State of Alabama v. LaSamuel Lee Gamble

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Rel: 10/01/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 CR-06-2274 S t a t e o f Alabama v. LaSamuel Lee Gamble LaSamuel Lee Gamble v. S t a t e o f Alabama Appeal WELCH, from S h e l b y C i r c u i t (CC-96-813.60) Court Judge. The granting, State o f Alabama i n part, appeals LaSamuel the circuit Lee Gamble's court's order postconviction CR-06-2274 petition of a t t a c k i n g h i s c a p i t a l - m u r d e r c o n v i c t i o n and death. court's Gamble 1 partial filed denial a cross-appeal of claims in from his sentence the circuit postconviction petition. I n N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 8 , G a m b l e was c o n v i c t e d o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r . The jury recommended, sentenced to death. recommendation Gamble's the and by The a vote of 10 circuit sentenced court Gamble capital-murder conviction circuit court f o r that court t o 2, that Gamble followed the to death. We affirmed the criminal aggravating State, remand, 791 we activity and f o r t h a t and t h e m i t i g a t i n g S o . 2 d 409 affirmed (Ala. Crim. App. Gamble's d e a t h State, 791 So. 2 d a t 449. United States Supreme 2000). sentence. denied certiorari the See Gamble v . On return to See Gamble v. The A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t Court history court to reweigh circumstances. to statutory m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t G a m b l e h a d no s i g n i f i c a n t of p r i o r jury's b u t remanded t h e case to consider be and t h e review. See R u l e 3 2 . 1 0 , A l a . R. C r i m . P., s t a t e s : " A n y p a r t y may appeal the decision of a c i r c u i t court according to the procedures of the Alabama Rules of A p p e l l a t e Procedure t o the C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s upon t a k i n g a t i m e l y a p p e a l as p r o v i d e d i n R u l e 4, A l a b a m a R u l e s o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e . " 1 2 CR-06-2274 Gamble v. Alabama, State 534 In (No. U.S. 858 September postconviction 1992229, his conviction petitions i n March a had been 131-page filed to Rule November and Gamble order finding a v. and P., amended November 2004. the c i r c u i t court Gamble's a t the p e n a l t y phase for Crim. Gamble f i l e d 2006, that petition 3 2 , A l a . R. 2003, h e a r i n g i n June ineffective 2001), and sentence. 2003, an e v i d e n t i a r y issued Gamble pursuant attacking After 2, (2001). 2002, relief March trial counsel o f Gamble's because c o u n s e l d i d n o t i n v e s t i g a t e and p r e s e n t any trial mitigating e v i d e n c e a n d t h a t G a m b l e c o u l d no l o n g e r b e s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h b e c a u s e h i s more c u l p a b l e c o d e f e n d a n t , M a r c u s P r e s l e y , h a d h a d his sentence possibility the time court's See Rule Crim. P. commuted to life imprisonment o f p a r o l e b e c a u s e P r e s l e y was of the order murders. granting, 4(b)(1), The i n part, A l a . R. App. Gamble a l s o a p p e a l e d insofar as i t denied counsel related to a State 16 y e a r s appealed Gamble's P., and Rule Rule from the c i r c u i t claim of ineffective the p e n a l t y phase trial. 3 without of o f age the 32 32.10, the at circuit petition. A l a . R. court's order assistance of his capital-murder CR-06-2274 The State's showed t h e evidence at Gamble's capital-murder following: "On J u l y 25, 1996, Gamble and h i s a c c o m p l i c e s , Marcus P r e s l e y and Steven M c K e n z i e , robbed 'John's 280 Pawn,' a pawnshop o n H i g h w a y 280 i n S h e l b y County. During the robbery, P r e s l e y k i l l e d John Burleson, t h e owner o f t h e pawnshop, and J a n i c e L i t t l e t o n , an e m p l o y e e o f t h e pawnshop, b y s h o o t i n g them i n t h e head. A s u r v e i l l a n c e camera i n s i d e t h e p a w n s h o p c a p t u r e d t h e e n t i r e r o b b e r y on v i d e o t a p e , i n c l u d i n g Gamble's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e r o b b e r y and the murders and P r e s l e y ' s s h o o t i n g o f B u r l e s o n and Littleton. Events depicted on the videotape r e v e a l e d t h a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 m i n u t e s b e f o r e t h e robbery, Presley entered the pawnshop, looked a r o u n d , a n d a s k e d B u r l e s o n a b o u t some m e r c h a n d i s e i n the s t o r e . P r e s l e y l e f t , a n d a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3:20 p.m., he r e t u r n e d , t h i s t i m e a c c o m p a n i e d b y Gamble ( M c K e n z i e d i d n o t come i n s i d e t h e p a w n s h o p d u r i n g the robbery, but waited o u t s i d e i n the c a r ) . Both men w e r e a r m e d w i t h h a n d g u n s . Gamble and P r e s l e y f o r c e d B u r l e s o n a n d L i t t l e t o n t o l i e down o n t h e floor behind the counter while they spent a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 m i n u t e s g o i n g t h r o u g h t h e p a w n s h o p , taking jewelry, guns, and cash from the cash register. Before leaving the store, Presley a p p r o a c h e d B u r l e s o n a n d L i t t l e t o n , who w e r e still l y i n g on t h e f l o o r ; he l e a n e d o v e r t h e c o u n t e r , a n d f i r e d one s h o t . The v i d e o t a p e s h o w e d t h a t a f t e r P r e s l e y f i r e d t h e s h o t , h i s gun jammed. W h i l e he was t r y i n g t o u n j a m h i s g u n , P r e s l e y t u r n e d a n d m o t i o n e d t o G a m b l e , who was s t a n d i n g j u s t o u t s i d e the f r o n t door. G a m b l e w a l k e d t o w h e r e P r e s l e y was standing, and then returned to the front door. P r e s l e y f i r e d h i s gun a t t h e v i c t i m s a s e c o n d t i m e ; h i s gun a g a i n jammed. A t t h a t p o i n t , Gamble began p i c k i n g up u n s p e n t b u l l e t s t h a t h a d f a l l e n o u t o f P r e s l e y ' s g u n w h e n P r e s l e y was t r y i n g t o u n j a m i t . P r e s l e y f i r e d one more s h o t a t t h e v i c t i m s . The v i d e o t a p e showed t h a t Gamble t h e n l e a n e d o v e r t h e 2 3 4 trial CR-06-2274 c o u n t e r a n d l o o k e d a t t h e v i c t i m s on t h e f l o o r . t w o men t h e n q u i c k l y l e f t t h e p a w n s h o p . The "Testimony r e v e a l e d t h a t P r e s l e y shot B u r l e s o n t w i c e i n t h e head and L i t t l e t o n once i n t h e head. B u r l e s o n was d e a d w h e n t h e p o l i c e a r r i v e d a t t h e p a w n s h o p . L i t t l e t o n was s t i l l a l i v e w h e n t h e p o l i c e a r r i v e d , b u t she d i e d l a t e r t h a t day a t t h e h o s p i t a l f r o m t h e g u n s h o t wound. "The d a y f o l l o w i n g t h e r o b b e r y - m u r d e r s , Gamble and h i s accomplices t r a v e l e d by bus t o Boston, M a s s a c h u s e t t s , where t h e y remained f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y one week. M c K e n z i e was a r r e s t e d i n B o s t o n o n A u g u s t 1, 1 9 9 6 . I n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n t o p o l i c e by McKenzie l e d t o t h e a r r e s t s o f Gamble a n d P r e s l e y on A u g u s t 9, 1 9 9 6 , i n N o r f o l k , V i r g i n i a . B o t h Gamble and Presley gave statements to police officers in V i r g i n i a b e f o r e t h e y were r e t u r n e d t o Alabama. On August 19, 1996, Gamble a n d P r e s l e y gave second statements t o i n v e s t i g a t o r s w i t h the Shelby County, Alabama, S h e r i f f ' s Office. Items identified as b e i n g s t o l e n from t h e pawnshop were f o u n d i n t h e possession of McKenzie, Gamble, and P r e s l e y after their arrests. Some o f t h e i t e m s s t o l e n f r o m t h e pawnshop were a l s o f o u n d i n Gamble's mother's house i n Birmingham. "The r e c o r d shows t h a t M c K e n z i e , who w a i t e d outside o f t h e pawnshop i n the car during the robbery and murders, p l e a d e d g u i l t y , pursuant t o a p l e a agreement w i t h t h e S t a t e , t o two c o u n t s o f murder. 2 3 Gamble, "There was no a u d i o 791 So. 2 d a t 4 1 5 - 1 6 on t h e v i d e o t a p e . " (footnote omitted). 5 CR-06-2274 Standard o f Review "When r e v i e w i n g a c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s r u l i n g o n a R u l e 32 p e t i t i o n , we a p p l y a n a b u s e - o f - d i s c r e t i o n standard. R e e d v . S t a t e , 748 S o . 2 d 2 3 1 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 9 9 ) . On d i r e c t a p p e a l we r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d f o r p l a i n e r r o r ; however, t h e p l a i n - e r r o r s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w d o e s n o t a p p l y t o a R u l e 32 p r o c e e d i n g attacking a death sentence. See H i l l v . S t a t e , 695 So. 2 d 1223 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) . " Ferguson v. S t a t e , 13 S o . 3 d 4 1 8 , 424 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) . H o w e v e r , "when t h e f a c t s a r e u n d i s p u t e d a n d a n a p p e l l a t e is presented w i t h pure in a Rule 2d 1 0 9 7 , 1098 questions of law, that 32 p r o c e e d i n g i s d e n o v o . " ( A l a . 2001). Ex p a r t e White, The de n o v o deference t o the lower court's f i n d i n g s . 21 S o . 3 d 772 ( A l a . C r i m . court's standard court review 792 S o . gives no See Hooks v. S t a t e , App. 2008). I. The State concluding failing that argues that Gamble's to investigate the trial circuit court c o u n s e l were erred i n ineffective for and present m i t i g a t i o n evidence a t the p e n a l t y phase o f h i s c a p i t a l - m u r d e r t r i a l . When evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of c o u n s e l , we u s e t h e s t a n d a r d a r t i c u l a t e d b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Strickland (1984). In order t o prove v. that 6 Washington, 466 U.S. 668 c o u n s e l was i n e f f e c t i v e , t h e CR-06-2274 petitioner must ineffective; and show that: (2) h e was (1) counsel's prejudiced by performance the ineffective performance. " J u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y o f c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e must be h i g h l y d e f e r e n t i a l . I t i s a l l too tempting f o r a defendant t o second-guess counsel's assistance a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n o r adverse s e n t e n c e , and i t i s a l l too easy f o r a court, examining counsel's defense a f t e r i t has p r o v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l , t o c o n c l u d e t h a t a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. C f . E n g l e v . I s a a c , 456 U.S. 1 0 7 , 133-34 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney p e r f o r m a n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t b e made t o eliminate the d i s t o r t i n g effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's c h a l l e n g e d conduct, and t o e v a l u a t e t h e conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n making the e v a l u a t i o n , a court must indulge a strong presumption that c o u n s e l ' s conduct f a l l s w i t h i n the wide range o f reasonable professional assistance; that i s , the d e f e n d a n t must overcome t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t , under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e c h a l l e n g e d a c t i o n 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' See M i c h e l v. Louisiana, [ 3 5 0 U.S. 9 1 ] , a t 1 0 1 [ ( 1 9 5 5 ) ] . There are c o u n t l e s s ways t o p r o v i d e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i n any g i v e n case. Even t h e b e s t c r i m i n a l defense attorneys would not defend a p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t i n the same w a y . " Strickland v. W a s h i n g t o n , 466 U.S. a t 689. "[T]he purpose of i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s review i s not t o grade counsel's performance. See S t r i c k l a n d [ v . Washington], [ 4 6 6 U.S. 6 6 8 , ] 104 S . C t . [ 2 0 5 2 ] a t 2065 [ ( 1 9 8 4 ) ] ; s e e a l s o W h i t e v. S i n g l e t a r y , 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1992) ('We are not i n t e r e s t e d i n g r a d i n g l a w y e r s ' p e r f o r m a n c e s ; we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n whether the adversarial process at 7 was CR-06-2274 t r i a l , i n f a c t , w o r k e d a d e q u a t e l y . ' ) . We r e c o g n i z e that ' [ r ] e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s an a r t , a n d an a c t o r o m i s s i o n t h a t i s u n p r o f e s s i o n a l i n one c a s e may be s o u n d o r e v e n b r i l l i a n t i n a n o t h e r . ' S t r i c k l a n d , 104 S.Ct. a t 2067. D i f f e r e n t lawyers have different g i f t s ; t h i s f a c t , as w e l l as d i f f e r i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m c a s e t o c a s e , m e a n s t h e r a n g e o f w h a t m i g h t be a r e a s o n a b l e a p p r o a c h a t t r i a l m u s t be b r o a d . To s t a t e the obvious: the t r i a l lawyers, i n every case, could have done something more or something different. So, o m i s s i o n s a r e i n e v i t a b l e . But, the i s s u e i s n o t w h a t i s p o s s i b l e o r 'what i s p r u d e n t o r appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.' B u r g e r v . Kemp, 483 U.S. 7 7 6 , 107 S.Ct. 3 1 1 4 , 3 1 2 6 , 97 L . E d . 