CR-07-1913 Garrett Dotch v. State of Alabama

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REL: 04/02/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 CR-07-1913 Garrett Dotch v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal MAIN, Dotch the intentional deadly Court Judge. Garrett for from M o b i l e C i r c u i t (CC-07-788) weapon 13A-5-40(17), while appeals his conviction forcapital murder o f T i m a r l a murder Taldon by t h e use o f a s h e was i n a v e h i c l e , i n v i o l a t i o n A l a . Code 1975, and h i s r e s u l t i n g of § sentence of CR-07-1913 death. Dotch was indicted for intentionally killing was in a vehicle, intentionally § f o r two 13A-5-40(a)(17), killing Taldon o r p r o c e e d i n g , and by, or was related 40(a)(14), by the count first second count. members o f verdict of In 1975. the the the j u r y , of death by h e a r i n g was the accepted Dotch to The Taldon a the of Dotch not of 10-2, jury's § 13A-5- as as to to the trial, Dotch's the r e t u r n e d an advisory A trial recommendation or caused guilty b e f o r e the for criminal guilty of l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e . then h e l d was she was witness. found i n d i c t m e n t and i n favor and in a stemmed f r o m , as jury a vote 1975; testified s e n t e n c i n g phase sentencing judge role The o f a gun w h i l e A l a . Code or had her murder: s h o o t i n g h e r when s h e the murder to A l a . Code of c a p i t a l T a l d o n by t h e use had been subpoenaed to t e s t i f y , trial counts separate court, and and sentenced death. State's attended evidence middle showed school the following. together and Dotch began a and dating r e l a t i o n s h i p . S u b s e q u e n t l y T a l d o n m o v e d f r o m h e r p a r e n t ' s home and rented relationship an apartment; ended Dotch i n 2002. (R. o u t o f s c h o o l a t t h e age lived 964, of s i x t e e n , 2 with 975.) but her Dotch until had T a l d o n had their dropped completed CR-07-1913 high school and was attending college at the time of her death. On S e p t e m b e r 1, units of the responded 2003, L t . S t e p h a n i e Smith of the Mobile to a Police call at burglary complaint. had s p l i n t e r e d and been that Taldon there and was blood pleaded assault. had (R. conviction, She stated that "kicked to served, and (R. 817.) her He was was sentenced to the be placed to on eye and 15 a testified and that arrested third-degree years on each concurrently. i n c a r c e r a t i o n was 5 she apartment D o t c h was served time of She right 817.) that concerning door to the i n . " (R. eye. sentences he the first-degree burglary s e n t e n c e s were s p l i t and time testified apartment b r u i s i n g to i n s i d e her 818-19.) the Taldon's suffered guilty Department assaults years' The set probation. at (C. 641.) Taldon's mother t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r the b u r g l a r y , p u r c h a s e d a gun. (R. 9 6 4 - 6 6 . ) I n May for the and assault for third-degree pleaded court burglary guilty. sentenced 2005, w h i l e on probation c o r r e c t i o n s , D o t c h was arrested domestic violence against (C. him 646, to R. Taldon 835-36.) 180 days, 3 The the T a l d o n and Mobile sentence he again municipal to run CR-07-1913 concurrently serving with that probation the sentences sentence, Dotch f o r the previous f o r h i s other charges. was (R. following testified that 967.) July there, asked him mother to 1, 2 0 0 6 , T a l d o n cousin, Taldon morning knocking alone. (R. on J u l y Jiquisa July 8, she a p p r o x i m a t e l y 20 July week She times while she to t a l k 9, 2 0 0 6 , Taldon's two o f Taldon's (R. 9 6 8 , 9 4 9 . ) that present times. to him and When testified was outside the apartment. bedroom door and t o l d (R. 9 5 0 . ) a n d Thomas (R. 9 5 1 . ) Thomas 4 Dotch Dotch In the a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2:00 current boyfriend. her that during when s h e was p r e s e n t a t t h e a p a r t m e n t a t the door, f o rher apartment. many 2006, lived the 968-69.) Thomas, 2006 spent at her d i d n o t want T a l d o n , and Taldon's loudly then her a t her apartment. o f Sunday, o r 3:00 a.m., sister, her daughter her with of mother telephoned Taldon leave week telephoned early Dotch remained first with the apartment Taldon's the 1 Taldon's although Taldon left cousins a.m. July h e r p a r e n t s , a l t h o u g h she c o n t i n u e d t o pay r e n t apartment. was to continue h i s offenses. F r o m t h e e n d o f May 2 0 0 6 u n t i l with released After Someone b e g a n saw D o t c h knocked was with her on standing Taldon's at the door. When CR-07-1913 Taldon went inside, to the door, and Taldon Taldon tried i n the morning, leave her apartment, that he Taldon Dotch left Taldon money him to leave on July 9, 971-72.) current leave Dotch He and t e l l also boyfriend. her (R. 9 5 2 . ) to get Taldon to daughter that instructed Cellular telephone 51 the p o l i c e . (R. 9 5 3 - 5 4 . ) telephoned that Taldon, included She s t a t e d that he was g o i n g disparaging alone, Dotch t o h e r and h e r c a r . (R. 9 5 3 . ) and her mother. Dotch hung she h e a r d him to k i l l h e r . (R. about Taldon's remarks (R. 9 7 3 . ) When T a l d o n ' s that mother t o l d him t o up. Taldon's mother continued to telephone her daughter Taldon to on t h a t d a y . times left. t h a t D o t c h d i d n o t know t h a t s h e was her that made testified she call to the conversation. Taldon him o u t . s h e was c a l l i n g arrived. 2006, Taldon's mother t e s t i f i e d curse and t r i e d and t h a t p u t h i m on a t h r e e - w a y listening t o keep and Dotch f o r h e r under before the p o l i c e Also h i s way the door the door, he r e t u r n e d to force s t a t i n g t h a t he n e e d e d t o t a l k had p l a c e d told attempted to shut s u c c e s s f u l l y shut Later Dotch call the p o l i c e . records indicate that 5 Dotch (R. called and 973.) Taldon CR-07-1913 On phone July records, Taldon a Taldon routinely restroom. A adjacent to vehicle. sandwich parked the day co-employee testified woman the the sandwich McDonald's shop ran fast into sandwich testified food the the parking (R. 683.) l o t where Rodgers he found that day routine, vehicle. i n the restaurant sandwich testified Taldon shop, The driver's door open side l e g were (R. co-employee out 683, front of was the vehicle, 689-90.) Rodgers dead in on a g u n . and and her the testified 684.) hand vehicle that hand (R. left (R. 684.) T a l d o n dead. Emergency p e r s o n n e l soon (R. 688.) 6 and was he in and c a r r i e d T a l d o n i n t o t h e s a n d w i c h shop and l a i d the f l o o r . ran her that Taldon's right resting declared the t h e o c c u p a n t s t h a t s o m e t h i n g h a d o c c u r r e d , a n d he her legs, on Taldon's, he d i d n o t w a l k h e r t o h e r i n her p u r s e between reverse. where t h a t s h e l e f t e a r l y w h i l e he was from cell w r o n g w i t h T a l d o n on t h a t was left shop of behind o f t h e o f f e n s e . He s o m e t h i n g was of her s h i f t , He to Subway of her b e h a v i o r . However, d e s p i t e t h e i r u s u a l (R. 682.) alerting a c c o r d i n g to Dotch's Rodgers, that the c l o s e out telephoned the a s s h e d i d on because a.m., Willie that he b e l i e v e d at he worked. testified shop, 1 0 , 2 0 0 6 , a t 9:35 arrived a her and CR-07-1913 Tracy of the a man "there gun that she gunshots, restaurant saw testified that McDonald's r e s t a u r a n t testified like Sayer heard like running at a a p p e a r e d t o be at the time of the "successive from i n the was the at three coming area, she the "trot" from described skinned t h e man with both i n her 694.) She testified long, dark blue Sayer sandwich denim was full officer she i n f o r m e d the a faces was (R. not "one t h a t she had that k i n d of (R. like 693-94.) at t r i a l as 1 a She dark(R. a white and (R. array the 698.) hundred percent in then T-shirt 694.) following was She o f medium b u i l d . wearing o f s i x men. photograph officer was and photographic immediately i n c l u d e d the perpetrator's he and 2 Subway l o t and parking black, She sounded the 693.) the i t still." tall shorts. shown shop that that l o t . " (R. statement s h o r t , bushy h a i r , of was something--it at t h i s person's side h o l d i n g offense. pows t h a t direction parking drive-through the array. at the Subway incident, She which informed sure" (R. that 699.) s e e n "more o r l e s s a the the She profile On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , S a y e r a d m i t t e d t h a t she had n e v e r m e n t i o n e d any gun o r w h a t m i g h t h a v e b e e n a gun t o t h e p o l i c e when she g a v e h e r s t a t e m e n t t o t h e m . ( R . 697.) 1 H e r s t a t e m e n t was taken approximately T a l d o n ' s b o d y h a d b e e n f o u n d . (R. 695.) 2 7 an hour after CR-07-1913 of the face" or the r i g h t "side o f t h e b o d y " o f t h e man ran away. (R. 6 9 8 - 9 9 . ) T h e r e f o r e , S a y e r t o l d she would feel she could see Around more c o m f o r t a b l e m a k i n g the "profile 9:00 or array, six 700-01.) men. (R. from the a r r a y . the man she had Taldon's which seen p.m., At t r i a l , (R. the o f f i c e r face." was (R. shown that she was window the time of at t h a t she h e a r d g u n s h o t s someone standing described old, the man by identified as at the offense. side (R. (R. 708.) of 707.) a vehicle. d a r k - s k i n n e d , between wearing a "white s h i r t She t e s t i f i e d that Dotch Dotch as i n which she restaurant, second d r i v e - t h r o u g h She the t h i r d medium h e i g h t , w i t h a "low h a i r c u t . " t h a t he was of 695.) and t h a t a f t e r the second of away f r o m t h e v e h i c l e working the a profiles B r i t t a n y S l a c k , an e m p l o y e e o f t h e M c D o n a l d ' s testified i f 700.) the photograph Sayer he that identification of the r i g h t identified "trotting" found. she consisted She (R. 701.) b o d y was versus a f u l l 10:00 photographic the as s h o t , she (R. 20 testified 707.) and (R. 707.) 26 She and d a r k b l u e j e a n saw him shoot at the saw Slack years stated shorts." vehicle and then run b e h i n d the McDonald's r e s t a u r a n t . the On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , w h e n a s k e d why s h e h a d n e v e r t o l d p o l i c e t h a t s h e h a d s e e n t h e man s h o o t i n t o t h e v e h i c l e , 3 8 (R. 7 0 8 . ) 3 The CR-07-1913 officers showed her a photographic array a t the McDonald's restaurant a n d s h e t e n t a t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d D o t c h a s t h e man s h e had (R. 7 1 0 . ) seen. Later, depicting him the police the p r o f i l e a s t h e man Slack also seen. brought of Dotch she had seen Moore drive-through of single photograph and she p o s i t i v e l y i n the parking (R. 7 1 0 . ) i n the parking a man a p p r o a c h e d man as a n d woman talking, McDonald's r e s t a u r a n t . African-American, haircut, s h e was w o r k i n g that and then she had at the f i r s t a t the time s h e saw a woman l o t o f t h e Subway t h e woman. M o o r e v e h i c l e . Moore h e a r d t h r e e the that a s t h e man t h a t (R. 7 2 1 . ) She t e s t i f i e d to a vehicle shop; the testified at t r i a l identified lot. window o f t h e McDonald's r e s t a u r a n t the offense. walk Dotch a (R. 7 0 8 . ) Brandi identified her stated t h e woman that sandwich s h e saw got into the g u n s h o t s a n d saw t h e man r u n b e h i n d (R. 7 2 2 - 2 3 . ) She d e s c r i b e d t h e man i n h i s " e a r l y to mid 20s," with a"low" approximately 5'6" t o 5 ' 8 " t a l l , Slack maintained t h a t she had t o l d b u t t h a t s h e was u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r (R. 7 1 3 - 1 4 . ) 9 and as h a v i n g a someone what s h e h a d s e e n i t h a d b e e n w r i t t e n down. CR-07-1913 medium complexion. wearing a white Moore rolled hanging The out of saw the i n the car In Lynn window of restaurant at that, 724.) and the she identified the "bangs" of McDonald's the wearing shorts When s h e saw a rolling and and (R. she (R. 724.) array and seen. (R. man she had as (sic) the and t h e y were b l u e Subway vehicle. 10 the fast-food she She stated that she running the from back described (R. red. sandwich 736.) shop She the as that and the of him believed source of the (R. at h e a r d what toward She in line she shop 20s" h i t a parked and a man 734-35.) the vehicle was McDonald's saw to determine the behind was 734.) (R. that she the "in his man looked vehicle that of Subway s a n d w i c h restaurant. African-American that offense heard direction the "legs Dotch was 723.) a "car b a c k f i r i n g . " and shots, whom s h e he 722.) opened." t h e man b e l i e v e d was three the (R. occupant's drive-through of shorts. that shown a p h o t o g r a p h i c testified time stated d o o r was was l o t . (R. the The D o t c h as Gregg also after the she court, parking She blue-jean (R. identified Bonita first and f o l l o w i n g day, 726-27.) 722.) testified a truck. tentatively 723, shirt also into (R. an he was 735.) noise, slowly stated she start that CR-07-1913 the d r i v e r ' s d o o r was was hanging she drove to attempted she out could she the not had The in The sustained her The casings outside was left two possible, door had a was identify foot and pulse; shown anyone l o t . (R. as a the 737.) f a t h e r drove him to the p o l i c e gave statement. a (R. evidence collarbone, as opened Gregg to wounds t o h e r l e f t and wounds were the one one vehicle. Three in the statement indicating chest, that Taldon the o u t e r p a r t adjacent to her fatal. followed 934-35.) (R. on the rear three b u l l e t s were f i r e d were fired b u l l e t s were console, and gun, 737.) he introduced soon i n j u r e d occupant unable where seat, the the t o be a 1001.) neck. Two of (R. shell w e r e f o u n d i n t h e v e h i c l e a n d two w e r e on t h e p a v e m e n t vehicle: casings to Dotch's a second first went r u n n i n g i n the p a r k i n g gunshot arm, As one.(R. and Mobile State 736.) i f the find seen (R. vehicle, array i m m e d i a t e l y by 994.) door. f o l l o w i n g day, station her the to determine photographic man of open and t h a t what a p p e a r e d from t h e e x p e r t was one right in also the floorboard. front (R. f r o m t h e same h a n d g u n , the same h a n d unable 11 gun; to determine found in the passenger's 744-48.) and however, whether the The four without the same CR-07-1913 gun d i s c h a r g e d palm p r i n t found palm p r i n t . the both the b u l l e t s (R. was m e n t a l l y i l l of unable to appreciate r e b u t t a l testimony actions, other cocaine. (R. t h a t he the nature and (R. 1 1 2 0 . ) from another expert who o f any d i f f i c u l t y that t h a t D o t c h s h o w e d no i n d i c a t i o n would have p r e v e n t e d his lay-witness testimony of h i s a c t i o n s at the time of the offense. The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d on 946.) a n d was 4 A left (R. 7 8 7 . ) A d d i t i o n a l l y , b l o o d s t a i n s w e r e f o u n d Dotch i n t r o d u c e d expert-and opined (R. 8 7 7 . ) on t h e d r i v e r ' s w i n d o w m a t c h e d D o t c h ' s d r i v e r ' s seat. quality and t h e c a s i n g s . him from understanding and a p p r e c i a t i n g than t h a t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the v o l u n t a r y use 1212.) I. Dotch argues that the trial court erred by a d m i t t i n g w h a t he s a y s was u n r e l i a b l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n based on procedures. the impermissibly Specifically, identification suggestive improperly testimony police-identification Dotch contends that the admission evidence from the three witnesses of was Dotch's expert testified that Dotch suffered from d e l u s i o n a l d i s o r d e r o f an u n s p e c i f i e d t y p e ; polysubstance abuse; and p e r s o n a l i t y d i s o r d e r , not otherwise s p e c i f i e d , w i t h a n t i s o c i a l , s c h i z o i d , p a r a n o i d , a n d b o r d e r l i n e f e a t u r e s . (R. 1111.) 4 12 CR-07-1913 erroneous the because police and identifications alleges of that the the at the improper conduct unreliability the time of witnesses' the and of procedures the offense. in-court by witnesses' He therefore identifications were inadmissible. Dotch the of argues that improper and suggestive police resulted in his identification the crime the shooting scene. by He three argues w i t n e s s e s who as procedures the were perpetrator present at different improprieties by as the to each of witnesses. A. As t o B r i t t a n y S l a c k , food restaurant Dotch single argues located that the photograph identification photographic array insufficiently identification that to police she not to of each have make unduly 13 photographs other of an fast- sandwich shown a or officer coercive. shop, her a positive photographic array; the presence p r o c e d u r e was Subway failed consisted to the should original similar d e s c r i p t i o n ; and next after i n the an e m p l o y e e a t t h e M c D o n a l d ' s that that to the were Slack's during the CR-07-1913 Although the use of a s i n g l e photograph f o r purposes i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r a i s e s the question of p o s s i b l e it "does not State, 516 United necessarily States dismissed, (1974); cert. So. 2d v. 889, denied, 8 94 Baxter, 414 U.S. Kalmbach inject 801, v. 492 Jones, 417 U.S. F. (1973), 913 488 suggestiveness, prejudice." ( A l a . Crim. 2d cert. F. (1974). 2d Hutchinson App. 150 1987), denied, v citing (9th C i r . ) , 134 of cert. 416 U.S. 940, (5th C i r . 1973), "Although a one-man showup i s i n h e r e n t l y s u g g e s t i v e , ' i t does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t the procedure [is] unduly suggestive so t h a t [a] s u b s e q u e n t i n - c o u r t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . ' So. 2 d 1 1 1 5 , 1117 State, 624 S o . 2 d 1 3 2 8 , 1338 one-man unduly (Ala. Crim. s o ' ) , and C o o l e y App. 1983) was s u b j e c t e d t o a one-man that identification Gavin v State, cert. denied, cert. denied, 891 Ex parte Gavin 2d (although suggestive, they are not v . S t a t e , 439 S o . 2 d 1 9 3 , ('the mere f a c t that the a p p e l l a n t showup does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y procedure So. See a l s o N i c h o l s v . ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1992) nature 907, Gavin, v Alabama, 14 taint Q u a r l e s v . S t a t e , 711 App. 1997). showups ' a r e by t h e i r necessarily 195 (Ala. Crim. i t would render impermissibly suggestive')." 960 891 ( A l a .Crim. So. 543 U.S. 2d 998 1123 App. 2003), ( A l a . 2004), (2005). CR-07-1913 "In Ex p a r t e A p p l e t o n , t h i s Court noted: [828 S o . 2 d 8 94 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ),] "'"The d a n g e r i n h e r e n t i n a one-man showup, w h e r e a w i t n e s s i s shown a s i n g l e s u s p e c t a n d a s k e d , ' I s t h a t t h e man?' i s t w o f o l d . F i r s t , a one-man s h o w u p c o n v e y s a c l e a r message t h a t 'the p o l i c e s u s p e c t t h i s man.' Second, a one-man s h o w u p d o e s n o t give the witness a choice of i d e n t i f y i n g a n o t h e r p e r s o n as b e i n g t h e p e r p e t r a t o r o f the c r i m e c h a r g e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , when a one-man showup i s used to i d e n t i f y the p e r p e t r a t o r of a crime, the r e l i a b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s n o t p u t t o an objective test, such as a l i v e or photographic lineup, i n which a single s u s p e c t must be c h o s e n from a group of persons possessing similar physical characteristics."' "828 S o . 729 So. omitted) Ex 2d a t 899-900 ( q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e F r a z i e r , 2d a t 254-55 [(Ala. 1998)] (citations (emphasis o m i t t e d ) ) . " p a r t e Wimes, Courts 14 S o . 3d 1 3 1 , 138 have determined i d e n t i f i c a t i o n b a s e d on l i e s of s u c h as a l i v e suspect must similar physical 253, originally be 254-55 shown single i s not put or photographic l i n e u p , chosen from a group characteristics." ( A l a . 1998). a six-man photograph] an i n the f a c t that "the r e l i a b i l i t y the w i t n e s s ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n test, 2d [a ( A l a . 2009). of t o an i n which a persons Here, however, single possessing Ex p a r t e F r a z i e r , photographic array 15 objective 729 Slack from which So. was she CR-07-1913 tentatively already identified been put Moreover, crime circumstances.' parte that immediately single t h a t the of was the by cert. 828 she Kinsey, v. the called assembled. (R. 919.) Kinsey also composed of tentatively informed to stated frontal that or So. So. 2d 2d 31 25, six-man that Police police I t was then and the and as because 16 (Ala. Ex array she was shown (R. suspect (R. where 919, from that 712.) testified scene the array the scene, 920.) Agent array array perpetrator. was the 710, at the photographic she 29 photographic d e l i v e r e d to the exigent Slack station that a Here, Department, Slack. first Dotch that, an of ( A l a . 1 97 9 ) . " (Ala. 2001). name o f t h e the pictures Kinsey commission 369 and Mobile Sayer identified Agent the the of the over ten minutes" l a t e r . and shown reliability emergency 899 offense officers learned i t was 894, the of the after 369 shown had f r o m a one-man s h o w u p , " ' i t i s denied, offense where in State, 2d identification test. danger was after her necessity, So. p h o t o g r a p h "not A g e n t Ben the Brazell 1 978), Appleton, testified objective conducted promptly demanded C r i m . App. Thus, of a p e r p e t r a t o r where or an despite identification permitted to Dotch. standing was Slack Slack in the CR-07-1913 McDonald's profile showed restaurant drive-through window, s h e saw only a s t h e man p a s s e d b y h e r . (R. 9 2 0 . ) A g e n t K i n s e y her the s i n g l e positively picture identified Dotch. further of Dotch alleges Dotch in profile, then and she (R. 9 2 0 . ) impropriety concerning the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s used by t h e p o l i c e , s p e c i f i c a l l y to the composition to Slack. of the photographic array Dotch argues men with varying all the photographs descriptions of skin that tones in array and reveals skin array tones. also argues d i d not match the because bald, 8 2 , C. the other that witnesses' the witnesses a l l was bald. a l l s i x men They appear pictures i n the photographic had s i m i l a r features, builds, t o be o f t h e same a g e g r o u p , t h e b a c k g r o u n d i s t h e same i n a l l o f t h e p h o t o g r a p h s . Exhibit shown h a d s h o r t h a i r , b u t o n e o f t h e men of the s i x f r o n t a l that originally as included photographs of a n d b u i l d s . He the perpetrator the photographic A review the array i n the array stated that the perpetrator a 708.) M o r e o v e r , although five (State's hair. have short one and o f t h e men i s "'On t h e w h o l e , t h e p h y s i c a l a p p e a r a n c e o f [ D o t c h ] i s n o t so dissimilar to that of the other 17 line-up participants that CR-07-1913 it So. renders the 2d (Ala. 165, line-up unduly suggestive.' 170 1984 ) , L.Ed.2d ( A l a . C r i m . App. cert. 160 (1984 ) . " ( A l a . C r i m . App. (Ala. 2000), 976 (2002). See App. (holding photographs H u n t e r was unduly 170 the H u n t e r v. the suggestive); that was and h i s p h o t o was 2d 1239, 1241 photographic other men although in the a the was o n l y man most Crim. not lineup App. photograph developed, array the was other 18 134, folded (Ala. 2001) six gray and l i n e u p was not 2d of of 134 at not man unduly a blank State, a wall 687 So. that the because appearance mutilated photographs 169¬ wearing suggestive or 2d (Ala. (holding similar So. the against E l s t o n v. 170 U.S. was only 1996) of the So. impermissibly were 83 537 three shade 827 standing recent); 232, 271-72 273 in shirt, the 171 2d 265, 2d lighter State, 2d Alabama, 2d So. photographic Burgess l i n e u p was the was So. S.Ct. So. v. backgrounds 450 B u r g e s s , 827 So. 802 in a striped (Ala. Elston's imperfectly the B u r g e s s v. the 802 State, 450 105 827 Burgess denied, array although w i n d b r e a k e r and 873, v.State, State, cert. o n l y man (holding U.S. denied, although in suggestive Burgess cert. 2000), that 469 aff'd, 1 9 9 8 ) , a f f i r m e d , Ex p a r t e 193 Crim. denied, 1983), J o n e s v. were and, and also CR-07-1913 defective); C h i l d e r s v. S t a t e , Crim. App.), c e r t . that although a denied, a witness convenience 339 S o . 2 d 5 9 7 , 5 9 9 - 6 0 0 ( A l a . 339 S o . 2 d 601 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) i d e n t i f i e d the suspect i n a robbery store as w e a r i n g a red sleeveless was the only participant i n the lineup sleeveless shirt, Hunter there was (holding shirt, of and a red likelihood no wearing of misidentification). Dotch during also Slack's contends that argues that the police identification the o f f i c e r ' s was presence officer's unduly during m i n u t e p e r i o d when s h e v i e w e d t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c in coercive old. any pressure Dotch c i t e s such because of Slack's suggestive. array facts pressure. " ' P r e - t r i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s a r e t o be s e t a s i d e on g r o u n d s o f p r e j u d i c e o n l y i f t h e p r e - t r i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e i s so i m p e r m i s s i b l y s u g g e s t i v e as t o g i v e r i s e t o a substantial l i k e l i h o o d of m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . S c o t t v . S t a t e , 479 S o . 2d 1343 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1 985) . The t o t a l i t y of the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court i d e n t i f i c a t i o n n e e d be a n a l y z e d o n l y when t h e p r e - t r i a l p r o c e d u r e s used were u n n e c e s s a r i l y o r i m p e r m i s s i b l y s u g g e s t i v e . C o l e m a n v . S t a t e , 487 S o . 2 d 1380 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 6 ) . The f a c t t h a t witnesses a r e shown p h o t o g r a p h s d o e s n o t 19 He t h e 10- t o 15- a g e - s h e was t o no e v i d e n c e o r s p e c i f i c presence resulted 15 years indicating CR-07-1913 establish suggestiveness. Matthews v. State, 401 S o . 2 d 2 4 1 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1 9 8 1 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 401 S o . 2 d 248 ( A l a . 1981).' "Ex p a r t e Musgrove 1 992), v. Stout, State, affirmed, 547 638 Ex So. So. parte 2d 2d 901 , 904 1347, ( A l a . 1989)." 1351 Musgrove, ( A l a . Crim. 638 So. 2d 1360 1 9 9 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , M u s g r o v e v . A l a b a m a , 513 U.S. Slack's age raises a question i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by t h e t r i e r So. 2d 47, age of a require 50 ( A l a . Crim. 17-year-old of f a c t . App. defendant there i s no presence during Slack's any that coercion misidentification. (Ala. Crim. shown the App. Jackson 1977). from v. array, her Cf. Bradley v. S t a t e , 337 (finding that not a State, young itself admissible"). the 361 testified the t o h e r as (R. 1 6 7 , 20 of officer's substantial So. t o who 179.) 2d that police (R. 1 6 6 , 717) o r t h a t the array. i n and otherwise that the mere of the photographs r e s u l t e d i n in Slack suggestion from the photographs photograph resulted photographic made no viewing (1994). accorded "does indication (Ala. t o be 1976) a r e j e c t i o n of a confession Here, present of weight 845 App. risk 1152, when officer she of 1154 she was who was should she had t o p i c k pick any CR-07-1913 Further, would the have there caused i s no the identification evidence witness of was mature officer's of coercion no identification identification Moreover, this case reliable U.S. 188, had 199 be her Dotch or t o be even to by of her age that young somehow There the employed, certain that of and suggest was no officer. The her testimony identification. was in a factor any age There her caused way in her unreliable. i f the been under the to Slack's photograph. suggestiveness enough indication that presence Dotch's or d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t s h e was is indication procedures improper, used Slack's by the police identification f a c t o r s enumerated i n N e i l v. Biggers, (1972). "'In d e t e r m i n i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l adequacy of pretrial identification procedures and the admissibility of identification testimony, the central q u e s t i o n i s whether, under the t o t a l i t y of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was reliable. M a n s o n [ v . B r a t h w a i t e , 432 U.S. 98 (1977 ) ] . T h i s determination involves the application of a two-pronged t e s t . "'"[T]he r e q u i r e d i n q u i r y i s two-pronged. The f i r s t q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e initial i d e n t i f i c a t i o n procedure was ' u n n e c e s s a r i l y ' ... o r ' i m p e r m i s s i b l y ' ... s u g g e s t i v e . I f i t i s found to have been so, the c o u r t must then p r o c e e d to the q u e s t i o n whether the p r o c e d u r e found to have been 21 in was 409 CR-07-1913 'unnecessarily' or 'impermissibly' s u g g e s t i v e was s o ' c o n d u c i v e t o i r r e p a r a b l e m i s t a k e n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ' ... o r h a d s u c h a tendency 'to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ' ... t h a t a l l o w i n g t h e w i t n e s s t o make a n i n - c o u r t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w o u l d be a d e n i a l o f d u e p r o c e s s . " United S t a t e s e x r e l . P h i p p s v . F o l l e t t e , 42 8 F. 2d 912, 914-15 (2d C i r . 1 9 7 0 ) . ' " B r a z e l l v . S t a t e , 369 S o . 2 d a t 2 8 - 2 9 (emphasis a d d e d ) . See a l s o D o n a h o o v . S t a t e , 371 S o . 2 d 6 8 , 72 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 7 9 ) . I n e v a l u a t i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d of m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h e c o u r t must c o n s i d e r t h e following factors: "'[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the c r i m i n a l a t the time of the crime, [2] t h e w i t n e s s ' s d e g r e e o f a t t e n t i o n , [3] the accuracy of the witness's prior d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c r i m i n a l , [4] t h e l e v e l of c e r t a i n t y d e m o n s t r a t e d by the w i t n e s s a t t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n , a n d [5] t h e l e n g t h o f time between the crime and the confrontation.' " N e i l v . B i g g e r s , 409 U.S. 1 8 8 , 1 9 9 , 93 S . C t . 3 7 5 , 3 8 2 , 34 L . E d . 2 d 4 0 1 , 411 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . See also Ex p a r t e Frazier, [729 So. 2d 253 ( A l a . 