City of Prattville v. S&M Concrete, LLC, and Bobby Steve Carter II

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REL: 09/13/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2013 2120271 City of P r a t t v i l l e v. S&M Concrete, LLC, and Bobby Steve C a r t e r I I Appeal from Autauga C i r c u i t (CV-09-152) Court THOMAS, J u d g e . The City of P r a t t v i l l e ("the C i t y " ) appeals from a j u d g m e n t o f t h e A u t a u g a C i r c u i t C o u r t ("the c i r c u i t c o u r t " ) i n f a v o r o f S&M C o n c r e t e , L L C ("the b u s i n e s s " ) , Carter I I . C a r t e r i s t h e owner o f p r o p e r t y a n d Bobby S t e v e located within the 2120271 City ("the business. property"); i s also the sole owner of The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g r e l e v a n t and p r o c e d u r a l to b u i l d he history. the facts Carter applied f o r a b u i l d i n g permit a s t r u c t u r e on t h e p r o p e r t y sometime i n 2006; the C i t y i s s u e d t h e p e r m i t on December 18, 2006. I n J a n u a r y 2008, Carter l i c e n s e f o r the applied business to the C i t y and l i s t e d the property The C i t y u l t i m a t e l y stating that the f o r a business denied property as t h e b u s i n e s s ' s address. 1 the b u s i n e s s - l i c e n s e a p p l i c a t i o n , was zoned "R-3" (single-family residential). On J a n u a r y 16, 2009, C a r t e r f i l e d an a p p l i c a t i o n w i t h t h e C i t y P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n ("the p l a n n i n g c o m m i s s i o n " ) t o r e z o n e the p r o p e r t y f r o m "R-3" t o "B-2" public hearing on May 21, 2009, t h e p l a n n i n g t o n o t recommend t h e z o n i n g city council held zoning voted change (general business). on J u l y 7, t o deny t h e z o n i n g commission change t o t h e c i t y a public hearing 2009, change. regarding a f t e r which After a council. the voted The requested i t unanimously On J u l y 8, 2009, t h e C i t y The C i t y had p r e v i o u s l y i s s u e d a b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e f o r t h e b u s i n e s s ; h o w e v e r , J a n u a r y 2008 was t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y was l i s t e d on a b u s i n e s s - l i c e n s e a p p l i c a t i o n as t h e business's address. 1 2 2120271 sent C a r t e r a l e t t e r 30, 2009, s t a t i n g that the business to relocate. appeal from t h e c i t y July 21, 2009. requested order 65, Carter had u n t i l and t h e b u s i n e s s filed an court on council's decision i n circuit In the appeal, Carter and July the business that the c i r c u i t court grant a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g ("TRO") a n d a p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n , p u r s u a n t t o R u l e A l a . R. relief. After C i v . P., The c i r c u i t a hearing, injunction and t h e y court the on J u l y sought issued circuit a TRO court 28, 2009, permanent i n j u n c t i v e ordering business l i c e n s e f o r the business continue on J u l y issued a 2 1 , 2009. preliminary the C i t y to issue a t o o p e r a t e on t h e p r o p e r t y . After submitted Adjustment filing a variance request ("the B Z A " ) . variance request Carter court request et the appeal i n the c i r c u i t on September 8, 2009. amended an a p p e a l court, t h e BZA d e n i e d t h e On S e p t e m b e r 25, 2009, the appeal i n the from t h e d e n i a l of t h e and t o seek d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f p u r s u a n t t o § s e q . , A l a . Code 1975. Carter to the P r a t t v i l l e Board of Zoning After a hearing, and t h e b u s i n e s s to include and t o a l l o w t h e b u s i n e s s t o Carter and t h e b u s i n e s s m o t i o n f o r a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t as t o t h e r e q u e s t e d 3 circuit variance 6-6-220 filed a declaratory 2120271 r e l i e f on O c t o b e r 23, 2 0 0 9 ; t h e C i t y r e s p o n d e d t o t h e amended a p p e a l on O c t o b e r 29, 2009. The m o t i o n f o r a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was d e n i e d on November 3, 2009. After a lengthy period of discovery, the C i t y m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t on June 3, 2 0 