t i n g t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n who h a d e a r l i e r a t t e m p t e d t o e n t e r R o c h e s t e r ' s The house e a r l i e r . man a p p e a r e d t o be i n t o x i c a t e d a n d was s t a g g e r i n g down t h e m i d d l e o f t h e s t r e e t . The o f f i c e r a s k e d t h e man q u e s t i o n s a n d he r e s p o n d e d i n a " s l u r r e d , b u t l o g i c a l way." officer determined that i t was not safe (R. 265.) The f o r t h e man to c o n t i n u e a n d a r r e s t e d h i m f o r p u b l i c i n t o x i c a t i o n . The o f f i c e r identified Morris at t r i a l as t h e man he h a d a r r e s t e d . He a s k e d t h e man i f he was c a r r y i n g any weapons, a n d he r e s p o n d e d t h a t he h a d a p o c k e t k n i f e i n h i s r i g h t f r o n t p o c k e t . He a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he h a d o t h e r described as " j u n k . " items (R. 267.) i n h i s p o c k e t s t h a t he (R. 267.) The o f f i c e r stated that the i t e m s were p i e c e s o f costume j e w e l r y . He a l s o h a d a c o u p l e o f pills and himself a cigarette Morris identified as " A n t h o n y M o r r i s " a n d gave t h e o f f i c e r an a d d r e s s for h i s residence. 1 i n h i s pockets. (R. 270.) I t was l a t e r d e t e r m i n e d t h a t A n t h o n y M o r r i s i s M o r r i s ' s b r o t h e r a n d t h e a d d r e s s t h a t he gave t h e o f f i c e r was t h a t o f h i s b r o t h e r . He a l s o gave h i s b r o t h e r ' s d a t e o f b i r t h when t h e o f f i c e r s were t a k i n g h i s c l o t h i n g t o be p r o c e s s e d . 1 6 CR-07-1997 Before the o f f i c e r l e f t the scene of M o r r i s ' s a r r e s t , the p a r a m e d i c was could brought identify him to as that the was had seen e a r l i e r taken to concluded was the t h a t he taken to j a i l had she was c e r t a i n t h a t he was at Rochester's administrative was too determine man p a r a m e d i c t e s t i f i e d t h a t she she l o c a t i o n to seen house. f o r t h e n i g h t and The the 223.) where i n t o x i c a t e d t o be she earlier. (R. building if man Morris officers interviewed. He i n t e r v i e w e d the f o l l o w i n g day. Rochester's some o f victim the and granddaughter jewelry Russell. taken and from Blood 2 Russell's Morris found as on son identified belonging Morris's to the shoe was d e t e r m i n e d t o be R o c h e s t e r ' s and a c i g a r e t t e b u t t f o u n d i n t h e Rochester's Morris's Morris the day t h e man house c o n t a i n e d t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l of the offense w i t h whom he and had t h a t he had had gotten into b e e n l i v i n g . He e v e n t u a l l y b e g a n g a m b l i n g w i t h a man 433.) He 2 t e s t i f i e d that DNA. he won an left argument the house known as "Cue a bag Some o f t h e j e w e l r y c o u l d n o t be 7 been d r i n k i n g of jewelry identified. on with and Ball." (R. from "Cue CR-07-1997 Ball" "Cue and t h a t , as Ball" he snatched stated that other was attempting money from him gamblers got b e c a u s e t h e y d i d n o t want him Morris s t a t e d t h a t he Ball" and walked a a involved to leave fight ensued. He i n the a l t e r c a t i o n , s i n c e he was winning. i n t h e a l t e r c a t i o n . He t e s t i f i e d threw the j e w e l r y to and jewelry, s u f f e r e d c u t s and b r u i s e s , as w e l l as l a c e r a t i o n over h i s eye, "Cue to gather the Huddle a t him House and t h a t he p i c k e d restaurant a that i t up for breakfast. He s t a t e d t h a t he became b e l l i g e r e n t w i t h t h e w a i t r e s s b e c a u s e he had been drinking, testified but that and he was a f t e r e a t i n g he d i d not testified put to leave. He also a c i g a r e t t e i n h i s mouth light i t . Morris forced officer who drinking that indicated and arrested s t a t e d t h a t he was that him (R. 4 4 1 ) , 443-444.) he vehicle, he around h i s was stated that feet. then Morris for encountered appeared public to a police have been intoxication. Morris taken i n the p o l i c e car "to the scene of a crime i n a house" While he (R. where a woman i d e n t i f i e d him. standing a dog 444.) in front of the (R. police "came f r o m somewhere" and was He 8 ran the subsequently taken to CR-07-1997 h o s p i t a l t o t r e a t t h e l a c e r a t i o n t o h i s eye and t h e n was to the taken jail. B e c a u s e M o r r i s has been s e n t e n c e d to death, this Court must r e v i e w t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b e l o w f o r p l a i n e r r o r , u n d e r R u l e 45A, Ala.R.App.P., which states: "In a l l c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y has been imposed, the C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s s h a l l n o t i c e any p l a i n e r r o r o r d e f e c t i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s under review, whether or not brought to the a t t e n t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e a p p e l l a t e a c t i o n by r e a s o n t h e r e o f , whenever such e r r o r has o r p r o b a b l y has a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of the a p p e l l a n t . " T h i s p l a i n - e r r o r s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w has b e e n a d d r e s s e d b y this c o u r t as follows: "The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n r e v i e w i n g a c l a i m u n d e r the p l a i n - e r r o r doctrine is stricter than the standard used i n r e v i e w i n g an issue that was p r o p e r l y r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r on a p p e a l . As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , t h e p l a i n - e r r o r d o c t r i n e a p p l i e s o n l y i f t h e e r r o r i s ' p a r t i c u l a r l y e g r e g i o u s ' and i f i t ' s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t [ s ] the f a i r n e s s , i n t e g r i t y or p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n o f j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s . ' See Ex p a r t e P r i c e , 725 So. 2d 1063 ( A l a . 1998), cert. d e n i e d , 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1809, 143 L.Ed.2d 1012 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; B u r g e s s v. S t a t e , 723 So. 2d 742 (Ala.Cr.App. 1997), aff'd, 723 So.2d 770 (Ala. 1 9 9 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1360, 143 L.Ed.2d 521 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , 620 So. 2d 679, 701 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 620 So.2d 709 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , on remand, 620 So. 2d 714 9 CR-07-1997 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 510 U.S. 285, 126 L . E d . 2 d 235 (1993)." H a l l v. S t a t e , 820 affirmed, 1080, 820 So. So. 2d 113, 2d 152 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . "The t h i s Court denied, 121-22 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999), 979 U.S. review Ex p a r t e P e r k i n s , 851 So. 2d 453, Morris's 540 U.S. failure to D i l l v. 1 9 9 1 ) , a f f i r m e d , 600 object will 507 U.S. 924 S t a t e , 600 So. 455 830(2003). not preclude f r o m r e v i e w i n g an i s s u e , i t w i l l w e i g h a g a i n s t c l a i m o f p r e j u d i c e . See C r i m . App. S.Ct. standard a p p l i c a b l e to p l a i n - e r r o r 2002), c e r t . denied, Although 114 ( A l a . 2001), c e r t . denied, i s a s t r i n g e n t one (Ala. 905, 2d 372 So. any 2d 343 (Ala. ( A l a . 1992), cert. (1993). I. Morris argues that his execution i s p r o h i b i t e d by E i g h t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n b e c a u s e i s m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d . He r a i s e s s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o n s on to support The Atkins Virginia, presentation trial he appeal h i s argument. r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t a h e a r i n g was v. the of the court concluded 536 h e l d pursuant U.S. 304 (2002), evidence and arguments that Morris 10 and of to following the counsel, the i s not m e n t a l l y retarded. CR-07-1997 Morris argues t h a t t h e t r i a l errors and t h a t i trelied c o u r t made a number o f f a c t u a l on " r e a s o n i n g c o u r t s " i n making i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The t r i a l an ( M o r r i s ' s b r i e f , a t 29.) c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i s due t o be e v a l u a t e d abuse-of-discretion standard. 0113, f o r e c l o s e d by the Byrd v. S t a t e , under [Ms. CR-07- May 1, 2 0 0 9 ] ___ So. 3 d ___ , ___ ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) ("'"'A j u d g e a b u s e s h i s d i s c r e t i o n o n l y when h i s d e c i s i o n i s b a s e d on an e r r o n e o u s c o n t a i n s no e v i d e n c e c o n c l u s i o n o f l a w o r where t h e r e c o r d on w h i c h he r a t i o n a l l y c o u l d have b a s e d his d e c i s i o n . ' " ' " ) . The United guidelines States Supreme f o r determining Court whether a i n Atkins person provided i s mentally r e t a r d e d t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he o r s h e s h o u l d n o t be e x e c u t e d . However, t h e C o u r t a l s o h e l d t h a t u l t i m a t e l y t h e s t a t e s s h o u l d e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own d e f i n i t i o n s . The C o u r t stated: "To t h e e x t e n t t h e r e i s s e r i o u s d i s a g r e e m e n t about t h e e x e c u t i o n o f m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d o f f e n d e r s , i t i s i n determining which offenders are i n f a c t retarded. In this case, f o r instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins s u f f e r s f r o m m e n t a l r e t a r d a t i o n . N o t a l l p e o p l e who c l a i m t o be m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d w i l l be s o i m p a i r e d a s to f a l l w i t h i n t h e range o f m e n t a l l y retarded o f f e n d e r s a b o u t whom t h e r e i s a n a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . As was o u r a p p r o a c h i n F o r d v . W a i n w r i g h t , 477 U.S. 3 9 9 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , w i t h r e g a r d t o i n s a n i t y , 'we l e a v e t o t h e 11 CR-07-1997 S t a t e [ s ] t h e t a s k o f d e v e l o p i n g a p p r o p r i a t e ways t o e n f o r c e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n upon [ t h e i r ] e x e c u t i o n o f s e n t e n c e s . ' I d . , a t 405, 416-417." 536 U.S. a t 317, 122 S . C t . a t 2250. (Footnote omitted). Alabama has y e t t o s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e m e n t a l r e t a r d a t i o n in the context of determining the s u f f i c i e n c y o f an Atkins c l a i m . However, A l a b a m a h a s d e f i n e d a m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d p e r s o n f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e " R e t a r d e d D e f e n d a n t A c t , " § 15-24-1 e t seq., A l a . Code 1975, as f o l l o w s : "Mentally retarded person. A person with significant subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated with concurrent impairments i n adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period, as measured by appropriate standardized testing instruments. " § 15-24-2 ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975. The A l a b a m a Supreme Court has d i r e c t e d t h a t review of A t k i n s c l a i m s a r e t o be c o n d u c t e d a p p l y i n g t h e "'most common' or 'broadest' by d e f i n i t i o n o f m e n t a l r e t a r d a t i o n , as the c l i n i c a l definitions prohibit definitions set forth the 851 i n Atkins i n the s t a t u t e s of other imposition defendant i s mentally considered of the retarded. So. 2d 453, 455-56 death sentence Smith and t h e states See, e.g., Ex p a r t e ( A l a . 2002)." 12 represented when that the Perkins, v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-07-1997 1060427, May 25, 2 0 0 7 ] ___ So. 3d ___ , ___ (Ala. 2007). Moreover, i n examining the d e f i n i t i o n s of mental r e t a r d a t i o n in other s t a t e s w i t h s t a t u t e s p r o h i b i t i n g the e x e c u t i o n of a mentally retarded person, the Alabama Supreme Court has written: "Those states with statutes prohibiting the e x e c u t i o n of a m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d defendant r e q u i r e that a defendant, to be considered mentally retarded, must have significantly subaverage i n t e l l e c t u a l f u n c t i o n i n g (an IQ o f 70 o r b e l o w ) , and s i g n i f i c a n t or s u b s t a n t i a l d e f i c i t s in adaptive b e h a v i o r . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e s e p r o b l e m s must have manifested themselves during the developmental p e r i o d ( i . e . , b e f o r e t h e d e f e n d a n t r e a c h e d age 1 8 ) . " Ex p a r t e P e r k i n s , 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002). 3 S i m i l a r l y , i n suggesting guidance f o r determining a defendant is mentally defendant's execution, definitions of definitions mental "require the retarded so Atkins Court r e t a r d a t i o n and not only as to prohibit discussed concluded subaverage whether the clinical that these intellectual S e e 851 So. 2d a t 456 n. 3 f o r a l i s t o f s t a t u t e s r e f e r e n c e d . M o r e o v e r , Morrow v. S t a t e , 928 So. 2d 315, 323-24 n. 8, 9, and 10 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 4 ) , p r o v i d e s a l i s t o f s t a t e s t h a t have c r e a t e d p r o c e d u r e s f o r d e t e r m i n i n g m e n t a l r e t a r d a t i o n l e g i s l a t i v e l y and j u d i c i a l l y and s e t s o u t s t a t e s ' v a r y i n g r e q u i s i t e burdens of proof. 3 13 CR-07-1997 functioning, skills that but s u c h as became Further, also significant communication, manifest limitations in adaptive self-care, self-direction age before and 536 U.S. 18." " [ i ] m p l i c i t i n the d e f i n i t i o n at i s t h a t the subaverage i n t e l l e c t u a l f u n c t i o n i n g and t h e d e f i c i t s i n a d a p t i v e must be p r e s e n t a t t h e t i m e t h e c r i m e was having manifested themselves before So. 3d a t Legislature r e t a r d a t i o n t o be courts w i l l basis and (Ala. continue thus establishes a S m i t h v. definition by 698 a the guidelines State, the "on for mental Alabama a case-by-case t h a t have b e e n j u d i c i a l l y State, 928 So. 2d 315, 324 2004). the d e f e n d a n t , and preponderance So. as claims, Atkins to review such claims r e t a r d e d and t h e r e f o r e may e x e c u t e d i s on State, 18." burden of p r o o f f o r a c l a i m t h a t a c a p i t a l is mentally claim c o m m i t t e d as w e l l have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t u n t i l f a r . " Morrow v. C r i m . App. The courts used i n determining to apply developed behavior . Alabama a p p e l l a t e Alabama age 318. 2d 151 of the he 14 not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y or she evidence. ( A l a . C r i m . App. defendant 1995) must p r o v e Cf. Trawick be this v. ( o v e r r u l i n g Bass CR-07-1997 v S t a t e , 585 So. 2d 225 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 1 ) , t o t h e e x t e n t it i m p l i e d t h a t the burden of p r o v i n g an i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e was by a " p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e " r a t h e r t h a n b y " c l e a r a n d convincing evidence"). "'In the context o f an A t k i n s claim, the defendant has the burden of proving by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t he o r she i s m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d . ' S m i t h v. S t a t e , [Ms. 1060427, May 25, 2007] So. 3d a t ; s e e S m i t h v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-97-1258, J a n . 16, 2009] So. 3d at ___ ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000) ( o p i n i o n on r e t u r n t o f o u r t h r e m a n d ) . '"The q u e s t i o n o f [ w h e t h e r a c a p i t a l d e f e n d a n t i s m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d ] i s a f a c t u a l one, and as s u c h , i t i s t h e f u n c t i o n o f t h e f a c t f i n d e r , not t h i s Court, t o determine the weight t h a t s h o u l d be a c c o r d e d t o e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y o f t h a t i s s u e . " ' S m i t h v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-97-1258, J a n . 16, 2009] So. 3d a t ( q u o t i n g A t k i n s v. Commonwealth, [266 Va. 73,] 581 S.E.2d 514, 515 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ) . As t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h a s e x p l a i n e d , questions regarding w e i g h t and c r e d i b i l i t y d e t e r m i n a t i o n s are b e t t e r left to the c i r c u i t courts, 'which [have] t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p e r s o n a l l y o b s e r v e t h e w i t n e s s e s and assess t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y . ' S m i t h v. S t a t e , [Ms. 1060427, May 25, 2007] So. 3d a t (quoting S m i t h v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-97-1258, S e p t . 29, 2006] So. 3d , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 6 ) ( S h a w , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( o p i n i o n on r e t u r n t o t h i r d r e m a n d ) ) . " B y r d v. S t a t e , So. 3d a t . See a l s o J e n k i n s v. State, 972 So. 2d 165, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2005) ( " ' P r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e ' i s d e f i n e d a s : 'The g r e a t e r w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e , 15 CR-07-1997 n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e g r e a t e r number o f w i t n e s s e s testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most c o n v i n c i n g f o r c e ; s u p e r i o r e v i d e n t i a r y weight t h a t , though not s u f f i c i e n t t o f r e e the mind w h o l l y is one still side sufficient to incline of the issue D i c t i o n a r y 1220 a fair rather ( 8 t h ed. Moreover, i f M o r r i s from a l l reasonable than and i m p a r t i a l m i n d t o the other.' Black's fails t o p r o v e e v e n one o f t h e t h r e e he h a s n o t s a t i s f i e d h i s b u r d e n o f p r o o f . 3d a t ___ ("All three S m i t h v. S t a t e , retarded claim."). an opportunity Atkins hearing was held to Shealy, interviewed hours each first provide direct him t o prove by a preponderance o f t h e e v i d e n c e he i s m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d . M o r r i s p r e s e n t e d Allen for a f o r purposes of F o l l o w i n g t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on M o r r i s ' s appeal, evidence, f a c t o r s must be met i n o r d e r p e r s o n t o be c l a s s i f i e d as m e n t a l l y an A t k i n s Law 2004)."). prongs o f t h e A t k i n s t e s t by a preponderance o f t h e So. doubt, a Morris psychologist, on two who occasions time. 16 the testimony testified that for a period the that o f Dr. he of had three CR-07-1997 As t o M o r r i s ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l the Wechsler A d u l t f u n c t i o n i n g , he administered I n t e l l i g e n c e S c a l e E d i t i o n 3, t h e B e n d e r - G e s t a l t w i t h C a n t o r I n t e r f e r e n c e P r o c e d u r e , and t h e V i n e l a n d II Adaptive interviewed Behavior Morris's Scale. two He sisters also testified and reviewed that a number he of M o r r i s ' s r e c o r d s , i n c l u d i n g h i s p r i s o n a n d s c h o o l r e c o r d s . He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he r e v i e w e d p r e v i o u s p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e p o r t s and t e s t i n g s , as w e l l as r e c o r d s f r o m t h e T a y l o r H a r d i n Secure Medical F a c i l i t y . Dr. S h e a l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t M o r r i s was m i l d l y mentally and t h a t full-scale retarded he had a IQ o f 50. ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. 17.) He t e s t i f i e d t h a t , c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y , he reviewed s i x years Morris's first IQ t e s t a d m i n i s t e r e d was o f a g e , w h i c h h a d r e s u l t e d i n an IQ s c o r e o f 73. He a l s o n o t e d t h a t he h a d c o n s i d e r e d 1999 when M o r r i s an IQ t e s t a d m i n i s t e r e d i n b y Dr. K i m b e r l y A c k e r s o n , f i n d i n g t h a t M o r r i s h a d a f u l l s c a l e IQ o f 53 a n d t h a t he was m o d e r a t e l y m e n t a l l y retarded. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t h e n c o n s i d e r e d h i s own f i n d i n g s , as w e l l as the l a s t 2007, which concluded testing Morris c o n d u c t e d by Dr. G l e n n K i n g scored t h a t he was a full-scale malingering. 17 i n October IQ o f 41; Dr. King CR-07-1997 As that to Morris's he first Department of AAMD A d a p t i v e adaptive considered Mental the Health Behavior behavior, Scale Dr. Shealy findings after of i t had i n 1999 and testified the Alabama administered had concluded the that M o r r i s was m o d e r a t e l y r e t a r d e d . He t h e n c o n s i d e r e d t h e t e s t administered, concluding that Morris impaired i n s e v e r a l areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y also found that Morris was impaired was significantly i n communication. in daily living somewhat i n s o c i a l i z a t i o n . Most r e c e n t l y , M o r r i s was a d a p t i v e b e h a v i o r s c a l e b y Dr. K i n g , who was f u n c t i o n i n g a t an Dr. King Shealy he a l s o concluded testified the that M o r e o v e r , he as child, M o r e o v e r , Dr. Alabama mentally the moot. issue concluded, of Mental 18 and given an that Morris s i x months, but Although Dr. c o n c l u s i o n , because retarded can in special malingering ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. Shealy Department of He have b e e n m a l i n g e r i n g , s t a t e d t h a t b e c a u s e he was a and malingering. t h a t M o r r i s may the concluded years importance of t h i s even c u r r e n t t e s t s was the of f i v e b e l i e v e d t h a t M o r r i s was discounted classes age he malinger. education the more 25). b a s e d on Health on he a statement that the by reported CR-07-1997 history information behavior had been school records, before Morris on M o r r i s impaired that suggested since h i s mental that childhood, his adaptive as w e l l r e t a r d a t i o n had as on manifested r e a c h e d age 18. At the hearing, M o r r i s also presented the testimony of as a c h i l d . She one o f h i s s i s t e r s as t o h i s a d a p t i v e b e h a v i o r t e s t i f i e d t h a t M o r r i s was a s l o w l e a r n e r a n d t h a t he c o u l d n o t manage money o r h i s m e d i c i n e . not separate She a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d i d c o l o r s b e f o r e d o i n g t h e wash, d i d n o t c l e a n w e l l , and d i d n o t p r e p a r e m e a l s . She s t a t e d t h a t he h a d n e v e r lived a l o n e t h a t he h a d n e v e r m a r r i e d b u t h a d f a t h e r e d two c h i l d r e n . The State presented the testimony o f W y a t t Rhone, patient-education coordinator at Taylor Hardin Facility. times, He both testified when he that was an Secure a Medical he h a d met w i t h M o r r i s several outpatient was a n d when he an i n p a t i e n t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , he t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n 2006, M o r r i s was t r a n s p o r t e d from j a i l to Taylor Hardin, him a four- s i x times beginning during where Rhone met t o six-week period. a s s e s s m e n t s c o r e was a z e r o , a n d a t t h e of the six-week course, he was s t i l l 19 assessed with Morris's completion at zero. Rhone CR-07-1997 t e s t i f i e d t h a t e x a m p l e s o f q u e s t i o n s on t h e t e s t a r e : "[W]ho's the head of represents w o u l d be which the you courtroom[?]" or talks f o r you y o u r l a w y e r . Who is the difficult D.A." He testified concerning an as an episode that would have "Who of course i n court, he found scored a i t zero c o n c e r n e d v e r y b a s i c k n o w l e d g e , and c e r t a i n o c c a s i o n s M o r r i s was gave 85.) i n court, which to b e l i e v e that Morris he R. i s i t t h a t ' s a g a i n s t you (Id.) because the q u e s t i o n s matters; (Atkins hearing a b l e t o d i s c u s s f a r more c o m p l e x example of on the a d i s c u s s i o n they television show The had had Crocodile Hunter. Approximately inpatient, 10 t o 11 months l a t e r , Rhone t e s t i f i e d m i n u t e s e s s i o n s . He t h a t he gave M o r r i s t h e met when M o r r i s was w i t h him same t e s t , f o r 13 and he an 30- again s c o r e d z e r o . He a l s o gave M o r r i s a t r u e - f a l s e t e s t c o n t a i n i n g 10 q u e s t i o n s and M o r r i s s c o r e d a z e r o , w h i c h Rhone s t a t e d "a l i t t l e u n u s u a l . " ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. 91.) He t e s t i f i e d he a d m i n i s t e r e d t h e t r u e - f a l s e t e s t a s e c o n d t i m e , and was that Morris a n s w e r e d one q u e s t i o n c o r r e c t l y . Rhone c o n c l u d e d t h a t " [ i ] f he was managing to answer a l l of 20 them wrong, that was an CR-07-1997 indication (Atkins o f an i n t e l l e c t u a l hearing typically R. refused 92). a b i l i t y t o reason Rhone t o answer also stated multiple-choice t e s t i f i e d t h a t he d e t e r m i n e d t h a t M o r r i s The State presented nurse a t the J e f f e r s o n met with Morris conditions jail. his the testimony County j a i l , at least who s i x times and t r e a t m e n t s while that Morris questions. was of V i c k i Webster, stated that past medications. h i s medical incarcerated at the medical services provided Ned custodian identified Whitehead with and r e c o u n t e d h i s m e d i c a l h i s t o r y and He was a l s o a b l e the w r i t t e n m e d i c a l a she h a d She t e s t i f i e d t h a t M o r r i s d e m o n s t r a t e d f a m i l i a r i t y medical conditions He malingering. concerning he was that out." t o take advantage of the i n the j a i l , as w e l l as t o f i l l o u t forms. testified of the records a visitors f o r the State at the J e f f e r s o n l o g that indicated, that County he was jail. He despite Morris's s t a t e m e n t t o Dr. S h e a l y t h a t he h a d n o t s e e n h i s f a m i l y a n d that they may n o t know where he i s , that members h a d v i s i t e d h i m a number o f 21 times. Morris's family CR-07-1997 Terry Love, o f t h e Alabama P r o b a t i o n testified that presentence he had interviewed i n v e s t i g a t i v e report 2003. M o r r i s provided his Morris that '92 to '97, how he gambling, s t e a l i n g , s o l d marijuana, doing t o make a l i v i n g . " provided ordered had d i e d , h i s s i b l i n g s ' much to a in s u c h as h i s p a r e n t s ' employment h i s t o r y , i n c l u d i n g " l a w n s e r v i c e from Office, pursuant h a d been the information, names a n d t h e d a t e s t h e y and P a r o l e made doing names, a n d self-employed i t , hustling, a v a r i e t y o f t h i n g s he was (Atkins hearing R. 112) . He t h e names a n d ages o f h i s c h i l d r e n . ( A t k i n s also hearing R. 1 1 4 ) . Phillip testified R u s s e l l , o f t h e Birmingham that he i n t e r v i e w e d a r r e s t i n the present his brother's, address as brother's State comparison Department, on t h e d a y a f t e r h i s c a s e . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t M o r r i s gave h i m Anthony h i s own. Morris's, He signed name, d a t e of b i r t h , h i s statement and using h i s name. A handwriting the Morris Police specialist, that Morris purposes Steven D r e x l e r , t e s t i f i e d f o r gave a number o f w r i t i n g s a m p l e s f o r and t h a t 22 he could determine that the CR-07-1997 s i g n a t u r e on t h e s u b m i t t e d He c o u r t documents was s t a t e d , however, t h a t the documents was handwriting t h a t of M o r r i s . i n the t e x t of i n c o n c l u s i v e as t o t h e a u t h o r . D r e x l e r t h a t M o r r i s had a t t e m p t e d t o a l t e r h i s h a n d w r i t i n g of the samples and that w r i t i n g s where he was "[i]n particular the testified i n a number [in] the extended w r i t i n g paragraph a f t e r paragraph after p a r a g r a p h and m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t a l t e r e d s t y l e , i n my o p i n i o n i t would take a great deal style of maintain that habits." ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. t h a t t h e r e a s o n he the author "extended writing. of and not fortitude resort back to be to c o u l d n o t make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n the text of because I am the documents provided to comparing me able your 157). Moreover, D r e x l e r w r i t i n g standard And mental normal concluded concerning was because was not natural to the natural writing to u n n a t u r a l w r i t i n g , my o p i n i o n i s I d o n ' t have an o p i n i o n , i t ' s inconclusive." Finally, King, Morris ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. the a clinical on Facility. two He State presented and the testimony o f Dr. f o r e n s i c p s y c h o l o g i s t , who occasions first 163). at the Jefferson interviewed County s p o k e w i t h M o r r i s on O c t o b e r 3, 23 Glenn Detention 2007 and CR-07-1997 t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n i t i a l l y M o r r i s i n d i c a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t know h i s S o c i a l S e c u r i t y number o r h i s p r i s o n - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n number (AIS n u m b e r ) . Dr. K i n g t e s t i f i e d t h a t " I ' v e b e e n i n t e r v i e w i n g and evaluating death row i n m a t e s since about 1991, b o t h i n G e o r g i a a n d A l a b a m a . A n d Mr. M o r r i s i s t h e f i r s t p e r s o n t h a t ' s not known h i s AIS number." (Atkins hearing R. 176.) He i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h a d no r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h f a m i l y members and t h a t he d i d n o t know t h e i r b i r t h d a t e s o r a g e s . He i n d i c a t e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f h i s a r r e s t he was l i v i n g w i t h "some more p e o p l e , w o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y them." ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. 177.) He indicated that he h a d b e e n lawn s e r v i c e and s t e e l - m i l l involved i n odd j o b s , including a s s e m b l y w o r k and t h a t he h a d a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . D r . K i n g s t a t e d t h a t when a s k e d t h e f a r t h e s t d i s t a n c e he h a d d r i v e n , he became e v a s i v e . Morris and was m a l i n g e r i n g h i s current He a l s o f o u n d that i n h i s a n s w e r s as t o t h e c u r r e n t date l o c a t i o n . Dr. K i n g testified: " H i s t h o u g h t p r o c e s s e s were n o r m a l i n p r o g r e s s and f o r m . A n d a t t h e same t i m e , t h r o u g h o u t t h e i n t e r v i e w f r o m t h e e a r l y o n s e t , he was, i n my opinion, somewhat u n c o o p e r a t i v e , m i l d l y h o s t i l e , d i d n ' t want t o be t h e r e , c l i p p e d i n h i s a n s w e r s , frequently evasive, not answering questions or frequently s a y i n g ' I d o n ' t know' t o t h i n g s . A n d t h a t ' s how I 24 CR-07-1997 w o u l d d e s c r i b e h i s a f f e c t as w e l l i s t h a t he was somewhat i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e p r o c e s s a n d a t o t h e r t i m e s he was u n c o o p e r a t i v e . " ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. Dr. King 178.) testified t h a t he a d m i n i s t e r e d Morris and t h a t h i s o v e r a l l score "below the lowest o f one p e r c e n t population." one tenth was an IQ t e s t to 41, w h i c h p l a c e d h i m of the general ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. 181-82.) He s t a t e d t h a t "a l o t o f M o r r i s ' s s c o r e s were i n t h e t h r e e t o f i v e y e a r o l d r a n g e . " ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. 182.) Dr. K i n g concluded that Morris was " c l e a r l y m a l i n g e r i n g " f o r a number o f r e a s o n s . (Atkins hearing R. were 183.) He inconsistent" interview, noted with as w e l l that his IQ h i s "general scores presentation" as h i s r e s p o n s e s Moreover, incorrectly some of the questions that Morris was shown the on t h e ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. Morris c o u l d be a n s w e r e d c o r r e c t l y by p e o p l e from extreme mental r e t a r d a t i o n . during and s t a t e m e n t s v i d e o t a p e s made a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a r r e s t . 182.) "totally answered who suffer As e x a m p l e s , Dr. K i n g a p i c t u r e of a cat with noted a ball and s t a t e d t h a t t h e p i c t u r e showed a c a t w i t h a k i d . He was unable to person take four blocks a n d p u t them 25 i n t h e shape o f a CR-07-1997 although a plate showed the demonstrated the a p p r o p r i a t e u n a b l e t o do s o . Dr. in Morris's inability design. In the K i n g a l s o p o i n t e d out to count achievement fill-in-the-blank Morris but spell achievement his contrast, h i s w r i t t e n requests contained was able M o r r i s was unable to in consultations he t e s t e d M o r r i s on t h e 10 " d o m a i n s " d e a l i n g w i t h t h e a b i l i t y to to adaptive the behavior, ability f u n c t i o n a l academics. range of the 10. As sophisticated vocabulary. communicate, the were written that As but read however, test; f o r h e a l t h care simple to with his to and words still as syntax misspelled King inconsistency subtract responded incorrect. on the c o u l d add and test, questions words Dr. a s e r i e s of b l o c k s w h i l e a n s w e r s t h a t were o b v i o u s l y simple after c o n f i g u r a t i o n , M o r r i s was a c h i e v e m e n t t e s t showed t h a t he numbers. Even to use King scores, 1 t o 19, Dr. King testified community ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. s c o r i n g was to Morris's Dr. resources, 191.) He stated that w i t h the average testified: "He s c o r e d a t h r e e o r l o w e r on a b s o l u t e l y e v e r y t h i n g i n d i c a t i n g t h a t he e s s e n t i a l l y i s n o n f u n c t i o n a l i n all of these a r e a s m e a n i n g he's not able to 26 and being CR-07-1997 c o m m u n i c a t e , n o t a b l e t o u s e community r e s o u r c e s , n o t a b l e t o have any a c a d e m i c a b i l i t i e s , u n a b l e t o t a k e c a r e o f h i m s e l f , h a s no c o n c e p t i o n r e a l l y o f health and s a f e t y issues, can't use leisure a c t i v i t i e s , can't even take care o f h i m s e l f i n terms o f b a t h e h i m s e l f , wash h i m s e l f a n d t h a t s o r t o f t h i n g , c a n n o t d i r e c t h i m s e l f , a n d a l s o h a s no s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s meaning i n almost a l l o f these cases -- i n f i v e o f t h e s u b t e s t s c o r e s , he s c o r e d one, w h i c h i s t h e l o w e s t p o s s i b l e . And h i s i n d i v i d u a l a n s w e r s on some o f t h e i t e m s were a l s o a b s u r d . " ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. 192.) were t h a t he was u n a b l e Among t h e a n s w e r s g i v e n b y M o r r i s t o answer t h e t e l e p h o n e or t o cut h i s meat i n o r d e r t o e a t i t . Dr. King also t e s t i f i e d t h a t he a d m i n i s t e r e d a t e s t t o M o r r i s s p e c i f i c a l l y devised t o determine malingering--the Test i f the respondent i s o f Memory M a l i n g e r i n g . D r . K i n g found t h a t M o r r i s was m a l i n g e r i n g b a s e d on h i s s c o r e s on t h a t t e s t . He a l s o n o t e d administrators that h i s previous also indicated e x a m p l e , Dr. K i n g n o t e d scores given by other t h a t he was m a l i n g e r i n g ; f o r t h a t t h e chances o f M o r r i s ' s s c o r e d a 0 on a 1 0 - q u e s t i o n a l s o noted test having t r u e - f a l s e t e s t was 1 i n 4,000. He t h a t D r . Kamal N a g i , a psychiatrist and f o r e n s i c e x a m i n e r a t T a y l o r H a r d i n S e c u r e M e d i c a l F a c i l i t y who h a d a l s o i n t e r v i e w e d M o r r i s , b e l i e v e d t h a t he was m a l i n g e r i n g . 27 CR-07-1997 U l t i m a t e l y , b a s e d on a l l o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o him, functions i n the high b o r d e r l i n e t o low average range of i n t e l l e c t u a l ability with an Dr. K i n g concluded that Morris IQ p o s s i b l y i n t h e l o w 8 0 s . He a l s o adaptive able skills to support himself by w o r k i n g . a t 73, " c e r t a i n l y n o t r e t a r d e d . " and M o r e o v e r , he n o t e d there was special-education attorneys that no ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. 202.) Dr. indication c l a s s e s . The Dr. Shealy Morris's school that court had that i n f i r s t grade s c o r e d him a l s o n o t e d t h a t he h a d r e v i e w e d that Morris's i n d i c a t e d t h a t he c o u l d d r i v e a n d t h a t he was t h e IQ t e s t t h a t he was a d m i n i s t e r e d King found t h a t Morris confirmed stated that was records ever through Morris was in the in s p e c i a l - e d u c a t i o n c l a s s e s b a s e d on i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m M o r r i s o r f a m i l y members'. that Morris's ( A t k i n s h e a r i n g R. 204.) Dr. K i n g school records indicated that he was l e a r n e r , b u t t h a t he was r a t e d as a v e r a g e i n s e v e n t h participation although on testified t h e r e was a p l a c e on t h e f o r m i n t h e s c h o o l Morris. 28 none were slow grade f o r i n c l a s s d i s c u s s i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s ; w h i c h t o i n d i c a t e any h a n d i c a p s , a further, records included for CR-07-1997 On cross-examination, Dr. King stated M o r r i s i f he h a d a " j a i l h o u s e l a w y e r " jail help him f i l l and M o r r i s concluded that Morris found t h a t M o r r i s court found that, M o r r i s was m a l i n g e r i n g , IQ s c o r e ; higher also r a t h e r they than found referencing Finally, he retardation c o u l d n o t e s t a b l i s h an he h a d r e c e i v e d was his ability before believed that accurate a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t h i s a c t u a l IQ may be Morris found S p e c i f i c a l l y , the a l l the examiners they the scores that retarded. at the hearing, the t r i a l was n o t r e t a r d e d . because responded h i m on o c c a s i o n . Dr. i s not mentally B a s e d on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d court asked h i m t h a t when he h a d been a t Homewood, he h a d someone who h a d h e l p e d King he a t the J e f f e r s o n County o u t h i s documents, t h a t he d i d n o t . M o r r i s i n f o r m e d that to s e l l that age Morris's school records able there 18, to through adapt drugs was stating testing. and He function, and s t r e e t - s a v v i e s . no that were more r e l i a b l e manifestation he believed of that than the accounts g i v e n b y h i s f a m i l y members. In the present case, Morris has not proved p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t he i s m e n t a l l y 29 by a retarded, CR-07-1997 such t h a t the d e t e r m i n a t i o n the discretion vested by t h e t r i a l court, pursuant to i n i t as t h e f a c t f i n d e r , should be r e v e r s e d . As t o M o r r i s ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l f u n c t i o n i n g , t h e e x p e r t s all found concluded that that he was fact this Morris i s mentally found that malingering. d i d not p r o h i b i t h i s f i n d i n g retarded, Morris's Although Dr. K i n g specific of retarded. was e n t i t l e d t o w e i g h t h e c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y and evaluate discretion their testimony. Shealy that a n d W y a t t Rhone instances i n d i c a t e d t h a t he was n o t m e n t a l l y Dr. The c o u r t both malingering The t r i a l court of the experts d i d not exceed i t s i n doing so. While the conflicting jury expert is the testimony fact finder as t o m e n t a l i n reconciling competency a t t h e time of the o f f e n s e , the f o l l o w i n g g u i d e l i n e s are a p p l i c a b l e to determination the t r i a l testimony court's as t o c o n f l i c t i n g as t o m e n t a l r e t a r d a t i o n : "'"Opinions of experts i n the f i e l d of m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s as t o an a c c u s e d ' s s a n i t y or i n s a n i t y a r e o f course a d m i s s i b l e and c e r t a i n l y s h o u l d be c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d by a j u r y . Such o p i n i o n e v i d e n c e i s n o t , however, conclusive on t h e j u r y . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s upon t h e j u r y t o w e i g h 30 expert CR-07-1997 all the evidence, expert and lay, p e r t a i n i n g to the i s s u e of the accused's mental competency. The weight to be accorded a l l such evidence i s s o l e l y w i t h i n t h e j u r y ' s p r o v i n c e . They may r e j e c t i t a l l even though i t i s w i t h o u t conflict." " ' F i t z h u g h v. S t a t e , 35 A l a . App. 18, 26, 43 So. 2d 831, 838, c e r t . d e n i e d , 253 A l a . 246, 43 So. 2d 839 ( 1 9 4 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 339 U.S. 986, 70 S.Ct. 1007, 94 L.Ed. II 1388 (1950).... I " ' " E x p e r t t e s t i m o n y , e v e n when u n c o n t r a d i c t e d , i s n o t c o n c l u s i v e on t h e i s s u e o f s a n i t y , ... and t h e j u r y may f i n d s u c h t e s t i m o n y a d e q u a t e l y r e b u t t e d by t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s o f mere l a y m e n . " [ U n i t e d S t a t e s v.] M o t a , 598 F.2d [995] a t 999 [ ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) ] . See a l s o G r e i d e r v. D u c k w o r t h , 701 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th C i r . 1983) ("The jury could credit the t e s t i m o n y o f l a y w i t n e s s e s o v e r t h a t o f an e x p e r t w i t n e s s " ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Emery, 682 F.2d 493, 498 n. 3 ( 5 t h C i r . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 465, 74 L.Ed.2d 615 (1982) ("The j u r y can f i n d expert testimony adequately rebutted by the o b s e r v a t i o n s of laymen"). II I " ' A l t h o u g h "a f a c t f i n d e r n e e d n o t a d h e r e t o an e x p e r t o p i n i o n on i n c o m p e t e n c y i f t h e r e i s r e a s o n t o d i s c o u n t i t , " S t r i c k l a n d v. F r a n c i s , 738 F.2d 1542, 1552 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) , " t h e j u r y c a n n o t a r b i t r a r i l y i g n o r e the e x p e r t s i n f a v o r of the o b s e r v a t i o n s of l a y m e n , " i d . , and must have an " o b j e c t i v e r e a s o n , " to d i s r e g a r d the e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n which i s r e b u t t e d o n l y by l a y t e s t i m o n y . W a l l a c e v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102, 1109 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1985) . 31 CR-07-1997 "'"In making this judgment [to d i s r e g a r d the e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n ] , the c o u r t should consider "'"(1) the correctness or adequacy of the factual a s s u m p t i o n s on w h i c h t h e e x p e r t o p i n i o n s are based; "'"(2) p o s s i b l e b i a s i n experts' appraisal of defendant's c o n d i t i o n ; the the "'"(3) inconsistencies in the experts' testimony, or material variations between e x p e r t s ; and "'"(4) the relevance strength of the contrary testimony. and lay " ' " S t r i c k l a n d , 738 F.2d at 1552; B r o c k [v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , ] 387 F.2d [254, 258 (5th C i r . 1967) ] ( q u o t i n g Mims v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 375 F.2d 135, 143-44 ( 5 t h C i r . 1967)). " " ' W a l l a c e v. Kemp, 757 " E l l i s v. S t a t e , 570 1990)." Dunaway v. State, 1998), a f f i r m e d , 529 U.S. 1089 746 746 So. So. So. 2d F.2d 2d 744, 2d 1021, 1042 (2000). 32 at 1109.' 751-53 (Ala.Cr.App. 1033 (Ala. Crim. ( A l a . 1999), cert. App. denied, CR-07-1997 Moreover, M o r r i s d i d n o t prove by a preponderance o f t h e evidence that any o f t h e a l l e g e d d e f i c i t s i n h i s adaptive behavior t h a t might i n d i c a t e r e t a r d a t i o n had manifested the age o f 18. A l t h o u g h not live alone members, and t h a t evidence investigative his sisters at report t e s t i f i e d t h a t he c o u l d he h a d a l w a y s the hearing indicated that indication school records, contained classes. A records review i n the record presentence with T h e r e was a l s o no 4 that of he attended Morris's on a p p e a l 4, i n d i c a t e s t h a t he was c o n s i d e r e d learner a n d was d e s c r i b e d as " m i s c h i e v o u s " courses family was l i v i n g Exhibit s c h o o l , b u t was a s s e s s e d with the Morris of the offense. special-education lived in a n o t h e r man a t t h e t i m e i n Morris's before school as Defendant's t o be a slow i n elementary an IQ s c o r e o f 73. A l t h o u g h he f a i l e d i n 7 t h a n d 8 t h g r a d e s , he a l s o made B ' s , C ' s , a n d D's. B e c a u s e t h e e v i d e n c e was c o n f l i c t i n g and t h e r e f o r e i m p l i c a t e d c r e d i b i l i t y and w e i g h i n g c h o i c e s , t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s b e t t e r suited to the t r i a l c o u r t . See g e n e r a l l y Ex p a r t e B r i d g e t t , 1 D u r i n g M o r r i s ' s t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l , he a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t he was r e n t i n g f r o m a h a n d i c a p p e d man w i t h whom he l i v e d a n d f o r whom he s h o p p e d a n d p r e p a r e d m e a l s . (R. 428-29.) 4 33 CR-07-1997 So. 3d 1057, 1063 ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) ; Denson v. M i d d l e t o n , App. 17 A l a . 266, 267, 84 So. 473, 474 (1919) . T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n from t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d trial t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n made by t h e c o u r t was i m p r o p e r . As to Morris's adaptive f u n c t i o n i n g , although there e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t M o r r i s was i n c a p a b l e o f l i v i n g and of performing generally from certain Morris basic himself tasks, or this alone evidence his sisters. was came Although M o r r i s ' s s i s t e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t M o r r i s was i n c a p a b l e o f t a k i n g his temperature evidence or indicating taking medicine, that Morris the State sought medical j a i l when n e e d e d a n d a r t i c u l a t e l y r e q u e s t e d need f o r t r e a t m e n t . Morris See 5 The S t a t e attention i n h i s medication or also presented evidence that had worked and engaged i n drug d e a l i n g and g a m b l i n g . Smith v. S t a t e , [Ms. 1060427, May 25, 2007] ("'More i n s i g h t f u l fact presented that i n t o Smith's adaptive S m i t h was i n v o l v e d So. 3d a t behavior i n an i n t e r s t a t e i s the illegal-drug I t i s also notable that although Morris's s i s t e r also t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was i n c a p a b l e o f c o o k i n g a m e a l , M o r r i s t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t he h a d c o o k e d b r e a k f a s t f o r h i s l a n d l o r d a n d h i m s e l f on t h e m o r n i n g o f t h e o f f e n s e . 5 34 CR-07-1997 enterprise.'"). There was also evidence indicating M o r r i s w o r k e d i n l a w n c a r e a n d i n a s s e m b l y work. v. A l l e n , jobs that Cf. Holladay 555 F. 3d 1346, 1359 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2009) (Holladay's i n c l u d e d pumping g a s " w h i c h he h a d t o l e a v e b e c a u s e he c o u l d n o t work t h e c a s h r e g i s t e r " a n d a w a r e h o u s e j o b t h a t he lost "because other inabilities."). The employees State were concerned presented about h i s further evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t M o r r i s u s e d h i s b r o t h e r ' s name, a d d r e s s , and d a t e o f b i r t h when he was a r r e s t e d a n d a g a i n i n a s t a t e m e n t t o the police. See S m i t h v . S m i t h , Supreme C o u r t considered the fact So. 3d a t that (Alabama S m i t h gave a police o f f i c e r a f a l s e name two d a y s b e f o r e t h e o f f e n s e as i n d i c a t i n g of a l a c k o f d e f i c i t s Morris's conflicts specific i n h i s adaptive arguments i n the evidence, e v a l u a t e d by t h e t r i a l behavior.). raised on appeal address w h i c h were p r o p e r l y w e i g h e d a n d c o u r t as t h e f i n d e r o f f a c t . the t r i a l c o u r t d i d no e r r i n d e t e r m i n i n g mentally retarded f o r purposes of A t k i n s . 35 Therefore, that Morris i s not CR-07-1997 II. Morris a r g u e s t h a t he was i m p r o p e r l y b e c a u s e , he s a y s , find the the t r i a l existence circumstances, aggravating and of i t circumstance court sentenced t o death f a i l e d to consider several nonstatutory impermissibly and t o mitigating counted the same twice. A. M o r r i s contends t h a t the t r i a l court improperly consider the following nonstatutory he had a low l e v e l educational problems; that that m i t i g a t i n g evidence: of i n t e l l i g e n c e ; that he that suffered he h a d a h i s t o r y of alcohol he from poor psychiatric and d r u g abuse; that h i s d i v o r c e d when he was a t e e n a g e r ; t h a t h i s f a t h e r d i e d a fire when he was a t e e n a g e r months b e f o r e killing that had a he was i n t o x i c a t e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c r i m e ; parents in history; failed to and h i s mother d i e d t h e c r i m e f o r w h i c h he was c o n v i c t e d ; four that the o f R o c h e s t e r was n o t p l a n n e d b e c a u s e he b e l i e v e d no one was home; t h a t he h a d a d a p t e d t o p r i s o n l i f e ; a n d t h a t h i s s i s t e r a s k e d f o r m e r c y on h i s b e h a l f . Thus, M o r r i s a r g u e s t h a t the trial court's finding, without 36 explanation ini t s CR-07-1997 s e n t e n c i n g o r d e r t h a t no n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s e x i s t e d was erroneous. M o r r i s d i d n o t o b j e c t on t h i s g r o u n d level; therefore this J o h n s o n v. So. 3d court i s s u e must be a n a l y z e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e . R u l e 45A, In at the t r i a l State, Ala.R.App.P. [Ms. CR-99-1349, O c t o b e r ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009), t h i s Court 2, 2009] determined t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o make s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s as t o each nonstatutory mitigating order d i d not present case, required, mitigating constitute the circumstance i n i t s sentencing plain error. sentencing order although i t d i d not list Moreover, addressed or f i n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n so h o l d i n g , we as in the a l l that was any n o n s t a t u t o r y wrote: "'In Ex p a r t e L e w i s , [ M s . 1070647, May 29, 2009] In So. 3d 3d ( A l a . 2 0 0 9 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t q u o t e d C l a r k v. S t a t e , 896 So. 2d 584 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , c o n c e r n i n g a t r i a l c o u r t ' s d u t y i n c o n s i d e r i n g whether p r o f f e r e d evidence c o n s t i t u t e s "'"The sentencing order shows that the trial court considered a l l of the m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by C l a r k . The trial c o u r t d i d not l i m i t or r e s t r i c t C l a r k i n any way as t o 37 CR-07-1997 t h e e v i d e n c e he p r e s e n t e d o r t h e arguments he made regarding m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. In i t s sentencing order, the t r i a l court addressed each statutory m i t i g a t i n g circumstance l i s t e d i n § 13A-5-51, A l a . Code 1975, a n d i t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t none o f t h o s e circumstances e x i s t e d under t h e evidence presented. Although the t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t l i s t a n d make f i n d i n g s as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o r nonexistence o f each n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g circumstance offered by C l a r k , as n o t e d a b o v e , s u c h a l i s t i n g i s n o t r e q u i r e d , and t h e trial c o u r t ' s n o t making such findings i n d i c a t e s only that the trial court found the o f f e r e d e v i d e n c e n o t t o be m i t i g a t i n g , not t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t consider t h i s evidence. C l e a r l y , the trial court considered Clark's p r o f f e r e d evidence of m i t i g a t i o n but concluded that the evidence d i d not r i s e t o the level of a mitigating circumstance. The t r i a l court's findings i n this regard are s u p p o r t e d by t h e r e c o r d . "'"Because i t i s c l e a r from a review of the e n t i r e record that the t r i a l c o u r t understood i t s duty to consider a l l the m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by Clark, that the t r i a l court d i d in fact consider a l l such evidence, and t h a t the t r i a l 38 CR-07-1997 c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s a r e s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e , we f i n d no e r r o r , p l a i n or otherwise, i n the t r i a l court's f i n d i n g s r e g a r d i n g the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances." "'896 " So. So. 3d a t 2d a t 652-53 (emphasis added).' . "Here, i t i s clear that the trial court c o n s i d e r e d a l l o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d and made p r o p e r f i n d i n g s as t o what e v i d e n c e constituted n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . '"[T]he t r i a l court i s not r e q u i r e d to s p e c i f y i n i t s sentencing o r d e r each i t e m of proposed n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d t h a t i t c o n s i d e r e d and f o u n d n o t t o be m i t i g a t i n g . " W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 710 So. 2d 1276, 1347 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 6 ) , a f f ' d , 710 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1 9 9 7 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 524 U.S. 929, 118 S.Ct. 2325, 141 L.Ed.2d 699 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . ' Brown v. S t a t e , 11 So. 3d 866, 932 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) , a f f i r m e d , Ex p a r t e Brown, 11 So. 3d 933 ( A l a . 2008), cert. d e n i e d , Brown v. A l a b a m a , U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2864, 174 L.Ed.2d 582 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 'We have o f t e n s t a t e d t h a t " ' [ a ] l t h o u g h the t r i a l c o u r t i s r e q u i r e d to consider a l l m i t i g a t i n g circumstances, the d e c i s i o n of w h e t h e r a p a r t i c u l a r m i t i g a t i n g circumstance i s p r o v e n and t h e w e i g h t t o be g i v e n i t r e s t s w i t h t h e s e n t e n c e r . ' " B o y d v. S t a t e , 715 So. 2d 825, 840 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 715 So. 2d 852 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) , q u o t i n g W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 710 So. 2d 1276, 1347 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 6 ) , a f f ' d , 710 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1 9 9 7 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 524 U.S. 929, 118 S.Ct. 2325, 141 L.Ed.2d 699 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . ' Hodges v. S t a t e , 856 So. 2d 875, 932 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , a f f i r m e d , Ex p a r t e Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936 ( A l a . 2003), cert. d e n i e d , Hodges v. A l a b a m a , 540 U.S. 986, 124 S.Ct. 39 CR-07-1997 465, 157 L . E d . 