19 9 8 ) ] . " Ex parte Appleton, 828 In the p r e s e n t the p e r p e t r a t o r She was standing parking lot in So. 2d a t 900. case, S l a c k had the o p p o r t u n i t y i n the parking l o t at the time of the offense. i n the drive-through which the to observe murder 22 window took that place. faces There the was CR-07-1913 testimony the distance vehicle victim's that was 78 testified that she window and saw a man then (R. saw him fire the third shot testify first as to give a fair degree So. of She attention (R. Slack's 1206 was 164, of on able to including 707, she did man, the McDonald's skin perpetrator man fire the specifically she was "which able indicates Hull v. to a State, 1990). was his shot. 176-77.) not part." App. Dotch his third the the describe She the o f f e n s e and Crim. of vehicle. the saw She the b e h i n d the clearly the out (R. [Slack's] (Ala. description looked attentiveness, description characteristics, age. of by and 810-11.) window. Although degree (R. the run the to the away. 1202, Slack's accurate. moved f r o m window then heard w a t c h e d him run detailed 2d she g u n s h o t s and her and standing two and the inches. shots as became a t t e n t i v e after 10 a gun gun she and two with the before Slack and heard 1 6 4 - 6 5 , 1 7 2 - 7 6 . ) She restaurant 581 feet between both detailed clothing color, and and physical haircut, height, 708.) identification photographic array; p h o t o g r a p h of D o t c h as was however, the tentative she man she 23 did at the select thought she time and had of the sign the s e e n . When CR-07-1913 shown the reflected able single photograph the perpetrator of from Dotch's the angle profile, that t o o b s e r v e , s h e was a b l e t o p o s i t i v e l y which she had been identify h i m . (R. 920.) The length tentative occurred at Based offense the testimony the present and array was hours. She s i g n e d the back of (R. 1 6 6 , 1 9 0 ) ; t h e o f f e n s e 2:30 p.m. g i v e n by Her positive later. Slack at the p r e t r i a l to suppress the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n offense Slack's photographic was made 10 t o 15 m i n u t e s on that the the a t 5:00 p.m. on t h e m o t i o n conclude at approximately identification in between two-and-a-half photograph hearing time identification approximately Dotch's of a n d on her i d e n t i f i c a t i o n her testimony evidence at t r i a l , was s u f f i c i e n t l y we reliable. B. Dotch Sayer, who restaurant time police of argues was that the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n the drive-through lane located next the murder, t o t h e Subway was engaged i n improper procedure. evidence from Specifically, unreliable he argues 24 a t the McDonald's sandwich because, conduct during that Tracy shop he at the says, the the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n the police made CR-07-1913 suggestive that signals the t o h e r as photographic she array presence of several procedure was was was at the improper, alleges otherwise informed perpetrator. sign next He to suspect her the of that the is officers no certain, or suppression first seen indeed array. profiles. administered should pick 133.) the box" from that photograph feel She better testified identification a certain committed t h i s Sayer not p o s i t i v e l y she w o u l d (R. having of offense Sayer first she from identify seeing that d i d not appeared i n the array. testimony should the that 31.) or at t r i a l that pick array. At a the l o o k i n g at the t h e man she had pictures showing the officer suggest who that she t h e man who (R. 1 3 4 - 3 5 . ) She photograph or t e l l her that 25 the the the Sayer t e s t i f i e d that a f t e r she c o u l d that by hearing or displayed (Dotch's b r i e f indication to any, hearing, array, and suggested that Sayer i m p l i c i t l y informed her presented at the p r e t r i a l suppression the signaled 'tentative' in this identification photograph contends the o f f i c e r s there the officers which "checked d i d appear However, the specifically photographic array, the that during and array, coercive. Dotch officers looking CR-07-1913 testified may not that he may have told her have been p r e s e n t i n the stated that did not picking out (R. that She array, the array 82, the suspect. testified the record officer but she showed contains which t h a t she that i t was or a copy of i s the first Sayer's not is checked, column d e s i g n a t e d located to the the to the was and f o r the right of witness's the " t e n t a t i v e i . d . " box. p o l i c e on this signature array. Slack's way s i g n i n g the back "negative marked any and 33.) This signature The this column r a t h e r T h u s , t h e r e was no a second identification. The that tentative in the column i s than next by ground. improper p h o t o g r a p h i c a r r a y r e f e r s to the shown that impropriety D o t c h ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t S a y e r ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was an of Exhibit shows appears signature; in 137.) State's negative. "remarks" stated i . d . " (R. s i d e of (S. as in further recall reverse photo identification box the She her her a 136.) may assist d i d not identified (R. suspect 136.) the array. the array from which she based f a c t t h a t she made a on was positive 5 To t h e e x t e n t t h a t D o t c h i n c o r p o r a t e s h i s argument t h e men i n t h e a r r a y v a r i e d as t o p h y s i c a l a t t r i b u t e s , i s s u e h a s a l r e a d y b e e n d i s c u s s e d a n d h e l d m e r i t l e s s . See I.A., supra. 5 26 that this Part CR-07-1913 Dotch contends that because h i s photograph was t h a t was i n t h e s e c o n d p h o t o g r a p h i c " a r r a y " knew t h a t h e r f i r s t identification In 1993), tainted than from Wright Wright identification v. the second State, alleged because one l i n e u p . h i s was This 6 that So. Court to call the 2d that that choosing ( A l a . Crim. identification included the appellant's photographic picture i n more " d i d nothing photograph or to coerce the appellant's was was identifications photograph. i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s were n o t u n d u l y s u g g e s t i v e , the App. the o f f i c e r a t t e n t i o n to the appellant's witnesses into 299 photograph held were n o t u n r e l i a b l e and s t a t e d Sayer was u n r e l i a b l e . the p r e t r i a l the only and because one was i n c o r r e c t , h e r p o s i t i v e photograph 641 the only although included grouping." Wright more The in than one v. S t a t e , 641 S o . 2 d a t 3 0 0 ¬ 301. Similarly, 1993), Crim. 905 i n Ex on r e m a n d App. 1993), (1993), parte t o , Johnson Johnson, v. S t a t e , 620 So. 2d 620 S o . 2 d 714 ( A l a . c e r t . d e n i e d , Alabama v. Johnson, Johnson alleged that 70 9 ( A l a . because 510 h i s photograph U.S. was Wright contended that h i s photograph appeared i n a l l t h r e e l i n e u p s , b u t t h e r e c o r d s h o w e d t h a t h i s p h o t o g r a p h was i n c l u d e d i n o n l y two o f t h e t h r e e . 6 27 CR-07-1913 included lineup of i n two p h o t o g r a p h i c a r r a y s before h e was i d e n t i f i e d identification Johnson, was a n d he t h e n a p p e a r e d i n a by the w i t n e s s , improperly 620 S o . 2 d a t 7 1 2 . The C o u r t "the process repetitive." Ex stated: " I n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e police repeatedly arranged confrontations between J o h n s o n a n d [ t h e w i t n e s s ] ; t h e mere f a c t t h a t [ t h e witness] was s h o w n J o h n s o n ' s p i c t u r e a n d a l s o saw him in the line-up does not establish any impropriety i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n process. Under Alabama l a w , i t i s n o t e r r o r t o have a d e f e n d a n t participate i n both a photographic array and a line-up, e v e n t h o u g h he may b e t h e o n l y common participant i n t h e two p r o c e d u r e s . Nicholes v. S t a t e , 40 9 S o . 2 d 454 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 1 ) . ... Moreover, the record i n d i c a t e s that the i n d i v i d u a l s in the photographic array and t h e l i n e - u p were p h y s i c a l l y s i m i l a r t o J o h n s o n . The o f f i c e r i n c h a r g e of choosing the individuals f o r the line-up testified at t r i a l t h a t he t o o k s p e c i a l c a r e t o l o c a t e p a r t i c i p a n t s who r e s e m b l e d J o h n s o n , s o t h a t it w o u l d be as d i f f i c u l t as p o s s i b l e f o r [the witness] to d i s t i n g u i s h Johnson. Because these p r e t r i a l i d e n t i f y i n g p r o c e d u r e s d i d n o t make [ t h e witness's] i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Johnson i n e v i t a b l e , the Court of Criminal Appeals c o r r e c t l y held that the pretrial identification procedures were not impermissibly suggestive and t h a t [the witness's] i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t e s t i m o n y was p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e d t o the jury f o r i t s consideration. We are not, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e d t o f u r t h e r examine t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e was a s u b s t a n t i a l l i k e l i h o o d of m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . " Ex parte Johnson, 620 S o . 2 d a t 7 1 3 . 28 parte CR-07-1913 Here a l s o , as p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the p h o t o g r a p h i c a r r a y r e s e m b l e d D o t c h , so t h a t h i s a p p e a r a n c e in both arrays inevitable. defense In fact, testified were that was array, shown and asked in both the suspect of the arrays. one She particular because Sayer knew that incorrect, s h e knew he reappeared i n the Sayer s h e was u n a b l e also argues that of three o f f i c e r s ' the d i d n o t make t o make the police sitting photographs suggestive. (Dotch's determined, the indicate any o f t h e o t h e r was because merit. that, an second incorrect an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n conduct around" w h i l e Sayer viewed the photographs viewed by array. Dotch and of him of the arrays whether both allegation identification i s without first identification (R. 7 0 5 . ) identification; the was included Dotch's her f i r s t Dotch Sayer's "I'm n o t s u r e i f t h e r e i s o n l y i n both." Moreover, that Sayer counsel at t r i a l participants person d i d n o t make mere in brief, first with of s u g g e s t i v e n e s s . See P a r t 29 the was as officers I.A., s u p r a . array h e r as she array a t 32.) However, presence "standing i n the second at the table the of unduly previously does There not i s no CR-07-1913 indication in suggestive as the officers she should the record good the d i d not pick suggest to her out of the Sayer's opportunity lot to the (R. following the he a b o u t 2:30 in the afternoon. (R. testify to the degree attention 2d her d e s c r i p t i o n was 1202, 1206 (Ala. description given matched the other clothing, haircut. As (R. to testified from the the his that first officer Crim. the was App. under Sayer had a the She 129, that 130.) the time was Although she did not that paid to the 581 So. she H u l l v. State, Moreover, accurate descriptions. his any, 700.) reliable 1990). was i f 699, supra. that " t r o t t e d " across and 131.) police height and She and this generally described build, his and his the confrontation, she positively identify 694.) of was c e r t a i n t y at unable photographic that day" d e t a i l e d . See color, level she of witnesses' skin 130, her to clear 137, or (R. gunshots. that man, "a as testified as i t was 136, Biggers, man coercive Sayer t e s t i f i e d identification view were which photograph, array. f a c t o r s e n u m e r a t e d i n N e i l v. parking officers to Sayer's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Furthermore, the that she was to array. "not 30 a She stated hundred that percent anyone she told sure the CR-07-1913 person [ s h e ] saw was profile a and t h a t profile there and t h a t [she] would versus a full [ s h e ] h a d s e e n more f e e l more c o m f o r t a b l e l o o k i n g a t face, that i d e n t i f y i n g that person at a p r o f i l e . " five hours second later, array of identification that the a t 9:00 men offense. police about later in profile She [she] also p.m., and s h e was was photograph an h o u r t e s t i f i e d that following array. t h e same felt better (R. 7 0 0 . ) A p p r o x i m a t e l y shown t h e positive of Dotch running i n the parking was s h o w n t h e f i r s t array o r 10:00 of the p r o f i l e she had seen of a of her a s t h e man l o t at the time of she f i r s t the offense spoke at which to the t i m e she (R. 6 9 5 . ) S h e was s h o w n t h e s e c o n d night. Thus, Sayer's t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t h e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was reliable based offense. Moreover, identification on her observations at the time of the t h e r e was n o e v i d e n c e o f i m p r o p r i e t y i n t h e p r o c e d u r e s used by t h e p o l i c e . C. Dotch argues that the identification made by Brandi Moore, an e m p l o y e e a t t h e M c D o n a l d ' s f a s t - f o o d r e s t a u r a n t was w o r k i n g a t t h e f i r s t d r i v e - t h r o u g h w i n d o w , was because, police he says, the 31 used improper who unreliable procedures to CR-07-1913 obtain her identification. the coached police appeared dispute right and by p r e s s u r i n g alleges before h e r t o make a n that b e e n i n v o l v e d i n an on g o i n g that this transcript suspect's concerning particular photograph. semantics another witness Moore an coached going s h e h a d made i n the array; that they dispute Moore by telling had a suspect with being she nature was opportunity to told to pick a n d she became collect that hearing out a the import upset i n order herself. suppression shows The of the prosecutor's She d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d used, who t h e v i c t i m and hearing h a d t o be c a l l e d t o t h e s t a n d examination i n an on her that suppression whether transpired at the p r e t r i a l direct suspect identification. as t o t h e exact questions certain the that p h o t o g r a p h was i n c l u d e d i n t h e a r r a y . of the p r e t r i a l M o o r e was c o n f u s e d her that the suspect the police she viewed t h e a r r a y , Dotch contends involved by informing d e c i s i o n by i d e n t i f y i n g Dotch had informing and had been 7 the victim; the her, h e r by i n the array with Specifically, The so of that to give following during Moore's : M o o r e was s h o w n t h e s e c o n d p h o t o g r a p h i c participants i n profile. 7 32 array depicting CR-07-1913 tell "Q ... A n d t h a t d e t e c t i v e , you which photo t o p i c k ? d i d that detective "A No, ma'am. He j u s t t o l d me t o p i c k w h i c h o n e that 1 recognize. "Q Okay. A n d d i d he t e l l "A 1 don't you, you had t o p i c k one? remember. "Q W e l l , i n o t h e r w o r d s , d i d he s a y y o u must p i c k one o f t h e s e p h o t o g r a p h s ? "A "Q say He j u s t t o l d me to point one o u t . B u t d i d he s a y y o u h a d t o p i c k one o r d i d he -¬ "[Defense object her counsel]: t o arguing Your when t h e l a d y Honor, 1 i s giving answer. "THE COURT: W e l l , t h e o t h e r p r o b l e m i s 1 can't hear t h e w i t n e s s ' s answer. You're g o i n g t o h a v e t o s p e a k -- L e a n u p a l i t t l e bit and p u l l t h a t toward your face. Pull t h a t down t o w a r d -- t h e m i c r o p h o n e . A n d i t doesn't work v e r y w e l l , so j u s t really s p e a k u p . Go a h e a d and ask i t again, please. "Q O k a y . W h a t 1'm t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d , B r a n d i , i s when -- w e ' r e j u s t t r y i n g t o g e t a b e t t e r i d e a o f w h a t was t h e d e t e c t i v e t e l l i n g y o u a b o u t how y o u w e r e -- w h a t i n s t r u c t i o n s was h e g i v i n g y o u a b o u t viewing a photo spread. "A He j u s t t o l d me h e was g o i n g p i c t u r e s a n d f o r me t o p i c k 33 t o show some CR-07-1913 "THE COURT: 1'm s o r r y , ma'am. 1 t m u s t b e my e a r s a n d n o t y o u r v o i c e . W o u l d y o u r e a l l y make a n e f f o r t t o s p e a k u p , p l e a s e , o r m a y b e s l o w down a l i t t l e b i t ? Go a h e a d and answer h e r q u e s t i o n . "Q J u s t speak l o u d l y . I t ' s okay. I t ' s okay. Y o u ' r e d o i n g f i n e . 1 know t h i s i s d i f f i c u l t . Y o u ' r e d o i n g f i n e , o k a y ? 1 t ' s o k a y . He t o l d y o u w h a t ? 1 t ' s okay, s w e e t i e . 1 t ' s okay. You're d o i n g f i n e . "THE COURT: Do y o u w a n t t o g i v e h e r a moment t o s t e p down a n d b e c o m e c o m p o s e d a n d maybe c a l l a n o t h e r w i t n e s s ? " (R. 160-61.) When M o o r e r e t u r n e d t o t h e s t a n d , questioning to her her concerning for identifying testified that no officer the prosecutor the police the man officers' whom suggested she instructions had to her that resumed seen. she should pick out a p a r t i c u l a r p h o t o g r a p h ; n e i t h e r d i d an o f f i c e r her who d i d t h i s that "the person will She be i n " t h e a r r a y . tell (R. 179.) Later, suppression d u r i n g Moore's hearing, cross-examination at the p r e t r i a l the following transpired: "Q A l l r i g h t . A n d when t h e y s h o w e d y o u t h a t p h o t o s p r e a d , d i d t h e y t e l l y o u why t h e y w e r e s h o w i n g you t h a t p h o t o s p r e a d ? "A Um, 1 don't remember. 34 CR-07-1913 "Q W e l l , d i d they t e l l you they thought they had somebody c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h i s t h i n g and t h e y j u s t wanted you t o l o o k i n t h e r e and see i f t h e y were i n there? "A Yes, s i r . "Q A l l r i g h t . A n d d i d t h e y t e l l y o u how t h e y knew t h a t t h e p e r s o n t h e y h a d i n t h i s photospread was w h o e v e r t h e y t h o u g h t was i n v o l v e d ? "A Yes, s i r . "Q How d i d they they -- w h a t d i d t h e y That them. "Q dispute right? O k a y . S o , t h e y t o l d y o u t h e r e was a n o n g o i n g b e t w e e n t h e p e r s o n t h a t was s h o t ; i s t h a t "A had And somebody an ongoing dispute Yes, s i r . "Q i t was you? "A between "A tell Yes, s i r . t h a t was i n that photospread? "Q A l lr i g h t . And d i d they t e l l you t h a t s o m e b o d y t h a t t h e y t h o u g h t was t h e o n e ? they "A Y e s , s i r . "Q A n d t h a t t h a t p e r s o n was i n t h e photospread? "A Y e s , s i r . "Q whoever "A S o , a t t h a t p o i n t , y o u knew t h a t likely i t w a s , was i n t h a t p h o t o s p r e a d s o m e w h e r e ? Yes, s i r . " 35 CR-07-1913 (R. 186-87.) Moore t e s t i f i e d on r e - d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t she p i c k at t r i a l officer suggested rather, "they thought t h a t i t w a s . " (R. 7 2 6 . ) H e r c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n a n d r e - just a particular t h a t no Even that any p o s s i b l e a n d she a g a i n became u p s e t cross-examination the suspect's picture prior was was t a i n t e d among photographs included i n the array, this array impermissibly or s u g g e s t i v e . I n E d w a r d s v . S t a t e , 574 S o . 2 d 864 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1990), was shortly into the re- to viewing the w o u l d n o t a l o n e make t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c lineup suggestiveness and had t o leave t h e stand. i f M o o r e was t o l d unnecessarily but t o l d [ h e r ] t o p o i n t t o t h e one t h a t [ s h e ] cross-examination d i d not address by t h e p o l i c e , photograph, Edwards c l a i m e d t h a t t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c because the photographs the witness that believed the c u l p r i t s h e was shown. This court stated: " T h i s a l o n e w o u l d n o t make t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c l i n e u p s u g g e s t i v e . Even i f t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r suggested t o [ t h e w i t n e s s ] t h a t t h e r o b b e r ' s p i c t u r e was o n e o f the seven pictures, this would n o t make t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c l i n e u p s u g g e s t i v e . T h i s c o u r t has h e l d i n J o n e s v . S t a t e , 415 So. 2 d 1233 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), ' t h a t a person [ w h o ] i s a c t u a l l y t o l d t h e s u s p e c t ' s p h o t o g r a p h i s among t h e p i c t u r e s , a l t h o u g h generally inadvisable, does n o t contaminate the 36 CR-07-1913 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g . ' See Ramsey v . S t a t e , So. 2 d 1 0 6 5 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) . " 574 So. 2d a t 867. M o r e o v e r , e v e n i f an o f f i c e r p h o t o g r a p h was that the 441 included an o f f i c e r suspect. told her that i n the array, informed Moore there the suspect's i s no i n d i c a t i o n of which photograph In a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n , this court depicted stated: "Here t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r m e r e l y t o l d one o f t h e i d e n t i f y i n g w i t n e s s e s t h a t b a s e d on t h e d e s c r i p t i o n she had p r e v i o u s l y given t h e p o l i c e , he h a d a s u s p e c t i n t h e g r o u p o f p h o t o g r a p h s he h a n d e d h e r t o view. He d i d n o t i n d i c a t e i n a n y m a n n e r which i n d i v i d u a l h e s u s p e c t e d . We f i n d t h a t t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r was m e r e l y s t a t i n g t h e o b v i o u s . T h e very purpose of a photographic d i s p l a y i s t o a s s i s t i n the apprehension of offenders. Simmons[v. United S t a t e s , 390 U.S. 3 7 7 , 88 S . C t . 9 6 7 , 19 L . E d . 2 d 1 2 4 7 (1968)]. I t w o u l d be a u s e l e s s law enforcement p r o c e d u r e i f a p o l i c e o f f i c e r showed a v i c t i m o r a w i t n e s s a s p r e a d o f p h o t o g r a p h s w h e r e , b a s e d on a d e s c r i p t i o n p r e v i o u s l y f u r n i s h e d h i m , he s u s p e c t e d none o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s d e p i c t e d . " Jackson v. State, 361 So. 2d 1152, 1154 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1977.) Moore c l e a r l y she recognized officers from the d i d not t e l l Dotch had testified argues she i d e n t i f i e d photographic lineup t h e man and h e r w h i c h p h o t o g r a p h she s h o u l d that made t h e c o r r e c t that the police signaled identification 37 t o Moore when s h e s i g n e d that that the select. that she the back CR-07-1913 of the photographic indicating that perpetrator. who had no. 2, she He that signed (C. to the photograph because the back of the parking l o t . She back the array, she had seen. read she no. array There the d e c i s i o n i n any a of witness photograph signifying that was is other way. finding 737, 755 (Ala. U.S. 1077 (2007). silent record. signature on the of the the man i t was she witness's a her believed testimony or she he prejudice. cert. A reviewing "'This court was evidence identification w o u l d have a f f e c t e d or 2007), saw indicating on the positive identification Speculation of a s t h e man and tentative identification a no shown t h e a r r a y the that a r r a y or that viewing support another the in 2 because m a k i n g a t e n t a t i v e one a recognized making i n photograph of the as n o t i f i e d t h a t her i d e n t i f i c a t i o n affirmed man she 2 box, 35.) a s k e d t o p i c k t h e man that no. Sayer, H o w e v e r , M o o r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e was of "tentative" made a p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , M o o r e was correct. next recognized argues already had array from a s i l e n t Ex parte denied, c o u r t can her record w i l l not So. 2d 552 not presume e r r o r from the v. 972 Alabama, i s bound by 38 after did affect Walker, Walker back record and not CR-07-1913 by allegations or arguments in brief reciting d i s c l o s e d b y t h e r e c o r d . ' Webb v . S t a t e , 565 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). See (Ala.Cr.App. 1987). F u r t h e r , we silent record. 1992); Woodyard v. aff'd, 428 S.Ct. 2d So. 3120, 354, 361 at also the v. 2 d 138 (Ala.), argues time to of the State, v. 597 So. 2d 136 734 462 U.S. be wrote a factor the of the i n Oakley. from a 1982), So. 1992). offense, she suggestive 2d 459 o n l y 17 was techniques; (Ala. Crim. Rather, in that years particularly App. s u p p o r t h i s a r g u m e n t . H o w e v e r , t h e w i t n e s s ' s age to 459 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . " W h i t l e y v . S t a t e , 607 t h a t b e c a u s e M o o r e was So. 2d (Ala.Cr.App. (Ala.Cr.App. denied, 1260 103 App. cert. So. predicate error So. 2d 2d 1259, S t a t e , 548 cannot not 1136, police's 457 Acres State, S t a t e , 428 (Ala. Crim. susceptible Oakley v. 77 L . E d . 2 d 1373 Dotch old Owens also So. matters case, he cites 1984), was not this held court witness: "[The w i t n e s s ] t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t she f e l t u n d e r p r e s s u r e t o ' p i c k ' t h e p e r s o n who a s s a u l t e d h e r . On t h e way to the photographic lineup her mother had told her t h a t i t was her duty and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to p i c k out a photograph from the a r r a y . [ T h e w i t n e s s ] l a t e r d e s c r i b e d t h e p r o c e d u r e as ' l i k e a t e s t ... I was a f r a i d t o c h o o s e b e c a u s e I was a f r a i d o f g e t t i n g s o m e t h i n g w r o n g . ' " 39 to CR-07-1913 457 So. 2d a t 460. was t o l d by p o l i c e was not t h e man to Oakley. factor is witness i n Oakley t h a t t h e man no i n determining also the cites v. referenced shown her under and youth pressure young only to make an inexperienced the a solely verify large the amount single to age was 414 case. mug F.2d 1176 who the was she case I n Mason shot. state that a identification. States, identification teller of her present l o s s o f a l a r g e a m o u n t o f m o n e y . She unusually witness's of United identification h i s argument; however, t h a t a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from was out t h a t the reliability Mason she originally picked had also stated that t o change her finding C i r . 1969), to support witness she which caused her T h e r e was Dotch (D.C. The The may the court have because she responsible been was a for the conceded t h a t d e s p i t e the withdrawal, she neglected s i g n a t u r e ; "thus, her prompt i d e n t i f i c a t i o n to of the to get c u l p r i t leading to h i s apprehension c o u l d have promised her Mason, 414 F.2d at 1182. witness's age made her more out There of was some no susceptible Although credibility very mention t o any hot that police the witness's and weight of water." the techniques. age the may be a factor in evidence, 40 i t would determining not effect CR-07-1913 the a d m i s s i b i l i t y G.S.R. Co. of the witness's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . v. H a l l , 105 want of e x p e r i e n c e evidence, but to i t s to combination of compounded the identification techniques w o u l d go not Moreover, A l a . 599, the extent (Ala. Dotch App. questioned aspects finding of effect). Crim. App. circumstances, factors, the the nature and v. combined to the used by the did not v. S t a t e , 562 clothing create[d] Moore's So. that none 2d 1373, of the s t a n d i n g alone mandated a nor did 369 their So. "the 2d hour, cumulative 25, totality cumulative f o r a showup, t h e u n u s u a l 41 police they effect confrontation itself, procedure"). the i n combination that unduly that the State, and argues of necessity an given none inducement the Dotch (holding (holding of t o be ("The perpetrator, Jackson Brazell 1978) (1895) of the 1990) or 179 reliability of i n t e r r o g a t i o n coercion Compare that the as suggestive, Crim. weight techniques on a m o u n t t o i m p r o p r i e t y . See 1384 176, admissibility."). impact were So. to the suggestive of 17 Cf. Alabama and suggestive the the 29 (Ala. of of the these lack of distinctive identification CR-07-1913 Moreover, M o o r e ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was also reliable under t h e f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h i n N e i l v. B i g g e r s , s u p r a . Moore had opportunity approached to view the the d r i v e r ' s man side in parking of the v e h i c l e p e r s o n s t a n d i n g by the v e h i c l e . She w a t c h e d the (R. 1 5 7 , and 181, in and t h e n h e a r d t h r e e g u n s h o t s . the v e h i c l e , the watched 724.) out the She of man run vehicle saw the She the opened (R. 183.) only saw him Moore She saw behind roll legs he spoke to the door. t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , who the backward of 185, 722.) (R. 724.) She (R. vehicle 157, hanging i n f o r m e d h e r manager o f what she had t e s t i f i e d at the p r e t r i a l hearing that she testified events because t h e man her a t t e n t i o n . She that backed and the f o r "[m]aybe a minute." further i n the 722.) restaurant h i t a truck. the person seated (R. 1 8 2 , McDonald's and was from d r i v e - t h r o u g h window and seen. as him from t h e d r i v e - t h r o u g h window, w h i c h f a c e d the shop. saw lot 182, Subway s a n d w i c h She the (R. she away 184.) was 8 attuned to the w a l k i n g across the p a r k i n g l o t caught testified, " I was just I knew something H o w e v e r , when t e s t i f y i n g as t o w h a t she h a d s e e n a t t r i a l , she r e f e r r e d t o a t i m e gap o f "a c o u p l e o f m i n u t e s " between watching the two persons talk and hearing the g u n s h o t s . (R. 722.) 8 42 CR-07-1913 -- I thought Moreover, something "[s]he t e s t i f i e d the course So. 2 d 889, 893 The of events that going (R. 181.) and i n g r e a t d e t a i l lucidly to as t o she gave the police and h a i r c u t . Her i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 516 1987). She d e s c r i b e d h i s c l o t h i n g , complexion, happen." e v e n i n g . " H u t c h i n s o n v. S t a t e , ( A l a . Crim. App. description accurate. race, was o f t h e man was also h i s age, h i s h e i g h t , (R. 1 5 7 , 7 2 2 . ) of Dotch's photograph as d e p i c t i n g t h e man whom s h e h a d s e e n was t e n t a t i v e . When t h e p r o s e c u t o r a s k e d her, "What responded, testified the man that 'tentative' I think s h e was n o t c e r t a i n she had seen indicates had passed her a.m. from to i s right." (R. you?", she 727.) She that the photograph was o f was shown t o Moore on t h e day (R. 1 5 8 , 7 2 3 , 7 2 5 . ) T h e b a c k that 9:40 mean i n t h e p a r k i n g l o t . (R. 7 2 5 . ) array the offense. approximately State, one photographic following hours t h e word "Which that The array does identification (S.R. 35.) the time was Therefore, of the offense. 516 So. 2 d a t 893 ( f i n d i n g entered less than at 24 H u t c h i n s o n v. that the factor that l e n g t h o f time between t h e crime and t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c 43 of the "[t]he line-up CR-07-1913 was less than 24 hours" weighed in favor of an accurate identification). D. Each of the witnesses gave r e l i a b l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s t h e f a c t o r s e n u m e r a t e d i n N e i l v. B i g g e r s , none of Dotch's a l l e g a t i o n s of the p o l i c e i s supported that, by suggestive the record. because of d i s c r e p a n c i e s seen in the parking lot by dark skinned, medium was d e s c r i p t i o n s of whereas complexion; approximately that " i f [she] 130) and (R. 707, 708.) the Moore to guess, the He guessed (R. used 722), man their r e f e r s to Sayer's had that that seen the the as man and being had man's while Sayer of "middle a height testified somewhere c l o s e t o s i x f e e t " as b e i n g by argues witnesses, whom t h e y t h e man (R. height." 9 d e s c r i p t i o n s do reliability of the Dotch states i n his (Dotch's b r i e f , at 40.) 9 techniques d e s c r i p t i o n s of the testified t o 5'8" Slack described These call had man Moore that 5'6" the Furthermore, Dotch, however, i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s s h o u l d be d i s c o u n t e d . Slack's supra. under not vary to the identifications brief 44 on appeal extent that they into question. that he is In 6'4". CR-07-1913 Thomas v . S t a t e , witnesses' provided 3 9 9 S o . 2 d 915 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1981), t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s v a r i e d f r o m t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f Thomas on t h e l i n e u p identifications sheet, and t h i s were n o n e t h e l e s s court reliable. found This that the court wrote: "While the d e s c r i p t i o n s given by the witnesses vary somewhat w i t h t h e d e s c r i p t i o n g i v e n on t h e l i n e u p sheet, they a r e n o t so i n c o n s i s t e n t t h a t they preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of appellant being the p e r s o n d e s c r i b e d b y t h e w i t n e s s e s t o t h e p o l i c e . The o n l y m a j o r d i s c r e p a n c y i s [a w i t n e s s ' s ] estimation o f t h e s u s p e c t ' s h e i g h t a s some t h r e e o r f o u r i n c h e s shorter than that of appellant." Thomas v . S t a t e , 399 So. 2d a t 920. See R e e s e v. S t a t e , So. ( A l a . Crim. 2 d 1 4 8 , 154 grounds, Huntley v. App. State, 627 1989), So. overruled 2d 1013 be r e v e r s e d the who differed So. descriptions presented 2d 420, 423 State's a jury question). ( A l a . Crim. witnesses differently of the person presented App. described a question 1978) the ("The item because assaulted Cf. B e l l v. S t a t e , fact taken them 364 that the somewhat f o r the jury."). "'The w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e witnesses, and i n f e r e n c e s t o be drawn from the evidence, where susceptible o f more than one rational conclusion, are f o r the jury alone. Willcutt v. S t a t e , 284 A l a . 