Luvena K. Meigs v. The estate of Madge B. Mobley, deceased

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REL: 06/21/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2111143 Luvena K. Meigs v. The e s t a t e o f Madge B. Mobley, deceased Appeal from Mobile C i r c u i t Court (CV-10-743) THOMPSON, P r e s i d i n g J u d g e . L u v e n a K. M e i g s a p p e a l s Mobile estate Circuit of determining Court Madge B. from t h e judgment e n t e r e d by t h e ("the t r i a l Mobley, court") deceased i n favor of the ("the estate"), t h a t M e i g s owed t h e e s t a t e $ 3 0 , 2 0 3 . The d i s p u t e 2111143 in this case elderly involves an oral loan f a m i l y member, M o b l e y , and agreement her between an granddaughter-in-law, Meigs. I n May in the 2010, trial the a complaint against 4, 2004, M o b l e y l o a n e d M e i g s $50,000 and M e i g s p r o m i s e d t o pay i n t e r e s t , was per month among o t h e r Meigs May $750 alleging, filed t h i n g s , t h a t on Mobley court estate until paid in f u l l . a l l e g e d d e b t b a s e d on claims stated," and The lent." material the a l l e g a t i o n s i n the "money a f f i r m a t i v e defenses. and motions maintaining Inc., an shareholder, e s t a t e s o u g h t payment o f of breach of c o n t r a c t , Meigs answered, complaint "account denying the pleadings the and the Meigs l a t e r f i l e d a d d i t i o n a l existence made t h e corporation not plus numerous t h a t M o b l e y had and amount, raising acknowledging Alabama principal of loan which to Meigs i n her of the debt to A l l u r e Meigs individual is but Studio, the sole capacity. 1 We n o t e t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t i n c l u d e d a s e p a r a t e c l a i m f o r a d d i t i o n a l moneys a l l e g e d l y "had and r e c e i v e d , " b u t , on m o t i o n o f M e i g s , t h a t c l a i m was d i s m i s s e d on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e estate lacked standing to assert that claim. In the complaint, t h e e s t a t e a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t , i n 2007, c e r t a i n amounts had b e e n a d d e d t o t h e b a l a n c e o f t h e l o a n , b u t i t e x p l a i n e d d u r i n g the t r i a l of the case t h a t the loan b a l a n c e t h a t i t a s s e r t e d e x i s t e d as o f June 2008, w h i c h i n c l u d e d t h e t a d d i t i o n a l amounts a l l e g e d l y a d d e d t o t h e l o a n i n 2007, was eg the p r o p e r b a l a n c e of the l o a n at t h a t time. D u r i n g the t r i a l 1 2 2111143 On A p r i l 4, 2012, t h e t r i a l it received conflicting copy of the t r a n s c r i p t r e c o r d on a p p e a l . court h e l d a hearing a t which o r e tenus and documentary e v i d e n c e ; a of that hearing i s included i n the Both p a r t i e s f i l e d post-hearing b r i e f s . May 29, 2012, t h e t r i a l court entered On a judgment i n f a v o r o f t h e e s t a t e i n t h e amount o f $30,203. On June 27, 2012, M e i g s f i l e d a m o t i o n t i t l e d " m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l o r t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e . " On J u l y 13, 2012, t h e t r i a l c o u r t h e l d a h e a r i n g on M e i g s ' s p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n ; t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l does n o t i n c l u d e a c o p y o f t h e t r a n s c r i p t of that hearing. On July 17, 2012, t h e e s t a t e response t o Meigs's postjudgment motion. Meigs filed another motion titled filed a On J u l y 18, 2012, "supplemental motion to o f t h e c a s e , t h e e s t a t e a l s o w a i v e d any c l a i m s i t h a d a s s e r t e d r e g a r d i n g two c h e c k s i n t h e amounts o f $4,900 a n d $8,100, respectively. F i n a l l y , d u r i n g t h e t r i a l o f t h e case and i n i t s p o s t - h e a r i n g b r i e f s , t h e e s t a t e p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e and c a l c u l a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g how i t a r r i v e d a t t h e t o t a l amount o f money i t c l a i m e d was owed b y M e i g s . We a l s o note t h a t , b e f o r e t h e t r i a l of t h e case, Meigs filed a m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , w i t h supporting d o c u m e n t a t i o n , a s s e r t i n g , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t , a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e d e b t was a p e r s o n a l d e b t , i t h a d b e e n d i s c h a r g e d i n A p r i l 2012 as p a r t o f M e i g s a n d h e r f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s C h a p t e r 13 b a n k r u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g , d i s c u s s e d i n f r a . M e i g s ' s m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t on t h a t m a t t e r was d e n i e d . 