2 d 379 (2003) ( f i n d i n g t h a t 'a t r i a l court i s not bound to find as a mitigating circumstance t h a t a codefendant r e c e i v e d a l e s s e r s e n t e n c e t h a n d e a t h . See J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 842 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 820 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 2001)')." So. 3d a t . Here, M o r r i s made no argument a t sentencing concerning t h e e x i s t e n c e o f any n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . fact, the only s i s t e r , who did not the became e m o t i o n a l argue nonstatutory witness the defense and was existence mitigating of presented was Morris's unable to t e s t i f y . any circumstances of the at the now "'The trial c o u r t d i d n o t have an obligation to instruct on a statutory m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t was n o t r e l i e d upon o r a r g u e d d u r i n g t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e . As we s t a t e d i n J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 842, 875 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , [ a f f ' d ] , 820 So. 2d 883 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) : d i d not present the p e n a l t y phase the statutory circumstances 13A-5-51 " ' " 40 Morris cited sentencing hearing. "'"Johnson any e v i d e n c e a t concerning mitigating enumerated i n § In CR-07-1997 "'"The trial court's i n s t r u c t i o n s were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the evidence presented at the penalty phase; they d i d not constitute p l a i n e r r o r . As we s t a t e d i n P r e s s l e y v. S t a t e , 770 So. 2d 115, 141-42 (Ala.Cr.App. 1999): The t r i a l j u d g e had no burden to recognize a statutory m i t i g a t i n g circumstance not presented by t h e d e f e n s e , and p r o f f e r i t to the j u r y There i s no r e q u i r e m e n t that the trial court read the entire list of statutory mitigating circumstances to a jury where there was no evidence offered to s u p p o r t e a c h circumstance. Holladay v. S t a t e , 629 So. 2d 673, 687 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1171, 114 S.Ct. 1208, 127 L.Ed.2d 555 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . The trial court's instructions were sufficient. The trial court d i d not commit p l a i n e r r o r by not sua sponte i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y on a statutory mitigating 41 CR-07-1997 circumstance not o f f e r e d by P r e s s l e y . " "'"See a l s o B u r g e s s v. S t a t e , 723 So. 2d 742 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1997), aff'd, 723 So. 2d 770 ( A l a . 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1360, 143 L.Ed.2d 521 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; R i e b e r v. S t a t e , 663 So. 2d 985 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1994), aff'd, 663 So. 2d 999 (Ala.), c e r t . d e n i e d , 516 U.S. 995, 116 S.Ct. 531, 133 L.Ed.2d 437 (1995)."' " M c G r i f f v. S t a t e , 908 So. 2d 961 a t 1020 A l a . C r i m App 2 0 0 0 ) ( o p i n i o n on r e t u r n t o r e m a n d ) . " Z i e g l e r v. S t a t e , 886 So. 2d 127, 148 c e r t . d e n i e d , 543 U.S. The jury was 863 charged ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2003), (2003). as t o e v e r y statutory mitigating c i r c u m s t a n c e and c h a r g e d t h a t i t c o u l d c o n s i d e r any a s p e c t o f M o r r i s ' s c h a r a c t e r or record. See § 13A-5-51 and § 13A-5-52, A l a . Code 1975. The t r i a l court i s not r e q u i r e d t o recognize a nonstatutory mitigating c i r c u m s t a n c e where no e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d a t s e n t e n c i n g as t o i t s e x i s t e n c e , n o r was any s u c h nonstatutory mitigating any impact circumstance argued by M o r r i s as t o i t may h a v e i n d e t e r m i n i n g h i s s e n t e n c e . 42 CR-07-1997 B. Morris argues that the trial judge and the jury i m p r o p e r l y c o u n t e d t h e same a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e t w i c e . He refers to the aggravating circumstances c o m m i t t e d w h i l e M o r r i s was engaged i n the b u r g l a r y , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, was c o m m i t t e d when M o r r i s was same conduct supported and commission of was a t h a t the murder engaged i n the commission of a r o b b e r y , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975. the t h a t the murder a He a r g u e s t h a t b e c a u s e finding of both aggravating c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t and j u r y s h o u l d have c o n s i d e r e d and found only Morris one. raises this c l a i m f o r the first time t h e r e f o r e , t h i s c l a i m must be e v a l u a t e d p u r s u a n t error rule. See Rule 45A, on appeal; to the p l a i n - ala.R.App.P. However, t h i s C o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i f two o r more o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s offense are also aggravating 4 9 ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, find each circumstance of the and t h a t make t h e o f f e n s e a circumstances then the t r i a l underlying so c h a r g e t h e 43 c o u r t may offenses jury. under as an § capital 13A-5- consider and aggravating CR-07-1997 In Turner v. State, 924 So. 2d 737 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2 0 0 2 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 547 U.S. 1056 ( 2 0 0 6 ) , T u r n e r c l a i m e d t h a t his constitutional consideration offenses of rights both had robbery i n h i s capital-murder been and violated rape, charge, aggravating circumstances. This Court by the the underlying as two separate found: "As we s t a t e d i n Hodges v. S t a t e , 856 So. 2d 875, 889 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2 0 0 1 ) , ' I f the actions committed d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e murder s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g t h a t more t h e n one o f t h e e n u m e r a t e d u n d e r l y i n g f e l o n i e s was c o m m i t t e d , t h e n a t r i a l c o u r t may a p p l y § 13A-5-49(4) more t h a n o n c e . ' C i t i n g S t e w a r t v. S t a t e , 730 So. 2d 1203 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 730 So. 2d 1246 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . " 924 So. 2d a t 790. The c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f R o c h e s t e r ' s m u r d e r s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g that t h e murder o c c u r r e d d u r i n g a b u r g l a r y and r o b b e r y and that each a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance s h o u l d a p p l y t o M o r r i s ' s sentencing. C. Morris argues that t h e E i g h t h Amendment to the United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t he be s e n t e n c e d t o no more than life i n prison without parole. 44 Specifically, Morris CR-07-1997 contends given t h a t b e c a u s e t h e m u r d e r was " e n t i r e l y the wealth background," the evidence i n Mr. and Morris's t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s were o u t w e i g h e d b y mitigating sentenced of m i t i g a t i n g unplanned circumstances, to l i f e imprisonment and he without should have the p o s s i b i l i t y been of parole. Morris raises this issue f o r the f i r s t time on a p p e a l ; t h u s , t h e p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e a p p l i e s . See R u l e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . The p r o c e s s o f w e i g h i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s a d d r e s s e d i n § 13A-5-48, A l a . Code 1975: "The process described in Sections 13A-5-46(e)(2), 13A-5-46(e)(3) and Section 13A-5-47(e) of weighing the aggravating and m i t i g a t i n g circumstances t o determine the sentence s h a l l n o t be d e f i n e d t o mean a mere t a l l y i n g o f a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o r t h e purpose o f n u m e r i c a l comparison. I n s t e a d , i t s h a l l be d e f i n e d t o mean a p r o c e s s b y w h i c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e l e v a n t t o sentence a r e m a r s h a l l e d and c o n s i d e r e d in an o r g a n i z e d fashion f o r t h e purpose of d e t e r m i n i n g whether the proper sentence i n view of a l l t h e r e l e v a n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n an i n d i v i d u a l c a s e i s l i f e imprisonment w i t h o u t p a r o l e o r death." The w e i g h i n g p r o c e s s i s b e s t u n d e r t a k e n b y t h e s e n t e n c i n g authority, who h a s d i r e c t l y heard 45 the evidence and seen t h e CR-07-1997 witnesses should and have punishment t h e r e f o r e can the greater f o r the capital b e t t e r determine impact in determining defendant. circumstances The of each evidence the This process d e a l w i t h n u m e r i c a l v a l u e s or comparisons. r e s t s on t h e s p e c i f i c what proper does not determination case. "In keeping w i t h the d i c t a t e s of the U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n L o c k e t t v. O h i o , 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the s e n t e n c i n g a u t h o r i t y i n Alabama, the t r i a l judge, has u n l i m i t e d d i s c r e t i o n t o c o n s i d e r any p e r c e i v e d mitigating circumstances, and he can assign appropriate weight to particular mitigating c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t s p e c i f i c w e i g h t s be a s s i g n e d t o d i f f e r e n t a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . M u r r y v. S t a t e , 455 So. 2d 53 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1983) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 455 So. 2d 72 ( A l a . 1984) . T h e r e f o r e , the trial judge i s free to consider each case individually and determine whether a particular aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances or v i c e v e r s a . Moore v. B a l k c o m , 716 F. 2d 1511 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) . The d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances outweigh the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances i s n o t a n u m e r i c a l one, b u t i n s t e a d i n v o l v e s t h e g r a v i t y o f t h e a g g r a v a t i o n as compared t o the mitigation." Ex parte denied, Clisby, 456 So. 2d 105, C l i s b y v. A l a b a m a , 470 46 U.S. 108-09 ( A l a . 1984), 1009(1985). cert. CR-07-1997 Moreover, " ' " ' [ w ] h i l e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f an aggravating or mitigating circumstance is a fact susceptible to proof under a reasonable doubt or preponderance s t a n d a r d , see S t a t e v. D i x o n , 283 So. 2d 1, 9 ( F l a . 1 9 7 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. [ 1 9 5 0 ] , 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974), and S t a t e v. J o h n s o n , 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E. 2d 597, 617-18 (1979), the r e l a t i v e weight i s not. The process of weighing circumstances i s a matter for judge and jury, and, unlike facts, i s not s u s c e p t i b l e to p r o o f by e i t h e r p a r t y . ' "'"696 F. 2d a t 818. A l a b a m a c o u r t s have adopted the Elev e n t h C i r c u i t ' s r a t i o n a l e . See Lawhorn v. S t a t e , 581 So. 2d 1159, 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ('while the e x i s t e n c e o f an a g g r a v a t i n g o r m i t i g a t i n g circumstance i s a fact s u s c e p t i b l e to p r o o f , the r e l a t i v e weight of each i s not; the process of weighing, u n l i k e f a c t s , i s n o t s u s c e p t i b l e t o p r o o f by e i t h e r p a r t y ' ) ; see a l s o M e l s o n v. S t a t e , 775 So. 2d 857, 900-901 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) ; M o r r i s o n v. S t a t e , 500 So. 2d 36, 45 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1985). "'"Thus, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n w h e t h e r t h e aggravating circumstances outweigh the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances i s not a f i n d i n g o f f a c t o r an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e . " ' " 47 CR-07-1997 H a r r i s v. S t a t e , 2 So. Here, the 905 ( A l a . C r i m . App. trial c o u r t p r o p e r l y weighed the and circumstances determining 3d 880, the Morris's mitigating sentence. aggravating circumstances The judge did burglary committed during the (§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 4 ) ) and c o n v i c t e d of a v i o l e n t mitigating course of a t h a t M o r r i s had before not d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t the three a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances m u r d e r was 2007). err t h a t the robbery and surrounding a p r e v i o u s l y been f e l o n y (§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 2 ) ) o u t w e i g h e d circumstances in his the character and background. III. Morris alleges that d i s m i s s e d b e c a u s e , he the charges s a y s , he was against denied h i s him should constitutional r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . M o r r i s argues t h a t the s i x - y e a r between his his prejudicial arrest and was and caused further c o n t e n d s t h a t he t h a t he was have been first by d i d not the trial was State's acquiesce disappeared. 48 certain gap presumptively negligence. to the d e l a y p r e j u d i c e d b e c a u s e t h e w i t n e s s e s ' memories a f f e c t e d ; moreover, be witnesses may He and may have CR-07-1997 Morris first raised this first appeal; therefore, plain error. See R u l e State, in his brief in his any e r r o r must r i s e t o t h e l e v e l o f 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . s e e a l s o [Ms. CR-05-2371, A u g u s t 29, 2008] (Ala. Sharp v. So. 3d , C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) . The r e c o r d February i n d i c a t e s t h a t R o c h e s t e r ' s murder o c c u r r e d 25, 1997, a n d t h a t intoxication him argument on t h a t Morris same d a t e . was a r r e s t e d on for public The a r r e s t w a r r a n t charging w i t h R o c h e s t e r ' s m u r d e r was i s s u e d on F e b r u a r y 27, 1997. On M a r c h trial. 6 3 1 , 2003, jury s e l e c t i o n began Thus, t h e d e l a y b e t w e e n M o r r i s ' s i n Morris's first a r r e s t and h i s t r i a l was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 73 months. "As t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 928 So. 2d 259, 263 ( A l a . 2005) : "'An a c c u s e d ' s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l i s g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e S i x t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and by A r t . I , § 6, o f t h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n , 1 9 0 1 . As noted, an e v a l u a t i o n o f an accused's s p e e d y - t r i a l c l a i m r e q u i r e s us t o b a l a n c e t h e f o u r f a c t o r s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme T h i s C o u r t may t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f i t s r e c o r d s i n M o r r i s ' s f i r s t a p p e a l . L e e v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-07-0054, O c t o b e r 9, 2009] So. 3d , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 9 ) , c i t i n g H u l l v. S t a t e , 607 So. 2d 369, 371 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) . 6 49 CR-07-1997 C o u r t s e t f o r t h i n B a r k e r [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ] : " [ l ] e n g t h o f d e l a y , t h e reason f o r the delay, the defendant's a s s e r t i o n o f [ h e r ] r i g h t , and p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . " 407 U.S. a t 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) . See a l s o Ex p a r t e C a r r e l l , 565 So. 2d [104] a t 105 [(Ala. 1 9 9 0 ) ] . "A s i n g l e f a c t o r i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y d e t e r m i n a t i v e , because t h i s i s a 'balancing t e s t , i n which the conduct of both the p r o s e c u t i o n and t h e d e f e n s e a r e w e i g h e d . ' " Ex p a r t e C l o p t o n , 656 So. 2d [1243] a t 1245 [ ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ] ( q u o t i n g B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 530, 92 S.Ct. 2 1 8 2 ) . We e x a m i n e e a c h f a c t o r in turn.' "(Footnotes omitted.) "A. L e n g t h o f d e l a y . As t h e Ex p a r t e W a l k e r c o u r t s t a t e d concerning the l e n g t h of the d e l a y : "'In D o g g e t t v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t e x p l a i n e d t h a t the first f a c t o r - l e n g t h of delay-"is a c t u a l l y a d o u b l e e n q u i r y . " 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . The f i r s t i n q u i r y u n d e r t h i s f a c t o r i s whether the l e n g t h of the d e l a y i s " ' p r e s u m p t i v e l y p r e j u d i c i a l . ' " 505 U.S. a t 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 ( q u o t i n g B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2 1 8 2 ) . A f i n d i n g t h a t the l e n g t h of d e l a y i s p r e s u m p t i v e l y p r e j u d i c i a l " t r i g g e r s " an e x a m i n a t i o n of the remaining three Barker f a c t o r s . 505 U.S. a t 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 ("[A]s t h e term i s used i n t h i s t h r e s h o l d context, 'presumptive prejudice' does not necessarily indicate a statistical p r o b a b i l i t y o f p r e j u d i c e ; i t s i m p l y marks 50 CR-07-1997 t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h c o u r t s deem t h e d e l a y u n r e a s o n a b l e enough t o t r i g g e r t h e B a r k e r e n q u i r y . " ) . See a l s o R o b e r s o n v. S t a t e , 864 So. 2d 379, 394 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) . " ' I n Alabama, " [ t ] h e l e n g t h of d e l a y i s measured from the date of the i n d i c t m e n t o r t h e d a t e o f t h e i s s u a n c e o f an a r r e s t warrant--whichever i s e a r l i e r - - t o the date o f t h e t r i a l . " R o b e r s o n , 864 So. 2d a t 394. Cf. § 15-3-7, Ala. Code 1975 ("A p r o s e c u t i o n may be commenced w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h i s c h a p t e r by f i n d i n g an i n d i c t m e n t , t h e i s s u i n g o f a w a r r a n t o r by b i n d i n g over the o f f e n d e r . " ) ; Rule 2.1, Ala.R.Crim.P. ( " A l l criminal proceedings s h a l l be commenced e i t h e r by i n d i c t m e n t o r by c o m p l a i n t . " ) . The l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y i n this c a s e was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 50 m o n t h s : W a l k e r was i n d i c t e d on J a n u a r y 14, 2000, and she p l e a d e d g u i l t y on M a r c h 25, 2004. See C a r r e l l , 565 So. 2d a t 107 ( c a l c u l a t i n g the length of delay from defendant's i n d i c t m e n t u n t i l h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y ) . The S t a t e c o n c e d e s (and b o t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s h e l d ) t h a t t h e 50-month d e l a y i n W a l k e r ' s c a s e was p r e s u m p t i v e l y p r e j u d i c i a l . ' "928 Belisle So.2d a t 263-64 v. State, 11 So. (footnotes omitted)." 3d 256, 2 0 0 7 ) , a f f i r m e d , 11 So. 3d 323 U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2865 271-72 ( A l a . Crim. ( A l a . 2008), c e r t . d e n i e d , (2009.) 51 App. CR-07-1997 Here, because the delay presumptively remaining was prejudicial. factors 73 m o n t h s , Accordingly, s e t out i n Barker the delay was examine the 407 U.S. 514 we v. Wingo, (1972). As t o t h e r e a s o n s f o r the delay, burden of j u s t i f y i n g the delay.'" 2d 777, 780 "'[t]he State has t h e Ex p a r t e A n d e r s o n , 979 So. ( A l a . 2007). In the present case, the m a j o r i t y of t h e d e l a y s a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e t o M o r r i s . M o r r i s was a r r e s t e d on F e b r u a r y 25, 1997, and t h e c a s e - a c t i o n summary i n c l u d e d i n t h e record of M o r r i s ' s first trial assigned to the o r i g i n a l t r i a l indicates that t h e case was c o u r t i n December 1997. M o r r i s was a r r a i g n e d i n J a n u a r y 1998, and t h e c a s e was s e t f o r t r i a l in May 1998. A number defense counsel, of motions were filed, largely by and s u b p o e n a s were i s s u e d , and h i s c a s e was r e s e t f o r t r i a l on F e b r u a r y 22, 1999. However, on F e b r u a r y 10, 1999, Morris psychiatric filed evaluation a motion could be for continuance completed. The until trial o r d e r e d t h a t M o r r i s be e v a l u a t e d f o r c o m p e t e n c y t o s t a n d and mental Ackerson state was then a t the time appointed of the offense. by 52 the trial Dr. court, a court trial Kimberly and she CR-07-1997 examined M o r r i s i n May 1999. He was again examined f o r the same r e a s o n s b y Dr. C l y d e W i l l i a m s . B o t h e x p e r t s f o u n d M o r r i s incompetent t o s t a n d t r i a l , b u t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t h i s competency c o u l d be r e s t o r e d t h r o u g h c o m p e t e n c y t r a i n i n g . T h e r e a f t e r , on November 11, 1999, Morris's competency 7 the State because filed the a motion trial had to determine been set for December 6, 1999. Morris dated was found incompetent to stand trial F e b r u a r y 21, 2001, and r e q u i r e d t o undergo by order competency t r a i n i n g by t h e Alabama Department o f M e n t a l H e a l t h and M e n t a l Retardation at Taylor Hardin Secure M e d i c a l Facility. Morris a t t e n d e d o u t p a t i e n t c o m p e t e n c y t r a i n i n g s e s s i o n s f r o m M a r c h 9, 2001, u n t i l to March 31, 2001. M o r r i s ' s assessment s c o r e s improve, and on June 22, 2001, competency-evaluation report i n d i c a t i n g M o r r i s was p u r p o s e f u l l y g i v i n g therefore, on November requesting that Morris 8, Wyatt Rhone failed filed a t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t f a l s e answers and m a l i n g e r i n g ; 2001, t h e S t a t e be p l a c e d into filed inpatient a motion treatment, The c a s e - a c t i o n summary, h o w e v e r , d e s p i t e t h e d a t e s t a m p e d on t h e S t a t e ' s m o t i o n , r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e S t a t e f i l e d t h i s m o t i o n on November 15, 1999. 7 53 CR-07-1997 training, and that case the determine evaluation. had Morris's been In that motion, continued competency and the State argued a number of times to that there was still no b a s i s on w h i c h t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r M o r r i s had b e n e f i t t e d f r o m the training trial. o r w h e t h e r he Thus, t h e t r i a l was currently competent t o stand c o u r t o r d e r e d M o r r i s t o be c o m m i t t e d t o T a y l o r H a r d i n S e c u r e M e d i c a l F a c i l i t y on December 4, 2001, he was c o m m i t t e d on M o r r i s was December 18, 2001. On J a n u a r y 31, d i a g n o s e d as c o m p e t e n t t o s t a n d t r i a l a l s o d e t e r m i n e d t h a t M o r r i s had b e e n m a l i n g e r i n g . 26, 2002, the w h i c h was be State again requested h e l d on December 9, c o m p e t e n t on January j u r y began on M a r c h 31, 15, a competency 2002. M o r r i s was 2003, and the 2002, by Dr. who and Nagi, On July hearing, determined striking of was Morris's concluded the 2003. Thus, a l m o s t f o u r y e a r s o f t h e d e l a y were a t t r i b u t a b l e determining to competency t o s t a n d trial. to Moreover, i t t h a t f o r at l e a s t p a r t of the treatment, he had b e e n m a l i n g e r i n g . " ' " ' D e l a y s o c c a s i o n e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t o r on his behalf heavily are excluded counted f r o m t h e l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y and against the 54 defendant in applying are the CR-07-1997 balancing test 265 1234 of Barker.'"' ( A l a . 2005) ( A l a . Crim. Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , ( q u o t i n g Zumbado App. 1993), v. S t a t e , quoting 928 So. 2d a t 615 So. 2d 1223, i n turn McCallum S t a t e , 407 So. 2d 865, 868 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 1 ) ) . " A n d e r s o n , 979 So. 2d a t 781. "'Barker v. Wingo recognizes three c a t e g o r i e s of reasons f o r d e l a y : (1) d e l i b e r a t e d e l a y , (2) negligent delay, and (3) j u s t i f i e d d e l a y . 407 U.S. a t 5 3 1 , 92 S.Ct. 2182. C o u r t s assign different weight to different reasons f o r delay. Deliberate delay is "weighted heavily" a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . 407 U.S. a t 531, 92 S . C t . 2182, 33 L . E d . 2 d 101. D e l i b e r a t e d e l a y i n c l u d e s an "attempt t o delay the t r i a l i n o r d e r t o hamper t h e d e f e n s e " o r " ' t o g a i n some t a c t i c a l a d v a n t a g e over (defendants) or t o harass them.'" 407 U.S. a t 531 & n. 32, 92 S . C t . 2182 (quoting United S t a t e s v. M a r i o n , 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S . C t . 455, 30 L . E d . 2 d 468 (1971)). Negligent delay is weighted less h e a v i l y against the State than i s d e l i b e r a t e delay. B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 5 3 1 , 92 S . C t . 2182; Ex p a r t e C a r r e l l , 565 So. 2d [104,] 108 [(Ala. 1990)]. J u s t i f i e d delay--which includes such occurrences as missing witnesses or delay f o r which the 55 v. Ex p a r t e CR-07-1997 defendant is primarily responsible--is not weighted a g a i n s t the S t a t e . Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Zumbado v. State, 615 So. 2d 1223, 1234 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1993) ("'Delays occasioned by the d e f e n d a n t o r on h i s b e h a l f are e x c l u d e d from the l e n g t h of d e l a y and a r e h e a v i l y c o u n t e d a g a i n s t the defendant i n applying the balancing test of Barker.'") ( q u o t i n g M c C a l l u m v. S t a t e , 407 So. 2d 865, 868 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1981)).' "Contrary to the a p p e l l a n t ' s a l l e g a t i o n s i n h i s b r i e f t o t h i s c o u r t , t h e r e i s n o t any indication t h a t the S t a t e d e l i b e r a t e l y or n e g l i g e n t l y delayed the t r i a l i n any way. In f a c t , d u r i n g several p r e - t r i a l hearings, the S t a t e expressed concern a b o u t n o t d e l a y i n g t h e t r i a l u n n e c e s s a r i l y . B a s e d on the r e c o r d b e f o r e us, i t appears t h a t v e r y l i t t l e of t h e d e l a y was a c t u a l l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e S t a t e . Thus, 'we see no d e l i b e r a t e d e l a y by t h e S t a t e t o e n h a n c e i t s own c a s e o r t o p r e j u d i c e t h e d e f e n s e . ' I r v i n v. S t a t e , 940 So. 2d 331, 343 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2005). "Some o f t h e d e l a y i n t h i s c a s e was c a u s e d by n e u t r a l reasons t h a t are not a t t r i b u t a b l e to e i t h e r t h e S t a t e o r t h e a p p e l l a n t . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n was completed, forensic analysis was performed, psychological testing was done, discovery was c o n d u c t e d , and numerous e v i d e n t i a r y m a t t e r s were resolved. Neutral reasons for delay do not o r d i n a r i l y r e q u i r e a d i s m i s s a l o f t h e c a s e b a s e d on a v i o l a t i o n of the r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l . See 56 CR-07-1997 P i e r s o n v. S t a t e , App. 1996). " ' 677 So. 2d 830, 831 (Ala. Crim. ' "...Thus, t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e d e l a y was j u s t i f i e d d e l a y t h a t was a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the a p p e l l a n t and/or to the t r i a l c o u r t , and i t w e i g h s h e a v i l y a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t r a t h e r than a g a i n s t the S t a t e . " S h a r p v. , State, CR-05-2371, A u g u s t 29, ( A l a . C r i m . App. Because motions was [Ms. the filed by So. 3d result of 2008). majority Morris 2008] of the delays concerning his no i n d i c a t i o n o f u n j u s t i f i e d d e l a y s were the c o m p e t e n c y and or negligence g r o u n d by t h e S t a t e , t h i s r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y i s n o t against the S t a t e , but S t a t e , 11 So. delays were rather against Morris. 