5 4 7 , 2 2 6 S o . 2 d 328 (1969).' W a l k e r v . S t a t e , 416 So. 2 d 1 0 8 3 , 1089 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 2 ) . ' I t was w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e o f 45 other ( A l a . 1992) (Reese's c l a i m t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d victims' on 549 CR-07-1913 the j u r y to g i v e the evidence i n the case whatever w e i g h t and emphasis t h e y t h o u g h t p r o p e r i n r e a c h i n g t h e i r v e r d i c t . ' L i n s o n v . S t a t e , 394 S o . 2 d 8 5 , 92 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 1 ) . 'Where, a s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n and the d e f e n s e , i t i s f o r t h e j u r y t o r e s o l v e t h e conflict and determine the defendant's guilt or innocence. ... In making i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , the j u r y may b e l i e v e o r d i s b e l i e v e a l l o r a n y p a r t o f t h e t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d by e i t h e r s i d e . ' T e r r y v. S t a t e , 424 S o . 2 d 6 5 2 , 655 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 2 ) . "'Conflicting evidence always presents a question f o r the j u r y unless the evidence f a i l s to e s t a b l i s h a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e . S t a r l i n g v . S t a t e , 398 S o . 2 d 337 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , Ex p a r t e S t a r l i n g , 398 S o . 2 d 342 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . ' G a r d n e r v. S t a t e , 440 S o . 2 d 1 1 3 6 , 1137 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983)." Mosley v. State, 461 Furthermore, So. 2d Dotch 34, 36 contends (Ala. Crim. that Slack App. and 1984). Sayer both gave u n r e l i a b l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l because both testified time of the o f f e n s e , w h i l e n e i t h e r had mentioned the police this that when matter was Similarly, Crim. App. she in 135 jury Powell an the man gave to carrying her burn neck "a State, gun not 46 at statement. the fact this 600 So. 2d d e s c r i b e d P o w e l l as as b e i n g fact a to However, resolve. pounds, whereas a t t r i a l or t a l l e r , his v. officer a s b e i n g 5'5" on saw originally f o r the 1992), and w e i g h i n g they they 1085 being (Ala. 5'4" he d e s c r i b e d P o w e l l s m a l l and mentioned having a scar in his or original CR-07-1913 report." not The officer's u n r e l i a b l e . Powell although v. State, 600 h o w e v e r , was So. 2d a t held 1086. of over i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was jury to 5'8" 162 admissible. resolve, (Ala.Cr.App. and 1990), see the 590 v. So. State, 2d 918 590 actual officer's "Questions of i d e n t i t y Holton aff'd, pounds, as Further, the o f f i c e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n v a r i e d from Powell's appearance the identification, are for 2d 914 So. ( A l a . 1991) " Id. Neither the d e s c r i p t i o n s nor original this their evidence were m a t t e r s discrepancies the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the statements discredited to cited and those in the f o r the The witnesses' testimony weight r e s o l u t i o n of f i n d e r s of the descriptions in their identifications. and in their at t o be credibility trial accorded decisions fact. E. Finally, identified parking Slack, Dotch lot at identification impermissibly in Sayer, court the and as time the of procedure suggestive misidentification; thus, Moore man the was so as the t o be they had offense. not positively seen in The initial unnecessarily the or conducive to i r r e p a r a b l e witnesses 47 each did not require an CR-07-1913 independent basis court to for their identifications due process. Ex identifications o f D o t c h . The i n - were n o t a v i o l a t i o n parte Wimes, 14 So. of Dotch's 3d 131, rights 134 ( A l a . 2009). II. Dotch evidence contends to argues that due introduction from process and a because, he says, and inflammatory the outset" improperly fair introduce proceedings. this the (Dotch's b r i e f , of h i s Specifically, rendered indictment he his contained that prejudiced the the State evidence prior-bad-act evidence information and because of i n violation trial. the introduction of this unfair "irrelevant jury the irreparably tainted his trial, rights trial that was throughout allowed a l l of to the a t 44-45.) A. D o t c h c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e i n d i c t m e n t was o v e r l y because i t referred to his prior contends that the t r i a l the indictment this c o n v i c t i o n s . Moreover, compounded the e r r o r by he reading to the jury. Dotch f a i l e d therefore, court prejudicial to object issue on t h i s ground t o the t r i a l i s due t o be a n a l y z e d 48 under the court plain- CR-07-1913 error r u l e . Rule "[i]n a l l cases the of Ala.R.Crim.P. i n which notice i n the proceedings under review or probably the According the death penalty Court of Criminal Appeals s h a l l defect has 45A, has a d v e r s e l y to this has been rule, imposed, any p l a i n e r r o r o r ... w h e n e v e r s u c h error affected the substantial r i g h t appellant." "'"Plain error i s defined as error that has 'adversely affected the s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of the a p p e l l a n t . ' " ' E x p a r t e B r o w n , 11 S o . 3 d 9 3 3 , 936 ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) , q u o t i n g H a l l v . S t a t e , 820 S o . 2 d 1 1 3 , 121 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) . "'"The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n r e v i e w i n g a claim under the p l a i n - e r r o r d o c t r i n e i s stricter than the standard used in r e v i e w i n g a n i s s u e t h a t was p r o p e r l y r a i s e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r on a p p e a l . As t h e United States Supreme Court stated in United S t a t e s v . Y o u n g , 470 U.S. 1, 1 0 5 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the p l a i n - e r r o r doctrine applies only i f the e r r o r i s ' p a r t i c u l a r l y egregious' and i f i t 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, i n t e g r i t y or p u b l i c reputation of j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s . ' S e e E x p a r t e P r i c e , 725 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 3 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 5 2 6 U.S. 1133, 119 S . C t . 1 8 0 9 , 1 4 3 L . E d . 2 d 1012 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; B u r g e s s v . S t a t e , 723 S o . 2 d 742 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 723 S o . 2 d 770 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1360, 143 L . E d . 2 d 521 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; J o h n s o n v . S t a t e , 620 S o . 2 d 6 7 9 , 701 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) , r e v ' d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , 620 S o . 2 d 709 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , o n r e m a n d , 620 S o . 2 d 714 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . ) , 49 CR-07-1913 c e r t . d e n i e d , 5 1 0 U.S. 9 0 5 , 114 S . C t . 2 8 5 , 126 L . E d . 2 d 2 3 5 ( 1 9 9 3 ) . " " ' H a l l v . S t a t e , 820 S o . 2 d 1 1 3 , 1 2 1 - 2 2 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1999), aff'd, 820 S o . 2 d 152 ( A l a . 2001). Although the f a i l u r e t o object w i l l not preclude our review, i t will weigh against any claim of p r e j u d i c e . S e e D i l l v . S t a t e , 600 S o . 2 d 3 4 3 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1991), aff'd, 600 S o . 2 d 372 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) . 'I " II 1 nno\ Johnson v. S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 9 9 - 1 3 4 9 , , ( A l a . Crim. Alabama Supreme C o u r t ) , 345 3d App. 2005) ( o p i n i o n ( A l a . 2008), , 129 S . C t . 2062 on remand q u o t i n g S a l e v. S t a t e , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2008), c e r t . 352 O c t . 2, 2 0 0 9 ] cert. 13A-5-40(a)(14), from the 8 So. 3d 330, d e n i e d , Ex p a r t e S a l e , denied, S a l e v. Alabama, 8 So. U.S. (2009). Count two o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t c h a r g e d Dotch w i t h § So. 3d A l a . Code 1975, which violating designates as capital. " m u r d e r when t h e v i c t i m i s s u b p o e n a e d , o r has been subpoenaed, t o t e s t i f y , o r t h e v i c t i m had t e s t i f i e d , i n any p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g , grand j u r y p r o c e e d i n g , c r i m i n a l t r i a l or c r i m i n a l proceeding of whatever nature, or c i v i l trial or c i v i l proceeding of whatever n a t u r e , i n any m u n i c i p a l , s t a t e , o r f e d e r a l c o u r t , when t h e m u r d e r s t e m s f r o m , i s c a u s e d b y , o r i s r e l a t e d t o t h e c a p a c i t y o r r o l e o f t h e v i c t i m as a witness." In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , c o u n t two o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t s p e c i f i c a l l y charged that Dotch 50 CR-07-1913 "did intentionally cause the death of another person, t o - w i t : T i m a r l a Taldon, by s h o o t i n g h e r w i t h a g u n , when t h e s a i d T i m a r l a T a l d o n was o r h a d b e e n subpoenaed to testify, or had t e s t i f i e d i n a c r i m i n a l t r i a l or c r i m i n a l proceeding i n the case of S t a t e o f Alabama v s . G a r r e t t Dotch, i n t h e Grand Jury o f M o b i l e County t h a t i n d i c t e d s a i d defendant for Burglary 1 s t degree and A s s a u l t 3 r d degree a n d / o r t h e c a s e o f M-05-05-2768 where t h e d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d a n d f o u n d g u i l t y o f D o m e s t i c V i o l e n c e 3rd degree o f T i m a r l a Taldon and t h e s a i d murder stemmed f r o m , was c a u s e d b y , o r was r e l a t e d t o t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e s a i d T i m a r l a T a l d o n as a w i t n e s s , i n v i o l a t i o n o f 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 1 4 ) o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a against t h e peace and d i g n i t y of the state of Alabama." Thus, the references to the prior convictions provided the f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h e charge as t o t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g for which the victim, Taldon, was a witness. These facts p l a c e d D o t c h on n o t i c e a s t o t h e e x a c t c h a r g e s o t h a t he c o u l d prepare question, apprises a knowing and of course, adequate i s whether the accused with defense. "The 1 0 the indictment reasonable certainty crucial sufficiently of the nature o f t h e a c c u s a t i o n made a g a i n s t h i m s o t h a t h e may p r e p a r e h i s defense, that he may be protected against a subsequent Rule 13.2(e), Ala.R.Crim.P., provides f o ra motion f o r more d e f i n i t e s t a t e m e n t when an i n d i c t m e n t f a i l s t o i n c l u d e s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l s or f a c t s t o support t h e charge t o apprise a d e f e n d a n t o f t h e e x a c t c h a r g e he o r s h e m u s t d e f e n d a g a i n s t . D o t c h made n o s u c h m o t i o n . 1 0 51 CR-07-1913 prosecution f o r the 1181, (Ala. Crim. 1183 Alabama, 506 The in a U.S. 918 S t a t e was criminal such a indictment this proceeding of 6, the the acts that role a witness spawned Thus, this language offense. Johnson State, [Ms. C R - 9 9 - 1 3 4 9 , O c t o b e r 2, App. against Johnson testified and the convictions, the her other admitted to the and part of substantive properly court's 52 the 2009] i t the bigamy conviction was thus was was an witness substantive a d u l t e r y and res on that prove a l l e g a t i o n s of as indictment trial (holding charge of c a p i t a l murder of a were t h e r e f o r e Because because against f u r t h e r , the State [Ms. (Ala. 2006), 2005) the fulfill State, the , v. there in 3d for her required to prove that So. were p r o p e r l y offense v. f a c t s t h a t w o u l d be p r o v e d t o 2006)] e s s e n t i a l element of the evidence; that S t a t e was necessary'" had Harper denied, 2d (Ala. Crim. 3d conviction who and charged remand t o , J o h n s o n v. "'highly cert. So. (1992.) s p e c i f i e d the Oct. So. 1991), c r i m i n a l proceeding. element 1041313, App. r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e t h a t T a l d o n was murder. Therefore, was same o f f e n s e . " E x p a r t e H a r p e r , 594 gestae bad of the evidence). mentioned i n s t r u c t i o n s to the the prior jury, in CR-07-1913 which the judge read the indictment r e q u i s i t e proof of the elements also and charged as to the of the charged offenses, were the were proper. B. Dotch also argues that inadmissible because, charge under c o u n t two o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t capital because he says, prior t h e v i c t i m was they convictions were i r r e l e v a n t to the a l l e g i n g m u r d e r made a p e r s o n who has t e s t i f i e d i n a c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g a n d t h e m u r d e r s t e m m e d f r o m , was by, o r was r e l a t e d to the victim's r o l e as a w i t n e s s . submits t h a t t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s were n o t a d m i s s i b l e motive caused He also t o show or i n t e n t . However, as s t a t e d were a d m i s s i b l e because i n Part II.A., the State the p r i o r convictions had t o prove t h a t there was a c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g i n v o l v i n g t h e v i c t i m as a w i t n e s s that had p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e murder. Because the p r i o r offenses were as t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s o f an properly element prove charged i n the indictment of the offense, them. Further, the t h e y were a l s o i n t r o d u c e d v. State, i t was incumbent convictions were upon the State relevant t o prove motive and i n t e n t . [Ms. 1 0 4 1 3 1 3 , O c t o b e r 53 6, 2006] to because Johnson So. 3d a t . CR-07-1913 The the evidence o f Dotch's p r i o r charge i n count Brown v. S t a t e , (Ala. Crim. c o n v i c t i o n s was r e l e v a n t t o two o f t h e p r e s e n t As stated i n [Ms. C R - 0 7 - 1 9 5 8 , N o v e m b e r 1 3 , 2 0 0 9 ] So. 3d App. 2009), concerning case. the relevancy evidence: " ' R u l e 4 0 2 , A l a . R. E v i d . , p r o v i d e s that "[a]ll relevant evidence i s a d m i s s i b l e , e x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the U n i t e d States or t h a t o f t h e S t a t e o f Alabama, by s t a t u t e , by these rules, or by other rules applicable i n the courts of this State." R u l e 4 0 1 , A l a . R. E v i d . , d e f i n e s " r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e " as "evidence h a v i n g any tendency t o make t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n y f a c t t h a t i s of consequence t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n more p r o b a b l e o r l e s s p r o b a b l e t h a n i t w o u l d be w i t h o u t t h e e v i d e n c e . " "Alabama recognizes a l i b e r a l test of relevancy, which states that evidence i s admissible ' i f i t has any tendency t o l e a d i n l o g i c t o make t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t f o r w h i c h i t i s o f f e r e d more o r l e s s p r o b a b l e t h a n i t w o u l d be w i t h o u t t h e e v i d e n c e . ' " Hayes [ v . S t a t e ] , 717 S o . 2 d [ 3 0 ] a t 36 [ ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) ] , q u o t i n g C. G a m b l e , G a m b l e ' s Alabama Evidence § 401(b). "[A] f a c t i s admissible against a relevancy challenge i f it has any p r o b a t i v e v a l u e , however[ ] s l i g h t , upon a m a t t e r i n t h e c a s e . " K n o t t s v . S t a t e , 6 8 6 S o . 2 d 4 3 1 , 468 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1995), a f f ' d , 686 S o . 2 d 4 8 6 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) . R e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e s h o u l d be e x c l u d e d only " i f i t s probative value i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by t h e danger o f unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 54 of CR-07-1913 considerations o f undue d e l a y , waste of time, or needless presentation of c u m u l a t i v e e v i d e n c e . " R u l e 4 0 3 , A l a . R. E v i d . "The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t articles w h i c h a r e p r o p e r l y i d e n t i f i e d and which t e n d t o show t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e c r i m e o r t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h i t was committed or elucidate some matter in issue are a d m i s s i b l e i n e v i d e n c e f o r i n s p e c t i o n and o b s e r v a t i o n by t h e j u r y . " B e a s l e y v. S t a t e , 408 So. 2d 173, 179 (Ala. Crim. App. Brown v. S t a t e , So. So. ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2d 907, 963-64 3d a t , quoting G a v i n v. S t a t e , 891 2003). These c o n v i c t i o n s were n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v e the count and of second the motive indictment intent. 2009] Johnson So. In 2005), reversed this Court cases v. 3d a t Stephens v. and State, on o t h e r addressed motive and State, relevant [Ms. to Dotch's CR-99-1349, October 2, . 982 So. grounds, the i n v o l v i n g domestic proving were 2d 982 admission abuse or 1110 (Ala. Crim. S o . 2 d 1148 of prior ( A l a . 2006), convictions a h i s t o r y of violence intent i n a current murder case: " I t has l o n g b e e n t h e r u l e i n Alabama t h a t former a c t s of c r u e l t y , h o s t i l i t y , or v i o l e n c e by the accused toward the v i c t i m are admissible in o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h a m o t i v e t o commit t h e c h a r g e d h o m i c i d e . S e e , e . g . , B e n n e f i e l d v . S t a t e , 281 A l a . 283, 202 S o . 2 d 55 (1967) (evidence of husband's prior assaults on wife admissible to e s t a b l i s h 55 App. in for CR-07-1913 motive i n p r o s e c u t i o n f o r murder because acts ' t e n d e d t o show i l l f e e l i n g b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s ' ) ; P a t t e r s o n v . S t a t e , 243 A l a . 2 1 , 8 S o . 2 d 268 (1942) (proof t h a t husband had p r e v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d o f a s s a u l t i n g h i s wife admissible t o e s t a b l i s h motive i n p r o s e c u t i o n f o r murder); Doane v . S t a t e , 351 S o . 2 d 6 4 8 , 653 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1977) ( t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g p r e m a r i t a l f i g h t between defendant and v i c t i m a d m i s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h motive and m a l i c e i n prosecution f o r manslaughter). Indeed, Professor Gamble has n o t e d : "'One o f t h e m o s t common c a s e s w h e r e motive i s shown i s t h a t where t h e w i f e a l l e g e d l y i s murdered by t h e husband. I n these cases a whole host o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s , existing between t h e two p a r t i e s , are a d m i t t e d f o r t h e purpose o f showing that one s p o u s e h a d a m o t i v e f o r k i l l i n g t h e other. "'Former a c t s o f h o s t i l i t y o r c r u e l t y by t h e a c c u s e d upon t h e v i c t i m a r e v e r y commonly t h e b a s i s f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s proof that the accused had a motive t o commit t h e c h a r g e d h o m i c i d e . ' "1 C. G a m b l e , M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a E v i d e n c e § 4 5 . 0 1 ( 8 ) . "Here, evidence was admitted concerning a h i s t o r y o f m a r i t a l d i f f i c u l t i e s between Stephens and A n n i e . As a r e s u l t , A n n i e and t h e c o u p l e ' s t h r e e c h i l d r e n h a d moved o u t o f t h e m a r i t a l residence s e v e r a l months e a r l i e r and were l i v i n g w i t h A n n i e ' s father a t the time the homicides occurred. Although A n n i e r e t u r n e d t o t h e c o u p l e ' s m o b i l e home t o d o l a u n d r y , s h e d i d s o when S t e p h e n s was n o t p r e s e n t , most l i k e l y t o a v o i d a c o n f r o n t a t i o n . A n n i e ' s f a t h e r testified that i n 1992 Stephens had shot Annie f o l l o w i n g an argument, r e s u l t i n g i n h i s c o n v i c t i o n f o r second-degree a s s a u l t . D u r i n g c l o s i n g argument, 56 CR-07-1913 the State argued that the evidence demonstrated that Stephens's motive for killing Annie was in a l l l i k e l i h o o d r a g e . T h u s , e v i d e n c e o f t h e 1992 s h o o t i n g was admitted to support the State's theory that Stephens had s t a b b e d h i s w i f e i n a f i t of rage, following an argument or some other type of confrontation. " E v i d e n c e o f t h e 1992 c o n v i c t i o n was likewise a d m i s s i b l e under the i n t e n t e x c e p t i o n to the g e n e r a l exclusionary rule. "Addressing the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of c o l l a t e r a l - a c t evidence pursuant to the i n t e n t e x c e p t i o n , P r o f e s s o r Gamble has w r i t t e n : " ' I f the accused i s charged w i t h a crime that requires a p r e r e q u i s i t e i n t e n t , c o l l a t e r a l crimes, acts or misconduct are admissible to show that the accused possessed the necessary i n t e n t . This r u l e i s based upon the t h e o r y t h a t because the u n i n t e n t i o n a l d o i n g o f an a c t i s a b n o r m a l and u n u s u a l , t h e more a p e r s o n does o t h e r acts s i m i l a r to the act i n q u e s t i o n , the greater the l i k e l i h o o d that the act i n question was not done inadvertently. Whether t h e c o l l a t e r a l a c t has a t e n d e n c y t o show t h a t t h e a c c u s e d d i d p o s s e s s t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s t a t e of mind i s , of course, one of relevancy vested l a r g e l y i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l court.' "1 C. G a m b l e , M c E l r o y ' s (footnotes omitted)." Stephens v. State, Moreover, convictions 982 the was not So. Alabama Evidence 2d at relevance outweighed 57 § 69.01(5) 1128-29. of the by evidence the evidence of these of i t s CR-07-1913 prejudicial impact. confuse the jury, do exist,"' not "The or State d i d not or '"to bolster a State, 7 So. App. State, [Ms. 2009] Johnson So. The that Loggins, So. did this 2d weak evidence of facts case 3d 397, which against 430 to the (Ala. Crim. CR-99-1349, October 2, . court determining 771 v. 3d a t trial this '"to imply the inference d e f e n d a n t . " ' B l a c k m o n v. 2005)." use not abuse evidence 1093, 1103 i t ' s discretion was admissible. Ex in parte ( A l a . 2000). C. Dotch count that of two argues indictment, the s t e m m e d f r o m o r was a criminal should not because related proceeding, have been the jury which of a d m i t t e d . He the capital weapon w h i l e evidence charge of the p r i o r the Taldon i n the v e h i c l e , convictions him the was i s evaluated at the time the 58 to murder a witness i n prior convictions that because by using a deadly the admission of reversible evidence the irrelevant the error. However, r e l e v a n c e r e l a t e s t o t h e c r i m e o r c r i m e s and as as charge and were of murdering T a l d o n was that role submits convictions pertained only to this to charged to Taldon's evidence acquitted i s sought charged to be CR-07-1913 introduced. Here, Dotch was charged with two capital offenses. Although the j u r y found that the State had f a i l e d t o prove with count that two o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t , crime. Dotch n o t now a r g u e that d i d n o t move the charges contends that evidence of count evidence of the prior Dotch because f o r a severance charged and does s h o u l d have been s e v e r e d . the State two was v a l i d l y d i d not present of the indictment, convictions 1 1 He sufficient the admission of was r e v e r s i b l e error. Furthermore, Dotch d i d not s u f f e r c o m p e l l i n g p r e j u d i c e by the admission admissible intent. of these as motive "'When collateral leading evidence of up a the f o r the purpose defendant which of shedding a t the time the accused because t o t h e murder, former defendant and t h e a s s a u l t e d p a r t y is acts difficulty were as w e l l between as a i s o f f e r e d by the State, i t light on t h e t r u e o f the subsequent i s on t r i a l . ' " they conduct of difficulty for B a r t o n v. S t a t e , 494 S o . 2 d The c h a r g e s h e r e were p r o p e r l y c o n s o l i d a t e d because t h e c r i m e s w e r e " ' " ' o f a same o r s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r s o t h a t a person e v a l u a t i n g the crimes would b e l i e v e that the o f f e n s e s w e r e c o m m i t t e d b y t h e same p e r s o n . ' " ' " C u l v e r v . S t a t e , 22 S o . 3d 499, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 8 ) , c e r t d e n i e d , C u l v e r v. S t a t e , 22 S o . 3 d 530 ( A l a . 2 0 0 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , C u l v e r v . A l a b a m a , U.S. , 130 S . C t . 4 6 2 , 1 7 5 L . E d . 2 d 308 ( 2 0 0 9 ) M o r e o v e r , e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g each o f t h e s e o f f e n s e s would have been admissible i n the t r i a l f o r the other offense. Id. 11 59 CR-07-1913 943, 952 (Ala. Crim. testimony purpose as of showing evidence State, The Taldon her 277 for So. bad intent), 2d 922, indicates years, that not was 6, ( 1 9 7 3 ) . See 2006] Dotch culminating in her f o r the v. Johnson 3d been . terrorizing murder. After T a l d o n a t t e m p t e d t o move f o r w a r d i n h e r l i f e however, the continued to victimize parking lot as she their without her u n t i l attempted State, also So. had victim's admissible q u o t i n g Thigpen 924 that the offered character but 1041313, October evidence He, in 176, and (holding b e a t i n g s was Barton's of motive [Ms. break-up, Dotch. 1986) concerning former 50 A l a . A p p . v. App. shot leave to he her workplace. Despite of the p r i o r Dotch's acquittal convictions was as to count two, the evidence admissible. III. Dotch by failing jury argues to that sua concerning the sponte i t s use trial give of c o u r t committed limiting the plain instructions prior-conviction error to evidence. However, i n a s i m i l a r c a s e , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has that in such l i m i t i n g the present instructions case, the held are not necessary because, prior 60 the convictions were as being CR-07-1913 introduced as substantive 1041313, O c t o b e r Although 2000), and support 2006] 3d at D o t c h c i t e s Ex p a r t e M i n o r , Snyder situation, because defendants' credibility. substantive 2d . 780 So. 482 , d i s t i n g u i s h e d these evidence not So. [Ms. 2d 796 (Ala. v. at 893 State, o f h i s c l a i m , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t i n J o h n s o n 3d State, v. in So. v. conviction were So. Johnson (Ala. 2001), State, present 6, evidence. was in being In those evidence those cases, introduced cases, of the cases from the to prior- impeach the p r i o r offenses. the the convictions The Court wrote: " I t i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y and i n c o n s i s t e n t t o a l l o w , on t h e one h a n d , e v i d e n c e o f J o h n s o n ' s p r i o r b i g a m y conviction and prior bad acts as substantive e v i d e n c e o f t h e o f f e n s e w i t h w h i c h s h e was charged, yet, on the other hand, to require a limiting instruction instructing the j u r y that i t cannot c o n s i d e r t h e e v i d e n c e as s u b s t a n t i v e e v i d e n c e t h a t Johnson committed the charged o f f e n s e . " J o h n s o n v. Thus, limiting State, the trial So. 3d court i n s t r u c t i o n s to the at . acted properly jury concerning convictions. 61 in not Dotch's giving prior CR-07-1913 IV. Dotch the argues that i n t r o d u c t i o n of evidence violation plea improperly of Dotch's civil sentencing. He contends that court concerning abused the probate court's to a mental-health relevant facility. to h i s plea prior-conviction Dotch appeal, because by he or defect, of committing to rebut the argues whether his State's brief a n a l y s i s used by p r o b a t e are commitment based on to on an committed. He of discretion. He abuse the old and a r e t h e r e f o r e 62 courts be c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e two c a s e s c i t e d b y t h e S t a t e appeal Dotch c o u r t e r r e d by r e f e r r i n g t o an i n d i v i d u a l s should amounted original further determining this legal in that on the evidence submits brief a evidence Dotch a l l e g e s that t h i s and n e c e s s a r y and a entered excluding 2003 o r d e r that the t r i a l and o u t d a t e d determine trial, evidence. specifically firstly, incorrect i t s discretion prohibited commitment, i n a fair of not g u i l t y by reason of mental disease trial to court o f h i s r i g h t s t o due p r o c e s s , reliable was the t r i a l legal in i t s basis inapposite. for CR-07-1913 According to § 22-52-10.4(a), A l a . Code 1975, which g o v e r n s t h e n e c e s s a r y f i n d i n g s by t h e c o u r t t o commit a p e r s o n to inpatient treatment: "A r e s p o n d e n t may b e c o m m i t t e d to inpatient t r e a t m e n t i f t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t f i n d s , b a s e d upon clear and convincing evidence that: (i) the respondent i s mentally i l l ; ( i i )as a r e s u l t o f t h e mental illness the respondent poses a real and p r e s e n t t h r e a t o f s u b s t a n t i a l harm t o s e l f and/or others; ( i i i ) the respondent w i l l , i f not treated, c o n t i n u e t o s u f f e r mental d i s t r e s s and w i l l c o n t i n u e to experience deterioration of the a b i l i t y to f u n c t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y ; and ( i v ) t h e respondent i s u n a b l e t o make a r a t i o n a l a n d i n f o r m e d d e c i s i o n a s to whether or not treatment f o r mental i l l n e s s would be d e s i r a b l e . " The forerunner to this 1975, which provision, addressed the findings § 22-52-10(a), necessary f o r c o m m i t m e n t a n d w h i c h was r e p e a l e d b y A c t No. 1991, p. 783, § 14, A l a . Code involuntary 91-440, A l a . A c t s stated: "(a) I f a t t h e f i n a l h e a r i n g upon a p e t i t i o n s e e k i n g t o commit a p e r s o n t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e s t a t e department of mental health or such other p u b l i c f a c i l i t y a s t h e c o u r t may o r d e r , t h e p r o b a t e judge, on t h e b a s i s of clear, u n e q u i v o c a l and convincing evidence, s h a l l find: "(1) That t h e p e r s o n m e n t a l l y i l l ; and sought t o be c o m m i t t e d i s "(2) That as a consequence of the mental i l l n e s s t h e p e r s o n poses a r e a l and p r e s e n t t h r e a t o f s u b s t a n t i a l harm t o h i m s e l f o r o t h e r s ; and 63 CR-07-1913 "(3) That t h e t h r e a t o f s u b s t a n t i a l harm has been e v i d e n c e d by a r e c e n t o v e r t a c t ; and "(4) That t r e a t m e n t i s a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e person's mental i l l n e s s or t h a t confinement i s necessary to prevent the person from c a u s i n g s u b s t a n t i a l harm t o h i m s e l f o r t o o t h e r s ; and "(5) That commitment restrictive alternative available for treatment mental i l l n e s s " The trial of is the least necessary and of the person's determination to by when a d e f e n d a n t mental Code 1975, disease which or be made a jury enters a p l e a of not defect i s governed by in guilty § a criminal by reason 13A-3-1, Ala. states: "(a) It is an affirmative defense to a p r o s e c u t i o n f o r any c r i m e t h a t , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e commission of the a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g the o f f e n s e , the d e f e n d a n t , as a r e s u l t o f s e v e r e m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , was unable to a p p r e c i a t e the nature and q u a l i t y or wrongfulness of h i s acts. Mental disease or d e f e c t does not o t h e r w i s e c o n s t i t u t e a d e f e n s e . "(b) 'Severe m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ' i n c l u d e an a b n o r m a l i t y m a n i f e s t e d o n l y b y c r i m i n a l or otherwise a n t i s o c i a l conduct. " ( c ) The defense of evidence." does not repeated d e f e n d a n t has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g t h e insanity by clear and convincing 1 2 1 2 1991) S e e W e s t v . S t a t e , 586 S o . 