1 1 . business filed a motion to strike filed a C a r t e r and t h e the C i t y ' s motion for a summary j u d g m e n t on June 8, 2011, a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e m o t i o n f o r a summary Ala. R. j u d g m e n t was u n t i m e l y p u r s u a n t C i v . P., and t h e c i r c u i t t o Rule court's 56(c)(2), scheduling order. The f i r s t d a y o f t r i a l was h e l d on June 14, 2011, a t w h i c h t h e circuit court heard evidence ore tenus. The c i r c u i t court g r a n t e d C a r t e r and t h e b u s i n e s s ' s m o t i o n t o s t r i k e and d e n i e d the City's into 14, motion the State 2011. f o r a summary Judicial Testimony judgment by e n t r y I n f o r m a t i o n System was not completed on directly ("SJIS") June on 14, 2 0 1 1 ; t h e r e f o r e , t h e c a s e was n e x t c a l l e d on J a n u a r y 25, 2012. City f i l e d a motion for a "directed verdict" 2 June on t h a t The same A l t h o u g h t h e C i t y moved f o r a " d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , " we r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h a t m o t i o n i s p r o p e r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a m o t i o n f o r a j u d g m e n t on p a r t i a l f i n d i n g s p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 2 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. See Lawson v. H a r r i s C u l i n a r y Enters., LLC, 83 So. 3d 483, 490 n.7 ( A l a . 2 0 1 1 ) . 2 4 2120271 day. The 3 last day o f t r i a l was held on May 1, 2012; t h e record i n d i c a t e s that the c i r c u i t court a l s o denied the motion for a " d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t " on May 1, 2012. The c i r c u i t Carter the court entered and t h e b u s i n e s s circuit granted court rezoned the property The c i r c u i t c o u r t d e n i e d vacate "B-2" and on November The amend, o r v a c a t e t h e j u d g m e n t on A u g u s t 27, 2012; C a r t e r and t h e b u s i n e s s or I n i t s judgment, i n j u n c t i v e and d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f . C i t y f i l e d a motion t o a l t e r , 7, 2012. judgment i n f a v o r o f on J u l y 27, 2012. judicially the requested a final r e s p o n d e d on November the motion t o a l t e r , 13, 2012. The City filed a amend, timely a p p e a l w i t h o u r supreme c o u r t on December 17, 2012; t h e a p p e a l was t h e n t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h i s Ala. court pursuant t o § 12-2-7(6), Code 1975. In i t s brief on a p p e a l , the C i t y r a i s e s several t h a t may be s u m m a r i z e d as w h e t h e r t h e c i r c u i t granting the requested business failed issues court erred i n r e l i e f because, i t says, C a r t e r and t h e t o prove that the C i t y acted i n denying and c a p r i c i o u s manner for T h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c a s e was i m m e d i a t e l y r e s e t May 1, 2012, due t o " t e c h n i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . " 3 5 the request i n an a r b i t r a r y t o change t h e 2120271 zoning that classification the c i r c u i t appeal of the property. court jurisdiction over the h a d been filed. Because the c i r c u i t presumption conclusions of evidence, court heard evidence ore tenus, correctness the evidence.'" to the i t sdetermination or against P o l l a r d v. Unus P r o p s . , 2004)(quoting "'[w]hen as 708 the t r i a l 2d 129, court 132 improperly n o t be supporting the great weight of LLC, 902 So. 2d 18, 23 American Petroleum Equip. So. "'a court's will i t i s c l e a r l y erroneous, without manifestly unjust, Fancher, exists on i s s u e s o f f a c t ; disturbed unless v. d i d n o t have f r o m t h e BZA's d e c i s i o n b e c a u s e t h a t a p p e a l untimely (Ala. The C i t y a l s o a r g u e s & Constr., Inc. ( A l a . 