Thomas Pell v. Lance Tidwell and Municipal Utilities Board of Albertville

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REL: 05/10/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter of Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2120313 Thomas P e l l v. Lance T i d w e l l and M u n i c i p a l U t i l i t i e s Board o f A l b e r t v i l l e Appeal from M a r s h a l l C i r c u i t (CV-08-200178) Court THOMPSON, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e . Thomas P e l l a p p e a l s f r o m t h e summary j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f Lance T i d w e l l and t h e M u n i c i p a l U t i l i t i e s A l b e r t v i l l e ("the b o a r d " ) . Tidwell, t h e board, Pell filed a civil a n d Donna R u c k s alleging Board of action against negligence i n 2120313 connection vehicle with a motor-vehicle collided passenger. with the accident vehicle in accident then proceeded occurred across case are not e v i d e n c e as for Rucks's Pell was set f o r t h i n the In his job with a lift was and, i n f a c t , he T i d w e l l and had the clear. facts adopts b r i e f i n support of the by a that i n t e r s e c t i o n where the motion the board. That following: t h e b o a r d , T i d w e l l d r o v e and bucket. l i c e n s e to operate the t h a t he had the i n dispute, e v i d e n c e t e n d s t o show t h e with c o u l d p r o c e e d and P e l l acknowledges t h a t the a summary j u d g m e n t f i l e d truck which w i t h o u t v e r i f y i n g t h a t t h e way In his appellate b r i e f , in this which P e l l a s s e r t e d t h a t T i d w e l l , a b o a r d employee, n e g l i g e n t l y s i g n a l e d t o R u c k s t h a t she R u c k s had in He and truck, had he a commercial t e s t i f i e d by n e v e r b e e n i n v o l v e d i n any operated previous a driver's deposition motor-vehicle accidents. On December northbound on Highway 431 i s a d i v i d e d f o u r - l a n e highway w i t h a g r a s s median between the deposition, 4, 2006, Highway 431 northbound Tidwell Tidwell in and was Albertville. southbound testified that 2 driving he In lanes. his truck that area, In p u l l e d i n t o the his left- 2120313 t u r n l a n e i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f m a k i n g a l e f t t u r n o n t o Buchanan Road. He s t a t e d t h a t he saw a T o y o t a a u t o m o b i l e i n t h e p a v e d p o r t i o n o f the median. T i d w e l l s a i d t h a t the Toyota t o be p o i n t i n g s l i g h t l y t o t h e n o r t h , though the d r i v e r intended and i t l o o k e d appeared t o h i m as t o p u l l o n t o Highway 431 t o t r a v e l north. Tidwell said that, i n entering the l e f t - t u r n lane, he p u l l e d t h e t r u c k so f a r t o t h e l e f t t h a t p a r t o f t h e t r u c k was off t h e pavement. B e c a u s e o f t h e way t h e T o y o t a was s i t u a t e d i n t h e m e d i a n , T i d w e l l s a i d , t h e r e was n o t enough room f o r h i m t o t u r n i n t o t h e m e d i a n t o b e g i n h i s t u r n o n t o Buchanan Road. He s a i d t h a t he saw t h e d r i v e r o f t h e T o y o t a r a i s e b o t h hands i n the a i r . the left B e c a u s e t h e T o y o t a was p r e v e n t i n g turn, the Toyota. Tidwell elected to y i e l d He s a i d t h a t he l o o k e d him from making the right-of-way to i n t h e s i d e m i r r o r on t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e o f t h e t r u c k t o make s u r e t h a t t h e l e f t h a n d , o r inside, northbound lane was clear. l a n e was c l e a r as f a r as he c o u l d at the i n s i d e northbound lane. He said that, s e e , he p o i n t e d when t h e his finger T i d w e l l s a i d t h a t , by making t h a t h a n d s i g n a l , he meant t h a t t h e i n s i d e l a n e was c l e a r so that the Toyota could t u r n i n t o t h a t lane 3 and t r a v e l n o r t h . 