3 2111143 alter, amend, o r v a c a t e . " letter brief. order On July On 25, denying Meigs's evidence 2012, "motion t i m e l y a p p e a l e d on A u g u s t The presented age Franklin, of 87. At the at James Meigs, the t r i a l Meigs filed a c o u r t e n t e r e d an Meigs the April 4, 2012, hearing M o b l e y d i e d on June 17, 2007, a t Mobley died, she lived At the time of her death, was M e i g s ' s g r a n d m o t h e r - i n - l a w . grandson, 2012, 2012. time North Carolina. 20, to vacate or modify." 28, r e v e a l s the f o l l o w i n g f a c t s . the July from in Mobley M e i g s was m a r r i e d t o M o b l e y ' s 1991 until they divorced in F e b r u a r y 2009. M o b l e y was s u r v i v e d by h e r t w i n d a u g h t e r s , D a l e Cobb and Gale M e i g s ; at the time old. is o f t h e h e a r i n g , t h e y were 73 Dale i s the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the e s t a t e . years Gale James's m o t h e r . During Meigs and their James marriage lived and i n the at the Mobile time area. of the h e a r i n g , Gale and Dale p r e v i o u s l y l i v e d i n t h e M o b i l e a r e a , b u t a t some p o i n t b e f o r e 2004 t h e y moved t o N o r t h C a r o l i n a . b o t h G a l e and D a l e the lived At the time Mobley i n North Carolina. hearing, at l e a s t Dale continued to l i v e 4 died, At the time there. of 2111143 Meigs i s a l i c e n s e d m a n i c u r i s t . working Also, and " r e n t i n g space" at i n e a r l y 2004, t h e and d e c i d e d I n e a r l y 2004, M e i g s a salon i n the Mobile s a l o n owners l o s t t h e i r t o c l o s e , so M e i g s d e c i d e d was area. salon space t o open h e r own salon. M e i g s f o u n d a s a l o n n e a r b y where t h e s a l o n owner, who wanted t o r e t i r e , was s a l o n space. l o o k i n g f o r someone t o assume t h e l e a s e f o r h e r Apparently, M e i g s r e a c h e d an a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h a t s a l o n owner t o t a k e o v e r t h e l e a s e o f h e r s a l o n s p a c e . decided t o name h e r Meigs James. salon " A l l u r e discussed her Meigs c o n t a c t e d desire Studio." to the Mobile open h e r own salon for the business plan, dated March 22, " A l l u r e S t u d i o " and " O w n e r : L u v e n a M e i g s . " estimated s t a r t - u p c o s t s o f $65,595.94. start-up costs. w i t h a l l t h r e e b a n k s , b u t by 2004 a l l o f them had denied The The up a p p o i n t m e n t s w i t h t h r e e b a n k s i n M o b i l e f o r a l o a n f o r the with A r e a Chamber o f Commerce, and t h e Chamber h e l p e d h e r d e v e l o p a b u s i n e s s p l a n . page Meigs The cover 2004, reads business plan Chamber a l s o s e t f o r Meigs to Meigs a p p l i e d f o r a approximately mid Meigs's request to late apply loan April for a loan. M e i g s and James d i s c u s s e d o t h e r o p t i o n s , and t h e e v i d e n c e indicates that i n late A p r i l 2004 James, and 5 p o s s i b l y Meigs, 2111143 d i s c u s s e d w i t h Gale the p o s s i b i l i t y of Mobley's l o a n i n g Meigs the money. Although the conversation i s c o n f l i c t i n g , evidence as to that initial the i n i t i a l conversation occurred b e t w e e n e i t h e r G a l e and James o r G a l e , James, and M e i g s . Gale testified had from that i f James and Meigs M o b l e y , " t h e y w o u l d come t h r o u g h me." wanted Within money a few d a y s o f t h a t i n i t i a l c o n v e r s a t i o n , G a l e t o l d M e i g s t h a t she h a d t a l k e d t o M o b l e y and t h a t D a l e and M o b l e y "were g o i n g see what t h e y c o u l d d o . " Shortly thereafter, t h a t M o b l e y c o u l d l o a n $50,000. t o t h e bank t o Gale t o l d Meigs At that time, M o b l e y was 84 years o l d . Mobley intended Macon Bank i n N o r t h to obtain t h e money f o r the loan C a r o l i n a by p l a c i n g an " e q u i t y c r e d i t d e e d o f t r u s t " on h e r home. On A p r i l from line 30, 2004, of Mobley e s t a b l i s h e d t h e e q u i t y l i n e i n t h e amount o f $50,000 a t Macon Bank. On May 5, 2004, t h e d e e d r e f l e c t i n g filed in Carolina. the Register of Deeds Macon A l l documentation regarding the e q u i t y l i n e bears Mobley's