1997)). However, a p p l i e s the law t o the f a c t s , no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s as t o t h e c o u r t ' s judgment. In addition, the ore tenus c o r r e c t n e s s has no a p p l i c a t i o n t o a t r i a l on q u e s t i o n s presumption court's conclusions of law.'" I d . Both p a r t i e s argue t h a t the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s review City's denial classification debatable of of of standard. the request the property to change i s governed by the the Our supreme c o u r t has s t a t e d : 6 of the zoning fairly 2120271 "'When a m u n i c i p a l body a c t s e i t h e r t o a d o p t o r t o amend a z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e , i t a c t s i n a l e g i s l a t i v e c a p a c i t y and the scope of j u d i c i a l r e v i e w of such a c t i o n i s q u i t e r e s t r i c t e d . The r e s t r i c t e d r o l e i n reviewing the validity of a zoning o r d i n a n c e o r r e g u l a t i o n has b e e n s t a t e d as follows: "'"Zoning is a legislative matter, and, as a general p r o p o s i t i o n , the e x e r c i s e of the zoning power should not be subjected to judicial interference unless clearly necessary. In enacting or amending z o n i n g l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s are v e s t e d w i t h b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n , and, i n c a s e s where t h e v a l i d i t y o f a z o n i n g ordinance is fairly debatable, the c o u r t cannot s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment for that of the l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . I f there is a rational and justifiable b a s i s f o r t h e e n a c t m e n t and i t does not violate any state s t a t u t e o r p o s i t iv e constitutional guaranty, the wisdom o f t h e z o n i n g r e g u l a t i o n is a matter exclusively for l e g i s l a t i v e determination. "'"In accordance w i t h these p r i n c i p l e s , i t has b e e n s t a t e d that the courts should not i n t e r f e r e w i t h the e x e r c i s e of the zoning power and hold a zoning enactment i n v a l i d , u n l e s s the enactment, i n whole or i n relation to any particular p r o p e r t y , i s shown t o be c l e a r l y 7 2120271 arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, having no substantial relation t o the public health, safety, or w e l f a r e , o r ... p l a i n l y c o n t r a r y to the zoning laws."' "[Homewood C i t i z e n s A s s ' n . v. C i t y o f Homewood, 548 So. 2d [142,] 143 [ ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ] ( q u o t i n g 82 Am. J u r . 2d Z o n i n g a n d P l a n n i n g § 338 (1976) (citations omitted))." Pollard, Court 902 So. 2d a t 24 ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) . i n Homewood C i t i z e n s A s s o c i a t i o n f u r t h e r s t a t e d : The b u r d e n i s upon t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g r e l i e f show that the ordinance Moreover, "the was not a f r o m an o r d i n a n c e t o fairly debatable issue b e f o r e t h e m u n i c i p a l g o v e r n i n g b o d y . ' 548 So. 2d a t 144." I d . a t 25 n.9. The final circuit court made the following findings i n judgment: "1. That assumed. the Appeal i s accepted, jurisdiction "2. T h a t t h e [ C i t y ] was i m p r o p e r i n failing to change t h e r e q u e s t e d z o n i n g t o B-2 o f t h e P r a t t v i l l e Zoning Ordinance. "3. T h a t t h e [ C i t y ] h a d i m p r o p e r l y c h a n g e d t h e zoning a n d was completely unable to present t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y was n o t B-2, as t h e [ C i t y ] c o u l d n o t a d v i s e t h i s C o u r t as t o t h e zoning assigned as t h i s area was originally annex[ed], o r t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e changes i n t h e area. 8 i t s 2120271 "4. That t h e p r e d e c e s s o r i n t i t l e to [Carter], m a i n t a i n e d t h e p r o p e r t y as a b u s i n e s s l o c a t i o n , w i t h a g r a v e l p i t a n d f u r t h e r u t i l i z e d t h e same w i t h a m o b i l e home l o c a t e d t h e r e o n . " We first Carter's address predecessor the circuit in title court's finding had used t h e p r o p e r t y t i m e as a b u s i n e s s l o c a t i o n , w h i c h c o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a t had the r i g h t to continue the nonconforming property. The definitions section ordinance defines a nonconforming structure or land which, conform with the Section pertinent part, further Carter use of the the C i t y ' s zoning " [ a ] u s e o f any though o r i g i n a l l y l a w f u l , does n o t provisions 4 a t one u s e as s u b s