2 d 9 9 9 , 1000 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . ( " ' I n s a n i t y i s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , a n d a d e f e n d a n t 64 CR-07-1913 See I v e r y v. S t a t e , 1996), opinion after 1996) (analyzing establish 686 S o . 2 d 4 9 5 , 5 0 0 - 0 2 remand, the 686 S o . 2 d 5 2 0 meaning "wrongfulness" i n s a n i t y ) . The c o m m e n t a r y as t h a t of and term t o § 13A-3-1 ( A l a . Crim. App. ( A l a . Crim. App. proof necessary i s applied to to criminal explains: "The l a w i n A l a b a m a o n i n s a n i t y a s a d e f e n s e i n a c r i m i n a l case has been w e l l r e c o g n i z e d : "'Under a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y by r e a s o n o f i n s a n i t y , t h e b u r d e n i s on t h e d e f e n d a n t to clearly prove to the reasonable s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e j u r y t h a t h e was s o a f f e c t e d b y d i s e a s e o f t h e b r a i n when t h e o f f e n s e was c o m m i t t e d a s t o r e n d e r h i m s o i n s a n e t h a t h e d i d n o t know r i g h t from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such m e n t a l d i s e a s e he c o u l d n o t r e s i s t d o i n g t h e wrong; and t h e c r i m e must have been t h e product solely of such d i s e a s e d mind.' S t r e e t e r v . S t a t e , 278 A l a . 2 7 2 , 177 S o . 2 d 826 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ; A a r o n v . S t a t e , 2 7 1 A l a . 7 0 , 122 S o . 2 d 360 ( 1 9 6 0 ) ; L e e v . S t a t e , 2 6 5 A l a . 6 2 3 , 93 S o . 2 d 757 ( 1 9 5 7 ) ; L a k e y v . S t a t e , 258 A l a . 1 1 6 , 61 S o . 2 d 117 ( 1 9 5 2 ) a n d c a s e s c i t e d ; P a r s o n s v . S t a t e , 81 A l a . 5 7 7 , 2 S o . 854 ( 1 8 8 6 ) who r a i s e s i t m u s t p r o v e " b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e a n d t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e j u r y , " Magwood [ v . S t a t e ] , 426 So. 2 d [ 9 1 8 ] , 921-22 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 2 ) , t h a t h e was i n s a n e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o f f e n s e . M a g w o o d , 4 2 6 S o . 2 d at 922. See a l s o M c K i n n o n v. S t a t e , 4 0 5 S o . 2 d 7 8 , 80 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 1 ) . ' Demos v . S t a t e , 5 5 5 S o . 2 d 1 1 6 9 , 1 1 7 3 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989)."). 65 CR-07-1913 Section of 15-16-2, A l a . Code 1975, insanity proved in to the The person a l l criminal reasonable determination is so insane order, d i f f e r i s not defect. be guilty Because asked of the that in a different Such a can has be met crime by shall the The the standard in may trial of on clearly Judge's of p r o v i n g or i n determining i f disease or questions defect judge's court in jury the as order e v a l u a t i n g Dotch's cause that disease from the probate a an was mental confusion present stated: "The C o u r t : I t h i n k the standard the Probate C o u r t l o o k s a t i s b e c a u s e o f some m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n , t h e p e r s o n b e f o r e t h e c o u r t p o s e s a r e a l and p r e s e n t danger to themselves or o t h e r s and a r e i n need of m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n . They may c a l l t h a t i n s a n e . T h e y may c a l l i t s o m e t h i n g e l s e . Of c o u r s e , w h a t we d e a l w i t h h e r e i s w h e t h e r t h e D e f e n d a n t -- o r t h e j u r y b e l i e v e s , because of a severe mental i l l n e s s or d e f e c t , t h e D e f e n d a n t was u n a b l e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e n a t u r e a n d q u a l i t y o f h i s a c t s o r was unable to 66 a a n a l y s i s when mental asked different mental be d e c i d i n g whether committed reason defense jury." h i s burden t o be defense, distinction misunderstanding. therefore he determining based state. of a n a l y s i s when committed are criminal a and questions affirmative on satisfaction a person s o m e o n e s h o u l d be to prosecutions from t h a t of the d e t e r m i n a t i o n and d e c i d i n g whether he requires that "[t]he and case CR-07-1913 a p p r e c i a t e t h e w r o n g f u l n e s s o f h i s a c t s . I'm j u s t not sure t h a t the a d j u d i c a t i o n i n Probate Court i s f o c u s e d o n t h e same l e g a l s t a n d a r d a s we a r e h e r e . W h a t I was t h i n k i n g t o s a y i s t h a t I t h i n k i t w o u l d be i m p r o p e r t o i n f e r o r a r g u e t o t h e j u r y t h a t t h i s man's i n s a n i t y o r m e n t a l -- s e v e r e m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t has been determined by another c o u r t f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s . One i s , a g a i n , I'm n o t s u r e t h e same l e g a l s t a n d a r d i s b e i n g a p p l i e d . A n d s e c o n d l y , I think the testimony here has t o be t h a t he s u f f e r e d t h a t c o n d i t i o n a t o r about t h e time o f the c o m m i s s i o n o f t h i s o f f e n s e . A n d he w a s , o b v i o u s l y , r e l e a s e d f r o m S e a r c y H o s p i t a l , s o somebody f o u n d he h a d o v e r c o m e w h a t e v e r d e f e c t s he was s u f f e r i n g f r o m . oS, I d o n ' t know t h a t i t ' s r e l e v a n t . " (R. 911-12.) The trial court later stated: " [ I ] t would be, I t h i n k , improper t o have t h i s j u r y i n f e r t h a t t h e i s s u e o f h i s ' s a n i t y ' has a l r e a d y been d e c i d e d by a c o u r t o f competent j u r i s d i c t i o n b e c a u s e n o m a t t e r w h a t was d e c i d e d i n P r o b a t e C o u r t , at that p o i n t i n time, f i r s t of a l l , you, t h i s morning, probably educated me as to the new p r o c e d u r e s a n d due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s o f P r o b a t e Court and t h e a d v e r s a r i a l nature o f a l l o f t h a t . "But g e t t i n g beyond t h a t , I don't I don't think the Probate Court reads the pattern jury i n s t r u c t i o n on m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , w h i c h i s an excuse for criminal conduct, and a p p l i e s that s t a n d a r d , which i s t h e s t a n d a r d t h i s j u r y has g o t t o apply, before [ i t ] involuntarily commit[s] somebody." (R. 1016.) Thus, the trial court found that, not only d i d the i n q u i r i e s and d e t e r m i n a t i o n s by t h e probate c o u r t f i n d i n g s and 67 CR-07-1913 the jury differ, but the time period pertinent e v a l u a t i o n a l s o d i f f e r e d . The commitment p r o c e e d i n g s Dotch's the to was mental state f o u n d t o be his the determination 1975, 10.4(a), neither after commission of the treatment Here, offense, trial to Ala. was Code statutory could court gleaned the h a v e b e e n made p u r s u a n t which therefore the repealed, 1975, the analysis confuse or the judge mirrors the jury. probate to current law, correctly the present This i s more involved. Revenue, 968 because standards So. a from administrative correctness 2d Cf. 18, reviewing an law 21 Lanzi (Ala. Civ. circuit appellate judge's App. court court order, v. no 22-52that inquiry and because a correctness Alabama 2006) applies when § Ala. Dept (holding different reviewing an presumption of applies). Because n e i t h e r of the to generally, court's stated so t o a j u r y , was relevant long § 22-52-10, which might c a r r y a presumption of that he pertinent w h i c h was judge's order, of addressed release. Whether Code hearing; sane enough f o r r e l e a s e . p e r i o d surrounds the after before the the present s t a t u t e s c o n c e r n i n g commitment case, the 68 trial court d i d not err was by CR-07-1913 a l l u d i n g to the repealed j u d g m e n t may a n a l y s i s . R u l e 45, A l a . R . A p p . P . be r e v e r s e d or set aside, n o r new ...on t h e g r o u n d o f m i s d i r e c t i o n o f t h e j u r y opinion of the court examination error substantial State, Lewis's the of cause, has i t should probably appear injuriously contention standard of that legal ( A l a . C r i m . App. the t r i a l insanity court i n the a f t e r an that the affected r i g h t s o f t h e p a r t i e s . " ) . See g e n e r a l l y , 889 S o . 2 d 6 2 3 , 6 9 3 - 9 4 granted ...unless to which the appeal i s taken... of the e n t i r e complained trial ("No L e w i s v. 2003) (despite erroneously applied i n determining whether his h i s t o r y of mental i l l n e s s c o n s t i t u t e d m i t i g a t i n g evidence, the judge's finding that his actions the evidence applied was Lewis merely of mental was a statement illness i n his consideration Dotch discretion further by aware argues excluding of the wrongfulness i n h i s determination was unpersuasive of m i t i g a t i n g that the the commitment b e c a u s e " [ e ] v i d e n c e trial probate 69 not evidence). court court's of the probate court 75.) that a n d was abused i t s order of materials were r e l e v a n t t o [ h i s ] m e n t a l h e a l t h h i s t o r y . " (Dotch's at of brief, CR-07-1913 However, t h e t r i a l commitment (other medical evaluations were r e l e v a n t materials the introducing the than trial agreed that the probate and admissible. motion court's The r e c o r d into evidence i n limine any evidence judge evidence o f Dotch's and treatments r e l a t i v e were a l l o w e d state's court order) t o t h e commitment indicates that at t r i a l . to prevent of the probate and t h e When granting the defense court's "THE COURT: Now, l e t me s a y t h i s : I'm n o t -- B y m a k i n g t h i s r u l i n g o n t h e S t a t e ' s m o t i o n i n l i m i n e , I'm n o t s a y i n g t h a t h i s prior mental condition could n o t be c o n s i dered by and, perhaps, t e s t i f i e d about b y a m e d i c a l -- a m e n t a l h e a l t h e x p e r t who may come t o t e s t i f y . He may s a y I ' v e l o o k e d at h i s h i s t o r y of i l l n e s s e s , I've looked a t h i s c o n d i t i o n a n d , y o u know, i n s u p p o r t o f a diagnosis that a t t h e r e l e v a n t time and p l a c e , he s u f f e r e d f r o m t h i s c o n d i t i o n . So, I don't t h i n k I can exclude t h e f a c t that h e w a s h o s p i t a l i z e d , b u t I'm m o r e c o n c e r n e d about t r y i n g t o i n f e r t h a t t h e i s s u e has a l r e a d y been d e c i d e d "THE counsel]: Your COURT: -- i f t h a t Honor made a n y s e n s e . " (R. 9 1 3 . ) The court thereafter stated: "Now, t u r n i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n t o y o u r m o t i o n i n l i m i n e , I agree w i t h t h e State's p o s i t i o n that t h e Defendant w i l l be i n s t r u c t e d and t h e Defendant i s 70 from proceedings, stated: "[Defense these CR-07-1913 i n s t r u c t e d i n h i s q u e s t i o n i n g o f w i t n e s s e s and in h i s c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s o r any o t h e r comments t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t i s n o t t o make a n y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e court p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e P r o b a t e C o u r t as i t r e l a t e d t o the commitment of the D e f e n d a n t t o a s t a t e m e n t a l h o s p i t a l . That's a court proceeding that I don't t h i n k i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e s t o be d e c i d e d by this jury. "I am n o t , h o w e v e r , s t a t i n g t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t he was a t one t i m e c o m m i t t e d t o o r a p a t i e n t i n a s t a t e h o s p i t a l w o u l d n o t , p e r h a p s -- I d o n ' t know what the testimony i s going t o be. I t may be r e l e v a n t as t o h i s b a c k g r o u n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f Dr. V a n R o s e n o r w h o m e v e r e l s e t e s t i f i e s t h a t he looked a t a l l o f t h e s e d o c u m e n t s a n d he saw d o c u m e n t s f r o m S e a r c y H o s p i t a l and t h a t has some b e a r i n g on his u l t i m a t e o p i n i o n s t h a t he o f f e r s i n t h i s c a s e . "So, I'm n o t s a y i n g y o u c a n ' t t a l k a b o u t S e a r c y o r t h a t he was t h e r e o r w h e n he was t h e r e b u t a s f a r as that a probate judge made a judicial determination i s what I'm restricting you from t a l k i n g about." (R. 1014-15.) T h u s , D o t c h was allowed to introduce been committed to Searcy Mental F a c i l i t y had received treatment there. medical records pertaining probate judge's order whether Dotch was He to from relevant evidence exclusion of reversible error. The order 71 1018) also allowed his commitment. a mental was (R. was r e l e v a n t by suffered e v i d e n c e t h a t he does definition disease not cumulative and to to the or the issue defect, other he introduce Although always of that had result the in evidence CR-07-1913 of Dotch's commitment and m e d i c a l diagnoses, treatments, and reports. The properly ought discretion vested i n the t r i a l . . . t o [only] discretion Evidence t o determine the relevancy correct by t h e t r i a l §21.01(6) "Rule court a n d "an a p p e l l a t e a plainly court." of evidence i s prejudicial court misuse C. G a m b l e , M c E l r o y ' s of Alabama (4thed. 1991). 4 0 3 , A l a . R. E v i d . , provides: " ' A l t h o u g h r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e may b e excluded i f i t s probative value i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by t h e danger o f unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations o f undue d e l a y , waste o f time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.' "See a l s o H o u s t o n v . S t a t e , 565 So. 2 d 277, 281 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that '[t]he e x c l u s i o n o f a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e does n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r where t h e e v i d e n c e "would have been merely cumulative of other e v i d e n c e o f t h e same n a t u r e , w h i c h was a d m i t t e d . " ' ) . I n t h i s c a s e , much o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t was i n c l u d e d i n t h e e x c l u d e d documentation was not relevant and c o u l d have resulted i n a confusion of the issues f o r the jury. A l s o , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t was r e l e v a n t was m e r e l y cumulative t o t e s t i m o n y . . . t h a t had n o t been d i s p u t e d by t h e S t a t e . " Newton v. S t a t e , , [Ms. C R - 0 5 - 1 5 1 7 , O c t o b e r 2, 2 0 0 9 ] ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009). 72 So. 3d CR-07-1913 As 490 this Court ( A l a .Crim. Alabama, 5 4 9 U.S. s t a t e d i n Beckworth App. 2005), cert. v. S t a t e , denied, 946 S o . 2 d Beckworth v. 1120(2007): "'Furthermore, even i f the trial c o u r t ' s r u l i n g was e r r o n e o u s , we d o n o t believe the error injuriously affected the substantial rights of this appellant. Matters i n the excluded records pertaining to t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s home a n d f a m i l y w e r e admitted i n evidence through other records and through the testimony o f numerous witnesses, thus making t h e evidence i n t h e excluded records cumulative. The appellant's sister testified at the sentencing hearing about t h e home a n d family l i f e o f t h e a p p e l l a n t . Thus, i f e r r o r o c c u r r e d , a t a l l , i t was h a r m l e s s . See A l a . R . A p p . P . 4 5 ; M c M a h o n v . S t a t e , 5 60 So. 2 d 1 0 9 4 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1989).' "Id. See a l s o E x p a r t e H o d g e s , 856 So. 2 d 936, 945-48 ( A l a . 2003) ( t e s t i m o n y about defendant's unstable home e n v i r o n m e n t w a s r e l e v a n t , b u t n o reversible error occurred when prosecutor's o b j e c t i o n s t o t e s t i m o n y were s u s t a i n e d because t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o p r e s e n t m o s t o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h r o u g h l a t e r t e s t i m o n y ) ; W i n d s o r v . S t a t e , 683 So. 2 d 1 0 2 7 , 1 0 3 8 - 3 9 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 4 ) , a f f ' d , 683 So. 2 d 1042 (Ala. 1996)(trial court erred i n excluding hearsay evidence, b u t no r e v e r s a l due because s i m i l a r evidence was p r e s e n t e d i n later testimony)." 946 So. 2d a t 505-06. Although Dotch's plea the probate of not guilty court's order by reason 73 was o f mental relevant to disease or CR-07-1913 defect, caused the the admission confusion jury, Dotch's and the was effects, value the plainly trial Finally, argues the evidence precipitated the the committed, As proving of history. thereby charged concerning Because its so as to door to commitment by the State court's order to prove the offense. They as convictions that Dotch's those to State convictions properly satisfy and substantive the were also introduced i t s burden as motive C. introduced the of The evidence m o t i v e a s a r e s u l t o f t h e b r e a k down o f D o t c h a n d 74 the s a n i t y at P a r t I I . B . and were that i n s a n i t y defense. State convictions introduced of contends underlying held, opened the prior r e b u t t i n g Dotch's prior were to abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n t e n t i n t h e v i c t i m ' s m u r d e r . See stated evidence § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( 1 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, convictions have prejudicial Dotch offenses the may i t s potential the convictions previously evidence of order. these that that probate introducing time other outweigh order have been m i s l e a d i n g mental-health not the Dotch. of introduced of court d i d not Dotch admission of i s s u e s , may and did prejudice evidence cumulative commitment probative the of into of and prior of to the show victim's CR-07-1913 relationship. They further showed intent by i n d i c a t i n g t h e m u r d e r was n o t i n a d v e r t e n t . A n y l i g h t mental state a t the time was i n c i d e n t a l . if i t tends defendant to of the commission prove guilt [and] i t s h o u l d incidental effect."' 1983), denied, of and such competent cert. as t o of these "[E]vidence of separate crimes i s being t r i e d (Ala.Cr.App. shed be the '"evidence admitted Weeks v . S t a t e , affirmed, 4 7 1 U.S. crime 456 that Dotch's offenses i s admissible f o r which the i s r e l e v a n t and regardless of i t s 456 So. 2 d 3 9 5 , 399-400 So. 2d 404 ( A l a . 1984), 1 0 3 0 , 1 0 5 S . C t . 2 0 5 1 , 85 L . E d . 2 d 324 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; C. G a m b l e , M c E l r o y ' s A l a b a m a E v i d e n c e , § 6 9 . 0 1 ( 1 ) ( 3 r d ed. App. 1977)." Haywood v. S t a t e , 501 So. 2d 5 1 5 , 519 (Ala. Crim. 1986). "'All evidence i s relevant which t h r o w s , o r tends t o throw, any l i g h t upon the g u i l t o r innocence o f t h e p r i s o n e r . And relevant evidence which i s introduced t o p r o v e any m a t e r i a l f a c t ought n o t t o be r e j e c t e d merely because i t proves, or tends t o p r o v e t h a t a t some o t h e r t i m e o r a t t h e same t i m e t h e a c c u s e d h a s b e e n g u i l t y o f some other separate, independent and d i s s i m i l a r c r i m e . The g e n e r a l r u l e i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a l l e v i d e n c e must be r e l e v a n t . If the evidence i s relevant upon t h e g e n e r a l i s s u e o f g u i l t , o r i n n o c e n c e , no valid reason exists for i t s rejection m e r e l y b e c a u s e i t may p r o v e , o r may t e n d t o prove, that the accused committed some 75 CR-07-1913 other crime c o l l a t e r a l and Weeks v. or may unrelated State, 2d affirmed, 1030 456 456 So. So. 2d 404 395, establish fact.'" 400 some (Ala. Crim. (Ala. 1984), cert. App. denied, 1983), 471 U.S. stated i n a p r e t r i a l hearing that (1985). Although the prior the prosecutor convictions disease-or-defect concerning the were defense, admission of admissible her and proving Thus, a l t h o u g h Dotch's the rebut arguments evidence motive of to mental the jury convictions were Code and the the § 13A-5-40(14), A l a . d i r e c t e d at the purposes of p r o v i n g 1975, to i n t e n t f o r the evidence of the p r i o r murder. c o n v i c t i o n s may have a l s o s h e d l i g h t on D o t c h ' s m e n t a l s t a t e a t t h a t t i m e , that was an open the ancillary effect. Therefore, door to the admission of the this incidental effect. 295, 302 (Ala. statement, Drinkard s t a t e m e n t and, State could under the admission). 2000) not (where was the allowed State to rebut parte State to the p o s s i b i l i t y 777 introduced the the that Drinkard opened also Ex Brownfield, 2d of a r e s t of the crime, the collateral the of So. part a collateral of 76 not Drinkard, evidence parte did introduce i t referenced introduce Compare order Compare Ex although posture the door [Ms. offense to its 1070255, CR-07-1913 December 23, not open made 2009] the during So. door a 3d f o r the mental ( A l a . 2009) State to evaluation (Brownfield d i d introduce statements that would he otherwise be i n a d m i s s i b l e s i m p l y because B r o w n f i e l d had i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e of h i s mental a p l e a of not A party introduction was s t a t e a t the time of the o f f e n s e and had guilty does of by reason not of mental ordinarily rebuttal evidence not the a p p a r e n t and argued the original introduction evidence. of proof of the 1975, and to this prove Here, open the door to to disprove a matter the was offense, § intent disease). the that i n t e n t f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n evidence capital entered and intent to of satisfy the motive; State's i t s burden 13A-5-40(a)(14), therefore, of Ala. Dotch of Code was p r o p e r l y not a l l o w e d to i n t r o d u c e the probate c o u r t ' s order of commitment prior to prove his mental illness the time of the Dotch was offenses. Furthermore, as previously stated, a l l o w e d t o i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e t h a t he was Mental and at facility treatment allow the following were probate also the committed o f f e n s e s , and admitted, court's because order 77 any into error to Searcy his evaluations in evidence failing did to not CR-07-1913 injuriously effect his substantial rights. Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P. V. Dotch the argues related that the verdict instructions were confusion. Specifically, provided jury verdict and of not g u i l t y caused incorrect the jury by argues with reason a this and invited juror the t r i a l that court separate of mental to disregard and the jury form disease verdict for a or defect by g i v i n g them forms o r the trial instructions. Dotch f a i l e d court's the given erroneous Dotch improperly forms original to object to the verdict charge t o the j u r y concerning i t s use of the v e r d i c t forms. However, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d f o l l o w i n g t h e trial its court's question The that instructions during record the verdict defect order to the jury deliberations indicates that as i n response to the verdict the t r i a l court forms. determined a split to the jury verdict. The on a s e p a r a t e following form i n transpired trial: you to of not g u i l t y by reason of mental d i s e a s e o r s h o u l d be p r e s e n t e d to avoid given "THE COURT: A n d t h e n t h e v e r d i c t -- How w o u l d t h i n k , t h a t i t w o u l d b e o n C o u n t One, g u i l t y , 78 at CR-07-1913 not g u i l t y or not g u i l t y by reason of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t ? A n d on t h e s e c o n d v e r d i c t f o r m , g u i l t y , not g u i l t y or not g u i l t y by reason of mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , e t c e t e r a ? "[Defense counsel]: I think that f o l l o w s up t h e c h a r g e we h a d -¬ "THE COURT: question, disease I t seems i f he's not g u i l t y or defect, them. So, I don't form t o me t h a t we f i n d i f you c o u l d the defendant Yeah, the time reason he's not g u i l t y know "[Prosecutor]: by at as of i n mental t o any o f have j u s t one -¬ I would think you would have t o have one f o r m n o t g u i l t y b y r e a s o n o f m e n t a l disease o r d e f e c t because "THE COURT: w h a t i f t h e y -¬ Split " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : Yeah, you don't want i n c o n s i s t e n t verdicts. that "THE COURT: M a y b e to the j u r y . "[Defense (R. 1325-26.) counsel]: you're That's right. I ' l l explain fine." 1 3 See, as t o i n c o n s i s t e n t v e r d i c t s , People v. F l o r i d a , C r i m . No. 9 6 - 0 0 0 6 0 A (D. Guam A p p . D i v . A p r i l 2 1 , 1 9 9 7 ) (when the jury was p r e s e n t e d w i t h separate verdict forms f o r a g g r a v a t e d m u r d e r a n d t h r e e l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s , i t was h e l d t o be r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r t o i n c l u d e n o t g u i l t y b y r e a s o n o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t as an o p t i o n o n l y on t h e a g g r a v a t e d murder v e r d i c t form). 1 3 79 CR-07-1913 Dotch Alabama jury. argues that the verdict form Pattern Jury I n s t r u c t i o n s and argues that the He trial court deviated that also from the i t confused the deviated from the p a t t e r n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s i n i t s charge to the j u r y concerning its use trial of court arriving was first charged at a proper jury should if the v e r d i c t forms. the j u r y first the verdict. record jury The indicates that as court to the i t s process Dotch not guilty as in instructed that the consider the charges i n the indictment, found to consider The to these the l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d offense offenses, i t of murder. found Dotch not g u i l t y of murder, then the t r i a l then court If i t charged t h a t t h e j u r y s h o u l d c o n s i d e r r e c k l e s s m a n s l a u g h t e r . The trial court next charged the j u r y concerning Dotch's s p e c i a l p l e a not guilty court by reason of mental f u r t h e r charged that the offense or offenses disease or defect. i f the j u r y found Dotch charged i n the indictment The trial guilty or a of of lesser- i n c l u d e d offense, then i t should consider Dotch's s p e c i a l p l e a a n d w h e t h e r he "was s u f f e r i n g from a severe mental disease d e f e c t o f t h e m i n d w h i c h c a u s e d h i m t o be u n a b l e t o the n a t u r e and q u a l i t y or wrongfulness of h i s acts 1404-05.) 80 or appreciate " (R. CR-07-1913 The the trial verdict determine found court thereafter instructed thej u r y concerning forms, guilt Dotch and i t stated as t o t h e c a p i t a l not guilty as to that the jury offenses, those then charged that, possible guilty offenses, by reason Later, question the i fthe jury Dotch i t should then of mental during to the t r i a l jury's found guilty court, which c o n f u s i o n . The f o l l o w i n g i t was court further consider a verdict the of not (R. 1 4 1 7 - 2 0 . ) jury Dotch submitted contends transpired (R. ^ 4- V ^ ^ ^ ^ n n ^ 4 - n n 4- 4- V ^ ^ 1425-26.) 81 v^v^. ^ ^ ^ ^ at t r i a l : 4- a evidences "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . Y'all have a seat, p l e a s e . I ' v e b e e n h a n d e d a n o t e w h i c h s a y s , 'Do we n e e d t o come u p w i t h a v e r d i c t o n b o t h c o u n t s o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r ? I n o t h e r w o r d s , do b o t h forms n e e d to be f i l l e d o u t ? ' And t h e answer i s y e s . As I ' v e s a i d e a r l i e r today, the j u r y i s t o consider a l l the evidence, and i f you a r e convinced beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s met t h a t b u r d e n of p r o o f , t h e n i t would be your d u t y t o f i n d t h e D e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f t h a t c o u n t . The o t h e r s i d e o f the c o i n i s , o f c o u r s e , on e i t h e r o r b o t h c o u n t s , you a r e n o t s a t i s f i e d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e doubt, t h e n you w o u l d f i n d t h e Defendant n o t g u i l t y . So, you can have a guilty on b o t h counts of the indictment, not guilty on b o t h counts of the i n d i c t m e n t , o r g u i l t y o n o n e c o u n t a n dd n o t gg uu iillt y o n an the o t h e r c o u n t , b u t one o f them c a n n o t be l e f t b l a n k . Makes s e n s e , I hope." 4- V ^ ^ to o f any o f t h e disease or defect. deliberations, to i ft h e j u r y offenses, c o n s i d e r t h e l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s . The t r i a l was CR-07-1913 The to trial this that court instruction the jury referring and asked to d i d not the i f the p a r t i e s had the jury. mention trial Defense to which court failed question. do we trial The judge question need to f i l l stated that s t a t e d t h a t he the to mention "just The initial really during The the charge concerning in the v e r d i c t responded (R. to the the c a p i t a l murder, 1426.) D e f e n s e counsel deliberations will they asked." (R. verdict forms, the the v e r d i c t , and response i t s inclusion t r i a l court responded, "I think beyond the q u e s t i o n p r o p r i e t y of instructions was not-guilty-by-reason-of-mental-disease-or- the charge to the j u r y . that's i t or defect. d e f e c t f o r m s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d , a n d he r e q u e s t e d in responded v e r d i c t form asked, concerning out both forms." (R. exceptions counsel form f o r not g u i l t y by r e a s o n of m e n t a l d i s e a s e 1 4 2 6 . ) The any to the e a c h be jury's 1427.) trial court's the t r i a l court's question submitted discussed. A. There i s no law i n Alabama p r o v i d e d w i t h v e r d i c t forms disease or defect as v e r d i c t be c o n t a i n e d to requiring that the jury of not g u i l t y by r e a s o n of each charged offense or o n t h e same f o r m a s t h e c h a r g e d 82 be mental that this offense. CR-07-1913 Compare P e o p l e v. 2d 512, 531-32 Rhoads, (1979) 73 (holding s t a t u t e r e q u i r e d t h a t the verdict Rhoads this error the jury was waived would so that find him that form issue harmless because same a c t 3d "the for by the 288, 315, although j u r y be p r o v i d e d reason-of-insanity had I l l . App. with each as an to only one offense, object charged offenses to Illinois charged failing N.E. not-guilty-by- p o s s i b i l i t y w o u l d be insane 391 and arose the out slim" that of the mental that disease Moreover, the or defect, "[a] plea of of the issue his alleged the special plea." § As forms, to general of the issue, verdict each offense all offenses The trial of verdict necessarily has not which the shall 23.3, be 83 the usual question reason only of under 1975. Ala.R.Crim.P., submitted i n each a u t h o r i t y under of state." into triable to requires jury for the evidence, where w a r r a n t e d by included so a c c u s e d by being Code put jury reason preclude not of the by shall not shall question Rule guilty verdict 15-16-1, A l a . c h a r g e d , and court the irresponsibility insanity, this "[f]orms is insanity shall plea that the defendant the offenses). Pursuant to Rule 23.2(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., "[w]hen the determines of the for offense this charged." rule to correct CR-07-1913 or to complete no requirement mental the v e r d i c t that disease, verdict forms a where one form verdict pleaded, f o r charged present case, the t r i a l as t o f o r m of be not guilty included or included court i n open c o u r t . on offenses. by There is reason of the separate Thus, i n the d i d not e r r i n submitting not-guilty-by-reason-of-mental-disease-or-defect to the only verdict jury. B. Moreover, incorrect the instructions were not a n d d i d n o t c o n f u s e o r m i s l e a d t h e j u r y . The judge's verdict forms were c o r r e c t . determine guilty court's i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the j u r y ' s use of the original guilty, trial guilt as As t h e c o u r t s t a t e d , to the t h e n t h e j u r y was by reason of mental According to § offenses, the j u r y should and i f i t found first Dotch t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r D o t c h was disease or 15-16-24, A l a . Code defect. 