It in i s undisputed o r a l agreement. the e q u i t y l i n e County, North the establishment of signature. t h a t Mobley loaned M e i g s t h e money by A l t h o u g h t h e e s t a t e and M e i g s d i s p u t e 6 was whether 2111143 M o b l e y made t h e l o a n t o M e i g s i n h e r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y o r t o Allure Studio, are undisputed. Inc., the following facts regarding the loan Payments were due e a c h month i n t h e amount o f $750 u n t i l t h e l o a n amount, p l u s i n t e r e s t , was p a i d i n f u l l . The i n t e r e s t r a t e w o u l d m i r r o r t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e on M o b l e y ' s equity loan a t Macon Bank--i.e., i t would i n t e r e s t r a t e o f prime p l u s be a variable 1%, w i t h a f l o o r o f 5%. On A p r i l 26, 2004, M e i g s opened a bank a c c o u n t f o r A l l u r e Studio was a t R e g i o n s B a n k i n M o b i l e ; t h e owner o f t h a t a c c o u n t listed as " L u v e n a Kay Meigs dba A l l u r e Studio I n c . " However, t h e b u s i n e s s name on t h e c h e c k s f o r t h a t a c c o u n t h a s a l w a y s been " A l l u r e S t u d i o , deposited bank Inc." On A p r i l a $3,000 c h e c k f r o m M o b l e y i n t o account. The r e c o r d does 27, 2004, the A l l u r e not contain a copy Meigs Studio of that c h e c k , a n d t h e r e c o r d i s s i l e n t as t o w h e t h e r M o b l e y made t h a t check p a y a b l e t o Meigs or t o A l l u r e Studio. On A p r i l 29, 2004, M e i g s , v i a a c h e c k f r o m t h e A l l u r e S t u d i o bank a c c o u n t , made a payment property she i n t h e a p p r o x i m a t e amount o f $1,800 manager f o r h e r s a l o n had needed the loan space. proceeds payment. 7 to the Meigs t e s t i f i e d "quickly" t o make that that 2111143 On May 5, 2004, M o b l e y w i r e d North Carolina to the A l l u r e Studio Bank i n M o b i l e . the bank account a t R e g i o n s The o u t g o i n g w i r e - t r a n s f e r r e c e i p t originator beneficiary $46,838 f r o m Macon B a n k i n as "Madge account B. Mobley" reflects a n d t h e name on t h e as " L u v e n a K. M e i g s " ; t h e b e n e f i c i a r y - a c c o u n t number m a t c h e s t h e A l l u r e S t u d i o bank a c c o u n t . The outgoing w i r e - t r a n s f e r r e c e i p t bears Mobley's s i g n a t u r e . The i n c o m i n g w i r e - t r a n s f e r r e c e i p t r e f l e c t s t h e s e n d e r as "Madge B. M o b l e y " a n d t h e name on t h e b e n e f i c i a r y a c c o u n t as " L u v e n a Kay Meigs"; the beneficiary-account Studio bank account. At number m a t c h e s t h e A l l u r e the top of the incoming wire- t r a n s f e r r e c e i p t , t h e name " L u v e n a K a y M e i g s dba A l l u r e S t u d i o Inc." appears. Two d a y s filed articles later, on May 7, 2004, of incorporation i n the Mobile Probate The r e c o r d does n o t c o n t a i n a n y o t h e r the incorporation incorporation corporation A l l u r e Studio, Inc., documentation of A l l u r e Studio, identify Meigs Inc. Court. regarding The a r t i c l e s of a n d James as d i r e c t o r s o f t h e a n d M e i g s as i n c o r p o r a t o r . 8 2111143 All o f t h e $50,000 l o a n p r o c e e d s were u s e d f o r s t a r t - u p costs for Allure Studio. A l l p a y m e n t s on t h e l o a n have b e e n 2 made on c h e c k s f r o m t h e A l l u r e S t u d i o b a n k a c c o u n t b e a r i n g t h e b u s i n e s s name " A l l u r e S t u d i o , I n c . " on t h e f a c e o f t h e c h e c k s . To p a y t h e d e b t , M e i g s agreed t o deposit $750 p e r month i n t o G a l e ' s a c c o u n t a t R e g i o n s Bank, a n d G a l e i n t u r n use those Mobley's funds t o make m o n t h l y equity loan. were p a i d directly p a y m e n t s t o Macon We n o t e t h a t t h e f i r s t five t o Macon B a n k a n d t h e s i x t h would Bank on payments payment was p a i d t o D a l e , b u t , t h e r e a f t e r , t h e p a y m e n t s were made t o G a l e in t h e manner described above. Gale p r o v i d e d Meigs with c o p i e s o f t h e Macon B a n k s t a t e m e n t s v e r i f y i n g t h a t t h e f u n d s she r e c e i v e d f r o m t h e p a y m e n t s t o h e r f r o m M e i g s were u s e d t o p a y down M o b l e y ' s In was loan. December 2004, l e s s t h a n e i g h t months a f t e r t h e l o a n made, M e i g s they equity were a n d James d i s c h a r g e d from 2012. filed f o r Chapter bankruptcy later, in April There Mobley had had any knowledge t h a t Meigs more 13 b a n k r u p t c y ; than s i x years i s no e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g that a n d James h a d f i l e d T h e $50,000 l o a n p r o c e e d s c o n s i s t e d o f t h e $3,000 c h e c k f r o m M o b l e y , t h e $46,838 w i r e t r a n s f e r f r o m M o b l e y , a n d a p p a r e n t l y t h e payment o f a s m a l l a t t o r n e y ' s f e e . 