3d a t 272 due to See there on this weighed Belisle ("It appears t h a t the m a j o r i t y of motions filed by Belisle. v. the 'Justified d e l a y - - w h i c h i n c l u d e s s u c h o c c u r r e n c e s as m i s s i n g w i t n e s s e s or d e l a y f o r which the defendant i s p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e - i s not weighted a g a i n s t the S t a t e . Barker, 2182.' Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 928 So. 57 407 2d 259 U.S. a t 265 a t 531, 92 S.Ct. ( A l a . 2005).") CR-07-1997 See a l s o Blackmon v. S t a t e , denied, U.S. 7 So. 3d 397, 448 , 129 S . C t . 2052 (2009) a good p o r t i o n o f t h e d e l a y s Blackmon."). (Ala. 491 See a l s o S h a r i f i ("The r e c o r d every precaution v. S t a t e , trial. shows t o ensure ("It appears that that that 993 So. 2d 907, 924 U.S. , 129 S . C t . the c i r c u i t Sharifi court was g r a n t e d took a fair I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e d e l a y s were due t o t h e c o u r t ' s d e s i r e t o make e v e r y r e s o u r c e before cert. w e r e b a s e d on m o t i o n s f i l e d b y C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , (2008) (2005), he f a c e d Morris trial on t h e c a p i t a l charge."). d i d n o t a s s e r t h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l the appeal from h i s f i r s t So. 3d a t 272, where B e l i s l e speedy t r i a l available to Sharifi until trial. I n B e l i s l e v. S t a t e , d i d not assert 10 months b e f o r e 11 h i s right to a he was t r i e d , stated: "'An a c c u s e d does n o t w a i v e the r i g h t t o a speedy trial s i m p l y by f a i l i n g t o a s s e r t i t . B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 528, 92 S . C t . 2182. Even s o , c o u r t s applying t h e B a r k e r v. Wingo f a c t o r s a r e to consider i n the weighing process whether a n d when t h e accused asserts the r i g h t t o a 58 until this Court CR-07-1997 s p e e d y t r i a l , 407 U.S. a t 528-29, 92 S.Ct. 2182, and not every assertion of the r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l i s w e i g h t e d e q u a l l y . Compare K e l l e y v. S t a t e , 568 So. 2d 405, 410 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) ("Repeated r e q u e s t s for a speedy t r i a l weigh h e a v i l y in favor of an accused."), with C l a n c y v. S t a t e , 886 So. 2d 166, 172 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) ( w e i g h i n g t h i r d f a c t o r a g a i n s t an a c c u s e d who a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l two weeks b e f o r e trial, and s t a t i n g : "'The fact t h a t the a p p e l l a n t d i d not a s s e r t his r i g h t to a speedy trial s o o n e r " t e n d s t o s u g g e s t t h a t he e i t h e r a c q u i e s c e d i n the delays or suffered only minimal p r e j u d i c e p r i o r to t h a t date."'") ( q u o t i n g B e n e f i e l d v. S t a t e , 726 So. 2d 286, 291 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1997), additional citations o m i t t e d ) , and Brown v. S t a t e , 392 So. 2d 1248, 1254 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (no speedy-trial violation where defendant a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l t h r e e days b e f o r e trial).' "Ex parte W a l k e r , 928 So. 2d a t 265-66." M o r e o v e r , i n S h a r p v. S t a t e , s u p r a , this he issue raised Sharp f a i l e d to r a i s e i n a p r e t r i a l motion f o r a speedy t r i a l . this contention in 59 a post trial motion Instead, for a CR-07-1997 j u d g m e n t o f a c q u i t t a l . T h i s C o u r t q u o t e d I r v i n v. S t a t e , So. 2d 331, 343 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) , stating: "'Irvin failed to assert his constitutional r i g h t t o a speedy trial b e l o w . The r e c o r d c o n t a i n s no m o t i o n f o r a speedy t r i a l . I n B a r k e r v. Wingo, t h e Supreme Court recognized, " f a i l u r e to a s s e r t t h e r i g h t w i l l make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r a d e f e n d a n t t o p r o v e t h a t he was d e n i e d a s p e e d y t r i a l . " 407 U.S. a t 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. L i k e w i s e , t h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d : " ' " ' S i n c e t h e r e was no e f f o r t on the part of the appellant to secure h i s r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l ... he may n o t c o m p l a i n o f any d e l a y on a p p e a l . ' T i d m o r e [ v . C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m ] , 356 So. 2d [231,] 233 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1977)]. While a defendant who f a i l s t o demand a s p e e d y trial does n o t f o r e v e r w a i v e h i s r i g h t , t h i s i s one f a c t o r w h i c h must be considered." " ' B a i l e y v. S t a t e , 375 So. 2d 519, 523 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 7 9 ) . I n T u r n e r v. S t a t e , 924 So. 2d 737, 748 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) , t h i s Court recognized that the f a i l u r e of the defendant t o a s s e r t h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l weighed a g a i n s t a f i n d i n g o f plain error regarding this claim.'" So. 3d a t . 60 940 CR-07-1997 Because M o r r i s d i d not a s s e r t t h i s r i g h t u n t i l the from h i s f i r s t Finally, trial, this Morris has r e s u l t of t h i s d e l a y . he d i d n o t a c q u i e s c e f a c t o r must w e i g h a g a i n s t failed He to show any him. prejudice a l l e g e s i n h i s b r i e f on as a appeal that t o t h i s d e l a y and t h a t t h e d e l a y may have r e s u l t e d i n d i m i n i s h e d memories o f t h e w i t n e s s e s . He, does n o t a present appeal any specific example of such however, diminished memory. He a l l u d e s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p a r a m e d i c ' s n o t e s were destroyed, b u t t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t in a f f e c t e d her any way He also disappeared subpoena present first there that certain that Huddle counsel House trial, on witnesses defense states three Morris's testimony. claims and this who restaurant could the n i g h t of the may attempted employees have t e s t i f i e d offense. have that before he commission also speculates door to trial, t h a t the Rochester's may of the police house, have c o n f i r m e d offense who on the o f f i c e r who could not same n i g h t . had be t h a t R o c h e s t e r ' s dog 61 was However, e v e n i f M o r r i s had b e e n t o t h e H u d d l e House r e s t a u r a n t , t h a t does negate h i s to guarded identified l e f t the not He the at house CR-07-1997 on t h e m o r n i n g f o l l o w i n g t h e o f f e n s e . Thus, he s p e c u l a t e s the dog could shoe. T h i s the have t r a n s f e r r e d the p o s s i b l e evidence, State's However, then evidence this claim that is he the to Morris's c l a i m s , w o u l d have dog clearly blood d i d not leave conjecture that refuted the based house. on more conjecture. These c i t e d i n s t a n c e s by M o r r i s a r e s p e c u l a t i o n and to show any r e s u l t i n g p r e j u d i c e . Moreover, because the a c t e d w i t h due d i l i g e n c e i n attempting to has trial, he prejudice. failed "'[W]here reasonable the to meet state fail State to timely bring Morris his pursues burden the of proving accused "with d i l i g e n c e , " the delay--however l o n g - - g e n e r a l l y i s excused u n l e s s the accused demonstrates " s p e c i f i c p r e j u d i c e to his d e f e n s e . " D o g g e t t v. U n i t e d 112 S.Ct. the S h a r p v. 928 So. evidence U.S. 648 (1992), [ a t ] 2686. Thus, when t h e s t a t e a c t s w i t h diligence has S t a t e s , 505 reasonable i n b r i n g i n g the defendant burden of proving State, 2d a t 267. to defendant to t r i a l , So. prejudice 3d a t c a u s e d by , quoting Ex the the delay.'" parte Walker, " A p p e l l a n t must p o i n t t o s p e c i f i c f a c t s i n support his claim. United 62 States v. Radue, 707 CR-07-1997 F.2d 493, S.Ct. 495 281, (11th C i r . ) , 78 L.Ed.2d 259 cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916, 104 (1983) . ' [ S ] p e c u l a t i v e a l l e g a t i o n s , s u c h as g e n e r a l a l l e g a t i o n s o f l o s s o f w i t n e s s e s and failure of the actual memories, are insufficient to demonstrate p r e j u d i c e . . . . ' U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B u t t s , 524 Cir. 604 1975), c i t i n g United 1127, App. 1134-35 1 9 8 6 ) . See (Ala. Crim. f a i l e d t o show any S t a t e , 501 a l s o Lawson v. App. 2006). So. 977 (5th 2d 598, F. 2d 515, S t a t e , 954 Because So. Morris 518 2d has p r e j u d i c e b a s e d on t h e d e l a y , t h i s f a c t o r must be w e i g h e d a g a i n s t After 975, S t a t e s v. McGough, 510 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) . " Haywood v. (Ala. Crim. F.2d reviewing him. Morris's claim that his constitutional r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l had b e e n v i o l a t e d by t h e d e l a y b e t w e e n his a r r e s t and Barker factors, first trial, t h e r e was and e v a l u a t i n g and weighing no p l a i n e r r o r on t h i s the ground. IV. Morris argues t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n should because the State was witness identification allowed to of based him introduce overturned an unreliable an impermissibly s u g g e s t i v e one-man showup. He a l l e g e s t h a t t h e identification 63 on be CR-07-1997 of h i m b y t h e p a r a m e d i c on t h e m o r n i n g following the offense was u n d u l y s u g g e s t i v e , was n o t i n d e p e n d e n t l y r e l i a b l e , a n d was not harmless The to error. r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t , when t h e p a r a m e d i c the c a l l a t R o c h e s t e r ' s home, t h e p a r a m e d i c responded informed the p o l i c e a b o u t t h e man s h e h a d s e e n e a r l i e r a t t h a t l o c a t i o n who had a t t e m p t e d t o g a i n e n t r y details gave of the f i r s t them matched into emergency a description the d e s c r i p t i o n , t h e house call and t o l e a r n t h e involving o f t h e man, Russell. She a n d when M o r r i s , who was s e e n b y an o f f i c e r later that m o r n i n g i n t h e a r e a o f t h e o f f e n s e , t h e p a r a m e d i c was t a k e n t o v i e w a n d p o s s i b l y i d e n t i f y M o r r i s as t h a t man. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9:00 p.m. d u r i n g t h e initial the emergency c a l l , man, he a p p r o a c h e d after she f i r s t began s p e a k i n g w i t h h e r on t h e w a l k w a y t o t h e h o u s e . As t h e y s p o k e , he a t t e m p t e d t o w a l k a r o u n d h e r , b u t she b l o c k e d him. A t t h a t t i m e , t h e y were s t a n d i n g " l i t e r a l l y (R. 205.) She e s t i m a t e d t h a t inches apart. their toe to toe." f a c e s were l e s s t h a n 24 (R. 205.) A f t e r he h a d b e e n i n s t r u c t e d t o l e a v e and a p p e a r e d t o have done s o , t h e p a r a m e d i c a g a i n saw h i m when 64 CR-07-1997 she had stepped testified down i n s t r u c t e d to leave. to clearly lighting t h e back t h a t he was on t h e s i d e w a l k when he was a g a i n ability from s e e t h e man, o f t h e ambulance. w i t h i n 10 f e e t o f h e r (R. 210-11.) As t o h e r she s t a t e d from t h e house, a s t r e e t l i g h t , that "I'm f a i r l y there and l i g h t s f i r e and r e s c u e v e h i c l e s c a l l e d "scene l i g h t s . " also t e s t i f i e d that She was from t h e (R. 212.) She c e r t a i n t h a t i t was a p r e t t y good moon t h a t n i g h t b u t i t was v e r y c l e a r f o r me t o be able t o s e e h i m . " (R. 212.) A f t e r g i v i n g t h e p o l i c e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e man a n d t h e clothes he was wearing during her second dispatch, which occurred a r o u n d m i d n i g h t , s h e was t a k e n t o t h e l o c a t i o n where M o r r i s was a r r e s t e d f o r p u b l i c i n t o x i c a t i o n , b e t w e e n 4:00 a n d 5:00 a.m., she b y p o l i c e c a r . She was a s k e d t o v i e w t h e man, b u t testified that person or anything looked 222.) like that." "never s a i d t h a t i t was t h e (R. 222.) She s t a t e d t h a t " I a t h i m a n d r e a l i z e d who he was, I knew who he was." (R. She s t a t e d t h a t confronted she the o f f i c e r s she r e c o g n i z e d h i m as t h e man s h e h a d e a r l i e r , b u t t h a t , o u t o f an abundance o f c a u t i o n , planned on requesting that 65 the o f f i c e r s order him t o CR-07-1997 s p e a k . He b e g a n t a l k i n g a n d " f u s s i n g " before she c o u l d do s o , and she t e s t i f i e d t h a t " I knew when I saw h i m t h a t i t was h i m , but t h a t was j u s t a c o n f i r m a t i o n 223.) t o me t h a t i t was h i m . " (R. The p a r a m e d i c s t a t e d t h a t she i d e n t i f i e d t h e man t o t h e o f f i c e r s a n d t o l d them t h a t l a c e r a t i o n had not been t h e r e Morris at t r i a l occasions In as t h e man "without the present approximately earlier. four a doubt." case, hours on t h e man's (R. 223.) She a g a i n that she h a d s e e n two (R. 225.) t h e one-man after showup was the paramedics and a p p r o x i m a t e l y s e e n h i m . She was shown o n l y M o r r i s " I n Ex p a r t e A p p l e t o n , t h i s Court noted: identified on t h o s e p o l i c e a b o u t t h e man who h a d e a r l i e r b e e n p r e s e n t of the o f f e n s e , forehead informed the a t t h e scene seven hours a f t e r she h a d to identify. 828 So.2d 894 ( A l a . 2001), "'"The d a n g e r i n h e r e n t i n a one-man showup, where a w i t n e s s i s shown a s i n g l e s u s p e c t a n d a s k e d , ' I s t h a t t h e man?' i s t w o f o l d . F i r s t , a one-man showup c o n v e y s a c l e a r message t h a t ' t h e p o l i c e s u s p e c t t h i s man.' S e c o n d , a one-man showup does n o t give the witness a choice of i d e n t i f y i n g a n o t h e r p e r s o n as b e i n g t h e p e r p e t r a t o r o f t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , when a one-man showup i s u s e d t o i d e n t i f y t h e 66 conducted CR-07-1997 p e r p e t r a t o r of a crime, the r e l i a b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s not put t o an o b j e c t i v e t e s t , s u c h as a l i v e o r photographic l i n e u p , i n which a s i n g l e s u s p e c t must be c h o s e n f r o m a g r o u p o f persons possessing similar physical characteristics."' "828 So. 2d a t 899-900 ( q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e F r a z i e r , 729 So. 2d a t 254-55 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) (emphasis omitted))." Ex parte Wimes, 14 So. 3d 131, 134 ( A l a . 2008). despite the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to u n r e l i a b i l i t y presents, a one-man " ' " i t i s p e r m i t t e d where c o n d u c t e d the commission However, showup promptly after o f a c r i m e o r demanded b y n e c e s s i t y , e m e r g e n c y , or e x i g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " ' " G a v i n v. S t a t e , 891 So. 2d 907, 959 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 891 So. 2d 998 ( A l a . 2004), c e r t . d e n i e d , G a v i n v. A l a b a m a , 543 U.S. q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e A p p l e t o n , 828 So. 2d 894, 900 q u o t i n g i n t u r n B r a z e l l v. S t a t e , Moreover, employed in identification are two the c l e a r (2005), ( A l a . 2001), 369 So. 2d a t 29. import of e v a l u a t i n g the procedures pretrial identifications, testimony, i s to determine prongs 1123 involved in this well reliability. evaluation; addresses the suggestiveness of the i n i t i a l 67 as the as There first identification. CR-07-1997 "The s e c o n d p r o n g o f t h e B r a z e l l f v. S t a t e , 369 So. 2d 25, 28-29 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1978)] test r e q u i r e s us t o a d d r e s s w h e t h e r t h e ' " p r o c e d u r e f o u n d to have b e e n ' u n n e c e s s a r i l y ' or 'impermissibly' s u g g e s t i v e was so ' c o n d u c i v e t o i r r e p a r a b l e m i s t a k e n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ' ... o r had s u c h a t e n d e n c y ' t o g i v e r i s e to a v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l l i k e l i h o o d of i r r e p a r a b l e m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ' ... t h a t a l l o w i n g t h e w i t n e s s t o make an i n - c o u r t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w o u l d be a d e n i a l o f due p r o c e s s . " ' B r a z e l l , 369 So. 2d a t 28-29 ( q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s ex r e l . P h i p p s v. F o l l e t t e , 428 F.2d 912, 914-15 (2d C i r . 1 9 7 0 ) ) . We evaluate the likelihood of m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n under the five f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h i n N e i l v. B i g g e r s f , 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 94 L.Ed. 2d 401 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ] : " ' [ 1 ] [T]he o p p o r t u n i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s t o view the c r i m i n a l at the time of the crime, [2] t h e w i t n e s s ' d e g r e e o f a t t e n t i o n , [3] the accuracy of the witness' prior d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c r i m i n a l , [4] t h e l e v e l o f c e r t a i n t y d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e w i t n e s s a t t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n , and [5] t h e l e n g t h o f time between the crime and the confrontation.' "409 U.S. omitted)." at Ex p a r t e Wimes, 14 199-200, So. Here, even i f the the paramedic's surrounding her reliability of 93 3d a t S.Ct. (emphasis 134-35. initial showup was testimony reveals observing and her 375 hearing identification. 68 that She unduly the Morris suggestive, circumstances support testified to the the CR-07-1997 d u r a t i o n of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n , her p r o x i m i t y t o M o r r i s the confrontation, testimony due to her of Morris the good lighting role his as as a caregiver aggressive and approximately five behavior. feet and and "not s t a t e d t h a t he was real "what we c a l l desert a l l of the w i t h i n approximately She of inches clean tall, shaven." also her s e v e n h o u r s and identification. identification happened were p a r t o f h e r "As t h i s C o u r t n o t e d i n O ' D e l l v. S t a t e , 482 1341 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 5 ) : " ' " [ I ] t i s s e t t l e d law t h a t prompt, on-the-scene confrontations are not constitutionally impermissible, but are consistent with good police work." 69 of Further, single shift. 2d a described (R. 217-18.) c e r t a i n t y of t h i s these bases described camo s a n d , t h e brown t o n e s t h e c a m o u f l a g e p a n t s and t e n n i s s h o e s . " confirms she w e a r i n g a b a s e b a l l cap, possibly a sweatshirt. testimony She eight s a t e e n j a c k e t , and w o u l d now him equipment; e s p e c i a l l y i n unruly dark complexion, (R. 217-18.) She Finally, Her whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , i n c l u d e d p r o t e c t i n g the medium b u i l d , her conditions. c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d a h i g h degree of a t t e n t i o n t o testified, light and during So. CR-07-1997 ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) Hobbs v. S t a t e , 401 So. 2d 276, 279 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1981) . A prompt on-the-scene i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a suspect i n c r e a s e s the r e l i a b i l i t y of the identification under the following rationale: "'"[T]he p o l i c e a c t i o n i n r e t u r n i n g the suspect to the v i c i n i t y of the crime for immediate identification in c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u c h as t h e s e f o s t e r s t h e d e s i r a b l e o b j e c t i v e s of f r e s h , a c c u r a t e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h i n some i n s t a n c e s may lead to the immediate release of an i n n o c e n t s u s p e c t and a t t h e same t i m e e n a b l e t h e p o l i c e t o resume t h e s e a r c h f o r the f l e e i n g c u l p r i t w h i l e the t r a i l i s f r e s h . " I d . a t 280, q u o t i n g B a t e s v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 405 F.2d 1104 (D.C. C i r . 1 9 6 8 ) . ' "482 So. 2d a t 1346." G a v i n v. S t a t e , 891 So. 2d a t 960. H e r e , t h e f a c t o r s e n u m e r a t e d i n N e i l v. B i g g e r s , 409 188 (1972), a l l support identification the reliability o f M o r r i s as t h e man of the U.S. paramedic's she h a d c o n f r o n t e d a t t h e s c e n e o f t h e o f f e n s e o n l y h o u r s b e f o r e t h e m u r d e r . Thus, e v e n if t h e one-man showup h a d b e e n u n d u l y s u g g e s t i v e , i t d i d n o t t a i n t her i d e n t i f i c a t i o n misidentification. B r a z e l l v. S t a t e , Ex 369 as i t d i d n o t i n v i t e parte So. Appleton, 2d 25, 29 70 828 an So. irreparable 2d ( A l a . C r i m . App. at 900; 1978). CR-07-1997 V. Morris argues improperly that during h i s testimony with police officers only what was trial court repeatedly and a d m o n i s h e d h i m i n f r o n t o f t h e j u r y . He r e f e r s t o instances testify the of conversations when t h e t r i a l court admonished him t o as t o what he a n d t h e o f f i c e r said. Morris contends that this he h a d h a d d i d rather testimony than was n o t h e a r s a y b e c a u s e i t was n o t b e i n g o f f e r e d t o p r o v e t h e t r u t h o f the matters asserted. Further, court's actions diminished trial; failed contends that the trial h i s c r e d i b i l i t y w i t h t h e j u r y and l e f t him unable t o f u l l y p r e s e n t Morris he to object h i s testimony t o any o f t h e s e i n f a c t , defense counsel to the j u r y . instances at i n d i c a t e d t h a t he a g r e e d t h a t M o r r i s was a t t e m p t i n g t o g i v e h e a r s a y t e s t i m o n y a n d i n s t r u c t e d him a c c o r d i n g l y . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s i s s u e i s t o be a n a l y z e d under t h e p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e . R u l e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . This testimony b y M o r r i s was r e s t r i c t e d as t o what he was t o l d b y a p o l i c e o f f i c e r as he was r e c o u n t i n g h i s a r r e s t a n d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t h e paramedic. A l l the s t a t e m e n t s from t h e 71 CR-07-1997 officer were i n s t r u c t i o n s or informational to Morris to f a c i l i t a t e Morris's arrest. " R u l e 8 0 1 ( c ) , A l a . R. E v i d . , reads: " ' " H e a r s a y " i s a s t a t e m e n t , o t h e r t h a n one made b y t h e d e c l a r a n t w h i l e t e s t i f y i n g a t the t r i a l or h e a r i n g , o f f e r e d i n evidence to prove t h e t r u t h of the matter a s s e r t e d . ' " R u l e 802, A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s that "'[h]earsay i s not admissible except as p r o v i d e d b y t h e s e r u l e s , o r b y o t h e r r u l e s a d o p t e d b y t h e Supreme C o u r t o f Alabama o r by s t a t u t e . ' " Ex p a r t e 906 Baker, 906 So. 2d 277, 283 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , on remand, So. 2d 292 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) . The trial court's concerned out-of-court restrictions on M o r r i s ' s s t a t e m e n t s made b y a p o l i c e testimony officer. 8 The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o s t a t e d t h a t i t would n o t a l l o w Morris t o give r e n d i t i o n s of h i s out-of-court conversations b e c a u s e he w o u l d n o t be a l l o w e d t o "make a s p e e c h " b u t r a t h e r must "answer q u e s t i o n s . " (R. 442.) T h e r e was no e r r o r i n t h i s s t a t e m e n t b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Hodges v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-041226, M a r c h 2 3 , 2007] So. 3d , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2007) ( t r i a l c o u n s e l was n o t i n e f f e c t i v e f o r f a i l i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o Hodges t o " s t o p m a k i n g s t a t e m e n t s " a n d " s i m p l y a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n s he was a s k e d . " T h e r e was a l s o no m e r i t t o t h e c l a i m . "Hodges made an u n s o l i c i t e d comment t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r , t h e n a s k e d t h e c o u r t i f he c o u l d make a s t a t e m e n t . The t r i a l c o u r t i s v e s t e d w i t h much d i s c r e t i o n t o c o n t r o l t h e p r o c e e d i n g s i n i t s courtroom and t o 8 72 CR-07-1997 See generally 2009] from Vaughn So. 3d Officer v. State, , Shultz [Ms. CR-08-0485, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) regarding what the victim August 7, ("Testimony told him c o n s t i t u t e d hearsay; the nonhearsay p o r t i o n of h i s testimony-what he observed constitute when substantive he arrived evidence revocation of p r o b a t i o n . " ) . 1249, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2004) 1261 at the necessary scene--did to C f . W h i t e v. S t a t e , t o be t h a t S l a t o n was p e r m i t t e d not support a 900 So. 2d ("His o n l y o b j e c t i o n seems t o t e s t i f y about hearsay, but S l a t o n d i d n o t t e s t i f y a b o u t what Thompson t o l d h i m , o n l y t h a t he met Thompson a t t h e l o c a t i o n where Newton h a d t e s t i f i e d she met Thompson. ... S l a t o n ' s t e s t i m o n y a b o u t what he d i d was n o t hearsay."). Even i f t h i s t e s t i m o n y m i g h t have been a d m i s s i b l e because i t was b e i n g o f f e r e d n o t " t o p r o v e t h e t r u t h o f w h a t e v e r f a c t s might be stated, 'but r a t h e r to e s t a b l i s h the reason f o r a c t i o n o r c o n d u c t by t h e w i t n e s s , ' " G r a y s o n v. S t a t e , 824 So. 2d 804, 813 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , q u o t i n g 502 So. 2d 846, 849 (Ala. Edwards v. S t a t e , C r i m . App. 1 9 8 6 ) , q u o t i n g e n s u r e t h a t p r o p e r decorum i s 73 maintained."). i n turn CR-07-1997 Tucker v. S t a t e , 474 So. 2d 131, 132 rev'd on other omission was grounds, harmless. 474 So. Morris ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2d was 134 1984), ( A l a . 1985), i t s not prevented from or r e s t r i c t e d i n t e s t i f y i n g as t o h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e e v e n t s . F o r e x a m p l e , a l t h o u g h , as a r e s u l t o f t h e o b j e c t i o n s he changed h i s t e s t i m o n y t o s t a t e t h a t he g o t o u t o f t h e p o l i c e carf o r the paramedic t o l o o k a t him, r a t h e r than t e s t i f y i n g t h a t the o f f i c e r t o l d h i m t o do s o , t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e t e s t i m o n y remained t h e same. There is no indication in the record that these i n s t r u c t i o n s i n a n y way l i m i t e d M o r r i s ' s t e s t i m o n y . A n y e r r o r on this b a s i s was h a r m l e s s , and M o r r i s ' s s u b s t a n t i a l rights were n o t p r o b a b l y a f f e c t e d b y t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s . "No j u d g m e n t may be r e v e r s e d o r s e t a s i d e , n o r new t r i a l g r a n t e d ... on t h e ground of misdirection r e j e c t i o n of evidence of the j u r y ... o r t h e i m p r o p e r ... ... u n l e s s i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e c o u r t t o w h i c h t h e a p p e a l i s t a k e n o r a p p l i c a t i o n i s made, a f t e r an examination error of the e n t i r e complained of has cause, i t s h o u l d appear probably injuriously that the affected s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s . " R u l e 45, A l a . R . A p p . P . 