1975: "If i t s h a l l appear from the evidence t h a t a d e f e n d a n t d i d t h e a c t c h a r g e d as c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e o f f e n s e , b u t a t t h e t i m e o f c o m m i t t i n g t h e a c t he was i n s a n e , t h e j u r y s h a l l r e n d e r a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t to the e f f e c t t h a t the defendant i s not g u i l t y by reason of i n s a n i t y , b u t i f the j u r y does not b e l i e v e from the evidence t h a t the defendant committed the a c t o r i f i t b e l i e v e s f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t he i s n o t g u i l t y upon any g r o u n d o t h e r t h a n h i s a l l e g e d i n s a n i t y , i t must r e t u r n a g e n e r a l v e r d i c t of not 84 not CR-07-1913 g u i l t y ; otherwise, conviction." The trial followed Pattern you the Alabama Jury find further original Pattern the State has elements of the and consider nevertheless this must i s not endorse 127, 145 n.7 863 (2004) use See encourage (3d responsible of "The the as Alabama 2003), cert. courts to f o r use 575 2d was 575 So. 2d cases."); ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1989), 127 (jury ( A l a . 1990) result Pattern i n Alabama (1980)," was Pattern Jury 85 he of a of Jury So. 2d So. 2d 543 U.S. use the Alabama by the Alabama Wesley reversed charge v. State, on that other Wesley language Instructions, Criminal, proper). go 908 presumed sane, which " s u b s t a n t i a l l y t r a c k [ e d ] the found must that denied, Court in capital doubt S t a t e , 886 a l s o Z e i g l e r v. trial a Ex p a r t e M c G r i f f , Supreme grounds, ("[I]f appellate courts I n s t r u c t i o n s - C r i m i n a l adopted 116 1994) defense Jury 108, Alabama t h e n you Pattern So. substantially ed. charged, defendant's ( A l a . C r i m . App. ("We 1.9 or d e f e c t . " ) . (Ala. 2004). of I n s t r u c t i o n s . See offense Instructions i n c r i m i n a l cases." 1033 verdict proved beyond a reasonable the the a instructions Jury criminally mental disease state 1024, return Instructions: Criminal that each of the severe court's i t IIID-2 CR-07-1913 Dotch court during these i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t he c l a i m s c o n f u s e d t h e j u r y . A f t e r t h e trial court c i t e s two charged the charged offenses, of those offenses, You stop there. " s e n t e n c e s by the t r i a l jury that i t should i t s t a t e d , " I f you that w i l l (R. 1398; the State the elements first (R. has failed emphasis of both to prove of those consider f i n d g u i l t on one be y o u r v e r d i c t . however, gave the f o l l o w i n g charge find first or That w i l l added.) the both be i t . The court, immediately after, " I f you beyond a reasonable charges, l e s s e r i n c l u d e d of murder, which then you'll go doubt to I've j u s t c h a r g e d the you." 1398.) Dotch has pulled context. The trial to duty in i t s the court two emphasized sentences s e q u e n t i a l l y i n s t r u c t e d the i t s verdict, jury as i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Dotch's s p e c i a l p l e a i f the j u r y were t o find him or a l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d offense. of a charged at of including guilty arriving out "'A t r i a l c o u r t h a s b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n w h e n f o r m u l a t i n g i t s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s . See W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 611 S o . 2 d 1 1 1 9 , 1123 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) . When r e v i e w i n g a t r i a l court's i n s t r u c t i o n s , "'the court's charge must be t a k e n as a w h o l e , a n d t h e p o r t i o n s c h a l l e n g e d a r e n o t t o be i s o l a t e d t h e r e f r o m or taken out of context, but rather c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r . ' " S e l f v. S t a t e , 620 S o . 2 d 1 1 0 , 113 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1992) (quoting 86 CR-07-1913 Porter v. State, 520 So. 2d 235, 237 (Ala.Cr.App. 1 9 8 7 ) ) ; see also Beard v. S t a t e , 612 S o . 2 d 1 3 3 5 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ; Alexander v. State, 601 So. 2d 1130 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992).' " W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , App. 1999)." R o b i t a i l l e v. S t a t e , cert. d e n i e d , 552 795 So. 971 U.S. So. 2 d 4 3 , 74 990 2d 753, 780 (Ala. Crim. ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2005), (2007) . C. As to question that the posed charge during his instruction given the jury deliberations, i n response in the was response trial to i t s judge f o r m u l a t e d so stated as to be strictly c o n f i n e d t o t h e p r e c i s e q u e s t i o n a s k e d . The q u e s t i o n asked by t h e j u r y was: on counts both forms need responded to "Do of capital be filled we t o come up murder? out?" affirmative and In with a verdict other do trial The words, judge properly explained that both the verdict f o r m s as t o e a c h c o u n t h a d t o be c o m p l e t e d t o i n d i c a t e whether the i n the need j u r y f o u n d D o t c h g u i l t y o r n o t g u i l t y as t o e a c h c o u n t . He had a l r e a d y i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y t h a t the s p e c i a l p l e a would be considered i f the j u r y entered a v e r d i c t in any charge. The jury's question matter. 87 finding did not Dotch address guilty that CR-07-1913 The must trial first determine indictment. Rule 23.2, forms, As on verdicts to guilt the the as the j u r y t h a t the to each offense addresses the thereto court responsibility jury the may return, in verdict the states forms, that i t . " T h e r e i s no if the jury finds rule deciding of "[t]he what restricting the jury the offense o r as t o t h e e x a c t verdict forms. S.E. 235, 2d See 239 form contained the Beasley guilty of i t s duty trial court error did not State, (finding no 269 or in not not guilty of one or l a y o u t of the Ga. abuse 620, e r r o r when 623, "the spaces whether c l e a r l y informed i t s discretion or and verdicts, here. 88 each charge."). i t s verdict "'"The trial court discretion in formulating 502 verdict space underneath each c o u r t p r o p e r l y and reaching guilty marked of j u r o r s were t o s p e c i f y i n those Because the t r i a l jury v. n o t h i n g more t h a n a b l a n k c h a r g e , and was is structure, design, Beasley (1998) defendant to submitted r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t e a c h f o r m m u s t be that the for verdict r e t u r n i n g v e r d i c t s f o r w h i c h v e r d i c t forms have been to jury charged necessity commentary the the informed r e q u i r e d marking of Ala.R.Crim.P. and places court properly there is vested with i t s c h a r g e , so l o n g was broad as i t the the no CR-07-1913 a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t s t h e l a w . " ' P o w e r s v . S t a t e , 963 So. 2d 679, 691 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2006), (quoting C l a r k v . S t a t e , 621 S o . 2 d 3 0 9 , 324 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ) ) . S e e a l s o W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 795 S o . 2 d 7 5 3 , 780 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) . 'When r e v i e w i n g a t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , we m u s t v i e w t h e m a s a w h o l e , n o t i n b i t s and p i e c e s , and as a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r w o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d them. I n g r a m v. S t a t e , 779 So. 2d 1225 (Ala.Cr.App. 1999).' Johnson v. S t a t e , 820 S o . 2 d 8 4 2 , 874 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2000)." M a r s h a l l v. S t a t e , cert. denied, Further, the three of considered the Dotch , 130 suffered State v. v e r d i c t forms, offenses, mental 3d 830, U.S. v e r d i c t s . See 1983)(five 20 S o . 836 S.Ct. no ( A l a . C r i m . App. 635 prejudice Huth, 334 a n o t - g u i l t y form, form, with i n s t r u c t i o n s to the testimony presented during as to the 485, guilty form 491 proper the and forms as to reason adequate j u r y as of (S.D. and a n o t g u i l t y by illness the "were (2009). N.W.2d i n c l u d i n g three 2008), when a whole and holding in trial"). VI. Dotch argues that B a t s o n v. K e n t u c k y , African-American that the record purposeful the 476 U.S. State 79 the (1986), by i m p r o p e r l y veniremembers. Specifically, r a i s e s an i n f e r e n c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n because 14 A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n violated Dotch that the State State struck submits engaged i n of the p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s while defense counsel did 89 the striking 10 CR-07-1913 not strike consisted any of African-American eight white However, the f o r the he first failed and record object to four African-American the R u l e 45A, strikes g r o u n d o f r a c i a l b i a s ; he d i d not o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; and d i d not come f o r w a r d with The jury jurors. r e v e a l s t h a t Dotch r a i s e s t h i s t i m e on a p p e a l . to potential jurors. he reasons f o r her Ala.R.App.P. At by the prosecutor issue trial, on e s t a b l i s h a prima facie request t h a t the the case prosecutor strikes. "'"'"For p l a i n e r r o r to e x i s t i n the Batson context, the record m u s t r a i s e an i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e s t a t e [or the defendant] engaged in 'purposeful d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ' i n the e x e r c i s e of i t s peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . See E x p a r t e W a t k i n s , 509 So. 2d 1074 (Ala.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S.Ct. 2 6 9 , 98 L . E d . 2 d 226 (1987)."'" " ' S m i t h v . S t a t e , 756 So. 2 d 8 9 2 , 915 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 8 ) , a f f ' d , 756 So. 2d 957 ( A l a . 2000) ( q u o t i n g R i e b e r v. S t a t e , 663 So. 2d 985, 991 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1994), quoting i n turn other cases).' "Ex Ex parte Walker, parte Sharp, [Ms. , (Ala. 972 So. 2d 1080959, 2009). 90 at 742." December 4, 2009] So. 3d CR-07-1913 A. Dotch argues discrimination of that the record i t sstrikes t o remove he African-American jurors who a n s w e r e d q u e s t i o n s He first alleges was cites similarly one p o t e n t i a l by the State; i n the medical Dotch says shares and similar three jurors were n o t removed. juror who juror as a w h i t e specifically, field, who h e was recognized married, some of the the white potential characteristics, juror the African- American veniremember worked a t Searcy Mental F a c i l i t y , Dotch had been witnesses-that treated, a police the psychiatrist 408-10.) She s t a t e d but that he could prosecutor also friend with that a letter She stated at her workplace. h e was n o t h e r i m m e d i a t e write where two o f t h e S t a t e ' s and a p s y c h i a t r i s t . was a s u p e r v i s o r reprimand c o n c e r n i n g her. the and worked officer of recommendation removed a w h i t e p o t e n t i a l 91 Facility. (R. supervisor (R. 4 0 9 . ) T h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s who w o r k e d a t S e a r c y M e d i c a l of characteristics African-American p o t e n t i a l w i t n e s s e s . However, u n l i k e who inference potential w i t h t h e same h a d t h e same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s not struck worked an on t h e p a r t o f t h e S t a t e b e c a u s e i t u s e d although white p o t e n t i a l or presents or that j u r o r who h a d a (R. 4 6 6 . ) CR-07-1913 The was second A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n c i t e d f o r d i s p a r a t e treatment born retired in i n the f r o m one i t s brief juror's be a white to this to the company. p e n a l t y was being more i n c l i n e d to was reason f o r s t r i k i n g . teacher or juror who had State submits The that, because sought, McGahee v. affirmed, 976 489 State, 554 So. ( a l a . Crim. striking U.S. 554 2 d 473 App. d e n i e d , 514 cases these may without a U.S. sufficient more is (college 461 (1995) reasons. So. 2d 1989), So. 981 (teachers), 2d (Ala. i n some Assumptions however, see counselors); a f t e r r e m a n d , 632 632 an 1988), ( A l a . C r i m . App. suspect; 92 juror, ( A l a . C r i m . App. affirmed, 1078 b e e n h e l d t o be potential 506 ( A l a . 1989), race-neutral t h a t a veniremember i s has (1989) 2d 454, 1993), cert. be 2d 501, 1028 So. 1993), professions i n v a l i d as a for denied, educator rehabilitation. reason So. an a c o u n s e l o r and Although the f a c t 548 as struck potential white counselor alone W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , cert. also and college insufficient who educator T h i s r e a s o n h a s b e e n h e l d t o be a veniremember, c l a i m by n o t i n g t h a t t h e background opposed f o r a paper the death might responds as as j o b b u t c o n t i n u e d t o work. However, the S t a t e professional counselor, worked same y e a r where about white CR-07-1913 veniremembers disparate were struck treatment the for and the the same reasons neutral. Here, prosecutor j u r o r who w o r k e d w i t h Good W i l l E a s t e r p o t e n t i a l j u r o r who Retarded Citizens prosecutor Home as Math and an Moreover, psychiatry, veniremember who 34) and a 267, As juror have to the cited by another was may veniremember her graduate white married, was or stated of School or her of who for Mobile 93 of not jury readings in retardation; she guilty Because by the veniremember's her reason objectivity. an argues veniremember worked in required mental health defect, he Alabama i n t e r e s t e d i n these studies. strike Dotch, the studies interfered with last 33, 628.) a f f i r m a t i v e defense studies SSR. white recruiter for Dotch disease white for 467, she mental another worked (R. also stated that of and potential The p s y c h o l o g y , and r a i s e d the Seals race 34.) years. (SSR. (R. that a white a w h i t e p o t e n t i a l j u r o r who this questionnaire struck validly no for admissions Sciences. be is 10 for Care can there worked w i t h the Mobile A s s o c i a t i o n also struck MidSouth worked had also reasons, African-American that was this not County, potential veniremember, struck and outside by the remembered like State, a few CR-07-1913 details of the offense American County veniremember Health from the media. stated Department, that she which, 1 4 However, worked as a the African- f o r the result of Mobile Dotch's s p e c i a l p l e a , might have i n f l u e n c e d h e r i n d e c i d i n g t h i s The white veniremember Office. Moreover, struck white worked f o r t h e Revenue C o m m i s s i o n e r ' s as p r e v i o u s l y veniremembers establishments, Citizens provides nonracial and stated, who specifically, Retarded case. worked the MidSouth the prosecutor Mobile Home C a r e . reasons f o r these for also health-care Association Thus, the for record strikes. B. Dotch a l s o a l l e g e s t h a t the S t a t e engaged i n a p a t t e r n s t r i k i n g A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n veniremembers t h a t i n d i c a t e d bias; however, he African-Americans percentage refers only to the percentage of jurors struck of the State's strikes American p o t e n t i a l jurors. by the State used to eliminate of racial potential and the African- M o r e o v e r , as D o t c h n o t e s i n b r i e f , before the removal of veniremembers whites and 18 A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s f o r c a u s e , t h e r e were on t h e o r i g i n a l panel of 57 75, A n o t h e r p o t e n t i a l j u r o r , who was w h i t e , w o r k e d f o r t h e M o b i l e C o u n t y H e a l t h D e p a r t m e n t ; h o w e v e r , s h e was r e m o v e d f o r cause. 1 4 94 CR-07-1913 76 percent and 24 percent, consisted of 8 whites 33 p e r c e n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y . However, and 4 A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s , r e s p e c t i v e l y , so t h a t A m e r i c a n s o n t h e j u r y was of African-Americans 67 p e r c e n t the percentage a c t u a l l y higher the jury and of A f r i c a n - than the percentage on t h e v e n i r e . C. Dotch f u r t h e r submits that the Mobile district o f f i c e has a l o n g h i s t o r y o f Batson v i o l a t i o n s , although was n o t r e f l e c t e d i n , o r i n d i c a t e d b y , t h e r e c o r d . v. State, 993 inference So. 2d 907, from the record challenges 928 ( A l a . Crim. attorney's See App. this Sharifi 2008) (no of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y use of peremptory by t h e p r o s e c u t o r despite Sharifi's argument that Madison County has a l o n g h i s t o r y o f v i o l a t i n g Batson and t h a t the number o f s t r i k e s u s e d b y t h e S t a t e Further, the i n i t s b r i e f on a p p e a l , cases cited by Dotch discrimination occurred prosecutor i n Dotch's as indicated prejudice). the State a r g u e s t h a t none o f indicating a history of w i t h i n the l a s t decade or i n v o l v e d the case. (State's brief 69.) D. Dotch the 10 also contends that African-Americans prejudice struck 95 i s indicated by the State because were CR-07-1913 heterogeneous; gender the were alone 4 w e r e men does strikes. not a whole. Ex race was the varying reason for argument t h a t these p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s respects parte 6 w e r e women. H o w e v e r , indicate that T h e r e i s no i n a l l other and heterogeneous Branch, 526 So. 2d as 609, the 622 community (Ala. as 1987). E. Finally, Dotch contends t h a t four of the veniremembers during State d i d not make a n y d i r e that would provide voir a basis for being H o w e v e r , two had been the Mobile a America. the of t h o s e j u r o r s were the removed by disparate County Health counselor and Brown 2006), (strike treatment: had and Girls State, 982 So. U.S. juror who court's relatives (Ala. Crim. decision who that had App. 1991) the striking suffered a 96 S.Ct. 1893, neutral nephew nervous and where State, (upholding nurse of (Ala. race be as 586 a b e e n t r e a t e d f o r m e n t a l d i s e a s e ) ; B a s s v. 237 to for Club had Brown had 225, held , 128 argued worked 565, with 2d problems 2d grandson So. mental struck. worked who Boys potential who one the c e r t . denied, of one through v. response same j u r o r s D o t c h Department and educator Compare C r i m . App. (2008) removed by African-American the because breakdown 585 trial she was had a CR-07-1913 race-neutral case). were reason under the circumstances of the p a r t i c u l a r M o r e o v e r , as p r e v i o u s l y struck for the African-American treatment As argues or to or similar veniremembers. indication that another that same stated, white p o t e n t i a l jurors the Thus, the reveals there as was these no struck only that by she the was responded juror knew to each veniremember, prosecutor. questioning other, who was (R. 1 6 and that the white, she record 1 5 was he employed as the strike list shows t o y e a r s o l d . A l t h o u g h age a l o n e as be suspect, be sufficient coupled with i t a l s o may Batson, difficulty 1 5 See shows also potential that the struck by when oldest juror a reason for s t r i k i n g t o overcome a the other factors at may challenge indicating i n s e r v i n g as a j u r o r . M o r e o v e r , where w h i t e SSR. other s t r i k i n g of a p o t e n t i a l have been the 74 under another However, 508.) Dotch a l s o c i t e s the p r o s e c u t o r ' s juror and race. State, a maintenance worker at U n i v e r s i t y of South Alabama. she two disparate s t r i k e s w e r e b a s e d on potential juror record reasons jurors 33. The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t the p r o s e c u t o r used her second s t r i k e t o remove t h e p o t e n t i a l j u r o r known by t h e c i t e d j u r o r , a n d t h e n e x t s t r i k e was u s e d t o r e m o v e t h e c i t e d v e n i r e m e m b e r . 1 6 97 CR-07-1913 were also struck lack of r a c i a l shows t h a t because o f age, t h e r e motivation other elder i s an i n d i c a t i o n o f a behind the s t r i k e . veniremembers (both Here t h e white, record a male and a f e m a l e a g e d 71 a n d 7 3 , r e s p e c t i v e l y ) w e r e a l s o s t r u c k b y t h e prosecutor. Although w h i t e f e m a l e was one v e n i r e m e m b e r who was a 73-year-old r e m o v e d b y D o t c h , he u s e d h i s f i r s t strike to do s o . Moreover, the record called was indicates that judge questioning before because questionnaire. and the the (R. 4 4 8 . ) prosecutor filling she juror had failed i f she out the questionnaire; as to had for individual sign the she f o r g o t received any juror t o do s o , help questioned this potential follows: Okay. You D o e s t h a t mean y o u h a v e questions put a bunch of you d o n ' t have an answer reading " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : D i d you have any t r o u b l e any o f t h e q u e s t i o n s ? reading questions or "[Potential "[Potential o r d i d you have X's. trouble the those -¬ juror]: juror]: in she r e s p o n d e d t h a t she had n o t . the prosecutor "[Prosecutor]: to parties She s t a t e d t h a t asked (R. 4 4 8 . ) T h e r e a f t e r , and this potential juror Y e s , ma'am. I d i d not." 98 CR-07-1913 (R. 449.) It i s clear believed on from her questioning C r i m . App. 2000), denied, appeared reason In the prosecutor t h a t t h i s p o t e n t i a l j u r o r might have t r o u b l e t h e j u r y . See A c k l i n v . S t a t e , cert. that cert. denied, 533 t o be U.S. unable f o r the strike Ex p a r t e denied, addressed 513 U.S. 936 to was McNair, 1159 790 S o . 2 d 9 7 5 , 9 8 8 - 8 9 ( A l a . 790 S o . 2 d 1 0 1 2 (2001) read race 653 serving or (where write, (Ala. potential the 2001), juror prosecutor's neutral). So. (1995), a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n and 2 d 353 the ( A l a .1994), Alabama Supreme cert. Court stated: "The prosecutor s t a t e d t h a t he h a d s t r i c k e n j u r o r L e o n a r d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t h e was 82 y e a r s o l d and 'slow,' and j u r o r s Bracken, Brady, R i v e r s , and Thomas, on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e y were t o o young ( i . e . , t o o c l o s e i n a g e t o M c N a i r ) . A g e may s e r v e a s a legitimate racially neutral reason for a p e r e m p t o r y s t r i k e , s e e J e l k s v . C a p u t o , [607 So. 2 d /Ala 1 9 9 2 ) ] ; H a r r e l l [ v . S t a t e , 555 So. 2 d 2 63, 177 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ] . H a r r e l l [ v . S t a t e , 555 So. 2 d 2 6 3 , 2 6 8 , n. 1 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ] ; E x p a r t e B i r d , 594 S o . 2 d 676 (Ala.1991); e s p e c i a l l y when, a s w i t h L e o n a r d , t h e age of the individual, when coupled with h i s demeanor, i n d i c a t e s i n a t t e n t i v e n e s s and a general i n a b i l i t y t o f o l l o w t h e p r o g r e s s o f t h e t r i a l . See Nesbitt [v. S t a t e , 531 S.2d 37 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987)]. The record also indicates that the prosecutor s t r u c k w h i t e s w i t h i n t h e same a g e g r o u p as j u r o r s B r a c k e n , B r a d y , R i v e r s , a n d Thomas. A g a i n , this consistency indicates r a c i a l l y neutral striking on t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s part." 99 CR-07-1913 653 So. 2d a t 357. See a l s o Ex p a r t e 1046 (Ala. 1999), Thus, t h e s e potential "'Within cert. the context of Batson, R i l e y v. State, U.S. 352, 3 6 0 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . does purpose the strikes, prosecutor's American prospective explanation than the race So. 2 d 3 5 2 , 355 ( A l a . there n o t i n d i c a t e any r a c i a l behind challenge. 659 S o . 2 d 1 3 5 , 147 i n t u r n , H e r n a n d e z v . New Here, f o r the prosecutor's record 875 other A l l e n v. S t a t e , Crim. App.1994), quoting reasons (2000). a "race-neutral" b a s e d on s o m e t h i n g C r i m . App. 2003), q u o t i n g 500 1089 j u r o r s a s t o whom D o t c h a s s e r t s a B a t s o n the juror."'" (Ala. 5 2 9 U.S. were v a l i d n o n r a c i a l reasons f o r s t r i k i n g t h e "means a n e x p l a n a t i o n of denied, D u n a w a y , 746 S o . 2 d 1 0 4 2 , were valid and a bias removal York, nonracial review of the or discriminatory of the African- jurors. VII. Dotch juror argues f o r cause that the t r i a l who could instructions a n d who the and a r r i v i n g evidence The by have court improperly listened c o u l d have been to removed the court after judge's impartial i n evaluating at a decision. r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e p o t e n t i a l j u r o r was the t r i a l a extensive 100 questioning. removed The judge CR-07-1913 determined that work or listen with important reason, not t h e veniremember matter thet r i a l perform Therefore, t o other about which court decided the duties the t r i a l people he n o t , and would n o t , when h a d an dealing opinion. with For that thepotential juror required court could of a fair and proper removed t h e veniremember an this could juror. from t h e panel. The following transpired at t r i a l : "[Potential juror]: against the death penalty w h e n I w a l k e d i n , my f i r s t n e v e r -- I d o n ' t b e l i e v e I o t h e r p e o p l e a n d me, j u s t A Really, I have nothing o r a c a p i t a l case, b u t i m p r e s s i o n was I s a i d I ' d could give the panel, the team up w i t h them a n d do 4- "THE COURT: S a y t h a t "[Potential animals. I stay of people and I o t h e r p e o p l e on h o n e s t -- not a l i t t l e b i t -- j u r o r ] : I'm a p e r s o n t h a t I r a i s e w i t h a n i m a l s . I'm n o t a r o u n d a l o t d o n ' t b e l i e v e I c o u l d a g r e e w i t h 11 m o s t a n y t h i n g . I mean, t h a t ' s t h e "THE COURT: I a p p r e c i a t e s u r e w h a t t o do w i t h i t . your candor. I'm just " [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] : W e l l , I d o n ' t know w h a t t o do w i t h i t e i t h e r , b u t t h a t ' s me. T h a t ' s t h e w a y I am. I ' v e b e e n d o i n g i t a l o n g t i m e . "THE COURT: T h a t ' s fine. 101 CR-07-1913 " [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] : And I j u s t don't see where I c o u l d s i t w i t h 11 o t h e r p e o p l e a n d r e n d e r t h a t k i n d o f s e n t e n c e t h a t h a s t o be done. II " [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] : I c a n ' t -- I c a n n o t s a y t h a t I c a n s i t t h e r e w i t h 11 o t h e r p e o p l e a n d w e i g h a l l t h e e v i d e n c e b e c a u s e I d o n ' t t h i n k I'm c a p a b l e o f d o i n g i t . I mean, I j u s t -- I ' v e b e e n a l o n e r a l l my l i f e a n d I j u s t d o n ' t s e e how I c o u l d g e t t o g e t h e r w i t h t h a t . C o m i n g down t o me h a v i n g t o make t h a t decision, I just couldn't. "THE COURT: Y o u process or wouldn't? "[Potential couldn't juror]: participate i n that I could not. " "THE COURT: H e ' s l e a n i n g l i k e h e ' s h a v i n g a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y h e a r i n g y o u . Speak up s o I c a n hear you t o o . " [ P r o s e c u t o r ] : We asked a question on t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e , i s t h e r e any i n f o r m a t i o n about which y o u f e e l t h e J u d g e a n d t h e a t t o r n e y s s h o u l d know i n r e f e r e n c e t o your a b i l i t y t o s e r v e as a j u r o r , and you s a i d y e s . And you s a i d I have a t e n d e n c y t o t h i n k t h a t a l o t of people don't t e l l the t r u t h . W h a t e x a c t l y d i d y o u mean b y t h a t ? " [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] : I h a v e a t e n d e n c y t o know t h a t p e o p l e d o n o t a l w a y s t e l l t h e t r u t h . I'm n o t t a l k i n g about w i t n e s s I am t h e t y p e p e r s o n I don't -I don't like sympathy or whatever, e m o t i o n a l s t u f f , a n d w h e n i t c o m e s down t o b a r e f a c t s , when l a w y e r s a s k t h e q u e s t i o n a n d t h e n t h e w i t n e s s c a n ' t -- d o n ' t make t h e a n s w e r , t h e n I f e e l l i k e i t ' s something t h a t s h o u l d have been s a i d and I g e t t h a t -- I s a i d , w e l l , I a i n ' t h e a r d a l l I n e e d 102 CR-07-1913 t o know. A n d I know t h a t ' s t h e w a y t r i a l s a r e r u n , b u t t h a t ' s why I s a y I d o n ' t b e l i e v e I n e e d t o b e part of i t . "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . [Defense counsel]? "[Defense counsel] : [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] , you s a i d you d o n ' t r e a l l y have a n y t h i n g against the death penalty; i s that right? "[Potential j u r o r ] : No. " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : So, t h a t w o u l d be s o m e t h i n g i f y o u w o u n d u p i n t h a t -- y o u know, i n t h e j u r y , you would at least be a b l e t o consider that, wouldn't you, i fyou g o t t o t h a t p o i n t ? "[Potential -- j u r o r ] : No. "[Defense counsel]: I'm s o r r y . Go a h e a d . You don't t h i n k t h e r e ' s any " [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] : When I w a l k e d t h r o u g h t h e d o o r , I t o o k a m e n t a l p i c t u r e o f t h i s room, t h e p e o p l e s i t t i n g a r o u n d . I s a i d , no, I c a n ' t do i t . I'm n o t g o i n g t o d o i t . T h a t ' s j u s t a s h o n e s t a s I can b e . all " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : I a p p r e c i a t e t h a t . A n d we do. This i s n ' t something anybody wants t o do. " [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] : That's t h e reason I say I d o n ' t w a n t t o w a s t e t h e C o u r t ' s t i m e w i t h p u t t i n g me i n a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e I'm n o t g o i n g t o b e a b l e t o s i t and d i s c u s s b e c a u s e p a r t o f t h e p e o p l e t h a t I ' l l be discussing t h i s w i t h w o n ' t b e t h e same k i n d o f people I am. I'm t a l k i n g about like I was a c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k e r a l l my l i f e and these other p e o p l e p r o b a b l y b e b e t t e r e d u c a t e d t h a n I am, a n d I j u s t d o n ' t f e e l l i k e I ' l l b e a b l e b e c a u s e -"THE COURT: Okay. 103 CR-07-1913 to " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : Would you be a b l e t o l i s t e n t h e Judge's i n s t r u c t i o n s and f o l l o w those? "[Potential juror]: I can listen to his instructions and f o l l o w those as l o n g as I can remember, b u t I c a n ' t remember a l o t o f d e t a i l s a n d I d o n ' t w a n t t o h a v e a d e t a i l -- I d o h a v e a l i t t l e h e a r i n g p r o b l e m t o o , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n t h e l a d y was doing the t a l k i n g . " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : L e t me a s k y o u t h i s b e c a u s e , I mean, t h a t ' s why y o u h a v e t h e j u r y o f 1 2 p e o p l e b e c a u s e nobody i s g o i n g t o remember a l l t h e d e t a i l s , no one p e r s o n . And understanding that whatever d e c i s i o n t h a t y o u f e l t was r i g h t w o u l d b e y o u r s o l e d e c i s i o n , y o u d o n ' t h a v e t o , y o u know, a g r e e w i t h everybody e l s e . I t ' s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t you agree with everybody e l s e . I t ' s whatever [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] f e e l s i s r i g h t b a s e d upon t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t you h e a r d . C o u l d y o u do t h a