2 9 2111143 f o r C h a p t e r 13 b a n k r u p t c y . The e v i d e n c e was u n c l e a r , a t b e s t , as t o w h e t h e r a n d when G a l e a n d / o r D a l e , o b t a i n e d k n o w l e d g e o f the bankruptcy Meigs filing. a n d James d i d not l i s t the loan p e r s o n a l debt i n t h e i r bankruptcy f i l i n g s . testified at the hearing at issue Nonetheless, as a James i n t h i s c a s e t h a t he c o n s i d e r e d t h e l o a n t o be a " l o a n t o h e l p s t a r t t h e b u s i n e s s , " " a l o a n t o u s to help start the business." considered the loan individual He and Gale also been clarified testified l o a n t o Meigs and n o t t o A l l u r e made that that t o Meigs he capacity. Dale t o have then i n her M o b l e y h a d made t h e Studio, Inc. Dale testified t h a t M o b l e y h a d t o l d h e r t h a t s h e h a d made t h e l o a n t o M e i g s in her i n d i v i d u a l capacity. Gale testified t h e Mobley had made t h e l o a n t o M e i g s i n h e r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y a n d t h a t , a t the time the loan was made, M o b l e y c o r p o r a t i o n t h a t Meigs had i n t e n d e d Meigs, on t h e o t h e r hand, d i d n o t know o f any t o form. testified that the loan was made t o " A l l u r e S t u d i o , I n c . " M e i g s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e were never i t was any d i s c u s s i o n s individual capacity. that Meigs 10 a testified loan to her i n her that i f she h a d 2111143 considered t h e l o a n t o have b e e n made t o h e r i n h e r individual capacity, she bankruptcy would have included i t in the filings. Tony Zick, testified the t h a t the accountant l o a n has for Allure Studio, Inc., a l w a y s b e e n t r e a t e d as a l o a n to A l l u r e Studio, Inc. A c o p y o f 2004 f e d e r a l i n c o m e - t a x r e t u r n for Inc., Allure admitted Studio, into evidence, which reflects was prepared that t r e a t e d as a l o a n t o t h e c o r p o r a t i o n . the t r i a l court interest on r u l e d t h a t the the loan could be Zick loan was and being Zick t e s t i f i e d that i f l o a n was not the by a personal treated as debt, a the business expense, which would c o s t the b u s i n e s s thousands of d o l l a r s i n lost deductions. The went e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t the loan-payment arrangement smoothly until James's d i v o r c e stopped early given receiving Meigs about p r o c e e d i n g s began. a l l the the time she she documentation in had that she requested, the e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t M e i g s had p r o b l e m s r e c e i v i n g c o p i e s 11 and that Although Gale t e s t i f i e d information Meigs Meigs t e s t i f i e d payment-verification J a n u a r y o r F e b r u a r y 2008. had 2008, of 2111143 the Macon Bank s t a t e m e n t s b e g i n n i n g i n 2008 and continuing thereafter. On J u n e 19, 2008, u n b e k n o w n s t t o M e i g s , D a l e " r e f i n a n c e d " the equity when she l o a n ; Dale died and G a l e i n June 2007. had Dale i n h e r i t e d Mobley's testified that she home never d i s c u s s e d the e q u i t y loan or the r e f i n a n c i n g w i t h Meigs. Gale t e s t i f i e d t h a t she d i d n o t t e l l M e i g s a b o u t t h e r e f i n a n c i n g o f the equity loan business." As outstanding because part she d i d n o t want M e i g s of the r e f i n a n c i n g , Dale b a l a n c e on t h e o r i g i n a l e q u i t y t o "know paid o f f the loan--$36,890.85-- and o b t a i n e d a new e q u i t y l i n e i n t h e amount o f $110,000. The i n t e r e s t r a t e on t h e new e q u i t y l i n e was a f i x e d r a t e o f During her testimony, refinancing, Dale maintained i n t e r e s t rate changed e s t a t e was the to a f i x e d on the my that, loan r a t e o f 7.5%. 