2120313 Rucks, t h e d r i v e r o f t h e Toyota, t e s t i f i e d by d e p o s i t i o n t h a t she saw T i d w e l l a p p r o a c h i n t h e t r u c k a n d r e c o g n i z e d he h a d t h e r i g h t - o f - w a y that t o make a l e f t t u r n . She s a i d t h a t she saw T i d w e l l s i g n a l a n d r e l i e d on h i s s i g n a l t o mean t h a t she could "go." She waved an acknowledgment to Tidwell and s t a r t e d a c r o s s t h e n o r t h b o u n d l a n e s ; she d i d n o t t u r n i n t o t h e inside northbound lane as Tidwell had expected. Rucks t e s t i f i e d t h a t she d i d n o t p a u s e t o e n s u r e t h a t a l l t h e l a n e s were c l e a r b e f o r e Highway 4 3 1 . she p r o c e e d e d a c r o s s t h e n o r t h b o u n d l a n e s o f As R u c k s crossed into the outside northbound l a n e , n o t t h e lane T i d w e l l had motioned f o r h e r t o e n t e r , h e r car collided with the c a r i n which Pell was a passenger. P e l l ' s l e g was b r o k e n i n t h e a c c i d e n t . After considering the evidence and the a r g u m e n t s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a summary judgment o f T i d w e l l a n d t h e b o a r d on A u g u s t against 2012, Rucks remained pending, however. the t r i a l remaining 20, 2010. claims court entered a g a i n s t Rucks a 1 final i n favor Pell's judgment dismissing a f t e r she a n d P e l l the entered a P e l l then appealed The A u g u s t 20, 2010, judgment was n o t c e r t i f i e d judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. 4 claims On November 29, 1 pro tanto j o i n t s t i p u l a t i o n o f d i s m i s s a l . parties' as a 2120313 t h e j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f T i d w e l l and t h e b o a r d t o t h e A l a b a m a Supreme Court, which transferred the p u r s u a n t t o § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code We appeal to this court 1975. r e v i e w a summary j u d g m e n t p u r s u a n t to the following standard: " T h i s C o u r t ' s r e v i e w o f a summary j u d g m e n t i s de novo. W i l l i a m s v. S t a t e Farm Mut. A u t o . I n s . Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74 ( A l a . 2003) . We a p p l y t h e same s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w as t h e t r i a l court applied. S p e c i f i c a l l y , we must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e movant has made a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s and t h a t t h e movant i s e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . Rule 5 6 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P.; B l u e C r o s s & B l u e S h i e l d o f A l a b a m a v. H o d u r s k i , 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 ( A l a . 2004). I n m a k i n g s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , we must r e v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e nonmovant. W i l s o n v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 ( A l a . 1986) . Once t h e movant makes a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e b u r d e n t h e n s h i f t s t o t h e nonmovant t o p r o d u c e ' s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ' as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . B a s s v. S o u t h T r u s t Bank o f B a l d w i n C o u n t y , 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ; A l a . Code 1975, § 12-21-12." Dow v. (Ala. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 2d 1035, 1038-39 2004). As m e n t i o n e d , t h e p a r t i e s do n o t d i s p u t e t h e e v e n t s l e d t o the c o l l i s i o n between Rucks's in So. which whether, Pell was a passenger. The as a m a t t e r o f l a w , T i d w e l l 5 v e h i c l e and t h e issue in this that vehicle case i s can be h e l d l i a b l e for 2120313 negligently signaling b o a r d argue t h a t T i d w e l l h a d no l e g a l when T i d w e l l m o t i o n e d Tidwell's Rucks to proceed. Tidwell 2 and t h e d u t y t o Rucks o r P e l l f o r Rucks t o p r o c e e d . They a s s e r t that " a c t o f c o u r t e s y " i n m o t i o n i n g Rucks t o t h e i n s i d e l a n e d i d n o t impose a d u t y on T i d w e l l , a n d i t d i d n o t r e l i e v e R u c k s o f what t h e y s a i d was h e r