t ? " [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] : W e l l , t h e J u d g e y e s t e r d a y -¬ We h a v e t o h a v e a l o t o f p a t i e n c e , a n d I d o n ' t h a v e a l o t o f p a t i e n c e . I mean, t h a t ' s j u s t me. A n d i f I g o t o n t h e p a n e l w h e n some p e o p l e h a d some r e a s o n why t h a t t h e y -- t h a t I d i d n ' t t h i n k t h e y w a s g o i n g t o d e a l s t r a i g h t , t h e n we j u s t w o u l d n ' t g e t a l o n g . T h a t ' s my p r o b l e m . A n d I d o n ' t w a n t t o g e t i n t o t h a t situation." (R. 334-39.) Thereafter, the outside the presence of the p o t e n t i a l j u r o r , f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n was h a d b y t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e t r i a l court: "THE COURT: [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] p o s e s a b i t o f a unique situation, and what I thought was very s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d i s t h a t as f a r as t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n process and l i s t e n i n g t o other people and s h a r i n g 104 CR-07-1913 v i e w s , h e , a s a w h o l e , s a i d t h a t n o t o n l y c o u l d he n o t do t h a t , he w o u l d n o t do t h a t . A n d I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t w o u l d be f a i r t o [ D o t c h ] o r t o t h e S t a t e to h a v e s o m e o n e t h a t w o u l d n o t be w i l l i n g t o l i s t e n t o other j u r o r s ' views. "[Prosecutor]: He's a Court strike, right? "THE COURT: I t h i n k h e ' s u n q u a l i f i e d t o s e r v e on t h e j u r y , s o I w i l l n o t r e q u i r e y ' a l l t o make a challenge. "[Defense counsel]: t o him b e i n g struck. Y o u r H o n o r , we would except "THE COURT: T h a t ' s f i n e . L e t me j u s t a m p l i f y f o r t h e moment f o r t h e r e c o r d , i t ' s n o t t h a t he h a d a s t r o n g v i e w , i t ' s n o t t h a t he w o u l d be a man to s t r i k e f o r h i s view. That's not the i s s u e . But like in a d y n a m i t e c h a r g e , you t e l l people l i s t e n to e v e r y o n e e l s e ' s p o i n t o f v i e w and c o n s i d e r e v e r y o n e e l s e ' s p o i n t of view without s a c r i f i c i n g your own o p i n i o n s . [ P o t e n t i a l j u r o r ] seemed, by h i s demeanor, his a p p e a r a n c e i n c o u r t s e e m e d t o be v e r y e m p h a t i c t h a t he w o u l d h a v e an o p i n i o n a n d t h a t ' s a l l t h a t he w o u l d c o n s i d e r d u r i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s a n d he c o u l d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e g i v e and take. "He i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h a s a l a c k o f patience w i t h p e o p l e t h a t d i s a g r e e w i t h h i m . He s a i d t h a t he d o e s n ' t t h i n k p e o p l e t e l l t h e t r u t h , a n d he s a i d he has a h a r d t i m e h e a r i n g women. We h a v e two State attorneys. I'm going to remove him over your exception. " [ D e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] : J u d g e , i f I m i g h t j u s t make s u r e I h a v e t h e r e c o r d c l e a r . B y way o f r e a s o n s f o r o u r e x c e p t i o n , t h e man s a i d he c o u l d l i s t e n t o y o u r i n s t r u c t i o n s . He d i d s a y t h a t he d i d n ' t know i f he w o u l d -- c o u l d go a l o n g w i t h e v e r y b o d y e l s e , a n d I would submit t h a t t h a t ' s not a j u r o r ' s duty to go a l o n g w i t h e v e r y b o d y e l s e . E a c h p e r s o n has t o r e a c h 105 CR-07-1913 t h e i r own d e c i s i o n e v e r how i t i s , a n d he d i d n o t -¬ as the C o u r t s a i d , he seemed t o have a pretty d e f i n i t e i d e a a b o u t how he w o u l d f u n c t i o n . "But he's d i s t r u s t f u l . I s u b m i t t h a t ' s n o t a bad q u a l i t y i n a j u r o r , that they should question the evidence. They s h o u l d q u e s t i o n i n t h e i r mind the witnesses, t h e i r motivation, t h e i r a b i l i t y to recal1 and r e l a t e w h a t e v e r i t i s t h e y ' r e t e s t i f y i n g a b o u t , and I t h i n k he h a s not demonstrated sufficiently t h a t he i s u n q u a l i f i e d o r u n w i l l i n g t o s e r v e a s a j u r o r a n d we w o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , e x c e p t t o t h e C o u r t ' s ruling." (R. 340-42.) Although juror's follow Dotch statements the consistent trial and group context points to and isolates indicating that court's i n w h i c h he w o u l d be and opinions. It judge who was position demeanor and to potential listen could he a listen was to for to his potential to and veniremember was could not serve required to l i s t e n to compromise, or to e v a l u a t e ideas in he i n s t r u c t i o n s , the clear in stating that people's opinions, the this reason observe and that the explanations to a other exchange the trial veniremember's juror. removed "The j u r y ' s r o l e i n a t r i a l i s to '"'assure a f a i r and e q u i t a b l e r e s o l u t i o n of f a c t u a l i s s u e s . ' " ' [ U n i t e d S t a t e s v.] R i c h a r d s o n , 233 F . 3 d 1 2 8 5 , ] 1289 [(11th C i r . 2000)] (quoting S t a n d a r d O i l Co. of C a l i f o r n i a v . A r i z o n a , 738 F . 2 d 1 0 2 1 , 1031 (9th C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n C o l g r o v e v . B a t t i n , 413 U.S. 106 in the CR-07-1913 149, 157, 93 S . C t . 2 4 4 8 , 37 L . E d . 2 d 522 Proper communication i s necessary for c o r r e c t l y f u l f i l l i t s f a c t - f i n d i n g duty Ex parte Malone, Group promotes, stated 44 in (Colo. 12 So. interaction and is 3d and essential P e o p l e ex 60, 63-64 (Ala. deliberation to, the r e l . H u n t e r v. (1973)) a jury " to 2008). by jury members fact-finding process. District Court, 634 1981): "[T]he term p e r s o n s . The ' j u r y ' connotes a d e l i b e r a t i v e body w o r d ' j u r y ' has been d e f i n e d as: of "'A body of men sworn to give a v e r d i c t u p o n some m a t t e r s u b m i t t e d t o t h e m ; ... a b o d y o f men selected according to law, i m p a n e l e d and sworn to i n q u i r e into and t r y any m a t t e r o f f a c t , and to give their verdict a c c o r d i n g to the evidence legally produced.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1966. "See a l s o B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 993 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); W i l l i a m s [ v . F l o r i d a , 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L . E d . 2 d 446 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ] ; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S . C t . 1444, 20 L . E d . 2 d 491 (1968); S i n g e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 380 U.S. 24, 85 S . C t . 783, 13 L . E d . 2 d 630 (1965) . to " I n W i l l i a m s , s u p r a , t h e Supreme C o u r t the s i z e of a j u r y s t a t e d : speaking "'... the essential feature of a jury o b v i o u s l y l i e s i n the i n t e r p o s i t i o n between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense j u d g m e n t o f a g r o u p o f l a y m e n , and i n the community p a r t i c i p a t i o n and shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that results from 107 As P.2d CR-07-1913 that group's determination of guilt or i n n o c e n c e . The p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h i s r o l e i s not a f u n c t i o n of t h e p a r t i c u l a r number o f t h e b o d y t h a t m a k e s up the j u r y . To be s u r e , t h e n u m b e r s h o u l d p r o b a b l y be large enough to promote group d e l i b e r a t i o n , f r e e from o u t s i d e attempts at i n t i m i d a t i o n , and to provide a f a i r p o s s i b i l i t y for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community ' "It i s thus obvious that composed of a s i n g l e p e r s o n . I f a one person determination i n n o c e n c e , he may w a i v e t h e j u r y court." 634 P. 2d at Here, honestly as other of the confessed and trial the Whether court. of (Ala. see reversal i f the was a unable as potential and f a r as prospective a jury juror unwilling to deliberating juror is i s a matter within and trial the demeanor judge." "This and Knop the a n s w e r s g i v e n by, discretion McCain, C o u r t must l o o k was the properly a p p r o p r i a t e absent abuse of 108 serve the qualified is within v. who with to the 561 the based sound So. 2d questions prospective exercised. this to discretion " T h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a g a i n , i s t o be 1989.) this i s not a answers p r o p o u n d e d t o , and to he removed effective juror juror's 232 court that a member o f discretion 229, trial jurors. s e r v e as on 46-47. the a fair a j u r y may not be the accused d e s i r e s of his guilt or a n d be t r i e d b y the juror ... A discretion." CR-07-1913 Ex parte trial by E l l i n g t o n , 580 So. 2 d 1 3 6 7 , 1 3 6 9 court ( A l a . 1990). i n t h e p r e s e n t case d i d n o t abuse removing this The i t sdiscretion p o t e n t i a l j u r o r from t h e panel. VIII. Dotch argues that the t r i a l prone j u r y by d e a t h - q u a l i f y i n g Dotch his right to a that death-qualifying the fair to convict produced the venire trial. "condition[ed]" qualification women. In States 17 such juries their toward (Dotch's b r i e f , views Court trial guilt; on c a p i t a l pretrial causing and excludes 4 7 6 U.S. held may A l t h o u g h Dotch d i exclusion of minorities in h i s p r e t r i a l motion, him t h e r i g h t t o a f a i r j u r y . (C. 174.) 1 7 contends death- the jury to because death- minorities and a t 109.) L o c k h a r t v. McCree, capital-murder he are significantly t h e defendant; because disproportionately Supreme and thereby denied Specifically, q u a l i f i c a t i o n assumes a d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t , be a conviction- a j u r y r e s u l t s i n an i m p a r t i a l j u r y f o r f o l l o w i n g reasons: because more p r o n e court be that 162 (1986), veniremembers "death-qualified" punishment. the United to The a p p e l l a t e i n a determine courts i n d not s p e c i f i c a l l y r a i s e t h e ground of a n d women b y d e a t h - q u a l i f y i n g t h e j u r y he d i d a r g u e t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e d e n i e d c r o s s - s e c t i o n o f t h e c o m m u n i t y on h i s 109 CR-07-1913 Alabama have r e p e a t e d l y applied the Lockhart holding. C o u r t s t a t e d i n S o c k w e l l v. S t a t e , 675 S o . 2 d 4 As this (Ala.Crim.App. 1993): " ' I n L o c k h a r t v . M c C r e e , 476 U.S. 1 6 2 , 106 S . C t . 1 7 5 8 , 90 L . E d . 2 d 137 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n does not prohibit states from "death q u a l i f i c a t i o n " of j u r i e s i n c a p i t a l cases and t h a t so q u a l i f y i n g a j u r y does n o t d e p r i v e a d e f e n d a n t o f an i m p a r t i a l j u r y . 476 U.S. a t 1 7 3 , 106 S . C t . a t 1 7 6 4 . A l a b a m a C o u r t s h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d l i k e w i s e . See W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 556 S o . 2 d 737 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 6 ) , r e v ' d i n p a r t , 556 So. 2d 744 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ; E d w a r d s v . S t a t e , 515 S o . 2 d 8 6 , 88 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) ; M a r t i n v . State, 494 S o . 2 d 749 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1985).' "675 So. Lee v. S t a t e (Ala. In cert. [Ms. C R - 0 7 - 0 0 5 4 , Crim. Sneed v. denied, raised merit 2d a t 18." App. October So. 3d , 2009). State, 1 So. U.S. , t h e same i s s u e s to h i s claims, 9, 2 0 0 9 ] 3 d 104 129 Dotch ( A l a . Crim. Ct. S. 1039 r a i s e s , and t h i s App. 2007), (2009), Sneed court found stating: "The a p p e l l a n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t d e a t h - q u a l i f y i n g a j u r y i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because the j u r o r s are more p r o n e t o c o n v i c t , i t assumes t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t is guilty, and i t disproportionately excludes m i n o r i t i e s a n d women. I n D a v i s v . S t a t e , 718 S o . 2 d 1148, 1157 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1995) ( o p i n i o n on r e t u r n 110 no CR-07-1913 t o remand), stated: aff'd, 718 So. 2d 1166 ( A l a . 1998), we "'A jury composed exclusively of j u r o r s who have been d e a t h - q u a l i f i e d i n accordance w i t h the t e s t e s t a b l i s h e d i n W a i n w r i g h t v . W i t t , 469 U.S. 4 1 2 , 105 S . C t . 8 4 4 , 83 L . E d . 2 d 841 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , i s c o n s i d e r e d t o b e i m p a r t i a l e v e n t h o u g h i t may b e m o r e c o n v i c t i o n prone than a n o n - d e a t h - q u a l i f i e d j u r y . W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 710 S o . 2 d 1276 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 6 ) . See L o c k h a r t v . M c C r e e , 476 U.S. 1 6 2 , 106 S . C t . 1 7 5 8 , 90 L . E d . 2d 137 (1986). N e i t h e r the f e d e r a l nor the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s the s t a t e from [ ] death-qualifying jurors in capital c a s e s . I d . ; W i l l i a m s ; H a n e y v . S t a t e , 603 So. 2d 368, 391-92 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), a f f ' d , 603 S o . 2 d 412 ( A l a . 1992), cert. d e n i e d , 507 U.S. 9 2 5 , 113 S . C t . 1 2 9 7 , 122 L . E d . 2 d 687 (1993).' "(Footnote omitted.) Therefore, argument i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . " 1 So. 3d a t the appellant's 136-37. Therefore, these i s s u e s have p r e v i o u s l y been determined a d v e r s e l y t o D o t c h ' s a r g u m e n t s , a n d t h e r e i s no m e r i t t o these claims. IX. Dotch gruesome which, Dotch he alleges and unduly says, refers to that the trial prejudicial court improperly photographs requires that his conviction crime-scene and 111 autopsy admitted of the be overturned. photographs victim, without CR-07-1913 specifying the exact photographs that he found unduly prejudicial. Moreover, of Dotch d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f any these photographs at t r i a l any m o t i o n b e f o r e t h e t r i a l error must rise to n o r d i d he r a i s e court. the level argues this claim i n (R. 6 8 7 - 8 8 . ) T h e r e f o r e , a n y of that plain error. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P. Dotch simply Taldon's death photographs was was undisputed, because the cause the probative outweighed by t h e i r value prejudicial exclusion i f , identification, after i t tends light C r i m i n a l Law 4 3 8 ; N i c h o l s v . S t a t e , Crim. App. concerning properly 1976) the material ( 1 9 5 8 ) ; McHugh v . S t a t e , (1974)." Watts v. S t a t e , ( p h o t o g r a p h was nature and 337 of admitted although the evidence 112 "The ground f o r testimony. and or 6 267 A l a . 2 1 7 , 53 A l a . A p p . 473, 301 S o . 2 d 9 1 , 92 ( A l a . illustrative location the strengthen, Ala.Digest, 2 d 238 other on, the So. of shed of authentication illustrate 100 S o . 2 d 750 truth to proper the effect. f a c t t h a t a p h o t o g r a p h i s gruesome i s i n s u f f i c i e n t its of the of testimony wound and was was u n c o n t r o v e r t e d CR-07-1913 that s h o o t i n g was insanity the cause of death and Watts presented an defense). "The f a c t t h a t a p h o t o g r a p h has v e r y little p r o b a t i v e v a l u e does n o t p r e v e n t i t s a d m i s s i o n i n e v i d e n c e where t h e p h o t o g r a p h will tend to shed light on, s t r e n g t h e n o r i l l u s t r a t e the t r u t h of other testimony, or where the photograph has reasonable tendency t o prove or disprove some m a t e r i a l f a c t or i s s u e i n the case, or i s used t o i d e n t i f y the deceased or t o i l l u s t r a t e the l o c a t i o n , n a t u r e o r e x t e n t o f a wound. G i l m o r e v . S t a t e , 346 S o . 2 d 1 1 9 3 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 7 7 ) . The e v i d e n t i a r y r u l e in this state favors the admission of photographs and affords the t r i a l c o u r t a wide and liberal latitude in the admission of photographs illustrative of a criminal transaction and the s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A r n o l d v . S t a t e , 348 S o . 2d 1092 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 7 7 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , Ex p a r t e A r n o l d , 348 S o . 2 d 1 0 9 7 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; L e w i s v . S t a t e , 339 So. 2 d 1035 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 7 6 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 339 S o . 2 d 1038 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) . " L a w r e n c e v . S t a t e , 409 S o . 2 d 9 8 7 , 990 A review testimony of the photographs concerning these admitted, photographs, photographs were properly prejudicial. They d i d not emphasize, the victim's scene. of the wounds, nor admitted d i d they F u r t h e r , t h e y were i l l u s t r a t i v e location of ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1982) . the victim's 113 and as well shows were the not overly or distort misrepresent of the crime This the that exaggerate, wounds. as the crime scene and evidence was CR-07-1913 relevant victim and may was i n d i s p u t e because not have been Dotch i n her v e h i c l e contended when she that was the shot. X. Dotch argues that § 13A-5-40(a)(17), u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a g u e a n d o v e r b r o a d . He is no reasonable j u s t i f i c a t i o n A l a . Code 1975, alleges that there f o r imposing the death p e n a l t y when t h e v i c t i m o f t h e s h o o t i n g i s i n s i d e a s t a t i o n a r y b u t n o t when t h e v i c t i m I n May this v. State, Court upheld the i s s t a n d i n g o u t s i d e t h e same 710 So. 2d 1362 vehicle vehicle. ( A l a . C r i m . App. constitutionality of § equal protection. I n so d o i n g , t h i s Court 1997), 13A-5-40(a)(17) against a claim that the s t a t u t e v i o l a t e s a defendant's to is rights held: "The o n l y a c t made c a p i t a l b y § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 1 7 ) , Ala. Code 1975, i s the i n t e n t i o n a l murder of a person in a vehicle. 'Murder is not a constitutionally protected activity.' Ex parte W o o d a r d , 631 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 5 , 1068 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), c e r t . d e n i e d , 662 S o . 2 d 929 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 513 U.S. 8 6 9 , 115 S . C t . 1 9 0 , 130 L . E d . 2 d 123 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . Even so, there is a rational basis for the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s r e c o g n i t i o n o f k i l l e r s whose v i c t i m s a r e k i l l e d w h i l e i n a v e h i c l e as a s e p a r a t e c l a s s , and making t h a t o f f e n s e p u n i s h a b l e by e i t h e r life i m p r i s o n m e n t o r t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . The f a c t s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e s e r v e w e l l t o d e m o n s t r a t e one r a t i o n a l b a s i s w h i c h the l e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d have c o n s i d e r e d i n e n a c t i n g t h e s t a t u t e . Marcum, s u f f e r i n g a m o r t a l wound, a t t e m p t e d t o d r i v e f r o m t h e s c e n e o f t h e s h o o t i n g . He l o s t c o n t r o l o f t h e c a r a n d c r a s h e d i n t o o t h e r v e h i c l e s p a r k e d n e a r b y . F o r t u n a t e l y , no 114 CR-07-1913 o n e e l s e was instance. i n j u r e d by the runaway v e h i c l e i n this "Here, t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o f t h e k i l l e r o f a p e r s o n i n a v e h i c l e as one g u i l t y o f a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e has a r a t i o n a l b a s i s . " 710 So. 2d a t 1365. See (Ala. C r i m . App. cert. d e n i e d , 543 U.S. have been 40(a)(17) "to a l s o Key v. S t a t e , affirmed, 2002), entitled 891 2 d 384 1005 to (2004) relief differently a defendant from whose a defendant previously his victim claim Moreover, this was a r b i t r a r y and sitting in that a away this car from Court affirmed the Key). Court has So. Court 13A-5- the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l In this § not rejected A l a . Code 1975, State, that p r i n c i p l e s " because making § 13A-5-40(a)(17), F a r r i o r v. 368 ( A l a . 2004), whose v i c t i m s t u m b l e d c o n s i d e r e d and r a i s e d by 2d 353, ( h o l d i n g t h a t Key w o u l d on a car v i o l a t e d equal-protection arguments" So. i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague and punish "has 891 So. 728 2d 691 rationale a capital (Ala. Crim. App. offense. 1998), wrote: "The f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e d e m o n s t r a t e one s i t u a t i o n the l e g i s l a t u r e sought t o a d d r e s s by e n a c t i n g the s t a t u t e . The a p p e l l a n t f i r e d a t M c C o m b s ' c a r s e v e r a l t i m e s . There were f o u r p e o p l e i n the c a r , i n c l u d i n g two v e r y young c h i l d r e n . Another car driven by N i c o l e J a c k s o n , who h a d h e r b a b y i n t h e c a r , was 115 for CR-07-1913 nearby. Because of the mobile n a t u r e of a v e h i c l e , t h e r e i s an i n c r e a s e d r i s k o f h a r m t o t h e d r i v e r , passenger, pedestrians, b y s t a n d e r s , and p e o p l e i n other vehicles i f a person f i r e s i n t o a vehicle with a d e a d l y weapon. F u r t h e r m o r e , the r e c e n t i n c r e a s e i n drive-by shootings, c a r j a c k i n g s , and o t h e r random a c t s of v i o l e n c e i n v o l v i n g v e h i c l e s c o u l d have l e d the l e g i s l a t u r e to enact the s t a t u t e . There are s e v e r a l f a c t s i t u a t i o n s t h a t w o u l d s e r v e as r a t i o n a l reasons f o r c l a s s i f y i n g t h i s type of i n t e n t i o n a l m u r d e r a s c a p i t a l m u r d e r . A c c o r d i n g l y , a s we h e l d i n May [ v . S t a t e , 710 S o . 2 d 1362 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997)] § 13A-5-40(a)(17) does not v i o l a t e the appellant's equal protection r i g h t s . " Farrior v. State, Because intentional capital merit. a 728 offense, (Ala. 1975, which defines to vague. driven or occupant of App. the who is for inside making a 1997) overly State, v. (§ broad 741 the vehicle within the or claim the fail[ing] vehicle use from that of a the a an a statute vehicle must m u s t be 116 2d 1099, Ala. Code weapon fired i s vague f o r be outside as or is constitutional operable to s t a t e whether the or void i n t e n t i o n a l murder deadly vehicle, or So. 13A-5-40(a)(18), as a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e whether ... statute through Merrill's and victim Compare M e r r i l l Crim. "specify a exists i s not 1107 despite basis this too used 701. of unreasonableness i s w i t h o u t being otherwise of at Dotch's c l a i m Moreover, by 2d rational killing committed So. or v i c t i m may the failing being be vehicle"). an CR-07-1913 "'To withstand a challenge of v a g u e n e s s , a s t a t u t e m u s t : 1) g i v e a p e r s o n of ordinary intelligence a reasonable o p p o r t u n i t y t o know w h a t i s p r o h i b i t e d , a n d , 2) p r o v i d e e x p l i c i t s t a n d a r d s t o t h o s e who a p p l y t h e l a w s . G r a y n e d [ v . C i t y o f Rockford, 408 U.S. 1 0 4 , 1 0 8 - 0 9 , 92 S . C t . 2 2 9 4 , 2 2 9 8 - 9 9 , 33 L . E d . 2 d 222 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ] . "'"[T]his prohibition a g a i n s t e x c e s s i v e vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n . Many s t a t u t e s will have some inherent vagueness, f o r ' [ i ] n most E n g l i s h words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.' Robinson v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 324 U.S. 2 8 2 , 2 8 6 , 65 S . C t . 6 6 6 , 6 6 8 , 89 L . E d . 944 ( 1 9 4 5 ) . E v e n t r a i n e d l a w y e r s may find i t necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n s b e f o r e t h e y may s a y w i t h a n y c e r t a i n t y w h a t some statutes may compel or forbid." " ' R o s e v . L o c k e , 4 2 3 U.S. 4 8 , 4 9 - 5 0 , 96 S.Ct. 2 4 3 , 2 4 4 , 46 L . E d . 2 d 1 8 5 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . "A d e f e n d a n t who c h a l l e n g e s a s t a t u t e o n t h e g r o u n d o f v a g u e n e s s 'must d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t the statute under attack i s vague as a p p l i e d t o h i s own c o n d u c t , r e g a r d l e s s o f the potentially vague applications to o t h e r s . ' " S e n f v . S t a t e , 622 S o . 2 d 4 3 5 , 437 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) , q u o t i n g A i e l l o v . C i t y o f W i l m i n g t o n , 623 F. 2 d 8 4 5 , 850 ( 3 r d Cir. 1980).(Emphasis supplied [in Culbreath].)'" 117 CR-07-1913 State v. Randall, 669 So. Here, the statute 2d 223, 225-26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). p r o h i b i t e d conduct arbitrary or clearly notified and p r o v i d e d e x p l i c i t discriminatory does Dotch actually conduct, so as Rockford, 408 104, 2d 222 U.S. (Dotch's although brief, without to because violating only § sentenced to l i f e directly Dotch 92 S . C t . argues XI) the merit. excessive that not nor constitutionally Grayned v. City 2 2 9 4 , 2 3 0 2 , 33 nature Dotch other of defendants imprisonment the this submits 13A-5-40(a)(17), tied sentence to in the a separate death of L.Ed. that who issue penalty crime, this his was issue sentence were was convicted of been w i t h o u t p a r o l e where the facts to the death. 118 1975, is had victim A l a . Code f a c t s and e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g Dotch's his i t was i t does not p r o h i b i t , overbroad. 114-15, Issue disproportionate more t o be the (1972). Finally also Thus, claim that i t prohibits, protected of standards to prevent enforcement. u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. Moreover, Dotch vehicle. However, conviction also the support CR-07-1913 As t h i s Court stated (Ala. C r i m . App. 1024 2000), i n M c G r i f f v. State, 908 So. 2d 961 r e v e r s e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 908 So. 2d ( A l a . 2004): "'Furthermore, the sentencing procedure for a person convicted of violating § 13A-5-40(a)(17), Ala. Code 1975, i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y sound. "'"'A capital sentencing scheme must ... provide a "'meaningful basis for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e few c a s e s i n which [the death p e n a l t y ] is imposed from the many cases i n which i t i s not.'" [ G r e g g v . G e o r g i a , 428 U.S. 1 5 3 , 96 S . C t . 2 9 0 9 , 2 9 3 2 , 49 L . E d . 2 d 859 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ] , q u o t i n g F u r m a n v . G e o r g i a , [408 U.S. 2 3 8 , 3 1 3 , 92 S . C t . 2 7 2 6 , 33 L . E d . 2 d 346 (1972)] (White, J., concurring). " ' " ' T h i s means t h a t i f a State wishes to authorize c a p i t a l punishment i t has a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t a i l o r and a p p l y i t s law i n a manner that avoids the arbitrary and c a p r i c i o u s i n f l i c t i o n of the death p e n a l t y . ' 4 " ' " G o d f r e y v . G e o r g i a , 44 6 U.S. ¢ 2 0 , 427-428, 100 S.Ct. 1 7 5 9 ,. 1764, . 64 rd o 98 r\ L . Ep ^. 2 d 3 n o , 406c /11c9 o r\ \ . " ( 8 0 ) ii T A " ' [ E x p a r t e ] Woodard, 631 So.2d [1065] at 1069 [ ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 662 S o . 2 d 929 119 CR-07-1913 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 130 L . E d . 2 d 123 123 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ] . " ' " 869, 115 S.Ct. " Not e v e r y d e a t h of a v i c t i m i n a vehicle w i l l constitute capital murder. Section 13A-5-40(a)(17) r e q u i r e s that, to c o n s t i t u t e a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e , the murder must be i n t e n t i o n a l . T h e r e f o r e , t h e s t a t u t e i s not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the U n i t e d States Supreme Court's holding in Enmund v. F l o r i d a , 458 U.S. 7 8 2 , 102 S . C t . 3 3 6 8 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). In addition, a conviction under this s t a t u t e does not a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e s u l t i n a mandatory death sentence. Instead, "'[u]pon c o n v i c t i o n of a defendant for a capital offense, the trial court [conducts] a separate s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without p a r o l e or to death.'" H a d l e y v . S t a t e , 575 So. 2 d [ 1 4 5 ] a t 152 [(Ala.Crim.App. 1 9 9 0 ) ] , q u o t i n g § 13A-545(a), Ala.Code 1975. " ' " ' [ T ] h e [ U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme] Court has imposed two general requirements on the capital sentencing process. First, a state must channel the sentencer's d i s c r e t i o n i n order to " g e n u i n e l y narrow the c l a s s of persons eligible f o r the death p e n a l t y a n d ... [ t h u s ] r e a s o n a b l y j u s t i f y t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a more s e v e r e s e n t e n c e on t h e defendant compared t o o t h e r s found guilty o f m u r d e r . " S e c o n d , t h e S t a t e may not limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant evidence that might lead the 120 190, CR-07-1913 sentencer the death to decline penalty. to impose "'"'The r e q u i r e d n a r r o w i n g o f t h e class of death-eligible defendants may occur at either the g u i l t or the s e n t e n c i n g phase of a capital trial. When narrowing i s accomplished during the sentencing phase, the sentencer determines whether certain characteristics of the crime, known as aggravating circumstances, distinguish the g r a v i t y o f t h e o f f e n s e so as t o justify the i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y . ' " "'Woodard, omitted). II I II 631 So. 2d at 1070 (citations II " " ' " [ T ] h e l e g i s l a t u r e has c l e a r l y c l a s s i f i e d certain crimes as 'capital offenses,' § 13A-5-40, and i t has set the minimum p u n i s h m e n t f o r s u c h c r i m e s as i m p r i s o n m e n t for life without parole, see §§ 13A-5-45(f); 13A-5-46(e)(1). This is no different from the legislature's c l a s s i f y i n g other offenses f o r purposes of p u n i s h m e n t and establishing minimum and maximum punishments for each c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . S e e §§ 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ; 1 3 A - 5 - 6 ; 1 3 A - 5 - 7 . A g r e a t e r p u n i s h m e n t - d e a t h - may be imposed on a defendant c o n v i c t e d of a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e , b u t o n l y i f one o r m o r e o f the aggravating circumstances enumerated i n § 13A-5-49 i s f o u n d to exist and that 121 CR-07-1913 aggravating circumstance(s) outweighs any m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e ( s ) t h a t may e x i s t . " " ' . . . " "' Thus, for a defendant to be sentenced t o death upon c o n v i c t i o n f o r v i o l a t i n g § 13A-5-40(a)(17), the defendant must be g u i l t y o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l m u r d e r committed through the use of a deadly weapon w h i l e t h e v i c t i m i s i n a v e h i c l e "and t h e s e n t e n c e r must f i n d t h e e x i s t e n c e of at least one of the aggravating circumstances e n u m e r a t e d i n § 13A-5-49, thereby narrowing the class of ' d e a t h - e l i g i b l e ' d e f e n d a n t s . " W o o d a r d , 631 So. 2 d a t 1 0 7 0 . "'"'[W]hen, i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e , a class of victims r e q u i r e [ s ] s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n and t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme p r o v i d e s a meaningful method o f narrowing the c l a s s of defendants who a r e death eligible, the statute is not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n f i r m . ' " J _ 4 - T ^ ^ l - ^ ^ - ^ T ^ l ^ J .4-,,4-. " ' W o o d a r d , 631 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 7 2 (citation omitted). Alabama's capital sentencing scheme d e l i n e a t e s a p r e c i s e p r o c e d u r e t o determine whether a defendant convicted u n d e r t h i s s t a t u t e w i l l be s e n t e n c e d t o death or t o l i f e imprisonment without the possibility of p a r o l e . Furthermore, i t narrows the class of "death-eligible" defendants. Accordingly, the procedure f o r sentencing a person convicted of v i o l a t i n g § 13A-5-40(a)(17) withstands the appellant's challenges.' "Farrior [v. S t a t e ] , 728 S o . 