e q u e n t amendments t h e r e t o located." of that of this ordinance or any f o r the d i s t r i c t i n which i t i s of the C i t y ' s zoning ordinance, explains: "(B) Any u s e o r s t r u c t u r e e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e o f enactment or o f subsequent amendment to this ordinance, but not in conformity with i t s p r o v i s i o n s , may be c o n t i n u e d with the f o l l o w i n g l i m i t a t i o n s : Any u s e o r s t r u c t u r e w h i c h does n o t conform t o the p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s ordinance, except w i t h the w r i t t e n approval of the Board of Zoning Adjustment, s h a l l n o t be: 9 in 2120271 "(a) C h a i n e d [ s i c ] t o a n o t h e r n o n c o n f o r m i n g use.[ ] 4 "(b) R e - e s t a b l i s h e d f o r one (1) y e a r . after discontinue [sic] "(c) R e b u i l t a f t e r f i r e or storm l o s s , e x c e e d i n g i t s v a l u e , above f o u n d a t i o n , at the time of l o s s . " According gravel to p i t or a Carter, dirt his pit f a t h e r used the (hereinafter g r a v e l p i t " ) f r o m sometime i n t h e in 1993 or 1994; C a r t e r ' s m o t h e r was father divorced of Zoning 2008), 2003), testimony i n 1993. court, at referred to e a r l y 1980s u n t i l the trial a "the sometime revealed that Carter's I n Mousseau v. C i t y o f Daphne B o a r d 6 quoting Corporations as as a w a r d e d t h e p r o p e r t y when she and Adjustments, this Municipal 5 property § So. 3d 8A 544, 550 (Ala. Eugene M c Q u i l l i n , 25.188.50 at 67-69 Civ. The (3d Law ed. App. of rev. stated: We note t h a t comparable zoning o r d i n a n c e s of other m u n i c i p a l i t i e s l o c a t e d i n Alabama p r o v i d e t h a t a nonconforming use may n o t be "changed t o a n o t h e r n o n c o n f o r m i n g use." (Emphasis added.) 4 We f i n d no e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e was e v e r i s s u e d f o r a b u s i n e s s l o c a t e d on t h e property. However, t h e C i t y does n o t a p p e a r t o d i s p u t e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y was u s e d as a c o m m e r c i a l g r a v e l p i t b e f o r e 1987, when t h e C i t y ' s z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e was e n a c t e d . 5 10 2120271 "'A n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e w i l l n o t be r e c o g n i z e d i n the absence o f s u f f i c i e n t competent e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e i t was l a w f u l l y i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e t h e o r d i n a n c e was e n a c t e d a n d t h a t i t h a s c o n t i n u e d i n e x i s t e n c e . The b u r d e n o f p r o o f i s upon t h e p a r t y asserting a right t o a nonconforming use t o e s t a b l i s h t h e l a w f u l and c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f t h e use a t t h e d a t e o f t h e e n a c t m e n t o f z o n i n g l a w s pertaining to i t . ' " (Emphasis added.) Although Carter he was testified not abundantly that he resided c l e a r as t o t h e in a manufactured l o c a t e d on t h e p r o p e r t y b e t w e e n 1994 a n d 2000. u s e d as a g r a v e l p i t ; h o w e v e r , he c o u l d anyone r e m o v i n g d i r t period. At trial, approximate the year i t was repeatedly i n which the property as a c o m m e r c i a l g r a v e l p i t . asked during Carter that to c e a s e d t o be u s e d C a r t e r would not d i r e c t l y the C i t y ' s q u e s t i o n , i n s t e a d responding still n o t remember o r g r a v e l from the p r o p e r t y the C i t y home Carter stated t h a t , d u r i n g t h e t i m e he r e s i d e d on t h e p r o p e r t y , being dates, answer t h a t he " d i d n ' t know" o r " [ c o u l d n ' t ] a n s w e r t h a t " o r t h a t " i t was a l o n g t i m e a g o . " F o r e x a m p l e , i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e C i t y ' s i n q u i r y as t o w h e t h e r t h e p r o p e r t y " [ w ] a s ... c o m m e r c i a l l y while C a r t e r was l i v i n g can't b e i n g u s e d as a d i r t p i t " on t h e p r o p e r t y , I wasn't t h e r e every Carter stated: "I d a y , so I d o n ' t know. I mean, I 11 2120271 d i d n ' t s i t out trucks t h e r e by c o m i n g i n