Wakilii Brown v. State of Alabama

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REL: 06/25/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 CR-07-1332 Wakilii Brown v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal WISE, P r e s i d i n g The counts from T a l l a d e g a C i r c u i t (CC-01-290) Judge. appellant, of capital Wakilii murder m u r d e r made c a p i t a l Brown, was c o n v i c t e d f o rthe killings ("Dotty") a n d Cherea Jemison with Court ("Cherea"). because of o f Dotty three Jemison Count I charged h i m he k i l l e d Dotty and Cherea CR-07-1332 pursuant to 40(a)(10), one Ala. robbery-murder and Count see § by which a vote to him conduct, see § charged him with II and w i t h the Code 10-2, of Ala. the death. f o r New 13A-5- The Trial 1975. jury trial sentenced robbery-murder a to Cherea, that accepted death. 1975; sentencing recommended court Brown and/or After of the the Brown R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of he be jury's filed a Sentence," conducting a hearing. This followed. Because this imposed, Rule objection we 45A, at is a have Ala. trial involving the case 2d 1106 R. will death ( A l a . 1985). i n which reviewed App. not the P. bar the death Although our raise. R u l e 45A, penalty record for plain review penalty, i t w i l l c l a i m o f p r e j u d i c e B r o w n may So. of Count the t r i a l c o u r t denied a f t e r appeal case course o f D o t t y , see § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 2 ) , A l a . Code recommendation "Motion or 1975; I I I charged sentenced See Code 13A-5-40(a)(2), hearing, been scheme the of lack an weigh error. of issue an in a against any See E x p a r t e K e n n e d y , 472 A l a . R. A p p . P., provides: "In a l l c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y has been imposed, the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals shall n o t i c e any p l a i n e r r o r o r d e f e c t i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s u n d e r r e v i e w ... w h e n e v e r s u c h e r r o r h a s o r p r o b a b l y has a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t o f the appellant." 2 has CR-07-1332 " [ T h i s ] p l a i n - e r r o r exception to the rule in i s t o be which 'used sparingly, a m i s c a r r i a g e of U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Y o u n g , 470 84 L. 816 2d 1 152, U.S. Ed. (1985) 163 n.14, n.14 following solely justice U.S. i n those would 1, 1 5 , circumstances otherwise 105 S. C t . 1 0 3 8 , ( q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v. S. Ct. 1584, 1592 result.'" n.14, 1046, Frady, 71 L. 456 Ed. 2d (1982)). The 102 contemporaneous-objection by the t r i a l summary o f t h e r e l e v a n t c o u r t , may facts, as prepared be h e l p f u l t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f case: "The d e f e n d a n t was i n d i c t e d , t r i e d a n d c o n v i c t e d f o r the c a p i t a l o f f e n s e of C a p i t a l Murder wherein two o r more p e r s o n s a r e m u r d e r e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t p u r s u a n t t o one scheme o r c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t as p r o v i d e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-40(a)(10) o f t h e Code o f Alabama; the c a p i t a l o f f e n s e of Murder, Robbery 1st Degree by t h e d e f e n d a n t o f D o t t y J e m i s o n as p r o v i d e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-40(a)(2) o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a ; and the c a p i t a l o f f e n s e of Murder, Robbery l s t Degree by the defendant of Cherea Jemison as p r o v i d e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-40(a)(2) o f t h e Code o f Alabama. The v i c t i m s o f C o u n t 1 w e r e D o t t y J e m i s o n a n d C h e r e a J e m i s o n ; t h e v i c t i m o f C o u n t 2 was D o t t y Jemison; and the v i c t i m o f C o u n t 3 was Cherea Jemison. The sole perpetrator of these capital o f f e n s e s was the d e f e n d a n t , W a k i l i i Brown. The f a c t s l e a d i n g up t o t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e s e c r i m e s a r e as f o l l o w s : " D o t t y J e m i s o n l i v e d a t 449 M a r i o n A v e n u e i n t h e Pinecrest area of Sylacauga. Sometime i n 2000, Cherea Jemison, Dotty's daughter, moved i n w i t h 3 this CR-07-1332 Dotty Jemison. C h e r e a was a c c o m p a n i e d b y h e r t h r e e c h i l d r e n , [ F . S . ] , [ T . S . ] and [ K . S . ] Sometime i n t h e F a l l o f 2000, t h e D e f e n d a n t a l s o moved i n w i t h D o t t y Jemison. The d e f e n d a n t h a d a d a t i n g relationship w i t h C h e r e a J e m i s o n a n d was t h e f a t h e r o f [ T . S . a n d K.S.] 1 "On F r i d a y , M a r c h 9, 2 0 0 1 , t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d some w o r k w i t h M i c h a e l P o p e . M i c h a e l Pope a n d A l e t h a Pope, M i c h a e l ' s w i f e , p a i d h i m f o r work done and gave h i m a r i d e t o a n o t h e r l o c a t i o n . T h a t was t h e l a s t t i m e t h a t M i c h a e l P o p e saw t h e d e f e n d a n t . " S a t u r d a y , M a r c h 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , was C h e r e a J e m i s o n ' s birthday. Family members tried to c a l l the r e s i d e n c e a t 4 4 9 M a r i o n b u t t h e r e was n o a n s w e r . "On t h e same d a y , t h e d e f e n d a n t w e n t t o t h e A l a b a m a T r u s t Bank i n S y l a c a u g a t o c a s h a c h e c k on Dotty Jemison's account. The t e l l e r , A l e t h a Pope, t o l d h i m t h a t s h e c o u l d n o t c a s h i t b e c a u s e i t was on an a c c o u n t on F i r s t F e d e r a l B a n k . The d e f e n d a n t l e f t a n d came b a c k . He t h e n w a n t e d t o c a s h a c h e c k f r o m C h e r e a J e m i s o n ' s a c c o u n t ( S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t #38 i s t h e c h e c k f r o m C h e r e a ' s a c c o u n t , d a t e d 3/10/01 for $200). The d e f e n d a n t t o l d A l e t h a Pope t h a t t h e b a b y , [ K . S . ] , was s i c k a n d h a d a n u p p e r r e s p i r a t o r y problem and was at Children's Hospital i n Birmingham. Roxanne Womack, an employee of C h i l d r e n ' s H o s p i t a l i n Birmingham, t e s t i f i e d that t h e y h a d no r e c o r d o f a [ K . S . ] i n M a r c h o f 2 0 0 1 . "On t h e same d a t e , a c h e c k f r o m t h e a c c o u n t o f D o t t y J e m i s o n was c a s h e d b y J e n n i f e r Weed, a t e l l e r at F i r s t F e d e r a l Bank. T h e c h e c k was s e n t f r o m t h e t h i r d d r i v e - t h r o u g h l a n e , a t F i r s t F e d e r a l Bank i n S y l a c a u g a by a b l a c k male d r i v i n g a blue car. The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e t h a t , a t t h e time o f t r i a l , t h r e e c h i l d r e n had been l e g a l l y adopted. 1 the 4 CR-07-1332 (State's Exhibit account) #42 i s a c h e c k f o r $200 on D o t t y ' s "On Sunday, March 11, 2001, n e i t h e r Dotty J e m i s o n o r C h e r e a J e m i s o n was a t c h u r c h s e r v i c e s a t the R i s i n g S t a r C h u r c h i n S y l a c a u g a . The p a s t o r a n d f a m i l y t r i e d t o c a l l t h e r e s i d e n c e a t 449 M a r i o n , b u t d i d n o t g e t an answer. "On t h e same d a t e , a n a n o n y m o u s c a l l w a s p l a c e d t o S y l a c a u g a P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t a t 5:31 p.m. s t a t i n g t h a t t h e r e was a p r o b l e m a t 449 M a r i o n A v e . O f f i c e r D o u g Kemp w a s d i s p a t c h e d t o 4 4 9 M a r i o n A v e n u e f o r a w e l f a r e check. No o n e a n s w e r e d t h e d o o r a n d h e l e f t the residence. L a t e r t h a t n i g h t , a t 9:36 p.m., a s e c o n d c a l l e r i d e n t i f i e d h i m s e l f a s M r . Adam M u r r e l l and s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be d e a d b o d i e s i n t h e house. P o l i c e o f f i c e r s w e r e a g a i n d i s p a t c h e d t o 449 Marion Ave. I n v e s t i g a t o r Mike Smith o f Sylacauga P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t made e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e r e s i d e n c e t h r o u g h a window and f o u n d two b o d i e s . One b o d y o f a b l a c k f e m a l e was f o u n d i n a n u n l o c k e d b e d r o o m c o v e r e d w i t h two b l a n k e t s . She a p p e a r e d t o be d e a d . The s e c o n d b o d y w a s f o u n d i n a l o c k e d b e d r o o m . I t was a b l a c k f e m a l e whose a n k l e s a n d w r i s t s were bound w i t h duct tape and green tape. " R o z e l l Lohman, f r o m t h e A l a b a m a D e p a r t m e n t o f Forensic Sciences, t e s t i f i e d that a latent print of value has 9 p o i n t s or b e t t e r . He i d e n t i f i e d t h e l a t e n t p r i n t s on i n s i d e o f a c a r d b o a r d c y l i n d e r t h a t was f o u n d n e x t t o t h e b o d y o f D o t t y J e m i s o n . Latent #1 i s t h e l e f t t h u m b o f t h e d e f e n d a n t . L a t e n t #2 i s the l e f t index finger of the defendant. No o t h e r l a t e n t s o f v a l u e were found. "Dr. J o s e p h Embry o f t h e B i r m i n g h a m Department of Forensic Sciences preformed the autopsies of Cherea Jemison and Dotty Jemison. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t C h e r e a J e m i s o n h a d a wound i n t h e m i d l i n e o f h e r f a c e , l a c e r a t i o n s deep t o t h e bone, f r a c t u r e d n a s a l bones and b l o o d under t h e s k i n o f h e r eye l i d . She 5 CR-07-1332 a l s o had a l a c e r a t i o n i n her l e f t e a r . H e r h e a d was s h a v e d t o o b s e r v e her o t h e r wounds. State's Exhibit #4 s h o w s t h e r i g h t s i d e o f h e r h e a d a n d d e p i c t s 10 l a c e r a t i o n s i n her s c a l p , above her r i g h t ear, back o f h e r h e a d and u p p e r p a r t o f h e r r i g h t e a r . Dr. Embry t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e l a c e r a t i o n s a p p e a r t o be c a u s e d by a b l u n t o b j e c t . S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t #5 s h o w s t h e u p p e r r i g h t s i d e of h e r h e a d and l a c e r a t i o n s t o the top of her head. S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t #11 s h o w s two l a c e r a t i o n s b e h i n d her l e f t ear, which o v e r l i e s a large basal skull fracture. There were defensive w o u n d s on h e r h a n d s , s u f f e r e d f r o m d e f e n d i n g o f f blows. S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t #14 s h o w s b l u e b r u i s i n g a n d s w e l l i n g i n the r i n g and l i t t l e f i n g e r of her left hand. Dr. Embry t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r i g o r i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t was thirty-six to f o r t y - e i g h t hours a f t e r d e a t h . T h e r i g o r was c o n s i s t e n t i n D o t t y a n d C h e r e a Jemison. " D r . E m b r y a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t D o t t y J e m i s o n was bound at the ankles, w r i s t s and was gagged with s i l v e r duct tape. T h e r e was a l s o g r e e n t a p e on h e r ankles. State's Exhibit #27 depicts four l a c e r a t i o n s to the r i g h t s i d e of Dotty Jamison's h e a d and b e h i n d h e r r i g h t e a r . T h e r e was a p a t t e r n i n j u r y on t h e t o p f r o n t o f D o t t y J e m i s o n ' s h e a d t h a t was consistent with the c l a w end of a hammer. S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t #21 d e p i c t s the r i g h t r i n g f i n g e r was c o m p l e t e l y f r a c t u r e d . S t a t e ' s e x h i b i t #23 s h o w s bruising and swelling between the thumb and forefinger. Dr. Embry t e s t i f i e d t h a t D o t t y J e m i s o n d i e d as a r e s u l t o f b l u n t f o r c e t r a u m a t o t h e h e a d and t h a t t h e wounds t o D o t t y J e m i s o n and Cherea Jemison are s i m i l a r . "On Monday, M a r c h 12, 2008, a s t a n d o f f b e g a n with the defendant and the Cleveland Crisis I n t e r v e n t i o n team. Sgt. L a r r y Hughes t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was t h e A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Commander o f t h e Crisis I n t e r v e n t i o n Team i n C l e v e l a n d , O h i o and t h a t the d e f e n d a n t was b a r r i c a d e d i n 405 E a s t 1 5 2 n d S t r e e t i n Cleveland. The s t a n d o f f w i t h t h e p o l i c e l a s t e d f o r 6 CR-07-1332 o v e r 24 h o u r s a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t o n l y surrendered after being gassed with several canisters of a chemical agent. S g t . Hughes t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was a w a r e o f t h e BOLO f o r a b l u e M a z d a 6 2 6 , w h i c h w a s the p r o p e r t y o f C h e r e a J e m i s o n a n d t h a t i t was located within close proximity to the barricaded residence. ( S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 21) T h i s w a s t h e same b l u e M a z d a 626 a u t o m o b i l e t h a t w a s g i v e n t o C h e r e a Jemison by Reverend Henry Sanders. "[T.S.], [F . S . ] , and [K.S.], the c h i l d r e n of Cherea J e m i s o n , were t a k e n from t h e defendant's defendan mother's residence i n Cleveland, Ohio and placed i n the custody o f s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . At the t r i a l of t h i s c a s e , [ T . S . ] t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n 2001 s h e was f o u r y e a r s o f a g e a n d l i v e d w i t h h e r mom, C h e r e a , W a k i l i i , [ T . S . ] , [ F . S . ] a n d Ambo ( D o t t y J e m i s o n ) . [ T . S . ] t e s t i f i e d t h a t she c a l l e d t h e defendant dad when he w a s n ' t f u s s i n g a n d W a k i l i i when he was fussing. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e l a s t t i m e s h e saw h e r Mom, C h e r e a J e m i s o n , w a s i n t h e h a l l w a y o f t h e i r home. [T.S.] t e s t i f i e d t h a t C h e r e a was i n t h e h a l l w a y f u s s i n g w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h a t i s what woke [ T . S . ] u p . H e r two b r o t h e r s , [ F . S . ] and [K.S.], were a s l e e p . [T.S.] looked out of her b e d r o o m d o o r a n d saw h e r m o t h e r , C h e r e a J e m i s o n , l y i n g on t h e f l o o r , w i t h b l o o d on h e r c h e s t . She was l y i n g on h e r b a c k w i t h h e r h e a d c l o s e s t t o [ T . S . ] ' s bedroom door. T h e d e f e n d a n t was s t a n d i n g over her. Cherea's eyes were c l o s e d and she d i d n ' t say a n y t h i n g . [ T . S . ] r a n back t o bed, scared and went t o s l e e p . " S i n c e t h e l a w r e q u i r e s o n l y a summary o f t h e crime, the Court believes that the foregoing findings should suffice and w i l l n o t go into a d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l s o f t h e f a c t s l e a d i n g up t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . The e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d i n the trial was both direct and c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e w i t h o v e r 25 w i t n e s s e s being c a l l e d and o v e r 120 p i e c e s o f e v i d e n c e b e i n g a d m i t t e d , which overwhelmingly supported the jury's v e r d i c t . " 7 CR-07-1332 (C.R. 92-97.) In worked addition, f o r him; that, working that, the Michael on Earl Friday, f o r him as a p a i n t e r a r o u n d 3:00 p.m., painters, Pope testified March 9, a t a h o u s e on S e t t l e m e n t Brown a s k e d h i m f o r more m o n e y ; t h a t he o f f work; that h i s wife, that that he i n Sylacauga; that he went t o a gas gave t h e $20 Aletha teller Pope was testified up A l e t h a and cashed she gave Brown a $20 check; he d r o p p e d B r o w n o f f on the last that, after t i m e h e saw B r o w n . i n March 2001, she was a a t A l a b a m a T r u s t B a n k ; t h a t she knew C h e r e a b e c a u s e she a c u s t o m e r a t t h e b a n k a n d b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e b o t h members a t t h e same c h u r c h ; t h a t she station h i s wife Pope, worked a t Alabama he p i c k e d to Brown; that Hammett S t r e e t ; a n d t h a t was Aletha until o f f w o r k ; t h a t Brown rode w i t h h i m ; t h a t A l e t h a $10; up he got got Road; them; that n o t h a v e a n y more money, s o he h a d t o w a i t Bank was i t s t a r t e d r a i n i n g ; t h a t he p i c k e d did Trust Brown 2001, Brown t o o k them t o h i s house, and p a i d gave Brown $ 5 0 ; t h a t that knew Brown from she knew D o t t y church and husband. 8 from c h u r c h ; and b e c a u s e he worked that f o r her CR-07-1332 Aletha husband her testified to pick t h a t , on M a r c h 9, 2 0 0 1 , B r o w n h e r up from t h e b a n k ; t h a t a s k e d h e r i f s h e h a d a n y money t o g i v e him she o n l y stopped they not had $ 1 0 , and she gave see him a g a i n that night. She a l s o cash could a check not cash on D o t t y ' s came i n t o account; the check because that they d i d t h a t , on t h e bank and wanted she t o l d him she on a F i r s t Federal Bank a c c o u n t , b u t he c o u l d t a k e i t t o F i r s t F e d e r a l B a n k ; Brown he l e f t , b u t h e came b a c k l a t e r ; t h a t , w h e n h e came c a s h e d a $200 wanted him; c h e c k on C h e r e a ' s a c c o u n t ; t h a t her to telephone that Brown respiratory Children's told problem Hospital her husband her that and they back, Brown also had i n Birmingham; that h a d an taken him upper to the she t e l e p h o n e d h e r h u s b a n d a n d t o l d h i m t h a t Brown w a n t e d h i s money; t h a t he her t o take and that t h e money f r o m t h e i r she took $100 from account and g i v e their 9 that t o s e e i f he w o u l d p a y t h e b a b y , W.S., that told they inside; testified that i t was she t o Brown; that o f f on Hammett S t r e e t ; a n d t h a t S a t u r d a y , March 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 ,Brown to that with h e r husband Brown; that a t a g a s s t a t i o n , and h e r h u s b a n d went d r o p p e d Brown came account told i tto him; and gave i t to CR-07-1332 Brown. F i n a l l y , Aletha t e s t i f i e d that Cherea, or the c h i l d r e n i n church she d i d n o t see Dotty, t h e n e x t day. Vaunzcea J e m i s o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n March 2 0 0 1 , she l i v e d in Cleveland, her sister; O h i o ; t h a t D o t t y was h e r m o t h e r , a n d C h e r e a t h a t , on F r i d a y , March Birmingham f o rher brother's visit h e r mother that, around 9, 2 0 0 1 , s h e t r a v e l e d t o w e d d i n g ; t h a t s h e was p l a n n i n g and s i s t e r ; a i r p l a n e a t 5:00 p.m. that she l e f t Cleveland she t e l e p h o n e d h o u s e , b u t no o n e a n s w e r e d Dotty the telephone; and that to on an a n d a r r i v e d i n B i r m i n g h a m a t 10:30 1 1 : 0 0 p.m., was p.m.; Cherea's she t r i e d to t e l e p h o n e them s e v e r a l t i m e s on S a t u r d a y , M a r c h 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , b u t was n o t a b l e t o r e a c h them; t h a t she went b a c k t o C l e v e l a n d Sunday, March 1 1 , 2001; t h a t Cherea several times contact them; t h a t Dotty to contact and Cherea weekend; 2001, them knew and t h a t , she l e a r n e d Sunday, but to contact she was she t a l k e d t o them a t l e a s t week on t h e t e l e p h o n e ; able on she t r i e d that on F r i d a y , s h e was around that i t was u n u s u a l Saturday, going 1 1 : 0 0 p.m. Dotty t o be not three that and able to times a s h e was n o t o r Sunday; that i n Alabama that on S u n d a y , M a r c h and Cherea had been 10 Dotty on killed. 11, CR-07-1332 Manuel Smith, I I I testified that R i s i n g S t a r M i s s i o n a r y B a p t i s t Church was the sister of t h a t he last was the pastor i n Sylacauga; his wife, Shirley; attended h i s church; he that Dotty that Dotty saw or talked at and Cherea to Dotty and C h e r e a on t h e S u n d a y b e f o r e t h e i r b o d i e s w e r e d i s c o v e r e d ; t h a t he d i d not talk to them during e v e n i n g , he h a d h e a r d t h a t K.S. the was week; sick; that, on Saturday t h a t he h a d tried to t e l e p h o n e D o t t y a n d C h e r e a on S a t u r d a y e v e n i n g , b u t he d i d n o t get an answer; not at church and that Dotty, Cherea, on S u n d a y . He later and the c h i l d r e n l e a r n e d about the were murders f r o m a c h u r c h member a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e b o d i e s Dotty and Cherea. Investigator Jeff Mobbs of Department t e s t i f i e d t h a t , around March 11, 2001, he was the 10:56 notified Sylacauga p.m. about a M a r i o n A v e n u e ; t h a t he a r r i v e d a t t h e s c e n e and he of and situation; investigator the other that, officers shortly entered residence; that he residence; and that present thereafter, the residence and the he other called 11 and and Police 10:57 p.m. on at 449 situation around 11:05 conferred he found dispatch about and and the another bodies investigator p.m., in left the the requested CR-07-1332 additional information. information Murrell; he received that, Cleveland, Murrell; He a f t e r he Ohio, that also testified from talked with telephone the dispatch, person he telephoned M u r r e l l , he number he t h a t , b a s e d on he talked had to telephoned a p.m. point, and 11:30 officers Adam that on M a r c h 1 1 , d e v e l o p e d Brown as Murrell Alabama; p.m. testified B r o w n was his a that of March that Cleveland; Sylacauga t h a t he he 11, Department to find u l t i m a t e l y telephoned the initially t h e r e " and told them that to the house. the police happened and He t h a t he somebody b e i n g he told could not killed. he d i d not his sister; to out what bad had i n touch with them 12 Hull, know him t h a t , on the him from telephone the was on; going that further that happened "up someone t o go t h a t , w h e n he telephoned something remember s a y i n g Murrell Hope telephoned him something also testified department, some p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t ; and t h a t they needed to get out in Washington asked between that, at lived nephew, b u t Washington Police 2001, and who suspect. he p e r s o n a l l y ; t h a t B e t t y W a s h i n g t o n was evening 2001; a from female i d e n t i f i e d h e r s e l f a s B e t t y W a s h i n g t o n ; t h a t t h a t was 11:00 Adam received was the bad anything testified had about regarding CR-07-1332 the sequence o f telephone c a l l s between him and Washington and between him and law enforcement During the State's authorities. case-in-chief, the State B e t t y W a s h i n g t o n as a c o u r t w i t n e s s . W a s h i n g t o n was B r o w n ' s a u n t ; with the State; the assistant she had been witness stand. allowed Washington Cleveland, t o be c a l l e d her brother; 2001, she l i v e d with her she would and L i n d a come a n d that that Brown was and v i s i t she and L i n d a She a l s o both h e r nephews; t h a t 13 was and would talk she d i d n o t i t ; that, i n i n March minutes from Linda; that that she and L i n d a that on t h e associate s h e w o u l d s e e Brown, he w o u l d and speak t o h e r , and t h a t great- lived t e s t i f i e d that, relationship one a n o t h e r ; her B r o w n , was h e r n i e c e ; about t e n o r f i f t e e n had a good court witness. Ohio; and t h a t , a t t h e time of t r i a l , i n t h e same d u p l e x . telephone that as a c o u r t testified lived she pursuant Over t h e defense's o b j e c t i o n , t h e t r i a l Washington was uncooperative b u t t h e y w o u l d h e a r t h a t when s h e t o o k t h e nephew; t h a t Brown's m o t h e r , L i n d a Murrell that s u b p o e n a ; a n d t h a t she h a d t o l d one d i s t r i c t attorneys testify truthfully, Betty asserted t h a t t h e y had t o b r i n g h e r t o Alabama t o an o u t - o f - s t a t e w i t n e s s of that The S t a t e asked t o c a l l respect i n March 2001, CR-07-1332 s h e knew C h e r e a , b u t s h e was n o t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h e r ; t h a t s h e did in n o t know D o t t y ; t h a t S y l a c a u g a , b u t d i d n o t know w h e r e ; ever been to their Washington 11, in she knew t h a t C h e r e a a n d D o t t y and t h a t State t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a t some t i m e o n S u n d a y , find and t h a t there were some She then t e s t i f i e d t h a t out about what was was However, t h e the substance of the she t o l d happening; March h i m t h a t Brown rumors. instructed her not to get into rumors. she had n o t house. 