74 See CR-07-1997 also O.A.C. v. S t a t e , 2002) (trial testifying showing 851 So. 2d 146, 152 ( A l a . C r i m . App. court d i d not erroneously prevent as he that "failed the t o make evidence he a p p e l l a n t from the necessary sought to threshold introduce was s u f f i c i e n t l y p r o b a t i v e w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s c l a i m e d d e f e n s e , so as t o t i p the balance i n favor of admitting t h e e v i d e n c e on the b a s i s of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o present a d e f e n s e . " ) ; W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 531 So. 2d 49 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1988) (any error i n the t r i a l defense witness harmless); App. court's limitation concerning victim's of examination of intoxication was K i n g v . S t a t e , 929 So. 2d 1032, 1039-40 ( A l a . C r i m . 2005) examination (trial court's limitation of o f h i s w i f e , i f e r r o r a t a l l , was We f i n d no p l a i n e r r o r as t o t h i s King's cross- harmless). claim. VI. Morris States previous argues that Constitution trial the Eighth prohibits to the United h i s execution r e s u l t e d i n a hung j u r y . M o r r i s i s s u e f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l ; analyzed Amendment because h i s raises this t h e r e f o r e , i t i s due t o be u n d e r t h e p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e . R u l e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . 75 CR-07-1997 M o r r i s ' s s e c o n d t r i a l e n d e d when t h e t r i a l a mistrial Although b e c a u s e t h e j u r y was u n a b l e Morris contends t h a t t h i s court t o reach fact should f o rMorris's a verdict. d i s a l l o w any f u t u r e s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h as t o t h e same o f f e n s e , l e g a l support declared there argument. I n S t a t e v. Woods, 382 S.C. 153, 676 S.E. 2d 128 Woods's f i r s t t r i a l was r e t r i e d e n d e d i n a hung j u r y a n d m i s t r i a l , and s e n t e n c e d t o death. change o f venue was a p p r o p r i a t e the trial court's holding i s no In addressing (2009), a n d he whether a f o r t h e s e c o n d t r i a l b a s e d on i n the f i r s t trial, the stated: "A m i s t r i a l i s t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f no t r i a l a n d l e a v e s t h e cause pending i n t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t . S t a t e v. S m i t h , 336 S.C. 39, 518 S.E. 2d 294 ( C t . App. 1 9 9 9 ) . I t l e a v e s t h e p a r t i e s 'as t h o u g h no t r i a l h a d t a k e n p l a c e . ' Grooms v. Z a n d e r , 246 S.C. 512, 514, 144 S.E. 2d 909, 910 (1965) ( r u l i n g s o f t r i a l j u d g e in proceeding ending in mistrial represent no binding a d j u d i c a t i o n upon t h e p a r t i e s as t h e m i s t r i a l l e a v e s t h e p a r t i e s i n s t a t u s quo a n t e ) . A c o u r t r u l i n g as t o a d m i s s i b i l i t y a n d c o m p e t e n c y o f testimony during a t r i a l which i s l a t e r d e c l a r e d a m i s t r i a l r e s u l t s ' i n no b i n d i n g a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s . ' K e e l s v. P o w e l l , 213 S.C. 570, 572, 50 S.E. 2d 704, 705 ( 1 9 4 8 ) . " 76 court CR-07-1997 "Here, the case h a v i n g r e s u l t e d i n a m i s t r i a l , i t was a n u l l i t y and t h e r e f o r e b e g a n anew when c a l l e d a g a i n f o r t r i a l . S t a t e v. M i l l s , 281 S.C. 60, 314 S.E. 2d 324, c e r t . d e n i e d 469 U.S. 930, 105 S.Ct. 324, 83 L.Ed. 2d 261 (1984) (when m i s t r i a l o c c u r s b e c a u s e o f i n a b i l i t y o f j u r y t o a g r e e on v e r d i c t , i t i s t h e same as i f no t r i a l t o o k p l a c e ) . " 382 S.C. at M a n n i n g , 329 was 157-58, S.E. 2d 1, 495 S.C. 676 at S.E. 2d 191 131. See (1997) e.g. S t a t e v. (wherein Manning s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h f o r m u r d e r i n g a s t a t e t r o o p e r and h i s c o n v i c t i o n was r e v e r s e d on a p p e a l , l e a d i n g t o a s e c o n d trial, which r e s u l t e d i n a m i s t r i a l because the j u r y c o u l d not reach a decision); 300 as P e o p l e v. H o v a r t e r , 44 C a l . 4 t h 983, ( C a l . 2008) (wherein j u r y was mistrial during and he a was rape and retried d e a t h ) ; Hogan v. S t a t e , 139 P.3d trial for capital kidnapping, and P. 3d unable to reach a v e r d i c t to penalty i n Hovarter's f i r s t committed 189 convicted murder resulting and in sentenced 907, 948-49 ( O k l a . C r i m . a to App. 2006) ("Where a c a p i t a l - s t a g e j u r y becomes ' d e a d l o c k e d ' d u r i n g its deliberations, penalty. this i s not an 'acquittal' on the death Hence t h e S t a t e can r e - p u r s u e t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i n a r e - s e n t e n c i n g or r e t r i a l i n t h e same c a s e . Thus S a t t a z a h n [v. 101 P e n n s y l v a n i a , 537 U.S. 77 (2003)] a p p l i e s t h e same r u l e CR-07-1997 t o c a p i t a l - s t a g e 'hung j u r i e s ' t h a t t h e C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y applied t o hung juries i n the g u i l t stage." (footnotes omitted)). The r a t i o n a l e i n Hammond v . S t a t e , 776 So. 2 d 884 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 9 8 ) , i n w h i c h t h i s C o u r t f o u n d p l a i n e r r o r i n t h e prosecutor's comment r e f e r e n c i n g Hammond's p r e v i o u s applicable to this trial, is issue: "We h o l d t h a t a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g phase o f a second o r subsequent c a p i t a l murder t r i a l , i t i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o comment on the r e s u l t o f a defendant's p r e v i o u s t r i a l f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . F r a z i e r v . S t a t e , 632 So. 2d 1 0 0 2 , 1007 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993). I t does n o t m a t t e r t h a t trial counsel d i d not preserve this error f o r r e v i e w ; we f i n d t h e e r r o r t o be p l a i n e r r o r . R u l e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P ; T o m l i n v. S t a t e , 591 So. 2 d 550 (Ala.Cr.App. 1 9 9 1 ) ; F r a z i e r v. S t a t e , supra. T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y so when t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n f o r m s t h e j u r y t h a t a p r e v i o u s j u r y recommended, a n d a p r e v i o u s judge imposed, t h e death p e n a l t y . I n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r Hammond s h o u l d r e c e i v e t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y o r life imprisonment without p a r o l e , t h i s j u r y was aware o f how a n o t h e r j u r y h a d r e s o l v e d t h i s v e r y i s s u e - - a d v e r s e l y t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . I f a j u r o r was u n c e r t a i n as t o w h e t h e r a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances existed, o r , i f found t o e x i s t , whether they outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the k n o w l e d g e t h a t 12 o t h e r p e o p l e h a d d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t d i d c o u l d have swayed t h e j u r o r ' s v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f death. F u r t h e r , t h e j u r y ' s awareness o f Hammond's p r e v i o u s d e a t h s e n t e n c e w o u l d d i m i n i s h i t s sense o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and m i t i g a t e t h e s e r i o u s 78 CR-07-1997 c o n s e q u e n c e s o f i t s d e c i s i o n . P e o p l e v. Hope, 116 I l l . 2d 265, 274, 508 N.E. 2d 202, 205, 108 I l l . Dec. 41, 45 ( I l l . 1 9 8 6 ) . " 776 So. 2d a t There 892. i s no prohibition a g a i n s t a death sentence s e c o n d t r i a l where a c a p i t a l d e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t t r i a l in a mistrial attributable to a hung jury. in a resulted In such s i t u a t i o n , a c a p i t a l d e f e n d a n t i s t r i e d anew w i t h a new a jury. The p r e v i o u s j u r y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a r e n e i t h e r a t t r i b u t a b l e t o nor t o be c o n s i d e r e d by p l a i n e r r o r on t h i s the l a t e r jury. Thus, t h e r e was no ground. VII. Morris Arizona, argues 536 he his 584 U.S. determine whether unanimously that sentence (2002), contravened because the i s mentally retarded; jury Ring v. did not the j u r y d i d not f i n d t h a t the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances e x i s t e d ; and t h e j u r o r s were i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e i r v e r d i c t was only a recommendation. Morris level; failed to raise these issues at the t r i a l court t h e r e f o r e , t h i s i s s u e i s due t o be e v a l u a t e d u n d e r p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e . R u l e 45A, Ala.R.App.P. 79 the CR-07-1997 Initially, the capital aggravating found the we note t h a t the offenses containing, circumstances existence Specifically, of in this jury's finding by of guilt definition, of two i n d i c a t e s t h a t the j u r y unanimously these two case, aggravating the circumstances. j u r y unanimously found the e x i s t e n c e of the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances t h a t the murder was c o m m i t t e d w h i l e M o r r i s was engaged i n the commission of the b u r g l a r y and o f t h e r o b b e r y o f R o c h e s t e r by f i n d i n g him guilty o f t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s o f m u r d e r d u r i n g a b u r g l a r y and m u r d e r during 40(a)(2) a robbery. and instructed penalty 13A-5-49(4), ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975. the unless aggravating § jury i t that found circumstance. Ala. (R. 1975; § 13A-5- Furthermore, the t r i a l i t could the Code not existence vote on of at the court death least 592.) "'The Supreme C o u r t has h e l d , i n numerous c a s e s , t h a t the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t f i n d i n g a defendant g u i l t y of c a p i t a l murder d u r i n g the g u i l t phase of h i s t r i a l , i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e j u r y had u n a n i m o u s l y f o u n d a p r o f f e r e d aggravating circumstance included w i t h i n t h e § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r capital-murder o f f e n s e charged i n the i n d i c t m e n t . See, e.g., Ex p a r t e Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ; Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. 2d 1181 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ; S t a l l w o r t h v. S t a t e , 868 So. 2d 1128 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2001) ( o p i n i o n on r e t u r n t o s e c o n d 80 one CR-07-1997 r e m a n d ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 868 So. 2d 1189 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . B u t s e e Ex p a r t e M c G r i f f , 908 So. 2d 1024, 1039 (Ala. 2004) (authorizing prospective use o f a penalty-phase s p e c i a l i n t e r r o g a t o r y ) . Moreover, i n Ex p a r t e McNabb, 887 So. 2d 998 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , t h e Supreme Court held that even a nonunanimous recommendation o f death by t h e j u r y proved t h a t the j u r y , i n c l u d i n g t h e j u r o r s who v o t e d a g a i n s t t h e recommendation o f death, had unanimously found the existence of a p r o f f e r e d aggravating circumstance, e v e n t h o u g h t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e was n o t i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the d e f i n i t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r capital-murder o f f e n s e charged i n the i n d i c t m e n t , because the t r i a l c o u r t had s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y t h a t i t c o u l d n o t p r o c e e d t o a v o t e on w h e t h e r t o impose t h e death p e n a l t y u n l e s s i t had a l r e a d y unanimously agreed that the aggravating circumstance e x i s t e d . B e c a u s e t h e j u r y recommended b y a v o t e o f 10-2 t h a t L e w i s be s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h , i t i s c l e a r t h a t i t u n a n i m o u s l y f o u n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a t l e a s t one aggravating circumstance.'" Sharifi v. State, 993 So. 2008), cert. quoting L e w i s v. S t a t e , So. [Ms. 2d denied, , U.S. 940-41 , 129 S.Ct. [Ms. CR-03-0480, A p r i l CR-05-1517, O c t o b e r 2, 2009] 491 App. (2008), 28, 2006] So. 3d , (Ala. ("'"We n o t e t h a t R i n g r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t t h e unanimously circumstance ( A l a . Crim. ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 6 ) . See Newton v. S t a t e , C r i m . App. 2009) jury 2d 907, find in the order existence to death-eligible."'"). 81 make of an aggravating the defendant CR-07-1997 Thus, existence was no i t is clear o f two that aggravating the j u r y unanimously circumstances. v i o l a t i o n o f R i n g v. A r i z o n a , Moreover, as Morris found Therefore, c o n c e d e s , A l a b a m a does n o t Virginia, 536 (2002), or mentally U.S. i n Ex 304, parte requires a jury Beckworth v. State, require of whether retarded. "[N]othing i n Atkins 122 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 453 (Ala. S.Ct. Perkins, 851 determination 946 there supra. t h a t a j u r y i n a c a p i t a l c a s e make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e d e f e n d a n t was the So. So. of 2d 2d mental 490, 510 v. 335 2002), retardation." (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). As to Morris's v. A r i z o n a , sentencing c l a i m t h a t the s u p r a , by i m p r o p e r l y d e c i s i o n was State, CR-97-1258, J a n u a r y 16, Court 2000) v i o l a t e d Ring o n l y a recommendation, t h i s i s s u e been C r i m . App. court i n s t r u c t i n g the j u r y t h a t i t s previously [Ms. trial decided (opinion adversely on to Morris. 2009] return to So. In Smith 3d f o r t h remand), stated: 889 "We a d d r e s s e d t h i s same i s s u e i n Duke v. S t a t e , So. 2d 1, 43 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 2 ) , v a c a t e d on 82 has v. (Ala. this CR-07-1997 o t h e r g r o u n d s , 544 270 L.Ed.2d 270 ( 2 0 0 5 ) , U.S. 901, 125 and s t a t e d : S.Ct. 1588, 161 "'Duke a l s o argues that Ring [v. A r i z o n a , 536 U.S. 584 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , ] r e q u i r e s p e n a l t y - p h a s e r e l i e f when t h e j u r y i s t o l d that i t s v e r d i c t i s "advisory" or merely a "recommendation." Contrary to Duke's contention, Ring does n o t a d d r e s s t h e advisory nature of a jury's sentencing r e c o m m e n d a t i o n . Duke's j u r y was p r o p e r l y informed that under Alabama law, i t s verdict was an advisory one. See § 13A-5-46, A l a . Code 1975. Thus, t h e j u r y was n o t m i s l e d r e g a r d i n g i t s r o l e i n t h e sentencing decision. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; Ex p a r t e T a y l o r , 666 So. 2d 73, 88 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 516 U.S. 1120, 116 S.Ct. 928, 133 L.Ed.2d 856 (1996).' "See a l s o I r v i n v. S t a t e , 940 So. 2d 331 App. 2 0 0 5 ) . " So. 3d a t Therefore, Arizona, (footnote Morris's (Ala. Crim. omitted). sentencing d i d not v i o l a t e Ring v. supra. VIII. M o r r i s argues t h a t the t r i a l the j u r y concerning mitigating court improperly instructed i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the aggravating circumstances. Specifically, 83 Morris contends and that CR-07-1997 the t r i a l court e r r e d by f a i l i n g to i n s t r u c t the j u r y that i t was r e q u i r e d t o u n a n i m o u s l y f i n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a t l e a s t one particular to be aggravating unanimous circumstances. in circumstance a n d t h a t i t d i d n o t have i t s decision as to the m i t i g a t i n g Moreover, M o r r i s a l l e g e s t h a t the t r i a l court f a i l e d t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t i t must recommend a s e n t e n c e of life imprisonment aggravating circumstances were o f e q u a l These without parole i f i t found and t h e m i t i g a t i n g that the circumstances weight. issues are being raised f o r the f i r s t time on a p p e a l ; a n d t h e r e f o r e , t h e y must be e v a l u a t e d u n d e r t h e p l a i n e r r o r r u l e . R u l e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . However, reasonable because the jury of a robbery, the found doubt d u r i n g t h e g u i l t stage t h a t M o r r i s a murder d u r i n g t h e course phase unanimously a committed o f a b u r g l a r y and d u r i n g t h e course the j u r y unanimously found during aggravating beyond circumstances the penalty contained in these o f f e n s e s . As t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n Newton v . S t a t e , s u p r a , when Newton a r g u e d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a d v i o l a t e d h i s E i g h t h a n d Fourteenth Amendment r i g h t s b y f a i l i n g 84 to instruct the j u r y CR-07-1997 that i t h a d t o be aggravating unanimous as t o i t s f i n d i n g s concerning circumstances: "We a d d r e s s e d and r e j e c t e d a s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t i n B l a c k m o n v. S t a t e , 7 So. 3d 397, 432-33 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) , as f o l l o w s : "'Blackmon a l s o argues t h a t h e r death s e n t e n c e v i o l a t e s R i n g b e c a u s e t h e j u r y was not i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i t had t o unanimously determine the e x i s t e n c e of the aggravating c i r c u m s t a n c e and t h e w e i g h t t h a t s h o u l d be assigned to that aggravating circumstance. A g a i n , i n Duke we s t a t e d : "'"We note that Ring requires only that the jury unanimously f i n d the e x i s t e n c e of an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e i n order t o make the defendant d e a t h - e l i g i b l e . A l a b a m a l a w does not require that the jury's advisory verdict be unanimous b e f o r e i t can recommend death. See § 13A-5-46(f), A l a . Code 1975. N o t h i n g i n R i n g s u p p o r t s Duke's c l a i m t h e j u r y ' s a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t be u n a n i m o u s . " Duke, 88 9 So. 2d a t 43 n. 4.' " D u r i n g t h e g u i l t phase o f t h e t r i a l , t h e j u r y unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t Newton c o m m i t t e d a m u r d e r d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f c o m m i t t i n g a r o b b e r y . 'The j u r y ' s unanimous f i n d i n g o f one a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y R i n g . ' Ex p a r t e McNabb, 887 So. 2d 998, 1006 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e r e f o r e , Newton's a r g u m e n t i s w i t h o u t merit." 85 CR-07-1997 So. 3d a t This Court . also addressed Newton's claim that c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s had been v i o l a t e d by t h e t r i a l failure to i n s t r u c t the jury that his court's i t d i d n o t have to be unanimous i n i t s d e c i s i o n as t o t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n f i n d i n g no p l a i n e r r o r on t h i s g r o u n d , the Court stated: "We a d d r e s s e d a s i m i l a r argument i n S m i t h v. S t a t e , 795 So. 2d 788, 835-36 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , as follows: "'Smith a l s o argues t h a t the t r i a l court's f a i l u r e to i n s t r u c t the j u r y that i t s f i n d i n g as t o m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s d i d n o t have t o be u n a n i m o u s , i m p l i e d t h a t t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s h a d t o be u n a n i m o u s . T h e r e was no o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d a t t r i a l concerning the court's f a i l u r e to i n s t r u c t that the j u r y ' s f i n d i n g d i d not have t o be u n a n i m o u s . We r e v i e w t h i s i s s u e f o r p l a i n e r r o r . R u l e 45A, A l a . R.App. P. "'A r e v i e w o f t h e j u r y ' s i n s t r u c t i o n on mitigating circumstances does not r e f l e c t that the t r i a l court i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n t h a t e v i d e n c e was m i t i g a t i n g h a d t o be u n a n i m o u s . The t r i a l court i n s t r u c t e d that j u r y i n accordance w i t h t h e Alabama Proposed Pattern Jury I n s t r u c t i o n s f o r Use i n t h e G u i l t S t a g e o f C a p i t a l C a s e s T r i e d Under A c t No. 81-178. "'As we r e c e n t l y s t a t e d i n H a l l v. S t a t e , 820 So.2d 113 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1999) : 86 CR-07-1997 "'"This Court addressed i similar issue i n Freeman v, 4 n n C S t a.t -e^ , 776 So. 2d 160 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1999) : O-l "'"'Freeman also contends t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by f a i l i n g to i n s t r u c t the jury t h a t i t s f i n d i n g s as t o m i t i g a t i n g circumstances d i d not have t o be u n a n i m o u s . In failing to so i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y , he says, the t r i a l court i m p l i e d that the j u r o r s had to unanimously agree before they could f i n d the existence of a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance. Freeman d i d not o b j e c t a t t r i a l to the t r i a l court's instructions to the jury concerning m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; therefore, we will review t h i s c l a i m under the p l a i n e r r o r r u l e . R u l e [45A,] A l a . R.App. P.' "'"We have reviewed the t r i a l court's i n s t r u c t i o n s to the j u r y ; we f i n d nothing i n the instructions that would have suggested to the j u r o r s , or given 87 CR-07-1997 them t h e i m p r e s s i o n , t h a t t h e i r f i n d i n g s concerning the e x i s t e n c e of m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s h a d to be u n a n i m o u s . See C o r a l v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 985 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), aff'd, 628 So. 2d 1004 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , cert. d e n i e d , 511 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 1387, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994); W i n d s o r v. S t a t e , 683 So. 2d 1027 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), aff'd, 683 So.2d 1042 ( A l a . 1996), cert. d e n i e d , 520 U.S. 1171, 117 S.Ct. 1438, 137 L.Ed.2d 545 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . " ' " So. 3d a t In the instructions . present to the case, jury a review of concerning the trial i t s duty m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e v e a l s t h a t t h e r e i s no in court's finding "reasonable l i k e l i h o o d o r p r o b a b i l i t y " t h a t t h e j u r o r s m i g h t have b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e y were r e q u i r e d t o u n a n i m o u s l y any p a r t i c u l a r mitigating circumstance. f i n d the e x i s t e n c e of Thus, t h e r e was no error. Morris also f a i l e d t o charge claims t h a t the t r i a l court's instruction the j u r y t h a t i f i t found t h a t the weight of the a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s was e q u a l , i t must recommend a s e n t e n c e 88 of l i f e imprisonment CR-07-1997 w i t h o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f p a r o l e . However, t h e g i v e n by the t r i a l c o u r t i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e were e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e g i v e n i n Ex p a r t e McNabb, 887 1001 ( A l a . 2004), instructions So. 2d i n w h i c h t h e y were f o u n d t o be h a r m l e s s . d i s c u s s i n g McNabb d e c i s i o n , this c o u r t has written: "The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e i n Ex p a r t e McNabb, 887 So. 2d 998 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) . I n t h a t c a s e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y as f o l l o w s d u r i n g the s e n t e n c i n g phase of the t r i a l : "'[I]f, after a full and fair c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l of the evidence i n the c a s e , you a r e c o n v i n c e d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance does exist and you are convinced t h a t the a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance outweighs the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances, t h e n y o u r v e r d i c t w o u l d be: "We, t h e j u r y , recommend t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t be p u n i s h e d b y d e a t h , and t h e v o t e i s as f o l l o w s " However, i f after a full and fair c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l of the evidence i n this case, you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh any a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance or circumstances t h a t e x i s t , o r you a r e n o t c o n v i n c e d b e y o n d a reasonable doubt t h a t a t l e a s t one a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e does e x i s t , y o u r verdict should be to recommend the punishment of l i f e imprisonment without parole ' "McNabb, 887 So. 2d a t 1001. Thus, j u s t as i n t h i s case, the language used i n i n s t r u c t i n g the j u r y i n McNabb d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on 89 998, In CR-07-1997 what t o do i f t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s were i n b a l a n c e . and "The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y as t o what t o do when t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s were i n b a l a n c e , ' t h e j u r y [ i n McNabb] was n o t i n v i t e d t o recommend a s e n t e n c e of death without finding any aggravating c i r c u m s t a n c e . ' I d . a t 1004. The Supreme C o u r t t h e n h e l d t h a t , i n c o n s i d e r i n g the j u r y charge i n i t s e n t i r e t y , i t c o u l d n o t c o n c l u d e t h a t 'the e r r o r " s e r i o u s l y affect[ed] the f a i r n e s s , i n t e g r i t y or p u b l i c r e p u t a t i o n of [these] j u d i c i a l proceedings," Ex p a r t e D a v i s , 718 So. 2d a t 1173-74, so as t o r e q u i r e a r e v e r s a l o f t h e s e n t e n c e . ' McNabb, 887 So.2d a t 1004." S a l e v. S t a t e , 8 So. 3d 330, 349 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) , d e n i e d , 8 So. 3d 352 129 S . C t . 2062 ( A l a . 2008), c e r t . denied, U.S. cert. , (2009). Here, a r e v i e w of t h e complete i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n by the trial court fairness of reveals that the there sentencing i s no indication proceedings was in that the any way a f f e c t e d . The j u r y was i n f o r m e d as t o i t s r o l e i n w e i g h i n g i t s findings as to the aggravating circumstances and the m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Thus, t h e r e was no p l a i n e r r o r as t o this issue. 90 CR-07-1997 IX. Morris argues that the prosecutor made improper s t a t e m e n t s i n h i s o p e n i n g and c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s , i n v i o l a t i o n of h i s F i f t h , Morris failed S i x t h , E i g h t h , and F o u r t e e n t h Amendment r i g h t s . to remarks a t t r i a l ; object to any of these alleged improper t h e r e f o r e , any e r r o r must r i s e t o t h e o f p l a i n e r r o r . R u l e 45A, level Ala.R.App.P. A. M o r r i s contends t h a t the p r o s e c u t o r i m p r o p e r l y p r e j u d i c e d him in front concerning of the jury conflicting by making evidence the following between w i t n e s s e s and t h e e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by t h e argument certain State's defense: " I f you b e l i e v e t h e d e f e n s e and you b e l i e v e A l f o n z o M o r r i s you must a l s o b e l i e v e two a d d i t i o n a l t h i n g s . You must b e l i e v e t h a t O f f i c e r S m i t h and O f f i c e r S h i r l e y J a c k s o n c o n s p i r e d t o swap t h o s e c i g a r e t t e s somehow and t h a t t h e y l i e d t o you, b o t h o f them, on t h e s t a n d . " (R. 516.) This comment by t h e p r o s e c u t o r was merely referring to c e r t a i n c o n f l i c t s i n t h e e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d b y t h e S t a t e and t h e evidence offered by the defense. 