and the r o a d w i t h , a c h a i r and out." The circuit court watch f o r stated b a s e d on i t s h a v i n g p r e s i d e d o v e r C a r t e r ' s p a r e n t s ' 1993, i t was "relatively C a r t e r come use the conclusion gravel that p i t while he of the p r o p e r t y , o r d i n a n c e was Carter divorce i n didn't let property resided failed on continued the e n a c t e d i n 1987, t o be property. to prove that w h i c h was the became t h e owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y continued i n 1993. Instead, 1993, property we had We that the been d i s c o n t i n u e d t h e r e f o r e , no property conclude n o n c o n f o r m i n g use the without further first seeking conclude least a variance the record continued use one there of year, and, e s t a b l i s h e d on from the the the BZA. contains credible e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e C i t y d i d n o t a c t i n an arbitrary and c a p r i c i o u s manner by to the zoning classification that zoning Thus, b e c a u s e c o u l d be we a f t e r h i s mother nonconforming f o r at a nonconforming i s no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e n o n c o n f o r m i n g use after support u s e d as e s t a b l i s h e d before had Mr. divorce." i s not s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o the conclude that Carter use Mrs. [gravel] p i t a f t e r the Carter's testimony the sure that, denying Carter's request of the p r o p e r t y . Carter 12 change purchased 2120271 t h e p r o p e r t y f r o m h i s m o t h e r on November 6, f o r the b u i l d i n g permit on December 8, 2006; he a p p l i e d 2006. As r e q u i r e d by t h e C i t y , C a r t e r s u b m i t t e d a b u i l d i n g p l a n , w h i c h was labeled " o f f i c e l a y o u t , " w i t h the b u i l d i n g - p e r m i t a p p l i c a t i o n . Carter and t h e b u s i n e s s seem t o a r g u e t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e C i t y granted the building commercial approval City's the approved, consequently permit, the purposes. of the building approval inconsistent We 6 of with the the City use was of the disagree plan use i n any of zoning on the notice property that way a of, for city solely employee's culminated property ordinance. in This We n o t e t h a t t h i s a r g u m e n t i s , i n e f f e c t , e s t o p p e l argument. However, 6 and in a is the manner further an e q u i t a b l e - " [ o u r supreme c ] o u r t has h e l d t h a t ' [ t ] h e d o c t r i n e o f e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l , as a g e n e r a l r u l e , i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e to the s t a t e , to m u n i c i p a l s u b d i v i s i o n s , or to s t a t e - c r e a t e d a g e n c i e s , ' because '"[p]ersons d e a l i n g w i t h a g e n c i e s of government are presumed t o know t h e l e g a l l i m i t a t i o n s upon t h e i r power and c a n n o t p l e a d e s t o p p e l on t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e y have b e e n m i s l e d as t o t h e e x t e n t o f t h a t power."' M a r s h v. B i r m i n g h a m B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n , 349 So. 2d 34, 36 ( A l a . 1 9 7 7 ) , q u o t i n g C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m v. L e e , 254 A l a . 237, 247, 48 So. 2d 47, 55-56 ( 1 9 5 0 ) . " Ex p a r t e 1996) . City of Jacksonville, 13 693 So. 2d 465, 467 (Ala. 2120271 s u b s t a n t i a t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e C i t y , w h i c h h a d i n p r e v i o u s years issued Carter's a business application for license a for business the business, license after denied i t was n o t i f i e d t h a t the b u s i n e s s had been r e l o c a t e d t o the p r o p e r t y . In F o r t Morgan C i v i c A s s o c i a t i o n , I n c . v. B a l d w i n Commission, court 890 So. 2d 139, 145 ( A l a . C i v . App. County 2003), this stated: "The s t a n d a r d of review i n r e z o n i n g cases i s 'whether t h e r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s s o u n d and f a i r . I f it is fairly debatable as to whether the r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s s o u n d and f a i r , t h e C o u r t w i l l not s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of