2 d 638 (1987)." Chandler 2000) v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 218 F.3d 1305, 1318-19 (11th C i r . (footnotes omitted). In r e g a r d t o an attorney's duty to investigate, we stated: " W h i l e c o u n s e l has a d u t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e i n an attempt to locate evidence favorable to the defendant, 'this duty only r e q u i r e s a reasonable i n v e s t i g a t i o n . ' S i n g l e t o n v . T h i g p e n , 847 F . 2 d 668, 669 ( 1 1 t h C i r . ( A l a . ) 1 9 8 8 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 822, 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989) (emphasis added). See S t r i c k l a n d , 466 U.S. a t 6 9 1 , 104 S . C t . a t 2 0 6 6 ; M o r r i s o n v . S t a t e , 551 S o . 2 d 435 (Ala. C r . App. 1 9 8 9 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 495 U.S. 911, 110 S . C t . 1 9 3 8 , 109 L . E d . 2 d 301 (1990). Counsel's obligation is to conduct a 'substantial i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o each of the p l a u s i b l e l i n e s of d e f e n s e . ' S t r i c k l a n d , 466 U.S. a t 6 8 1 , 104 S . C t . a t 2061 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . 'A s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s j u s t what t h e t e r m i m p l i e s ; i t d o e s n o t demand t h a t counsel d i s c o v e r every shred of evidence but that a reasonable inquiry into a l l plausible 8 have CR-06-2274 d e f e n s e s be at 2063." Jones v. State, made.' 753 So. More r e c e n t l y , v. was Smith, 539 U.S. ineffective present 510 for mitigation investigate dysfunctional The failing was 1191 686, 104 S.Ct. ( A l a . C r i m . App. to bleak and Court adequately The 1999). evidence s e x u a l abuse, Court because that upbringing, that counsel investigate Wiggins ineffective present substantial physical deficiencies. at (2003), addressed a c l a i m t h a t evidence. and and 2d 1174, U.S. t h e U n i t e d S t a t e Supreme C o u r t i n W i g g i n s counsel's performance to I d . , 466 he found counsel Wiggins that failed had suffered a n d t h a t he h a d U.S. a t 535. The mental stated: Court further 9 stated: a from " P e t i t i o n e r t h u s h a s t h e k i n d o f t r o u b l e d h i s t o r y we have d e c l a r e d r e l e v a n t t o a s s e s s i n g a d e f e n d a n t ' s moral c u l p a b i l i t y . P e n r y v . L y n a u g h , 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) ('"[E]vidence about the defendant's b a c k g r o u n d and c h a r a c t e r i s r e l e v a n t because o f the b e l i e f , l o n g h e l d by t h i s s o c i e t y , t h a t d e f e n d a n t s who c o m m i t c r i m i n a l a c t s t h a t a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e t o a disadvantaged background ... may b e l e s s culpable t h a n d e f e n d a n t s who h a v e no s u c h e x c u s e " ' ) ; s e e a l s o Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (noting that c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the offender's l i f e h i s t o r y i s a '"part of the process of i n f l i c t i n g the p e n a l t y o f d e a t h " ' ) ; L o c k e t t v . O h i o , 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (invalidating Ohio law t h a t d i d not permit c o n s i d e r a t i o n of aspects of a defendant's background)." 539 and CR-06-2274 "In f i n d i n g t h a t [ t r i a l c o u n s e l ' s ] i n v e s t i g a t i o n d i d n o t m e e t S t r i c k l a n d ' s p e r f o r m a n c e s t a n d a r d s , we emphasize t h a t S t r i c k l a n d does n o t r e q u i r e c o u n s e l to i n v e s t i g a t e e v e r y c o n c e i v a b l e l i n e o f m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e no m a t t e r how u n l i k e l y t h e e f f o r t w o u l d b e to a s s i s t the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present m i t i g a t i n g evidence at sentencing i n every case. Both conclusions would interfere with the ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d independence of counsel' a t t h e h e a r t o f S t r i c k l a n d , 466 U.S., a t 6 8 9 . We base o u r c o n c l u s i o n on t h e much more limited p r i n c i p l e t h a t ' s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e s made a f t e r less than complete i n v e s t i g a t i o n are reasonable' o n l y t o the e x t e n t t h a t 'reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l judgments s u p p o r t t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on i n v e s t i g a t i o n . ' I d . , a t 690-691. A d e c i s i o n n o t t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h u s 'must be d i r e c t l y a s s e s s e d f o r r e a s o n a b l e n e s s i n a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ' I d . , a t 691. "Counsel's investigation into Wiggins' background d i d not r e f l e c t reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment. T h e i r d e c i s i o n t o end t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n when they d i d was neither consistent with the p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d a r d s t h a t p r e v a i l e d i n 1989, n o r reasonable in light of the evidence counsel uncovered i n the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s records--evidence t h a t would have l e d a r e a s o n a b l y competent a t t o r n e y to i n v e s t i g a t e f u r t h e r . " 539 U.S. In States a t 533-34. W i l l i a m s v . T a y l o r , 5 2 9 U.S. Supreme deficient mitigation "failed Court because that counsel evidence t o conduct found until did a (2000), counsel's not week an i n v e s t i g a t i o n 10 362 begin before the United performance to trial was investigate and t h a t would have counsel uncovered CR-06-2274 extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish childhood, because they to such not because incorrectly records." of any thought 5 2 9 U.S. strategic calculation that s t a t e law barred but access a t 395. "The U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t has h e l d t h a t t r i a l counsel's failure to investigate the p o s s i b i l i t y of mitigating evidence i s , per se, d e f i c i e n t performance. See H o r t o n v . Zant, 941 F . 2 d 1 4 4 9 , 1 4 6 2 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 1 ) ( ' o u r case law r e j e c t s the notion that a "strategic" d e c i s i o n c a n be r e a s o n a b l e when t h e a t t o r n e y h a s failed to investigate h i s options a n d make a r e a s o n a b l e c h o i c e b e t w e e n t h e m ' ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 503 U.S. 9 5 2 , 112 S . C t . 1 5 1 6 , 117 L . E d . 2 d 652 (1992); s e e , a l s o , J a c k s o n v . H e r r i n g , 42 F . 3 d 1 3 5 0 , 1 3 6 6 - 6 8 (11th C i r . ) ('Although counsel need n o t" i n v e s t i g a t e every e v i d e n t i a r y l e a d , " he must g a t h e r enough knowledge o f t h e p o t e n t i a l m i t i g a t i o n evidence t o a r r i v e a t an " i n f o r m e d judgment" i n making [the decision not to present such evidence] [A] legal d e c i s i o n to forgo a m i t i g a t i o n presentation cannot be reasonable i f i t i s unsupported by sufficient investigation.') (emphasis added; c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) , c e r t . d i s m i s s e d , 5 1 5 U.S. 1 1 8 9 , 116 S . C t . 3 8 , 132 L . E d . 2 d 919 (1995)." Ex p a r t e L a n d , 775 So. 2 d 8 4 7 , 853-54 v. Herring, Court 42 F . 3 d 1 3 5 0 of Appeals ( A l a . 2000) . (11th C i r . 1995), f o r the Eleventh Circuit In Jackson the United States stated: "In cases where s e n t e n c i n g counsel d i d not conduct enough investigation to formulate an a c c u r a t e l i f e p r o f i l e o f a d e f e n d a n t , we h a v e h e l d the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n beneath p r o f e s s i o n a l l y competent standards. See, e.g., Blanco [ v . S i n g l e t a r y ] , 943 F.2d [1477] 1501-03 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1991)] (counsel's 11 CR-06-2274 performance d e f i c i e n t where h i s s o l e attempt to p r o c u r e m i t i g a t i o n w i t n e s s e s f o r p e n a l t y p h a s e was to l e a v e messages f o r t h e w i t n e s s e s and a w a i t t h e i r r e s p o n s e s , a n d he thus ultimately conducted no i n t e r v i e w s ) ; H a r r i s [ v . D u g g e r ] , 874 F . 2 d [ 7 5 6 ] 763 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1989)] ( c o u n s e l d e f i c i e n t w h e r e he d i d not investigate defendant's family, scholastic, m i l i t a r y and employment b a c k g r o u n d ) ; M i d d l e t o n [v. Dugger], 849 F . 2 d [ 4 9 1 ] 493 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1988)] (performance deficient where 'trial counsel conducted almost no background investigation, despite discussions with Middleton concerning the existence of such mitigating evidence' as p s y c h i a t r i c problems, b r u t a l childhood, p h y s i c a l , s e x u a l and drug abuse, and low I.Q.); A r m s t r o n g [v. D u g g e r ] , 833 F . 2 d [ 1 4 3 0 ] 1 4 3 3 - 3 4 [ ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) ] (performance deficient where trial counsel's i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e was l i m i t e d t o s i n g l e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h defendant and h i s p a r e n t s , and a n o t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s p a r o l e officer)." 42 F . 