2001, she t e l e p h o n e d M u r r e l l and t o l d Cleveland lived Murrell to t r y to that she d i d not ask M u r r e l l t o t e l e p h o n e t h e S y l a c a u g a P o l i c e Department; t h a t she did not t e l l house; that Murrell that she there d i d not t e l l m i g h t be someone d e a d Murrell that Cherea at the and h e r m o t h e r were d e a d i n t h e h o u s e ; a n d t h a t s h e d i d n o t know t h e y were dead. regarding Murrell She a l s o r e v i e w e d t e l e p h o n e r e c o r d s and t e s t i f i e d t h e sequence of telephone c a l l s and M u r r e l l and l a w enforcement Subsequently, the following between officers. occurred: "[PROSECUTOR G I D D E N S : ] Do y o u r e m e m b e r you've g i v e n a s t a t e m e n t i n t h i s case, hadn't "[WASHINGTON:] Huh? 14 h e r and and you? CR-07-1332 "[PROSECUTOR GIDDENS:] Y o u ' v e t a l k e d t o J e f f Mobbs a n d y o u ' v e t a l k e d t o o t h e r p o l i c e o f f i c e r s ? "[WASHINGTON:] Uh-huh. "[PROSECUTOR GIDDENS:] D i d W a k i l i i Brown C l e v e l a n d t e l l you t h i s o r t h i s i n substance i n "[PROSECUTOR GIDDENS:] D i d W a k i l i i Brown i n C l e v e l a n d , O h i o , t e l l you t h i s o r t h i s i n s u b s t a n c e , t h a t he h a d done s o m e t h i n g b a d , v e r y b a d ? "[WASHINGTON:] "[PROSECUTOR No. GIDDENS:] He d i d not t e l l you that? "[WASHINGTON:] No. " [ P R O S E C U T O R GIDDENS:] That's a l l I have. reserve the right to r e c a l l . "[WASHINGTON:] I d i d n ' t even see W a k i l i i . " (R. I 639-41.) After the defense Washington, the State completed recalled i t s cross-examination Mobbs. Mobbs t e s t i f i e d when he t a l k e d t o W a s h i n g t o n on t h e t e l e p h o n e , s h e t o l d that been "she had something girls, see wrong and t h a t what's g o i n g told t o them we by h e r nephew girls up there, needed t o go i n t h a t on." (R. 6 4 6 . ) 15 that He a l s o he he of that, him had done had hurt them house and check and testified that, at CR-07-1332 the end o f t h e i r c o n v e r s a t i o n , Washington t o l d him not t o t e l l a n y o n e a b o u t w h e r e he h a d g o t t e n that information. I. Brown's erroneously first argument i s that allowed the State t o present the trial court inadmissible hearsay. " ' H e a r s a y ' i s a s t a t e m e n t , o t h e r t h a n o n e made b y the declarant while testifying at the t r i a l or h e a r i n g , o f f e r e d i n evidence t o prove the t r u t h of the matter a s s e r t e d . " Rule 801(c), A l a . R. Evid. " A l t h o u g h r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e may b e e x c l u d e d i f i t s p r o b a t i v e value i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweighed by the danger o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e , confusion o f t h e issues, or misleading the j u r y , or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Rule 4 0 3 , A l a . R. Initially, Evid. State presented i n a d m i s s i b l e h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g an a l l e g e d confession he Brown made t o B e t t y First, allowed Police that the Washington. Brown Melinda contends asserts that Blankenship, Department, the t r i a l a dispatcher to testify about 16 court with erroneously the Sylacauga two t e l e p h o n e calls she CR-07-1332 received from Adam M u r r e l l . Blankenship's offered testimony t o show officers to dispatching why Specifically, was h e a r s a y ; Blankenship the residence; the officers the State the statement dispatched that was that he a l l e g e s t h a t law enforcement Blankenship's irrelevant cross-examined was to reason for his guilt Murrell or innocence; that about h i s statements to Blankenship the matter a s s e r t e d a t t h a t p o i n t ; and t h a t t h e admission and thus u s e d them f o r t h e t r u t h o f of B l a n k e n s h i p ' s t e s t i m o n y was u n d u l y p r e j u d i c i a l a n d s h o u l d h a v e been e x c l u d e d not pursuant t o Rule object to Blankenship's 4 0 3 , A l a . R. E v i d . testimony t o l d h e r d u r i n g h i s two t e l e p h o n e his Ala. arguments i n this regard r e g a r d i n g what calls. f o rp l a i n Brown d i d Murrell T h e r e f o r e , we error. review See R u l e 45A, R. A p p . P. Blankenship testified t h a t s h e was on d u t y 2 0 0 1 ; t h a t s h e r e c e i v e d an anonymous c a l l regarding the anonymous c a l l e r residence at 449 s a i d t h a t he f e l t the house a n d t h a t he w a n t e d and t r y t o l o c a t e anyone Marion like on M a r c h 11, from a pay telephone Avenue; something that the was w r o n g a t someone t o go t o t h e r e s i d e n c e o r see i f anything p l a c e a t t h e h o u s e ; t h a t she d i s p a t c h e d O f f i c e r 17 looked out of Doug Kemp t o CR-07-1332 449 Marion back Avenue; that t o her around other officers that, around 5:30 p.m.; 9:30 p.m., her that Sylacauga, he would not he he that call felt back; reported She a l s o a telephone testified call the i n i t i a l conversation, like someone he w o u l d and she d i d n o t send any time. she r e c e i v e d during knew make and t h a t , there was something to a call so telephone based that he from Murrell wrong Murrell could call, second time; number and t o l d also that testified Murrell gave Murrell h e r h i s name he Murrell was back telephone Alabama; t o l d h e r t h a t Cherea Jemison had p o s s i b l y been that "the g i r l ' s she was s u p p o s e d t o a l s o b e k i l l e d " ; information, she that killed m o t h e r was s u p p o s e d t o b e e n t h e r e dispatched and t h a t , Sergeant (R. 4 6 3 . ) 18 a and o f 449 M a r i o n A v e n u e ; and address. called call. f r o m Hope H u l l , h e r he was c a l l i n g M u r r e l l gave h e r t h e a d d r e s s Murrell said and that on t h e v o i c e s , that i n get the t h e p e r s o n who made t h e i n i t i a l a n o n y m o u s t e l e p h o n e Blankenship that and that b u t he d i d n o t h a v e an a d d r e s s ; thought address, t o t h e scene t o t h e scene a t t h a t Adam M u r r e l l ; t h a t , told Kemp w e n t Jimmy also, b a s e d on Parker that to the CR-07-1332 Blankenship's testimony that Murrell told her that and h e r mother had p o s s i b l y been k i l l e d was not offered Rather, t o show i t was o f f e r e d the truth Cherea a t 449 M a r i o n of the asserted t o show why t h e o f f i c e r s Avenue therein. went to the home a n d how t h e y d i s c o v e r e d t h e b o d i e s o f D o t t y a n d C h e r e a . I t w a s a l s o o f f e r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t M u r r e l l h a d i n f a c t made the was s t a t e m e n t , n o t t o show t h a t t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e s t a t e m e n t true. Therefore, Blankenship's testimony about what M u r r e l l t o l d h e r was n o t h e a r s a y p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 8 0 1 ( c ) , A l a . R. Evid. statement Brown contends to Blankenship cross-examined Murrell. cross-examined M u r r e l l that as the State substantive However, to establish used evidence i t appears the fact that Murrell's when i t the State t h a t h e h a d made the s t a t e m e n t , n o t t o show t h e t r u t h o f t h e m a t t e r a s s e r t e d i n the statement. Therefore, the State's questions regardingthe s t a t e m e n t s h e made t o B l a n k e n s h i p d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e Moreover, the substance of Murrell's statement B l a n k e n s h i p was t h a t C h e r e a a n d D o t t y h a d b e e n k i l l e d home. hearsay. to at their Even i f t h e S t a t e had attempted t o i n t r o d u c e M u r r e l l ' s statement t o prove evidence was m e r e l y the truth of the matter therein, cumulative t o subsequent 19 any such testimony that CR-07-1332 law enforcement o f f i c e r s found Dotty's and Cherea's the home. did the S t a t e attempt t o e l i c i t made was F u r t h e r , a t no t i m e d u r i n g B l a n k e n s h i p ' s t e s t i m o n y statements that Brown conference, although Murrell the hearsay, statements. T h u s , even substantive 45, did not Brown that, statements not introduce any such i f t h e S t a t e had used t h e s t a t e m e n t as i f a n y , was h a r m l e s s . Finally, error t h e danger outweigh testimony. t h e r e was a n y p l a i n asserted statements, those and i t would substantially Blankenship's or that In fact, during a specifically such evidence, error, A l a . R. A p p . P. something the v i c t i m s . State h a d made constituted any testimony that M u r r e l l had h a d done t h e p e r s o n who h a d k i l l e d bench bodies i n the Accordingly, i n this of unfair probative we See R u l e prejudice value do n o t f i n d of that regard. 2. Brown allowed next asserts the State that t o read the t r i a l extensively court from erroneously the t r a n s c r i p t o f M u r r e l l ' s statement t o law enforcement Specifically, he a l l e g e s that unofficial officers. the reading of the transcript "impermissibly introduced multiple levels of hearsay evidence" a n d was u n q u e s t i o n a b l y p r e j u d i c i a l . 20 ( B r o w n ' s b r i e f a t p. 2 5 . ) CR-07-1332 Brown d i d not transcript for plain o b j e c t when t h e p r o s e c u t o r into evidence. error. At t r i a l , recollection See Therefore, Rule 45A, we had review A l a . R. App. M u r r e l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t he b e c a u s e he read p o r t i o n s of had suffered four this the fact Subsequently, that outside he the could problems with strokes. not presence of the and Police Department. remembering After he had M u r r e l l again things questioning calls and about his questioned made to and various Murrell Sylacauga his problems medical could Then, recollection the t a l k e d about M u r r e l l a b o u t w h a t he he write. for Murrell. about whether hearing h i s statement r e f r e s h e d h i s telephone Also, jury, Investigator i n the presence of the j u r y , the prosecutor the his problems read Mike Smith read M u r r e l l ' s statement aloud regarding argument P. advised the court about h i s v a r i o u s other medical about the and problems. could not remember, t h e S t a t e r e a d p o r t i o n s o f t h e t r a n s c r i p t t o M u r r e l l and asked statement. the State Murrell's him i f he B a s e d on was not remembered a review attempting statement to law various of the to portions introduce the i t is clear record, of that the transcript enforcement o f f i c e r s t r u t h of the matter a s s e r t e d t h e r e i n . 21 Rather, of to prove the i t appears that CR-07-1332 the S t a t e was attempting to refresh H o w e v e r , t h e S t a t e was l i m i t e d i n i t sa b i l i t y on M u r r e l l ' s i n a b i l i t y t o r e c a l l could not read. specific portions. the and then Therefore, recollection. t o do s o b a s e d c o u p l e d w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t he Accordingly, portions of the transcript Murrell's prosecutor read about asked M u r r e l l the t r i a l court small those d i d not e r r when i t a l l o w e d t h e S t a t e t o r e a d p o r t i o n s o f t h e t r a n s c r i p t during i t s examination of Murrell. Furthermore, the danger o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e d i d not s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweigh the probative value of the State's questions regarding the various portions of the transcript. the t r i a l See R u l e 4 0 3 , A l a . R. Evid. Therefore, c o u r t d i d n o t e r r when i t a l l o w e d t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o read portions of the t r a n s c r i p t during i t s d i r e c t of examination Murrell. Moreover, State the contents questioned between Murrell However, b o t h Murrell dealt and Washington Blankenship telephone calls. rendered harmless t h e same e f f e c t of the transcript telephone and calls Blankenship. testified about the t h a t may be i n a d m i s s i b l e may b e or subsequent or from which the and M u r r e l l and Washington "[Evidence] by p r i o r with about which t h e lawful t h e same f a c t s 22 testimony c a n be to inferred." CR-07-1332 White v. S t a t e , overruled (Ala. 650 S o . 2 d 5 3 8 , 541 on o t h e r Crim. grounds, App. error, was h a r m l e s s . Washington, evidence that Blankenship Rivers, Because the 669 S o . 2 d 2 3 9 of the and of the t r a n s c r i p t 4 5 , A l a . R. A p p . P. that, during the State "strongly its cross-examination Murrell, the hearsay during the testimony o f Ms. i n order i t had e l i c i t e d a n d Mr. 1994), of Blankenship i f any, i n t h e r e a d i n g See R u l e App. portions t o the testimony Brown f u r t h e r a s s e r t s of Ex p a r t e 1995). t r a n s c r i p t were c u m u l a t i v e Washington, (Ala. Crim. emphasized t o suggest that Mr. M u r r e l l a n d Ms. W a s h i n g t o n k n e w t h a t t h e J e m i s o n ' s w e r e d e a d . " (Brown's brief examination at p. 29.) of Washington, "[PROSECUTOR:] During the the following Then y'all State's direct occurred: call later on that n i g h t , y ' a l l t a l k f o r 20 m i n u t e s a t 1 1 : 3 0 . B u t you know what information he t o l d Sylacauga Police D e p a r t m e n t a f t e r he t a l k e d t o y o u ? "[WASHINGTON:] No. "[PROSECUTOR:] That Dotty Jemison and h e r mother were dead "[WASHINGTON:] Well, "[PROSECUTOR:] Over t h e r e 23 -- I didn't at that Cherea tell h i m -¬ CR-07-1332 "[WASHINGTON:] I d i d n ' t know i t m y s e l f . didn't tell him because I "[PROSECUTOR:] W e l l , Mr. M u r r e l l has been i n t h i s courtroom. A n d a l t h o u g h he seemed v e r y w i t t y and f u n n y "[WASHINGTON:] Uh-huh. "[PROSECUTOR:] strokes and can't he claims "[WASHINGTON:] He "[PROSECUTOR:] -- r e m e m b e r "[WASHINGTON:] He h a v e . he's had four have. anything. He a i n ' t p l a y i n g . "[PROSECUTOR:] b u t h e r e m e m b e r e d y o u t e l l i n g him there were two p e o p l e dead o v e r t h e r e , and you're s a y i n g you d i d n ' t t e l l him t h a t ? "[WASHINGTON:] "[PROSECUTOR:] them "[WASHINGTON:] I d i dnot t e l l Then he c a l l s him that. y o u b a c k . He t e l l s Uh-huh. "[PROSECUTOR:] ' L e t me get some more information.' A n d he c a l l s you. And t h e next information he relates to Sylacauga Police Department i s Cherea Jemison and h e r mother have been k i l l e d i n t h a t house "[WASHINGTON:] Well, I don't -¬ "[PROSECUTOR:] "[WASHINGTON:] No. No, I d i d n o t . " you d i d n o t t e l l 24 him that? CR-07-1332 (R. 637-39.) assertions that two Brown that Murrell people were testify that such statement a questions did not T h e r e f o r e , we R. App. Murrell hearsay; were State's telling that; that, did the other previously the hearsay asserted. to did incorrectly remembered telephoned Washington the State Murrell; telephoned assert However, trial court. See R u l e 45A, they might based Sylacauga be Murrell him presented evidence that, the that telling on Ala. dead. that two testified people that Washington telephone f o r D o t t y and Based on this evidence, the jury c o u l d have r e a s o n a b l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t Washington had M u r r e l l t h a t D o t t y and Cherea were dead. T h e r e f o r e , any in harmless. assertion 25 was that and that incorrect call, Cherea said State's were P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t ; and M u r r e l l gave B l a n k e n s h i p the a d d r e s s the not had, the on prosecutor used arguments him i f he that based r e v i e w them f o r p l a i n e r r o r . However, Murrell these the her that the t r u t h of the matter present State he dead. him been the that P. The that false; exchange that alleges remembered told have the and he was had would during evidence to prove said dead Washington hearsay; elicited Brown specifically See told error Rule CR-07-1332 45A, A l a . R. A p p . P. the State's Murrell Blankenship about the truth Moreover, a s we n o t e d attempted to introduce evidence, c o n t r a r y t o Brown's a s s e r t i o n s , cross-examination told evidence Further, o f Washington d i d not of amount the matter i n Part I.A.1., Murrell's in Therefore, any plain error i n this as of Dotty we d o n o t f i n d regard. substantive therein. substantive t o testimony had found the bodies what i fthe State had statement i t would have been c u m u l a t i v e residence. to asserted even enforcement o f f i c e r s their regarding that law and Cherea that there was S e e R u l e 4 5 A , A l a . R. A p p . P. 4. Brown asserts Mobbs t o t e s t i f y Specifically, offering that the t r i a l court erroneously allowed a b o u t t h e s t a t e m e n t W a s h i n g t o n made t o h i m . he a l l e g e s t h a t the statement the State t o impeach asserted Washington that and t h a t t h e State d i d not lay a proper foundation pursuant t o Rule Ala. regarding R. E v i d . , f o r M o b b s ' s t e s t i m o n y i t was 613(b), the statement. "Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness i s not admissible unless the w i t n e s s has been c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e circumstances of t h e statement w i t h s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i t y t o enable t h e witness t o i d e n t i f y the statement andi s a f f o r d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y t o admit o r t o deny h a v i n g made i t . " 26 CR-07-1332 Rule 613(b), During A l a . R. i t s cross-examination asked Washington very ask Evid. i f Brown had t o l d bad, and Washington Washington of said the h e r he h a d done he h a d n o t . any more q u e s t i o n s . confront Washington with Washington, The A t no t i m e the statement State something State d i d not d i d the State s h e h a d made t o M o b b s o r g i v e W a s h i n g t o n an o p p o r t u n i t y t o a d m i t o r deny h a v i n g the statement. the State Therefore, to present s t a t e m e n t t o Mobbs. even without presented The to See R u l e State presented from on t h e m o r n i n g Trust Bank Jemison's account, evidence Pope to o f Brown's allowed Washington's However, 2 Mobbs, the on to the evening a trying of March 10, 2001, Brown cash State guilt. t h a t Brown h a d been of March i n Sylacauga about A l a . R. E v i d . statement evidence Michael court erroneously 613(b), overwhelming evidence that, Alabama extrinsic Washington's g e t money 2001; the t r i a l made check 9, went on b u t A l e t h a Pope t o l d h i m she c o u l d n o t to Dotty cash Brown a l s o argues t h a t t h e S t a t e improperly called Washington f o r the sole purpose of impeaching her w i t h the s t a t e m e n t s h e h a d made t o M o b b s . H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e we find that the t r i a l court erroneously admitted evidence about W a s h i n g t o n ' s s t a t e m e n t t o M o b b s o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , we n e e d n o t address t h i s argument s e p a r a t e l y . 2 27 CR-07-1332 it b e c a u s e i t was left and Pope cashed on a First Federal Bank a c c o u n t ; t h a t Brown c a m e b a c k w i t h a $ 2 0 0 c h e c k on C h e r e a ' s a c c o u n t ; t h a t the c h e c k ; and t o l d P o p e t h a t K.S. Birmingham. was that, s i c k and However, while was was there, at Children's Children's H o s p i t a l i n Birmingham, t e s t i f i e d that they d i d not The State being also presented J e n n i f e r Weed, a t e l l e r check on third drive-through male i n the Dotty's driving at F i r s t Federal the lane; that c a r ; and hospital i n March evidence that account; that a blue an Hospital in of o f K.S. Womack, Brown employee have a r e c o r d Roxanne he the that check on Bank, 9, 2001, cashed a was c h e c k was Cherea March 2001. sent sent $200 from by the a black owned a b l u e Mazda 626. The 2001, State Vaunzcea J e m i s o n had Birmingham Dotty was and not for able t h e m on that Vaunzcea had a Cherea reach had f u r t h e r presented plans to reach going to v i s i t 11:00 Vaunzcea p.m. on that on, March 9, Cleveland, Ohio, to tried March 9, t h e m ; t h a t V a u n z c e a was Saturday was t r a v e l e d from wedding; that around evidence, or Sunday; that Dotty to Dotty be 28 Cherea. 2001, telephone but she also unable and i n A l a b a m a ; and and to Cherea that to knew Vaunzcea CR-07-1332 The State Cherea were Manuel Smith a d d i t i o n a l l y presented evidence that D o t t y and not a t church had Sunday; and that 11:00 p.m. tried Smith on M a r c h on to Sunday, March 11, 2 0 0 1 ; t h a t telephone Dotty and Cherea was n o t a b l e 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 , Adam t o reach Murrell them. killed entered there; that and h e r mother might law enforcement the residence, and found Around telephoned the S y l a c a u g a P o l i c e Department, gave them t h e a d d r e s s f o r and D o t t y , and s a i d t h a t Cherea on Cherea have been o f f i c e r s w e n t t o t h e home, the bodies o f Cherea and D o t t y ; t h a t D o t t y ' s a n k l e s and hands were bound w i t h d u c t tape a n d g r e e n " C h r i s t m a s " t a p e ; t h a t a c a r d b o a r d r o l l was a t t a c h e d to the green " C h r i s t m a s " t a p e ; and t h a t Brown's were on t h e c a r d b o a r d Brown last time and Cherea's fingerprints roll. daughter, s h e saw h e r m o t h e r , T.S., t e s t i f i e d she had been that, the sleeping i n her r o o m ; t h a t h e r m o t h e r a n d Brown were f u s s i n g a n d woke h e r u p ; t h a t h e r mother a n d Brown were b o t h s c r e a m i n g ; t h a t she g o t up and peeped out h e r d o o r ; t h a t floor; on that h e r mother's eyes her chest; that that Brown she g o t back i n t o was s h e saw h e r m o t h e r l y i n g on t h e were closed, standing over and she had b l o o d h e r mother; and b e d and went t o s l e e p . 29 CR-07-1332 The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e located i n Cleveland, standoff with standoff lasted Brown left Ohio; Cleveland t h a t B r o w n was that Brown law enforcement approximately the apartment was involved officers; twenty-four i n which subsequently h e was that hours; located and only numerous c a n i s t e r s o f a c h e m i c a l agent h a d been f i r e d apartment. from C h e r e a ' s b l u e M a z d a was the area enforcement in the where Finally, beyond a reasonable t o Mobbs. 510, S. 103 Ct. (1967). admission See R u l e after K.S. and law t o Cherea were also as was overwhelming. a whole, " i s i t clear doubt t h a t t h e j u r y would have r e t u r n e d a the admission o f Washington's U n i t e d S t a t e s v . H a s t i n g , 461 U.S. 1974, Chapman v . C a l i f o r n i a , 705 record o f g u i l t y " even w i t h o u t statement 2d and as t o Brown's g u i l t reviewing the e n t i r e verdict T.S., that into the barricaded himself, F.S., the i n Cleveland. Thus, t h e e v i d e n c e After had a a short distance o f f i c e r s found a checkbook t h a t belonged vehicle. located Brown located in Under 76 L. Ed. 386 U.S. these of Washington's 4 5 , A l a . R. A p p . 2d 96 statement 30 See also 1 8 , 87 S. C t . 8 2 4 , 17 L. E d . circumstances, P. (1983). 499, any e r r o r t o Mobbs was i n the harmless. CR-07-1332 5. Brown f u r t h e r a s s e r t s that the State improperly t o n o t e s a b o u t W a s h i n g t o n ' s s t a t e m e n t t o Mobbs. he appears made to allege the notes; unidentified triple notes the that the State the notes author; that i n the presence issue In references for plain this the notes evidence. Rather, the State defense o r i g i n a l l y asserted statement Washington improperly Mobbs referred by d i d not object we 45A, A l a . R. A p p . not introduced to the notes into t h a t i t d i d n o t have a copy o f any made to Mobbs. of the statement. Also, the parties c o u r t was d e t e r m i n i n g Therefore, the to the extent Brown i s again a d m i s s i o n o f W a s h i n g t o n ' s s t a t e m e n t t o Mobbs, i n the admission 31 the prosecutor's Moreover, I.A.4., any e r r o r P. when t h e hearsay. Part to review t o the notes d i d not c o n s t i t u t e inadmissible in an referred to the reference the had inadmissible Therefore, were r e f e r r e d t o t h e n o t e s when t h e t r i a l admissibility Brown See R u l e notes that constituted about the notes. the Specifically, a c t u a l l y created of the j u r y . error. case, asserted were h e a r s a y ; and t h a t t h e S t a t e State's this that referred triple challenging a s we of that found statement CR-07-1332 was h a r m l e s s . this T h e r e f o r e , Brown i s n o t e n t i t l e d to relief i n regard. Brown also contends allowed Manuel Smith Cherea. Specifically, that the t r i a l to testify about court erroneously h i s alleged abuse he a s s e r t s t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y a b o u t t h e abuse c o n s t i t u t e d i n a d m i s s i b l e h e a r s a y and i m p r o p e r e v i d e n c e p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 4 0 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. E v i d . raise h i s argument evidence that f o rplain court. error. T h e r e f o r e , we See R u l e character Brown d i d n o t the testimony constituted before the t r i a l contention of improper review that 4 5 A , A l a . R. A p p . P. During defense counsel's cross-examination of Smith, the following occurred: " [ D E F E N S E COUNSEL:] Do y o u r e c a l l g i v i n g a statement t o Mike Smith back, i t l o o k s l i k e t h e 2 1 s t o f M a r c h o f 2 0 0 1 , w h e r e y o u s a t down a n d y o u w e r e t a l k i n g t o Mike Smith? "[SMITH:] occasions, yes, I've s i r . talked to him on several " [ D E F E N S E COUNSEL:] W e l l , t h i s w o u l d h a v e b e e n b r i g h t a f t e r t h e l a d i e s were f o u n d i n t h e h o u s e or shortly thereafter. And a t t h e time, they asked you t h i s o r t h i s i n s u b s t a n c e , s o m e t h i n g a b o u t Mr. Brown going back t o Cleveland. Y o u s a i d he w e n t b a c k t o Cleveland twice. He g o t some m o n e y . And you s a i d C h e r e a w a s mad a n d t a l k e d t o y o u r w i f e . I guess that's Shirley. And they asked the q u e s t i o n or Mike 32 CR-07-1332 Smith asked t h e q u e s t i o n , ' D i d she ever mention any kind of violence or anything?' A n d y o u s a i d 'To me, no.' Do y o u r e c a l l t h a t ? "[SMITH:] I'm sorry. Say i t a g a i n , s i r . " [ D E F E N S E COUNSEL:] He a s k e d y o u t h e q u e s t i o n that 'she,' I'm taking that as Cherea, ever m e n t i o n e d any k i n d o f v i o l e n c e o r a n y t h i n g , and you a n s w e r e d 'To me, n o . ' That's what you t o l d Mike Smith? "[SMITH:] She d i d n ' t . " [ D E F E N S E COUNSEL:] And you then s a i d , 'I'm sure s h e m e n t i o n e d some s t u f f t o my w i f e . She d i d n ' t m e n t i o n i t t o me a t a l l . ' I s that right or wrong? "[SMITH:] violence." (R. 364-66.) examination She didn't Subsequently, of Smith, talk t o me during the following the about State's the redirect occurred: "[PROSECUTOR:] Pastor Smith, [defense counsel] was a s k i n g y o u w h e t h e r C h e r e a h a d c o n f i d e d i n y o u about any p r i o r domestic v i o l e n c e , and you i n d i c a t e d t h a t she had n o t . Had she c o n f i d e d t h a t i n your wife? " [ D E F E N S E COUNSEL:] I object to that, Judge. "[PROSECUTOR:] J u d g e , h e ' s o p e n e d t h e d o o r a n d asked the questions. "[DEFENSE anything COUNSEL:] h i s wife would be hearsay, -¬ "[PROSECUTOR:] didn't That He asked go i n t o i t . 