2 d [ 6 9 1 ] [ ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 8 ) ] See a l s o M e r r i l l 122 at v. 701-03 State, CR-07-1913 741 S o . 2 d 1 0 9 9 S t a t e , 710 S o . 2 d McGriff v. State, Thus, committed and under the Key facts State, § unconstitutional merit. statute, rationale disproportionate So. So. 2d as o v e r l y as finding sentence that was proper. have been convicted 2d 353 470 (Ala. Crim. ( A l a . C r i m . App. Ala. Code App. See, 2002); 2004). 1975, is not vague o r o v e r b r o a d and because i t f o r i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , Dotch's the murder are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y sound his 13A-5-40(a)(17), Moreover, a have been s e n t e n c e d t o death. 891 907 for evidence supported a statute State, Because a and v. 1008-10. sentencing procedures this this v. K n i g h t v. has the 2d a t o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s i n A l a b a m a who violating e.g., So. § 13A-5-40(a)(17) violated Moreover, of because because Dotch 908 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 7 ) ; May 1362 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) . " death penalty in this claims case have was no not compared t o the c r i m e . XI. Dotch argues committed at t r i a l sentence. Dotch t h o s e he has that the requires fails cumulative of errors a r e v e r s a l of h i s c o n v i c t i o n t o s p e c i f y any previously effect argued 123 errors; in briefs. rather he and cites CR-07-1913 "The A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s s e t f o r t h t h e cumulative-error r u l e as f o l l o w s : '[W]hile, under the f a c t s o f a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , no s i n g l e error among multiple errors may be sufficiently p r e j u d i c i a l t o r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l u n d e r R u l e 45, i f the accumulated e r r o r s have " p r o b a b l y i n j u r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s , " then the c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f t h e e r r o r s may require r e v e r s a l . ' E x p a r t e W o o d s , 789 S o . 2 d 9 4 1 , 9 4 2 - 4 3 n. 1 ( A l a . 2001) ( q u o t i n g R u l e 45, A l a . R . A p p . P . ) . " Lewis v. affirmed, State, 24 So. Alabama, A guilt 24 3d and and the 3d 866, 932 933 (Ala. 2008), S.Ct. thorough phases of (Ala. Crim. 796 cert. App. 2006), denied, Lewis of the Dotch's of record as any of the reveals trial to no the alleged s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s . Brown v. S t a t e , 2007), denied, v. (2009). effect ( A l a . C r i m . App. cert. 538 review cumulative e r r o r s a f f e c t e d Dotch's So. 480, ( A l a . 2009), , 130 sentencing that 3d 540 U.S. careful evidence So. affirmed, U.S. , 129 11 So. S.Ct. 11 3d 2864 (2009). XII. Dotch argues f i n d the existence his substantially that the trial court erred in failing of the s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g circumstance of impaired capacity based on the jury's r e j e c t i o n of h i s mental-disease-or-defect defense at the phase of his to trial. Specifically, 124 Dotch argues that guilt the CR-07-1913 standards disease for or analyzing defect and circumstance of Therefore, contends the he analysis the affirmative those for substantially f o r the that the analyzing impaired trial the m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e d i d not exist. that the substantially affirmative correct less defense, standard and i n proving than the that trial that Further, that he alleges mitigating factor should indicates differ. i n determining court the mitigating used burden that mental improperly has found the of capacity court a f f i r m a t i v e defense because h i s burden defense in proving have a p p l i e d mitigating was the the circumstance existed. The record the made the f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g s c o n c e r n i n g the m i t i g a t i n g circumstance that Dotch's " c a p a c i t y to appreciate the or the to conform substantially his conduct impaired," to trial court c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s requirements of conduct law was pursuant to § 13A-5-51(6), A l a . Code 1975: " S u b s t a n t i a l l y Impaired Capacity: The defense i n j e c t s t h i s m i t i g a t o r . Dr. Van R o s e n t e s t i f i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t has a f u l l s c a l e IQ. o f 77 a n d suffers f r o m a d e l u s i o n a l d i s o r d e r , p o l y s u b s t a n c e abuse and personality disorder. Dr. Van Rosen r e l i e d upon these diagnoses, the h i s t o r y of mental illness suffered by the defendant's mother, and the defendant's own h i s t o r y of mental treatment to 125 CR-07-1913 support h i s o p i n i o n t h a t the defendant s u f f e r e d from a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e o f f e n s e . The j u r y r e j e c t e d t h e mental disease or defect defense i n f i n d i n g the d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f i n t e n t i o n a l m u r d e r . The State p r e s e n t e d Dr. D o u g l a s McKeown, a p s y c h o l o g i s t , who testified that the defendant's only mental difficulties r e s u l t e d from h i s c o n t i n u o u s use of c o c a i n e . He d i a g n o s e d t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h p e r s o n a l i t y disorder with antisocial features, polysubstance abuse, a h i s t o r y of p o s s i b l e thought d i s t u r b a n c e , and low average intelligence. No evidence was presented to indicate c o c a i n e abuse l o w e r e d the defendant's mental c a p a c i t y or i m p a i r e d h i s a b i l i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d 'the r e q u i r e m e n t s of law,' or the consequences of h i s a c t i o n s at the time of the murder. "The jury's rejection of the defendant's argument for a lesser-included conviction for manslaughter based on a voluntary intoxication theory demonstrates that the jury believed the d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o ' a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y o f h i s conduct' and t h a t h i s a b i l i t y t o 'conform h i s conduct to the requirements of law was [not] s u b s t a n t i a l l y impaired.' In f i n d i n g the defendant guilty of capital murder, the jury necessarily r e j e c t e d t h e t h e o r y t h a t he was s o i n t o x i c a t e d b y i l l e g a l d r u g s t h a t he f a i l e d t o f o r m a n i n t e n t t o commit murder. "The C o u r t d o e s n o t d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e j u r y ' s conclusion to reject the plea of i n s a n i t y . The d e l i b e r a t e manner i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t c a r r i e d o u t the commission of the offense, coupled w i t h a p r i o r t h r e a t t o commit t h e o f f e n s e , does n o t d e m o n s t r a t e that the defendant s u f f e r e d from a d i m i n i s h e d mental c a p a c i t y . The C o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y f i n d s t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p a i r e d i n h i s c a p a c i t y t o appreciate the c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct or to conform h i s conduct to the requirements of law. 126 CR-07-1913 A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t o r i s found t o e x i s t , a n d t h e C o u r t g i v e s i t no w e i g h t . " (C. not 565-67.) Despite evidence Dotch's presented claim, t h e judge's at t r i a l and t h e j u r y ' s mean t h a t the judge incorrect analysis i n considering this fact, the trial definition a p p l i e d t h e wrong judge references used the of the mitigating f i n d i n g s do n o t standard and used t h e mitigating language to the factor. included In i n the factor. The p r o s e c u t o r s t a t e d a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g p h a s e t h a t h e was introducing presented and r e l y i n g during on the g u i l t a l lthe evidence phase. Code 1 9 7 5 , r e q u i r e s a t r i a l and mitigating should October be accorded." 2, 2 0 0 9 ] presented exist Johnson So. 3d v. State, , [Ms. ( A l a .Crim. [Ms. C R - 0 4 - 2 5 7 0 , A p r i l So. App. 2008) that had , because (Ala. Crim. there was e v i d e n c e ingested cocaine, the t r i a l 127 presentence aggravating a n d how much w e i g h t Compare S p e n c e r v. S t a t e , 2d been d u r i n g t h e g u i l t and i n determining whether circumstances had " S e c t i o n 13A-5-47(d), A l a . court to consider the report, along with the evidence p e n a l t y phases o f t h e t r i a l that court CR-99-1349, App. indicating should 2009). 4, 2 0 0 8 ] ( i n which Spencer at t r i a l they argued that have found he that CR-07-1913 he was s u b s t a n t i a l l y impaired, "[a]lthough court's the evidence conclusion in that of the presented that criminality of requirement of commission A of trial his was this was that or v. State, Court found existence 889 that, So. 2d 623 although the conform his to impaired in no § the evidence appreciate the conduct the to during the added.)"). consider a l l the evidence a c a p i t a l defendant. (Ala. Crim. trial trial question impaired court of the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances of s u b s t a n t i a l l y was to (Emphasis i s required we capacity to the circumstance ' [t]here o f f e r e d f o r m i t i g a t i o n when s e n t e n c i n g Lewis supports present, substantially offense.' court not Spencer's conduct law record mitigating assertion Kerry t h i s Court determined that, the the 1 3 A - 5 - 5 1 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975, propriety and App. 2003), d i d not find t h a t Lewis had (§ 1 3 A - 5 - 5 1 ( 6 ) ) o r t h a t he had In this the been been under the i n f l u e n c e of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (§ a l l of 13A-5-51(2)), mitigating the evidence. court This properly Court considered stated: "Regarding the s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g circumstances t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was c o m m i t t e d w h i l e L e w i s was u n d e r the influence of extreme mental or emotional d i s t u r b a n c e and t h a t L e w i s ' s c a p a c i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e the c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct or to conform h i s c o n d u c t t o t h e l a w was s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p a i r e d , the 128 the CR-07-1913 court s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t i t had considered the 'great deal of evidence' t h a t had been presented regarding Lewis's h i s t o r y of mental i l l n e s s . (C. 14.) I n a d d i t i o n , a l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t f i n d any n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s to e x i s t u n d e r § 13A-5-52, A l a . Code 1975, i t i n d i c a t e d in i t s order t h a t i t had considered ' a l l of the evidence presented during a l l stages of the t r i a l i n t h i s c a u s e , as w e l l as t h e C o u r t ' s o b s e r v a t i o n and evidence admitted during a l l proceedings, pretrial and p o s t t r i a l . ' (C. 14.) B a s e d o n i t s s e n t e n c i n g order, i t i s clear that the t r i a l court fully complied w i t h L o c k e t t v . O h i o , 438 U.S. 5 8 6 , 98 S.Ct. 2 9 5 4 , 57 L . E d . 2 d 973 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , a n d i t s p r o g e n y in that i t considered a l l evidence that could p o s s i b l y have been c o n s i d e r e d m i t i g a t i n g . " 889 So. 2d a t 692. Furthermore, 693, Lewis also although argued applied the standard its order actions the that i n Lewis that the v. trial 889 court So. Lewis was aware of However, t h i s at noting i n the wrongfulness volition 2d "improperly f o r i n s a n i t y , " by " s p e c i f i c a l l y a n d t h a t he e x e r c i s e d h i s own crimes." State, in of h i s committing C o u r t f o u n d no m e r i t t o t h a t claim, s t a t i n g that " [ c ] o n t r a r y t o Lewis's contention, merely because the court his actions that found that was and t h e c r i m i n a l i t y the court aware of the wrongfulness of legal i n s a n i t y to the See, e.g., F e r g u s o n v. S t a t e , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2 0 0 0 ) , a f f ' d , 129 of o f h i s c o n d u c t d o e s n o t mean applied the standard m i t i g a t i n g evidence. 925 Lewis 814 S o . 2 d 970 814 S o . 2d ( A l a . 2001), CR-07-1913 cert. denied, (2002) (holding sentencing that 535 the order trial U.S. 907, that the 122 trial court applied there i s no nonexistence capacity to conform of his the appreciate the to s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p a i r e d . The evidence, the the t r i a l existence of the 'insane' that the L.Ed.2d statement standard 145 in i t s d i d not of show insanity to Id. trial court used legal insanity i n determining circumstance criminality the of that his the Dotch's conduct requirements of or law t h a t the State mitigating preponderance of the evidence. to was r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t b a s e d on court determined the 152 of m i t i g a t i o n ) . " mitigating conduct not indication the a n a l y s i s f o r determining 1208, court's t h a t F e r g u s o n was Ferguson's p r o f f e r e d evidence Here, S.Ct. the disproved circumstance by § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( g ) , A l a . Code a 1975. XIII. Dotch by argues excluding Specifically, ordered mitigation trial contends that Dotch's brother and for their opinions sentencing court testimony he volunteering recommend t h a t the and as the from trial father to from 130 abused i t s discretion Dotch's court to family. improperly refrain from what the jury should asking for mercy. Dotch CR-07-1913 contends that the witnesses' have been a d m i t t e d opinions as t o s e n t e n c i n g as m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e concerning should Dotch's character. In T a y l o r v. S t a t e , 666 S o . 2 d 36 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 4 ) , t h i s Court held that the t r i a l Taylor's court properly refused to allow f a m i l y and f r i e n d s t o ask t h e j u r y t o spare h i s l i f e . In h o l d i n g t h a t t h i s a c t i o n by t h e t r i a l court d i dnot prevent the evidence, jury from considering mitigation this Court stated: "'[T]he opinion of a r e l a t i v e of a v i c t i m i s irrelevant to the jury's determination of whether the d e a t h p e n a l t y s h o u l d be imposed.' R o b i s o n v. M a y n a r d , 943 F . 2 d 1 2 1 6 , 1 2 1 7 ( 1 0 t h C i r . ) , cert. d e n i e d , 502 U.S. 9 7 0 , 112 S . C t . 4 4 5 , 1 1 6 L . E d . 2 d 4 6 3 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . S e e a l s o R o b i s o n v . M a y n a r d , 829 F . 2 d 1 5 0 1 , 1504-05 (10th Cir.1987). Such testimony i s ' c a l c u l a t e d t o i n c i t e a r b i t r a r y response' from t h e j u r y . R o b i s o n , 829 F . 2 d a t 1 5 0 5 . "Although P a y n e v . T e n n e s s e e , 5 0 1 U.S. 8 0 8 , 826-28, 111 S . C t . 2597, 2609, 115 L . E d . 2 d 720 (1991), h e l d t h a t t h e E i g h t h Amendment d o e s n o t p r o h i b i t the admission of 'victim impact' evidence at t h e sentencing phase o f a c a p i t a l t r i a l , "'Payne m e r e l y p u t a s i d e t h e b a r t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a n d comment u p o n victim impact e v i d e n c e w h i c h had been c r e a t e d i n B o o t h [ v . M a r y l a n d , 482 U.S. 4 9 6 , 107 S . C t . 2 5 2 9 , 96 L . E d . 2 d 440 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ] , a n d S o u t h C a r o l i n a v. G a t h e r s , 490 U.S. 8 0 5 , 1 0 9 S.Ct. 2 2 0 7 , 104 L . E d . 2 d 8 7 6 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . The Court d i d not expand the universe of 131 CR-07-1913 admissible relevant mitigating evidence e s t a b l i s h e d b y L o c k e t t v . O h i o , 438 U.S. 5 8 6 , 98 S . C t . 2 9 5 4 , 57 L . E d . 2 d 973 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , a n d E d d i n g s v . O k l a h o m a , 455 U.S. 1 0 4 , 102 S.Ct. 8 6 9 , 71 L . E d . 2 d 1 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . ... We cannot agree that Payne portends a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f any e v i d e n c e o t h e r than t h a t r e l a t e d t o the v i c t i m and t h e impact of t h e v i c t i m ' s d e a t h on t h e members o f t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y . N o t h i n g s a i d by t h e C o u r t suggests the Court intended t o broaden the scope of r e l e v a n t m i t i g a t i n g evidence t o include the opinion of a v i c t i m ' s family member t h a t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y s h o u l d n o t b e invoked "Under Alabama law, n o n s t a t u t o r y e v i d e n c e must be r e l e v a n t . mitigating "'In addition to the mitigating circumstances specified in section 13A-5-51, m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s shall include any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the d e f e n d a n t o f f e r s as a b a s i s f o r a s e n t e n c e of l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h o u t p a r o l e i n s t e a d of d e a t h , and any o t h e r r e l e v a n t m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t o f f e r s as a basis f o r a sentence of l i f e imprisonment without parole instead of death.' "Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-52. ' " [ S ] u b j e c t o n l y t o t h e loose e v i d e n t i a r y requirement of relevance, c a p i t a l d e f e n d a n t s have a r i g h t t o o f f e r any e v i d e n c e t h e y c h o o s e on c h a r a c t e r o r r e c o r d o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e o f f e n s e . ' " C l i s b y v . S t a t e , 456 S o . 2 d 9 9 , 101 (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) ( q u o t i n g S t a n l e y v . Z a n t , 697 F . 2 d 9 5 5 , 960 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 467 U.S. 1 2 1 9 , 104 S . C t . 2 6 6 7 , 81 L . E d . 2 d 372 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . 132 CR-07-1913 "'Evidence i s "relevant" i f i t l o g i c a l l y r e l a t e s to the u l t i m a t e , m a t e r i a l i n f e r e n c e i n the case f o r w h i c h i t i s p r o f f e r e d . ' J . C o l q u i t t , A l a b a m a Law o f E v i d e n c e § 4.1 (1990). '"Evidence i s r e l e v a n t i f i t has any p r o b a t i v e value, however s l i g h t , upon a m a t t e r a t i s s u e i n t h e c a s e . ' P h e l p s v. S t a t e , 439 S o . 2 d 7 2 7 , 736 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1983) " E v i d e n c e i s r e l e v a n t i f i t has any t e n d e n c y t o t h r o w l i g h t upon t h e m a t t e r i n i s s u e , e v e n t h o u g h s u c h l i g h t may be weak and f a l l s h o r t o f d e m o n s t r a t i o n . " A u s t i n v. S t a t e , 434 S o . 2 d 2 8 9 , 292 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1983).' B r e w e r v . S t a t e , 644 S o . 2 d 39 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 4 ) . 'In t h i s S t a t e , e v i d e n c e i s r e l e v a n t i f i t has any l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to the purpose f o r which i t i s offered.' Rose v. State, 598 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). "It i s the h o l d i n g of t h i s Court that the opinion of the f r i e n d s or r e l a t i v e s of the defendant t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d n o t be s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h i s not a r e l e v a n t m i t i g a t i n g circumstance f o r the j u r y to c o n s i d e r at the p e n a l t y phase of a c a p i t a l c a s e . C o m p a r e M c G a h e e v . S t a t e , 632 S o . 2 d 9 7 6 , 978 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , a f f i r m e d , 632 S o . 2 d 981 ( A l a . 1993) ('The p h y s i c a l e f f e c t s o f e l e c t r o c u t i o n a r e n o t a n aspect of the a p p e l l a n t ' s character or record and a r e n o t r e l e v a n t t o any o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c r i m e ; a n d we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h i s t y p e o f e v i d e n c e does not constitute evidence of m i t i g a t i o n . ' ) ; H i n t o n v . S t a t e , 548 S o . 2 d 5 4 7 , 5 6 0 - 6 1 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) , a f f i r m e d , 548 S o . 2 d 562 ( A l a . 1989), c e r t . d e n i e d , 493 U.S. 9 6 9 , 110 S . C t . 4 1 9 , 107 L . E d . 2 d 383 (1989) ('We interpret this section to limit m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e t o t h a t w h i c h assumes t h a t the defendant committed the crime f o r which he was convicted This court therefore finds that polygraph r e s u l t s which i n d i c a t e that the defendant i s n o t g u i l t y o f t h e c r i m e f o r w h i c h he i s b e i n g sentenced are not r e l e v a n t to e i t h e r a g g r a v a t i n g or m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h u s a r e i n a d m i s s i b l e i n a s e n t e n c i n g proceeding under § 13A-5-45(d).')." 133 CR-07-1913 Taylor v. State, 666 So. 2d a t Thus, Dotch's b r o t h e r from asking the spare Dotch's August 31, jury life. on defendant p e n a l t y phase. 2005); return So. not is and f a t h e r were p r o p e r l y a particular Compare S m i t h v. 2007] 2000)(opinion App. to 51-53. remand from entitled 2d , the to a v. State, 775 mercy 952 So. sentence [Ms. (Ala. Supreme See B a r b e r v. S t a t e , Melson State, 2d restricted Court) 2 d 393 857 to CR-97-1258, Crim. ("A instruction So. or App. capital in the (Ala. Crim. (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)."). There defendant i s no be constitutional allowed to ask requirement a jury that a capital f o r mercy. "[W]e v i e w P r o f f i t t v . F l o r i d a , 428 U.S. 242, 96 S . C t . 2 7 6 0 , 49 L . E d . 2 d 913 (1976) t o h a v e t a c i t l y h e l d t h a t the a v a i l a b i l i t y of such a mercy o p t i o n t o the sentencing a u t h o r i t y i s not a constitutional requirement. As Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in Proffitt points out, the sentencing a u t h o r i t y i n F l o r i d a i s r e q u i r e d t o impose the death p e n a l t y on a l l f i r s t d e g r e e m u r d e r e r s a s t o whom t h e statutory aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Proffitt a t 260. This r e q u i r e d i m p o s i t i o n of the death penalty, regardless of mercy, passed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l muster i n P r o f f i t t , and i s i n k e e p i n g w i t h the c o n c e r n t h a t arbitrary and c a p r i c i o u s i m p o s i t i o n of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y be a v o i d e d . H o p p e r v . E v a n s , 456 U.S. 6 0 5 , 102 S.Ct. 2 0 4 9 , 72 L . E d . 2 d 367 (1982)." 134 CR-07-1913 Whisenant v. State, 482 S o . 2 d 1 2 2 5 , 1 2 3 6 (Ala. Crim. App. 1 9 8 2 ) , a f f i r m e d i n p a r t , r e m a n d e d i n p a r t on o t h e r g r o u n d s , E x parte Whisenant, However, prejudiced for 482 S o . 2 d 1 2 4 1 despite by t h e t r i a l (Ala. Dotch's 1983). contention court's preventing that he was h i s family t o ask mercy, t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t h i s f a m i l y d i d p l e a d f o r sympathy and t h e t r i a l court found these a nonstatutory m i t i g a t i n g circumstance. pleas to constitute The t r i a l court found: " M e r c y : The d e f e n d a n t , h i s a t t o r n e y s a n d f a m i l y p l e a d f o r mercy. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e l e t t e r r e c e i v e d from G a r r e t t Dotch, t h e Court r e c e i v e d l e t t e r s from his f a m i l y members a n d a f o r m e r b a s k e t b a l l c o a c h . Those c a l l s f o r m e r c y c a n n o t be r e b u t t e d b y t h e S t a t e . The C o u r t i s a l s o m i n d f u l o f t h e t r a g i c a n d i r r e p l a c e a b l e l o s s s u f f e r e d by t h e v i c t i m ' s f a m i l y and f r i e n d s . However, t h i s n o n - s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t o r was i n j e c t e d b y t h e d e f e n s e , i s f o u n d t o e x i s t a n d i s g i v e n some w e i g h t . " (C. 5 7 2 . ) XIV. Dotch in argues that the t r i a l court abused i t s discretion assigning only small weight to the nonstatutory m i t i g a t i n g circumstances However, o f Dotch's poor mental because first time on a p p e a l , plain error rule. Rule this matter health. i s being raised i t i s due t o be a n a l y z e d p u r s u a n t 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . 135 f o r the to the CR-07-1913 The trial determining mental acted within t h a t the n o n s t a t u t o r y health weighing court was to be afforded its circumstance only discretion of Dotch's poor small weight process. " ' [ T ] h e w e i g h t t o a t t a c h t o [a] k n o w n m i t i g a t i n g circumstance i s w i t h i n the discretion of the trial court. See B u s h v . S t a t e , 695 So. 2 d 70 (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 5 ) , a f f ' d 695 So. 2 d 138 (Ala.), c e r t . denied, 522 U.S. 969, 118 S.Ct. 418, 139 L.Ed.2d 320 ( 1 9 9 7 ) . ' H o d g e s v . S t a t e , 856 So. 2d 8 7 5 , 893 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 1 ) , a f f ' d 856 S o . 2 d 936 (Ala. 2003). "'The circuit court must consider evidence o f f e r e d i n m i t i g a t i o n , but i t i s not obliged to find that the evidence constitutes a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance. As t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t has s t a t e d : " ' " S e e L o c k e t t v . O h i o , 438 U.S. 586, 98 S . C t . 2 9 5 4 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Ex p a r t e H a r t , 612 So. 2d 536, 542 (Ala. 1992) ('Lockett does not r e q u i r e that all evidence offered as m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e be f o u n d t o be m i t i g a t i n g . ' ) , c e r t . denied, 508 U.S. 9 5 3 , 113 S . C t . 2 4 5 0 , 124 L . E d . 2 d 666 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; and Ex p a r t e Slaton, 680 So. 2d 909, 924 (1996) ('"While L o c k e t t and i t s progeny r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of all evidence submitted as m i t i g a t i o n , whether the evidence is actually found to be m i t i g a t i n g i s i n the d i s c r e t i o n 136 in in its CR-07-1913 of the sentencing a u t h o r i t y . " ' ) ; q u o t i n g B a n k h e a d v. S t a t e , 585 S o . 2 d 97, 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1 0 7 9 , 117 S . C t . 7 4 2 , 136 L . E d . 2 d 680 ( 1 9 9 7 ) ) . " "'Ex p a r t e F e r g u s o n , (Ala. 2001). ' " C a l h o u n v. App. 2005), 2984, Spencer v. , 165 L.Ed.2d [Ms. (Ala. Crim. the concerning this So. 2d S t a t e , 932 So. 2 d 9 2 3 , c e r t . d e n i e d , 548 U.S. State, Here, 814 trial 990 976 975 ( A l a . C r i m . 9 2 6 , 126 S.Ct. (2006)." CR-04-2570, A p r i l App. 970, 4, 2008] So. 3d 2008). court made the nonstatutory mitigating following finding circumstance: " M e n t a l S t a t u s : The C o u r t h a s c o n s i d e r e d t h e defendant's mental health status i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s of 'extreme mental or e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e ' and 'diminished capacity.' The Court found that the defendant's mental h e a l t h s t a t u s does not s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of the existence of either of these statutory m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . However, i t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t has had m e n t a l h e a l t h p r o b l e m s throughout h i s l i f e , which have o c c a s i o n a l l y been t r e a t e d . The C o u r t f i n d s t h i s t o b e a n o n - s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e a n d a s s i g n s i t some w e i g h t . However, t h i s w e i g h t i s s m a l l b e c a u s e t h e d e f e n d a n t has r e f u s e d b o t h t o p u r s u e a v a i l a b l e m e n t a l h e a l t h treatment and to take medication prescribed to alleviate his condition. According to the o b s e r v a t i o n s of t h o s e c l o s e t o him, the m e d i c a t i o n was c a p a b l e o f s t a b i l i z i n g D o t c h ' s o t h e r w i s e e r r a t i c d e m e a n o r . The d e f e n d a n t ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a v o i d i n g h i s m e d i c a t i o n was t h a t i t ' s l o w e d h i m d o w n . ' " 137 CR-07-1913 (C. 5 7 0 - 7 1 . ) Thus, the trial court m i t i g a t i n g circumstance did found that the of a h i s t o r y of mental h e a l t h problems e x i s t , but a t t r i b u t e d l i t t l e weight to t h i s Dotch refrained helped individual taking there taking Dotch c a n n o t be held h i s medicine argues reasoned evidence explanation court rather that court capable the medicine remain find that mentally stable, his illness out giving the h i m down. The of slowed not from pointed the t r i a l was have mentally i l l f o u n d t h a t b e c a u s e D o t c h c h o s e t o f e e l more than properly that was a could for refraining as t h e t r i a l Dotch f a c t o r because that that accountable h i s or her medicine, was trial from Although him. nonstatutory court entitled to alert could much weight. XV. Dotch a l l e g e s t h a t the t r i a l in assigning mitigating circumstance environment following insubstantial during findings court weight of a lack childhood. concerning the nonstatutory of a stable and n u r t u r i n g The this circumstance: 138 abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n to trial court non-statutory made the mitigating CR-07-1913 "Lack of Stable and Nurturing Environment: The d e f e n d a n t was b o r n o u t o f w e d l o c k w h i l e h i s m o t h e r was i n a m e n t a l f a c i l i t y d u e t o a n e r v o u s b r e a k d o w n . She was i n m e n t a l h e a l t h c a r e f a c i l i t i e s , including S e a r c y H o s p i t a l , 12 t o 14 t i m e s w i t h a d i a g n o s i s o f paranoid schizophrenia during the defendant's c h i l d h o o d . The d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r b e c a m e a d d i c t e d t o c r a c k c o c a i n e w h e n h e was about 8 y e a r s o l d and r e m a i n e d u n d e r i t s i n f l u e n c e f o r many y e a r s . The d e f e n d a n t ' s f a t h e r s p e n t most o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s youth i n the p e n i t e n t i a r y and a d d i c t e d t o drugs. When the defendant's father and mother were t o g e t h e r , t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p was m a r k e d b y p h y s i c a l v i o l e n c e often committed i n the presence of the defendant. As a result of the mother's mental i l l n e s s a n d d r u g a b u s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t was p l a c e d i n the c u s t o d y o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Human R e s o u r c e s a t age 8. A f t e r several years of f o s t e r care, the d e f e n d a n t l i v e d w i t h one o r more o f t h e mother's b r o t h e r s a n d s i s t e r s a n d f o r some t i m e l i v e d w i t h a grandmother. "When t h e d e f e n d a n t was 14 o r 15 y e a r s o f a g e , h e was c o n f r o n t e d b y h i s f a t h e r i n a v i o l e n t m a n n e r w h i l e a t h i s g r a n d m o t h e r ' s home. A s a r e s u l t o f t h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t moved i n t o an a p a r t m e n t w i t h h i s 19 y e a r o l d b r o t h e r who t h e r e a f t e r p r o v i d e d the only support and guidance the defendant r e c e i v e d . The d e f e n d a n t ' s f a t h e r a n d m o t h e r w o u l d visit the apartment in order to steal their c h i l d r e n ' s b e l o n g i n g s a n d s e l l t h e m f o r d r u g s . The d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t l e a r n t h a t t h e man involved i n t h e s e e v e n t s was h i s f a t h e r u n t i l he was a l m o s t 20 y e a r s o l d . The d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r r e c e i v e d a S o c i a l S e c u r i t y check f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t and would use i t t o s u p p o r t h e r d r u g a d d i c t i o n , a l t h o u g h on o c c a s i o n s h e w o u l d g i v e h i m some p a r t o f t h e c h e c k . The d e f e n d a n t n e v e r h a d a s t a b l e w h o l e s o m e home p l a c e o r f a t h e r t o p r o v i d e him s u p e r v i s i o n and g u i d a n c e . Any p a r e n t a l i n f l u e n c e was p r o v i d e d b y f o s t e r c a r e o r t h e v a r i o u s s i b l i n g s o f h i s m o t h e r w i t h whom h e o c c a s i o n a l l y a n d t e m p o r a r i l y r e s i d e d . F r o m a g e 14 o r 1 5 , h i s o n l y 139 CR-07-1913 s u p e r v i s i o n was p r o v i d e d six years older. by a brother approximately "Accordingly, this Court finds this n o n - s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t o r d o e s e x i s t a n d g i v e s i t some w e i g h t . The w e i g h t g i v e n i s n o t s u b s t a n t i a l , b e c a u s e many p e o p l e i n o u r s o c i e t y a r e e x p o s e d t o t h e same t r o u b l i n g c o n d i t i o n s b u t r e f r a i n from s e n s e l e s s l y m u r d e r i n g i n n o c e n t v i c t i m s . The d e f e n d a n t ' s o l d e r b r o t h e r s h a r e d t h e same p a r e n t s a n d s u f f e r e d many o f t h e same c i r c u m s t a n c e s as t h e defendant. Y e t , he w o r k e d , was p r o d u c t i v e a n d p r o v i d e d f o r t h e w e l f a r e of others." (C. 568-70.) The trial upbringing. of in there Dotch's court family cared court this that circumstance finds circumstance; that that this however, the abuse i t s insubstantial members h i s childhood and 11 S o . 