3 d a t 1 3 6 7 . With these principles findings i n mind, court's detailed in regard circuit c o u r t made t h e f o l l o w i n g we to findings review this of the circuit claim. fact: " T h i s C o u r t makes t h e f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g s o f f a c t as to what each c o u n s e l d i d , and f a i l e d t o do, a t Gamble's capital murder trial in regards to i n v e s t i g a t i n g and p r e s e n t i n g m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e f o r the jury's consideration. As t o Mr. H a r r y L y o n , t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t G a m b l e ' s c a s e was t h e f i r s t c a s e i n w h i c h Mr. L y o n p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e p e n a l t y phase o f a c a p i t a l t r i a l . This Court f i n d s , based o n M r . L y o n ' s own a d m i s s i o n s , t h a t p r i o r t o G a m b l e ' s c a s e , h e d i d n o t know w h a t m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e w a s , how to obtain mitigating evidence, or what mitigating evidence was admissible during the 12 The CR-06-2274 p e n a l t y phase o f a c a p i t a l t r i a l . This Court finds t h a t Mr. L y o n f a i l e d t o v i s i t o r s e e h i s c l i e n t a t the l o c a l j a i l p r i o r t o t r i a l and t h a t t h e extent o f his i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h h i s c l i e n t were c o n f i n e d t o meetings i n the courtroom during various pretrial hearings, t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Mr. L y o n d i d n o t meet a n y f a m i l y members o r f r i e n d s o f t h e Gamble family u n t i l the t r i a l had s t a r t e d . This Court finds that Mr. L y o n ' s statement that he a n d c o - c o u n s e l ' w o r k e d on t h e w h o l e c a s e a s a t e a m , ' t o be i n a c c u r a t e . T h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Mr. L y o n t o o k a l m o s t no r o l e i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e : M r . L y o n made n o e f f o r t t o c o n t a c t f a m i l y m e m b e r s ; M r . L y o n made n o e f f o r t t o c o n t a c t f r i e n d s ; Mr. L y o n made n o e f f o r t t o c o n t a c t f o r m e r t e a c h e r s ; a n d M r . L y o n made n o e f f o r t t o o b t a i n a n y r e c o r d s p e r t a i n i n g t o Gamble o r h i s f a m i l y . "To t h e e x t e n t t h a t M r . L y o n b i l l e d t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a f o r 61 h o u r s o f o u t - o f - c o u r t p r e p a r a t i o n f o r m i t i g a t i o n , t h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t n o t one b i l l e d hour r e f l e c t e d f a c t u a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o p o t e n t i a l m i t i g a t i n g evidence. This Court notes that the first entry regarding preparation for mitigation o c c u r s l e s s t h a n two months b e f o r e Gamble's t r i a l . E x c e p t f o r w a t c h i n g t h e t r i a l o f P r e s l e y , Gamble's c o - d e f e n d a n t who w a s t r i e d f i r s t , M r . L y o n b i l l e d almost exclusively for 'legal research' and 'preparation for mitigation t r i a l . ' Mr. Lyon's billing entries entitled 'preparation for mitigation,' however, simply reflect additional legal research with i n t e r m i t t e n t phone c a l l s t o cocounsel and l e a r n i n g what ' a g g r a v a t i n g things,' the State intended to introduce at Gamble's capital-murder t r i a l . This Court also finds that the majority o f hours billed b y Mr. L y o n i n ' p r e p a r a t i o n f o r m i t i g a t i o n ' o c c u r r e d t h e same m o n t h a s G a m b l e ' s c a p i t a l m u r d e r t r i a l -- i n d e e d , twenty hours are b i l l e d as ' P r e p a r a t i o n for Mitigation T r i a l ' a mere two d a y s b e f o r e t r i a l s t a r t e d . None o f t h e h o u r s s u b m i t t e d b y Mr. L y o n were p a r t o f an active i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o obtain m i t i g a t i n g evidence. 13 CR-06-2274 " T h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Mr. L y o n ' s f a i l u r e s w i t h regard to obtaining and presenting mitigating evidence were, in part, due to an unreasonable misunderstanding of the scope of mitigating evidence. Mr. Lyon reached the conclusion that, b e f o r e a n y m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e was a d m i s s i b l e a t t h e penalty phase, i t must f i t within one of the statutorily-enumerated mitigating circumstances o u t l i n e d a t § 1 3 A - 5 - 5 1 [ , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 ] . The Court reaches this conclusion based on many factors. F i r s t , Mr. L y o n t e s t i f i e d a t t h e R u l e 32 e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g t h a t i t was 'my u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the law,' t h a t any p o t e n t i a l m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e had t o f i t w i t h i n one o f t h e s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d circumstances o u t l i n e d by the L e g i s l a t u r e . S e c o n d , Mr. Lyon's c l o s i n g argument to the j u r y i n the p e n a l t y phase c o n s i s t e d o f s i m p l y r e a d i n g a n d c o m m e n t i n g on e a c h s t a t u t o r i l y - l i s t e d m i t i g a t i n g circumstance, whether i t a p p l i e d t o Gamble and h i s case or not. And, t h i r d , Mr. L y o n e x p l a i n e d a t t h e R u l e 32 e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g t h a t t h e r e was no b a s i s t o h i r e a m i t i g a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t i n G a m b l e ' s c a s e ' b e c a u s e t h e r e w e r e no m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s to p r e s e n t o t h e r than the two statutory mitigating factors that I argued at t r i a l . ' T h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t n o t o n l y d i d Mr. L y o n f a i l t o c o n t r i b u t e t o an i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e m i t i g a t i n g evidence, but h i s conclusions about what c o n s t i t u t e d m i t i g a t i o n , w e r e , as a m a t t e r o f l a w , i n error. " "This Court finds that Mr. Morgan first attempted contact with the family of Gamble in F e b r u a r y 1997, w h e n he sent l e t t e r s to Gamble's parents. A s a d m i t t e d b y Mr. M o r g a n , a t t h e t i m e he sent these letters he was unaware of the mental/emotional status of either parent, their cognitive limitations, or t h e i r a l c o h o l and drug abuse. T h i s Court f i n d s t h a t the next s u b s t a n t i a l s t e p t o l o c a t e G a m b l e ' s f a m i l y was n o t u n d e r t a k e n b y Mr. M o r g a n u n t i l N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 7 , a mere e l e v e n d a y s 14 CR-06-2274 before the s t a r t of the t r i a l . This Court further f i n d s t h a t Mr. M o r g a n ' s a t t e m p t t o g a t h e r m i t i g a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n c o n s i s t e d of randomly stopping people i n Gamble's n e i g h b o r h o o d and a s k i n g these p e o p l e i f t h e y knew G a m b l e , a n d , i f s o , w h a t was t h e i r o p i n i o n o f h i m . M r . M o r g a n h a d no b a s i s t o b e l i e v e t h a t a n y o f t h e p e o p l e h e s t o p p e d a n d t a l k e d t o a c t u a l l y knew Gamble o r c o u l d p r o v i d e r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n . This Court f i n d s t h a t t h e e f f o r t s by counsel t o c o n t a c t t h e members o f G a m b l e ' s f a m i l y w e r e m i n i m a l . This Court further finds that t h e methods chosen t o l o c a t e Gamble's f a m i l y were i l l - c o n c e i v e d and h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t o produce p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s . This Court also finds that ' i n - t h e - f i e l d ' attempts to t a l k to Gamble's f a m i l y d i d n o t occur u n t i l the l a s t minute -- a t a t i m e w h e r e a n y i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y t h e f a m i l y c o u l d n o t be c o r r o b o r a t e d o r v e r i f i e d t h r o u g h the accumulation of documentary evidence. " T h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Mr. M o r g a n h a d c l e a r notice t h a t Gamble h a d some l e v e l of cognitive limitation. Despite this knowledge, this Court finds that counsel failed to follow this lead, instead choosing t o s u b m i t Gamble t o a competency and l e g a l i n s a n i t y a s s e s s m e n t . Counsel testified t h a t he h o p e d t h a t G a m b l e ' s e v a l u a t i o n w o u l d be t h e 'one i n a t h o u s a n d t e s t s where t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t t h a t does t h e t e s t would s a y , uh huh, t h i s guy i s m e n t a l l y i l l . ' C o u n s e l chose n o t t o t a l k t o any o f G a m b l e ' s t e a c h e r s who p r o v i d e d v a l u a b l e t e s t i m o n y a t t h e R u l e 32 e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g , c h o s e n o t t o o b t a i n any e d u c a t i o n a l r e c o r d s w h i c h l i k e w i s e p r o v e d t o be v a l u a b l e e v i d e n c e a t t h e h e a r i n g , and chose not t o submit Gamble to cognitive t e s t i n g which, when u n d e r t a k e n by p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n c o u n s e l , c o n c l u s i v e l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t G a m b l e was c o g n i t i v e l y l i m i t e d . "This Court finds that counsel f a i l e d to request any o f t h e m u l t i t u d e o f r e c o r d s c o n c e r n i n g Gamble and h i s f a m i l y t h a t were r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . C o u n s e l concedes, and t h i s Court f i n d s , t h a t counsel failed t o p r o c u r e Gamble's m e d i c a l records, educational 15 CR-06-2274 r e c o r d s , f a m i l y r e c o r d s , s u c h a s DHR [ D e p a r t m e n t o f Human R e s o u r c e s ] r e c o r d s , s o c i a l s e r v i c e o r w e l f a r e r e c o r d s , and j u v e n i l e dependency or f a m i l y c o u r t records. "This Court agrees w i t h Mr. Morgan t h a t f o r t h e s e f a i l u r e s t h e r e was ' n o e x c u s e . ' T h i s Court f i n d s t h a t c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e o r make further inquiries r e g a r d i n g Gamble's f a t h e r , Leo Gamble, J r . This Court finds that counsel had knowledge of Leo Gamble's military service i n Vietnam, h i s subsequent v i o l e n c e , e r r a t i c behavior, and drug and a l c o h o l dependencies. This Court f i n d s , as c o u n s e l conceded, t h a t c o u n s e l c o u l d n o t have judged the value of pursuing mitigation evidence concerning h i s c l i e n t ' s f a t h e r having never seen any o f t h e e x i s t i n g r e c o r d s o r documentation. "Mr. Morgan recognized the need t o h i r e a mitigation s p e c i a l i s t or m i t i g a t i o n investigator i n Gamble's case. T h i s Court f i n d s t h a t Gamble's t r i a l counsel a c t u a l l y f i l e d a motion s e e k i n g funds f o r a m i t i g a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t o r , but abandoned t h a t request. Mr. M o r g a n c o n c e d e s t h a t a m i t i g a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t could have obtained the necessary records that counsel failed t o seek, c o u l d have l o c a t e d the f a m i l y , c o u l d have t a l k e d t o t e a c h e r s , and c o u l d h a v e t e s t i f i e d on b e h a l f o f f a m i l y members i n c a p a b l e of t e s t i f y i n g i n a courtroom. Mr. Morgan c o n c e d e s t h a t a m i t i g a t i o n e x p e r t s h o u l d have been h i r e d i n Gamble's case. T h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e r e was no l e g i t i m a t e reason not t o seek the s e r v i c e s o f a m i t i g a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t , a n d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o do s o d i d n o t r e s t on a n y t a c t i c a l o r s t r a t e g i c b a s i s . " T h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t Mr. M o r g a n d i d n o t meet w i t h members o f G a m b l e ' s f a m i l y u n t i l November 17, 1997, ' r i g h t b e f o r e t h e t r i a l s t a r t e d . ' T h i s C o u r t f i n d s t h a t M r . M o r g a n made a n i n i t i a l a s s e s s m e n t t o c a l l some o f G a m b l e ' s f a m i l y m e m b e r s a s w i t n e s s e s , b u t made t h i s a s s e s s m e n t a f t e r s p e a k i n g w i t h t h e m , i n a group, f o r approximately ten minutes. This 16 CR-06-2274 C o u r t f u r t h e r f i n d s t h a t , a t t h i s l a s t m i n u t e , Mr. M o r g a n h a d no i d e a w h a t he w a n t e d t h e f a m i l y members t o t e s t i f y a b o u t b e c a u s e no m i t i g a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t i o n had been conducted. This Court finds that the ultimate decision not to call any witnesses to t e s t i f y a t t h e p e n a l t y p h a s e o f G a m b l e ' s t r i a l was not a s t r a t e g i c o r t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n , as s u g g e s t e d b y t h e S t a t e , b u t , i n c o u n s e l ' s own w o r d s , 'we j u s t d i d n ' t h a v e e n o u g h i n f o r m a t i o n b e c a u s e we d i d n ' t g e t a m i t i g a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t . ' A t one p o i n t i n Mr. Morgan's testimony, he commented t h a t he h a d ' t h e impression that sometimes i t was p o s s i b l e that m i t i g a t i o n h u r t t h e case, t h a t they would have been b e t t e r o f f without i t . ' Perhaps such a case e x i s t s . Any s u c h ' i m p r e s s i o n ' o r ' d e c i s i o n ' a b o u t t h e m e r i t s o f p r e s e n t i n g m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e o r n o t c a n o n l y be made after a reasonable investigation into mitigation, and i n the absence of a reasonable mitigation i n v e s t i g a t i o n , such decisions cannot r e a s o n a b l y b e made b y c o u n s e l . " H a v i n g made t h e f o r e g o i n g findings of fact, t h i s Court applies the relevant law t o these facts t o determine i f t h e performance o f Gamble's trial c o u n s e l was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e f i c i e n t . This Court recognizes that federal courts of appeals have analyzed counsel's performance i n a case, i n c l u d i n g cases p r i o r t o t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e 1989 ABA G u i d e l i n e s f o r counsel i n c a p i t a l cases, by c i t i n g both t h e 1989 a n d 2003 ABA G u i d e l i n e s f o r the Appointment and Performance o f Defense Counsel i n Death P e n a l t y Cases. See e . g . , D i c k e r s o n v . B a g l e v , 453 F . 