33 the question. We CR-07-1332 "THE COURT: ahead. "[SMITH:] You can answer Go Y e s , ma'am. "[PROSECUTOR:] "[SMITH:] the question. On s e v e r a l Many occasions? occasions." (R. 3 6 8 . ) "When o n e p a r t y o p e n s t h e d o o r t o o t h e r w i s e inadmissible evidence, the doctrine of 'curative a d m i s s i b i l i t y ' provides the opposing p a r t y with 'the r i g h t t o rebut such evidence w i t h other illegal evidence.' M c E l r o y ' s Alabama E v i d e n c e , § 14.01, p. 49 ( 5 t h e d . 1 9 9 6 ) . '[T]he law [ i s ] t h a t even though a p a r t y i n t r o d u c e s e v i d e n c e t h a t may b e i m m a t e r i a l or i l l e g a l , h i sopponent has t h e r i g h t t o rebut such evidence and t h i s r i g h t i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l . ' C l a r k v. S t a t e , 54 A l a . A p p . 1 8 3 , 1 8 6 , 3 0 6 S o . 2 d 5 1 , 54 (1974). '"A p a r t y who h a s b r o u g h t o u t e v i d e n c e o n a c e r t a i n s u b j e c t h a s no v a l i d c o m p l a i n t as t o t h e trial c o u r t ' s a c t i o n i n a l l o w i n g h i s opponent o r adversary to introduce evidence on the same subject."' H u b b a r d v . S t a t e , 471 So. 2 d 4 9 7 , 499 (Ala. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 4 ) ( q u o t i n g B r o w n v . S t a t e , 392 So. 2 d 1 2 4 8 , 1260 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 0 ) , cert. d e n i e d , 392 So. 2 d 1266 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) ) . " Ex parte In did D.L.H., 8 0 6 S o . 2 d 1 1 9 0 , 1 1 9 3 ( A l a . this case, not question abuse Cherea during Smith may h a v e defense counsel i t s direct regarding made 2001). examination, the State any a l l e g a t i o n s o f t o him or t o h i s wife. raised this issue during i t s prior Rather, cross-examination of Smith and brought out Smith's statement t o law enforcement 34 CR-07-1332 officers his t h a t he was wife. On sure Cherea redirect, had mentioned prior the State d i d not e l i c i t d e t a i l s regarding those a l l e g a t i o n s . abuse any specific Rather, the State merely c l a r i f i e d t h e t e s t i m o n y e l i c i t e d by t h e d e f e n s e . Based cross-examination the evidence to Smith, regarding prior Smith's plain of wife. error the in this defense allegations T h e r e f o r e , we regard. opened on i t s door o f abuse the v i c t i m to made do n o t f i n d t h a t t h e r e was See to Rule 45A, A l a . R. App. any P. II. Brown's erroneously second argument a l l o w e d T.S. is that to t e s t i f y at the trial court trial. A. Initially, testify length trial of not based of on time her age between that at the the T.S. and tested present App. any the of murders reliability these T.S. time c o u r t s h o u l d have conducted T h e r e f o r e , we R. Brown contends was not of the and competent o f f e n s e and trial and that a more e x t e n s i v e v o i r o f h e r memory. arguments to r e v i e w them f o r p l a i n e r r o r . the the the dire Brown d i d trial court. See R u l e 45A, P. "Every person i s c o m p e t e n t t o be a witness e x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d i n t h e s e r u l e s . " 35 to Ala. CR-07-1332 Rule 6 0 1 , A l a . R. E v i d . " [ R u l e 601] a c k n o w l e d g e s t h e p r e v a i l i n g sentiment that very few persons are incapable of giving testimony u s e f u l t o t h e t r i e r o f f a c t and t h a t the historic grounds of incompetency -mental i n c a p a c i t y , c o n v i c t i o n , e t c . -- s h o u l d g o t o t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e witness and t h e weight t h e t r i e r of f a c t g i v e s t o t h e w i t n e s s ' s t e s t i m o n y . S e e H. W e i h o f e n , T e s t i m o n i a l C o m p e t e n c e a n d C r e d i b i l i t y , 34 Geo. W a s h . L. R e v . 53 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ; E. C l e a r y , M c C o r m i c k on E v i d e n c e § 71 ( 3 d e d . 1 9 8 4 ) ( r e f e r r i n g t o r u l e s of incompetency as ' s e r i o u s o b s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e ascertainment of truth'); C. Mueller & L. K i r k p a t r i c k , 3 F e d e r a l E v i d e n c e § 232 ( 2 d e d . 1 9 9 4 ) ; Comment, T h e M e n t a l l y D e f i c i e n t W i t n e s s : T h e D e a t h o f I n c o m p e t e n c y , 14 Law & P s y c h o l . R e v . 1 0 6 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . " "While Rule 601 i m p o s e s no r e q u i r e m e n t of testimonial competency, i t provides that i n c o m p e t e n c y may a r i s e 'as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d i n these r u l e s . ' Both academic w r i t i n g s and j u d i c i a l opinions suggest t h a t t h i s p r o v i s i o n vests i n the trial court the discretion to preclude a witness f r o m t e s t i f y i n g i n e x t r a o r d i n a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s when t h e w i t n e s s p o s s e s s e s some s i g n i f i c a n t t e s t i m o n i a l deficiency. T h a t d i s c r e t i o n i s s a i d t o a r i s e when the witness's deficiency renders the testimony i n a d m i s s i b l e because of i t s being i r r e l e v a n t (Rule 401) or too p r e j u d i c i a l ( R u l e 4 0 3 ) , o r when t h e w i t n e s s i s w i t h o u t p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e ( R u l e 602) o r is unable t o understand the o b l i g a t i o n t o t e l l the truth (Rule 603). See, e.g., U n i t e d S t a t e s v. R a m i r e z , 8 7 1 F . 2 d 582 ( 6 t h C i r . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 4 9 3 U.S. 8 4 1 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Odum, 7 3 6 F . 2 d 104 (4th C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . L i g h t l y , 677 F . 2 d 1027 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 8 2 ) ; S t a t e v . F u l t o n , 742 P . 2 d 1 2 0 8 ( U t a h 1 9 8 7 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 484 U.S. 1 0 4 4 ( 1 9 8 8 ) . S e e a l s o J . W e i n s t e i n & M. B e r g e r , W e i n s t e i n ' s Evidence 5 6 0 1 [ 0 4 ] , a t 601-27 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d , 36 CR-07-1332 however, t h a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n of these authorities exceeds t h e i r r e a l i t y i n terms o f w i t n e s s e s a c t u a l l y e x c l u d e d by t h e c o u r t s . I n d e e d , as one a u t h o r h a s o b s e r v e d , an a n a l y s i s o f t h e d e c i d e d c a s e s r e v e a l s t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f R u l e 601 i s ' c l o s e r t o a n i r r e b u t t a b l e presumption of competency f o r every w i t n e s s . ' Comment, The M e n t a l l y D e f i c i e n t W i t n e s s : The D e a t h o f I n c o m p e t e n c y , 14 Law & P s y c h o l . R e v . 1 0 6 , 114 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . The b e g i n n i n g p r e m i s e r e m a i n s : a l l witnesses are competent and any testimonial d e f i c i e n c y goes t o weight r a t h e r than a d m i s s i b i l i t y . See F. Weissenberger, Weissenberger's Federal E v i d e n c e § 6 0 1 . 2 , a t 1 8 1 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; 3 D. L o u i s e l l & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 252 (1979). Compare U n i t e d S t a t e s v . V a n M e e r b e k e , 548 F . 2 d 415 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 430 U.S. 974 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . " R u l e 6 0 1 , A l a . R. E v i d . , A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e ' s N o t e s . this Finally, c o u r t has a d d r e s s e d t h e competency o f a c h i l d w i t n e s s as follows: "The a p p e l l a n t n e x t c o n t e n d s that the t r i a l court erred in allowing the appellant's seven-year-old son t o t e s t i f y at t r i a l . The a p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t h e was n o t c o m p e t e n t t o t a k e the w i t n e s s s t a n d because o f h i s age. 'There i s no age a t w h i c h c o m p e t e n c y i s p r e s u m e d . A four-year old can t e s t i f y i n cases o t h e r than s e x u a l abuse o r s e x u a l e x p l o i t a t i o n i f he o r s h e h a s f i r s t been d e t e r m i n e d t o be c o m p e t e n t . ' P r i c e v . S t a t e , 590 S o . 2 d 3 8 1 , 382 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , a f f ' d , 590 S o . 2 d 383 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . "In t h e p r e s e n t case t h e t r i a l c o u r t q u e s t i o n e d t h e c h i l d b e f o r e h e was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y . I t appears f r o m t h e r e c o r d t h a t t h e c h i l d was v e r y articulate f o r a seven-year-old. I n f a c t t h e r e was no o b j e c t i o n t o h i s t e s t i m o n y d u r i n g t h e t r i a l . We f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e c h i l d as a competent w i t n e s s . C o l e v . S t a t e , 443 37 CR-07-1332 So. 391 2 d 1386 ( A l a . C r . App. 1983); M i l l e r So. 2 d 1102 ( A l a . C r . App. 1980)." S t e w a r t v. overruled (Ala. eleven 491, the 503 Ex parte g r o u n d s by ascertained to tell testify to about being right trouble honest to i f she testify. sixth T.S. that school and ( A l a . C r i m . App. Gentry, 689 ascertained grade at the understood i t was and of 1992), So. 2d 916 tell would t e l l the the at the t i m e between t h e m u r d e r s and that testimony not f i n d t h a t t h e r e was regard. See Rule 45A, that she she knew she had the t r i a l , could 38 get plain P. be into and that, i f these reasons, was and the t h a t went t o App. learned i t would permitted the competent time of the murders, the A l a . R. been For truth. error, had that rather than i t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y . any she trial. that that truth; T . S . ' s memory w e r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s her time of was importance a d e q u a t e l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t T.S. T . S . ' s age T.S. court ascertained church; truthful; that that utmost trial testify truthfully; d i d not t o t e s t i f y , she court that court F i n a l l y , the Sunday f o r her trial i n the and the t r u t h . went trial 3d case, this also T.S. So. other y e a r s o l d and called she on 601 State, 1996). In It State, v. to length of reliability of the weight Therefore, or otherwise, in we of do this CR-07-1332 Brown also impermissibly its voir that was contends that indicated i t s favor d i r e examination of T.S. of the trial court T.S.'s t e s t i m o n y during Specifically, he asserts "[t]he court's gentle questioning emphasized that a churchgoing child who understood ( B r o w n ' s b r i e f a t p. 55.) to Therefore, See that the trial Rule In court. 45A, Long A l a . R. v. Brown d i d not p r e s e n t App. State, 611 So. court addressed the in the j u r y as we review 2d 443, from this wrong." argument i t for plain error. P. 1992), t h i s f r o n t of right [T.S.] 445 questioning (Ala. Crim. of a c h i l d victim follows: "Long contends t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g h i s m o t i o n f o r m i s t r i a l on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e c o u r t examined the victim in front of the jury to determine h i s c a p a c i t y to t e s t i f y before the State's examination of the v i c t i m . " T h i s c o u r t has c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t has c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e c o n d u c t o f a t r i a l , and u n l e s s c l e a r l y a b u s e d , i t s d e c i s i o n i n e x e r c i s i n g t h a t d i s c r e t i o n w i l l n o t be o v e r t u r n e d on appeal. B u r k e t t v . S t a t e , 439 So. 2 d 737 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1983). "In the i n s t a n t case, there i s nothing i n the record to support a f i n d i n g t h a t the t r i a l court c l e a r l y abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n q u e s t i o n i n g the victim i n f r o n t of the jury before the State's 39 App. CR-07-1332 e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e v i c t i m , and t h e c o u r t ' s q u e s t i o n s t o t h e v i c t i m d i d n o t i n any manner i n d i c a t e f a v o r or d i s f a v o r toward the w i t n e s s . The t r i a l court t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r l y d e n i e d Long's motion f o r m i s t r i a l on t h i s g r o u n d . " In to this put her at regarding to fact the questioned that she the trial or Rule church and Sunday the oath importance of telling questioning of d i s f a v o r t o w a r d T.S. f i n d t h a t t h e r e was See court any 45A, i n a manner understand to court's favor trial went t o ability any regard. T.S. Also, T.S.'s the indicate court questioned understand to However, the t r i a l ease. the determine ability not case, and App. her truth. did Therefore, e r r o r , p l a i n or otherwise, A l a . R. school the T.S. T.S. not we in do this P. III. Brown's third argument is that the trial court should h a v e d i s m i s s e d t h e i n d i c t m e n t a g a i n s t h i m b a s e d on a d e n i a l o f his right to a speedy t r i a l . first time plain error. W i n g o , 407 the on See U.S. United factors appeal. that States must 92 45A, S. we Ala. Ct. Supreme be raises this Therefore, Rule 514, He 2182, Court weighed when 40 review R. App. 33 set L. argument f o r the this argument f o r P. In Ed. 2d forth reviewing 101 the a Barker v. (1972), following speedy trial CR-07-1332 claim: (1) t h e l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y ; delay; (3) t h e a c c u s e d ' s trial; and due assertion (4) t h e d e g r e e to the delay. proper application pertinent speedy suffered So. 2 d 259 ( A l a . Court provided guidance of those dates 928 f o r the to a of p r e j u d i c e the accused t h e A l a b a m a Supreme The of h i s right I n Ex p a r t e Walker, 2005), (2) t h e r e a s o n as t o t h e factors. and events in this case are follows: March 1 1 , 2001 Law e n f o r c e m e n t officers discovered the bodies of D o t t y and Cherea Jemison. M a r c h 13, 2001 B r o w n was t a k e n i n t o c u s t o d y b y t h e C l e v e l a n d P o l i c e SWAT Unit. June 28, 2001 B r o w n was i n d i c t e d f o r t h r e e counts o f c a p i t a l murder f o r the killings of Dotty and Cherea. June 29, 2001 Brown made an i n i t i a l appearance i n the Talladega D i s t r i c t Court. July 10, 2001 Jeb Fannin and B i l l W i l l i n g h a m were a p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n t Brown. July 16, 2001 Brown was arraigned. State filed a motion discovery. 41 The for as CR-07-1332 August 29, 2001 F e b r u a r y 4, March June 28, 19, 2002 2002 Brown filed a request f o r p r o d u c t i o n by t h e S t a t e . The c a s e c a l l e d f o r a s t a t u s c a l l a n d , on Brown's m o t i o n , the trial court continued the case t o the March 4, 2002, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call Docket. The d e f e n s e f i l e d a motion for a court-ordered mental e x a m i n a t i o n o f Brown. 2002 The trial court ordered a mental examination to determine Brown's mental condition to stand trial and/or to evaluate his mental state at the time of the offense. November 6, 2002 Dr. G l e n K i n g , a c e r t i f i e d f o r e n s i c examiner, f i l e d h i s forensic evaluation report. January 21, 2003 Brown filed a "Motion f o r Funds f o r E x p e r t P s y c h i a t r i c and P s y c h o l o g i c A s s i s t a n c e . " January 31, 2003 The t r i a l court granted Brown's "Motion f o r Funds for Expert Psychiatric and Psychological Assistance." March 3, 2003 Fannin and W i l l i n g h a m f i l e d a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. April 7, 2003 Fanning withdrew withdraw. 42 and W i l l i n g h a m their motion to CR-07-1332 May 5, 2003 Brown filed a "Motion f o r F u n d s t o H i r e an E x p e r t to Assist in Guilt Phase I n v e s t i g a t i o n of Case." May 7, 2003 The t r i a l court granted Brown's m o t i o n f o r funds t o hire an expert subject to the defense submitting anticipated costs. May 28, June 17, October April May 2003 30, 19, 17, The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r a l l o w i n g Brown t o h i r e D r . M a r i a n n e G. Rosenzweig as a psychiatric and psychological expert. 2 003 2004 2004 2004 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an order that provided Brown funds to hire a private investigator. Brown filed a "Motion f o r Funds for Investigation" requesting the funds to employ a m i t i g a t i o n e x p e r t . The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d the m o t i o n and a l l o w e d Brown t o employ L u c i a Penland as a mitigation investigator. The t r i a l c o u r t s e t a s t a t u s conference f o r S e p t e m b e r 2, 2004. The case was h e a r d on t h e C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The case was continued by a g r e e m e n t t o t h e A u g u s t 16, 2004, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call Docket. 43 CR-07-1332 May June 27, 2004 24, 2004 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r t o t r a n s p o r t Brown t o the crime scene. Brown filed a "Motion f o r F u n d s f o r Neuropsychologist." September 2, 2004 The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d status conference. September 13, 2004 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s "Court Findings at Status Conference" from the September 2, 2004, status conference. The t r i a l c o u r t ordered the defense to provide copies of the report prepared by Rosenzweig to the S t a t e and ordered that the S t a t e provide copies o f all videotapes from the S t a t e o f Ohio t o the defense on or before October 1, 2004. I t also noted that the defense had advised the court that Dr. John Goff w o u l d n o t be a b l e t o see t h e appellant until after N o v e m b e r 1, 2 0 0 4 . However, it ordered the defense to provide Goff's report after i t was c o m p l e t e d . The t r i a l court also noted that the S t a t e made a n o r a l motion for Brown to undergo an intelligence quotient test at Taylor-Hardin Secure Medical F a c i l i t y , that the defense d i d not o b j e c t , and that i t would enter a separate order directing 44 a CR-07-1332 such a test. Finally, it noted that, based on discussions between the parties, the earliest p o s s i b l e date f o r the case to be t r i e d would be t h e F e b r u a r y 2005 t e r m o f c o u r t , b u t t h a t w o u l d be s u b j e c t t o the completion of reports and evaluations and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of witnesses. September 1 3 , 2004 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an " O r d e r D i r e c t i n g Intelligence Quotient E x a m i n a t i o n , " o f Brown. September 20, 2004 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. The c a s e was c o n t i n u e d by a g r e e m e n t t o t h e O c t o b e r 18, 2004, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call Docket. September 22, 2004 The defense n o t i f i e d the court that i t would probably b e N o v e m b e r 2004 b e f o r e D r . R o s e n z w e i g w o u l d be a b l e t o submit report regarding Brown. September 30, 2004 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r f o r funds f o r Brown t o hire Dr. John Goff as a neuropsychologist. October 10, 2004 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. On B r o w n ' s m o t i o n , t h e c a s e was continued to the November 15, 2004, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. 45 CR-07-1332 November 15, 2004 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by a g r e e m e n t t o t h e J a n u a r y 24, 2005, Criminal Status Docket. N o v e m b e r 1 9 , 2004 The t r i a l c o u r t s e t a s t a t u s conference for March 9, 2005. January 14, 2005 King f i l e d a second evaluation report. January 24, 2005 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by agreement to the February 23, 2005, Criminal Status C a l l Docket. February 23, March 9, 2005 March 10, 2005 2005 forensic The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. On B r o w n ' s m o t i o n , t h e c a s e was c o n t i n u e d t o t h e M a r c h 21, 2005, Criminal Status C a l l Docket. The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a special status conference. The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s "Court's Findings at Status Conference and Order," from t h e M a r c h 9, 2 0 0 5 , special status conference. In i t s order, the trial court ordered Brown t o g i v e t h e State the reports of Rosenzweig and G o f f ; o r d e r e d Brown to give the court records that were i n the 46 CR-07-1332 possession of the defense and t h a t m i g h t be s u b j e c t t o the State's motion for d i s c o v e r y so t h a t i t c o u l d make a n i n c a m e r a i n s p e c t i o n of those records; and ordered the State to give the d e f e n s e any d i s c o v e r a b l e items, including any videotapes, from the State of Ohio. I t also noted that, based on the discussion between the parties, the earliest possible date for trial w o u l d be t h e t e r m beginning o n May 9, 2 0 0 5 , b u t t h a t was subject to the a v a i l a b i l i t y of witnesses. March 18, 2005 Brown filed a Individual Voir "Motion Dire." for March 21, 2005 The c a s e was called for a Criminal Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was nt c o n t iin u e d by 18, agreement to the A p r i l 2005, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call Docket. March 23, 2005 The t r i a l c o u r t s e t a s t a t u s conference for April 8, 2005. March 28, 2005 Brown f i l e d a motion requesting a trial by jury as to the unanimous determining the issue of e x i s t e n c e o f any a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances and as t o h i s ultimate sentence i f the S t a t e were t o seek t h e d e a t h , 47 4- V, CR-07-1332 penalty. Brown a l s o f i l e d a "Motion to Amend Order," ; ^ ^ 1 seeking a d d i t i o n a l funds for the Rosenzweig's s e r v i c e s . April 8, April 11, 2005 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s "Order Upon In Camera Inspection of Defendant's Record." April 19, 2005 The t r i a l court set a special status conference f o r May 9, 2 0 0 5 . May 6, 2005 2005 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s "Court's Findings at Status Conference and Order." In that order, i t denied Brown's motion f o r individual voir dire; s t a t e d t h a t i t was g o i n g t o hold Brown's "Motion to Amend O r d e r " i n abeyance; and d e n i e d Brown's motion r e g a r d i n g the unanimous j u r y determination as to sentencing. I t also stated that, based on the discussion between the p a r t i e s , t h e t r i a l m i g h t be postured f o r the t r i a l term t h a t w o u l d s t a r t o n May 9, 2005, but that would be subject to the a v a i l a b i l i t y of witnesses. The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a special status conference. When t h e c a s e was called, the State moved for a continuance based on a witness scheduling problem 48 CR-07-1332 f o r t h e May 9, 2 0 0 5 , trial date. The trial court granted the motion for a continuance over Brown's o b j e c t i o n and scheduled t h e trial for the week of September 12, 2005. The trial court also set a special status conference f o r S e p t e m b e r 8, 2 0 0 5 . September 13, 2005 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s "Court Findings at Status Conference and Order," from the September 8, 2005, status conference. The order indicated that the parties had discussed p o s s i b l e t r i a l dates i n t h i s case. The trial court ordered the parties to determine whether their w i t n e s s e s w o u l d be a v a i l a b l e for trial the week of November 14, 2005, and t o notify the court regarding their availability before September 23, 2005. I t also indicated that, i f there were any c o m p l i c a t i o n s w i t h the a v a i l a b i l i t y of witnesses, the t r i a l would be s e t f o r t h e F e b r u a r y 2006 term. September 19, 2005 T h e c a s e was c a l l e d f o r a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was c o n t i n u e d to the October 17, 2005, C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. 