2 d 8 6 6 , 9 3 1 - 3 2 ( A l a . the trial court m i t i g a t i n g circumstances i n the difficult i n c l u d i n g that other " ' i n considering even Dotch's d i d not f o r him during (finding nonstatutory members, unpleasant trial was a l s o e v i d e n c e 2007) stated defendant, the See Brown v. S t a t e , App. considered and c o n s i d e r e d according family adolescence. Crim. found However, discretion weight; court light i s a where the testimony most favorable nonstatutory mitigating properly trial of both to the mitigating circumstance of an home l i f e was t o t a l l y o u t w e i g h e d b y t h e a g g r a v a t i n g 140 CR-07-1913 c i r c u m s t a n c e s as p r e s e n t e d See [by] t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c a s e . ' " ) . a l s o V a n p e l t v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 1 5 3 9 , D e c e m b e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 9 ] So. 3d mitigating , ( A l a . Crim. circumstances diagnosed antisocial mitigating circumstance was outweighed committed 1171, by 9, of lack aggravating imprisonment v. history as that State, activity, murder [Ms. of circumstances, the t r i a l i t has i tw i l l c o u r t must discretion give that circumstance. 710 S o . 2 d 1 2 7 6 (Ala. 1997)." ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996), Newton v. 2009] So. 3d , contended that the t r i a l nonstatutory mitigating State, of l i f e by t h e a g g r a v a t i n g consider a l l i n determining whether a p a r t i c u l a r m i t i g a t i n g circumstance i s proven weight App. dysfunctional and t h e j u r y ' s recommended s e n t e n c e "Although was CR-04- ( A l a .Crim. circumstances and statutory criminal , w i t h o u t p a r o l e were outweighed circumstances). mitigating well of prior Yancey (nonstatutory family as So. 3d 2009)(nonstatutory mitigating 2009) circumstance gain). 2009] f a m i l y environment difficult personality, f o r pecuniary October of App. and t h e See W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , aff'd, 710 S o . 2 d 1 3 5 0 [Ms. C R - 0 5 - 1 5 1 7 , October 2, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009) (where Newton court improperly failed to reference circumstances 141 of h i s upbringing, h i s CR-07-1913 family noted history, that and trial upbringing h i s accomplice's court's order that the t r i a l and h e l d sentence, referenced court this his Court difficult d i d n o t abuse i t s discretion). XVI . Dotch during argues the that sentencing violated his right that and failed court to and trial. improperly committed that, in Specifically, urged the jury to prior impaired instances to object to these level; the l e v e l capacity, of alleged so, he to reject error. Rule 45A, the disturbance as improperly misconduct. Dotch r e l i e f she contends alleged improprieties at the therefore to afford of p l a i n as w e l l misconduct doing f a c t o r s of extreme mental or emotional substantially referred phase to a fair the prosecutor mitigating the prosecutor they must Dotch trial rise Ala.R.App.P. A. Dotch alleges that the prosecutor improperly encouraged the j u r y t o r e j e c t the m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and b a s e d on t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g the prosecutor substantially of g u i l t . He impaired f u r t h e r argues c o n f l a t e d t h e two c i r c u m s t a n c e s 142 capacity that by s t a t i n g to CR-07-1913 the jury, these I t h i n k you l o o k a t t w o t o g e t h e r . " (R. 1 5 6 5 . ) The the " L e t ' s l o o k a t t h e s e two because record indicates prosecutor was concerning the circumstances 1 8 was a s that, commencing three argued when m a k i n g her alleged by Dotch this argument statutory and t h a t statement, to the jury mitigating her entire argument follows: " L e t ' s l o o k a t t h e s e two b e c a u s e I t h i n k you look at these two together. We'll take them separately. T h e m u r d e r was committed while the Defendant was u n d e r extreme mental or emotional d i s t u r b a n c e . W e l l , l a d i e s and gentlemen of the j u r y , in our case-in-chief, I t h i n k we w e n t o v e r this throughout the e n t i r e t r i a l . Dr. Rosen went o v e r t h i s . D r . McKeown w e n t o v e r t h i s . A n d y o u h e a r d D r . R o s e n g e t b a c k up on t h e s t a n d i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g p h a s e a n d a l l e g e t h e same t h i n g h e a l l e g e d i n t h e trial. And by your verdict, you have already d e t e r m i n e d t h i s . You d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e i r c l a i m o f n o t g u i l t y b y -- e x c u s e me, n o t g u i l t y b y r e a s o n o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t was n o t v a l i d . Y o u f o u n d h i m g u i l t y o f t h i s c r i m e . Y o u f o u n d t h a t h e was a b l e to a p p r e c i a t e the nature and wrongfulness of h i s a c t s a t t h e t i m e t h a t he c o m m i t t e d t h i s m u r d e r . "So, I s u b m i t t o y o u , l a d i e s a n d g e n t l e m e n o f the j u r y , t h i s i s n o t a m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e . A t t h e t i m e t h a t he c o m m i t t e d t h i s m u r d e r , he was n o t u n d e r e x t r e m e m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e . He knew w h a t h e was d o i n g . Y o u f o u n d t h a t w h e n y o u found him g u i l t y o f c a p i t a l murder. A t t h e time t h a t D o t c h a l s o a r g u e d t h a t h i s age a t t h e t i m e o f t h e murder was a s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e . 1 8 143 CR-07-1913 he c o m m i t t e d t h i s m u r d e r , h e h a d t h e c a p a c i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y o f h i s c o n d u c t . You f o u n d t h a t when y o u f o u n d h i m g u i l t y o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r . jury, (R. "I submit t o you, l a d i e s and gentlemen o f t h e t h i s m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e does n o t e x i s t . " 1565-66.) I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e same e v i d e n c e t h a t i s i n t r o d u c e d f o r e v a l u a t i n g w h e t h e r a d e f e n d a n t ' s s a n i t y was i n q u e s t i o n time of of the offense mental disease so as t o s a t i s f y or defect may the affirmative also be looked at the defense to for a determination of whether the m i t i g a t i n g circumstances of both substantially impaired and under emotional i n f i r m i t y exist. (Ala. 1989), rehearing cert. denied, psychological 498 evidence, 1127 examination circumstances, no See Ex p a r t e overruled, U.S. indicating that Davis emotional infirmity [Ala.] have some (1991) (where t h e same Davis two sought a mitigating there was "was u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of a mental or doubt pretrial that 1990), examinations, at the (Ala. mental C o d e 1 9 7 5 , §§ [cast] 554 S o . 2 d 1 1 1 1 Supreme C o u r t h e l d the time f e l o n y t h a t w o u l d be r e l e v a n t in Davis, of mental or 5 6 9 S o . 2 d 738 t o prove t h e Alabama including the influence he to the mitigating 13-11-7(2) on committed [Davis's] 144 and the circumstances (6)"or "that sanity capital might a t the time he CR-07-1913 committed the found "no capital f e l o n y . " 554 evidence that So. [Davis's] 2d at 1118. mental The court condition seriously i n question, either at the g u i l t phase of the or sentencing the at the Moreover, court the informed being record the circumstances, as a r g u e d by phase of Dotch. as the existence instructed the three mitigating is in dispute. as to of the m i t i g a t i n g i t s duty (R. i s no (R. 1 9 the two jury's trial mitigating the jury circumstances, as t o d i s p r o v e them i f t h e i r 1611-21.) The jury was also weighing these 1612-15.) indication mitigating c a u s e d by her the circumstances charged i n c o n s i d e r i n g and c o n f u s e d by the p r o s e c u t o r ' s of statutory court also f u l l y S t a t e ' s burden of proof circumstances. There indicates that a l l the The trial Id.). of as as t o t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f well further jury well trial." was i n the circumstances. the that comments as t o t h e comments c o n c e r n i n g d e c i s i o n , from record guilt Nor was See jury was consideration there the evidence, phase. the confusion including Part XII, the supra. T h e j u r y was n o t i m p r o p e r l y i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d o f p r o o f f o r t h e s e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s was a s h i g h a s that f o r the a f f i r m a t i v e defense of mental disease or d e f e c t . I v e r y v . S t a t e , 686 So. 2 d 4 9 5 , 503 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1996). 1 9 145 CR-07-1913 See also App. Ferguson 2000) v. State, So. 2d 925, 962 ("Contrary to Ferguson's contention, the trial and found that Ferguson the court applied that 814 court used the word 'insane' knew r i g h t the Crim. merely because i n i t s sentencing from wrong standard (Ala. of does legal order not mean insanity to Ferguson's p r o f f e r e d m i t i g a t i n g evidence. A f t e r reviewing record and t h a t the was the trial legally ability court insane i n f l u e n c e o f an his trial to court's d i d not in require order to order, we conclude Ferguson to prove that show that he was under extreme mental or e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e , appreciate s u b s t a n t i a l l y impaired, the sentencing the criminality o r t h a t he was substantial domination of the another of his he the that conduct under extreme duress was or person."). B. Dotch instances argues that of alleged his references to disparaging r e m a r k he as a health fights teenager, and the he prosecutor prior got improperly misconduct. involved in made a b o u t a t e a c h e r , his choking facility. 146 a mentioned He as cites a youth, his selling housekeeper at her a a drugs mental- CR-07-1913 The jury record that through the indicates evidence records from he which existence of the upbringing and mental and his housed objected argued that for teacher the marijuana "bitch." (R. a comments, and to would fighting, his Defense prosecutor contradict the overruled the jury as to how drug usage and judge inform the a evidence. then stolen bleak calling the trial from the referred 1584.) The prosecutor in a of his evidence. consider this suspension and relevant to it phase t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d D o t c h as a s t a t e d t h a t he the mental-health prosecutor was and his from evidence objection The The fighting, these to guilt circumstances records to mitigating should the school records that referred to h i s physical-education responded and argued r e f u t e d h i s arguments of 2 0 illness. suspended during school mitigating manipulator prosecutor presented was mental-health-facility counsel the Dotch's facilities being that referred school for vehicle. She to Dotch's having argued been to caught the Dotch s t a t e d i n h i s medical r e p o r t s at Searcy M e d i c a l jury with that Facility I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e s e r e c o r d s w e r e i n t r o d u c e d b y Dotch at the g u i l t phase. 2 0 147 CR-07-1913 that he had activities with never taken responsibility and d r u g usage and h i s medicines. argument in desolate (R. 1585.) She that was negated by Dotch's specifically, t h a t he sold noted short-term that he jobs was school. (R. goes show t h a t to tried 1 5 8 6 - 8 7 . ) The the (R. and play t h a t he to brother circumstances job was fired instance wherein Searcy Medical the Facility. was aggravating factor. circumstance; this prosecutor Dotch attempted prosecutor prosecutor from yet sports she in high a l l of this q u i t e what they s t a t e d , "And weren't were history; follow rules, organized prosecutor defense's ladies and 1587.) Thereafter, view his self-reported drugs, to and t o make t h e m s e e m i n t h e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e , gentlemen." the Dotch illegal noncompliant argued t h a t the for failing able his f u r t h e r t h a t he was mitigation several for arguing evidence however, the t r i a l evidence as going t h e r e f o r e i n s t r u c t e d the counsel 1 5 8 7 - 8 8 . ) The could present to comment on an to s t r a n g l e a housekeeper Defense improperly (R. began objected another trial that the unauthorized court noted to negate a that mitigating court stated that i t did to that purpose. The trial not court j u r y to d i s r e g a r d "the b e g i n n i n g " 148 at of CR-07-1913 the prosecutor's misconduct." (R. Defense they moved comments as prior ruled acts made p a r t law. ... f o r the going to trial because prejudicial As that to ability to conform the time on the court, the stated argument probative conduct the go into these prior that otherwise part of to into these acts that haven't been hearing, was would "I've a c l o s i n g argument that." i t to stated, l e t you (R. and so I'm 1590-91.) The sustaining concerning value the however, sentencing that the to go objection refute appreciate his records i n the to to going summation, any any based went his or not then to evidence c a s e - i n - c h i e f as sustain objection the trial I'm of first court The that the that conduct in this of mistrial The concerning his you've p u l l e d out to a were u n d u l y p r e j u d i c i a l . factor already for she mitigating of prior c r i m i n a l conduct because responded requirements r e l a t e d some the prosecutor of she r e l e v a n t and were not criminality " i n which 1588.) counsel prosecutor's says, argument the be choking outweighed Dotch's incident by its effect. the because motion the jury for had a mistrial, already 149 the prosecutor determined guilt argued in the CR-07-1913 first phase trial. The the of trial, Dotch would not be entitled judge determined that h i s c u r a t i v e (R. Here, and argument the t r i a l court s u s t a i n e d Dotch's instructed " i n which 1588.) T h i s a c t i o n error to any 1592.) p r o s e c u t o r that i t would acts, new instructions objection argument c o n c e r n i n g the c h o k i n g of the housekeeper, any a j u r y t o d i s r e g a r d t h e comments were s u f f i c i e n t t o c u r e error. the to as the she by to the instructed not allow r e f e r e n c e to the jury to disregard related the t r i a l some prior j u d g e was the prosecutor's misconduct." sufficient to t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s comments. "A declaration of a mistrial indicates a m i s c a r r i a g e o f j u s t i c e and i s g r a n t e d o n l y where i t i s c l e a r l y m a n i f e s t t h a t j u s t i c e c a n n o t be i n s u r e d . C h e s s o n v . S t a t e , 435 S o . 2 d 1 7 7 , 181 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) ; L o n g v . S t a t e , 370 S o . 2 d 354 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979). "Where t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m m e d i a t e l y i n s t r u c t s t h e j u r y not to consider a f a c t , that i n s t r u c t i o n , i n e f f e c t , removes o r e x c l u d e s t h a t m a t t e r from the j u r y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and t h e p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t of the statement i s deemed to be cured by such i n s t r u c t i o n . B r a d l e y v . S t a t e , 450 S o . 2 d 1 7 3 , 176 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) ; R i c h a r d s o n v . S t a t e , 374 S o . 2 d 433 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 7 9 ) . The t r i a l j u d g e ' s i m m e d i a t e charge to the j u r y to disregard an impropriety raises a prima facie presumption against error. K e l l e y v . S t a t e , 405 S o . 2 d 728 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 405 S o . 2 d 731 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . 150 prior (R. cure CR-07-1913 "'The e n t r y o f a m i s t r i a l i s n o t l i g h t l y t o be u n d e r t a k e n . I t s h o u l d be o n l y a l a s t r e s o r t , a s i n cases of otherwise ineradicable prejudice. Where e r r o r i s e r a d i c a b l e a m i s t r i a l i s t o o d r a s t i c and i s properly denied.' Woods v . S t a t e , 460 So. 2 d 291, 296 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 4 ) ; C h i l l o u s v . S t a t e , 405 So. 2 d 58 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 1 ) . "'When p r e j u d i c i a l r e m a r k s h a v e b e e n made, t h e trial judge is in a better p o s i t i o n than the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t to determine whether the remarks w e r e so p r e j u d i c i a l as t o be i n e r a d i c a b l e . ' C h a m b e r s v . S t a t e , 382 So. 2 d 6 3 2 , 635 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. d e n i e d , 382 S o . 2 d 636 (Ala. 1980)." Soriano v. State, 527 So. 2d 1367, 1371 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). Moreover, examination the of Dotch's t e s t i f i e d t h a t he from time also acknowledged evidence trial." to that record brother that during the penalty at (R. that 1554.) Furthermore, "both sides accepted during will the the rely guilt (R. 1 5 5 6 . ) T h u s , e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g 2007 } from the c r i m e s by So. 2d Alabama cross- phase, S m i t h v. State, [Ms. ( A l a . C r i m . App. Supreme Smith during Court) trial he court on a l l the phase of the Dotch's bad i n c l u d i n g h i s drug usage, were p r o p e r l y b e f o r e p e n a l t y phase. Cf. the knew t h a t D o t c h " m i g h t h a v e s m o k e d some w e e d time." was reveals j u r y at the CR-97-1258, A u g u s t 31, 2007) (State's the acts, ( o p i n i o n on reference to remand prior i t s o p e n i n g argument t h a t were not a l l 151 CR-07-1913 proven was at the evidence penalty p h a s e was admitted at concerning his trial i n s t r u c t e d the the arguments of were not aggravating e r r o r because sentencing c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y and counsel harmless court evidence and c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d c o u l d be that there extensive jury only that the considered two by the jury.). " S t a t e m e n t s o f c o u n s e l i n a r g u m e n t m u s t be v i e w e d as i n t h e h e a t o f d e b a t e and m u s t be v a l u e d a t t h e i r t r u e w o r t h r a t h e r t h a n as f a c t o r s i n t h e formation o f t h e v e r d i c t . H a y e s v . S t a t e , 395 So. 2 d 127 (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 0 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 395 So. 2 d 150 (Ala. 1 9 8 1 ) ; M c Q u e e n v . S t a t e , 355 So. 2 d 407 (Ala. Crim. App. 1 9 7 8 ) ; P i c k e t t v . S t a t e , 417 So. 2 d 589 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 8 2 ) . " O r r v . S t a t e , 462 So. 2 d 1013, 1016 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). The trial court i n s t r u c t e d the j u r y t h a t the a t t o r n e y s ' arguments and comments w e r e n o t t o be v i e w e d as e v i d e n c e and c u r e d any e r r o r i n the prosecutor's reference to p r i o r bad a c t s by D o t c h . XVII. Dotch argues that his sentence reversed pursuant to the holding 584, S.Ct. L.Ed. 122 2 4 2 8 , 153 Alabama's c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g to the s c h e m e h e l d t o be j u r y ' s v e r d i c t i s not 2d of death i n R i n g v. 556 is Arizona, ( 2 0 0 2 ) . He to be 536 U.S. alleges that scheme i s f u n c t i o n a l l y i d e n t i c a l u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n Ring, binding due on t h a t Alabama's c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g 152 the court. He because further the argues scheme v i o l a t e s A p p r e n d i v. CR-07-1913 New J e r s e y , 530 that any U.S. that fact 466 (2000), by v i o l a t i n g i n c r e a s e s the proved beyond a reasonable maximum the requirement p e n a l t y must be doubt. I n A p p r e n d i , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t fact that increased a defendant's other than the fact sentence beyond statutory limits, of a p r i o r h a d t o be found by a j u r y beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. a the conviction, The Court then a p p l i e d t h i s h o l d i n g to cases i n v o l v i n g the death p e n a l t y in Ring, supra. However, c o u r t s i n Alabama have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t Alabama's sentencing scheme Apprendi because a capital the 2002); App. issue unconstitutional i s not a finding therefore, to circumstances. not weigh See Beckworth v. a the Ex already been 153 at constitutionally So. not 859 2d 1120 determined arguments. to arrive o r an aggravating 946 or of fact p a r t e Waldrop, State, Ring, is jury 2 0 0 5 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 549 U.S. has under the weighing process undertaken sentence offense; required is and So. 490, element of mitigating 2d 515 1181 (Ala. (Ala. Crim. (2007). T h e r e f o r e adversely to this Dotch's CR-07-1913 XVIII. Dotch contends rendered Alabama's (Dotch's brief, procedures substantial violate States violate I, that "evolving method at of 116.) execution Dotch f o r administering risk the Eighth of standards o f decency a inflicting argues lethal also submits t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e Alabama this appellate issue that courts of this Alabama's injection unnecessary that pain pose and to the these State United procedures Art. punishment. have repeatedly t o be m e r i t l e s s . "This issue has been addressed by recent o p i n i o n s f r o m t h i s C o u r t . I n S a u n d e r s v . S t a t e , 10 S o . 3 d 53 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 7 ) , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d : "'The U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s held that the imposition of the death p e n a l t y as a sentence f o r c a p i t a l murder i s n o t p e r se u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . See G r e g g v . G e o r g i a , 428 U.S. 1 5 3 , 96 S . C t . 2 9 0 9 , 49 L . E d . 2 d 859 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . I n a d d i t i o n , A l a b a m a ' s capital-murder statute has been upheld against a variety of constitutional c h a l l e n g e s . S e e , e . g . , C l a r k v . S t a t e , 896 S o . 2 d 584 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) , a n d cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . This Court has a l s o held that lethal injection does not constitute per se cruel and unusual p u n i s h m e n t . S e e , e . g . , M c N a b b v . S t a t e , 991 154 a thus C o n s t i t u t i o n 1901, § 15, p r o h i b i t i n g c r u e l and u n u s u a l The unconstitutional." a n d F o u r t e e n t h Amendments C o n s t i t u t i o n . He have held CR-07-1913 So. 2 d 313 ( A l a . Crim. App. 2007), and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . Therefore, Saunders's general claim that the death penalty c o n s t i t u t e s c r u e l and unusual punishment i s merit less.'" J a c k s o n v. S t a t e , 3d , [Ms. [Ms. C R - 0 6 - 1 3 9 8 , D e c e m b e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 9 ] ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2009). See a l s o V a n p e l t v. CR-06-1539, December 18, 2009] So. 3d C r i m . App. 2009) (Vanpelt's argument t h a t of rendered decency have unconstitutional" States Supreme held the Alabama State, , (Ala. "evolving standards Alabama's method t o have been Court, So. of execution rejected Supreme by ... the United Court, and this Court). XIX. Dotch and from argues unusual that punishment "long-lasting (Dotch's brief, Under the death when a p p l i e d mental to a person health problems" who like cruel suffers himself. a t 118.) constitutional from the imposition meet the definition guidelines, of the death of Perkins, 8 5 1 S o . 2 d 453 U.S. (2002), 304 penalty i s especially retarded, ( A l a .2002); 155 t o be exempt penalty, a defendant mentally or the d e f i n i t i o n i n order see Ex must parte A t k i n s v. V i r g i n i a , of l e g a l insanity. 536 § 15- CR-07-1913 16-24, A l a . Code 1975. Moreover, Alabama's system of the aggravating circumstances in order to determine or death not i s the t o be and the m i t i g a t i n g whether l i f e appropriate concerning a defendant's thus, In phase, to death. the mental that Dotch determining concerning the case, was not sentencing, the mitigating the § held evidence to be 13A-5-48. insane. jury at the guilt Thereafter, considered circumstances or been determined determined legally i n f l u e n c e of extreme mental is parole the defendant c o u l d not jury the has mitigating health § 13A-5-46(e); present i n a case i f the outweigh the aggravating evidence, sentenced circumstances imprisonment without sentence unconstitutional; weighing evidence t h a t D o t c h was emotional when under disturbance and t h a t h i s c a p a c i t y to a p p r e c i a t e the c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct or to conform i t to the impaired. requirements § 13A-5-51(2) and o f l a w was substantially ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975. evidence circumstance c o n c e r n i n g Dotch's m e n t a l h e a l t h and h i s t o r y . determined aggravating Dotch, that this circumstances. accorded small weight the nonstatutory jury considered jury of The evidence The to 156 trial the was mitigating outweighed court, also by The the in sentencing nonstatutory mitigating CR-07-1913 circumstance concerning h i s mental statutory mitigating Ala. Code 1975, Thus, Court will not prohibitions this case. App. 2003), denied, was and properly extend Gavin cert. U.S. unusual punishment statute's rather denied, 891 1123 So. (2005) validity s h o u l d be can 937 not determined So. 2d 2d 998 death, and (quoting other (6), this constitutional 935-38 (Ala.Crim. ( A l a . 2004), claim r e a c h e d as of cert. cruel and factually "'"the question of determined o n l y as the of the death p e n a l t y i n (Gavin's be that weight. b a s e d on a c h a l l e n g e t h a t d i d n o t enforced i n the s p e c i f i c at the 891 a p p l y t o h i s c a s e s h o u l d n o t be a to expand State, found a c c o r d e d t h e m no sentenced or v. and i n § 13A-5-51(2) and a g a i n s t the a p p l i c a t i o n See 543 circumstances d i d not e x i s t Dotch status abstractly, i t applies and case b e f o r e the c o u r t . " ' " i s to 891 So. but be 2d cases)). XX. Pursuant to t o § 13A-5-35, A l a . Code address the p r o p r i e t y of Dotch's death. because Dotch he was killed indicted and we are required c o n v i c t i o n and sentence convicted Timarla Taldon 157 1975, by use of of of capital a murder deadly weapon CR-07-1913 while s h e was i n a vehicle. See § 13A-5-40 (17), Ala.Code 1975. According entire t o R u l e 45A, A l a . R . A p p . P . , we h a v e s e a r c h e d proceedings f o r any p l a i n Further, pursuant required to death. in address § 13A-5-53, The record imposed does as prejudice, that adversely result any that the Dotch's influence are sentence of i s no e r r o r rights. the sentence arbitrary none. 1 9 7 5 , we a f f e c t e d Dotch's of other of found court that there not r e f l e c t the or of this and have A l a . Code the propriety I t i s the finding the sentencing was to error the of of death passion, factor. See § 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1975. The trial circumstances: was under previously court found the existence sentence been of imprisonment convicted 1 9 7 5 . The t r i a l statutory of the court mitigating mitigating aggravating t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was c o m m i t t e d b y D o t c h w h e n h e of a threat of violence t o the person. Code o f two that Dotch i n v o l v i n g the use or f u r t h e r found the existence the t r i a l circumstances 158 had § 13A-5-49(1) and (2), A l a . circumstances. circumstances, following felony and As to the court and o f no nonstatutory found the existence accorded each "some CR-07-1913 weight": during Dotch's lack childhood, of a Dotch's stable long-term Dotch's mental-health problems, care Dotch's, for others, attorneys' further the pleas of parole for mercy. death and In recommended to Dotch's his the favor order life weight under circumstances, the illegal The by love and and his trial i t of imprisonment the court considered a vote 10 in without law. circumstances trial drugs, members', that death of environment capacity to 568-72.) of aggravating of family (C. sentence in g a v e i t due weighing mitigating 2 nurturing abuse indicated i n i t s sentencing jury's favor and and court against the determined: " T i m a r l a T a l d o n was a y o u n g woman l o v e d b y h e r family, and she d i d not deserve her fate. She supported h e r s e l f w h i l e c o n t i n u i n g her education. G a r r e t t D o t c h t o r m e n t e d h e r and w o u l d not l e t h e r l i v e i n p e a c e . He t w i c e p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o committing c r i m e s a g a i n s t h e r , y e t he c o n t i n u e d t o h a r a s s and threaten her. Garrett Dotch, acting with unexplainable malice, violently ended Timarla Taldon's p r o m i s i n g young l i f e . " (C. 574-75.) The trial court determined circumstances outweighed trial findings concerning of court's these circumstances are the that mitigating the supported 159 the circumstances. existence by aggravating the and record. The weighing CR-07-1913 It i s the finding of this Court that death i s the proper s e n t e n c e i n t h i s c a s e . S e c t i o n 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) ( 2 ) , A l a . Code 1975, r e q u i r e s t h i s c o u r t t o weigh t h e a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances and the mitigating propriety of circumstances Dotch's sentence weighing of indicates that the t r i a l that death As Court the aggravating i s the proper required must by disproportionate in and mitigating So. 2 d 470 After 13A-5-53(b)(3), circumstances whether A l a . Code Dotch's 1975, sentence this was case i s neither o r e x c e s s i v e when c o m p a r e d t o t h e p e n a l t i e s cases, considering (Ala. Crim. (Ala. Crim. carefully App. expressed the circumstances See, e.g., Key v. S t a t e , App. 2002); Knight v. S t a t e , reviewing the record of both here, we 907 2004). phase and t h e s e n t e n c i n g phase of Dotch's reasons independent sentence. surrounding both t h e crime and Dotch. So. 2 d 353 An c a s e s . The p e n a l t y i n t h i s similar 891 death. o r e x c e s s i v e when c o m p a r e d t o t h e s e n t e n c e s imposed i n s i m i l a r imposed § of the c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n was p r o p e r a n d determine disproportionate independently t o determine affirm trial, Dotch's the g u i l t and f o rt h e conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. Welch, concurs Windom, and Kellum, i n the result. 160 J J . , concur. Wise, P . J . ,

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