3 d 690 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) ; H a m b l i n v . M i t c h e l l , 354 F . 3 d 482 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) . They do s o u n d e r t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e 1989 a n d 2003 ABA G u i d e l i n e s a r e 'not a s p i r a t i o n a l i n t h e sense t h a t they represent norms n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d a f t e r S t r i c k l a n d . ' b u t a r e i n s t e a d simply 'thec l e a r e s t e x p o s i t i o n of counsel's d u t i e s a t t h e p e n a l t y phase o f a c a p i t a l case,' H a m b l i n , s u p r a , 354 F . 3 d a t 4 8 7 , 4 8 8 . T h e s e d u t i e s are r o o t e d i n S t r i c k l a n d as w e l l as l o n g s t a n d i n g , common-sense p r i n c i p l e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n u n d e r s t o o d 17 CR-06-2274 by competent counsel in death-penalty cases. N o t a b l y , i n R o m p i l l a v . B e a r d , 545 U.S. 374 (2005), t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t seemed t o a d o p t t h i s approach, and applied the 1989 and 2003 ABA G u i d e l i n e s as t h e g u i d i n g r u l e s and s t a n d a r d s t o a c a s e whose t r i a l o c c u r r e d b e f o r e t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f the 1989 ABA Guidelines.[ ] This Court need not r e s o l v e s u c h w e i g h t y q u e s t i o n s ; G a m b l e was t r i e d i n November 1997. The 1989 ABA Guidelines for the A p p o i n t m e n t and Performance of Counsel i n Death P e n a l t y Cases were i n e x i s t e n c e at the time of Gamble's t r i a l . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s C o u r t w i l l use the 1989 ABA Guidelines, and forego the 2003 ABA G u i d e l i n e s , to a s s i s t i t i n r e s o l v i n g the q u e s t i o n whether Gamble's t r i a l counsel's performance met p r e v a i l i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l norms. 2 "Guideline 11.4.1 o f the 1989 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel i n Death P e n a l t y Cases i s entitled ' I n v e s t i g a t i o n . ' The Guideline reads: 'Counsel should conduct independent i n v e s t i g a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e g u i l t / i n n o c e n c e phase and t o the penalty phase of a capital trial. Both investigations should begin immediately upon c o u n s e l ' s e n t r y i n t o t h e c a s e and s h o u l d be p u r s u e d e x p e d i t i o u s l y . ' ABA G u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e A p p o i n t m e n t and P e r f o r m a n c e o f C o u n s e l i n Death P e n a l t y C a s e s , Guideline 11.4.1(A) (1989) (hereinafter ABA Guidelines or Guideline). With respect to investigation in preparation f o r the sentencing phase, Guideline 11.4.1(C) states, 'This i n v e s t i g a t i o n should comprise e f f o r t s to discover "Although t h e ABA g u i d e l i n e s may, i n some i n s t a n c e s , provide guidance as t o what i s reasonable i n terms of counsel's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , they are not d e t e r m i n a t i v e . Rather, the two-pronged a n a l y s i s set f o r t h i n S t r i c k l a n d remains the standard for deciding ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims." J o n e s v . S t a t e , [Ms. C R - 0 5 - 0 5 2 7 , A u g u s t 3 1 , 2 0 0 7 ] So. 3 d , ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2007) . 2 18 CR-06-2274 a l l reasonably m i t i g a t i n g evidence[.]' o c c u r i n Gamble's case. "The same guideline investigative information: suggests This did not sources of "'collect information relevant to the sentencing phase of t r i a l i n c l u d i n g , but not l i m i t e d t o : medical h i s t o r y , (mental and p h y s i c a l i l l n e s s o r i n j u r y , a l c o h o l and d r u g use, b i r t h t r a u m a and developmental d e l a y s ) ; e d u c a t i o n a l h i s t o r y (achievement, performance and behavior); special educational needs (including cognitive limitations and learning disabilities); military history (type and length of service, conduct, special training); employment and t r a i n i n g h i s t o r y ( i n c l u d i n g skills and p e r f o r m a n c e , and b a r r i e r s to e m p l o y a b i l i t y ) ; f a m i l y and s o c i a l h i s t o r y ( i n c l u d i n g p h y s i c a l , sexual or emotional a b u s e ) ; p r i o r a d u l t and j u v e n i l e r e c o r d ; prior c o r r e c t i o n a l experience (including conduct on supervision and in the institution, education or training, and c l i n i c a l s e r v i c e s ) ; r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l influences. "ABA Guideline 11.4.1(D)(2)(C). None of this i n f o r m a t i o n was sought, except through counsel's request that his client, who presented obvious cognitive deficits, compose a j o u r n a l t h a t would include his biography. Neither attorney sought medical records, educational records, military records, f a m i l y records or s o c i a l h i s t o r y records. II "This Court f i n d s t h a t not one of the ABA Guidelines concerning the investigation into m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e was a d o p t e d b y G a m b l e ' s c o u n s e l . T h e r e was no m i t i g a t i o n p l a n , a n inconsequential 19 CR-06-2274 m i t i g a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t i o n , no m i t i g a t i o n i n v e s t i g a t o r o r s p e c i a l i s t , a n d no m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d at the s e n t e n c i n g phase. On t h i s e v i d e n c e a l o n e , t h i s Court finds t r i a l counsel deficient. This Court garners support for i t s conclusion by c o n s i d e r i n g d e c i s i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t and t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A p p e a l s . "As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t r e p e a t e d l y e m p h a s i z e d i n W i g g i n s v . S m i t h , 539 U.S. 510 ( 2 0 0 3 ) , the question of whether counsel exercised 'reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment' i s not answered by whether counsel should have presented a m i t i g a t i o n case. Rather, the focus i s whether the underlying investigation supporting counsel's d e c i s i o n not to i n t r o d u c e m i t i g a t i n g evidence was itself reasonable. Wiggins, s u p r a , 539 U.S. at 522-23. I n W i g g i n s , as i n Gamble's c a s e , c o u n s e l d i d not present evidence i n m i t i g a t i o n . But the Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n r e s t e d on an a s s e s s m e n t of counsel's mitigation investigation. Counsel in Wiggins had their client evaluated by a p s y c h o l o g i s t , who c o n c l u d e d t h a t p e t i t i o n e r had a low IQ, had difficulty coping with demanding situations, and had features of a personality disorder. Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at 523. Gamble's counsel did not have their client evaluated, except f o r a two-day e x a m i n a t i o n for c o m p e t e n c y , w h i c h G a m b l e ' s own c o u n s e l d e s c r i b e d a s a 'farce.' In Wiggins, p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel also ' t r a c k e d down' r e c o r d s f r o m t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s documenting their client's various foster care placements, as well as a pre-sentence investigation report, that noted petitioner's 'misery as a youth,' his own self-reported background as 'disgusting,' and his long-term placement i n f o s t e r care. W i g g i n s , s u p r a , 539 U.S. a t 523. G a m b l e ' s c o u n s e l d i d n o t ' t r a c k down' a n y r e c o r d s c o n c e r n i n g Gamble o r h i s f a m i l y , even t h o u g h they had direct knowledge o f Gamble's cognitive l i m i t a t i o n s and knowledge o f h i s f a t h e r ' s v i o l e n c e and a l c o h o l and d r u g abuse. The United States 20 CR-06-2274 Supreme C o u r t , i n W i g g i n s , f o u n d t h a t c o u n s e l fell s h o r t o f p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d a r d s by not expanding their investigation beyond the records they obtained. Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at 524. Gamble's c o u n s e l d i d not o b t a i n a s i n g l e r e c o r d and never had their client evaluated for cognitive limitations. I f c o u n s e l was d e f i c i e n t i n W i g g i n s , counsel f o r Gamble, h a v i n g done even l e s s , must l i k e w i s e be d e f i c i e n t " I n B r o w n l e e v . H a l e y , 306 F . 3 d 1043 (11th C i r . 2002), the Court of Appeals f o r the E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t f o u n d t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l had ' f a i l e d t o c o n d u c t any kind of substantive investigation into his background or c h a r a c t e r f o r purposes of presenting potentially mitigating evidence at sentencing.' Brownlee, supra, 306 F.3d a t 1068. Indeed, the State of Alabama conceded t h a t counsel's performance was d e f i c i e n t , B r o w n l e e , s u p r a , 306 F . 3 d a t 1 0 6 8 - 6 9 , a n d t h i s C o u r t f i n d s no r e l e v a n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f c o u n s e l i n B r o w n l e e and t h a t o f Gamble's t r i a l attorneys. "In another case from the Court of Appeals f o r t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t , H a r d w i c k v . C r o s b y , 320 F.3d 1127 (11th C i r . 2003), the a t t o r n e y ' d i d not o b t a i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e and j u v e n i l e r e c o r d s t h a t showed t h a t H a r d w i c k ' s f a t h e r was an a b u s i v e a l c o h o l i c ' a n d d i d not obtain records t h a t show t h a t 'Hardwick was found to possess dirty syringes,' at age 14. H a r d w i c k , s u p r a , 320 F . 3 d a t 1 1 7 3 - 7 4 . In a d d i t i o n , during state p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n proceedings, Hardwick demonstrated the existence of clear mitigating e v i d e n c e not l o c a t e d by c o u n s e l , i n c l u d i n g the f a c t t h a t ' t h e r e was a s t o r y o f h e a v y a l c o h o l i s m on b o t h s i d e s o f h i s f a m i l y , m o t h e r and f a t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y on t h e f a t h e r ' s s i d e , w i t h ... h i s f a t h e r b e i n g an a l c o h o l i c . ' H a r d w i c k , s u p r a , 320 F . 3 d a t 1 1 7 4 . In addition, ' t h e r e was a h i s t o r y of p h y s i c a l abuse shown... by h i s f a t h e r t o w a r d h i s m o t h e r . . . there was a h i s t o r y t h a t t h e r e was a lack of parenting s u p p o r t or s t r u c t u r e by e i t h e r p a r e n t i n the o p i n i o n 21 CR-06-2274 of o t h e r r e l a t i v e s . ' Hardwick, s u p r a , 320 F . 