the [ l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t ] . ' [ C i t y o f T u s c a l o o s a v. B r y a n , 505 So. 2d 330, 337 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ] . The ' f a i r l y debatable' r u l e was d i s c u s s e d i n A m e r i c a n P e t r o l e u m E q u i p m e n t & C o n s t r u c t i o n , I n c . v. F a n c h e r , 708 So. 2d 129 (Ala. 1997). Our supreme c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d that ' " ' [ i ] f the a p p l i c a t i o n of a zoning c l a s s i f i c a t i o n to a s p e c i f i c p a r c e l of p r o p e r t y i s reasonably subject to disagreement, that i s , i f i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i s f a i r l y debatable, then the a p p l i c a t i o n of the o r d i n a n c e by t h e z o n i n g a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d n o t be d i s t u r b e d by t h e c o u r t s . ' " ' 708 So. 2d a t 131 ( q u o t i n g B y r d Cos. v. J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , 445 So. 2d 239, 247 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n D a v i s v. S a i l s , 318 So. 2d 214, 217 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . App. 1975))." We the find "fairly Construction, f u r t h e r guidance debatable" Inc. v. r e g a r d i n g the a p p l i c a b i l i t y rule in American Fancher, 708 So. 1997). 14 2d Petroleum 129, 132 of & (Ala. 2120271 " B e c a u s e t h e a d o p t i o n o f an o r d i n a n c e i s a l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n , t h e c o u r t s must a p p l y a h i g h l y d e f e r e n t i a l s t a n d a r d i n zoning cases. C i t y of Mobile v. K a r a g a n , 476 So. 2d 60, 63 ( A l a . 1985) . T h i s C o u r t has s a i d : has "'"[I]f the adoption of the ordinance raises q u e s t i o n s upon w h i c h reasonable d i f f e r e n c e s may e x i s t i n v i e w o f a l l t h e circumstances, and the wisdom of the ordinance i s f a i r l y debatable, then the a c t i o n o f a m u n i c i p a l g o v e r n i n g body i n a d o p t i n g t h e o r d i n a n c e w i l l n o t be deemed a r b i t r a r y , a c o u r t b e i n g u n w i l l i n g under such circumstances to substitute its judgment for that of the municipal g o v e r n i n g body a c t i n g i n a legislative c a p a c i t y . L e a r y v. Adams, 226 A l a . 472, [147] So. 391 [(1933)]; Episcopal F o u n d a t i o n o f J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y v. W i l l i a m s , [281 A l a . 363, 202 So. 2d 726 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ] . " ' " C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m v. N o r r i s , s u p r a , 374 So. 2d [854,] 856 [ A l a . 1979)] ( q u o t i n g W a t e r s v. C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , 282 A l a . 104, 209 So. 2d 388 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ) . " We 239 also find ( A l a . 1983), property Byrd Cos. v. instructive owners s u b m i t t e d J e f f e r s o n County, i n the present a request to the case. 445 So. In 2d Byrd, J e f f e r s o n County Commission t o rezone the p r o p e r t y a t i s s u e from r e s i d e n t i a l t o commercial. Id. at 243. Similar to the present case, the p r o p e r t y owners i n B y r d d i d n o t a r g u e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y c o u l d n o t be u s e d f o r r e s i d e n t i a l p u r p o s e s i t was but i n s t e a d argued that c o s t - p r o h i b i t i v e to construct a residence. Id. at 242. 15 2120271 The J e f f e r s o n County Commission d e n i e d t h e r e z o n i n g request. Id. a t 243. Our supreme c o u r t , i n a f f i r m i n g t h e t r i a l court's j u d g m e n t , n o t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l t h e words o f t h e t r i a l court: "'[T]he C o u r t d o e s n o t mean t o i m p l y t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d have a n e g a t i v e i m p a c t on any o f t h e e l e m e n t s e n u m e r a t e d a b o v e [ ; ] ... h o w e v e r , s i n c e t h e Court b e l i e v e s t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e County Commission d i d bear a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e p o l i c e power, a n d t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n s a t i s f i e