7.5%. after Meigs Dale the owed the testified t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t - r a t e change " w a s n ' t r e a l l y b a s e d on [ t h e new loan]. She had a variable rate and I j u s t picked a happy medium i s what I d i d . " The Gale that downturn evidence i n d i c a t e s that t h e b u s i n e s s was i n t h e economy. i n 2009 M e i g s having d i f f i c u l t y expressed to because of the I n June 2009, D a l e and G a l e o f f e r e d 12 2111143 t o a c c e p t m o n t h l y p a y m e n t s i n t h e amount o f $500 i f M e i g s u n a b l e t o pay n o t e d on an evidence: i n accordance w i t h the o r i g i n a l agreement. amortization schedule, Gale introduced into "$750 o r i g i n a l a g r e e m e n t " and "when house s o l d can d r o p t o $ 5 0 0 , " b u t "you h e l p you o u t . " and w h i c h was can d r o p t o $500 now I n a l e t t e r d a t e d November 16, G a l e t o M e i g s , w h i c h was also introduced i f that was you will 2009, f r o m D a l e into evidence, D a l e and G a l e s t a t e d , i n p a r t : "We have p r o o f t h a t [ M a c o n ] B a n k w i r e d you t h e money a l o n g w i t h l e t t e r s t h a t you s e n t thanking [ M o b l e y ] f o r t h e [ l ] o a n , [ a n d ] a l s o s t a t i n g t h a t you w o u l d s e n d $750 o r more a month u n t i l p a i d o f f . However, we have o f f e r e d f o r you t o pay o n l y $500 ( i n June 2 0 0 9 ) a month, i f you were u n a b l e t o pay the o r i g i n a l agreement. " "The [ a ] m o u n t [ p ] a s t [ d ] u e @ $500 a month t o t a l s $2,500. We w i l l n o t h o l d you t o t h e a g r e e d amount o f $750 a month, i f you w i l l s e n d t h e p a s t due and c o n t i n u e a t $500 a month." The selling e v i d e n c e a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n 2009 M e i g s the difficulty salon and obtaining that, loan-balance documentation from Gale. all the information according and to Meigs, requested. when M e i g s s t o p p e d m a k i n g t h e had gave M e i g s Gale t e s t i f i e d m o n t h l y payments on 13 she payment-verification G a l e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she t h a t she considered the that loan, 2111143 t h e y had "she a c o n v e r s a t i o n about the matter d i d n ' t want t o t a l k money." the a b o u t i t " and and M e i g s t o l d "she her d i d n ' t have the M e i g s t e s t i f i e d t h a t she u l t i m a t e l y s t o p p e d p a y i n g loan based on advice of counsel p r o o f o f where [ h e r ] money was "until [ s h e ] had on some going." A c c o r d i n g t o D a l e , f o l l o w i n g t h e r e f i n a n c i n g , M e i g s made payments totaling $9,375 t h r o u g h July 8, 2009. During h e a r i n g , counsel f o r the e s t a t e e x p l a i n e d t h a t , of simplicity, t h e e s t a t e had f o r the the sake c r e d i t e d a l l t h o s e payments t o the p r i n c i p a l balance without c h a r g i n g i n t e r e s t f o r the p e r i o d of June 18, 2008, t h r o u g h J u l y 8, 2009, t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e l o a n b a l a n c e t o $27,515.85. up until the date A c c o r d i n g t o D a l e , f r o m J u l y 8, of the hearing, Meigs had a d d i t i o n a l p a y m e n t s i n t h e amount o f $250 e a c h , October the date 2011. of A c c o r d i n g to Meigs, the hearing, she 2009, made four beginning i n f r o m J u l y 8, 2009, up had until made a p p r o x i m a t e l y eight payments i n t h e amount o f $250 e a c h , beginning i n July 2009. A t t h e c l o s e o f t h e h e a r i n g , t h e t r i a l c o u r t , among o t h e r o b s e r v a t i o n s , n o t e d on t h e r e c o r d t h a t , debt was an individual debt, have t o be made as t o how a further i f i t determined determination to c a l c u l a t e prejudgment 14 the would interest. 2111143 The trial court noted that this type of case was full of problems: " [ T ] h i s i s j u s t an a b s o l u t e d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r y i n g t o make s e n s e o u t o f d e a l s where p e o p l e b o r r o w $50,000 o v e r t h e t e l e p h o n e . They d o n ' t have any memorandum. They d o n ' t have any ... how do y o u ... where i s t h e m e e t i n g o f t h e minds? What a b o u t a c c e l e r a t i o n ? What about i n t e r e s t f o r p r e - p a y m e n t , a l l t h a t s t u f f t h a t goes i n t o t h o s e -- We have n o t h i n g t h e r e . So, I d o n ' t know how i n t h e w o r l d y o u s i t down a n d s t a r t c a l c u l a t i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s -- I'm s u r e t h e c o n c e p t a t some p o i n t i n t i m e was [ M o b l e y ] w o u l d go b o r r o w a g a i n s t h e r house and [Meigs] would pay o f f t h e debt. T h a t ' s p r o b a b l y what t h e y d i d . " The trial court i n v i t e d the p a r t i e s to f i l e page