3 d a t 1174. The m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t i n G a m b l e ' s case i s remarkably s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n Hardwick. In both cases, the attorneys f a i l e d t o conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation, and i n both c a s e s , v o l u m i n o u s e v i d e n c e o f m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e -¬ t h a t was a v a i l a b l e h a d c o u n s e l o n l y c o n d u c t e d a reasonable investigation was p r e s e n t e d a t t h e state post-conviction evidentiary hearing. "Many o t h e r c a s e s rendered by the Court of A p p e a l s f o r t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t s u p p o r t Gamble's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t h i s t r i a l c o u n s e l were d e f i c i e n t i n failing to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigations. See e . g . . J a c k s o n v . H e r r i n g , 42 F . 3 d 1 3 5 0 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) ; C a v e v . S i n g l e t a r y , 971 F . 2 d 1 5 1 3 ( 1 1 C i r . 1 9 9 2 ) ; C u n n i n g h a m v . Z a n t , 928 F . 2 d 1 0 0 6 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 1 ) ; Thomas v . Kemp, 7 9 6 F . 2 d 1 3 2 2 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) ; B l a k e v . Kemp, 758 F . 2 d 5 2 3 (11th C i r . 1985). A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g case law from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t a n d t h e C o u r t o f Appeals f o r the E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t , and c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e 1989 ABA G u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e A p p o i n t m e n t a n d Performance o f Counsel i n Death P e n a l t y Cases, t h e only possible conclusion i s that t r i a l counsel, i n failing to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation, failed to exercise reasonable p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment and f e l l f a r s h o r t o f meeting t h e p r e v a i l i n g norms o f p r a c t i c e . " (C.R. 1590-1602.) In evidence were Gamble's case, counsel a t the p e n a l t y phase called to testify presented of h i s t r i a l i n h i s behalf. no -- mitigation no witnesses At the postconviction p r o c e e d i n g s , Gamble p r e s e n t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f h i s m o t h e r , h i s aunt, h i s u n c l e , h i s c o u s i n , two o f h i s s i x t h - g r a d e t e a c h e r s , 22 CR-06-2274 and a friend. Gamble's Lois and he H i s f a m i l y members p a i n t e d a bleak picture of childhood. Gamble, Gamble's mother, t e s t i f i e d that h e r husband G a m b l e ' s f a t h e r , L e o G a m b l e , was a b u s i v e a n d v i o l e n t , b e a t h e r when he was d r u n k , said that school three she had been because and t h a t he d r a n k o f t e n . i n s p e c i a l education s h e was " s l o w . " Lois when testified c h i l d r e n -- L a S a m u e l , M a r y A l i c e , that She s h e was i n that she had a n d L o n e k a -- b u t t h a t L o n e k a h a d b e e n s m o t h e r e d t o d e a t h when s h e was one m o n t h o l d w h e n L e o a r r i v e d home d r u n k a n d p a s s e d o u t o n t o p o f L o n e k a . Cassandra Dunn, Gamble's maternal aunt, testified that G a m b l e ' s home w a s a v e r y v i o l e n t environment and that L o i s and her children Leo's The h o u s e was f i l t h y , floor lived boards. with mother she s a i d , and you could Dunn a l s o testified occasion in Atlanta. that said, Lois Birmingham, Lois's reading. mental She d e t a i l e d when L o i s h a d t a k e n G a m b l e a n d h i s s i s t e r t o l i v e Dunn t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e r e c e i v e d a t e l e p h o n e had abandoned h e r c h i l d r e n . went shack." see through the concerning p r o b l e m s g r o w i n g up a n d h e r d i f f i c u l t y one i n a " r u n down to Atlanta but Lois to bring d i d not return 23 Her o l d e r the sister, children with them. back call she to Sometime CR-06-2274 later, Dunn Gamble, Lenair said, and his sister Gamble, brother was that had he parents a were Gamble's cousin, described of with teachers, testified of of Lois's. testified was Lois, that h i s never around, that both of Gamble's Wilson, one of Gamble's reading. testified introduced ineffective Robbie that May, Gamble's testified Gamble one of in a Fernando Green, father i n a rundown s h a c k w i t h i n which slow" t h a t G a m b l e was children. a friend, the house as a " c r a c k Gamble friend and s a i d t h a t G a m b l e was " a c a d e m i c a l l y Marvin Holiday, conditions claims and Lolita a l c o h o l i c and t h a t they l i v e d people. a b e c a u s e he program f o r special-needs Gamble's Birmingham uncle, problem, s p e c i a l help Gamble's s i x t h - g r a d e remedial father alcoholics. to i n with paternal drinking teachers, received returned moved not a good sixth-grade and Lois was 14 an other to the a p p a l l i n g lived i n , a house house." numerous exhibits assistance of i n support counsel. 3 The of h i s school D r . E l i z a b e t h B e c k , who h a d b e e n r e t a i n e d t o c o n d u c t a psychosocial a s s e s s m e n t on G a m b l e , a l s o t e s t i f i e d to the m a j o r i t y o f t h e f a c t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e n u m e r o u s e x h i b i t s . She testified t h a t s h e c o n d u c t e d 21 i n t e r v i e w s w i t h Gamble's f a m i l y members a n d t e a c h e r s and t h a t she o b t a i n e d numerous r e c o r d s r e l a t i n g t o Gamble's c h i l d h o o d . 3 24 CR-06-2274 records f o r G a m b l e ' s m o t h e r s h o w e d t h a t w h e n s h e was o f age she h a d a f u l l - s c a l e "educable showed mentally that Security he I Q o f 56 a n d was retarded." had an IQ Administration of Leo 14 years considered records school records i n the 11th grade. 72 Gamble's t o be Social showed that Leo had t e s t e d when he a p p l i e d f o r b e n e f i t s a n d t h a t he h a d an been organic mental d i s o r d e r because o f h i s "heavy a l c o h o l consumption" and was possibly schizophrenic. ("DHR") r e c o r d s showed t h a t h e was h o s p i t a l i z e d . and emaciated." obtained months that D e p a r t m e n t o f Human when Gamble The r e c o r d s At that was three Resources months o l d show t h a t G a m b l e was time Child Protective Services c u s t o d y o f Gamble b e c a u s e o f p a r e n t a l n e g l e c t . later Lois Gamble, paternal regained until he custody. was 7 g r a n d m o t h e r ' s home, relatives in 4 rooms. In DHR years a of "run 1984, records age, down when lived shack," Gamble was seven, he I n 1986, Gamble and h i s mother For the next year, p a s s e d a r o u n d among t h e i r moved i n with a Gamble relatives. friend 25 and four different returned and h i s s i s t e r I n 1987, Gamble lived in his 23 schools to Birmingham. with her show with h i s mother and attended i n two y e a r s . Seven also moved t o A t l a n t a w i t h mother "dirty were and h i s for nine CR-06-2274 years. had The friend Gamble exhibits neglect assist s o l d drugs out her presented and i n her a bleak drug and c l a s s e s , t h a t he records grade made m o s t l y "Ds" based on the years dropped of in the school i t was at the Rule psychologist, evidence murder hearing. by 32 age attended only promoted to policy i n the t h a t he that as had that 7th a "social grade full-scale low-average range. proceedings, presented of of the and Scale i n the middle Dr. Glen administered IQ was 77. of State's a clinical IQ None o f m i t i g a t i o n at IQ The King, he that his full-scale was of t h a t he year. testified Gamble's tests the to above capital- trial. Gamble's Morgan, marked school determined w h i c h p l a c e d him Gamble and and the S t a n f o r d - B i n e t I n t e l l i g e n c e administered 2004 and expert testimony frequently missed "Fs," school's 15 out and t h a t he was G a m b l e was 82 The frequently troubled childhood promotion." in sales. s h o w e d t h a t he f o u r t h g r a d e t h r e e t i m e s , and G a m b l e was house and indifference. Gamble's s c h o o l fifth of her Jr. two -- trial testified Morgan attorneys at testified the Harry Lyon and Joe postconviction evidentiary that 26 -- he was responsible for CR-06-2274 investigating Gamble's m i t i g a t i n g evidence trial. mitigating He met evidence, with and he f o r the penalty Gamble began e v i d e n c e a b o u t two months b e f o r e one to trial. wrote t o Gamble's mother s e v e r a l times Gamble's r e l a t i v e s by t e l e p h o n e , he said that relatives 11 d a y s would before not said, trial that he records, family with Gamble's juvenile him, find had mental conducted at to obtain records, records. family Neither testified that d e f i c i e n c i e s based Taylor he so he Also, Gamble's went about Gamble. to Hardin believed Secure that DHR on 5 before school records, or attempt to Morgan knew t h a t the p r e t r i a l Medical he Morgan Gamble's d i d Morgan obtain the services of a m i t i g a t i o n expert. Gamble that he reach He w a l k e d a r o u n d t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d , d i d not attempt medical mitigation and attempted t o realized of discuss Morgan s a i d t h a t 4 he a n d h e a s k e d a n y o n e he c o u l d testified prepare to b u t was u n s u c c e s s f u l . communicate Gamble's n e i g h b o r h o o d . time phase tests Facility. mitigating Lyon evidence M o r g a n ' s f e e d e c l a r a t i o n s h o w e d t h a t h e s p e n t o n l y 2.7 h o u r s t a l k i n g w i t h Gamble a b o u t p o s s i b l e m i t i g a t i n g e v i d e n c e to present a t the p e n a l t y phase. 4 A motion f o r a m i t i g a t i o n abandoned by t r i a l counsel. 5 27 expert was filed but was CR-06-2274 c o u l d be p r e s e n t e d i t h a d t o f i t w i t h i n one o f t h e s t a t u t o r i l y defined mitigating Judge Gamble's circumstances. Michael Joiner, p e n a l t y phase t h e same j u d g e at t r i a l , found present the omitted m i t i g a t i n g evidence to Gamble. found one committed robbery. that who that while circumstance Gamble was engaged the failure -- the c i r c u i t that had no significant i n the commission history activity a n d t h a t he was 18^ years offense. As n o n s t a t u t o r y m i t i g a t i n g to court t h e murder As m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e c i r c u i t Gamble over resulted i nprejudice When s e n t e n c i n g G a m b l e t o d e a t h , aggravating presided court or prior was of a found criminal o l d a t the time of the circumstances, the court found: " ( 1 ) G a m b l e ' s a g e a n d m a t u r i t y ; (2) t h e i n v o l v e m e n t of d r u g s i n Gamble's l i f e a n d t h e e f f e c t t h e d r u g s may h a v e h a d i n d i m i n i s h i n g G a m b l e ' s c a p a c i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d a p p r e c i a t e h i s a c t i o n s ; (3) t h e f a c t t h a t G a m b l e was n o t t h e t r i g g e r m a n i n t h e o f f e n s e ; (4) the r e l a t i v e c u l p a b i l i t y of the codefendant, who was t h e t r i g g e r m a n ; a n d (5) G a m b l e ' s c o o p e r a t i o n in p r o v i d i n g complete statements w i t h r e g a r d t o the f a c t and c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s case and o t h e r cases he h a d k n o w l e d g e o f . " Gamble, 791 So. 2d at B e c a u s e t h e same j u d g e that the f a i l u r e 450 ( o p i n i o n on return t o remand). who p r e s i d e d o v e r G a m b l e ' s t r i a l to present the mitigating 28 evidence found resulted CR-06-2274 in prejudice weight. 