49 CR-07-1332 October November 17, 21, 2005 2005 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued to the November 21, 2005, C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued to the January 23, 2006, C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. January 12, 2006 The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a special status conference. A f t e r a d i s c u s s i o n among t h e attorneys, the t r i a l court set Brown's trial for February 13, 2006, subject to the availability of witnesses. January 19, 2006 The S t a t e f i l e d a " S t a t e ' s Motion for Additional Discovery," asking the t r i a l court to order Brown to submit to a "'major-case f i n g e r p r i n t i n g ' examination." January 26, 2006 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an order granting the "State's Motion for Additional Discovery." February 6, 2006 The State filed a "Joint Motion to Continue" to continue the t r i a l from the February 13, 2006, trial docket to the March 13, 2006, t r i a l d o c k e t b a s e d on the unavailability of a 50 CR-07-1332 w i t n e s s who was m a t e r i a l t h e defense. February 22, 2006 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by agreement t h e M a r c h 27, 2006, C r i m i n al Status Call Docket. March 27, 2006 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by agreement t o the A p r i l 17, 2006, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call Docket because the DNA r e p o r t was s t i l l outstanding. April 17, 2006 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by the May 15, agreement o 0 0 6T, r' r i m i n a l 2nn/ C Status Call Docket because t h ee h DNA r e p o r t s t i l l was outstanding. , i-v-. ^ May July 15, 24, 2006 2006 v-^-I- - 1 - ^ -I-^-^ ^ ¢^/r-^TT The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by agreement t o the J u l y 24, 2006, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call t h ee DNA Docket because h s t i l l r e p o r t was outstanding. The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by a g r e e m e n t t o t h e A u g u s t 14, 2006, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call 51 CR-07-1332 Docket because r e p o r t was outstanding. August 14, September October 2006 18, 16, November 20, January 30, 2006 2006 2006 2007 the DNA s t i l l The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by agreement to the September 18, 2006, Criminal Status C a l l Docket because the DNA r e p o r t was s t i l l outstanding. The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by a g r e e m e n t t o t h e O c t o b e r 16, 2006, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call Docket because the DNA r e p o r t was s t i l l outstanding. The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued by agreement to the November 20, 2006, Criminal Status C a l l Docket because the DNA r e p o r t s t i l l was outstanding. The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. The c a s e was continued to the January 30, 2007, Criminal Status C a l l Docket and set for trial on F e b r u a r y 26, 2007. The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. After both parties announced 52 CR-07-1332 that t h e y were ready, the t r i a l c o u r t s e t the case f o r t h e M a r c h 26, 2007, c r i m i n a l t r i a l docket. I t also set a special status conference f o r F e b r u a r y 9, 2 0 0 7 . February 9, 2007 March 2, 2007 Brown filed a "Motion f o r Funds f o r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r Mitigation Witness." March 6, 2007 The case was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. The State moved for a continuance. Over Brown's objection, the t r i a l court c o n t i n u e d the case to the April 3, 2007 Criminal Status Call Docket. March 8, 2007 The t r i a l c o u r t s e t B r o w n ' s "Motion for Funds for T r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r Mitigation Witness," for a h e a r i n g on M a r c h 16, 2 0 0 7 . March 16, 2007 The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a special status conference. A f t e r both p a r t i e s announced that t h e y were ready, the trial court set the trial f o r M a r c h 26, 2007, s u b j e c t to the availability of witnesses. The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g on B r o w n ' s "Motion f o r Funds f o r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n for M i t i g a t i o n Witness" and granted the motion. I t also set Brown's case f o r t r i a l o n May 2 1 , 2 0 0 7 . 53 CR-07-1332 March 2 1 , 2007 May 8, May 29, 2007 The t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an order granting Brown's motion for funds for transportation of a mitigation witness. The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. The c a s e was c o n t i n u e d by agreement t o the June 18, 2007, c r i m i n a l t r i a l docket and the May 29, 2007, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. 2007 Brown filed a motion to continue because a necessary witness would not be available. The case was called f o r a Criminal Status Call Docket. Upon Brown's motion, the case was continued for trial until A u g u s t 20, 2007, a n d s e t f o r the J u n e 26, 2007, C r i m i n a l Status C a l l Docket. August 17, 2007 The S t a t e f i l e d a m o t i o n t o continue because i t was i n the process of obtaining s e r v i c e o f a s u b p o e n a f o r an out o f s t a t e w i t n e s s . The case was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. The trial court continued the case for trial until September 17, 2007, and noted that the State was trying another capital murder case. August 28, 2007 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. 54 CR-07-1332 T h e c a s e was c o n t i n u e d by agreement t o t h e September 25, 2007, Criminal Status C a l l Docket. September October 25, 2007 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. The c a s e was c o n t i n u e d by a g r e e m e n t t o t h e O c t o b e r 30, 2007, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call Docket. 30, 2007 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. The c a s e was c o n t i n u e d by a g r e e m e n t t o t h e D e c e m b e r 4, 2007, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call D o c k e t , a n d t h e c a s e was s e t for trial on F e b r u a r y 25, 2008. December 4, 2007 The c a s e was called for a C r i m i n a l S t a t u s C a l l Docket. The c a s e was c o n t i n u e d by a g r e e m e n t t o t h e J a n u a r y 29, 2008, C r i m i n a l S t a t u s Call Docket and set f o r the February 25, 2008, trial docket. December 6, 2007 The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a special status conference. The trial court scheduled another special status conference f o r January 3, 2008. December 19, 2007 Brown filed a "Motion f o r Change o f P l a c e o f T r i a l . " 55 CR-07-1332 January 30, February 2008 The t r i a l c o u r t s c h e d u l e d a motion hearing f o r February 19, 2008. 25, 2008 The a p p e l l a n t ' s t r i a l started. A. Unless the LENGTH OF delay i s presumptively prejudicial, remaining State, the Barker delay indictment first. or from Barker, date App. from of 1993). the date arrest, Accordingly, measured from the date 13, 2001, approximately shorter an until than length the this examination date (holding prejudicial). that a The of the occurred in this his trial formal ( A l a .Crim. taken into began, were of presumptively the remaining So. 2d 1290 31-month delay was 56 is custody on which was that and criteria. ( A l a . Crim. App. presumptively T h e r e f o r e , we w i l l e x a m i n e t h e r e m a i n i n g factors. App. case prejudicial Barker v. length of whichever delay be Zumbado T h i s c o u r t has p r e v i o u s l y found S e e , e . g . , V i n c e n t v . S t a t e , 607 1992) of t h e a p p e l l a n t was 83 m o n t h s . delays required the to to consider the supra; S e e N i c k e r s o n v . S t a t e , 629 S o . 2 d 60 1993). March See either the lengthy i t i s not necessary ( A l a . Crim. i s measured DELAY sufficiently factors. 615 S o . 2 d 1 2 2 3 THE Barker CR-07-1332 B. REASONS In the Walker, following FOR THE DELAY 928 S o . 2 d a t 2 6 5 , t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t s e t f o r t h standard f o r evaluating the reasons f o r the delay: "Barker recognizes three categories of reasons f o r delay: (1) d e l i b e r a t e d e l a y , (2) n e g l i g e n t d e l a y , a n d (3) j u s t i f i e d d e l a y . 407 U.S. a t 5 3 1 , 92 S. C t . 2182. Courts assign d i f f e r e n t weight to d i f f e r e n t reasons f o r delay. D e l i b e r a t e delay i s 'weighted heavily' against the State. 407 U.S. a t 5 3 1 , 92 S. C t . 2 1 8 2 . D e l i b e r a t e d e l a y i n c l u d e s an ' a t t e m p t t o d e l a y t h e t r i a l i n o r d e r t o hamper t h e d e f e n s e ' o r '"to g a i n some t a c t i c a l a d v a n t a g e o v e r (defendants) o r t o h a r a s s t h e m . " ' 407 U.S. a t 531 & n . 3 2 , 92 S. C t . 2 1 8 2 ( q u o t i n g U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M a r i o n , 404 U.S. 3 0 7 , 3 2 5 , 92 S. C t . 4 5 5 , 30 L. E d . 2 d 468 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ) . Negligent delay i s weighted less heavily against the State than i s d e l i b e r a t e delay. B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 531, 92 S. C t . 2 1 8 2 ; E x p a r t e C a r r e l l , 565 S o . 2 d [ 1 0 4 , ] 108 [ ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) ] . J u s t i f i e d d e l a y -- w h i c h i n c l u d e s such occurrences as m i s s i n g w i t n e s s e s o r delay f o r which the defendant is primarily r e s p o n s i b l e -- i s n o t w e i g h t e d a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 5 3 1 , 92 S. C t . 2 1 8 2 ; Zumbado v . S t a t e , 615 S o . 2 d 1 2 2 3 , 1234 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) ('"Delays o c c a s i o n e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t o r on h i s b e h a l f a r e e x c l u d e d from t h e l e n g t h o f d e l a y and a r e h e a v i l y counted against the defendant i n applying the b a l a n c i n g t e s t of Barker."') (quoting McCallum v. S t a t e , 407 S o . 2 d 8 6 5 , 8 68 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 19 8 1 ) ) . " In this case, there i s n o t any i n d i c a t i o n deliberately or negligently delayed this case, the State 57 i n a n y way. In a n n o u n c e d r e a d y on J a n u a r y initially the t r i a l that the State 30, CR-07-1332 2007. 9, I t a l s o announced t h a t 2007. entirely There clear are why i t was r e a d y a g a i n several the t r i a l instances was State specifically own b e h a l f . the State that the State trial issue i t s second with o f a subpoena court State t o enhance Irvin v. S t a t e , by neutral continuances continuance third due would to a i t requested i t s motion of obtaining Further, to continue, be trying the another T h u s , "we s e e n o d e l i b e r a t e d e l a y b y t h e case or to prejudice some that of the delay the defense." ( A l a . Crim. App. i n this c a s e was 2005). caused are not a t t r i b u t a b l e to e i t h e r the State o r Brown. case, a n d t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n was c o n d u c t e d , was p e r f o r m e d , on i t s i t does i n d i c a t e i t was i n t h e p r o c e s s 940 S o . 2 d 3 3 1 , 3 4 3 reasons the and t h a t the State i t s own Additionally, of the proceedings, f o r an o u t - o f - s t a t e w i t n e s s . that c a p i t a l murder case. the three i t s first the State's noted i t i s not However, continuance, a witness because i t granted only February t h e r e c o r d does n o t i n d i c a t e t h e reason requested continuance service when Although requested scheduling third requested where continued. record i n d i c a t e s t h a t , over the course on Initially, we note psychological testing 58 that this was a capital forensic analysis was d o n e , and d i s c o v e r y CR-07-1332 was conducted. was In fact, continued by the record a g r e e m e n t on indicates that several occasions p a r t i e s were s t i l l a w a i t i n g t h e r e s u l t s o f DNA the conducted trial court conferences, and arose the preparation for during delay based on Pierson hearings numerous a violation this court, i t appears the delay requested two indicates that at t o Brown's that least record there was status issues Neutral that reasons ( A l a . C r i m . App. assertions partially, See 1996). further Brown However, indicates that request w h e r e t h e c a s e was Therefore, continued at the very continuances. least, there were to of the reasons f o r to the specifically the record for a also continuance due t o t h e u n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a n e c e s s a r y d e f e n s e w i t n e s s . record case i n his brief attributable that one j o i n t calls, speedy t r i a l . the majority continuances. Also, a dismissal of the to a indicates because the various case. 677 S o . 2 d 8 3 0 , 831 contrary The require of the right Further, are, with case testing. docket of this do n o t o r d i n a r i l y v. S t a t e , defense. to deal the numerous The instances by t h e agreement o f t h e p a r t i e s . the defense acquiesced Thus, t h e m a j o r i t y 59 of the delay was to those justified CR-07-1332 delay that against was a t t r i b u t a b l e to Brown r a t h e r C. In forth the Walker, the Barker than Brown, against the BROWN'S A S S E R T I O N OF 928 following So. 2d at 265-66, guidelines for and i t weighs heavily State. RIGHTS the supreme evaluating this court prong test: "An a c c u s e d d o e s n o t w a i v e t h e r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l s i m p l y by f a i l i n g t o a s s e r t i t . B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 528. Even so, c o u r t s a p p l y i n g the B a r k e r factors are to consider i n the weighing process w h e t h e r and when t h e a c c u s e d a s s e r t s t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , 407 U.S. a t 5 2 8 - 2 9 , and not every a s s e r t i o n of the r i g h t to a speedy t r i a l i s w e i g h t e d equally. C o m p a r e K e l l e y v . S t a t e , 568 So. 2 d 405, 410 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1990) ('Repeated r e q u e s t s for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an a c c u s e d . ' ) , w i t h C l a n c y v . S t a t e , 886 So. 2 d 166, 172 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2003) ( w e i g h t i n g t h i r d f a c t o r against an a c c u s e d who asserted his r i g h t to a s p e e d y t r i a l two w e e k s b e f o r e t r i a l , and s t a t i n g : '"The f a c t t h a t the a p p e l l a n t d i d not a s s e r t h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l sooner 'tends t o suggest t h a t he e i t h e r a c q u i e s c e d i n t h e d e l a y s o r s u f f e r e d only minimal prejudice p r i o r to that date.'"') ( q u o t i n g B e n e f i e l d v . S t a t e , 726 So. 2d 286, 291 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), additional citations o m i t t e d ) , and B r o w n v . S t a t e , 392 So. 2 d 1 2 4 8 , 1254 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1980) (no s p e e d y - t r i a l v i o l a t i o n where d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l three days before trial). "In t h i s case, Walker a s s e r t e d her r i g h t to a s p e e d y t r i a l one t i m e - - l e s s t h a n f i v e m o n t h s a f t e r s h e was a r r e s t e d . The C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s d i d not e x p l i c i t l y weigh t h i s f a c t o r a g a i n s t the S t a t e . But t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d -- and t h e S t a t e c o n c e d e d 60 set of CR-07-1332 -- t h a t t h i s f a c t o r w e i g h s a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . We a l s o f i n d t h a t t h i s f a c t o r weighs i n Walker's f a v o r . "We n o t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t show whether Walker knew of the pendency of the indictment during the three years between her i n d i c t m e n t and h e r a r r e s t . A l t h o u g h t h e a c c u s e d has no o b l i g a t i o n t o b r i n g h e r s e l f t o t r i a l , B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 527, S m i t h v . S t a t e , 40 9 So. 2d 958 , 962 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1981), i n determining whether to presume p r e j u d i c e under the f o u r t h B a r k e r factor, c o u r t s have emphasized the accused's i g n o r a n c e of outstanding charges during the period from indictment u n t i l arrest. See, e.g., Doggett [v. United S t a t e s ] , 505 U.S. [647,] 653-54 [(1992)] ( h o l d i n g t h a t w h e r e t h e r e was unrebutted evidence t h a t t h e a c c u s e d was i g n o r a n t o f t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t h i m d u r i n g t h e 8 1/2 years between h i s i n d i c t m e n t a n d a r r e s t , t h e a c c u s e d was ' n o t t o be t a x e d f o r invoking h i s speedy t r i a l right only after his arrest'); [Ex p a r t e ] C l o p t o n , 656 So. 2d [1243,] 1244 [(Ala. 1995)] (recognizing that before his a r r e s t , the accused's ignorance of the indictment was ' u n d i s p u t e d ' ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , i n a case i n v o l v i n g d e l a y c a u s e d b y n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e s t a t e , t h e t h i r d f a c t o r u s u a l l y w i l l w e i g h more h e a v i l y i n t h e a c c u s e d ' s f a v o r when t h e r e i s a f f i r m a t i v e p r o o f of the accused's ignorance of the charges a g a i n s t her d u r i n g the d e l a y . See D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 653¬ 54; C l o p t o n , 656 So. 2 d a t 1 2 4 4 . In Walker's case, h o w e v e r , t h e r e i s no c o n c l u s i v e p r o o f one way o r t h e other r e g a r d i n g her knowledge of the charges d u r i n g t h e d e l a y b e t w e e n h e r i n d i c t m e n t and h e r arrest. Consequently, t h i s f a c t o r weighs i n Walker's f a v o r , but not as h e a v i l y as i t would i f the record a f f i r m a t i v e l y s h o w e d t h a t s h e d i d n o t know o f t h e charges d u r i n g the time from her i n d i c t m e n t until her a r r e s t . " (Footnotes omitted.) 61 CR-07-1332 Brown d i d not Rather, he denied his file a pre-trial waited u n t i l right two to that, on for a continuance, for such the defense a parties objected continuance, times on and the weighs the waiting unavailability against Walker, State's indicate first been argues requests the grounds that, after request record w e r e due for State's was continued of the for by fact of that, second also requested a witness. to the results indicates the t h a t the defense a forensic after request agreement the for four a continuance Therefore, that this a more based factor Brown. D. In case had Brown indicates State's trial. c o n t i n u e d by agreement s e v e r a l t i m e s the to the not also continuances still Finally, defense the t h e c a s e was the to r e c o r d does to t h a t some o f t h o s e Although objected record f o r a speedy t o a r g u e t h a t he trial. The and testing. he the objected were appeal speedy occasions, objections. continuance, this motion P R E J U D I C E TO 928 So. 2d at THE APPELLANT 266-67, the supreme court explained: "Because 'pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable,' Doggett[v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ] , 505 U.S. [ 6 4 7 , ] 6 5 6 , 112 S. C t . 2 6 8 6 [(1992)], the f o u r t h Barker f a c t o r examines whether 62 CR-07-1332 and t o what e x t e n t t h e d e l a y has p r e j u d i c e d the defendant. B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 5 3 2 , 92 S. C t . 2 1 8 2 . The U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s r e c o g n i z e d t h r e e t y p e s o f h a r m t h a t may result from d e p r i v i n g a defendant of the right to a speedy trial: ' " o p p r e s s i v e p r e t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n , " " a n x i e t y and c o n c e r n o f t h e a c c u s e d , " and "the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the [ a c c u s e d ' s ] d e f e n s e w i l l be i m p a i r e d " by d i m m i n g memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.' D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 6 5 4 , 112 S. C t . 2 6 8 6 ( q u o t i n g B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 5 3 2 , 92 S. C t . 2 1 8 2 , a n d c i t i n g S m i t h v . H o o e y , 393 U.S. 3 7 4 , 3 7 7 - 7 9 , 89 S. C t . 5 7 5 , 21 L. E d . 2 d 607 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . E w e l l , 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S. C t . 7 7 3 , 15 L. E d . 2 d 627 (1966)). 'Of t h e s e f o r m s o f p r e j u d i c e , " t h e m o s t serious i s the l a s t , because the i n a b i l i t y of a d e f e n d a n t a d e q u a t e l y t o p r e p a r e h i s c a s e skews t h e f a i r n e s s of the e n t i r e system."' 505 U.S. a t 654, 112 S. C t . 2 6 8 6 ( q u o t i n g B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 5 3 2 , 92 S. C t . 2 1 8 2 ) . "The U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t i n D o g g e t t u s e d three hypothetical cases to demonstrate the accused's burden under the f o u r t h Barker factor. 505 U.S. a t 6 5 6 - 5 7 , 112 S. C t . 2 6 8 6 . See R o b i n s o n v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 570 (5th C i r . 1993) (discussing Doggett). The accused's burden 'of p r o o f i n each s i t u a t i o n v a r i e s i n v e r s e l y w i t h the [ S t a t e ] ' s degree of c u l p a b i l i t y f o r the delay.' R o b i n s o n , 2 F . 3 d a t 570 ( c i t i n g D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. a t 6 5 6 , 112 S. C t . 2 6 8 6 ) . I n the f i r s t s c e n a r i o , where the state pursues the accused 'with reasonable d i l i g e n c e , ' the delay however l o n g generally i s excused unless the accused demonstrates ' s p e c i f i c prejudice to h i s defense.' D o g g e t t , 505 U.S. at 6 5 6 , 112 S. C t . 2 6 8 6 . T h u s , when t h e s t a t e a c t s with reasonable d i l i g e n c e i n b r i n g i n g the defendant to t r i a l , t h e d e f e n d a n t has t h e burden o f p r o v i n g p r e j u d i c e c a u s e d by t h e d e l a y . " 63 CR-07-1332 In this reasonable case, as set forth above, the State acted d i l i g e n c e i n b r i n g i n g Brown t o t r i a l . Brown has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g In h i s b r i e f to this court, with Therefore, t h a t the delay p r e j u d i c e d him. he makes o n l y general allegations t h a t he s u f f e r e d p r e j u d i c e b e c a u s e he s p e n t a l m o s t s e v e n in j a i l awaiting t r i a l with capital charges"; hindered and that his ability prepare because the delay "the a n x i e t y and concern o f f a c i n g the fact t o gather h i s defense; evidence, the allowed the State to present of a child witness and that T.S. his wife, occasions assertions the delay T.S. that to prepare consist a i s susceptible the State h e r t o be time met T.S. did not demonstrate were to State's because i t that of on of Smith Brown's Therefore, specific, we actual delay. conclude that Brown e n t i t l e d t o a p r e s u m p t i o n o f p r e j u d i c e due t o t h e s h e e r 64 the numerous However, allegations. i f we the i n the care bare t o h i s defense because of the presumed t o the passage of prejudice be witness, a witness. that even of witnesses, him with conclude Moreover, he result as incarcerated should prejudiced s p e n t much o f t h a t and was contact prejudice and time, he that negligence; memory that that allegedly was years was length CR-07-1332 of the delay, the majority d e l a y o r c a u s e d b y h i s own there his i s not any i n any way. After weighing the support a trial. speedy any error, that t h a t the See was either neutral the t h a t B r o w n was we do error, actually Also, hampered supra. factors, Accordingly, plain delay Walker, Barker a finding much l e s s delay a c t i o n s , as s e t f o r t h a b o v e . indication defense does not of record before denied not find in this his right that there us to was regard. IV. Brown's f o u r t h argument i s t h a t the p r o s e c u t o r misconduct trial to the during 1042, error. Supreme C o u r t 1061 trial. Because c o m m e n t s a b o u t w h i c h he them f o r p l a i n Alabama his (Ala. See Rule now 45A, s t a t e d i n Ex he did complains, A l a . R. parte not App. Windsor, engaged i n object we review P. As 683 So. 1996): "'"While this failure to object does not p r e c l u d e review i n a c a p i t a l case, i t does weigh a g a i n s t any c l a i m o f p r e j u d i c e . " Ex p a r t e Kennedy, 472 So. 2 d [ 1 1 0 6 , ] a t 1111 [ ( A l a . 1985)] (emphasis in original). " T h i s c o u r t has concluded that the failure to object to improper prosecutorial arguments ... s h o u l d be w e i g h e d as p a r t o f our e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e c l a i m on t h e m e r i t s b e c a u s e o f i t s suggestion t h a t the defense d i d not c o n s i d e r the comments i n q u e s t i o n t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y harmful." J o h n s o n v . W a i n w r i g h t , 778 F . 2 d 6 2 3 , 629 n. 6 ( 1 1 t h 65 at the 2d CR-07-1332 Cir. 201, 1 9 8 5 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 484 U.S. 98 L . E d . 2 d 152 ( 1 9 8 7 ) . " Initially, we note that jury that the evidence i n t h i s the witnesses evidence. 1994), prosecutor's argument the instructed the c a s e came f r o m t h e t e s t i m o n y o f exhibits that See T a y l o r v . S t a t e , aff'd, 666 S o . 2 d 73 closing argument, "'so i n f e c t e d were admitted the t r i a l 666 S o . 2 d 36 ( A l a . 1995). 477 U.S. E d . 2 d 144 ( 1 9 8 6 ) into court's (Ala. Crim. In judging with unfairness 1 6 8 , 1 8 1 , 1 0 6 S. C t . 2 4 6 4 , a s t o make Darden v. 2 4 7 1 , 91 L . ( q u o t i n g D o n n e l l y v. D e C h r i s t o f o r o , 4 1 6 U.S. 6 4 3 , 94 S. C t . 1 8 6 8 , 1 8 7 1 , 40 L. E d . 