d t h e " f a i r l y d e b a t a b l e " t e s t , t h e C o u r t does n o t n e e d t o go further.'" Id. In city to t h e p r e s e n t case, b o t h t h e p l a n n i n g commission and t h e council held p u b l i c hearings rezone the property. At both regarding Carter's meetings, request individuals who l i v e d on t h e same s t r e e t as t h e p r o p e r t y s p o k e i n o p p o s i t i o n to the rezoning testified request. at t r i a l that Three neighboring r e s i d e n t s each he o r she h a d moved t o t h a t area because o f t h e r e s i d e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s o f t h e a r e a and t h a t each o f them o p p o s e d r e z o n i n g t h e p r o p e r t y . We n o t e t h a t t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t d i d n o t f i n d t h a t t h e C i t y had acted rezoning arbitrarily request. or c a p r i c i o u s l y Rather, the c i r c u i t i n denying court's Carter's judgment i s b a s e d upon i t s b e l i e f t h a t t h e C i t y h a d i m p r o p e r l y c h a n g e d t h e z o n i n g o f t h e p r o p e r t y and, a l s o , t h a t C a r t e r ' s p r e d e c e s s o r i n 16 2120271 t i t l e had u s e d t h e p r o p e r t y as a b u s i n e s s l o c a t i o n . agree t h a t the C i t y f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t evidence the c i r c u i t We court with of the p r o p e r t y ' s zoning h i s t o r y , i n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y was not z o n e d "B-2." p l a n n e r , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y was s i n c e 1987, i f not before. Joel cannot evidence Duke, t h e z o n e d "R-3" at city least 7 " [ C a r t e r and t h e b u s i n e s s ' s a t t o r n e y : ] t h o u g h t you, s a i d i n '87 i t became R-3? So I -¬ "[Duke:] Make s u r e I'm c l e a r on t h a t . I t was -- i t had b e e n R-3 p r i o r t o t h a t . The l a s t t i m e t h a t I know t h a t t h e r e i s a c h a n c e t h a t i t m i g h t have b e e n c h a n g e d o r c o u l d have b e e n c h a n g e d w o u l d have b e e n 1987 when a map was a d o p t e d f o r t h e e n t i r e c i t y . I t r e m a i n e d R-3. C i t y r e c o r d s a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r me t o d e t e r m i n e e x a c t l y when i t became R-3 t h e f i r s t time. But a comprehensive r e z o n i n g of the p r o p e r t y D u k e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a t some p o i n t , t h e City p u r p o r t e d t o p a s s an o r d i n a n c e r e z o n i n g t h e a r e a i n w h i c h t h e p r o p e r t y i s s i t u a t e d f r o m "R-3" t o a d i f f e r e n t r e s i d e n t i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t h a t a l l o w e d m a n u f a c t u r e d homes. However, Duke f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d t h a t he and the c i t y a t t o r n e y , w h i l e r e s e a r c h i n g the h i s t o r y of the p r o p e r t y i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r this action, discovered that the notice requirements p r o m u l g a t e d i n § 1 1 - 5 2 - 7 7 ( 2 ) , A l a . Code 1975, were not f o l l o w e d when t h a t o r d i n a n c e r e z o n i n g t h e p r o p e r t y was p a s s e d . T h e r e f o r e , b e c a u s e t h a t o r d i n a n c e p u r p o r t i n g t o change t h e z o n i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was i n v a l i d , see Town o f S t e v e n s o n v. S e l b y , 839 So. 2d 647, 649 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , a d e c i s i o n was made by Duke and t h e c i t y a t t o r n e y t h a t t h e l a s t p r o p e r z o n i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e p r o p e r t y was "R-3." We c o n c l u d e t h a t , b e c a u s e e i t h e r z o n i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was f o r r e s i d e n t i a l u s e , n o t c o m m e r c i a l u s e , t h e p u r p o r t e d change does n o t a f f e c t our a n a l y s i s of t h i s i s s u e . 