summary" p o s t - h e a r i n g s h o r t , "two- b r i e f s as t o "what am I t o l o o k a t " r e l a t i n g t o t h e c e n t r a l i s s u e o f w h e t h e r M o b l e y made t h e l o a n to Meigs i n her i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y o r t o A l l u r e Studio, I n c . Both hearing loan forth parties filed post-hearing briefs. In i t s post- b r i e f , t h e e s t a t e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t M o b l e y h a d made t h e t o Meigs i n her i n d i v i d u a l capacity. i t s proposal f o r determining the applicable rate The e s t a t e s e t the loan of balance interest and maintained that on t h e outstanding b a l a n c e s h o u l d be t h e 6% r a t e p r e s c r i b e d b y § 8-8¬ 1, A l a . Code 1975. The e s t a t e a l s o f i l e d a s u p p l e m e n t a l b r i e f that states: 15 2111143 "You a s k e d t h a t I do t h e i n t e r e s t c a l c u l a t i o n on t h e j u d g m e n t t o be e n t e r e d a g a i n s t M e i g s . P l e a s e r e c a l l t h a t on J u l y 8 t h , 2009 when M e i g s i n i t i a l l y s t o p p e d making payments the balance was $27,515, as benchmarked i n t r i a l . The i n t e r e s t r a t e y o u have c h o s e n t o a p p l y i s t h e s i x (6%) p e r c e n t s t a t u t o r y interest rate. From J u l y 8, 2009 u n t i l O c t o b e r 1, 2011 (when M e i g s made h e r n e x t payment o f $250) 846 days e l a p s e d . S i x (6%) p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t on $27,515 p e r annum i s $1,591 p e r y e a r o r $4.36 p e r d a y . $4.36 x 846 d a y s e q u a l s $3,688 o f i n t e r e s t a c c r u e d u n t i l O c t o b e r 1, 2 0 1 1 . I s u g g e s t t h a t we t a k e t h e $27,515 amount f r o m J u l y 8, 2009 a n d a d d $3,688 t o t h a t . T h i s w o u l d b r i n g t h e t o t a l due t o $31,203. Then, t o s i m p l i f y the i n t e r e s t c a l c u l a t i o n s , I propose that we s u b t r a c t M e i g s ' f o u r (4) $250 payments t o t a l i n g $1,000 d i r e c t l y f r o m t h e $31,203 sum. T h i s l e a v e s a b a l a n c e o f $30,203. I r e q u e s t t h a t you e n t e r a j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t M e i g s i n t h e amount o f $30,203. I t w i l l b e a r i n t e r e s t a t t h e judgment r a t e u n t i l p a i d by h e r . I hope t h i s i s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h y o u r t h i n k i n g and f a i r l y s i m p l e t o u n d e r s t a n d . I have g i v e n M e i g s t h e b e t t e r d e a l on a l l p o i n t s . I f you need a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r t o e n t e r a judgment p l e a s e l e t me know." In h e r p o s t - h e a r i n g brief, Meigs m a i n t a i n e d t h a t had made t h e l o a n t o A l l u r e S t u d i o , her i n d i v i d u a l capacity. trial her Inc., Mobley and n o t t o Meigs i n Meigs a l s o m a i n t a i n e d t h a t i f the c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t M o b l e y h a d made t h e l o a n t o h e r i n i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y , t h e o r a l c o n t r a c t d i d n o t c o n t a i n an acceleration clause, and, thus, s h e a r g u e d , t h e amount owed s h o u l d be l i m i t e d t o t h e a c c r u e d m o n t h l y payments a t t h e t i m e of t h e judgment and n o t t h e f u l l 16 amount o f t h e d e b t owed. 2111143 Meigs m a i n t a i n e d t h a t the payments t o the trial $500 p e r court estate agreed to lower the month i n 2009. should Meigs a l s o argued calculate interest i n t e r e s t r a t e the p a r t i e s agreed to at the based specified payments she that on the loan time the made and n o t t h e 6% r a t e p r e s c r i b e d by § 8-8-1. a r g u e d t h a t t h e e s t a t e had monthly was Meigs finally f a i l e d to g i v e her c r e d i t f o r e i g h t claimed to have made a f t e r July 8, a judgment in 2009. On May 29, favor of 2012, Meigs f i l e d to the 2012, alter, trial i n the court amount o f a motion t i t l e d amend, essentially arguments estate the or addressed contained in same her h o w e v e r , t h a t , as t o h e r In i n c o n s i s t e n t l y argued extent the contained June motion, made brief. Court amend and applied apply 27, trial or Meigs the same We i n her note, that, post-hearing "[a]lthough c o n t a i n an i n t e r e s t r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n , an i n t e r e s t rate s t a t u t o r y r a t e s t a t e d i n § 8-8-1, should On i n t e r e s t - r a t e - c a l c u l a t i o n argument, brief O r d e r does n o t and post-hearing same argument also that issues M e i g s made t h e but $30,203. " m o t i o n f o r a new vacate." the entered the correct 17 other rate." to than [Meigs] s u b m i t s t h i s the the the Court 2111143 On Meigs's July 13, 2012, postjudgment the trial motion; the court held record on a a p p e a l does c o n t a i n a copy o f t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f t h a t h e a r i n g . 