2 d 4 3 1 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) . "In reviewing allegedly improper prosecutorial comments, c o n d u c t , a n d q u e s t i o n i n g o f w i t n e s s e s , t h e task o f t h i s Court i s t o consider t h e i r impact i n the c o n t e x t o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l , and not t o view the allegedly improper acts i n the abstract. W h i t l o w v . S t a t e , 509 So. 2 d 2 5 2 , 256 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1987); W y s i n g e r v . S t a t e , 448 S o . 2 d 4 3 5 , 438 ( A l a . Cr. App. 1983); C a r p e n t e r v . S t a t e , 404 S o . 2 d 8 9 , 97 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 0 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 404 S o . 2 d 100 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . M o r e o v e r , t h i s C o u r t h a s a l s o h e l d t h a t statements o f c o u n s e l i n argument t o t h e j u r y must be v i e w e d as d e l i v e r e d i n t h e h e a t o f d e b a t e ; such statements a r e u s u a l l y v a l u e d by t h e j u r y a t t h e i r t r u e w o r t h a n d a r e n o t e x p e c t e d t o become factors i n the formation of the verdict. O r r v. 66 a the standard i s whether the r e s u l t i n g c o n v i c t i o n a d e n i a l o f due p r o c e s s . ' " Wainwright, 637, the court We p r e s u m e t h a t t h e j u r y f o l l o w e d t h e t r i a l instructions. App. and the t r i a l 8 7 2 , 108 S. C t . CR-07-1332 S t a t e , 462 S o . 2 d 1 0 1 3 , 1016 ( A l a . C r . App. 1984); S a n d e r s v . S t a t e , 426 S o . 2 d 4 9 7 , 509 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1982)." Bankhead v. State, 1989), aff'd in 1991), rev'd on 585 So. relevant other 2d part, grounds, 97, 585 625 106-07 So. So. 2d (Ala. Crim. 2d 112, 1146 127 App. (Ala. ( A l a . 1993). Finally, " ' [ d ] u r i n g c l o s i n g argument, the p r o s e c u t o r , as w e l l as d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , has a r i g h t t o p r e s e n t h i s impressions from the evidence, i f reasonable, and may a r g u e e v e r y l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e . ' R u t l e d g e v. S t a t e , 523 S o . 2 d 1 0 8 7 , 1 1 0 0 ( A l a . C r . App. 1987), r e v ' d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , 523 S o . 2 d 1118 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) (citation omitted). Wide d i s c r e t i o n i s a l l o w e d t h e t r i a l court i n r e g u l a t i n g the arguments of counsel. R a c i n e v. State, 290 A l a . 225, 275 So. 2d 655 (1973). 'In evaluating allegedly prejudicial remarks by t h e p r o s e c u t o r i n c l o s i n g argument, ... e a c h c a s e m u s t b e j u d g e d on i t s own m e r i t s , ' Hooks v . S t a t e , 534 S o . 2 d 3 2 9 , 354 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1987), a f f ' d , 534 S o . 2 d 371 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 488 U.S. 1 0 5 0 , 109 S. C t . 8 8 3 , 102 L. E d . 2 d 1 0 0 5 (1989) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ( q u o t i n g B a r n e t t v. S t a t e , 52 A l a . A p p . 2 6 0 , 2 6 4 , 291 S o . 2 d 353 360 (Ala. Cr. A p p . 1 9 9 0 ) , a f f ' d , 590 S o . 2 d 3 6 9 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . 'In order to constitute reversible error, improper a r g u m e n t m u s t be p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i s s u e s a t t r i a l o r its natural tendency must be to influence the f i n d i n g o f t h e j u r y . ' M i t c h e l l v . S t a t e , 480 S o . 2 d 1254, 1257-58 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985) (citations omitted). 'To justify r e v e r s a l because of an attorney's argument t o the j u r y , t h i s court must c o n c l u d e t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e has r e s u l t e d . ' T w i l l e y v . S t a t e , 472 S o . 2 d 1 1 3 0 , 1 1 3 9 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985) (citations omitted)." 67 CR-07-1332 Coral v. S t a t e , aff'd, 628 S o . 2 d 1 0 0 4 Initially, closing 628 S o . 2 d 9 5 4 , 985 Brown arguments, App. 1992), ( A l a . 1993). contends that, the prosecutor p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n as t o h i s g u i l t . argument, (Ala. Crim. during h i s guilt-phase improperly asserted During h i s rebuttal closing the prosecutor stated: "So, I s u b m i t t o y o u i n c o u n t t h r e e i s t h e e x a c t same w a y . A l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f i n t e n t i o n a l murder o f C h e r e a J e m i s o n , y o u ' v e g o t t o b e l i e v e t h a t he d i d n o t r o b h e r , he j u s t k i l l e d h e r i n t e n t i o n a l l y . And then i f you take t h e i n t e n t i o n a l murder o u t , you've got j u s t robbery. And then i t ' s j u s t a robbery. It's not just a robbery. T h i n k a b o u t i t . Common sense you c a n u s e i s t h a t i t ' s an i n t e n t i o n a l a c t without question. They're intentionally killed. And i t i s a r o b b e r y w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n . And i t i s two o r more p e r s o n s p u r s u a n t t o one c o n d u c t w i t h o u t question. The o n l y q u e s t i o n y o u ' v e g o t i s y o u ' v e got t o g e t back here and determine beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i s d i d he do i t ? D i d he do i t ? Because we've proven a l l the elements of the o f f e n s e . I s u b m i t t o y o u , we p r o v e d h e d i d i t . B u t t h a t ' s t h e q u e s t i o n f o r y o u . I d o n ' t g e t t o go b a c k there w i t h you. My v o t e was c a s t a l o n g t i m e a g o when I c h a r g e d h i m w i t h w h a t he d i d . " (R. 970-71) (emphasis added). "'While i t i s never proper f o r the prosecutor to express h i spersonal opinion as t o t h e g u i l t of the accused during closing argument, r e v e r s i b l e error does n o t o c c u r when t h e a r g u m e n t c o m p l a i n e d o f 68 his CR-07-1332 constitutes concerning conclusions Allen v. (quoting State, Sams v . 659 mere e x p r e s s i o n o f opinion inferences, deductions and drawn from the e v i d e n c e . ' " So. 2d 135, State, 506 So. 139 2d (Ala. Crim. 1027, 1029 App. 1994) (Ala. 1986)). "'A p r o s e c u t o r as w e l l as d e f e n s e c o u n s e l has a right to present his impressions from the e v i d e n c e , ' and ' [ h ] e may argue every legitimate inference from the evidence and may examine, c o l l a t e , s i f t , and t r e a t the e v i d e n c e i n h i s own way.' W a t s o n v . S t a t e , 398 S o . 2 d 3 2 0 , 328 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 0 ) , w r i t d e n i e d , 398 S o . 2 d 332 (Ala.), c e r t . d e n i e d , 452 U.S. 9 4 1 , 101 S. C t . 3 0 8 5 , 69 L. E d . 2 d 955 (1981)." H e n d e r s o n v. State, 584 So. 2d 841, 856-57 (Ala. Crim. 1988). "'"'[T]he rule on which the weight of authority is in agreement i s t h a t i t i s improper f o r the p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y ... to express h i s p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n or b e l i e f in guilt of accused [ s o ] a s t o p e r m i t an i n f e r e n c e b y the jury that such opinion or belief i s based on reasons or i n f o r m a t i o n outside the evidence, but t h a t i t i s not improper f o r him to argue or t o e x p r e s s h i s opinion that accused i s g u i l t y , where he states, or i t is apparent, that such opinion is 69 App. CR-07-1332 based s o l e l y on the evidence.' 23A C . J . S . C r i m i n a l Law § 1104, p. 1 9 4 - 9 5 ( 1 9 6 1 ) . See Crenshaw v . S t a t e , 153 A l a . 5, 7, 45 So. 631, 632 (1908) (prosecutor argued to the effect that the e v i d e n c e showed a c l e a r case); C r a n m o r e v . S t a t e , 41 A l a . App. 276, 279, 129 So. 2d 121, 123 (1961) (prosecutor's statement, 'I n e v e r d i d ask you t o c o n v i c t a man I believe t o be innocent' f o u n d t o be 'a m e r e e x p r e s s i o n o f o p i n i o n by t h e s o l i c i t o r t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y , a n d ... not a cause f o r r e v e r s a l ' ) ; Handley v . S t a t e , 214 A l a . 1 7 2 , 1 7 5 , 106 So. 692, 695 (1925) (argument, 'She i s a murderer; she is a m u r d e r e r . She i s n o t some one who h a s c o m m i t t e d some o f t h e lower offenses of h o m i c i d e ' did 'not transcend the bounds of l e g i t i m a t e a r g u m e n t ' ) ; G a r d n e r v. S t a t e , 17 A l a . A p p . 589, 590-91, 87 So. 885, 886, cert. denied, 205 A l a . 60, 87 So. 888 (1920) (prosecutor's argument t h a t the defendant 'is a pickpocket' in prosecution for grand larceny 'was the expression of an o p i n i o n ' by t h e p r o s e c u t o r , 'and from the s t a t e ' s c o n t e n t i o n was s u p p o r t e d by one phase of the evidence.' Presiding Judge Bricken dissented, arguing that ' i t d i d not l i e i n the mouth of 70 CR-07-1332 the solicitor to decide these v i t a l q u e s t i o n s . ' ) ; M c C o l s t o n v. S t a t e , 20 A l a . A p p . 5 9 1 , 5 9 3 , 104 So. 347, 348-49 (1925) (prosecutor's argument, 'He is guilty of the crime of highway robbery,' should be refrained from but did not constitute error); Dunn v . State, 19 Ala. App. 576, 577, 99 So. 154, 155 (1924) ( p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment, ' I t e l l you t h a t t h i s d e f e n d a n t i s g u i l t y , ' was m e r e l y an argument of the inference drawn by the s o l i c i t o r a n d was n o t improper); Griggs v. State, 21 Ala. App. 530, 531, 109 So. 611 (1926) ( p r o s e c u t o r s t a t e d t h a t from the evidence he believed the d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y , and that, if he did not believe the d e f e n d a n t was guilty, he would not ask the j u r y to c o n v i c t him. H e l d : The o p i n i o n was b a s e d u p o n the evidence. 'Where t h i s i s t h e case, such e x p r e s s i o n of o p i n i o n w i l l n o t be s u f f i c i e n t u p o n w h i c h to predicate a reversal.'); T u c k e r v. State, 28 Ala. App. 4 9 2 , 494, 188 So. 2 7 6 , 277 (1939) (prosecutor's statement, 'I b e l i e v e he [ d e f e n d a n t ] i s g u i l t y ' was a 'mere e x p r e s s i o n o f o p i n i o n by the solicitor' and not improper remark); Gilbert v. S t a t e , 19 A l a . A p p . 104, 106-07, 95 So. 502, 504 (1923) 71 CR-07-1332 (prosecutor's closing argument, 'He is guilty as hell itself under this testimony, and you know i t ' t h o u g h n o t a p p r o v e d was 'but the mere expression of c o u n s e l made i n a r g u m e n t ' ) . " " ' G a l l o w a y v . S t a t e , 484 ( A l a . C r . App. 1986).' So. 2d 1199, 1201 " H u n t v . S t a t e , 659 So. 2d 9 3 3 , 9 4 0 - 4 2 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1994) ( h o l d i n g t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g comments by t h e p r o s e c u t o r w e r e n o t e r r o r : t h a t he f e l t t h a t t h e evidence presented was '"overwhelming,"' that '"at t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s t r i a l ... y o u w i l l a g r e e w i t h the S t a t e of Alabama t h a t the defendant i s g u i l t y of c a p i t a l m u r d e r , " ' and t h a t ' " i f t h i s i s n ' t capital m u r d e r , t h e n t h e r e has n e v e r b e e n c a p i t a l m u r d e r i n Walker County"'), aff'd, 659 So. 2d 960 (Ala. 1995)." McGowan v. State, 990 So. 2d 931, 971-72 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). After reviewing the prosecutor's comments i n c o n t e x t , c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e y w e r e s i m p l y p e r m i s s i b l e c o m m e n t s on guilt did that not were b a s e d improperly on the encourage evidence. the Also, jury to on reasons or i n f o r m a t i o n outside the we do was plain not find that there any 72 the convict evidence. error we Brown's prosecutor Brown based Accordingly, in this regard. CR-07-1332 Brown that also contends that were not supported by the prosecutor the evidence made and comments that "were intended s o l e l y t o provoke a v i s c e r a l r e a c t i o n from the j u r y . " (Brown's brief rebuttal closing a t p. 72.) argument, During the State's the following guilt-phase occurred: "And he t a l k s a b o u t 7 y e a r s s i n c e t h i s happened. Yes, i t has been years. Oh, a n d how c a n s h e remember t h a t after 7 years? L e t me t e l l y o u something: How d o y o u t h i n k s h e ' s e v e r g o i n g t o f o r g e t i t ? I w i s h she c o u l d . I wish a four-yearo1d g i r l ' s l a s t i m a g e o f h e r m o t h e r was n o t l y i n g i n that h a l l with that (pointing) k i l l e r standing over her. Do y o u t h i n k i t ' s d o y o u t h i n k i t ' s u n u s u a l s h e c a n ' t r e m e m b e r g o i n g t o C l e v e l a n d ? Do y o u t h i n k that's unusual? I know p e o p l e t h a t r e m e m b e r m i n u t e d e t a i l s about t h e b i r t h o f t h e i r f i r s t c h i l d , c o l o r o f t h e i r s k i n , how t h e i r h e a d l o o k e d , how t h e i r hands. I b e t t h e y d o n ' t know w h a t t h e y w e r e d o i n g 30 m i n u t e s l a t e r . B u t t h e y r e m e m b e r t h e l o o k o f t h a t baby. Just like she remembers t h e l o o k o f h e r mother with that thug right there (pointing) standing over her. How c o u l d s h e n o t r e m e m b e r t h a t ? Oh, s h e c o u l d n ' t r e c a l l t h a t . B u t she d i d . " (R. 959-60) (emphasis added). "And s o m e t h i n g [ d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ] s a i d s t r u c k me r i g h t o f fthe bat. He s a i d M a n u e l S m i t h h e a r d f r o m h i s w i f e he h a d n e v e r been a r r e s t e d f o r d o m e s t i c v i o l e n c e and abusing her. W e l l , h e h a s now. I t ' s j u s t a shame h e w a s n ' t a r r e s t e d f o r s l a p p i n g h e r . I t ' s [a shame] he w a s n ' t a r r e s t e d f o r k i c k i n g h e r . When h e g e t s a r r e s t e d f o r i t , h e ' s k i l l e d her." (R. 958) ( e m p h a s i s added). 73 CR-07-1332 "But I want you t o t h i n k about t h i s I want you t o t h i n k . I want t o t a l k about i t j u s t a g a i n . I s a i d i t . The l a s t image f o r t h a t c h i l d i s s e e i n g her mother t h e r e . B u t we a r e i n t h e l i g h t o f d a y now i n a c o u r t r o o m i n a c o u r t o f l a w f o r h i m . Right there. I want you because you b e l i e v e he's guilty beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt and t o a m o r a l c e r t a i n t y of each and e v e r y e l e m e n t , I want you t o g i v e him the l a s t image i n t h e l i g h t o f day f o r D o t t y and Cherea J e m i s o n , g i v e him the l a s t image o f h e a r i n g the w o r d s : 'We t h e j u r y f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t guilty o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r o f two o r more p e r s o n s . ' Give him the l a s t image o f s a y i n g : 'We the j u r y f i n d him g u i l t y of murder of D o t t y Jemison d u r i n g a robbery. We the j u r y f i n d him g u i l t y of murder d u r i n g a robbery of Cherea Jemison.' Make t h a t t h e last i m a g e he h e a r s o f D o t t y a n d C h e r e a J e m i s o n . Because t h e l a s t t h i n g t h a t he g a v e t h i s l i t t l e g i r l i s t o s e e h i s m o t h e r s t a n d i n g t h e r e -- o r s e e h e r lying t h e r e w i t h h e r Daddy o r e x c u s e me, that was Wakilii s t a n d i n g o v e r h e r , i t w a s n ' t Daddy. I thank you." (R. 971-72) prosecutor's (emphasis added). penalty-phase closing Subsequently, argument, the during following occurred: "And I tell you what, whether Rosenzweig b e l i e v e s i n the death p e n a l t y or G o f f or anybody e l s e , we know o n e t h i n g b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h e r e i s one p e r s o n i n t h i s c o u r t r o o m t h a t d o e s , a n d there (pointing) he sits. He believes in i t . B e c a u s e on M a r c h 9 t h a n d 1 0 t h , he a c t e d a s j u d g e , j u r y , and e x e c u t i o n e r o f D o t t y Jemison and Cherea Jemison. And t h e y d i d n ' t g e t t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e light o f day i n the courtroom i n the State of Alabama t o have a sentence hearing to put on e v i d e n c e t o h i m why t h e y s h o u l d n o t b e p u n i s h e d f o r d e a t h by d e a t h . He b e l i e v e s i n i t . He b e l i e v e s i n c a r r y i n g i t out. B u t he d o e s n ' t b e l i e v e i n t h e 74 the CR-07-1332 p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t people deserve a r i g h t t o have somebody b e g . I b e t y o u t h e r e was some b e g g i n g g o i n g on. I b e t you t h e r e was. And I ask you t o g i v e h i s sympathy and t h e r e s u l t of t h e i r begging the same way h e g a v e i t t o D o t t y J e m i s o n a n d C h e r e a J e m i s o n a n d s e n t e n c e h i m t h e d e a t h o r recommend t h e s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h a s t h e l a w a l l o w s b a s e d on t h e proof t o you." (R. 1225-26) Some (emphasis of the added). prosecutor's statements were reasonable i n f e r e n c e s b a s e d on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l . even i f the prosecutor d i d misstate or mischaracterize evidence presented at t r i a l , make t h e r e s u l t i n g Darden, the supra. Also, conviction the t r i a l the evidence in testimony from the witness stand introduced into the trial the entire such we case and presume court's instructions. Additionally, of We this came from that instructed from the the the exhibits the jury followed See T a y l o r , supra. a f t e r r e v i e w i n g t h e comments i n t h e c o n t e x t p r o c e e d i n g s , we conclude that t h e y were n o t o f a n a t u r e as t o i n f l a m e t h e p a s s i o n s o f t h e j u r y . view as o f due p r o c e s s . ' " court repeatedly that such with unfairness a denial jury evidence. the h i s s t a t e m e n t s were n o t o f a nature t h a t they "'so i n f e c t e d the t r i a l to However, statements of counsel i n closing h a v i n g b e e n made i n t h e h e a t o f d e b a t e , 75 Also, argument a n d we n o t e t h a t as such CR-07-1332 statements are u s u a l l y valued and by the j u r y a t t h e i r true a r e n o t e x p e c t e d t o become f a c t o r s i n t h e f o r m a t i o n verdict. See O r r v . S t a t e , worth ofthe 462 S o . 2 d 1 0 1 3 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1984). For these reasons, we d o n o t f i n d a n y p l a i n error i n this regard. C. Brown f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e S t a t e a negative connotation label was m i s c o n d u c t . State made 'Wakilii' use of form improperly f o r h i s name a n d t h a t Specifically, [T.S.'s] [him], testimony and to the use of that he a s s e r t s to create imbue that that of this the j u r y , a n d was i m p e r m i s s i b l e . Because which Rule label Brown h e now was d e s i g n e d d i d not object complains, we to manipulate label label with State's the emotions o f (Brown's b r i e f at trial "[t]he the p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s f a v o r a b l e meaning" and t h a t t h e " [ t ] h e use created a t p. 75.) t o t h e comment about review i tforplain guilt-phase closing error. See 4 5 A , A l a . R. A p p . P. During following The the State's argument, occurred: "[T.S.] s e c o n d w i t n e s s . You c a n ' t f o r g e t h e r . defendant's daughter. She was f o u r y e a r s o l d 76 the CR-07-1332 when h e r m o t h e r was k i l l e d . F o u r y e a r s o l d when h e r g r a n d m o t h e r was m u r d e r e d . E l e v e n y e a r s o l d when s h e came i n h e r e a n d h a d t h e c o u r a g e t o t e l l y o u a l l a b o u t t h e l a s t t i m e s h e saw h e r m o t h e r . She t o l d you s o m e t h i n g i m p o r t a n t . She s a i d ' I c a l l e d h i m W a k i l i i when t h e y w e r e f u s s i n , a n d I c a l l e d h i m d a d other times.' She c a l l e d h i m W a k i l i i t h i s n i g h t . D i d y o u n o t i c e t h a t ? She c a l l e d h i m W a k i l i i t h e r e i n the hallway." (R. 9 2 2 ) ( e m p h a s i s When her added). the State home w i t h was q u e s t i o n i n g T.S. a b o u t h e r a t t h e time o f t h e murders, who l i v e d i n the following occurred: "[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. Was t h e r e a n y b o d y e l s e ? Y o u r t w o b r o t h e r s , y o u r mom, a n d y o u r g r a n d m a , a n d y o u r Dad d i d y o u c a l l W a k i l i i y o u r Dad? "[T.S.:] When h e w a s n ' t "THE COURT: I'm "[PROSECUTOR:] "[T.S.:] "[T.S.:] was T e l l me t h a t Okay. him your again. fussing. So, dad? when he wasn't Y e s , ma'am. "[PROSECUTOR:] fussing? "[T.S.:] sorry. When h e w a s n ' t "[PROSECUTOR:] f u s s i n g , you c a l l e d mean. What d i d y o u c a l l h i m when he Wakilii. "[PROSECUTOR:] So, i s i t okay c a l l him W a k i l i i today? 77 with y o u i f we CR-07-1332 "[T.S.:] (R. 377-78.) she saw Yes, s i r [ s i c ] . " Subsequently, h e r mother, she T.S. t e s t i f i e d was standing at b e d r o o m ; t h a t h e r m o t h e r was i n t h e h a l l w a y her mother reviewing it was fussing the prosecutor's was a p e r m i s s i b l e the trial. inflame that with Also, "Wakilii." t h e door f u s s i n g ; and t h a t (R. 3 7 9 . ) statement i n context, After we f i n d was a n y p l a i n error Therefore, i n this that during t h e s t a t e m e n t was n o t o f s u c h n a t u r e of the jury. time of her comment o n t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d the passions there that the last as t o we d o n o t f i n d regard. D. Finally, the State's (Brown's Brown misconduct brief allegations contends a t p. that during 76.) "the cumulative trial We have necessitates considered of p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct impact reversal." each of the individually, a n d we have n o t found t h a t any o f those a l l e g a t i o n s o f e r r o r reversal. We have also considered p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct cumulatively, "the accumulated [Brown's] errors have 'probably substantial rights.'" 78 of the require allegations a n d we d o n o t f i n d injuriously Ex p a r t e Woods, of that affected 789 So. 2 d CR-07-1332 941, 942-43 P.). n.1 (Ala. Therefore, the trial Kentucky, (1986). and for U.S. that the a 79, Specifically, inference Rule a r g u m e n t i s t h a t we court 47 6 (quoting 45, Brown's argument i s w i t h o u t Brown's f i f t h to 2001) 106 he State hearing S. R. App. merit. remand t h i s case pursuant to Batson v. 1712, Ct. contends should Ala. L. Ed. 69 that discriminated the on 90 record the 2d raises basis of an race gender. " I n B a t s o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t b l a c k v e n i r e m e m b e r s c o u l d n o t be s t r u c k f r o m a b l a c k defendant's j u r y because of t h e i r race. In Powers v . O h i o , 499 U.S. 4 0 0 , 111 S. C t . 1 3 6 4 , 113 L. Ed. 2 d 411 (1991), the c o u r t e x t e n d e d i t s d e c i s i o n i n B a t s o n t o a p p l y a l s o t o w h i t e d e f e n d a n t s . ... The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n G e o r g i a v. M c C o l l u m , 505 U.S. 42, 112 S. C t . 2 3 4 8 , 120 L. E d . 2d 33 (1992), h e l d t h a t the p r o t e c t i o n s of B a t s o n were also a v a i l a b l e to defense counsel in criminal trials. The A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t t h e p r o t e c t i o n s of Batson apply to the s t r i k i n g of white prospective jurors. White Consolidated I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . v . A m e r i c a n L i b e r t y I n s u r a n c e , Co., 617 So. 2d 657 ( A l a . 1993) ." Grimsley v. 1995). Brown Therefore, Rule 45, State, we did 678 So. not raise review A l a . R. App. his 2d 1194, a argument P. 79 1195 Batson only (Ala. objection for plain Crim. at App. trial. error. See CR-07-1332 Plain error is " e r r o r t h a t i s so o b v i o u s t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o n o t i c e i t would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t the f a i r n e s s or i n t e g r i t y of the j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s . Ex p a r t e T a y l o r , 666 So. 2d 73 (Ala. 1995). The plain error standard a p p l i e s o n l y where a p a r t i c u l a r l y e g r e g i o u s e r r o r o c c u r r e d a t t r i a l and t h a t e r r o r has o r p r o b a b l y has s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e j u d i c e d the defendant. Taylor." Ex parte plain 511 Trawick, error U.S. i n the 127, violation, prosecutor 114 the was Crim. 1987 ) . " App. So. 2d 162, context of S. 1419, Ct. record must 'engaged discrimination.' (Ala. 698 Ex Blackmon v. (Ala. 1997). a Batson 128 or Ed. an the "To J.E.B.[v. L. supply in parte 167 Alabama, inference practice 2d 89 of (1994),] that 509 So. 2d 1074, State, So. 3d 397, 425 2003). "The burden of p e r s u a s i o n i s i n i t i a l l y on t h e p a r t y a l l e g i n g d i s c r i m i n a t o r y use of a p e r e m p t o r y challenge to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In determining whether there i s a prima f a c i e case, the court i s to consider ' a l l relevant circumstances' which could lead to an i n f e r e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . See B a t s o n , 476 U.S. a t 93, 10 6 S. C t . a t 1 7 2 1 , c i t i n g Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2 0 4 7 - 4 8 , 48 L. E d . 2d 597 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . The f o l l o w i n g a r e i l l u s t r a t i v e of the t y p e s of e v i d e n c e t h a t can be used to r a i s e the i n f e r e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n : "1. Evidence that the 'jurors question share[d] only this c h a r a c t e r i s t i c -- t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p i n 80 the purposeful Watkins, 7 find in one the 1076 (Ala. CR-07-1332 g r o u p -- a n d t h a t i n a l l o t h e r respects they [were] as heterogeneous as the community as a whole.' [People v.] W h e e l e r , 22 C a l . 