7 17 2120271 and t h e w h o l e c i t y was done where a a d o p t e d f o r t h e e n t i r e c i t y i n 1987." Furthermore, new map was C a r t e r and t h e b u s i n e s s d i d n o t a s s e r t a t n o r do t h e y a s s e r t on a p p e a l , t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y was trial, ever zoned "B-2." We conclude t h a t i t i s e v i d e n t from the r e c o r d t h a t the d e c i s i o n o f t h e C i t y t o deny C a r t e r and t h e b u s i n e s s ' s r e q u e s t to rezone the p r o p e r t y s a t i s f i e d the " f a i r l y d e b a t a b l e " We a l s o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e C i t y ' s a c t i o n was not test. "'"arbitrary, c a p r i c i o u s , o r u n r e a s o n a b l e , h a v i n g no s u b s t a n t i a l r e l a t i o n t o the p u b l i c h e a l t h , s a f e t y , or w e l f a r e . " ' " P o l l a r d , at 902 So. 2d 24. We now address the City's argument the circuit court l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e a p p e a l f r o m t h e BZA's d e n i a l of the untimely. variance request because S e c t i o n 11-52-81, A l a . Code 1975 that appeal was states: "Any p a r t y a g g r i e v e d by any f i n a l j u d g m e n t o r d e c i s i o n of such board of z o n i n g adjustment may w i t h i n 15 d a y s t h e r e a f t e r a p p e a l t h e r e f r o m t o t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t by f i l i n g w i t h s u c h b o a r d a w r i t t e n n o t i c e of a p p e a l s p e c i f y i n g the judgment or d e c i s i o n from which the appeal i s t a k e n . " The BZA denied S e p t e m b e r 8, 2009. Carter's request for a variance on C a r t e r and t h e b u s i n e s s amended t h e a p p e a l 18 2120271 to the circuit decision on r e q u e s t was appeal court include S e p t e m b e r 25, denied. from to the appeal 2009, more t h a n C a r t e r and BZA's an from the 15 d a y s a f t e r the b u s i n e s s argue decision is BZA's timely the that on based the the r e l a t i o n - b a c k d o c t r i n e e s p o u s e d i n R u l e 1 5 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. However, we have h e l d t h a t , " s i n c e the r i g h t to appeal i n zoning board cases d i d n o t e x i s t a t common l a w , t h e 15-day t i m e l i m i t f o r a p p e a l i n g a board's d e c i s i o n i s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i n n a t u r e r a t h e r t h a n p r o c e d u r a l . L i n d s e y v. B o a r d o f A d j u s t m e n t , 358 So. 2d 469 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1978). Therefore, compliance w i t h t h i s time p e r i o d w i t h i n w h i c h a p p e a l s must be f i l e d i s a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t t o t h e r i g h t t o m a i n t a i n an a p p e a l t o t h e c i r c u i t court. Lindsey, supra. Furthermore, since this p r o v i s i o n i s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l , t h i s c o u r t cannot a l t e r or e n l a r g e t h a t p e r i o d by r e s o r t i n g t o t h e A l a b a m a Rules of C i v i l Procedure. L i n d s e y , supra." Board of Adjustment 2d 471, 472 o f Town o f M i d l a n d C i t y v. E v a n s , ( A l a . C i v . App. Because jurisdictional, the time 577 So. 1990). provision and b e c a u s e t h i s of § 11-52-81 c o u r t i s not at l i b e r t y is to a l t e r o r e n l a r g e t h a t p e r i o d by r e s o r t i n g t o t h e A l a b a m a R u l e s of Civil Procedure, we cannot conclude that C a r t e r and b u s i n e s s ' s attempt t o " r e l a t e back" under Rule 15(c) the extended t h e t i m e t o a p p e a l f r o m t h e BZA's d e c i s i o n . Because C a r t e r and the the business did not comply 19 with statutory 2120271 requirements o f § 11-52-81, the c i r c u i t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r t a i n the appeal Based on t h e f o r e g o i n g , court d i d n o t have f r o m t h e BZA's d e c i s i o n . we c o n c l u d e that the c i r c u i t c o u r t e r r e d by e n t e r i n g a judgment i n f a v o r o f C a r t e r and t h e business. We, t h e r e f o r e , r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t , a n d we remand t h e c a u s e f o r t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t t o e n t e r a judgment c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, P . J . , a n d P i t t m a n and Donaldson, J J . , concur. Moore, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r e s u l t , w i t h o u t 20 writing.

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