2012, to Meigs hearing "supplemental amend, alter, that or vacate." In motion. As to her Meigs initial interest-rate-calculation a r g u m e n t , M e i g s c h a n g e d h e r p o s i t i o n and a r g u e d f o r t h e time that the oral contract 18, motion motion, e s s e n t i a l l y a d d r e s s e d t h e same i s s u e s c o n t a i n e d i n h e r postjudgment not On J u l y f i l e d another motion t i t l e d on contained a first usurious rate of i n t e r e s t f r o m J a n u a r y 2005 f o r w a r d , and, t h u s , she m a i n t a i n e d , according reflect t o § 8-8-1, t h e amount owed s h o u l d be no applied. i n t e r e s t due On "motion to f o r t h e p e r i o d when a u s u r i o u s r a t e J u l y 25, 2012, denying Meigs's reduced the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r to vacate or modify." Meigs timely appealed. A t t h e o u t s e t , we n o t e t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w . In W h o r t o n v. B r u c e , 2009), t h i s 17 So. 3d 661, 664-65 (Ala. Civ. App. c o u r t s e t out the a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d of review: "As t o o u r s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n s u c h a c a s e , c o u r t has w r i t t e n : "'When ore tenus evidence is presented, a presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s as t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s on 18 this 2111143 i s s u e s o f f a c t ; i t s j u d g m e n t b a s e d on t h e s e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d unless i t i s c l e a r l y erroneous, without supporting evidence, m a n i f e s t l y unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. J & M B a i l B o n d i n g Co. v. H a y e s , 748 So. 2d 198 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) ; G a s t o n v. Ames, 514 So. 2d 877 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) . When t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n a n o n j u r y case e n t e r s a judgment w i t h o u t making s p e c i f i c findings of fact, the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t " w i l l assume t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e made t h o s e f i n d i n g s necessary to support t h e judgment." Transamerica C o m m e r c i a l F i n . C o r p . v . AmSouth Bank, 60 8 So. 2d 375, 378 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) . Moreover, "[u]nder the ore tenus r u l e , the t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment and a l l i m p l i c i t f i n d i n g s necessary t o support i t c a r r y a presumption o f c o r r e c t n e s s . " T r a n s a m e r i c a , 608 So. 2d a t 378. However, when t h e t r i a l court i m p r o p e r l y a p p l i e s t h e l a w t o f a c t s , no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s as t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t . A l l s t a t e I n s . Co. v. S k e l t o n , 675 So. 2d 377 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ; M a r v i n ' s , I n c . v. R o b e r t s o n , 608 So. 2d 391 (Ala. 1 9 9 2 ) ; G a s t o n , 514 So. 2d a t 878; S m i t h v. S t y l e A d v e r t i s i n g , I n c . , 470 So. 2d 1194 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ; League v. M c D o n a l d , 355 So. 2d 695 ( A l a . 1 9 7 8 ) . " Q u e s t i o n s o f law are not subject t o the ore tenus standard of review." Reed v . B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s f o r A l a b a m a S t a t e U n i v . , 778 So. 2d 7 9 1 , 793 n. 2 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . A trial c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s on l e g a l i s s u e s c a r r y no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s on a p p e a l . Ex p a r t e C a s h , 624 So. 2d 576, 577 ( A l a . 