3 d [ 2 5 8 , ] a t 2 8 0 , 583 P . 2 d [ 7 4 8 , ] a t 7 6 4 , 148 C a l . R p t r . [ 8 9 0 , ] a t 905 [(1978)]. For instance ' i t may be s i g n i f i c a n t that the persons challenged, a l t h o u g h a l l b l a c k , i n c l u d e b o t h men a n d women and are a variety of ages, occupations, and social or economic c o n d i t i o n s , ' W h e e l e r , 22 C a l . 3 d a t 2 8 0 , 583 P . 2 d a t 7 6 4 , 148 C a l . R p t r . a t 9 0 5 , n. 2 7 , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t r a c e was t h e d e c i d i n g factor. "2. A p a t t e r n o f s t r i k e s a g a i n s t b l a c k j u r o r s on t h e p a r t i c u l a r v e n i r e ; e . g . , 4 o f 6 p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e s were used t o s t r i k e black jurors. B a t s o n , 476 U.S. a t 9 7 , 106 S. C t . a t 1 7 2 3 . " 3 . The p a s t c o n d u c t o f t h e o f f e n d i n g attorney i n using peremptory challenges to s t r i k e a l l blacks from the j u r y v e n i r e . S w a i n [ v . A l a b a m a , 380 U.S. 2 0 2 , 85 S. C t . 8 2 4 , 13 L. E d . 2 d 759 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ] . "4. The type and manner of the offending attorney's questions and statements during voir dire, including nothing more than desultory voir dire. B a t s o n , 476 U.S. a t 9 7 , 106 S. C t . a t 1 7 2 3 ; W h e e l e r , 22 C a l . 3 d a t 2 8 1 , 583 P . 2 d a t 7 6 4 , 148 C a l . R p t r . a t 9 0 5 . " 5 . The t y p e a n d m a n n e r o f q u e s t i o n s d i r e c t e d to the challenged juror, i n c l u d i n g a lack of questions, or a lack of meaningful questions. S l a p p y v . S t a t e , 503 So. 2 d 3 5 0 , 355 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) ; P e o p l e v . T u r n e r , 42 C a l . 3 d 7 1 1 , 726 P . 2 d 1 0 2 , 230 C a l . R p t r . 656 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ; P e o p l e v . 81 CR-07-1332 W h e e l e r , 22 C a l . 3 d 2 5 8 , 583 P . 2 d 7 4 8 , 7 64 , 148 C a l . R p t r . 890 [ 9 0 5 ] ( 1 9 7 8 ) . " "6. D i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t o f members o f the jury venire with the same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; o r who a n s w e r a q u e s t i o n i n t h e same o r s i m i l a r m a n n e r ; e . g . , i n Slappy, a black elementary school teacher was s t r u c k a s b e i n g p o t e n t i a l l y t o o l i b e r a l because of h i s j o b , but a white elementary s c h o o l t e a c h e r was n o t c h a l l e n g e d . Slappy, 503 S o . 2 d a t 352 a n d 3 5 5 . "7. D i s p a r a t e e x a m i n a t i o n o f members of t h e v e n i r e ; e.g., i n Slappy, a q u e s t i o n designed to provoke a c e r t a i n response that i s l i k e l y t o d i s q u a l i f y a j u r o r was a s k e d to b l a c k j u r o r s , b u t not t o w h i t e jurors. S l a p p y , 503 S o . 2 d a t 3 5 5 . "8. C i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e o f i n t e n t may b e p r o v e n b y d i s p a r a t e i m p a c t w h e r e a l l o r most o f t h e c h a l l e n g e s were u s e d t o s t r i k e b l a c k s from the j u r y . B a t s o n , 476 U.S. a t 9 3 , 106 S. C t . a t 1 7 2 1 ; W a s h i n g t o n v . D a v i s , 426 U.S. [ 2 2 9 , ] a t 2 4 2 [ , 96 S. C t . 2 0 4 0 , [ 2 0 4 9 ] , 48 L. E d . 2 d 597 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ] . "9. The offending party used peremptory challenges to dismiss a l l or most b l a c k j u r o r s , b u t d i d n o t use a l l o f h i s p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e s . S e e S l a p p y , 503 So. 2 d a t 3 5 4 , T u r n e r , supra." Ex parte Branch, First, disparity brief Brown 526 S o . 2 d 6 0 9 , 622 argues that there i n the prosecution's a t p. 81.) After ( A l a . 1987). was "a s t a r k use of i t ss t r i k e s . " excuses 82 and c h a l l e n g e s statistical (Brown's f o r cause, 44 CR-07-1332 veniremembers remained. white females, Thus, 29 State and and 10 Thus, 10 4 white males, black males. black person; 1 Thus, of one males 2 white black alternates. black 4 3 white the males and female. There 5 males and 7 and 19 The 7 black males, 6 white people The defense and 0 15 and 1 white were people Finally, females, consisted females. 1 b l a c k female, females. 6 white were challenges. females. struck 12 males, 6 20 female struck females, defense Thus, the j u r y people, were females, State and 11 w h i t e the 5 were b l a c k s i x t e e n peremptory males, people; and w e r e b l a c k ; 25 3 white black consisted 15 females. 3 black and and Each p a r t y had struck struck 10 w e r e b l a c k m a l e s , were w h i t e were male. Of t h o s e , 9 w e r e w h i t e m a l e s , also the 3 black 2 jury males, white female of 8 white people females, with 2 white and 4 female alternates. An examination categories jury is venire. set forth of the above percentages shows t h a t substantially similar We that also note the to against white people and and white using females, thus 83 the that 15 each of used i t struck of the c o m p o s i t i o n of composition defense strikes 11 the of of the its first 4 white i t s 16 the 12 males peremptory CR-07-1332 challenges numbers t o remove w h i t e v e n i r e m e m b e r s . carefully, including the A f t e r examining the defense's c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e y do n o t r a i s e a n i n f e r e n c e by the State Next, on t h e b a s i s Brown argues of e i t h e r race that the t r e a t m e n t o f v e n i r e m e m b e r s who who answered questions contends 225 that voir dire a n d who 83.) for striking knew one their in u l t i m a t e l y served Brown a s s e r t s or and that of engaged the in disparate 167, 190, in a Specifically, 212, 216, similar manner were n o t s t r u c k by t h e on t h e j u r y . " the only 219, (Brown's b r i e f witnesses or that the the and to a prosecution non-discriminatory were he a t p. reasons veniremembers veniremembers or f a m i l y members h a d b e e n a r r e s t e d o r c h a r g e d w i t h a c r i m e Talladega f e m a l e s who 162 72, those veniremembers more or gender. h a d t h e same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o r questions n u m b e r o f w h i t e f e m a l e s who we of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n a s i m i l a r manner. Veniremembers "answered State strikes, -- County. served and one served as indicated that m e m b e r s who He further asserts that on t h e j u r y -- V e n i r e m e m b e r s white f e m a l e who an alternate they knew one had been arrested was -- struck last Veniremember o r more w i t n e s s e s i n Talladega 84 three 63, by 129 146, and the State -- also or had County. white family CR-07-1332 We have carefully examined veniremembers, with p a r t i c u l a r Brown alleges conclude the were that State similar the record engaged the responses a t t e n t i o n to the veniremembers but does treated treatment above-referenced veniremembers. drugs were the voir the arrested the State proceedings, that record voir by e i t h e r they had o r had been indicated proceedings, that that to the shows or the defense. 72, that 212, During and 190 had problems on d r u g - r e l a t e d o f a c r i m e were we had problems w i t h m e m b e r s who Veniremembers regard the record with charges. a l l v e n i r e m e m b e r s who f o r or convicted dire with Veniremembers family arrested shows t h a t First, and his assertion h a d f a m i l y m e m b e r s who dire indicated drugs struck disparately, not support i n disparate a l l v e n i r e m e m b e r s who of a l l of the had a c t u a l l y struck. 129, Second, 216, been During the 219, they had p r e v i o u s l y been a r r e s t e d . and 225 Third, a l l v e n i r e m e m b e r s whose c h i l d r e n had p r e v i o u s l y been a r r e s t e d f o r or convicted of a crime were p r o c e e d i n g s , Veniremember previously been arrested 167 struck. During the v o i r dire i n d i c a t e d t h a t h i s d a u g h t e r had for a crime. In contrast, V e n i r e m e m b e r s 6 3 , 1 4 6 , 1 6 2 , a n d 205 d i d n o t s h a r e a n y o f t h e s e characteristics. Finally, t h e r e may b e o t h e r 85 differences that CR-07-1332 are not reflected prosecutor observed veniremembers. because the trial court prosecutor earlier in striking a white Although she had the actually involved discriminating prosecutor was based mistaken Cr. (holding belief, App. on simply responses. 1996) in See that see 1994); and had not the effort does not parte the Brown, 686 v. therefore, 86 State, i t disparate same is the show the question (Brown's brief that the question family members Rather than that the veniremembers' So. 2d can s t r i k e 666 asking answer i t appears about "[a] p r o s e c u t o r Taylor trial. precise about gender, mistaken at charges, enforcement. or therefore, to the that responded race various "[a]fter criminal to respond." answered law Ex that, the differences and, hearing answered record that engaged i n female's the veniremember had were previous he c o n t e n d s i n s t r u c t i n g her 84.) earlier, a Batson arrests that but are not p r i v y to those conduct about insisting veniremember (Ala. considered Specifically, and p. (Ala. transcript Brown a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e suppressed question, a d i d not veniremembers who and written H o w e v e r , we questioning. at the B r o w n d i d n o t make a B a t s o n o b j e c t i o n Finally, 12 by So. 409, based 2d logical 420 on 36, 42 that a CR-07-1332 prosecutor strike these a may also decide, veniremember. two jurors conclude that Smith State, v. were the Because treated strike 590 So. b a s e d on a m i s t a k e n b e l i e f , of 2d are the assumptions was 388, 19 390 may i n v o l v e d are discrepancy adequately Juror ( h o l d i n g t h a t "[a] p r o s e c u t o r as the was have carefully determine whether there in purposeful alleges. we race-neutral."); App. from mistake, b a s e d on way explained, an 1991) as long honest b e l i e f reviewed i s an the record and For the reasons that the set State forth State engaged alleged, history fashion, in on less using that the peremptory during that the of race or voir dire were 87 Brown has this strikes State gender, simply also a State has prosecutor in not situated a p a t t e r n of Brown to Brown or gender, or t h a t the challenges veniremembers characteristic questions established, engaged similarly discriminatory questioning. much of the b a s i s of race case m a l e s as above, treated this State i n f e r e n c e t h a t the v e n i r e m e m b e r s d i s p a r a t e l y , t h a t t h e r e was the in d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t b l a c k s and established the the to racially neutral"). We by in (Ala. Crim. strike not not has a discriminatory struck that shared the desultory only State's or not CR-07-1332 meaningful, t h a t the S t a t e engaged veniremembers, dismiss review or that State used of the record there i s any the State in Therefore, and Brown's inference we do not find arguments, of purposeful i t s exercise of there to B a s e d on o u r we do not find discrimination i t s peremptory that of i t s challenges a l l o r most b l a c k o r male v e n i r e m e m b e r s . that this the i n disparate examination i s any by challenges. plain error in regard. VI. Brown's sixth instructions argument violated is Alabama that law trial and court's the jury United States Constitution. A. Initially, instruction on Brown reasonable Cage v. L o u i s i a n a , 339 (1990). trial Rule court. 45A, contends 498 doubt U.S. 39, that violated 111 A l a . R. App. we review P. 88 trial the this court's principles S. C t . 3 2 8 , H o w e v e r , he d i d n o t p r e s e n t Therefore, the 112 L. E d . argument i t for plain of 2d to the error. See CR-07-1332 In opinion aff'd, Knotts after 686 So. v. State, remand, 2d 486 686 686 So. So. 2d 2d 484 ( A l a . 1996), we 431 (Ala. Crim. (Ala. Crim. App. App.), 1995), held: "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ' p r o t e c t s t h e a c c u s e d a g a i n s t c o n v i c t i o n e x c e p t upon p r o o f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt o f e v e r y f a c t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e c r i m e w i t h w h i c h he i s charged.' I n r e W i n s h i p , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. C t . 1 0 6 8 , 1 0 7 3 , 25 L. E d . 2 d 368 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . I n Cage v. L o u i s i a n a , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t f o u n d t h a t a j u r y charge t h a t d e f i n e d 'reasonable doubt' by u s i n g the p h r a s e s 'grave u n c e r t a i n t y , ' 'actual s u b s t a n t i a l doubt,' and 'moral c e r t a i n t y ' c o u l d have l e d a reasonable j u r o r to i n t e r p r e t the i n s t r u c t i o n s t o a l l o w a f i n d i n g o f g u i l t b a s e d on a d e g r e e of p r o o f b e l o w t h a t r e q u i r e d b y t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e . Subsequently, the Court 'made i t c l e a r t h a t the proper i n q u i r y i s not whether the i n s t r u c t i o n " c o u l d h a v e " b e e n a p p l i e d i n an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l manner, but whether there i s a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d that t h e j u r y d i d so a p p l y i t . ' V i c t o r v. N e b r a s k a , 511 U.S. 1, 6, 114 S. C t . 1 2 3 9 , 1 2 4 3 , 127 L. E d . 2 d 583 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ( q u o t i n g E s t e l l e v . M c G u i r e , 502 U.S. 6 2 , 7 2 ¬ 7 3 , a n d n. 4, 112 S. C t . 4 7 5 , 482 a n d n. 4, 116 L. E d . 2 d 385 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) . Thus, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n presented here i s whether there i s a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d that the jury understood the i n s t r u c t i o n s to a l l o w the c o n v i c t i o n based on p r o o f i n s u f f i c i e n t t o m e e t t h e Winship reasonable doubt standard. V i c t o r v. N e b r a s k a ; Ex p a r t e K i r b y , 643 S o . 2 d 587 (Ala.), cert. denied, [ 5 1 3 ] U.S. [ 1 0 2 3 ] , 115 S. C t . 5 9 1 , 130 L. E d . 2 d 504 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; C o x v . S t a t e , 660 S o . 2 d 233 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1994). "In r e v i e w i n g the reasonable doubt i n s t r u c t i o n , we do s o i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e c h a r g e a s a w h o l e . o the V i c t o r v . N e b r a s k a ; B a k e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 412 F.2d 1069 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 396 U.S. 1018, 89 CR-07-1332 90 S. C t . 5 8 3 , 24 L. E d . 2 d 5 0 9 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ; W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 538 S o . 2 d 1 2 5 0 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) . So l o n g as t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f ' r e a s o n a b l e doubt' i n t h e charge c o r r e c t l y conveys t h e concept o f reasonable doubt, the charge will n o t be considered so prejudicial as t o mandate r e v e r s a l . Victor v. Nebraska; Holland v. United St ates 348 U.S. 1 2 1 , 75 1 21 N e b r a s k a ; H o l l a n d v U n i t e d S t a t e s , 348 U S . S. C t . 1 2 7 , 99 L, E d . 150 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . " 686 So. 2d at terminology constitute 36, 56 found offensive (Ala. Crim. (quoting Crim. App. Further, some i n Cage does 672 So. 2d doubt i s a doubt f o r which and does that 1354 parte M c W i l l i a m s , 640 S o . 2 d 1 0 1 5 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , 90 ( A l a . 1995); C r i m . App. that c a n be not improperly Crim. App. 1998), (Ala. ( A l a . 1995)). a reason (Ala. 2d 2 d 73 ( A l a . the statement See B u r g e s s v. S t a t e , aff'd, 666 S o . 2 d 672 S o . 2 d 1 3 1 9 , 1 3 4 3 held of proof. automatically 666 S o . previously burden not a l lof the v. S t a t e , have Cage not aff'd, 1994), aff'd, but Taylor Dobyne v . S t a t e , not violate State's of error.'" App. 1994), we reasonable "'Use reversible 1995) does 459. given lessen the 827 S o . 2 d 134 827 S o . 2 d 1 9 3 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) ; M c M i l l i a n v. S t a t e , a aff'd, Ex 666 S o . 594 S o . 2 d 1 2 5 3 (Ala. 1991). Although the t r i a l objectionable instructions i n Cage, i n this court taken case used some o f t h e l a n g u a g e as a whole, properly 90 the t r i a l conveyed found court's the concept of CR-07-1332 reasonable burden find there also capital present review We So. 2d Also, was there the did i s not not argument i t for plain addressed 18, plain error that the jury that of 42-44 a lessen the a reasonable State's likelihood i n s t r u c t i o n s i n a manner t h a t Therefore, in this trial a robbery to the murders would not offense this any contends instruct afterthought the j u r y and Brown's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . that not the j u r y a p p l i e d the Brown did to of proof. t h a t the violate doubt the trial error. See similar argument ( A l a . C r i m . App. Rule do regard. court erred when i t c o m m i t t e d as a However, mere 45A, Ala. did not we R. i n R e e v e s v. 2000), as for Therefore, court. he App. State, follows: "The a p p e l l a n t a l s o contends that the trial court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to i n s t r u c t the j u r y on 'robbery [as an] afterthought.' At trial, the appellant requested several i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g to t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e o f law t h a t r o b b e r y as a mere afterthought and unrelated to the murder cannot s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n f o r c a p i t a l murder. However, the t r i a l court r e f u s e d to give the i n s t r u c t i o n s requested by the appellant, finding that i t was s u f f i c i e n t t o g i v e j u r o r s t h e p a t t e r n j u r y c h a r g e on c a p i t a l murder because the p a t t e r n charge a d e q u a t e l y c o n v e y e d t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e murder t o have o c c u r r e d ' d u r i n g ' a r o b b e r y i n o r d e r to s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n f o r c a p i t a l murder. 91 not support convictions robbery-murder. to we would P. 807 CR-07-1332 " I n F r e e m a n v . S t a t e , 776 S o . 2 d 160 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) , a f f ' d , 776 S o . 2 d 203 ( A l a . 2000), we stated the following regarding robbery as an 'afterthought': "'"The capital crime of the i n t e n t i o n a l k i l l i n g of the v i c t i m d u r i n g a r o b b e r y o r an a t t e m p t e d r o b b e r y i s a s i n g l e offense beginning w i t h the act of robbing or a t t e m p t i n g t o rob and c u l m i n a t i n g w i t h the i n t e n t i o n a l k i l l i n g of the v i c t i m . The o f f e n s e c o n s i s t s o f two e l e m e n t s , r o b b i n g and i n t e n t i o n a l l y k i l l i n g . D a v i s v. S t a t e , 536 So. 2 d 110 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1987), a f f ' d , 536 S o . 2 d 118 (Ala.1988), cert. d e n i e d , 490 U.S. 1 0 2 8 , 109 S. C t . 1 7 6 6 , 104 L. E d . 2 d 201 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; M a g w o o d v . S t a t e , 494 S o . 2 d 124 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 5 ) , a f f ' d , 494 S o . 2 d 154 (Ala.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 9 9 5 , 107 S. C t . 5 9 9 , 93 L. E d . 2 d 599 (1986). "'"'As t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t h e l d i n C o b e r n v . S t a t e , 273 A l a . 5 4 7 , 142 S o . 2 d 869 ( 1 9 6 2 ) , " t h e f a c t t h a t t h e v i c t i m was d e a d a t t h e t i m e t h e p r o p e r t y was taken would not militate [against a finding] of robbery i f the intervening time between the murder and t h e t a k i n g formed a continuous chain of events." C l e m e n t s v. State, 370 So. 2d 7 0 8 , 713 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1978), a f f ' d i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , 370 So. 2d 723 ( A l a . 1979); Clark v. S t a t e , 451 S o . 2 d 3 6 8 , 372 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 4 ) . To s u s t a i n a n y other position "would be tantamount to granting to would-be robbers a license to kill their victims prior to 92 CR-07-1332 robbing them in the hope of avoiding prosecution under the capital felony statute." Thomas So. 2d 207, 212, v . S t a t e , 460 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1983), a f f ' d , 460 So. 2d 216 (Ala. 1984). "'"'Although a robbery committed as a "mere afterthought" and unrelated to the murder w i l l not sustain a c o n v i c t i o n under § 13A-5-40(a)(2) for the capital offense of murder-robbery, see Bufford v. S t a t e , [382 So. 2 d 1162 (Ala. Cr. A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 382 So. 2d 1175 (Ala. 1980)]; O'Pry v. S t a t e , [642 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Cr. App. 1981)], the q u e s t i o n of a defendant's i n t e n t at the time of the commission of the crime i s u s u a l l y an i s s u e f o r t h e j u r y t o resolve. C r o w e v . S t a t e , 435 So. 2d 1371, 1379 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). The j u r y may i n f e r from t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t the robbery began when the accused a t t a c k e d the v i c t i m and the capital offense was c o n s u m m a t e d when t h e defendant took the victim's property and fled. C o b e r n v . S t a t e , 273 A l a . [at] 550, 142 So. 2d [at] 871 (1962). The defendant's intent t o r o b t h e v i c t i m c a n be i n f e r r e d where "the i n t e r v e n i n g time, i f any, between the killing and r o b b e r y was p a r t o f a c o n t i n u o u s chain of events." Thomas v. S t a t e , 460 So. 2 d a t 2 1 2 . . . . See a l s o C o b e r n v. S t a t e ; Crowe v. 93 CR-07-1332 S t a t e ; B u f f o r d v. v . S t a t e . '" State; Clements " ' B u s h v. State, 695 So. 2 d 70, 118-19 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 5 ) , a f f ' d , 695 So. 2d 138 ( A l a . ) , 522 U.S. 969, 118 S. C t . 418, 139 L. E d . 2 d 320 (1997), q u o t i n g Hallford v. State, 548 So. 2d 526, 534-35 (Ala. C r i m . App. 1 9 8 8 ) , a f f ' d , 548 So. 2d 547 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 493 U.S. 9 4 5 , 110 S. C t . 3 5 4 , 107 L. E d . 2 d 342 (1989), quoting i n t u r n C o n n o l l y v . S t a t e , 500 So. 2 d 57, 63 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 5 ) , a f f ' d , 500 So. 2 d 68 (Ala.1986).' "776 So. 2d a t 1 9 0 - 9 1 . The A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t has s t a t e d t h a t ' " [ e ] v e n had t h e [ d e f e n d a n t ] k i l l e d t h e v i c t i m f o r some p u r p o s e u n r e l a t e d t o t h e t h e f t , the t a k i n g of p r o p e r t y from the v i c t i m a f t e r the m u r d e r c o n s t i t u t e s r o b b e r y , as t h e m u r d e r and the subsequent taking of the property formed a continuous chain of events."' Ex p a r t e R o b e r t s , 735 So. 2d 1270, 1277 (Ala.), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 939, 120 S. Ct. 346, 145 L. E d . 2 d 271 (1999), quoting J o h n s o n v . S t a t e , 479 So. 2d 1377, 1380 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 5 ) , and c i t i n g C l a r k v. S t a t e , 451 So. 2 d 368 (Ala. Crim. App.), c e r t . denied, 451 So. 2 d 368 (Ala. 1984). "Here, the t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d the jury that i n order to c o n v i c t the appellant of c a p i t a l murder, the S t a t e had to prove that the m u r d e r was committed 'during the robbery.' (R. 1 0 9 4 . ) The t r i a l c o u r t d e f i n e d ' d u r i n g t h e r o b b e r y ' as ' i n the course of the commission of or in connection w i t h the commission of the robbery.' (R. 1094.) With these i n s t r u c t i o n s , the t r i a l court adequately conveyed to the jury the facts under w h i c h i t c o u l d , and c o u l d n o t , f i n d the appellant g u i l t y of c a p i t a l murder. 94 CR-07-1332 (Ala. "As we s t a t e d i n Woods v . C r i m . App. 1999): State, 789 So. 2d 896 " ' A l t h o u g h t h i s c o u r t has h e l d t h a t the taking of property as a mere a f t e r t h o u g h t t o a murder w i l l not support a capital murder conviction under § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 2 ) , B u f f o r d v . S t a t e , 382 So. 2 d 1162 ( A l a . C r . A p p . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 382 So. 2d 1175 ( A l a . 1 9 8 0 ) , we h a v e n o t h e l d that the t r i a l c o u r t must use t h e term "mere afterthought" in i t s jury i n s t r u c t i o n s on r o b b e r y - m u r d e r . The trial c o u r t more t h a n a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t the r o b b e r y had t o o c c u r " d u r i n g " the course of the murder.' "789 S o . 2 d a t 9 3 2 . See a l s o R o b e r t s v . S t a t e , 735 S o . 2 d 1244 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) , a f f ' d , 735 So. 2 d 1270 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 538 U.S. 9 3 9 , 120 S. C t . 3 4 6 , 145 L. E d . 2 d 271 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; E x p a r t e W i n d s o r , 683 S o . 2 d 1042 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 520 U.S. 1 1 7 1 , 117 S. C t . 