91 The officers referred to CR-07-1997 testified t h a t a c i g a r e t t e found a t t h e scene o f t h e o f f e n s e contained Morris's his DNA. M o r r i s testified arrest the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r took t h a t a t the time of a c i g a r e t t e from him t h a t M o r r i s h a d h a d i n h i s mouth. M o r r i s testified that "the o n l y c i g a r e t t e t h a t h a d my DNA on i t i s t h e c i g a r e t t e he t o o k out o f my mouth -- I mean, o u t o f my p o c k e t what I h a d i n my mouth a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a r r e s t . " (R. 446.) "The p r o s e c u t o r p r o p e r l y a r g u e d t o t h e j u r y e v i d e n c e t h a t c o n t r a d i c t e d t h a t d e f e n s e . The p r o s e c u t o r h a s a right to present h i s impressions from t h e evidence. See T a y l o r v. S t a t e , 666 So. 2d 36, 64 (Ala.Cr.App.), remanded on o t h e r g r o u n d s , o p i n i o n e x t e n d e d a n d a f f ' d on r e t u r n t o remand, 666 So.2d 71 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), a f f ' d , 666 So. 2d 73 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 516 U.S. 1120, 116 S . C t . 928, 133 L.Ed.2d 856 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . The p r o s e c u t o r may comment on p r o p e r i n f e r e n c e s t o be drawn f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e and may draw c o n c l u s i o n s b a s e d on h i s o r h e r own reasoning. I d . " Gamble v. S t a t e , 791 So. 2d 409, 431 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) . See F e r g u s o n v. S t a t e , 814 So. 2d 925,946-47 2000), 535 affirmed, U.S. 907 814 So. 2d 970 (2002) (holding i n f e r e n c e s and d e d u c t i o n s argued that prosecutor ( A l a . C r i m . App. ( A l a . 2001), that cert. prosecutor from t h e e v i d e n c e a l t h o u g h improperly 92 "'offered advice denied, can draw Ferguson on how t o CR-07-1997 evaluate the Ferguson's statements t o p o l i c e , which testimony of his codefendant on the contradicted question of [Ferguson's] r o l e i n the s h o o t i n g s ' " ) . The prosecutor properly argued h i s case i n c l u d i n g referencing the evidence presented to the jury, that contradicted that of the defense. B. Morris jury alleges that that defense the prosecutor counsel's improperly t o l d the argument showed t h a t M o r r i s Morris contends lying. Specifically, counsel had a r g u e d t h a t whoever committed t h e murder d i d n o t i n t e n d t o do s o , t h e p r o s e c u t o r that, improperly after was defense commented t h a t t h e d e f e n s e was a l l e g i n g c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h e o r i e s : t h a t M o r r i s d i d not commit t h e o f f e n s e did n o t mean t o commit i t . M o r r i s suggests that a n d t h a t he c o m m i t t e d t h e o f f e n s e b u t defense counsel's argues remarks that were this comment substantive e v i d e n c e a n d was an a t t e m p t b y t h e S t a t e t o l e s s e n i t s b u r d e n of proof. This legitimate argument comment by on the prosecutor, Morris's 93 however, theories of was a defense. CR-07-1997 "'"Argument by the prosecution concerning omissions and i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n t h e t h e defendant's v e r s i o n o f t h e case i s not improper."'" W h i t t v. S t a t e , C r i m . App. 1 9 9 8 ) , 1042 578 578 733 So. 2d 463, 482 ( A l a . q u o t i n g M o s e l y v. S t a t e , 628 So. 2d 1 0 4 1 , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n S a l t e r v . S t a t e , So. 2d 1092, 1096 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 0 ) , So. 2d regarding 1097 ( A l a . 1991). the defense's "The t h e o r y was cert. prosecutor's a fair and denied, argument legitimate comment on t h e e v i d e n c e a n d a f a i r r e s p o n s e t o t h e a r g u m e n t o f the d e f e n s e . " W h i t t v. S t a t e , 733 So. 2d a t 483. See M i n o r v . State, 914 So. 2d 372 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2004) ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s comments d u r i n g r e b u t t a l closing argument o f g u i l t phase o f c a p i t a l t r i a l d i d not i m p e r m i s s i b l y s h i f t the burden of proof but was a legitimate comment on the lack of evidence s u p p o r t M i n o r ' s t h e o r y o f d e f e n s e ) ; R e e v e s v. S t a t e , 2d 18 ( A l a . Crim. rebuttal closing App. 2000) to 807 So. ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment d u r i n g argument a t g u i l t phase d i d not s p o t l i g h t d e f e n s e ' s s t r a t e g y and argue t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d i d n o t s u p p o r t defense's theory afterthought'"). that the robbery was a "'mere H e r e , t h e comment b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r was an 94 CR-07-1997 appropriate 781 response to M o r r i s ' s So. 2d 994, 1004 arguments. ( A l a . C r i m . App. B u t l e r v. State, 2000). C. Morris argues j u r y t h a t i t was the i t s "oath" t o an e x h o r t a t i o n of h i s g u i l t - p h a s e its that prosecutor improperly to convict Morris. Morris made by one o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r s argument, a r g u i n g oath to hold Morris told responsible refers at the c l o s e t o t h e j u r y t h a t i t was f o r t h i s b r u t a l murder. "'Generally, the prosecutor i s i n e r r o r by e x h o r t i n g t h e j u r y t o "do w h a t ' s r i g h t , " o r t o "do i t s job," i f that exhortation "impl[ies] that, i n o r d e r t o do s o , i t can o n l y r e a c h a c e r t a i n v e r d i c t , r e g a r d l e s s o f i t s d u t y t o w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e and f o l l o w t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e l a w . " ' M c N a i r v. S t a t e , 653 So.2d 320, 339-40 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , a f f ' d , 653 So. 2d 353 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) , q u o t i n g A r t h u r v. S t a t e , 575 So. 2d 1165, 1185 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 0 ) . However, i t i s n o t i m p r o p e r f o r a p r o s e c u t o r t o argue t o the j u r y t h a t a defendant i s g u i l t y or t o urge the j u r y t o f i n d the defendant g u i l t y o f t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d so l o n g as t h a t a r g u m e n t i s b a s e d on t h e e v i d e n c e ; i n f a c t , t h a t i s e x a c t l y what a p r o s e c u t o r i s s u p p o s e d t o do d u r i n g c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t . See G a l l o w a y v. S t a t e , 484 So. 2d 1199 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 6 ) , and t h e a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . See a l s o B r o a d n a x v. S t a t e , 825 So. 2d 134, 183 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 825 So. 2d 233 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , and M e l s o n v. S t a t e , 775 So. 2d 857, 889-90 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , a f f ' d , 775 So. 2d 904 (Ala. 2000). Moreover, '"the p r o s e c u t i n g attorney may c h a r a c t e r i z e the accused or h i s conduct i n 95 the CR-07-1997 language which, a l t h o u g h i t c o n s i s t s o f i n v e c t i v e o r opprobrious terms, accords w i t h the evidence of the c a s e . " ' H e n d e r s o n v. S t a t e , 584 So. 2d 8 4 1 , 857 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 8 ) , remanded on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 584 So. 2d 862 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , on remand t o , 587 So. 2d 1071 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 1 ) , remanded on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 616 So. 2d 348 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) , on r e t u r n t o remand, 616 So. 2d 352 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g N i c k s v . S t a t e , 521 So. 2d 1018, 1023 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 7 ) , a f f ' d , 521 So. 2d 1035 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) . See a l s o H a n d l e y v . S t a t e , 214 A l a . 172, 175, 106 So. 692, 695 (1925) (argument, '"She i s a m u r d e r e r ; she i s a m u r d e r e r . She i s n o t some one who has committed some of the lower offenses of homicide"--did not transcend the bounds of l e g i t i m a t e a r g u m e n t ' ) ; M a p l e s v . S t a t e , 758 So. 2d 1, 58 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . ) , a f f ' d , 758 So. 2d 81 ( A l a . 1999) ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' " i s a m u r d e r e r ; a c a p i t a l m u r d e r e r " ' was n o t i m p r o p e r ) ; M e l s o n , 775 So. 2d a t 889 ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t as a ' " c o l d - b l o o d e d m u r d e r e r " ' w i t h '"no r e m o r s e " ' was n o t i m p r o p e r ) ; Thomas v . S t a t e , 766 So. 2d 860, 933-34 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 8 ) , a f f ' d , 766 So. 2d 975 ( A l a . 2000) (prosecutor's references t o defendant as a '"street punk,"' '"criminal,"' '"thug,"' '"murderer,"' and ' " m a n i p u l a t o r " ' were n o t i m p r o p e r ) ; a n d K i n a r d v . S t a t e , 495 So. 2d 705, 711 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1986) (prosecutor's reference t o defendant as '"an u n m i t i g a t e d l i a r a n d m u r d e r e r " ' was n o t i m p r o p e r ) . The p r o s e c u t o r ' s comments were s u p p o r t e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c a s e a n d were n o t i m p r o p e r . " M i n o r v. S t a t e , (finding 914 So. 2d 372, 420 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 4 ) , no p l a i n error i n p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment a s k i n g t h e j u r y " ' t o f i n d t h a t man g u i l t y o f t h e m u r d e r o f h i s s o n ' " ) . 96 CR-07-1997 There was no plain error in this comment by the prosecutor. D. Morris argues that t o him improper references the prosecutor as "'the one repeatedly liar made in this ( M o r r i s ' s b r i e f , a t 1 0 1 ) , b a s e d on h i s o m i s s i o n case'" of d e t a i l s i n his s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e p o l i c e . He f u r t h e r argues t h a t i n doing so, the the prosecutor witnesses. this Morris fails for credibility to c i t e to the of State's record i n support of argument. A review prosecutors, jury, or vouched of the a b a s e d on t h e arguments t a k i n g i n t o account t h e i r t o t a l r e v e a l s t h a t the being closing liar or by both comments r e f e r r i n g t o M o r r i s as implying deceit c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n the on false d i d not Morris's when he was c o n f l i c t s between h i s t e s t i m o n y 97 the lying part, were s t a t e m e n t s M o r r i s gave t o remember o r d i d n o t identification the argument t o the p o l i c e , M o r r i s ' s answers d u r i n g h i s t e s t i m o n y t h a t he of know, and arrested, as suggesting h i s use well and t h a t o f S t a t e ' s as of a the witnesses. CR-07-1997 T h i s C o u r t a d d r e s s e d t h i s same i s s u e r e c e n t l y i n v. State, (Ala. [Ms. CR-99-1349, O c t o b e r C r i m . App. 2009), and 2, 2009] So. Johnson 3d stated: " . . . [ A ] n y c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f J o h n s o n as a l i a r by t h e p r o s e c u t o r w o u l d have b e e n s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e i n the p r e s e n t case because of the v a r y i n g s t a t e m e n t s g i v e n by h e r t o t h e p o l i c e . She i n i t i a l l y s t a t e d t h a t she was i n T u s c a l o o s a , A l a b a m a , a t t h e time of the murder, but e v e n t u a l l y a d m i t t e d t h a t the f i r s t s t a t e m e n t was u n t r u e and c a s t t h e blame on Richards; she eventually admitted having been i n v o l v e d i n the murder. S i m i l a r l y , i n S m i t h v. S t a t e , 795 So. 2d 788 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , S m i t h argued t h a t the p r o s e c u t o r i m p r o p e r l y r e f e r r e d t o h i m as a l i a r . T h i s C o u r t s t a t e d : " ' C l e a r l y , t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e a p p e l l a n t i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e r e c o r d . Smith, i n h i s f i r s t statement, totally denied any involvement in the r o b b e r y - m u r d e r . I n t h e s e c o n d s t a t e m e n t he admitted his participation in the robber-murder. "[T]he p r o s e c u t o r , i n the a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e , may use o p p r o b r i o u s t e r m s to c h a r a c t e r i z e the accused or h i s conduct, p r o v i d e d t h a t the remarks are i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e . " B a n k h e a d [v. S t a t e , 585 So. 2d 97, 105 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1989), c e r t . d e n i e d , 519 U.S. 1079, 117 S.Ct. 742, 132 L.Ed. 2d 680 (1997)] "795 So.2d a t 825. " F u r t h e r , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t the p r o s e c u t o r i m p r o p e r l y vouched f o r the c r e d i b i l i t y of the S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s . 98 CR-07-1997 "'"A distinction must be made b e t w e e n an argument by t h e prosecutor personally vouching for a witness, thereby b o l s t e r i n g the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s , and an argument c o n c e r n i n g the c r e d i b i l i t y of a witness based upon t h e t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l . ' [ P ] r o s e c u t o r s must a v o i d m a k i n g p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t e e s as t o the c r e d i b i l i t y of the s t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s . ' Ex p a r t e P a r k e r , 610 So. 2d 1181 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) . See Ex p a r t e W a l d r o p , 459 So. 2d 959, 961 ( A l a . 1984), c e r t . denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2050, 85 L.Ed.2d 323 (1985). "'"'"Attempts to bolster a witness by vouching for his c r e d i b i l i t y are normally improper and error." ... The test for improper vouching is whether the jury could reasonably believe that the p r o s e c u t o r was indicating a personal b e l i e f i n the w i t n e s s ' credibility This t e s t may be satisfied i n two ways. F i r s t , t h e prosecution may place the prestige of the government b e h i n d the witness, by making explicit personal 99 CR-07-1997 assurances of the witness' veracity Secondly, a prosecutor may implicitly vouch for the witness' v e r a c i t y by indicating that information not presented to the jury s u p p o r t s t h e testimony.' "'"United S t a t e s v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 377 (11th C i r . 1983), c e r t . d e n i e d , 465 U.S. 1034, 104 S.Ct. 1304, 79 L.Ed.2d 703 (1984)." "'DeBruce v. S t a t e , 651 So. 2d 599, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , a f f ' d , 651 624 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) . ' 610-11 So. 2d "Brown v. S t a t e , 11 So. 3d 866, 910-11 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) , a f f i r m e d , Ex p a r t e Brown, 11 So. 3d 933 (Ala. 2 0 0 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , Brown v. A l a b a m a , U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 2864, 174 L.Ed. 2d 582 (200977 " H e r e , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for any w i t n e s s ' s c r e d i b i l i t y as he n e v e r s u g g e s t e d that t h e r e was evidence u n d i s c l o s e d to the j u r y t h a t w o u l d s u p p o r t a w i t n e s s ' s t e s t i m o n y n o r d i d he e v e r make p e r s o n a l a s s u r a n c e s o f a w i t n e s s ' s v e r a c i t y . Thus, t h e r e i s no e r r o r on t h i s g r o u n d . " So. The 3d a t . prosecutors' references were b a s e d on t h e e v i d e n c e to Morris as being and were t h u s a p r o p e r 100 a liar argument t o CR-07-1997 the jury. Moreover, c r e d i b i l i t y o f any the prosecutors witnesses did i n doing not vouch for the so. X. Morris argues because, that he reliability his says, of the c o n v i c t i o n i s due the State methodology failed to to f o r i t s DNA a l s o argues t h a t the S t a t e i m p r o p e r l y be overturned establish testing. the Morris f a i l e d t o r e t a i n samples o f DNA f o r t e s t i n g by t h e d e f e n s e . M o r r i s f a i l e d t o o b j e c t trial as to the Moreover, although failure methodology the of State's State's DNA testing. defense i m p l i e d e r r o r i n the t o r e t a i n a sample of the examining the the expert, at State's c i g a r e t t e b u t t when c r o s s - Morris never objected on this ground. M o r r i s contends t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by failing c o n d u c t an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g o u t s i d e t h e j u r y ' s p r e s e n c e t o t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e S t a t e ' s DNA never requested such a h e a r i n g as t e s t i n g . However, M o r r i s or o b j e c t e d to i t s omission. "In the p r e s e n t case, because the admission of t h e DNA e v i d e n c e was n o t c o n t e s t e d o r c h a l l e n g e d b e f o r e or d u r i n g t r i a l , the t r i a l c o u r t d i d not h o l d a h e a r i n g o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e j u r y . I n Payne v. S t a t e , 683 So. 2d 440, 455 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1995), 101 to CR-07-1997 a f f ' d , 683 So. 2d 458 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 520 U.S. 1146, 117 S . C t . 1319, 137 L.Ed.2d 481 ( 1 9 9 7 ) , we h e l d t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by n o t h o l d i n g a h e a r i n g o u t s i d e t h e presence of t h e j u r y t o determine t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f t h e DNA e v i d e n c e . I n Payne, we c o n c l u d e d t h a t i f a defendant wanted t o a l l e g e t h a t t h e t r i a l court erred i n not conducting a hearing outside the jury's p r e s e n c e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f t h e DNA evidence, i t was i n c u m b e n t upon t h e d e f e n d a n t t o have first requested that such a hearing be conducted. A c c o r d i n g l y , b e c a u s e Simmons d i d n o t r e q u e s t a h e a r i n g , no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r o c c u r r e d i n t h i s regard i n the t r i a l court's admission of the Simmons v. S t a t e , 797 So. 2d 1134, 1145 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999). Moreover, i n arguing t h a t t h e S t a t e e r r e d by f a i l i n g t o i d e n t i f y t h e method u s e d t o t e s t t h e DNA a n d t h e r e b y its reliability, counter 174 to verify M o r r i s acknowledged t h a t t h i s Court has h e l d t o h i s argument i n B r o a d n a x v . S t a t e , ( A l a . Crim. App. 2 0 0 0 ) , by finding 825 So.2d 134, that the State's f a i l u r e t o name t h e p a r t i c u l a r method o f DNA a n a l y s i s d i d n o t result i n u n r e l i a b l e evidence. "[t]he failure of testimony Rather, this Court h e l d that t o name t h e DNA method u s e d goes to the weight of the evidence, 102 not i t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y . " I d . CR-07-1997 "'"Whether otherwise reliable testing p r o c e d u r e s were p e r f o r m e d w i t h o u t e r r o r i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e goes t o t h e w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e , not i t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y . Only i f a party challenges the performance of a r e l i a b l e and r e l e v a n t t e c h n i q u e and shows t h a t t h e p e r f o r m a n c e was so p a r t i c u l a r l y and c r i t i c a l l y d e f i c i e n t t h a t i t u n d e r m i n e d the reliability of the technique, will evidence that i s otherwise r e l i a b l e and r e l e v a n t be deemed i n a d m i s s i b l e . " ' " B r o a d n a x v. State, 825 So. State, 797 So. at 1144-45, State, 746 So. 2d 355, Here, the methodology 2d 2d 360-61 the t e s t i n g was As in v. Turner v. turn, the DNA t e s t i n g was a matter a c c o r d e d t h a t e v i d e n c e and there the to speculation. to Morris's argument d e s t r u c t i o n of the testing, that u n r e l i a b l e . Thus, t o so c o n c l u d e w o u l d be demonstrate the r e l i a b i l i t y the quoting Simmons i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d o r s h o w i n g made by M o r r i s y i e l d to by 173-74, q u o t i n g ( A l a . 1998). of c o n c e r n i n g t h e w e i g h t t o be i s no at the State's record expert cigarette butt and shows was the that o f t h e DNA the State's t e s t i n g was cigarette butt during otherwise. asked about On the to compounded the pretrial cross-examination, destruction resulting inability 103 failure o f an of the independent CR-07-1997 test by a secondary expert. The expert testified that " [ t ] h e r e ' s DNA e x t r a c t r e m a i n i n g , t h e l i q u i d t h a t -- a f t e r t h e l i q u i d d i s s o l v e s the f i l t e r is c a l l e d t h e DNA we always yes." Morris t e s t e d t h e DNA 16 F. 3d 57, (1994) e x t r a c t . And t h e r e ' s retain for future that i s l e f t , Thus, and sponge m a t e r i a l , w h a t ' s (R. a p o r t i o n of that testing i f that's that required, so 420.) suffered no u s i n g h i s own 60 left prejudice expert. (4th C i r . 1994), he could have See H o l d r e n v. L e g u r s k y , c e r t . d e n i e d , 513 (any f a i l u r e by t r e a t i n g p h y s i c i a n U.S. to collect 831 samples f r o m r a p e v i c t i m f o r s u b s e q u e n t t e s t i n g went t o t h e w e i g h t o f the evidence Gingo, 605 rather So. 2d than 1237 i t s admissibility). ( A l a . 1992) Cf. Ex ( d e s t r u c t i o n of parte samples a l l o w e d e v i d e n c e o f t e s t r e s u l t s o n l y a g a i n s t G i n g o and he d e n i e d a c c e s s t o any p o t e n t i a l l y e x c u l p a t o r y was material). XI. Morris argues t h a t the t r i a l from questioning court improperly defense counsel police failure to i n v e s t i g a t e evidence suggesting officers restricted about the t h a t someone e l s e h a d c o m m i t t e d t h e m u r d e r . S p e c i f i c a l l y , M o r r i s a l l e g e s t h a t he 104 CR-07-1997 was not allowed to question his i n v e s t i g a t i o n revealed s e v e r a l b l a c k m a l e s was a State's that a limine seen i n the vicinity to a second motion bar Morris black several from males in m o t i o n s , however, are J u l y 17, before of whether van with Rochester's death. r e c o r d c o n t a i n s the S t a t e ' s renewal of i t s motion i n and court about suspicious blue house around the time of R o c h e s t e r ' s The witness i n limine, requesting referring i t located dated as filed to in a the the "'blue trial car alley.'" on M a r c h 19, These 2007, 2007, r e s p e c t i v e l y , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e y were Morris's second t r i a l , with filed w h i c h ended i n a m i s t r i a l . the second motion i n l i m i n e , the S t a t e argues t h a t d u r i n g first trial, defense counsel questioned the State's a b o u t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e a l l e g e d v e h i c l e . The that the therefore questioning before M o r r i s be b a r r e d In the the called second trial from a s i m i l a r third trial, for just following transpired: 105 line of prior State In the witness court held inadmissible the and hearsay; requested that questioning. to voir dire, the CR-07-1997 " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : W e l l , J u d g e , y o u know, I f o r g e t what a l l we d i d t h e l a s t t i m e b u t we j u s t want t o renew o u r m o t i o n s i n l i m i n e t h a t no questions involving hearsay o f -- w e l l , canvasing the neighborhood. I think they tried t o ask the detective that. I f the witnesses are a v a i l a b l e , t h a t ' s f i n e b u t we d o n ' t -- we w o u l d o b j e c t t o hearsay questions s o we have a m o t i o n i n l i m i n e about t h a t . I b e l i e v e you g r a n t e d t h a t l a s t time. "[Defense c o u n s e l ] : T h a t was a b o u t t h e b l u e c a r deal. "[Prosecutor]: "THE Right, that's right. COURT: A b o u t t h e what? " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : T h e r e was a s u s p i c i o u s b l u e c a r i n t h e a l l e y o r n e i g h b o r h o o d o r s o m e t h i n g . Who knows who s a i d t h a t . "THE COURT: W e l l , t o t h e e x t e n t i t i n v o l v e s h e a r s a y , I g r a n t t h e m o t i o n i n l i m i n e . You know, I k i n d o f have t o w a i t a n d s e e what h a p p e n s , y o u know, as we p r o g r e s s a n d s e e how t h e q u e s t i o n i s a s k e d because i t ' s d i f f i c u l t t o do t i l l I hear the questions." (R. 9-10.) No f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n was h a d on t h i s s u b j e c t , a n d M o r r i s did not attempt t o question the State's witness as t o any i n v e s t i g a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h i s a l l e g e d v e h i c l e . M o r r i s may n o t a s s e r t as e r r o r a b a r t o q u e s t i o n i n g sought t o q u e s t i o n a w i t n e s s when he n e v e r t h e w i t n e s s as t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n 106 he now CR-07-1997 c l a i m s was r e l e v a n t . The t r i a l r u l e on t h e q u e s t i o n s it would appears not allow So. 2d u n t i l t h e y were p o s e d a n d o n l y h e l d t h a t inadmissible from t h e r e c o r d acquiesced court stated that i t could not t o , the t r i a l 335, 340-41 that hearsay Morris court's ( A l a . Crim. i n t o evidence. was s a t i s f i e d ruling. App. J . E . v. S t a t e , 2007) ("J.E. p r e d i c a t e e r r o r on t h e v i o l a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t he acquiesced and i n the determination with, It or 997 cannot case because t h a t t h e e r r o r was cured t h a t f u r t h e r c o r r e c t i o n was n o t r e q u i r e d . " ) . T h e r e i s no e r r o r on t h i s ground. XII. Morris argues that the t r i a l court failed to properly i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e r e a s o n a b l e - d o u b t s t a n d a r d . this challenge f o r the f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l ; He r a i s e s therefore, this i n s t r u c t i o n i s due t o be e v a l u a t e d u n d e r t h e p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e . R u l e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . Morris s p e c i f i c a l l y takes issue with certain used by t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d e s c r i b e reasonable t o t h e f o l l o w i n g language by t h e t r i a l court: terminology d o u b t . He c i t e s "[A]nd the law means a s o u n d a n d s e n s i b l e r e a s o n a s o p p o s e d t o some 107 imaginary CR-07-1997 or fanciful suspicion, relating "[I]t reason"; i t ' s not "[I]t's not a probability a mere p o s s i b l e d o u b t b e c a u s e t o human a f f a i r s does not mean a i s open t o vague or mere everything doubt"; arbitrary notion"; or some p o s s i b l e "[I]t's d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a d o u b t a r i s i n g f r o m mere p o s s i b i l i t y , from bare 526.) imagination or from Morris a l s o a r g u e s as t o the jury that fanciful improper the " t o c o n v i c t an a g u i l t y p e r s o n damages t h e As to this improperly harmful last suggests that doubt standard stands unjust P r u i t t v. Morris wrongful f o r the State, 270 P. a l t h o u g h the p r i n c i p l e that (Morris's 2d 351, 362 i s no (Okla. at i t more reasonable- "'it i s better 107, C r i m . App. "'"'In setting out the standard for p l a i n e r r o r review of j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , the court i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. C h a n d l e r , 996 F.2d 1073, 1085, 1097 (11th C i r . 