1988) to See Gamble, F r a n c i s v. we S t a t e , 529 ("Postconviction exercises entitled to to This upbringing, App. that they 670, motions a and in to So. which the that evidence present was State, counsel's hearing an with phase clearly 987 any assistance capital-murder of counsel Gamble's 2d 1186 t r i a l because counsel 29 (Ala. Crim. so mitigation although court; at in strategic showed t h a t circuit 2008), or see informed So. -- mitigating presented, i n v e s t i g a t i o n was discover the is concerning evidence W a l d r o p v. penalty finding omitted made to 9 (Fla. abstract this and the agree effective not investigated to n. weight."). there of e v i d e n c e t h a t c o u l d have been p r e s e n t e d We 673 are vacuum, considerable ( A l a . C r i m . App. failed evidentiary 2d 418 Here, at So. finding 3d see 2007). in case S t a t e , 13 not present a cumulative counsel decision conducted not was F e r g u s o n v. relief considerable is evidence which be afford this the inadequate evidence the was Rule a to 32 plethora on G a m b l e ' s b e h a l f . G a m b l e was penalty denied phase of the his f a i l e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e and CR-06-2274 present The mitigating evidence. circuit court correctly See 6 S t r i c k l a n d v. granted relief on Washington. this claim. court erred II. The State granting next argues that capricious, i m p o s e d on h i s more c u l p a b l e Marcus P r e s l e y . was of parole based 540 on U.S. life the 1160 d e a t h f o r a d e f e n d a n t who he or she The relief committed circuit on this and Presley's sentenced to Simmons, Rule 32 in G a m b l e r e l i e f on h i s c l a i m t h a t h i s d e a t h s e n t e n c e i s arbitrary, he the disproportionate codefendant and to the s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h was (2004), was which decision barred penalty triggerman, vacated, imprisonment w i t h o u t the Supreme C o u r t ' s the a s i x t e e n y e a r s o f age and possibility i n Roper v. sentence of at the time murder. court stated the following when granting claim: "Gamble a s s e r t s t h a t b e c a u s e h i s c l e a r l y more culpable co-defendant, Marcus Presley, cannot r e c e i v e a d e a t h s e n t e n c e , Gamble's d e a t h s e n t e n c e i s B e c a u s e we have a f f i r m e d the circuit court's order granting relief on Gamble's claim that his counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e at the p e n a l t y phase f o r f a i l i n g to i n v e s t i g a t e and p r e s e n t m i t i g a t i o n e v i d e n c e , i t i s u n n e c e s s a r y t o r e v i e w Gamble's c l a i m i n h i s c r o s s - a p p e a l that his counsel erred i n f a i l i n g to o b j e c t to the c i r c u i t court's i n s t r u c t i o n s i n the p e n a l t y phase. 6 30 CR-06-2274 rendered a r b i t r a r y , capricious, and disproportionate. P e t i t i o n e r claims that t o execute h i m , when he d i d n o t k i l l e i t h e r o f t h e two v i c t i m s in this case w h i l e t h e u n d i s p u t e d triggerman i s spared, c o n s t i t u t e s ' c r u e l and unusual punishment' and v i o l a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandates o f f u n d a m e n t a l fairness. On J u n e 6, 2 0 0 6 , t h i s Court granted G a m b l e ' s r e q u e s t t o amend h i s R u l e 32 Petition. Subsequently t h i s c o u r t r e c e i v e d evidence and heard testimony concerning this claim, including the t e s t i m o n y o f D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y R o b e r t O w e n s , who p e r s o n a l l y p r o s e c u t e d b o t h P r e s l e y and Gamble, and who c o n t i n u e s t o s e r v e as t h e e l e c t e d District A t t o r n e y o f Shelby County, Alabama. "For t h e purposes of this claim, Gamble i s c h a l l e n g i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of h i s sentence i n t h e p r e s e n t d a y , p o s t - f R o p e r v . ] S i m m o n s f , 540 U.S. 1160 (2004)]. Specifically, as p l e d , i t i s t h e re-sentencing of P r e s l e y t o a non-death sentence that makes Gamble's sentence of death constitutionally unfair. Buttressing Petitioner's claim of fundamental u n f a i r n e s s i s the testimony of District Attorney Robert Owens a t the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing. "Mr. Owens w a s c a l l e d t o t h e w i t n e s s s t a n d b y c o u n s e l f o r P e t i t i o n e r Gamble. Since h i s e l e c t i o n in 1 9 9 3 , M r . Owens has c o n t i n u o u s l y h e l d t h e p o s i t i o n of D i s t r i c t Attorney f o r Shelby County, A l a b a m a . A s D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y f o r S h e l b y C o u n t y , he has p e r s o n a l l y t r i e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y t e n c a p i t a l c a s e s to conclusion. The u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n t o s e e k t h e death penalty rests w i t h him. I n making the d e c i s i o n t o s e e k t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i n a n y one c a s e , M r . Owens t e s t i f i e d t h a t he c o n s i d e r s t h e f a c t s o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r case, as w e l l as i s s u e s o f f a i r n e s s and e q u i t y . 31 CR-06-2274 "Mr. Owens made p l a i n t h a t h a d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n R o p e r v. Simmons n o t rendered Presley's sentence of death unconstitutional, he w o u l d n o t be testifying on behalf of Petitioner. I t was, however, this D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ' s c o n t i n u e d commitment t o i s s u e s of f a i r n e s s and e q u i t y t h a t c o m p e l l e d h i s c u r r e n t testimony before this Court. "The C o u r t f i n d s i t i n s t r u c t i v e t h a t M r . Owens, i n h i s t e s t i m o n y , m e n t i o n e d a t l e a s t two s e p a r a t e f a c t o r s that i n f l u e n c e d h i s e v a l u a t i o n of f a i r n e s s and e q u i t y i n t h i s c a s e . Mr. Owens e m p h a s i z e d not only the backgrounds of these i n d i v i d u a l s , but the d i f f e r i n g conduct at the occurrence of the event. The Court concurs that there is a substantial difference in both the background of these individuals and in the conduct of these two i n d i v i d u a l s at the occurrence of the event. " A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by P e t i t i o n e r , t h i s C o u r t c o n c u r s w i t h the o p i n i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y -- t h a t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , i t w o u l d be f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n f a i r t o c o n t i n u e t o seek t h e d e a t h o f Gamble w h i l e P r e s l e y ' s s e n t e n c e h a s now b e e n c o m m u t e d t o l i f e w i t h o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of parole. " I t i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and d u t y of each c o u r t t h a t s i t s i n judgment of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of Gamble's s e n t e n c e t o ensure t h a t the i m p o s i t i o n of the death p e n a l t y comports w i t h the requirements of fundamental fairness while avoiding arbitrariness. Proportionality in sentencing between co-defendants is a major, independent e l e m e n t u n d e r t h e E i g h t h Amendment i n a s s e s s i n g a death sentence. See E n m u n d v . F l o r i d a , 458 U.S. 7 8 2 , 788 (1982) . In determining whether a death sentence is p r o p o r t i o n a t e , and therefore, not arbitrary, the Supreme Court directs reviewing 32 CR-06-2274 courts to not only evaluate the defendant's c u l p a b i l i t y individually, but also relative to h i s co-defendants a n d a c c o m p l i c e s i n t h e same case. E n m u n d v . F l o r i d a , 458 U.S. 7 8 2 , 7 8 8 , 798 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . I n Enmund, s u p r a , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c o n f r o n t e d t h e s c e n a r i o w h e r e c o - d e f e n d a n t s , who h a d 'plainly different' levels of c u l p a b i l i t y f o r the k i l l i n g s , a l l r e c e i v e d t h e same s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h . The Court found that, among co-defendants, s e n t e n c i n g a l i k e t h o s e who h a d d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s o f responsibility ran afoul of the Eighth and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments. Enmund, s u p r a . 458 U.S. a t 798. Gamble's c a s e p r e s e n t s an e v e n more e g r e g i o u s situation, where the defendant with the unquestionably greater culpability received the lesser sentence. S e e , e . g . , P e o p l e v . K l i n e r , 705 N . E . 2 d 8 5 0 , 897 ( I l l . 1 9 9 8 ) ( ' [ S ] i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d codefendants s h o u l d n o t be g i v e n a r b i t r a r i l y o r u n r e a s o n a b l y d i s p a r a t e s e n t e n c e s . ' ) ; L a r z e l e r e v. S t a t e , 676 S o . 2 d 3 9 4 , 4 0 6 ( F l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ('When a codefendant ... i s e q u a l l y as c u l p a b l e o r more culpable than the defendant, disparate treatment of the codefendant may render the defendant's punishment d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e . ' ) . Whether t h e i s s u e i s that of ' p l a i n l y d i f f e r e n t ' defendants receiving the same sentence of death, or that of similarly-culpable defendants receiving different s e n t e n c e s , t h e i n q u i r y r e m a i n s t h e same: w h e t h e r t h e sentences are a r b i t r a r i l y or unreasonably disparate. " "In numerous c a s e s , Alabama a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have adjudicated the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of death sentences by comparing t h e sentences r e c e i v e d by co-defendants. S e e e . g . , E x P a r t e H e n d e r s o n , 616 S o . 2 d 348 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ( r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f d e a t h sentence i n l i g h t o f f a c t t h a t sentence imposed i n companion case was remitted from death by electrocution to l i f e i n prison without benefit of p a r o l e ) ; E x p a r t e B u r g e s s , 8 1 1 S o . 2 d 617 ( A l a . 2000) ( r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f d e a t h s e n t e n c e where f i v e 33 CR-06-2274 of s i x co-equal p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a crime received immunity from p r o s e c u t i o n , and s i x t h r e c e i v e d death s e n t e n c e ) ; E x p a r t e M c W h o r t e r , 781 S o . 2 d 330 ( A l a . 2000) ( a f f i r m i n g s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h f o r d e f e n d a n t a n d lesser sentences for accomplices because of d e f e n d a n t ' s p i v o t a l r o l e as ' t r i g g e r m a n ' i n c r i m e ) ; G a v i n v . S t a t e , 8 9 1 S o . 2 d 907 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2003) ( a f f i r m i n g d e a t h s e n t e n c e o f t r i g g e r m a n when a c c o m p l i c e s w e r e n o t s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h ) ; Hamm v . S t a t e , 564 S o . 2 d 453 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 9 ) ('The evidence i n the instant case established that a p p e l l a n t was t h e " t r i g g e r m a n , " a n d t h i s p o i n t a l o n e is sufficient to justify the d i s p a r i t y i n the s e n t e n c e s . ' ) ; W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e , 461 S o . 2 d 834 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1 9 8 3 ) , r e v ' d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , Ex p a r t e W i l l i a m s , 461 S o . 