1 4 3 8 , 137 L. E d . 2 d 545 (1997); J e n k i n s v . S t a t e , 627 S o . 2 d 1034 (Ala. Crim. App. 1 9 9 2 ) , a f f ' d , 627 S o . 2 d 1054 ( A l a . 1993), cert. d e n i e d , 511 U.S. 1 0 1 2 , 114 S. C t . 1 3 8 8 , 128 L. E d . 2 d 63 ( 1 9 9 4 ) . " Similarly, III, the Dotty trial in this with court instructed and Cherea had to Count I I , the regard case, the regard jury to that to take p l a c e d u r i n g the trial court Counts II the murders robbery. instructed the jury follows: "You've h e a r d t h e word ' d u r i n g ' used. When I s a i d the law s t a t e s i n t e n t i o n a l murder committed d u r i n g a robbery i n the f i r s t degree is capital murder. Now, d u r i n g means i n t h e c o u r s e o f o r i n 95 and of With as CR-07-1332 connection with the commission of or i n the immediate f l i g h t from t h e commission o f t h e robbery i n t h e f i r s t degree o r attempt t h e r e o f . "Now, d u r i n g , a g a i n n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s some m e n t a l c o n n e c t i o n o r some c o n n e c t i o n o f p u r p o s e i n the defendant's mind. And t h e i n t e n t t o rob and t h e intent to k i l l would have to coexist i n the defendant's mind i n order f o r the c a p i t a l offense t o occur. In order f o r the k i l l i n g t o occur during the course of a robbery, i t would n o t make any d i f f e r e n c e w h i c h was c o m m i t t e d f i r s t . Whether t h e taking of property first or the k i l l i n g was committed f i r s t . Nor would a minor l a p s e o f time n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p u r p o s e was n o t t h e r e . You have to look at the entirety of the circumstances and determine that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t t h e defendant k i l l e d Dotty Jemison. A n d i f s o , t h a t he a l s o intended t o rob Dotty Jemison or Cherea Jemison b e f o r e you c o u l d f i n d t h e defendant g u i l t y o f t h e capital offense o f t h e murder o f Dotty Jemison during robbery." (R. 1001-02.) court Finally, instructed with the jury as regard t o Count I I I , the t r i a l follows: "You h e a r d t h e w o r d ' d u r i n g ' u s e d w h e n I s a i d the law s t a t e s t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l murder committed during a robbery i n the f i r s t degree i s c a p i t a l murder. Now, d u r i n g m e a n s i n t h e c o u r s e o f , o r i n connection w i t h , o r i n immediate f l i g h t from t h e commission o f a robbery i n the f i r s t degree. Now, during, again necessarily implies some mental connection o r some c o n n e c t i o n o f purpose i n the defendant's mind. And t h e i n t e n t t o rob and t h e intent to k i l l would have to coexist i n the defendant's mind i n order f o r the c a p i t a l offense t o occur. In order f o r the k i l l i n g t o occur during the course of a robbery, i t would n o t make any d i f f e r e n c e w h i c h was c o m m i t t e d f i r s t , w h e t h e r t h e 96 CR-07-1332 taking of property was committed first or the k i l l i n g was committed f i r s t . Nor would a minor lapse of time n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e t h a t the purpose was n o t t h e r e . You h a v e t o l o o k a t t h e e n t i r e t y o f the circumstances and d e t e r m i n e i f t h e S t a t e has proved beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t the defendant k i l l e d Cherea Jemison. And i f s o , t h a t he also intended t o rob Dotty Jemison or Cherea Jemison b e f o r e you c o u l d f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e of murder of Cherea Jemison d u r i n g robbery i n the t h i r d degree." (R. 1016-18.) the jury that and thoroughly Brown's Because the the trial murders had instructed argument find t h a t t h e r e was 4 5A, A l a . R. App. any to take the i s without court place jury on merit. plain adequately instructed during the a term "during," Accordingly, error in this robbery we regard. do not See Rule P. VII. Brown's when seventh i t did not argument consider i s that numerous f a c t o r s a b o u t w h i c h he p r e s e n t e d this argument plain error. "The mitigation, f o r the See [trial] but first Rule 45A, court i t i s not on A l a . R. obliged court nonstatutory App. to constitutes a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance," we erred mitigating B e c a u s e he appeal, consider 97 trial evidence. time must the review raises i t for P. evidence find that offered the C a l h o u n v. in evidence State, 932 CR-07-1332 So. 2d 923, is from an 975 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), even i f t h a t evidence expert. "'[A] f a c t f i n d e r i s not bound by e x p e r t testimony "even i f a l l o f the w i t n e s s e s are p r e s e n t e d by o n l y one s i d e . " ' E l l i s v . S t a t e , 570 So. 2 d 7 4 4 , 752 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990). 'In Alabama, opinion t e s t i m o n y o f an e x p e r t w i t n e s s i s b i n d i n g u p o n a j u r y o n l y when s u c h t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n s a subject which i s e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h i n the knowledge of e x p e r t s and t h e t e s t i m o n y i s u n c o n t r o v e r t e d . ' Jefferson C o u n t y v . S u l z b y , 468 So. 2 d 1 1 2 , 116 ( A l a . 1985) 'An e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n , h o w e v e r , i s n o t c o n c l u s i v e on o the t r i a l c o u r t , even though u n c o n t r o v e r t e d . See K r o g e r Co. v . M i l l s a p , 280 A l a . 5 3 1 , 196 So. 2 d 380 (1967). Rather, a t r i a l c o u r t must l o o k t o t h e e n t i r e e v i d e n c e a n d i t s own o b s e r v a t i o n s i n d e c i d i n g factual issues.' W i l l i a m s v . C i t y o f N o r t h p o r t , 557 So. 2d 1272, 1273 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1989), cert. d e n i e d , 498 U.S. 8 2 2 , 111 S. C t . 7 1 , 112 L. E d . 2d 45 (1990). ' M e r e l y b e c a u s e an a c c u s e d proffers evidence of a mitigating circumstance does not r e q u i r e the judge or the j u r y to f i n d the e x i s t e n c e of t h a t f a c t . ' H a r r e l l v . S t a t e , 470 So. 2 d 1303, 1308 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 4 ) , a f f i r m e d , 470 So. 2 d 1 3 0 9 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 474 U.S. 9 3 5 , 106 S. C t . 2 6 9 , 88 L. E d . 2 d 276 (1985)." Carroll 1992). 57 L. v. State, "'While Ed. 599 So. 2d L o c k e t t [ v . Ohio, 2d 973 evidence is discretion 585 97, actually of the So. 2d 108 438 (1979),] c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l levidence the 1253, (Ala. Cr. U.S. and (Ala. Crim. 586, i t s 98 S. Ct. progeny to be mitigating authority.' App. 98 1989)." is B a n k h e a d v. Ex App. 2954, require s u b m i t t e d as m i t i g a t i o n , found sentencing 1272 parte whether in the State, Slaton, CR-07-1332 680 S o . 2 d 9 0 9 , 924 court must discretion consider i s proven the and See W i l l i a m s 1996), aff'd, a particular weight v. S t a t e , by T i t l e Findings although the t r i a l circumstances, i t will i t has mitigating give that 710 S o . 2 d 1 2 7 6 ( A l a . 710 S o . 2 d 1 3 5 0 i t s "Consideration, S e n t e n c e as R e q u i r e d the a l lmitigating whether circumstance. In Finally, i n determining circumstance C r i m . App. (Ala. 1996). (Ala. and 1997). Determination of 13A, C h a p t e r 5, S e c t i o n 4 7 ( b ) o f 1975 Code o f A l a b a m a as Amended," the t r i a l court stated: " T h i s C o u r t has c o n s i d e r e d t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and mitigating circumstances and the other factors allowed pursuant to the p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e 13A, C h a p t e r 5, S e c t i o n 4 0 , e t s e q . , r e l a t i v e t o s e n t e n c e determination. Based upon t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t trial, the evidence presented during the sentence h e a r i n g , and t h e p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t and any e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d i n connection with i t , the t r i a l c o u r t w i l l e n t e r h e r e i n s p e c i f i c w r i t t e n findings concerning the existence or non-existence of each a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance enumerated i n T i t l e 13A, C h a p t e r 5, S e c t i o n 49 o f t h e 1 9 7 5 C o d e o f A l a b a m a , as amended, e a c h m i t i g a t i n g circumstance e n u m e r a t e d i n T i t l e 13A, C h a p t e r 5, S e c t i o n 51 o f the 1975 Code o f A l a b a m a , as amended, and any a d d i t i o n a l m i t i g a t i n g circumstances offered pursuant t o T i t l e 13A, C h a p t e r 5, S e c t i o n 52 o f t h e 1 9 7 5 C o d e o f A l a b a m a , as amended. In a d d i t i o n , the t r i a l court w i l l enter separate w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s of fact summarizing the crime and the Defendant's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s a i d crime. 99 CR-07-1332 "The C o u r t h a s made a d i l i g e n t s e a r c h u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f T i t l e 13A, C h a p t e r 5, S e c t i o n 5 2 , 1975 C o d e o f A l a b a m a , as a m e n d e d , o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by t h e D e f e n d a n t , and t h e a s p e c t s o f t h e presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e D e f e n d a n t on m i t i g a t i o n to determine i f t h e r e i s any a s p e c t of the Defendant's character or record, or any c i r c u m s t a n c e o f t h e o f f e n s e f o r w h i c h he h a s b e e n convicted that would constitute mitigating circumstance, and finds that there i s only one mitigating circumstance and t h a t i s t h e s t a t u t o r y mitigating circumstance found hereinabove. The Court finds that there are no non-statutory mitigating circumstances i n this case." (C.R. 82-86.) Punishment Phase In of its the "Findings Trial," the of trial Fact in court Regard stated: "At the p u n i s h m e n t phase of the t r i a l of the d e f e n d a n t , t h e S t a t e o f f e r e d no a d d i t i o n a l evidence of aggravating circumstances as enumerated in S e c t i o n 13A-5-49 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a and relied upon the e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g the g u i l t phase o f t h e t r i a l as t o a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The defendant offered evidence of mitigating c i r c u m s t a n c e s as p r o v i d e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-51 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a and 13A-5-52 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a . J o h n R. G o f f , PhD a n e u r o p s y c h o l o g i s t a n d M a r i a n n e G. Rosenzweig, PhD a forensic and clinical p s y c h o l o g i s t t e s t i f i e d on b e h a l f o f t h e defendant. F u r t h e r the defendant o f f e r e d evidence of m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m h i s m o t h e r , L i n d a Brown and h i s Aunt, J a c q u e l i n e Heard. "The S t a t e o f A l a b a m a r e l i e d u p o n t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g t h e g u i l t p h a s e o f t h e t r i a l as t o aggravating circumstances. Evidence during the g u i l t p h a s e and t h e s e n t e n c i n g p h a s e o f t h e trial provided evidence of one statutory mitigating c i r c u m s t a n c e as p r o v i d e d b y l a w . The C o u r t finds from the evidence p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g the g u i l t phase 100 to CR-07-1332 o f t h e t r i a l and t h e s e n t e n c i n g p h a s e t h a t t h e r e no n o n - s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . are "At the c o n c l u s i o n of the s e n t e n c e h e a r i n g , jury returned a verdict recommending that d e f e n d a n t be p u n i s h e d b y d e a t h . The v o t e was 10 d e a t h a n d two f o r l i f e w i t h o u t p a r o l e . the the for "The Court finds that the conduct of the defendant constituted a brutal, aggravated, m e r c i l e s s and i n t e n t i o n a l k i l l i n g o f D o t t y J e m i s o n and Cherea Jemison, and that the sentence r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e j u r y as t o t h e p u n i s h m e n t o f d e a t h t o be i m p o s e d was f u l l y j u s t i f i e d b y t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c a s e and t h e aggravating circumstances outweighed the m i t i g a t i n g circumstance p r o v e d by t h e defendant." (C.R. 98-99.) complied 57 L. These with Ed. 2d excerpts Lockett 973 v. show Ohio, (1978), and 438 evidence Brown p r e s e n t e d hearing. The that nonstatutory establish Rather, the not that in this i t did i t simply find the not afforded to that there was 586, 98 S. 2954, Ct. in considering court did not phase the Brown o f f e r e d does not consider the trial such evidence. court exercised regard. any much l e s s error, the find i t i n that 101 court penalty properly regard. trial the trial establishes that the during m i t i g a t i n g circumstances discretion do U.S. i t s progeny mitigating fact that Therefore, plain we error, CR-07-1332 VIII. Brown's denying eighth argument i s that h i s m o t i o n f o r a change the t r i a l court erred i n of venue. "'A trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to d e t e r m i n e what e f f e c t , i f any, pretrial p u b l i c i t y might have i n a p a r t i c u l a r case. The t r i a l c o u r t h a s t h e b e s t o p p o r t u n i t y t o evaluate the effects of any pretrial p u b l i c i t y on t h e c o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e a n d on t h e i n d i v i d u a l members o f t h e jury venire. The t r i a l court's r u l i n g on a motion f o r a change o f venue will be r e v e r s e d o n l y when t h e r e i s a s h o w i n g t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t has abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . N e l s o n v . S t a t e , 440 S o . 2 d 1 1 3 0 ( A l a . C r . App. 1 9 8 3 ) . ' " J o i n e r v. S t a t e , A p p . 19 9 4 ) . " Clemons v. S t a t e , aff'd, 720 So. 2d 985 and sufficient to warrant must show 479 S o . 2 d 76 c o m m u n i t y was v. State, he So. attention a change 1155, 2d 1156 (Ala. Cr. ( A l a . C r i m . App. "The were mere widespread of venue. with 193, actual prejudicial 195 Ex ( A l a . Crim. not parte appellant that publicity." " ' M o r e o v e r , t h e p a s s a g e o f t i m e c a n n o t be i g n o r e d 102 or that i s Rather, prejudice 1996), fact ( A l a . 1985),] h e l d t h a t the suffered saturated 606 2d ( A l a . 1998). media that So. 720 S o . 2 d 9 6 1 , 977 publicity Graysonr, 651 App. as a the Slagle 1992). factor CR-07-1332 in bringing objectivity So. 2d 219, (Ala. 254 224 1989) So. 2d ( A l a . C r i m . App. (quoting 434, to t r i a l . ' " 435 W h i s e n h a n t v. S t a t e , 1988), D a n n e l l y v. S t a t e , ( A l a . C r i m . App. aff'd, 555 47 A l a . A p p . So. 2d 363, 555 235 364, 1971)). "In connection with p r e t r i a l publicity, there a r e two s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h mandate a c h a n g e o f v e n u e : 1) when the accused has demonstrated 'actual p r e j u d i c e ' a g a i n s t h i m on t h e p a r t o f t h e jurors; 2) w h e n t h e r e i s ' p r e s u m e d p r e j u d i c e ' r e s u l t i n g f r o m community s a t u r a t i o n w i t h such p r e j u d i c i a l p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y t h a t no i m p a r t i a l j u r y c a n be selected. S h e p p a r d v . M a x w e l l , 384 U.S. 3 3 3 , 86 S. C t . 1 5 0 7 , 16 L. E d . 2 d 600 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; R i d e a u [v. L o u i s i a n a , 373 U.S. 7 2 3 , 83 S. C t . 1 4 1 7 , 10 L. E d . 2 d 663 (1963)]; E s t e s v . T e x a s , 381 U.S. 5 3 2 , 85 S. C t . 1 6 2 8 , 14 L. E d . 2 d 543 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ; E x p a r t e G r a y s o n , 479 S o . 2 d 7 6 , 80 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 474 U.S. 8 6 5 , 106 S. C t . 1 8 9 , 88 L. E d . 2 d 157 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; C o l e m a n v . Z a n t , 708 F . 2 d 541 ( 1 1 t h . C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) . " Hunt v. S t a t e , aff'd, 642 We 642 So. must in presumed under and 2d 1060 first resulted that So. that 1042-43 determine this ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1993), ( A l a . 1994). "presumptive the p r e t r i a l 2) 2d 999, whether prejudice." standard, publicity the p r e j u d i c i a l community where the t r i a l the was the was For defendant prejudicial pretrial held. 103 pretrial prejudice must and publicity See publicity to show: be 1) inflammatory saturated the C o l e m a n v . Kemp, 778 CR-07-1332 F.2d 1487 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 5 ) . carries an e x t r e m e l y Under t h i s heavy burden standard, a defendant of proof. "Hunt r e l i e s on t h e 'presumed p r e j u d i c e ' s t a n d a r d announced i n Rideau [ v . L o u i s i a n a , 3 7 3 U.S. 7 2 3 , 83 S. C t . 1 4 1 7 , 10 L . E d . 2 d 663 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , ] a n d a p p l i e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n Estes [v. T e x a s , 3 8 1 U.S. 5 3 2 , 85 S. C t . 1 6 2 8 , 14 L . E d . 2 d 543 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , ] a n d S h e p p a r d [ v . M a x w e l l , 384 U.S. 3 3 3 , 86 S. C t . 1 5 0 7 , 16 L . E d . 2 d 600 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ] . This s t a n d a r d was d e f i n e d b y t h e E l e v e n t h F e d e r a l C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i n C o l e m a n v . Kemp, 778 F . 2 d 1 4 8 7 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 5 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 4 7 6 U.S. 1 1 6 4 , 1 0 6 S. C t . 2 2 8 9 , 90 L . E d . 2 d 730 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . The c o u r t stated: 'Prejudice i s presumed from pretrial p u b l i c i t y when p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y i s s u f f i c i e n t l y prejudicial and inflammatory and t h e p r e j u d i c i a l p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y s a t u r a t e d t h e community where t h e t r i a l s were h e l d . ' 778 F . 2 d a t 1 4 9 0 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d [in Hunt]). See a l s o H o l l a d a y v . S t a t e , 549 So. 2 d 122, 125 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) , a f f i r m e d , 549 So. 2 d 135 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 4 9 3 U.S. 1 0 1 2 , 110 S. C t . 5 7 5 , 107 L . E d . 2 d 5 6 9 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . "In d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e 'presumed p r e j u d i c e ' standard e x i s t s the t r i a l court should look a t 'the totality of the surrounding facts.' P a t t o n v. Y o u n t , 467 U.S. 1 0 2 5 , 104 S. C t . 2 8 8 5 , 81 L . E d . 2 d 847 (1984); M u r p h y v . F l o r i d a , 4 2 1 U.S. 7 9 4 , 95 S. C t . 2 0 3 1 , 44 L . E d . 2 d 5 8 9 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; I r v i n v . Dowd, 366 U.S. 7 1 7 , 81 S. C t . 1 6 3 9 , 6 L . E d . 2 d 7 5 1 (1961). The p r e s u m p t i v e prejudice standard i s 'rarely' a p p l i c a b l e , and i s reserved f o r only 'extreme s i t u a t i o n s ' . C o l e m a n v . Kemp, 778 F . 2 d a t 1537. 'In f a c t , our research has uncovered o n l y a v e r y f e w ... c a s e s i n w h i c h r e l i e f w a s g r a n t e d o n t h e b a s i s o f p r e s u m e d p r e j u d i c e . ' C o l e m a n v . Kemp, 778 F . 2 d a t 1 4 9 0 . "Hunt had the 'prejudicial pretrial burden of publicity' 104 showing saturated that the CR-07-1332 community. Sheppard, supra. '[T]he burden p l a c e d u p o n t h e p e t i t i o n e r t o show t h a t p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y d e p r i v e d him of h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l b e f o r e an i m p a r t i a l j u r y i s an e x t r e m e l y h e a v y one.' Coleman v . Kemp, 778 F . 2 d a t 1 5 3 7 . 'Prejudicial' publicity u s u a l l y m u s t c o n s i s t o f much m o r e t h a n s t a t i n g t h e c h a r g e , and o f r e p o r t a g e o f t h e p r e t r i a l and trial processes. ' P u b l i c i t y ' and ' p r e j u d i c e ' a r e n o t the same t h i n g . E x c e s s p u b l i c i t y d o e s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y or necessarily mean that the publicity was prejudicial. II "... I n o r d e r t o meet the b u r d e n o f s h o w i n g the necessity f o r a c h a n g e o f v e n u e due to pretrial p u b l i c i t y on t h e g r o u n d s o f c o m m u n i t y s a t u r a t i o n , ' t h e a p p e l l a n t m u s t show more t h a n t h e f a c t " t h a t a case generates even w i d e s p r e a d p u b l i c i t y . " ' Oryang v . S t a t e , 642 So. 2 d 9 7 9 , 983 ( A l a . C r . App. 1993), quoting, T h o m p s o n v . S t a t e , 581 So. 2 d 1 2 1 6 , 1233 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991), cert. denied, [502] U.S. [ 1 0 3 0 ] , 112 S. C t . 8 6 8 , 116 L. E d . 2d 774 (1992). "'"Newspaper articles alone would n e c e s s i t a t e a change i n venue u n l e s s i t shown t h a t t h e a r t i c l e s so a f f e c t e d general c i t i z e n r y through the i n s e r t i o n such sensational, accusational denunciatory statements, that a f a i r i m p a r t i a l t r i a l was i m p o s s i b l e . Patton State, 246 Ala. 639, 21 So. 2d [1945]."' not was the of or and v. 844 " T h o m p s o n , 581 So. 2 d a t 1 2 3 3 , q u o t i n g M c L a r e n v. S t a t e , 353 So. 2 d 24, 31 (Ala. Cr. App.), c e r t . d e n i e d , 353 So. 2 d 35 ( A l a . 1 9 7 7 ) . "A r e v i e w o f t h e m e d i a c o v e r a g e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y o f p r i n t m e d i a c o v e r a g e was r e a s o n a b l y f a c t u a l a n d m o r e or l e s s o b j e c t i v e . We f i n d t h a t the r e p o r t a g e by 105 CR-07-1332 t h e news m e d i a d i d n o t r e s u l t i n t h e c o m m u n i t y b e i n g so 'pervasively saturated' with prejudicial publicity so as t o make t h e c o u r t proceedings nothing more t h a n a ' h o l l o w f o r m a l i t y . ' Rideau, supra." Hunt, 642 So. 2d a t 1043-44. prejudice under extensive and s e n s a t i o n a l factual as this States v. A n g i u l o , In Brown standard, opposed undermines any c l a i m to the i n nature. a presumption publicity must be F.2d "Motion 1169, of both I f the media coverage i s inflammatory made t h e f o l l o w i n g in of justify or sensational, f o r a presumption of prejudice." 897 his written "To 1181 (1st C i r . f o r Change of this United 1990). Place of Trial," assertions: "1. T h e r e have been numerous newspaper a r t i c l e s the l o c a l newspaper c o n c e r n i n g the a l l e g e d f a c t s the case. "2. The c h i l d r e n o f one o f t h e v i c t i m s a r e i n t h e c u s t o d y o f a n i n d i v i d u a l who h a s r e c e n t l y b e e n the subject of several articles i n the local n e w s p a p e r , t h e D a i l y Home." (C.R. attach the 215.) or otherwise trial court. some s p e c i f i c court Although arguments alluded present any In h i s b r i e f articles i s bound he by in brief to a r t i c l e s , specific to this about these the record reciting and matters 106 not not d i d not media m a t e r i a l s court, case. Brown he However, by to references "'"[t]his allegations disclosed by or the CR-07-1332 record." Moore v. 1984), c e r t . 2d App. 820 denied, (1985).' 1989)." C r i m . App. before State, Garnett this information community that the pretrial 672 the So. record was does in Ct. 1153 1363, of p r e t r i a l to that warrant are before support was 84 L. 1366 not us, Ed. (Ala. properly we cannot prejudicial or s a t u r a t e d tide a App. (Ala. Crim. contained case as 1757, 2d emotional not this prejudicial "extreme s i t u a t i o n s " an (Ala. Cr. 2d So. record materials there publicity presumptively because 555 S. 989 those a r t i c l e s B a s e d on media 105 State, State, 981, or t h a t media a t t e n t i o n i n f l a m e d so Therefore, v. 2d 1053, Therefore, court. that So. U.S. S i m i l t o n v. 1995). conclude 470 457 the against him. conclusion that so inherently constitute a presumption one of or those of prejudice was actually publicity. B. We must prejudiced also against "The follows: determine whether the jury Brown. 'actual prejudice' standard i s defined "'To find the existence of actual p r e j u d i c e , two b a s i c p r e r e q u i s i t e s m u s t be satisfied. F i r s t , i t m u s t be s h o w n t h a t one o r m o r e j u r o r s who decided the case e n t e r t a i n e d an o p i n i o n , b e f o r e h e a r i n g t h e 107 as CR-07-1332 evidence adduced at trial, that the d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y . I r v i n v . Dowd, 366 U.S. [ 7 1 7 , ] 7 2 7 , 81 S. C t . [ 1 6 3 9 , ] 1 6 4 5 , [6 L. E d . 2 d 7 5 1 , 7 5 8 - 5 9 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ] . Second, t h e s e j u r o r s , i t must be d e t e r m i n e d , c o u l d not have laid aside these preformed o p i n i o n s a n d " r e n d e r [ e d ] a v e r d i c t b a s e d on the evidence presented i n court." Irvin v D o w d , 366 81 s Dowd, 366 U . S . a t 7 2 3 , 81 S. C t . a t 11 6 4 3 [6 U.S. a t Ct t 643 L. E d . 2 d a t 7 5 6 ] . "Coleman v. Hunt, 642 So. Zant, 2d at 708 F.2d at 544." 1043. "Furthermore, i n order f o r a defendant to show prejudice, the '"proper manner for ascertaining whether adverse publicity may have biased the prospective jurors is through the voir dire examination." A n d e r s o n v . S t a t e , 362 S o . 