1 9 9 3 ) , c i t e d Boyde v. C a l i f o r n i a , 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 108 that i n n o c e n t man brief, acquit system." contends conviction go f r e e t h a n one conviction.'" court's i n s t r u c t i o n entire criminal justice a wrongful a c q u i t t a l , t h a t a h u n d r e d g u i l t y men an a trial (R. i n n o c e n t person or t o instruction, that conjecture." suffer quoting 1954.) CR-07-1997 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t "an e r r o r occurs only when t h e r e i s a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d that the j u r y a p p l i e d the i n s t r u c t i o n i n an i m p r o p e r manner." W i l l i a m s v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276, 1306 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996), a f f ' d , 710 So. 2d 1350 ( A l a . 1997), c e r t . d e n i e d , 524 U.S. 929, 118 S.Ct. 2325, 141 L.Ed.2d 699 ( 1 9 9 8 ) . ' " " ' B r o a d n a x v. S t a t e , 825 So. 2d 134, 1 196 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , q u o t i n g P i l l e y v. a A 4 Ton a ^ o n r\ ooo oo / A ^ S t a. t-e^ , 789 So. 2d 870, 882-83 (- ATl ,a . r'C r i m . App. 1 9 9 8 ) . M o r e o v e r , "[w]hen r e v i e w i n g a t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , we must v i e w them as a w h o l e , n o t i n b i t s and p i e c e s , and as a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r w o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d them. I n g r a m v. S t a t e , 779 So. 2d 1225 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) . " J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , 820 So. 2d 842, 874 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000). ' " S n y d e r v. S t a t e , App. 2 0 0 3 ) . " B e l i s l e v. S t a t e , affirmed, , 129 11 So. S.Ct. 893 So. 11 So. 3d 256, 3d 323 2865 2d 488, 308 ( A l a . 2008), 548 ( A l a . Crim. ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2007), cert. denied, U.S. (2009.) A review of the e n t i r e reasonable-doubt i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n by the trial court in the present case reveals that i t p r o p e r l y f o l l o w e d t h e l e g a l g u i d e l i n e s and t h e A l a b a m a P a t t e r n 109 CR-07-1997 Jury Instructions in instructing c h a r g e d t h e j u r y as the jury. The trial court follows: "Now, l a d i e s and g e n t l e m e n , t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f i n t h i s c a s e i s on t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a as i t i s i n any c r i m i n a l c a s e . And you s a y , w e l l , what does t h a t mean. W e l l , i t ' s a l m o s t a s e l f - d e f i n i n g t e r m . I t means a d o u b t t h a t you can g i v e a r e a s o n f o r . And t h e l a w means a s o u n d and s e n s i b l e r e a s o n as o p p o s e d t o some i m a g i n a r y o r f a n c i f u l r e a s o n . Sometimes e f f o r t s t o d e f i n e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt don't a l w a y s c l a r i f y i t . I t ' s n o t a p r o b a b i l i t y o r a mere s u s p i c i o n , i t ' s n o t a mere p o s s i b l e d o u b t b e c a u s e e v e r y t h i n g r e l a t i n g t o human a f f a i r s i s open t o some p o s s i b l e doubt. "A r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i s a d o u b t o f a f a i r - m i n d e d j u r o r h o n e s t l y s e e k i n g t h e t r u t h a f t e r c a r e f u l and i m p a r t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l of the evidence. I t ' s a d o u b t b a s e d upon r e a s o n and common s e n s e . I t does n o t mean a vague o r a r b i t r a r y n o t i o n , b u t i t ' s an a c t u a l d o u b t b a s e d upon t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e l a c k o f evidence, a conflict i n the evidence, or a c o m b i n a t i o n of a l l of those f a c t o r s . I t ' s a doubt t h a t remains i n your minds a f t e r g o i n g over the e n t i r e c a s e and g i v i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o a l l o f t h e t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e and i t ' s d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a d o u b t a r i s i n g f r o m mere p o s s i b i l i t y , f r o m b a r e i m a g i n a t i o n or from f a n c i f u l c o n j e c t u r e . " I f a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l the evidence you're convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , i t w o u l d be y o u r d u t y t o c o n v i c t t h e d e f e n d a n t and you s h o u l d s a y s o . However, a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e you have a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t , t h e n you s h o u l d a c q u i t h i m and s a y so i n t h a t r e g a r d as well." 110 CR-07-1997 (R. 525-26.) None of Louisiana, 498 the language U.S. 39, was reasonable-doubt charge. standard of proof nor found 9 was objectionable u s e d by The the trial in court Cage v. in his i n s t r u c t i o n n e i t h e r lowered the i t confusing or deficient. "The i n s t r u c t i o n on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o v i d e d to the j u r y here i n c o r p o r a t e d the language found i n the Alabama P a t t e r n Jury I n s t r u c t i o n s on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . The p a t t e r n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s i n f o r m j u r o r s t h a t t h e i r doubt cannot be b a s e d on 'a mere g u e s s o r s u r m i s e ' b u t must be b a s e d on ' r e a s o n and common s e n s e . ' I t a l s o i n f o r m s j u r o r s that reasonable doubt t h a t 'entitles an a c c u s e d t o an a c q u i t t a l i s n o t a mere f a n c i f u l , vague, c o n j e c t u r a l or s p e c u l a t i v e doubt.' Alabama Pattern Jury I n s t r u c t i o n s : Criminal, Instructions 1.4 and 1.5 (3d e d . 1 9 9 4 ) . '"'A trial court's f o l l o w i n g o f an a c c e p t e d p a t t e r n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n w e i g h s h e a v i l y a g a i n s t any f i n d i n g o f p l a i n e r r o r . ' " W i l s o n v. S t a t e , 777 So. 2d 856 (Ala. Crim. App. 1 9 9 9 ) , q u o t i n g P r i c e v. S t a t e , 725 So. 2d 1003, 1058 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 725 So. 2d 1063 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1809, 143 L.Ed.2d 1012 ( 1 9 9 9 ) . ' S n y d e r v. S t a t e , 893 So. 2d 488, 550 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 3 ) . " H a r r i s v. State, 2 So. 3d 880, 913 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2007). We n o t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d use t h e terminology "mathematical c e r t a i n t y or beyond a l l doubt" in i t s c i r c u m s t a n t i a l - e v i d e n c e c h a r g e . (R. 533.) However, t h e r e was no e r r o r i n t h a t u s a g e . S h a r i f i v. S t a t e , 993 So. 2d 907, 933¬ 34 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 491 (2008.) 9 111 CR-07-1997 Moreover, preferable the t r i a l rather, See generally (holding, J a c k s o n v. S t a t e , without that innocent commenting many g u i l t y person principle that i tis than t o free a guilty of 432 So. 2d 504, 508 on t h e c h a r g e , that go u n p u n i s h e d i s convicted" because than i t was an (1983) the t o charge the j u r y t h a t people both. trial " i t is that one abstract oflaw). There court's man imply i t i n s t r u c t e d as t o t h e w r o n g f u l n e s s d i d not e r r i n f a i l i n g better d i d not t o c o n v i c t an i n n o c e n t one; court court was no error, plain or otherwise, i n the trial i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r y as t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e - d o u b t standard. XIII. Morris victim-impact Morris alleges that the evidence during r e f e r s to evidence State the g u i l t that introduced phase o f h i s t r i a l . Rochester d e a f , t h a t she l i s t e n e d t o " c h u r c h " g r a n d d a u g h t e r who d i e d improperly h a d a son who was m u s i c , a n d t h a t she h a d a of Hodgkin's d i s e a s e , that she owned r e l i g i o u s j e w e l r y , and t h a t she h a d a B i b l e t h a t was " t o r n up" 112 CR-07-1997 during the offense. He i n f l a m e d the j u r y . testimony analyzed at argues that this evidence unduly M o r r i s f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o any trial; therefore, this issue u n d e r t h e p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e . R u l e 45A, is of due to i m p a c t on M o r r i s ' s " I n Ex p a r t e R i e b e r , 1995), t h i s Court h e l d : be Ala.R.App.P. A review of the r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t t h i s testimony prejudicial this had no trial. 663 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Ala. "'It i s p r e s u m e d t h a t j u r o r s do n o t l e a v e t h e i r common s e n s e a t t h e c o u r t h o u s e door. I t would e l e v a t e form over substance f o r us t o h o l d , b a s e d on t h e r e c o r d b e f o r e us, t h a t [the defendant] d i d not r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e j u r o r s were told what they probably had already suspected--that [ t h e v i c t i m ] was not a "human i s l a n d , " b u t a u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l whose m u r d e r had i n e v i t a b l y had a p r o f o u n d i m p a c t on h e r c h i l d r e n , s p o u s e , p a r e n t s , friends, or dependents (paraphrasing a portion of Justice Souter's opinion c o n c u r r i n g i n t h e j u d g m e n t i n Payne v. T e n n e s s e e , 501 U.S. 808, 838, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2615, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)).'" Ex p a r t e W a l k e r , 972 So. from 2d 737, 747 ( A l a . 2007) reversible error i n t r o d u c t i o n of concerning f a m i l y h i s t o r y , community a c t i v i t y , 113 (holding guilt-phase and no evidence character CR-07-1997 of 87-year-old v i c t i m , and a as t e s t i m o n y from a daughter friend). After the as w e l l carefully admission constitute examining of the reversible t h e r e c o r d , we complained-of conclude testimony that did not error. XIV. M o r r i s argues of a police commented defense on that, officer during the prosecutor's questioning at trial, on M o r r i s ' s s i l e n c e the prosecutor following improperly the appointment counsel. Morris r a i s e s t h i s issue f o r the f i r s t appeal, and t h u s this p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e . Rule of time i s s u e i s t o be a n a l y z e d u n d e r t h e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . However, t h e t e s t i m o n y t o w h i c h M o r r i s a l l u d e s c o u l d n o t r e a s o n a b l y have b e e n c o n s t r u e d t o c o n s t i t u t e a comment on h i s failure to testify. During the d i r e c t o f f i c e r who h a d t a k e n M o r r i s ' s s t a t e m e n t and who elicited had interviewed testimony d e c e i t f u l responses, him again examination following h i s arrest later, r e c o u n t i n g a number of the prosecutor inconsistencies, and a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e s t a t e m e n t s 114 of the given CR-07-1997 by Morris. The following transpired during this direct examination: "Q. You t a l k e d t o h i m a b o u t t h e j e w e l r y he h a d on him when he was a r r e s t e d ? "A. Y e s , s i r , we d i d . "Q. How d i d he e x p l a i n possession of that? how he came t o be i n "A. S a i d he won i t i n a c r a p game s h o o t i n g "Q. D i d he t e l l y o u any o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n dice. for it? "A. He s a i d he h a d p a i d t e n d o l l a r s t o a guy f o r t h i s s t u f f t o o . When i t a l l s t a r t e d we a s k e d him where he l i v e d a n d who he l i v e d w i t h a n d t h e n he s a i d he p a i d t e n d o l l a r s f o r t h e s t u f f , and t h e n l a t e r on i n t h e i n t e r v i e w he s a i d he won i t i n a c r a p game. "Q. D i d he t e l l from? y o u t h e name o f t h e p e r s o n he won i t "A. No, s i r , he d i d n o t . "Q. D i d y ' a l l "A. Y e s , a s k h i m who? sir. "Q. D i d he t e l l "A. Y e s , "Q. y o u he d i d n ' t know? sir. D i d y ' a l l a s k h i m a b o u t names f o r any o f t h e p e o p l e t h a t he g o t i n a f i g h t w i t h ? 115 CR-07-1997 "A. Y e s , sir. "Q. D i d he t e l l y o u who t h e y "A. By name, no, "Q. D i d he t e l l were? sir. y o u who he was r o l l i n g d i c e w i t h ? "A. By name, no, sir. "Q. D i d y ' a l l t a l k t o h i m a b o u t h i s t i m e frame f o r when he was a t c e r t a i n p l a c e s t h e n i g h t b e f o r e ? "A. Y e s , "Q. sir. Was he a b l e t o g i v e s p e c i f i c times? "A. N o t h i n g was s p e c i f i c "Q. C o u l d he t e l l "A. S p e c i f i c you some accurate or time-wise. y o u what t i m e he l e f t h i s h o u s e ? t i m e , no, n o t b y t i m e , no. "Q. D i d he t e l l House? y o u what t i m e he a t e a t t h e H u d d l e "A. No, s i r . A s p e c i f i c t i m e , no, sir. "Q. D i d he g i v e y o u a g e s o f t h e g u y s who he g o t i n a f i g h t with? "A. Y e s , sir. "Q. Do you r e c a l l what ages t h o s e "A. E i g h t e e n t o t w e n t y y e a r s o l d . 116 were? CR-07-1997 "Q. D i d he t e l l you a n y t h i n g a b o u t b e i n g t a k e n to t h e crime scene? back "A. No, s i r . "Q. D i d he t e l l scene tape? you anything about seeing crime "Q. Where d i d he t e l l you he t h o u g h t a f t e r he was a r r e s t e d ? he was taken "A. I t h i n k he s a i d he went t o t h e f i r e s t a t i o n , yeah, I t h i n k t h a t ' s r i g h t , and t h e n t o Cooper Green. "A. No, s i r . "Q. D i d he t e l l you t h a t he was w i t h Ron Smith? "A. No, s i r . "Q. A t any p o i n t ? "A. No, s i r . "Q. A n d when was t h e f i r s t t i m e you h e a r d t h e names Ron S m i t h o r Cue B a l l o r John L e w i s i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s case? "A. A b o u t a month a g o . " (R. 470-72.) Taken i n c o n t e x t , t h e q u e s t i o n b y t h e p r o s e c u t o r was t o elicit testimony indicating that Morris had recently f o r m u l a t e d a s t o r y as p a r t o f h i s d e f e n s e . The j u r y w o u l d n o t 117 CR-07-1997 have u n d e r s t o o d this question to refer f o l l o w i n g the appointment As to Morris's silence of defense counsel. t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n C o n n e l l v. S t a t e , 7 So. 3d 1068 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) : "We have r e v i e w e d t h e c o m p l a i n e d - o f comment i n l i g h t of the e n t i r e t r i a l , i n c l u d i n g the defense's opening argument and t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s closing a r g u m e n t . V i e w e d i n t h a t c o n t e x t , t h e p r o s e c u t o r was o b v i o u s l y commenting on t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s p r e v i o u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s a n d on t h e f a c t t h a t t h e evidence d i d not support the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s defense c o u n s e l made i n h i s o p e n i n g a r g u m e n t . M o r e o v e r , t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment was n o t ' " o f s u c h c h a r a c t e r t h a t a j u r y would n a t u r a l l y and n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t r u e i t as a comment on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s i l e n c e . " ' Ex p a r t e D a v i s , 718 So. 2d a t 1173. T h e r e f o r e , t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s argument i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . " 7 So. 3d a t 1096. See B a r b e r v. S t a t e , (Ala. ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment w o u l d n o t have b e e n c o n s t r u e d b y t h e j u r y as a comment on B a r b e r ' s silence, but C r i m . App. 2005) 952 So. 2d 393, 440 rather was "a p e r m i s s i b l e r e p l y - i n - k i n d t o the defense's comment on t h e e v i d e n c e and implications"). XV. Morris argues that h i s conviction s h o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d b e c a u s e , he s a y s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d gruesome and unduly prejudicial photographs 118 of the victim into CR-07-1997 e v i d e n c e . M o r r i s r e f e r s t o pages i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t the admission of photographs d e p i c t i n g t h e v i c t i m ' s wounds a n d t h e c r i m e s c e n e . When t h e t r i a l objections counsel to the admission responded containing c o u r t a s k e d i f t h e r e were any of these photographs, t h a t he h a d no o b j e c t i o n . defense Therefore, this i s s u e must be a n a l y z e d u n d e r t h e p l a i n - e r r o r r u l e . R u l e 45A, Ala.R.App.P. "'"Generally, photographs are admissible i n t o evidence i n a c r i m i n a l prosecution ' i fthey tend t o prove or d i s p r o v e some d i s p u t e d o r m a t e r i a l i s s u e , to illustrate or elucidate some o t h e r relevant fact or evidence, or to c o r r o b o r a t e o r d i s p r o v e some o t h e r e v i d e n c e offered o r t o be o f f e r e d , and their a d m i s s i o n i s w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l j u d g e . ' " B a n k h e a d v. S t a t e , 585 So. 2d 97, 109 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 9 ) , remanded on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 585 So. 2d 112 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , a f f ' d on r e t u r n t o remand, 625 So. 2d 1141 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , r e v ' d , 625 So. 2d 1146 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , quoting Magwood v . S t a t e , 494 So. 2d 124, 141 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 5 ) , a f f ' d , 494 So. 2d 154 (Ala. 1986). "Photographic e x h i b i t s are admissible even though they may be cumulative, demonstrative of undisputed f a c t s , o r gruesome." W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 506 So. 2d 368, 371 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1986) (citations omitted). In addition, "photographic evidence, i f relevant, i s a d m i s s i b l e even i f i t has a tendency t o 119 CR-07-1997 i n f l a m e t h e m i n d s o f t h e j u r o r s . " Ex p a r t e S i e b e r t , 555 So. 2d 780, 784 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) . "This court has held that autopsy photographs, although gruesome, are a d m i s s i b l e t o show t h e e x t e n t o f a v i c t i m ' s i n j u r i e s . " F e r g u s o n v. S t a t e , 814 So. 2d 925, 944 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 814 So. 2d 970 ( A l a . 2001). "'[A]utopsy photographs d e p i c t i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r and l o c a t i o n o f wounds on a v i c t i m ' s body a r e admissible even i f t h e y are gruesome, c u m u l a t i v e , o r r e l a t e t o an u n d i s p u t e d m a t t e r . ' " J a c k s o n v. S t a t e , 791 So. 2d 979, 1016 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2000), quoting P e r k i n s v. S t a t e , 808 So. 2d 1041, 1108 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , a f f ' d , 808 So. 2d 1143 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , j u d g m e n t v a c a t e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 536 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , on remand t o , 851 So. 2d 453 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) . "The same r u l e a p p l i e s f o r v i d e o t a p e s as f o r p h o t o g r a p h s : 'The f a c t that a photograph i s gruesome and g h a s t l y i s no r e a s o n f o r e x c l u d i n g i t , i f r e l e v a n t , e v e n i f t h e p h o t o g r a p h may t e n d t o i n f l a m e t h e j u r y . ' " S i e b e r t v. S t a t e , 562 So. 2d 586, 599 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 9 ) , a f f ' d , 562 So. 2d 600 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) , q u o t i n g W a l k e r v. S t a t e , 416 So. 2d 1083, 1090 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) . See a l s o Ward v. S t a t e , 814 So. 2d 899 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). Generally, "[a] properly a u t h e n t i c a t e d v i d e o tape r e c o r d i n g of the scene of the crime c o n s t i t u t e s competent evidence" and " i s a d m i s s i b l e over the d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s t h a t t h e t a p e was i n f l a m m a t o r y , p r e j u d i c i a l , and c u m u l a t i v e . " K u e n z e l v. S t a t e , 577 So. 2d 474, 512-13 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 0 ) , a f f ' d , 577 So. 2d 531 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . " P r o v i d e d t h a t a p r o p e r 120 CR-07-1997 f o u n d a t i o n i s l a i d , the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of videotape evidence i n a c r i m i n a l t r i a l i s a m a t t e r w i t h i n the sound d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l j u d g e . " Donahoo v. S t a t e , 505 So. 2d 1067, 1071 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 6 ) . ' "973 So.2d a t 393. "Here, the crime scene v i d e o was properly a u t h e n t i c a t e d and c o n s t i t u t e d c o m p e t e n t evidence. D e s p i t e t h e gruesome a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e c r i m e s c e n e and t h e v i c t i m ' s b o d y , t h e v i d e o and p h o t o g r a p h s o f t h e body and c r i m e s c e n e were p r o p e r l y admitted w i t h i n the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . " J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , , [Ms. CR-99-1349, O c t o b e r 2, 2009] ( A l a . C r i m . App. In the present case, find admitted that 3d 2009). after viewing the photographs n o t i n g t h a t t h e y were p r o p e r l y a u t h e n t i c a t e d by we So. they were competent w i t h i n the trial court's p l a i n e r r o r as t o t h e a d m i s s i o n evidence and discretion. of the the and witness, properly T h e r e was no photograph. XVI. M o r r i s contends t h a t the t r i a l constitutional Specifically, and right Morris t h e v i c t i m was t o ask c o u r t d e p r i v e d him j u r o r s about t h e i r a r g u e s t h a t , b e c a u s e he a w h i t e woman, he 121 racial of h i s bias. i s a black s h o u l d have b e e n man allowed CR-07-1997 to submit a w r i t t e n q u e s t i o n n a i r e t o t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s t o a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h e y h a d any r a c i a l b i a s . He a r g u e s t h a t t h e trial his court's d e c i s i o n t o prevent Fifth, Sixth, under t h e U n i t e d Eighth, thorough voir and F o u r t e e n t h so v i o l a t e d Amendment rights States C o n s t i t u t i o n . In t h e present a him from doing case, dire group and i n d i v i d u a l limit or i n d i c a t i o n examination the questioning. claim t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e was of the venire, questioning. Moreover, The t r i a l Morris including court d i d not r a i s e s no specific o f p r e j u d i c e b y a j u r o r who s a t on h i s j u r y o r a n o t h e r member o f t h e v e n i r e . "'In Alabama Supreme examination trial Ex p a r t e Land, Court 678 So. 2d 224 held that ( A l a . 1996), t h e t h e method of v o i r i s w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l court's questionnaire refusal to allow the use dire c o u r t and a of i s n o t an abuse o f t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . ' [a] juror Hodges v . S t a t e , 856 So. 2d 875, 913 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , a f f ' d , 856 So. (Ala. 2d 936 ( A l a . 2003)." Sneed v . S t a t e , C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) , c e r t d e n i e d , c e r t . denied, U.S. 1 So. 3d 104, 135 1 So. 3d 104 , 129 S . C t . 1039 (2009.) 122 (Ala.2008), CR-07-1997 Similarly, C r i m . App. i n Brown v. State, 2 0 0 7 ) , Brown a r g u e d 11 So. 3d 866, "that the c i r c u i t 885 (Ala. court erred i n d e n y i n g h i s m o t i o n t o have t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s c o m p l e t e juror questionnaires related to their qualifications for jury service. [Brown] a s s e r t [ e d ] t h a t v o i r d i r e [was] i n a d e q u a t e t o u n c o v e r p r e j u d i c e s ; t h e r e f o r e , he a r g u e [ d ] , i t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t the j u r o r s complete q u e s t i o n n a i r e s . " In h o l d i n g t h a t the trial c o u r t d i d n o t abuse i t s " b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n " Brown's request for juror questionnaires, this by denying Court noted t h a t Brown p o i n t e d t o no s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e where t h e v o i r d i r e h a d b e e n i n a d e q u a t e t o show any p r e j u d i c e s . I d . In the p r e s e n t case, the t r i a l discretion indication in denying Morris's court motion, d i d n o t abuse i t s and there was no o f any r a c i a l p r e j u d i c e by t h e p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s . XVII. Morris contends t h a t h i s r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l j u r y v i o l a t e d by t h e s t r i k i n g opposed to the death o f two p r o s p e c t i v e penalty. j u r o r s who was were 1 0 We n o t e t h a t t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t a t h i r d p o t e n t i a l j u r o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t she h a d s t r o n g f e e l i n g s a b o u t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y b u t t h a t she was n o t f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n e d as t o h e r 10 123 CR-07-1997 The record examination a fixed death indicates that during the voir dire o f t h e v e n i r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s k e d i f anyone opinion e i t h e r i n favor penalty. (R. r e m o v a l M o r r i s now 21-23.) of The challenges, or two i n opposition to potential jurors the whose i n d i c a t e d that they h e l d a f i x e d o p i n i o n were s u b s e q u e n t l y had such questioned i n d i v i d u a l l y . The t r i a l c o u r t and d e f e n s e c o u n s e l q u e s t i o n e d t h e f i r s t p o t e n t i a l j u r o r , who unequivocally the penalty. The prosecutor f o r cause, and the death removed s t a t e d t h a t he w o u l d n e v e r M o r r i s d i d n o t o b j e c t . The that he would circumstances. court's not of death did not object prosecutor's motion p o t e n t i a l j u r o r f o r c a u s e . R u l e 45A, According the granted the again the court that juror the be motion. second p o t e n t i a l j u r o r a l s o s t a t e d consider Morris granting trial moved consider penalty to to under the strike any trial the Ala.R.App.P. t o § 12-16-152, A l a . Code 1975: "On t h e t r i a l f o r any o f f e n s e w h i c h may punished capitally or by imprisonment in p e n i t e n t i a r y , i t i s a g o o d c a u s e o f c h a l l e n g e by be the the b e l i e f s . However, t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y had t o e x e r c i s e a s t r i k e t o remove t h i s p o t e n t i a l j u r o r , and she d i d n o t s e r v e on t h e j u r y . 124 CR-07-1997 s t a t e t h a t the p e r s o n would r e f u s e t o impose the death p e n a l t y r e g a r d l e s s of the evidence produced or has a f i x e d o p i n i o n a g a i n s t p e n i t e n t i a r y p u n i s h m e n t o r t h i n k s t h a t a c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d n o t be had on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e , which cause of c h a l l e n g e may be p r o v e d by t h e o a t h o f t h e p e r s o n o r by o t h e r evidence." See R u l e 1 8 . 4 ( e ) , Ala.R.Crim.P. subject to challenge the prospective impartial m o t i o n o f any the f o r cause or i t r e a s o n a b l y j u r o r cannot verdict, party, ("When a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r i s the or court, will on not i t s own render appears a that fair initiative or and on s h a l l excuse t h a t j u r o r from s e r v i c e i n case"). " A l s o , ' " [ t ] h e t r i a l judge i s i n the best p o s i t i o n t o h e a r a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r and t o o b s e r v e h i s o r h e r demeanor."' M c N a i r v. S t a t e , 653 So. 2d 320, 324 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 2 ) , a f f ' d , 653 So. 2d 353 ( A l a . 