a f f i r m a t i v e , n o n d e l e g a b l e d u t y t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t - o f - w a y t o t r a f f i c p r o c e e d i n g on t h e t h r o u g h s t r e e t , t h a t i s , t r a f f i c t r a v e l i n g n o r t h b o u n d on Highway 4 3 1 . Pell, Tidwell on was volunteered the other under no hand, maintains affirmative t o do s o , he was t h e n a c t i n g w i t h due c a r e . and m o t i o n e d t o R u c k s , When T i d w e l l duty that to though a c t , once charged w i t h checked even he the duty of h i s side mirror P e l l s a y s , he "assumed t h e d u t y t o a c t as a r e a s o n a b l e a n d p r u d e n t p e r s o n . " Therefore, according to I n h i s a p p e l l a t e b r i e f , P e l l makes no a r g u m e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e summary j u d g m e n t as t o t h e b o a r d . Thus, any arguments P e l l c o u l d have made a r e deemed w a i v e d . Edosomwan ex r e l . Edosomwan v. A.B.C. D a y c a r e & K i n d e r g a r t e n , I n c . , 32 So. 3d 5 9 1 , 593 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2009) ( c i t i n g T u c k e r v. C u l l m a n - J e f f e r s o n C o u n t i e s Gas D i s t . , 864 So. 2d 317, 319 ( A l a . 2003)) ( s t a t i n g t h a t i s s u e s n o t r a i s e d a n d a r g u e d i n b r i e f a r e w a i v e d a n d a f f i r m i n g a summary j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t r e l a t e d t o c l a i m s about which t h e a p p e l l a n t had f a i l e d t o r a i s e an a r g u m e n t on a p p e a l ) . 2 6 2120313 Pell, T i d w e l l i s l i a b l e f o r any n e g l i g e n c e i n connection with and t h e b o a r d cite s i g n a l i n g t o Rucks t o p r o c e e d . In their brief on a p p e a l , Tidwell P a r k e r v. B i r m i n g h a m E l e c t r i c Co., 254 A l a . 488, 48 So. 2d 873 (1950), Rucks to support t h e i r a duty of care. argument that In Parker, T i d w e l l d i d n o t owe the p l a i n t i f f had been a p a s s e n g e r on a b u s o p e r a t i n g b e t w e e n B i r m i n g h a m a n d B e s s e m e r . A f t e r t h e p a s s e n g e r d i s e m b a r k e d , she h a d t o c r o s s a f o u r - l a n e "super highway." The p a s s e n g e r c o u l d n o t s e e a r o u n d t h e b u s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r i t was s a f e driver bus. signaled to her to cross t h e highway The p a s s e n g e r s t a r t e d a c r o s s cleared highway. other t h e highway, The p a s s e n g e r s u e d t h e b u s l i n e , things, that t h e bus driver plaintiff could a n d , as she passenger's safe crossing. down t h e claiming, h a d been among negligent t h e bus than the passenger f o r the Specifically, o u r supreme stated: that " I t may be a d d e d t h a t t h e s i g n a l b y t h e o p e r a t o r p l a i n t i f f might walk i n f r o n t o f t h e bus i n 7 in Our supreme c o u r t h e l d t h a t not s u s t a i n h e r a c t i o n because company was no more r e s p o n s i b l e The b u s i n front of the t h e b u s , she was h i t b y a c a r t r a v e l i n g m o t i o n i n g h e r a c r o s s t h e highway. the f o r her to cross. court 2120313 safety does not create a danger not readily observable t o the passenger. This [negligence] c o u n t d i d n o t a l l e g e o t h e r w i s e a n d i t may be assumed t h a t t h e p a s s e n g e r , as an o r d i n a r i l y i n t e l l i g e n t and p r u d e n t p e r s o n , w o u l d have k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e s u p e r h i g h w a y m i g h t have t r a f f i c on i t a n d t h a t i t was d a n g e r o u s t o go a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t w i t h o u t e x e r c i s i n g d i l i g e n c e t o a v o i d the danger." 