2 d 1296, 1299 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 7 8 ) . ' Ex p a r t e G r a y s o n , 479 S o . 2 d 7 6 , 80 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 474 U.S. 8 6 5 , 106 S. C t . 1 8 9 , 88 L. E d . 2 d 157 (1985)." O r y a n g v. State, Brown has not p r e j u d i c e d him. questioned exposure the to 642 the So. 2d 979, shown t h a t any they had about veniremembers media the and/or case. a l r e a d y formed information and (Ala. Crim. pretrial App. publicity 1993). actually During the v o i r d i r e proceedings, the S e v e r a l of the veniremembers had something 983 that in panels knowledge heard, However, o p i n i o n s about they c o u l d not 108 regarding their about case. the read, or seen very few or knew indicated that the case based be parties fair, and on the that trial CR-07-1332 court excused those veniremembers information veniremembers indicated they had that they previously make a d e c i s i o n b a s e d s o l e l y on the trial. jurors Accordingly, these the Brown were e i t h e r p r e s u m p t i v e l y Therefore, the trial denying h i s motion could The set about the any case and during any of the jurors shown t h a t against did did aside evidence presented not not f o r a change of the him. show that or a c t u a l l y p r e j u d i c e d court remaining not Brown has reasons, cause. obtained were a c t u a l l y p r e j u d i c e d For for abuse against him. i t s discretion in venue. IX. Brown's n i n t h argument i s t h a t the the right for cause a p r o s p e c t i v e to the t o be death tried penalty." by a j u r y of j u r o r who trial his peers stated that (Brown's b r i e f at p. court denied when i t "struck she opposed was 107.) However, "[i]n L o c k h a r t v . M c C r e e , 476 U.S. 162, 106 S. C t . 1 7 5 8 , 90 L. E d . 2 d 137 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , t h e S u p r e m e Co_u r t Co _ h e l d t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n does not p r o h i b i t s t a t e s from 'death q u a l i f i c a t i o n ' of j u r i e s in capital c a s e s and t h a t so q u a l i f y i n g a j u r y d o e s n o t d e p r i v e a d e f e n d a n t o f an i m p a r t i a l j u r y . 476 U.S. at 173, 106 S. Ct. at 1764. Alabama courts have c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d l i k e w i s e . See W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 556 So. 2 d 737 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1986), rev'd in p a r t , 556 So. 2 d 744 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ; Edwards v. S t a t e , 515 So. 2 d 86, 88 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) ; M a r t i n v. S t a t e , 494 So. 2 d 749 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1985)." 109 him CR-07-1332 Sockwell aff'd, v. State, 675 So. 675 2d So. 38 2d 4, (Ala. Crim. 1995). (Ala. 18 In c h a l l e n g e d veniremember s p e c i f i c a l l y vote against presented held death at t r i a l . that death the the penalty United was case, i n d i c a t e d t h a t she regardless States of the of C o n s t i t u t i o n does jurors, the removed the veniremember f o r case. there this 1993), any error in this the would evidence B e c a u s e , as Brown a c k n o w l e d g e s , qualification that App. Lockhart prohibit court trial not properly Therefore, we do not find regard. X. Brown's tenth argument is that his death sentence v i o l a t e s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n Ring Arizona, 536 153 (2002). In A p p r e n d i U.S. 2348, 147 L. Court held that statutory beyond holding a Ed. 584 , 122 2d any maximum reasonable i n Apprendi v. New 435 fact must S. Ct. 2428, Jersey, (2000), that be the U.S. United increases presented doubt. In to penalty death 530 110 Ring, L. Ed. 2d 556 466, 120 S. Ct. States a sentence to the a jury Court cases. v. Supreme above and the proven extended i t s CR-07-1332 First, scheme Brown that Alabama's capital sentencing i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e c a u s e t h e j u r y d o e s n o t make a l l of the findings of the death 2d contends 1181, that penalty. 1187-88 are necessary However, ( A l a . 2002), to support the imposition i n E x p a r t e W a l d r o p , 859 So. t h e Alabama Supreme explained: " I t i s t r u e t h a t u n d e r A l a b a m a l a w a t l e a s t one s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e u n d e r A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-4-49, must exist i n order for a defendant convicted of a capital o f f e n s e t o be sentenced t o death. See A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-545(f) ('Unless a t l e a s t one a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e as d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-49 e x i s t s , t h e s e n t e n c e shall be life imprisonment without parole.'); J o h n s o n v . S t a t e , 8 2 3 S o . 2 d 1, 52 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2001) ( h o l d i n g t h a t i n o r d e r t o s e n t e n c e a c a p i t a l d e f e n d a n t t o d e a t h , t h e s e n t e n c e r '"must d e t e r m i n e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a t l e a s t one o f t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s l i s t e d i n [ A l a . Code 1975,] § 13A-549"' ( q u o t i n g E x p a r t e W o o d a r d , 631 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 5 , 1070 ( A l a . Crim. App. 1993))). Many capital offenses listed i n A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-5-40, i n c l u d e conduct that c l e a r l y corresponds t o c e r t a i n a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s found i n § 13A-5-49: "'For example, t h e c a p i t a l offenses of intentional murder during a rape, § 13A-5-40(a)(3), i n t e n t i o n a l murder d u r i n g a robbery, § 13A-5-40(a)(2), intentional murder d u r i n g a b u r g l a r y , § 13A-5-40(a)(4), and i n t e n t i o n a l murder d u r i n g a k i d n a p p i n g , § 13A-5-40(a)(1), p a r a l l e l the aggravating circumstance that "[t]he c a p i t a l offense was committed while the defendant was 111 Court CR-07-1332 e n g a g e d ... [ i n a] r a p e , r o b b e r y , o r k i d n a p p i n g , " § 13A-5-4 9 ( 4 ) . ' "Ex parte (alterations burglary Woodard, 631 So. 2d at and o m i s s i o n i n o r i g i n a l ) . 1070-71 "Furthermore, when a d e f e n d a n t i s f o u n d g u i l t y o f a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e , 'any a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance which the verdict convicting the defendant e s t a b l i s h e s was p r o v e n b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a t trial shall be considered as proven beyond a reasonable doubt f o r purposes of the sentencing hearing.' A l a . Code 1975, § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( e ) ; see a l s o Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-50 ('The fact that a p a r t i c u l a r c a p i t a l o f f e n s e as d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-40(a) necessarily includes one or more aggravating circumstances as s p e c i f i e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-49 s h a l l n o t be construed to preclude the finding and consideration of that relevant circumstance or circumstances in determining sentence.'). T h i s i s known as ' d o u b l e - c o u n t i n g ' o r 'overlap,' and Alabama courts 'have repeatedly upheld death sentences where the o n l y a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance s u p p o r t i n g the death sentence overlaps w i t h an e l e m e n t o f t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e . ' Ex p a r t e T r a w i c k , 698 So. 2 d 1 6 2 , 178 ( A l a . 1997); see a l s o C o r a l v . S t a t e , 628 So. 2 d 954, 965 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1992). "Because the jury c o n v i c t e d Waldrop of two counts of murder d u r i n g a robbery i n the first d e g r e e , a v i o l a t i o n o f A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-540(a)(2), the s t a t u t o r y aggravating circumstance of committing a c a p i t a l o f f e n s e w h i l e engaged i n the c o m m i s s i o n o f a r o b b e r y , A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-54 9 ( 4 ) , was ' p r o v e n b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . ' A l a . Code 1975, § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( e ) ; A l a . Code 1975, § 13A-550. O n l y one a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e m u s t e x i s t i n o r d e r t o impose a sentence of death. A l a . Code 1975, § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 5 ( f ) . Thus, i n Waldrop's case, the jury, and not the trial judge, determined the e x i s t e n c e of the 'aggravating circumstance necessary 112 CR-07-1332 f o r i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y . ' Ring, 536 U.S. a t 6 0 9 , 122 S. C t . a t 2 4 4 3 . Therefore, the findings reflected i n the jury's verdict alone e x p o s e d W a l d r o p t o a range o f p u n i s h m e n t t h a t had as i t s maximum t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . T h i s i s a l l R i n g a n d Apprendi require." (Footnote omitted.) Because of the jury robbery-murder to one or of killing course two of conduct, proven case, the j u r y , at the existence of f o r i m p o s i t i o n of 609, 122 S. Ct. at the the exposed "[t]he t r i a l to or death 2443. e s p e c i a l l y heinous, application only i n weighing and the aggravating was reasonable not the death judge, circumstance penalty." f o r the Ring, the not Waldrop, a Ring jury penalty, and murder or c r u e l i s a f a c t o r the m i t i g a t i n g 536 circumstance, d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t the circumstances." Accordingly, there a aggravating atrocious, has and statutory F u r t h e r , because eligible c o u r t ' s subsequent beyond offense pursuant those "aggravating f o u n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a t l e a s t one B r o w n was capital o r more p e o p l e were necessary 1190. the circumstances determined [was] of Therefore, i n this doubt. U.S. and scheme aggravating c o n v i c t e d Brown that circumstances 859 So. violation in 2d at this c a s e , and Brown's arguments t o t h e c o n t r a r y a r e w i t h o u t m e r i t . 113 CR-07-1332 B r o w n a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t Ex p a r t e decided. However, § 12-3-16, A l a . W a l d r o p was Code 1975, erroneously provides: "The d e c i s i o n s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t s h a l l g o v e r n t h e h o l d i n g s and d e c i s i o n s o f t h e c o u r t s o f appeals, and t h e d e c i s i o n s and p r o c e e d i n g s o f s u c h c o u r t s o f appeals shall be subject to the general s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e a n d c o n t r o l o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t as p r o v i d e d b y C o n s t i t u t i o n a l A m e n d m e n t No. 328." Because this court Supreme Court, court's decision Finally, jury -- which, that would resolved v. i s bound the are we by in a i n Ex Brown under allow parte Ring, imposition 1 addressed and So. 3d rejected position that of a issue include must "any any death (Brown's b r i e f 104, of to the Alabama reverse that Waldrop. contends unanimously." State, not decisions 143 a similar (Ala. committed predicate sentence at p. Crim. argument as 112.) App. -- In be Sneed 2007), follows: a facts must "[T]he appellant asserts that his conviction v i o l a t e s R i n g because the j u r y d i d not u n a n i m o u s l y determine that statutory aggravating circumstances were p r e s e n t and t h a t t h e a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances o u t w e i g h e d t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and b e c a u s e i t was not r e q u i r e d to s p e c i f y which aggravating c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t found to e x i s t . 114 to we CR-07-1332 "In t h e g u i l t phase, t h e j u r y u n a n i m o u s l y found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed a robbery d u r i n g the course of committing a murder. 'The j u r y ' s unanimous finding o f one aggravating circumstance i s s u f f i c i e n t to s a t i s f y R i n g . ' E x p a r t e M c N a b b , 887 S o . 2 d 9 9 8 , 1 0 0 6 ( A l a . 2004). Also, '"[t]he d e t e r m i n a t i o n whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s n o t a f i n d i n g o f f a c t o r an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , R i n g a n d A p p r e n d i do not require that a jury weigh the aggravating c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " ' E x p a r t e H o d g e s , 856 S o . 2 d 9 3 6 , 943 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ( q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e (Ala. 2002))." Therefore, Brown's Waldrop, argument 859 So. 2d 1181, 1190 i s without merit. XI. Brown's sentencing eligible eleventh statute improperly he of circumstances. counting" penalty." He punishes to robbery t o one the and scheme capital also him So. 2d 915, 958-59 "Alabama's the universe of (Brown's b r i e f contend that or course appears f o r the capitaldefendants a t p. 114.) trial or more of conduct as both and as that same aggravating this 115 App. 1999), "double offense. arguments i n J a c k s o n v. (Ala. Crim. court o f two t o contend twice the the k i l l i n g offenses addressed and r e j e c t e d s i m i l a r 836 i s that t o narrow appears treated pursuant elements fails f o r the death Specifically, people argument as We State, follows: CR-07-1332 "'The f a c t t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r capital o f f e n s e as d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-40(a) necessarily includes one or more aggravating circumstances as s p e c i f i e d i n S e c t i o n 13A-5-49 s h a l l n o t be c o n s t r u e d t o p r e c l u d e t h e f i n d i n g and c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f that relevant circumstance or circumstances in determining sentence.' " A c c o r d i n g l y , u n d e r § 13A-5-50, A l a . Code 1975, a j u r y may c o n s i d e r a n e l e m e n t o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r a s an a g g r a v a t i n g circumstance i f that element i s listed in § 13A-5-49, A l a . Code 1975, as an aggravating circumstance. F u r t h e r , t h i s c o u r t has h e l d t h a t t h e u s e o f an e l e m e n t o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r as an aggravating circumstance does not punish a d e f e n d a n t t w i c e f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . B u r t o n v. S t a t e , 651 S o . 2 d 641 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) , a f f ' d , 651 S o . 2 d 659 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 514 U.S. 1 1 1 5 , 115 S. C t . 1 9 7 3 , 131 L. E d . 2 d 862 (1995). " ' T h i s p r a c t i c e , known a s " d o u b l e c o u n t i n g " s Haney or " o v e r l a p p i n g , " has been u p h e l d . ( A l a . C r . App. v . S t a t e , 603 S o . 2 d 368 1 9 9 1 ) , a f f ' d , 603 S o . 2 d 412 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) , cert. denied, 507 U.S. 9 2 5 , 113 S. C t . 1 2 9 7 , 122 L. E d . 2 d 687 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; Kuenzel [ v . S t a t e , 577 S o . 2 d 4 7 4 , 4 8 9 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 9 0 ) , a f f ' d , 577 S o . 2 d 5 3 1 (Ala.), c e r t . d e n i e d , 502 U.S. 8 8 6 , 112 S. C t . 2 4 2 , 116 L. E d . 2 d 197 (1991)]. "'Section 13A-5-50, Code o f A l a b a m a 1975, s t a t e s , i n p a r t , as f o l l o w s : "'"The fact that a particular capital offense as d e f i n e d in Section 13A-5-40(a) necessarily i n c l u d e s one o r more aggravating circumstances as specified in Section 13A-5-49 shall not be construed to preclude the f i n d i n g 116 CR-07-1332 and consideration of that relevant circumstance or circumstances i n determining sentence." " ' C l e a r l y , § 13A-5-50 p r o v i d e s t h a t a j u r y may c o n s i d e r a n e l e m e n t o f c a p i t a l murder as an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e i f that element i s listed i n § 13A-5-49. Further, this c o u r t has r e p e a t e d l y h e l d that t h e u s e o f an e l e m e n t o f c a p i t a l murder i n such a way d o e s n o t , a s t h e a p p e l l a n t argues, punish a defendant twice f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . K u e n z e l , s u p r a ; s e e a l s o E x p a r t e K e n n e d y , 472 S o . 2 d 1 1 0 6 ( A l a . ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 474 U.S. 9 7 5 , 1 0 6 S. C t . 3 4 0 , 88 L . E d . 2 d 3 2 5 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . "'"A c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t s c h e m e , u n d e r w h i c h t h e same f e l o n y may form t h e b a s i s o f an e s s e n t i a l element of the crime a n d an aggravating circumstance for consideration by the jury in recommending a sentence, does n o t constitute a denial of the guarantee against double jeopardy." "'Kuenzel, 577 S o . 2 d a t 4 8 8 , q u o t i n g F o r t e n b e r r y v . S t a t e , 5 4 5 S o . 2 d 1 2 9 , 142 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 8 ) , a f f ' d , 545 So. 2 d 145 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 4 9 5 U.S. 9 1 1 , 110 S. C t . 1 9 3 7 , 1 0 9 L . E d . 2 d 3 0 0 ( 1 9 9 0 ) . ' "Burton, Hutcherson 1994), Also, 651 S o . 2 d a t 6 5 7 - 5 8 . " v. S t a t e , rev'd on o t h e r 677 S o . 2 d 1 1 7 4 , 1 2 0 1 grounds, i n L o w e n f i e l d v. P h e l p s , 117 (Ala. Crim. 677 S o . 2 d 1 2 0 5 484 U.S. (Ala. App. 1996). 2 3 1 , 2 4 6 , 108 S. C t . CR-07-1332 546, 98 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1988), t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Court held: " H e r e , t h e ' n a r r o w i n g f u n c t i o n ' was p e r f o r m e d b y t h e j u r y a t t h e g u i l t p h a s e when i t f o u n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of t h r e e counts of murder under the p r o v i s i o n t h a t 'the o f f e n d e r has a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t t o k i l l or to inflict g r e a t b o d i l y harm upon more t h a n one person.' The f a c t t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g j u r y i s a l s o r e q u i r e d t o f i n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f an aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d n a r r o w i n g p r o c e s s , and so the fact that the aggravating circumstance d u p l i c a t e d one o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e d o e s n o t make t h i s s e n t e n c e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n f i r m . There i s no q u e s t i o n b u t t h a t t h e L o u i s i a n a s c h e m e n a r r o w s t h e c l a s s o f d e a t h - e l i g i b l e m u r d e r e r s and t h e n a t the sentencing phase a l l o w s f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of mitigating circumstances and the exercise of discretion. The C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s no m o r e . " Therefore, Brown's arguments are w i t h o u t merit. XII. Twelfth, instructed that those reasonable 115.) still jury the i t "had because Brown a r g u e s t h a t the jury, no circumstances Although of discretion doubt argues during i n the he that i t s penalty as to had guilt i t s discretion instructions, aggravating circumstances already caselaw instruction at been found (Brown's to the improperly sentencing." 118 c o u r t e r r e d when i t phase phase." acknowledges "this trial beyond brief a at p. contrary, he divested the (Brown's b r i e f at p. CR-07-1332 116.) However, a s we "double counting" trial court's argument explained i n Part XI, the p r a c t i c e of has r e p e a t e d l y been u p h e l d . instruction to the contrary was not i s without Therefore, improper, and the Brown's merit. XIII. Brown's t h i r t e e n t h argument i s t h a t t h a t Alabama's of execution Alabama 3 2 3 , 339 the United States , 128 "conclude[d] that Alabama's of execution United previously violates States 3d argument L. E d . of Court 2 d 420 lethal 2, Constitution. 2010] Also, App. merit. 119 Rees, (2008), injection and as a this court has execution See D o t c h v . S t a t e , [Ms. 3d App. [Ms. C R - 0 7 - 1 9 9 7 , ( A l a . Crim. i s without So. So. addressed r e j e c t e d c l a i m s t h a t Alabama's method o f April 11 t h e E i g h t h Amendment t o Constitution." 2 0 1 0 ) ; M o r r i s v. S t a t e , So. 170 use Supreme Belisle, d e c i s i o n i n Baze v. does not v i o l a t e the Alabama CR-07-1913, Court's C t . 1520, C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e i n Ex p a r t e the Alabama Supreme S. States However, ( A l a . 2008), U.S. the the United Constitution. 3d method violates method 2010). ( A l a . Crim. February 5, 2 0 1 0 ] Therefore, Brown's CR-07-1332 XIV. Brown's of f o u r t e e n t h argument i s t h a t t h e c u m u l a t i v e t h e above a l l e g e d errors entitles h i m t o a new have c o n s i d e r e d each o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f e r r o r and we have n o t found require error reversal. We that any o f t h o s e have do n o t f i n d 'probably rights.'" n.1 2001) (quoting Brown's argument Therefore, We individually, allegations that of error "the accumulated [Brown's] E x p a r t e W o o d s , 789 S o . 2 d 9 4 1 , Rule of affected injuriously substantial (Ala. trial. have a l s o c o n s i d e r e d t h e a l l e g a t i o n s c u m u l a t i v e l y , a n d we errors effect 45, Ala. R. 942-43 App. P.). i s without merit. XV. Finally, pursuant t o § 13A-5-53, required to address the p r o p r i e t y sentence of death. Brown three counts committed course of capital was murder -- one see § 13A-5-40(a)(10), a robbery, and count convicted of because t o one he scheme o r A l a . Code 1975, and the murders d u r i n g the course see § 1 3 A - 5 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 2 ) , 120 are f o r and t h e m u r d e r s b y one a c t o r p u r s u a n t of conduct, 1 9 7 5 , we convictions o f Brown's indicted two c o u n t s b e c a u s e he c o m m i t t e d of A l a . Code A l a . Code 1975. CR-07-1332 The was r e c o r d does imposed prejudice, 53(b)(1), The or any trial the other or flight the death to scheme Code 1975. mitigating 51(1), Ala. commission and trial conduct, court existed of p r i o r 1975. see found -- trial circumstances attempt and weighed correctly 121 one § that 1) to The the the Brown commit, robbery, pursuant 13A-5-49(9), one did did was intentionally act or that court court trial -- activity. shows mitigating 13A-5- engaged i n or Brown criminal The by circumstances. the § circumstances 2) B r o w n nonstatutory mitigating that See or a t t e m p t i n g t o commit, of circumstance Code o f , o r an o r more p e o p l e course significant history death passion, I t found o f f e n s e s w h i l e he was o f two The factor. of of circumstances A l a . Code 1975, or influence circumstances. aggravating § 13A-5-49(4), the sentence t h a t the aggravating committing caused of the 1975. i n the after that arbitrary mitigating two accomplice one result the c a p i t a l an reflect court found proved committed see the A l a . Code outweighed State as not Ala. statutory not See not have § 13A-5- find sentencing any order aggravating sentenced a Brown and to CR-07-1332 death. its The record i t sd e c i s i o n , a n d we agree with findings. Section weigh 13A-5-53(b)(2), the aggravating independently of supports death. t o determine After mitigating A l a . Code and 1975, r e q u i r e s mitigating the propriety independently weighing c i r c u m s t a n c e s , we find that us t o circumstances o f Brown's sentence t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and the death sentence i s appropriate. As r e q u i r e d b y § 1 3 A - 5 - 5 3 ( b ) ( 3 ) , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 , we determine whether excessive when cases. Brown course of (Ala. Crim. killed this So. aff'd, imposed people pursuant committed two are aff'd, 698 murders being 698 similar during App. 122 1994), or two by death So. 2d 1100 ( A l a . 1997); ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1996), (Ala. Crim. App.), or scheme punished So. 2d 1150 695 S o . 2 d 138 ( A l a .Crim. in t o one See Gaddy v . S t a t e , 695 S o . 2 d 176 666 S o . 2 d 36 2 d 71 disproportionate the penalty crimes 1995), was ( A l a . 1997); Bush v. S t a t e , C r i m . App. 1995), 666 and state. App. S o . 2 d 184 State, two Similar Brooks v. S t a t e , 695 sentence compared t o conduct robberies. throughout Brown's must aff'd, 695 S o . 2 d 70 ( A l a . ( A l a . 1997); T a y l o r v. opinion after aff'd, 666 remand, So. 2d 73 CR-07-1332 (Ala. 1995); App. H o l l a d a y v. 1988), State, (Ala. aff'd, 555 S o . 2 d 772 1989); 1986), 549 State, So. 2d 135 So. 2d 122 510 S o . 2 d 574 510 S o . 2 d 554 ( A l a . 1987). and we have a d v e r s e l y have n o t found Accordingly, of we a f f e c t e d Brown's any. See R u l e T h e r e f o r e , we nor a f f i r m Brown's f o r any A l a . R. convictions 780 App. find excessive. substantial 45A, v. 555 S o . 2 d F i n a l l y , we h a v e s e a r c h e d t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d may Siebert ( A l a . Crim. t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e was n e i t h e r d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e that ( A l a . Crim. ( A l a . 1989); ( A l a . Crim. App.), a f f ' d , P e o p l e s v. S t a t e , aff'd, 549 rights, App. and error P. sentence death. AFFIRMED. Windom concur and i n the Main, J J . , concur. result. 123 Welch and Kellum, J J . ,

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