2 d 852 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) ('The f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was t h e a c t u a l p e r p e t r a t o r o f t h e c r i m e , t h e t r i g g e r m a n , i s an i m p o r t a n t and very significant factor to weigh i n determining whether the defendant's sentence to death i s excessive or d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o the p e n a l t y imposed " "This Court finds that a l t h o u g h Gamble and Presley share c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y , Presley bears the g r e a t e r c u l p a b i l i t y f o r t h e t r a g i c murders o f John Burleson and J a n i c e Littleton. Faced w i t h the ' b i z a r r e ' r e s u l t t h a t t h e m o r e c u l p a b l e P r e s l e y no longer faces execution, while the lesser culpable Gamble r e m a i n s on d e a t h row, t h i s C o u r t f i n d s s u c h a result t o be a r b i t r a r y , disproportionate, and fundamentally unfair. This Court concludes that s u c h i n e q u i t y must be r e m e d i e d , and accordingly o r d e r s t h a t Gamble's s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h be v a c a t e d . A s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g s h a l l be s c h e d u l e d a f t e r t h i s o r d e r becomes f i n a l a n d a t t h a t t i m e Gamble s h a l l be resentenced t o a sentence other than death i n accordance with the dictates o f t h e E i g h t h and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." 34 CR-06-2274 (C.R. 1638-49.) The that State argues Gamble's that death disproportionate was parole. I t asserts longstanding convicted So. that that States Getsy's disproportionate t o support death given that relies Farina with defendant on Getsy v. S t a t e , v. 937 603 S o . 2 d 368 i t s argument. f o rthe Sixth ( 6 t hC i r . 2007), sentence was Circuit reviewed arbitrary and t h a t h i s c o d e f e n d a n t , who w a s s e n t e n c e d b y a d i f f e r e n t j u r y , was s e n t e n c e d t o l i f e court a of t o an i n d i v i d u a l i z e d v. S t a t e , Court of Appeals 495 F . 3 d 295 death finding conflicts State a n d Haney rendered the p o s s i b i l i t y provides The i n finding codefendant's without ( 6 t hC i r . 2007); ( F l a . 2006); G e t s y v. M i t c h e l l , whether year-old life erred automatically murder i s e n t i t l e d 495 F . 3 d 295 United was court the court's precedent Crim. App. 1991), The in to determination. 2 d 612 (Ala. h i s 16 reduced of capital sentencing Mitchell, sentence when sentence the c i r c u i t imprisonment. stated: " E i g h t h Amendment p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y , a s d e f i n e d b y t h e Supreme C o u r t , r e f e r s ' t o an a b s t r a c t e v a l u a t i o n of the appropriateness of a sentence for a p a r t i c u l a r c r i m e . ' P u l l e y v . H a r r i s , 4 6 5 U.S. 3 7 , 4 2 - 4 3 , 104 S . C t . 8 7 1 , 79 L . E d . 2 d 29 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ( h o l d i n g that the p e t i t i o n e r was not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 35 The CR-06-2274 entitled to a p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y review that would 'compare Harris's sentence with the sentences imposed i n s i m i l a r c a p i t a l c a s e s ' ) . Proportionality as defined by the Supreme Court evaluates a p a r t i c u l a r defendant's c u l p a b i l i t y f o r h i s crime i n r e l a t i o n t o the punishment t h a t he h a s received. S e e , e . g . , A t k i n s v . V i r g i n i a , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S . C t . 2 2 4 2 , 153 L . E d . 2 d 335 (2002) (reversing the death sentence of a mentally retarded defendant); E n m u n d v . F l o r i d a , 458 U.S. 7 8 2 , 102 S . C t . 3 3 6 8 , 73 L . E d . 2 d 1140 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ( r e v e r s i n g t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e o f a d e f e n d a n t who d i d n o t h i m s e l f t a k e l i f e , attempt to take l i f e , or i n t e n d to take l i f e ) ; Coker v. G e o r g i a , 433 U.S. 5 8 4 , 97 S . C t . 2 8 6 1 , 53 L . E d . 2 d 982 (1977) ( r e v e r s i n g t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e o f a d e f e n d a n t for t h e r a p e o f a n a d u l t woman t h a t d i d n o t r e s u l t in her death). I n e a c h o f t h e s e c a s e s , t h e Supreme C o u r t s t r u c k down a d e a t h s e n t e n c e n o t b e c a u s e i t was disproportionate i n comparison to sentences r e c e i v e d by o t h e r , s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d d e f e n d a n t s , but because o f w h a t t h e C o u r t d e e m e d t o be the inappropriateness of the sentence i n r e l a t i o n to the particular characteristics o f t h e c r i m e and the criminal at issue. T h e s e c a s e s a r e o f no h e l p t o Getsy, a competent adult who personally and i n t e n t i o n a l l y committed a g g r a v a t e d murder. "Unlike this absolute or individualized proportionality, Getsy's p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y argument rests on a claim that h i s death sentence is d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e o n l y by c o m p a r i s o n to Santine's [his codefendant's] l i f e sentence. In P u l l e y , the Supreme Court considered the precise argument a s s e r t e d b y G e t s y -- t h a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n d e m a n d s a comparative p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y review that 'purports to inquire ... whether the penalty is ... u n a c c e p t a b l e i n a p a r t i c u l a r case because [ i tis] d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e p u n i s h m e n t i m p o s e d on o t h e r s c o n v i c t e d o f t h e same c r i m e . ' P u l l e y , 465 U.S. at 44, 104 S . C t . 8 7 1 . The C o u r t s q u a r e l y r e j e c t e d t h i s a r g u m e n t as c o n t r a r y t o i t s h o l d i n g s i n J u r e k v. T e x a s , 428 U.S. 2 6 2 , 96 S . C t . 2 9 5 0 , 49 L . E d . 2 d 929 36 CR-06-2274 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , G r e g g v . G e o r g i a , 428 U.S. 1 5 3 , 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), and Proffitt v. F l o r i d a , 428 U.S. 2 4 2 , 96 S . C t . 2 9 6 0 , 49 L . E d . 2 d 913 (1976). P u l l e y , 465 U.S. a t 5 0 - 5 1 , 104 S . C t . 871. Three years l a t e r , the Court r e a f f i r m e d Pulley's h o l d i n g i n M c C l e s k e y v . Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S . C t . 1 7 5 6 , 95 L . E d . 2 d 262 (1987). In t h a t case, the Court e x p r e s s l y h e l d that a defendant could not 'prove a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s who may b e s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d did not r e c e i v e the death p e n a l t y . ' McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306-07, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (emphasis in original)." 495 F.3d The 612 at 305-06. Florida ( F l a . 2006), reduction of Supreme C o u r t i n F a r i n a v. addressed the v a l i d i t y Farina's sentence c o d e f e n d a n t , who based State, 937 of the t r i a l the fact 2d court's that his h a d b e e n s e n t e n c e d two y e a r s a f t e r F a r i n a was s e n t e n c e d , had been s e n t e n c e d t o l i f e on So. imprisonment. The court stated: "Although Jeffrey's life sentence would normally c o n s t i t u t e newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e under S c o t t [v. D u g g e r , 604 S o . 2 d 465 ( F l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ] , we r e d u c e d h i s s e n t e n c e b e c a u s e he was n o t e l i g i b l e a s a m a t t e r o f law t o r e c e i v e the death p e n a l t y . See F a r i n a [ v . S t a t e ] , 801 S o . 2 d [ 4 4 , ] 56 [ ( F l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ] (citing Brennan [ v . S t a t e ] , 754 So. 2d [ 1 , ] 5-6 [(Fla. 1999)]). T h u s , a s we s t a t e d i n A n t h o n y ' s direct appeal, J e f f r e y ' s l i f e sentence ' i s i r r e l e v a n t to Anthony's proportionality review because the a g g r a v a t i o n and m i t i g a t i o n i n t h e i r c a s e s a r e p e r se incomparable.' Id. J e f f r e y ' s l i f e sentence would not 'probably result in a life sentence for 37 CR-06-2274 [Anthony] on r e t r i a l . ' See V e n t u r a So. 2 d [ 5 5 3 , ] 5 7 1 [ ( F l a . 2001)]." 937 So. 2d a t 618. 1023 ( I n d . 2003) vacated the See W i l l i a m s ("That entitled Rouster's t o and has Sentences, 39 death received See Geo.L.J. ("A s e n t e n c e an also Ann. 793 N . E . 2 d 1 0 1 9 , sentence received. individualized Annot., Rev. Appellate Crim. Proc. i s not disproportionate App. C o u r t i n Haney v. S t a t e , 1991), has been Williams i s sentencing Review 906 n. of 2710 603 S o . 2 d 368 sentence."). (Ala. Crim. stated: " I n E n m u n d v . F l o r i d a , 458 U.S. 7 8 2 , 7 9 7 , 102 S . C t . 3 3 6 8 , 3 3 7 7 , 73 L . E d . 2 d 1 1 4 0 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r one who 'does n o t h i m s e l f kill, attempt t o k i l l , or intend that a k i l l i n g take place or that lethal f o r c e w i l l be e m p l o y e d . ' I n T i s o n v . A r i z o n a , 481 U.S. 1 3 7 , 107 S . C t . 1 6 7 6 , 95 L . E d . 2 d 127 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , t h e Court held that i t was not c r u e l and unusual punishment t o impose the death penalty upon a d e f e n d a n t who p l a y e d a significant role i n the f e l o n y t h a t r e s u l t e d i n m u r d e r a n d who a c t e d with r e c k l e s s i n d i f f e r e n c e t o human l i f e . The r u l e t h a t has e v o l v e d f r o m Enmund a n d T i s o n i s t h a t t h e d e a t h sentence i s disproportionate under the Eighth A m e n d m e n t f o r t h e n o n - t r i g g e r m a n who was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e scene and d i d n o t i n t e n d t h a t anyone be k i l l e d ; however, i t i s p e r m i s s i b l e under t h e E i g h t h 38 on under the E i g h t h Amendment j u s t b e c a u s e i t e x c e e d s a c o d e f e n d a n t ' s This 794 r e t a r d e d h a s no b e a r i n g of the sentence Williams determination."). (2010) v. S t a t e , because Rouster i s mentally lawfulness [v. S t a t e ] , CR-06-2274 A m e n d m e n t f o r f e l o n y m u r d e r e r s who a c t u a l l y k i l l e d , attempted t o k i l l , or intended that a k i l l i n g take p l a c e o r t h a t l e t h a l f o r c e be u s e d . I n White v. W a i n w r i g h t , 809 F . 2 d 1 4 7 8 , 1484 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) , i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y may b e i m p o s e d f o r c o n v i c t i o n o f a j o i n t r o b b e r y u n d e r t a k i n g where t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e m p l a t e d t h a t l e t h a l f o r c e w o u l d be u s e d , e v e n t h o u g h he c l a i m s p e r s o n a l o p p o s i t i o n t o the use of l e t h a l f o r c e , t h e court s t a t e d : " ' I n R o s s v . Kemp, 7 5 6 F . 2 d 1 4 8 3 ( 1 1 t h Cir. 1 9 8 5 ) ( e n b a n c ) we c o n s i d e r e d the possibility that appellant was a n o n - s h o o t e r a n d t h a t t h e f a t a l s h o t was f i r e d by h i s accomplice. We d e c l i n e d t o r e a d Enmund i n a m e c h a n i s t i c fashion but m e r e l y "as r e q u i r i n g a l e v e l o f i n d i v i d u a l participation that justifies the a p p l i c a t i o n of the death penalty," i d . a t 1489, a n d we c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e p r i m a r y purposes of c a p i t a l punishment, deterrence and retribution, legitimately could be a p p l i e d t o the f a c t s of the case. I d . We f o u n d , i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f Enmund, t h a t t h e defendant's " i n t e n t i o n s , e x p e c t a t i o n s and a c t i o n s " rose t o a l e v e l of c u l p a b i l i t y that the r e t r i b u t i v e purposes of c a p i t a l punishment would be furthered by defendant's sentence. Id. And, i n r e a c h i n g t h e s e h o l d i n g s , we c o n s i d e r e d n o t only the contemplation of lethal force but also the active participation by the defendant i n the a c t i v i t i e s that culminated i n the v i c t i m ' s death. I d . ' " 603 So. 2d a t 386-87. Alabama recognizes a right not that capital-murder t o an i n d i v i d u a l i z e d s e n t e n c i n g have to be sentenced to 39 the codefendants determination same punishment. have a n d do "To CR-06-2274 determine in a 'broad allow [Ms. t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s e n t e n c e , t h e s e n t e n c e r must engage an inquiry into individualized 1 0 1 0 2 6 7 , M a r c h 14, quoting a l l relevant Buchanan the Alabama So. 2d 330 v. Supreme mitigating determination.'" 