254 A l a . a t 493-94, 48 So. 2d a t 877-78. Although have i s i n s t r u c t i v e , Alabama a p p e l l a t e not yet considered driver she Parker i s liable signals jurisdictions the question f o r accidents the driver of courts whether a signaling t h a t might occur a f t e r he o r another t h a t have c o n s i d e r e d automobile. The the issue are s p l i t . t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f O h i o n o t e d i n an u n r e p o r t e d case: " T h e r e a r e two s c h o o l s o f t h o u g h t i n t h e U n i t e d States r e l a t i n g to the l i a b i l i t y of a s i g n a l i n g motorist. The m i n o r i t y v i e w , a d o p t e d b y t h e ... c o u r t [ i n D u v a l v. H e a r s , 77 O h i o App. 3d 270, 602 N.E.2d 265 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ] , h o l d s t h a t no d u t y e x i s t s f o r a s i g n a l i n g m o t o r i s t t o e x e r c i s e c a u t i o n and p r e v e n t accidents. T h i s v i e w r e s t s on t h e p r e m i s e t h a t a s i g n a l t o c r o s s c a n be i n t e r p r e t e d as no more t h a n a y i e l d i n g o f t h e r i g h t o f way. Thus, t h e s i g n a l e r i s n o t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any a c c i d e n t s t h a t m i g h t o c c u r when t h e c r o s s i n g m o t o r i s t e n t e r s i n t o a d i f f e r e n t l a n e . See A n n o t a t i o n , M o t o r i s t s L i a b i l i t y for S i g n a l i n g Other Vehicle or Pedestrian to P r o c e e d , o r t o P a s s S i g n a l i n g V e h i c l e ( 1 9 9 3 ) , 14 A.L.R. 5 t h 193, 202, S e c t i o n 2 [ a ] ; s e e a l s o , e.g., Peka v. Boose ( 1 9 8 8 ) , 172 H i c h . App. 139, 143, 431 N.W.2d 399, 401; Dawson v . G r i f f i n ( 1 9 9 1 ) , 249 Kan. 115, 122-23, 816 P.2d 374, 379, 14 A.L.R. 5 t h 1000, 1009. 8 As 2120313 "The m a j o r i t y v i e w , h o w e v e r , i s t h a t a s i g n a l e r may be h e l d l i a b l e , u n d e r some c i r c u m s t a n c e s , on t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t one who a c t s g r a t u i t o u s l y assumes a duty of care. L i a b i l i t y r e s t s on t h e v i e w t h a t sometimes a s i g n a l may be i n t e r p r e t e d as an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e way i s c l e a r and i t i s s a f e t o proceed. See 14 A.L.R. 5 t h a t 202, S e c t i o n 2 [ a ] ; see also, e.g., Cunningham v. Natl. Serv. I n d u s t r i e s , Inc. (1985), 174 Ga. App. 832, 331 S.E.2d 899, 904; Hassingale v. S i b l e y (La. App. 1 9 8 4 ) , 449 So. 2d 98, 101. ... "Even u n d e r t h e m a j o r i t y v i e w , h o w e v e r , i t i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of the s i g n a l e r ' s l i a b i l i t y t h a t h i s s i g n a l c o m m u n i c a t e d t h e message t h a t t h e d r i v e r c o u l d p r o c e e d s a f e l y a c r o s s b o t h l a n e s . Only i f the message i s r e a s o n a b l y v i e w e d as an ' a l l c l e a r ' can t h e s i g n a l e r be s a i d t o have t a k e n upon h i m s e l f t h e d u t y t o a c t c a u t i o u s l y . 14 A.L.R. 5 t h a t 202, Section 2[a]. The n a t u r e o f t h e message t h a t a d r i v e r ' s s i g n a l conveyed i s u s u a l l y a q u e s t i o n of f a c t f o r the t r i e r of f a c t . Askew v. Z e l l e r (Pa. S u p e r . 1 9 8 7 ) , 361 Pa. S u p e r . 35, 521 A.2d 459, 462. " I t i s a l s o necessary, under the m a j o r i t y view, t h a t t h e t u r n i n g d r i v e r a c t u a l l y r e l i e d on the s i g n a l as an ' a l l - c l e a r ' message. 14 A.L.R. 5 t h a t 202, S e c t i o n 2 [ a ] . O n l y w i t h s u c h r e l i a n c e can any act of negligence i n s i g n a l i n g be considered a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s . Askew, 521 A.2d a t 463." Isaacs App. v. 1998) L a r k i n E l e c . Co., (not r e p o r t e d court 267 (1991), "decline[d] cited 16948, S e p t . i n O h i o App. I n D u v a l v. H e a r s , 77 265, (No. O h i o App. i n Isaacs, 1998) (Ohio or N.E.2d). 3d 270, supra, t o impose a d u t y of care 9 4, the 274, Ohio 602 N.E.2d appellate to a s c e r t a i n safe 2120313 p a s s a g e on t h e m o t i o n i n g the Ohio a p p e l l a t e c o u r t Supreme C o u r t i n Van 536 motorist." relied J u r a v. Row, on In r e a c h i n g i t s d e c i s i o n , the 175 d e c i s i o n of the O h i o S t . 