1994) ( q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e D i n k i n s , 567 So. 2d 1313, 1314 (Ala. 1990)). F i n a l l y , "'[t]he test for determining whether a s t r i k e r i s e s t o the l e v e l of a c h a l l e n g e f o r c a u s e i s " w h e t h e r a j u r o r can s e t a s i d e t h e i r o p i n i o n s and t r y t h e c a s e f a i r l y and i m p a r t i a l l y , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e l a w and t h e e v i d e n c e . " M a r s h a l l v. S t a t e , 598 So. 2d 14, 16 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). "Broad d i s c r e t i o n i s v e s t e d w i t h the t r i a l c o u r t i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether or not t o s u s t a i n c h a l l e n g e s f o r c a u s e . " Ex p a r t e N e t t l e s , 435 So. 2d 151, 153 ( A l a . 1983). "The decision of the trial court 'on such 125 CR-07-1997 q u e s t i o n s i s e n t i t l e d t o g r e a t w e i g h t and w i l l n o t be i n t e r f e r e d w i t h u n l e s s c l e a r l y erroneous, equivalent to an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . ' " N e t t l e s , 435 So. 2d a t 153. In M a r s h a l l v. State, 598 So. 2d 14 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), t h i s c o u r t h e l d t h a t i t was n o t e r r o r f o r a t r i a l c o u r t t o deny challenges f o r c a u s e o f two jurors who s t a t e d t h a t t h e y knew t h e v i c t i m o r h e r f a m i l y . One v e n i r e m e m b e r had b e e n e m p l o y e d as a m a i d by t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y and t h e o t h e r s t a t e d t h a t she knew t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y . M a r s h a l l , 598 So. 2d a t 16. T h i s c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p was not g r o u n d s f o r a c h a l l e n g e f o r c a u s e as l o n g as t h e j u r o r i n d i c a t e s t h a t he o r she can be f a i r and i m p a r t i a l . 598 So. 2d a t 16.' " D u n n i n g v. S t a t e , App. 19 9 4 ) . " Killingsworth So. The 3d v. State, , trial dire and So. [Ms. 2d 995, court, which o r she subsequently 997 (Ala. Crim. CR-06-0854, November 13, ( A l a . C r i m . App. j u r o r ' s demeanor as he voir 659 is able 2009] 2009). to view the answers the q u e s t i o n s i f necessary, is in potential posed a better p o s i t i o n t o e v a l u a t e h i s or her b e l i e f s or c o n v i c t i o n s . In instant case, these potential jurors' t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y was 126 responses on the show that u n w a v e r i n g and thus CR-07-1997 w o u l d have p r e v e n t e d fair jurors. them f r o m T h e r e was carrying no e r r o r out t h e i r d u t i e s as here. XVIII. M o r r i s argues t h a t Alabama's " c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g statute fails t o narrow the u n i v e r s e of defendants e l i g i b l e f o r the death penalty." Specifically, (Morris's brief, at 112.) he contends t h a t the death p e n a l t y i s a r b i t r a r i l y imposed because Alabama a l l o w s the f a c t o r making c e r t a i n offenses capital to a l s o s e r v e as an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e i n t h e c a s e . He also again same argues offense by t h a t he being i s being convicted punished of capital twice f o r the murder because i t o c c u r r e d d u r i n g b o t h a r o b b e r y and a b u r g l a r y . M o r r i s r a i s e s these c l a i m s f o r the issue i s due 45A, first time t o e v a l u a t e d under on appeal; therefore, this the p l a i n - e r r o r rule. Rule Ala.R.App.P. Morris's aggravating claim concerning circumstance has the "double-counting" consistently been Alabama a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s : "'"[W]hen a d e f e n d a n t i s found g u i l t y o f a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e , 'any aggravating circumstance which 127 of the upheld by CR-07-1997 the verdict convicting the d e f e n d a n t e s t a b l i s h e s was p r o v e n beyond a reasonable doubt a t trial shall be considered as proven beyond a reasonable doubt f o r purposes of the sentencing hearing.' A l a . Code 1975, § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( e ) ; see a l s o A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-5-50 ('The f a c t t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r c a p i t a l o f f e n s e as d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-40(a) n e c e s s a r i l y i n c l u d e s one o r more aggravating circumstances as specified i n Section 13A-5-49 shall not be construed to preclude the finding and c o n s i d e r a t i o n of that r e l e v a n t circumstance or circumstances i n determining sentence.'). This i s known as 'double-counting' or 'overlap,' and Alabama courts 'have repeatedly upheld death sentences where the only aggravating circumstance supporting the death sentence o v e r l a p s w i t h an e l e m e n t o f t h e capital offense.' Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 178 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) ; s e e a l s o C o r a l v. S t a t e , 628 So. 2d 954, 965 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 19 9 2 ) . " ' " B i l l u p s v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-05-1767, November 13, 2009] 3d , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 9 ) , q u o t i n g B a r b e r So. v. S t a t e , 952 So. 2d 393, 458-59 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) . See a l s o Newton 128 CR-07-1997 v. State, [Ms. CR-05-1517, O c t o b e r 2, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009] to been narrow the addressed United States 3d , 2009). T h i s p r e c i s e ground of e r r o r , t h a t t h i s fails So. c l a s s of double-counting d e a t h - e l i g i b l e murderers, and determined Supreme adversely to Morris by has the Court: " H e r e , t h e ' n a r r o w i n g f u n c t i o n ' was p e r f o r m e d by t h e j u r y a t t h e g u i l t p h a s e when i t f o u n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of t h r e e c o u n t s of murder under the p r o v i s i o n t h a t 'the o f f e n d e r has a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t t o k i l l o r t o i n f l i c t g r e a t b o d i l y harm upon more t h a n one p e r s o n . ' The f a c t t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g j u r y i s a l s o r e q u i r e d t o f i n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f an aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d n a r r o w i n g p r o c e s s , and so the fact that the aggravating circumstance d u p l i c a t e d one o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e does n o t make t h i s s e n t e n c e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n f i r m . T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n b u t t h a t t h e L o u i s i a n a scheme n a r r o w s t h e c l a s s o f d e a t h - e l i g i b l e m u r d e r e r s and t h e n a t the s e n t e n c i n g phase a l l o w s f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of mitigating circumstances and the exercise of d i s c r e t i o n . The C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s no more." Lowenfield v. Phelps, Thus, as this 484 issue U.S. has 231, 246 (1988). p r e v i o u s l y been discussed and d e t e r m i n e d a d v e r s e l y t o M o r r i s ' s c o n t e n t i o n , t h e r e i s no e r r o r on t h i s ground. 129 CR-07-1997 Furthermore, convicted of and M o r r i s ' s argument sentenced based that on he both was improperly murder during a r o b b e r y and m u r d e r d u r i n g a b u r g l a r y i s w i t h o u t m e r i t h e r e . See P a r t I I . B . of t h i s jury's finding opinion. t h a t M o r r i s broke The evidence supported the i n t o R o c h e s t e r ' s home w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n o f c o m m i t t i n g a t h e f t i n s i d e and m u r d e r e d h e r i n the course of overcoming doing her so. He physical also murdered resistence and p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i n o r d e r t o commit t h e Despite Morris's contention Rochester causing while serious theft. that he could not be c o n v i c t e d and s e n t e n c e d t o b o t h o f t h e s e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s f o r the same murder, this argument has also been previously d e c i d e d a d v e r s e l y t o M o r r i s . As t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n B e l i s l e v. S t a t e , So. 3d 323 2865 11 So. 3d 256 ( A l a . C r i m . App. ( A l a . 2008), c e r t . d e n i e d , 2007), U.S. affirmed, , 129 (2009): " B e l i s l e was c h a r g e d and c o n v i c t e d f o r two c o u n t s o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r f o r m u r d e r i n g J o y c e Moore d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f a b u r g l a r y and a r o b b e r y , v i o l a t i o n s o f §§ 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 2 ) and ( a ) ( 4 ) , A l a . C o d e 1975. B o t h r e q u i r e p r o o f o f d i f f e r e n t e l e m e n t s - - o n e a b u r g l a r y and one a r o b b e r y - - a n d do n o t o f f e n d t h e Double Jeopardy Clause. 'A defendant can be 130 11 S.Ct. CR-07-1997 c o n v i c t e d o f two o r more c a p i t a l m u r d e r s f o r t h e d e a t h o f one v i c t i m , so l o n g as t h o s e c o n v i c t i o n s are i n accordance with Blockburger [v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 284 U.S. 299 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ] , i . e . , so l o n g as e a c h c o n v i c t i o n r e q u i r e d an e l e m e n t n o t r e q u i r e d i n t h e o t h e r c o n v i c t i o n s . ' H e a r d v. S t a t e , 999 So. 2d 992, 1009 ( A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) . See a l s o Ex p a r t e Haney, 603 So. 2d 412, 419 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ; Ex p a r t e P e r a i t a , 897 So. 2d 1227 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) ; Ex p a r t e M c W i l l i a m s , 640 So. 2d 1015 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ; C a s t i l l o v. S t a t e , 925 So. 2d 284 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) ; F l o w e r s v. S t a t e , 922 So. 2d 938 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 5 ) ; W h i t e v. S t a t e , 900 So. 2d 1249 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 4 ) ; Wynn v. S t a t e , 804 So. 2d 1122 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) ; B a r k s d a l e v. State, 788 So. 2d 898 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2000); Freeman v. S t a t e , 776 So. 2d 160 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) ; B u r t r a m v. S t a t e , 733 So. 2d 921 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 8 ) ; Hyde v. S t a t e , 778 So. 2d 199 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 8 ) ; M a d i s o n v. S t a t e , 718 So. 2d 90 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) ; M e r r i w e a t h e r v. S t a t e , 629 So. 2d 77 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 3 ) . " B e l i s l e ' s c o n v i c t i o n s f o r two c o u n t s o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r f o r m u r d e r i n g Moore d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f a b u r g l a r y a n d a r o b b e r y do n o t v i o l a t e t h e D o u b l e Jeopardy Clause." 11 So. 3d a t 280. See a l s o L e w i s v. S t a t e , October 2, 2009] Because these c a p i t a l Morris So. 3d could offenses , ( A l a . C r i m . App. properly violating [Ms. CR-06-1770, be convicted double-jeopardy 2009). of both principles, and b e c a u s e t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t e d t h e j u r y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n 131 of of CR-07-1997 guilt as to these two offenses, Morris's claim is without merit. XIX. Morris key argues t h a t the State's witness, trial. He general submits trial rule because i s s u e must be Morris failed presence at t r i a l . the in allowing d e f e n s e had for witnesses, s h o u l d n o t have b e e n a l l o w e d This erred D e t e c t i v e R u s s e l l , t o be p r e s e n t t h a t because exclusionary court to remain i n the analyzed to object Russell courtroom. plain-error rule Detective Russell's 861 So. 2d 1111, denied, 861 So. 2d 1145 (Ala. 2003) ("Because t h e a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o o b j e c t a t t r i a l to the C r i m . App. v. to the State, (Ala. Centobie under the during invoked Detective a 2001), c e r t . 1130 p r e s e n c e of e i t h e r [the v i c t i m ' s w i f e or the Alabama Bureau of Investigation investigator], but p r e s e n c e and w h e t h e r R u l e 615, merely Ala.R.Evid., questioned had b e e n their invoked, t h i s argument i s s u b j e c t t o r e v i e w p u r s u a n t t o t h e p l a i n - e r r o r rule. See R u l e 45A, " R u l e 9.3, Ala.R.App.P."). Ala.R.Crim.P., s t a t e s : 132 CR-07-1997 " ' ( a ) W i t n e s s e s . P r i o r t o o r d u r i n g any p r o c e e d i n g , t h e c o u r t , on i t s own m o t i o n o r a t t h e r e q u e s t o f any p a r t y , may e x c l u d e w i t n e s s e s f r o m t h e c o u r t r o o m and d i r e c t them n o t t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h e a c h o t h e r , o r w i t h anyone o t h e r t h a n t h e a t t o r n e y s i n t h e c a s e , c o n c e r n i n g any t e s t i m o n y u n t i l a l l w i t n e s s e s have been r e l e a s e d by t h e c o u r t . ' "The C o m m i t t e e Comments t o t h i s r u l e e s t a b l i s h t h a t 'The power t o e x c l u d e and s e p a r a t e w i t n e s s e s i s e n t i r e l y a matter of d i s c r e t i o n w i t h the t r i a l c o u r t . Teague v. S t a t e , 245 A l a . 339, 16 So. 2d 877 ( 1 9 4 4 ) ; Beddow v. S t a t e , 39 A l a . App. 29, 96 So. 2d 175 ( 1 9 5 6 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 266 A l a . 694, 96 So. 2d 178 ( 1 9 5 7 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 355 U.S. 390, 78 S.Ct. 412, 2 L.Ed. 2d 414 ( 1 9 5 8 ) . By i n v o k i n g t h e r u l e , the c o u r t i s not compelled t o exclude a l l witnesses b u t may be s e l e c t i v e as a p p r o p r i a t e . ' "Further, Rule 615, A l a . R . E v i d . , states: "'At t h e r e q u e s t of a p a r t y t h e c o u r t may o r d e r w i t n e s s e s e x c l u d e d so t h a t t h e y cannot hear the testimony of other w i t n e s s e s and i t may make t h e o r d e r o f i t s own m o t i o n . T h i s r u l e d o e s n o t a u t h o r i z e e x c l u s i o n o f (1) a p a r t y who i s a n a t u r a l person, (2) an o f f i c e r o r e m p l o y e e o f a party which i s not a n a t u r a l person d e s i g n a t e d as i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e by i t s a t t o r n e y , (3) a p e r s o n whose p r e s e n c e i s shown by a p a r t y t o be e s s e n t i a l t o t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p a r t y ' s c a u s e , o r (4) a v i c t i m of a c r i m i n a l offense or the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a v i c t i m who i s u n a b l e t o a t t e n d , when t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s been selected by the v i c t i m , the v i c t i m ' s guardian, or the v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y . ' 133 CR-07-1997 "The Comments t o t h i s r u l e e x p l a i n t h a t two o f t h e c a t e g o r i e s w h i c h do n o t a u t h o r i z e e x c l u s i o n a r e 'a p a r t y t h a t i s n o t a n a t u r a l p e r s o n i s e n t i t l e d t o have a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p r e s e n t . T h i s p e r s o n i s t o be an o f f i c e r o r e m p l o y e e o f t h e p a r t y a n d i s t o be d e s i g n a t e d by t h e p a r t y ' s a t t o r n e y . A l l o w i n g such a w i t n e s s t o be p r e s e n t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s t o r i c A l a b a m a p r a c t i c e . An e x a m p l e o f t h i s w o u l d be when a p o l i c e o f f i c e r , who h a s been i n c h a r g e o f t h e s t a t e ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i s allowed t o remain i n the c o u r t r o o m d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e o f f i c e r w i l l be a w i t n e s s . See, e . g . , P o r t o m e n e v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 221 F.2d 582 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 5 5 ) . ' " J o h n s o n v. S t a t e , , chief record establishes that Detective i n v e s t i g a t o r or " o n - c a l l homicide (R. 3 4 8 - 4 9 ) , enforcement a n d , as s u c h , representative'" 2d a t 1130. The t r i a l court he was R u s s e l l was t h e detective" t o remain Detective 'law i n the C e n t o b i e v . S t a t e , 861 So. d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n a l l o w i n g D e t e c t i v e R u s s e l l t o remain i n the courtroom fact that i n this the " o f f i c i a l and a l l o w e d c o u r t r o o m b y R u l e 615, A l a . R . E v i d . the So. 3d ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 9 ) . The case [Ms. CR-99-1349, O c t o b e r 2, 2009] Russell testified at t r i a l . despite " I n Ex p a r t e L a w h o r n , 581 So. 2d 1179, 1181 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t and again refused to hold 'Alabama a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have t i m e i t an a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n on t h e 134 CR-07-1997 part of the trial c o u r t t o a l l o w a s h e r i f f , p o l i c e c h i e f , or s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d p e r s o n who will the courtroom during See So. 2d 2d 1377 177 858 ( A l a . C r i m . App. ( A l a . C r i m . App. ( A l a . C r i m . App. cases." a l s o J a c k s o n v. 1 9 8 6 ) ; J o h n s o n v. 1 9 8 5 ) ; C h e s s o n v. 1983), and State, State, State, 479 435 authorities cited So. So. in 502 2d those Id. Here, the trial allowing Detective the trial.' l a t e r t e s t i f y to remain i n trial. court did not abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n by R u s s e l l to remain i n the T h e r e was courtroom no p l a i n e r r o r as t o t h i s during claim. XX. Morris argues that Alabama's method of u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l u n d e r t h e E i g h t h and F o u r t e e n t h the U n i t e d of 1901, Art. I, § c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e method o f l e t h a l r e s u l t i n excessive undisputed that, and 15. Alabama Specifically, Morris i n j e c t i o n used i n Alabama undue p a i n , b e c a u s e without is Amendments t o S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , as w e l l as u n d e r t h e Constitution could execution proper "'[i]t anaesthesia, is the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f p a n c u r o n i u m b r o m i d e and p o t a s s i u m c h l o r i d e , either separately or in combination, 135 would result in a CR-07-1997 terrifying, the inmate e x c r u c i a t i n g d e a t h . The would first b a s i c mechanics are be p a r a l y z e d and suffocated (because t h e p a r a l y s i s w o u l d make h i m u n a b l e t o draw b r e a t h ) , t h e n a burning p a i n throughout h i s b o d y , and then a t t a c k w h i l e remaining unable to breathe." 11 So. 3d 323, 338 n. 15 ( A l a . 2008), , 129 S . C t . 2 8 6 5 , 174 L.Ed. v. L i t t l e , 511 However, 2d 582 F.Supp. 2d 872, i n Ex parte 883 included in the administration suffer feel a heart Ex p a r t e B e l i s l e , cert. denied, U.S. (2009), q u o t i n g H a r b i s o n (M.D.Tenn. Belisle, A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t , that 11 So. in light of 3d 2007). at of the the drugs 338, safeguards used e x e c u t i o n s by l e t h a l i n j e c t i o n i n A l a b a m a , t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e c r u e l and u n u s u a l punishment. "We n o t e t h a t A l a b a m a ' s s t a t u t o r y d e a t h - p e n a l t y scheme has repeatedly been upheld against c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e s . A comprehensive listing of t h e c a s e s d e a l i n g w i t h t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s can be f o u n d i n T r a v i s v. S t a t e , 776 So. 2d 819, 873 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 776 So. 2d 874 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 531 U.S. 1081, 121 S.Ct. 785, 148 L.Ed.2d 681 (2001). Moreover, we know of no a u t h o r i t y i n support of the g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t d e a t h by l e t h a l i n j e c t i o n v i o l a t e s a d e f e n d a n t ' s constitutional rights. Indeed, a number of j u r i s d i c t i o n s have r e j e c t e d s u c h c l a i m s . See, e.g., Sims v. S t a t e , 754 So. 2d 657, 668 ( F l a . 2000); 136 the for do CR-07-1997 S t a t e v. C a r t e r , 89 O h i o S t . 3 d 593, 608, 734 N.E.2d 345 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; R i t c h i e v. S t a t e , 809 N.E. 2d 258, 262 ( I n d . 2 0 0 4 ) ; W h e e l e r v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W. 3d 173, 186 (Ky. 2003). Today, we join these jurisdictions in holding that d e a t h by lethal injection is not per se cruel and unusual punishment." Bryant v. State, 951 So. 2 0 0 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 951 549 U.S. 1324 2d So. 732, 2d 732 (2007).(Footnote 747-48 (Ala. Crim. ( A l a . 2006), c e r t App. denied, omitted.) XXI. M o r r i s argues that h i s c o n v i c t i o n be r e v e r s e d b a s e d on alleged the and s e n t e n c e a r e due c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of the previously errors. "'"The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has set f o r t h t h e c u m u l a t i v e - e r r o r r u l e as f o l l o w s : '[W]hile, under the f a c t s of a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , no s i n g l e e r r o r among m u l t i p l e e r r o r s may be s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l u n d e r R u l e 45, i f t h e a c c u m u l a t e d e r r o r s have " p r o b a b l y i n j u r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s , " then the c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of the e r r o r s may r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l . ' Ex p a r t e Woods, 789 So. 2d 941, 942-43 n. 1 ( A l a . 2001) (quoting Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P.). Applying this standard to Lewis's allegation of cumulative error, we have scrupulously r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d and f i n d no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f any o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l l y nonreversible errors in this 137 to CR-07-1997 case a f f e c t e d Lewis's s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s a t trial."' " S h a r i f i v. S t a t e , 993 So. 2d 907, 946-47 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2008) ( q u o t i n g L e w i s v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-03-0480, A p r i l 28, 2006] So.3d , (Ala.Crim.App.2006))." Brown v. S t a t e , [Ms. CR-07-1958, November 13, 2009] , So. 3d ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009.) In the present case, when we review t h e r e c o r d and t h e e r r o r s p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y affected Morris's substantial rights at t r i a l . XXII. A c c o r d i n g t o R u l e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . , we have s e a r c h e d t h e e n t i r e proceedings f o r any p l a i n e r r o r . that the record of the proceedings I n so d o i n g , we note does n o t a f f i r m a t i v e l y show t h a t t h e p e t i t j u r y was sworn as t o t h e i r o a t h o f s e r v i c e . (R. 107.) However, t h e c a s e - a c t i o n summary r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e j u r y was sworn and t h e r e c o r d d o e s show p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y that the v e n i r e - m e m b e r s were a d m i n i s t e r e d t h e i r o a t h b e f o r e v o i r examination. plain (C. 47, R. or otherwise, 989 So. 2d 504, 506 13.) Therefore, because of t h i s ( A l a . 2008). 138 there omission. i s no dire error, Ex p a r t e L e e , CR-07-1997 F u r t h e r , p u r s u a n t t o § 13A-5-53, A l a . Code 1975, we a r e required death. in t o address of Morris's sentence of I t i s t h e f i n d i n g o f t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e r e i s no e r r o r the sentencing The t r i a l another that adversely affected Morris's court found the e x i s t e n c e of three circumstances: that Morris rights. aggravating had p r e v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d o f f e l o n y i n v o l v i n g t h e use of v i o l e n c e t o t h e specifically 1975; the p r o p r i e t y second-degree person, a s s a u l t , § 13A-5-49(2),Ala. that Morris intentionally Code caused the death of Rochester d u r i n g the commission of f i r s t - d e g r e e robbery, § 13A-5-49(4), A l a . Code 1975; a n d t h a t M o r r i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a u s e d t h e d e a t h of R o c h e s t e r d u r i n g the commission of f i r s t - d e g r e e b u r g l a r y , § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 9 ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975. The t r i a l the existence Moreover, of no the t r i a l nonstatutory statutory court mitigating h e a r i n g , and the t r i a l found court f u r t h e r found mitigating that circumstances circumstances. Morris at presented the no sentencing c o u r t f o u n d none t o be p r e s e n t i n this case. In weighing mitigating the aggravating circumstances, circumstances the t r i a l 139 court against determined the that CR-07-1997 " [ a ] f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a l l t h e m a t t e r s t h a t were p r e s e n t e d to [the] Court, the testimony sentencing hearing before by aggravation, taking were proferred heard at trial, and the [ t h e ] C o u r t , b o t h i n m i t i g a t i o n and into before account [the] a l l other matters Court," aggravating circumstances outweighed 64.) The t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and mitigating It the m i t i g a t i n g the that circumstances. (C. c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e s u p p o r t e d by t h e r e c o r d . i s the f i n d i n g of t h i s Court t h a t death i s the proper sentence i n t h i s case. A f t e r c a r e f u l l y r e v i e w i n g the r e c o r d of both the g u i l t conclude and s e n t e n c i n g phases that there d e a t h was i m p o s e d or i s no 1975, we t h a t the sentence of under the i n f l u e n c e of p a s s i o n , p r e j u d i c e , any o t h e r a r b i t r a r y Code indication of M o r r i s ' s t r i a l , requires factor. this S e c t i o n 13A-5-53(b)(2), A l a . Court to weigh the c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s to determine independent circumstances determined independently the p r o p r i e t y of M o r r i s ' s sentence weighing of indicates the that aggravating the trial aggravating of death. and court An mitigating properly t h a t the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 140 CR-07-1997 mitigating circumstances and that death is the proper sentence. As Court required must by § 13A-5-53(b)(3), determine disproportionate whether A l a . Code Morris's neither imposed in disproportionate So. similar cases, of death i n t h i s case considering the circumstances See, e . g . , B e l i s l e v . 11 So. 3d 256 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 7 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 11 3d 323 ( A l a . 2008), Saunders v. S t a t e , cert. denied, 10 So. 3d 53 U.S. (Ala.Crim.App. d e n i e d , 10 So. 3d 53 ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 129 was nor excessive t o the p e n a l t i e s s u r r o u n d i n g b o t h t h e crime and M o r r i s . State, sentence o r e x c e s s i v e when compared t o t h e p e n a l t i e s i m p o s e d i n s i m i l a r c a s e s . The s e n t e n c e is 1975, t h i s S . C t . 2433 ,(2009); 2007), U.S. cert. , (2009.) For the reasons expressed here, M o r r i s ' s c o n v i c t i o n s and sentences are affirmed. AFFIRMED. Welch and K e l l u m , the r e s u l t . J J . , concur. Windom, J . r e c u s e s 141 Wise, herself. P.J., concurs i n
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