2003] So. Angelone, Court 522 stated 3d U.S. Ex parte , 269, i n Ex evidence to Smith, ( A l a . 2003), 276 (1998). As p a r t e McWhorter, 781 ( A l a . 2000): "The law does not r e q u i r e t h a t each person involved i n a crime receive t h e same sentence. W r i g h t v . S t a t e , 494 S o . 2 d 7 2 6 , 739 (Ala. Crim. A p p . 1985) ( q u o t i n g W i l l i a m s v . I l l i n o i s , 399 U.S. 2 3 5 , 2 4 3 , 90 S . C t . 2 0 1 8 , 26 L . E d . 2 d 586 (1970)). A p p e l l a t e c o u r t s s h o u l d 'examine t h e p e n a l t y imposed upon t h e d e f e n d a n t i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t imposed upon h i s a c c o m p l i c e s , i f a n y . ' B e c k v . S t a t e , 396 S o . 2 d 645, 664 ( A l a . 1980) . However, the sentences r e c e i v e d by c o d e f e n d a n t s are not c o n t r o l l i n g p e r se, Hamm v . S t a t e , 564 S o . 2 d 4 5 3 , 464 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1989), and t h i s C o u r t has n o t r e q u i r e d o r d i r e c t e d that every person i m p l i c a t e d i n a crime receive the same p u n i s h m e n t . W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e , 461 S o . 2 d 8 3 4 , 849 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) , r e v ' d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , 461 So.2d 852 ( A l a . 1984). '"There i s not a simplistic rule that a co-defendant may not be sentenced to death when another co-defendant receives a lesser sentence."' I d . (quoting Collins v . S t a t e , 243 Ga. 2 9 1 , 253 S . E . 2 d 729 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ) . " 781 So. 2d sentenced a t 344. to proportionality the The issue same r e v i e w was whether codefendants punishment addressed 40 based by on should be Alabama's the Alabama Supreme CR-06-2274 Court i n Ex parte Court Thomas, 460 So. 2d 216 ( A l a . 1984) . The stated: "The s e n t e n c e s r e c e i v e d by c o - d e f e n d a n t s must be considered by this court in determining the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f a d e a t h s e n t e n c e on a p p e a l , B e c k v . S t a t e , 396 S o . 2 d [ 6 4 5 ] 664 [(Ala. 1980)], but they are not controlling per se. (Appellant's contention that the trial court should have expressly considered the sentences received by a p p e l l a n t ' s c o - d e f e n d a n t s i s a n s w e r e d i n C o u l t e r v. S t a t e , 438 S o . 2 d 336 ( A l a . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 2 ) , aff'd, 438 So. 2 d 352 ( A l a . 1983) . In that case, we a f f i r m e d the Court of C r i m i n a l Appeals h o l d i n g the disproportionality question involving consideration of co-defendant sentences is something to be a d d r e s s e d by the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s i n s t e a d of a t the trial level. A c c o r d , M i l l e r v . F l o r i d a , 459 U.S. 1158, 103 S.Ct. 802, 74 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).[ ] Were t h e y [ s i c ] , t h e r e w o u l d b e no 7 In M i l l e r v. F l o r i d a , 459 U.S. 1158 M a r s h a l l s t a t e d t h e ffoolllloowwiinngg i n h i s d i s s e n t l of c e r t i o r a r i review: 7 (1983), Justice from the d e n i a l "An appellate court, i n the performance of the viewing function which this Court has held indispensable to a constitutionally acceptable capital punishment scheme, must examine the sentences imposed in a l l capital cases in the jurisdiction i n order 'to ensure that similar r e s u l t s are reached i n s i m i l a r cases.' P r o f f i t v. F l o r i d a , 428 U.S. 242 (1976) ( o p i n i o n o f S t e w a r t , P o w e l l a n d S t e v e n s , J J . ) . See a l s o , e . g . , Godfrey v . G e o r g i a , 446 U.S. 420 (1980) ( p l u r a l i t y ) . The s e n t e n c e r has a d i f f e r e n t role. The sentencer's duty i s to determine the f i r s t i n s t a n c e whether a death sentence i s warranted for a particular defendant. T h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n c a n o n l y b e made on 41 CR-06-2274 n e e d f o r u s t o make t h e o t h e r i n q u i r i e s in Beck." So. 2d a t 226-27. 460 we 438 S o . 2 d 3 3 6 (Ala. of In Coulter Crim. App. 1982), the t r i a l , v. S t a t e , we s t a t e d : the fact that mandated " I n t h e s e n t e n c i n g phase an a l l e g e d accomplice d i dnot receive t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i s no more r e l e v a n t as a m i t i g a t i n g factor f o r the defendant accomplice d i d receive aggravating See Ex Coulter, sentence 909 So. So. at 345: cannot 2d properly fact that penalty against him." Tomlin, 438 the the death circumstance parte than 2d 283 would be alleged as an 438 S o . 2 d a t 3 4 5 . ( A l a . 2003), "[Tomlin's be u s e d an t o undermine citing codefendant's] a mitigating circumstance." C o m p a r e E x p a r t e B u r g e s s , 8 1 1 S o . 2 d 617 ( A l a . 2000) Court that (Supreme Burgess was directed the only one trial court to consider of s i x participants i n the m u r d e r who w a s p r o s e c u t e d f o r t h e o f f e n s e ) . the b a s i s o f t h e evidence t h a t t h e judge has heard with respect t o that defendant, and, under t h e F l o r i d a p r o c e d u r e , o n t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n made b y t h e jury that heard that evidence. A c a p i t a l sentencing d e t e r m i n a t i o n c a n n o t p r o p e r l y b e made o n t h e b a s i s of evidence presented i n another trial or a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n made b y a n o t h e r j u r y . " 459 U.S. a t 1 1 6 1 . 42 fact CR-06-2274 First, we question proportionality of whether Gamble's the sentence issue to of the of his that c o d e f e n d a n t ' s was p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e R u l e 32 c o u r t g i v e n t h a t the S u p r e m e C o u r t i n Thomas h e l d t h a t a p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y is c o n d u c t e d b y an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t a n d n o t a t r i a l § 13A-5-53, 1975, states subject to determine: or A l a . Code that t h e Alabama review "(3) Second, murder i s both by the Court Alabama of Criminal Supreme Appeals, Court, of death the crime entitled "What See A l a . Code shall i sexcessive t o the p e n a l t y imposed i n s i m i l a r i n Alabama determination. court. 13A-5-53(b), Whether t h e sentence disproportionate considering 1975. S e c t i o n review cases, and the defendant." a defendant to an convicted individualized i s important ... i s a n of capital sentencing individualized d e t e r m i n a t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l and the circumstances of the crime." U.S. 862, 879 individualized in imposing 586, v. 605 State, (1983). consideration the death "'Because Zant of v. Stephens, "the as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sentence," need L o c k e t t v. Ohio, ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2003), 43 for requirement 438 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , t h e f o c u s must be on t h e d e f e n d a n t . ' " 8 9 1 S o . 2 d 9 0 7 , 994 4 62 U.S. Gavin quoting CR-06-2274 Wright Here, v. the penalty, was State, circuit based sentenced Court 494 stated So. court, 2d when i t s decision to in life 726, on 740 ( A l a . C r i m . App. setting aside the that fact imprisonment. As the 1985). Gamble's his death codefendant Florida Supreme Farina: "The reason [the codefendant] d i d not r e c e i v e the d e a t h p e n a l t y , h o w e v e r , h a d n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e circumstances of the crime or the presence or absence of a g g r a v a t i n g or m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r s . The b a s i s was p u r e l y l e g a l : we h a d h e l d i n B r e n n a n [ v . S t a t e ] , 754 S o . 2 d [1] a t 1 [ ( F l a . 1 9 9 9 ) ] , t h a t t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a s e n t e n c e o f d e a t h on a s i x t e e n - y e a r old defendant constitutes cruel and unusual p u n i s h m e n t , a n d J e f f r e y was s i x t e e n y e a r s o l d a t t h e time of these murders. See F a r i n a [ v . S t a t e ] , 763 S o . 2 d [ 3 0 2 ] a t 303 [ ( F l a . 1 9 9 9 ) ] (citing Brennan, 754 S o . 2 d a t 5-6) . Thus, whereas i n S c o t t [v. D u g g a r , 604 S o . 2 d 465 ( F l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ] , a j u r y a n a l y z e d the facts and, considering the aggravating and m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , recommended a s e n t e n c e o f l i f e , i n t h i s case, d e s p i t e a j u r y recommendation of a sentence of death, and the trial court's i m p o s i t i o n of such a sentence, t h i s Court concluded a s a m a t t e r o f l a w t h a t J e f f e r y was i n e l i g i b l e f o r the d e a t h p e n a l t y . See i d . U n l i k e S c o t t , J e f f r e y ' s s e n t e n c e r e d u c t i o n h a s no c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e n a t u r e or c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c r i m e o r t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s character or record. U n d e r L o c k e t t [ v . O h i o ] , [438 U.S. 586 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , ] i t i s i r r e l e v a n t a s a m i t i g a t i n g circumstance i n Anthony's case." 937 So. 2d Third, in a at 620. Gamble p r e s e n t e d t h i s motion to amend his claim petition 44 to the to circuit allege a court "newly- CR-06-2274 cognizable now constitutional disproportionate sentence claim" given that that had been v a c a t e d based h i s death his sentence codefendant's on R o p e r v. Simmons, was death supra. 8 H o w e v e r , t h e r e i s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y review i n death-penalty cases. Court stated "comparative required fact, rejected death state United the v. who may penalty.'" that a violation 'by 465 U.S. 1975, review conducted by however, t h i s at 465 U.S. i s not has provides In that the appellate ... I n specifically can demonstrating 43. (1984): review. defendant situated 37 Supreme constitutionally sentence Court capital be s i m i l a r l y A l a . Code sentence; review Supreme 53(b)(3), be Harris, court death States claim Amendment defendants Pulley proportionality i n every the Eighth in As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s prove that an other d i d not receive the Alabama, a court § 13A-5- proportionality on every death s t a t u t e does n o t a p p l y t o t h e c i r c u i t court. I n E x p a r t e P i e r c e , 851 S o . 2 d 6 0 6 , 616 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) , t h e Alabama Supreme Court recognized that, to survive the p r o c e d u r a l b a r s o f R u l e 3 2 . 2 ( a ) ( 3 ) a n d ( a ) ( 5 ) , A l a . R. C r i m . P., a p e t i t i o n e r ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m m u s t a l l e g e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was n o t k n o w n o r c o u l d n o t r e a s o n a b l y h a v e b e e n d i s c o v e r e d i n t i m e t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e a t t r i a l o r on a p p e a l . 8 45 CR-06-2274 For the reasons stated above, we hold that the circuit c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t G a m b l e ' s d e a t h s e n t e n c e was be and vacated because excessive imprisonment to 32 relief his constitutionally codefendant's without the p o s s i b i l i t y Accordingly, o p i n i o n , we i t was f o r the reasons a f f i r m the c i r c u i t i n part; f o r the court's Gamble sentenced cannot be codefendant was possibility of parole, Circuit Court sentenced and of this Rule set i n Part out death to life we remand t h i s P.J., and Windom, K e l l u m , 46 and II, as i t h o l d s because imprisonment consistent I i n Part merely case with A F F I R M E D I N PART; R E V E R S E D I N PART; AND Wise, life parole. judgment i n s o f a r f o r proceedings of judgment g r a n t i n g court's to to disproportionate sentence stated reasons reverse the c i r c u i t of due without to the this we that his the Shelby opinion. REMANDED. Main, J J . , concur.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.