41, 191 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; q u o t i n g t h e s y l l a b u s o f t h e c o u r t i n Van Duval court Ohio N.E.2d Jura, the noted: "'One who s e e k s t o make a l e f t t u r n , i n t h e f a c e o f t r a f f i c coming from the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n , cannot a b s o l v e h i m s e l f from the o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o c e e d w i t h due c a r e by c l a i m i n g t h a t he d e p e n d e d upon a s i g n a l of a m o t o r i s t going i n the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n , who s t o p p e d t o a l l o w t h e one m a k i n g a l e f t t u r n t o p a s s i n f r o n t of him.'" 77 O h i o App. a t 273, 602 N.E.2d a t 267. S i m i l a r l y , i n Peka v. B o o s e , 172 H i c h . App. N.W.2d Hichigan 399, 401 (1988), also cited in 139, Isaacs, 143, 431 supra, the Court of Appeals h e l d t h a t , " [ s ] i n c e a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s h e r e i n were motorists d r i v i n g i n ordinary circumstances ( i . e . , no u n u s u a l obstacles or obstructions), defendant Bottger assumed no d u t y t o p l a i n t i f f t o warn d e f e n d a n t Boose of p l a i n t i f f ' s approaching v e h i c l e . We f i n d as a m a t t e r of law t h a t d e f e n d a n t B o t t g e r ' s hand m o t i o n s i g n i f i e d n o t h i n g more t h a n p e r m i s s i o n t o c r o s s i n f r o n t o f h e r c a r and c o u l d n o t be r e l i e d upon as a s s u r a n c e t h a t a l l was c l e a r a h e a d . " In r e a c h i n g the o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n , the I n d i a n a Court of Appeals opined t h a t t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e D u v a l and 10 Peka courts 2120313 was n o t "so s i m p l e . " ( I n d . C t . App. 2012). Key v. H a m i l t o n , 963 N.E.2d 573, The I n d i a n a c o u r t 582 reasoned: " J u s t b e c a u s e [a s i g n a l e d d r i v e r ] h a d a d u t y t o y i e l d t o [an o n c o m i n g v e h i c l e ] a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n does n o t p r e c l u d e o t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g [ t h e s i g n a l i n g m o t o r i s t ] , from a l s o h a v i n g a duty o f c a r e t o [the d r i v e r o f an o n c o m i n g v e h i c l e ] o r any o t h e r m o t o r i s t on t h e r o a d a t t h e same t i m e . For example, t h e r e can be no d o u b t t h a t t h e i n j u r e d [ d r i v e r o f t h e o n c o m i n g v e h i c l e ] owed a d u t y o f c a r e when he e n t e r e d t h a t i n t e r s e c t i o n . L i k e w i s e , h a d t h e r e been a p o l i c e o f f i c e r d i r e c t i n g t r a f f i c a t t h e s c e n e , he w o u l d have a l s o owed a d u t y o f c a r e . The p o i n t i s t h a t more t h a n one p e r s o n may have a d u t y o f c a r e i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . Consequently, the question i s n o t w h e t h e r [ t h e s i g n a l i n g m o t o r i s t ] was t a k i n g away [ t h e s i g n a l e d d r i v e r ] ' s d u t y t o w a r d [ t h e d r i v e r of the oncoming v e h i c l e ] i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n ; r a t h e r , t h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r he h a d h i s own i n d i v i d u a l d u t y toward [the d r i v e r o f t h e oncoming v e h i c l e ] . " Id. I n A l a b a m a , by s t a t u t e , a d r i v e r has a d u t y t o obey t h e A l a b a m a R u l e s o f t h e Road, § 32-5A-1 e t s e q . , A l a . Code 1975. Specifically, person § 32-5A-3 p r o v i d e s t h a t i t i s u n l a w f u l f o r any " t o do any a c t f o r b i d d e n o r f a i l required i n this chapter." to perform any a c t The R u l e s o f t h e Road s e t f o r t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f a d r i v e r a t an intersection: "(b) E x c e p t when d i r e c t e d t o p r o c e e d by a p o l i c e o f f i c e r every d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e approaching a stop s i g n s h a l l s t o p a t a c l e a r l y marked s t o p l i n e , but i f none, b e f o r e e n t e r i n g t h e c r o s s w a l k on t h e n e a r s i d e o f t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n o r , i f none, t h e n a t t h e 11 2120313 p o i n t n e a r e s t t h e i n t e r s e c t i n g roadway where t h e d r i v e r has a v i e w o f a p p r o a c h i n g t r a f f i c on the i n t e r s e c t i n g roadway b e f o r e e n t e r i n g i t . After having stopped, the driver shall yield the r i g h t - o f - w a y t o any v e h i c l e i n t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n o r a p p r o a c h i n g on a n o t h e r roadway so c l o s e l y as to c o n s t i t u t e an i m m e d i a t e h a z a r d d u r i n g t h e t i m e when such driver is moving across or within the i n t e r s e c t i o n or j u n c t i o n of roadways." § 3 2 - 5 A - 1 1 2 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975 t h e Road a l s o r e q u i r e oncoming (emphasis added). a d r i v e r who i s turning The Rules of l e f t to y i e l d to traffic: "The d r i v e r o f a v e h i c l e i n t e n d i n g t o t u r n t o t h e l e f t w i t h i n an i n t e r s e c t i o n o r i n t o an a l l e y , private road, or driveway shall yield the r i g h t - o f - w a y t o any v e h i c l e a p p r o a c h i n g f r o m the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n which i s w i t h i n the i n t e r s e c t i o n o r so c l o s e t h e r e t o as t o c o n s t i t u t e an i m m e d i a t e hazard." § 32-5A-111, A l a . We signal signaled agree to Code with 1975. the Duval another motorist motorist of his court to a motorist's p r o c e e d does n o t to y i e l d to oncoming t r a f f i c . as for ensuring that This i s e s p e c i a l l y true unusual o b s t a c l e s or cannot d e l e g a t e i t under Alabama the e n s u r e t h a t i t i s s a f e t o t r a v e l a c r o s s an i n t e r s e c t i o n and Because a d r i v e r duty absolve to no her hand law i n t h i s case, t h e r e are or that is safe 12 to his when, obstructions. or responsibility proceed across an 2120313 intersection, i.e., especially under normal driving conditions, when t h e r e a r e no u n u s u a l o b s t r u c t i o n s o r c o n d i t i o n s , we now h o l d t h a t , as a m a t t e r o f l a w , a s i g n a l i n g m o t o r i s t cannot be driver held liable f o r negligence when the signaled p r o c e e d s a c r o s s an i n t e r s e c t i o n w i t h o u t i n d e p e n d e n t l y that i t i s safe motorist's t o do conduct so. In other constitutes a words, courtesy ensuring the s i g n a l i n g to the signaled m o t o r i s t , b u t i t does n o t r e l i e v e t h e s i g n a l e d m o t o r i s t o f h i s o r h e r own d u t y t o e n s u r e t h a t i t i s s a f e t o p r o c e e d . signal the c a n e a s i l y be m i s c o n s t r u e d , premise cross explained i n Isaacs, and our h o l d i n g supra, c a n be i n t e r p r e t e d as no more t h a n "that A hand r e s t s on a signal to a y i e l d i n g of the r i g h t o f way." In this Tidwell was admittedly, case, well the undisputed within the evidence left-turn indicates lane. a t r u c k i n a l e f t - t u r n l a n e may be more that Although, difficult t o s e e a r o u n d t h a n a c a r , i t c e r t a i n l y does n o t c o n s t i t u t e an unusual obstruction proceeded across or c o n d i t i o n . Rucks admitted that she the i n t e r s e c t i o n without v e r i f y i n g that the way was c l e a r o f o n c o m i n g t r a f f i c . B e c a u s e i t was t h e c o n d u c t o f R u c k s a n d n o t T i d w e l l t h a t was t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e 13 2120313 a c c i d e n t between Rucks's v e h i c l e and t h e v e h i c l e i n which Pell was for a passenger, negligence. trial Tidwell Accordingly, cannot under be liable to the facts of t h i s Pell case, the c o u r t p r o p e r l y e n t e r e d t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f T i d w e l l and t h e b o a r d . For trial the reasons set forth above, t h e judgment of the court i s affirmed. AFFIRMED. P i t t m a n , Thomas, Moore, a n d D o n a l d s o n , 14 J J . , concur.

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