1993) . T h i s c o u r t r e v i e w s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f l a w t o f a c t s de novo. A l l s t a t e , 675 So. 2d a t 379 ("[W]here t h e f a c t s b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t a r e e s s e n t i a l l y u n d i s p u t e d and the c o n t r o v e r s y i n v o l v e s q u e s t i o n s o f law for the court to consider, the [ t r i a l ] 19 2111143 c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t c a r r i e s no p r e s u m p t i o n o f correctness.").' " C i t y o f P r a t t v i l l e v. P o s t , 831 So. 2d 622, ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 2 ) . " On a p p e a l , Meigs first contends that the 627-28 trial e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e b t was h e r i n d i v i d u a l d e b t of the c o r p o r a t e debt of A l l u r e Studio, Inc. Meigs court instead concedes i n h e r b r i e f on a p p e a l t h a t t h i s i s s u e i . e . , t h e p r o p r i e t y o f the trial court's implicit finding of f a c t t h a t Mobley made t h e l o a n t o M e i g s i n h e r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y and n o t t o A l l u r e S t u d i o , I n c . - - i s r e v i e w e d under the ore tenus s t a n d a r d s e t out above. Meigs (Ala. cites 2009), Developers, Brown v. and W.P. City of 631 So. Inc., proposition that corporation not y e t formed, that s u b s e q u e n t l y may party a party corporate existence. Media, Orange 2d 850 I n c . , 17 Beach v. (Ala. can e n t e r i n t o So. 3d 1167 Perdido Pass 1993), estopped A l t h o u g h Meigs the an a g r e e m e n t w i t h and, t h r o u g h c o u r s e o f be for from a dealings, denying the c i t e s Brown and C i t y of Orange B e a c h f o r a l e g i t i m a t e p r o p o s i t i o n o f l a w , t h o s e c a s e s are f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from, and l e g a l a u t h o r i t y f o r , the case b e f o r e us. 20 are not controlling Without going into 2111143 a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f t h o s e c a s e s , we n o t e t h a t b o t h o f t h o s e c a s e s i n v o l v e d p a r t i e s d e a l i n g a t arm's l e n g t h i n a business environment. I n t h e c a s e b e f o r e u s , we have an 8 4 - y e a r - o l d grandmother ( i . e . , M o b l e y ) who a g r e e d t o o b t a i n an e q u i t y l o a n on h e r home in t h e amount o f $50, 000 i n o r d e r t o loan ( i . e , M e i g s ) money t o s t a r t a b u s i n e s s . Allure Studio, was made, trial nor court reasonably nor corporation contains entity Mobley I t i s undisputed contains evidence from which t h e Dale knew that Meigs the loan intended made. was to form The a record d i r e c t e v i d e n c e o f e x a c t l y t o whom o r t o what intended to loan the $50,000. The d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e as t o t h i s m a t t e r i s t h e o u t g o i n g transfer that c o u l d have f o u n d t h a t n e i t h e r M o b l e y , a t the time scant member I n c . , was n o t y e t i n c o r p o r a t e d when t h e l o a n and t h e r e c o r d Gale, a family r e c e i p t , dated May 5, 2004, a n d s i g n e d only wire- by Mobley; that outgoing w i r e - t r a n s f e r r e c e i p t r e f l e c t s the o r i g i n a t o r of the transfer beneficiary indication money was as "Madge account as B. "Luvena on t h e o u t g o i n g wired to Mobley" a K. and Meigs." wire-transfer corporate 21 t h e name or on t h e There receipt business i s no that the account. 2111143 Similarly, the incoming w i r e - t r a n s f e r receipt r e f l e c t s the s e n d e r as "Madge B. M o b l e y " a n d t h e b e n e f i c i a r y as "Luvena Kay Meigs." The bearing trial Studio, a l l payments to find that on t h e p r e s u m p t i o n Mobley say that made Accordingly, made by checks the loan to Allure i n her i n d i v i d u a l capacity. afforded the t r i a l under t h e o r e tenus the t r i a l the loan made of correctness f a c t u a l determinations cannot were I n c . " does n o t r e q u i r e t h e Mobley I n c . , and n o t t o Meigs court's we that t h e name " A l l u r e S t u d i o , court Based fact court erred standard, i n finding that t o Meigs i n her i n d i v i d u a l capacity. court's j u d g m e n t as t o t h i s issue i s the t r i a l affirmed. Next, applying maintains Meigs a 6% that, contends interest rate the t r i a l t o t h e amount court owed. erred 3 in Meigs p u r s u a n t t o §§ 8-8-1 a n d § 8 - 8 - 1 2 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975, a n d P a t t e r s o n App. that v. G r e e n , 474 So. 2d 725 ( A l a . C i v . 1985), any i n t e r e s t r a t e c h a r g e d by Mobley o r t h e e s t a t e A l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a j u d g m e n t f o r a lumpsum amount, i t i s c l e a r f r o m t h e r e c o r d t h a t i t a p p l i e d a 6% interest rate. See t h e e s t a t e ' s s e c o n d p o s t - h e a r i n g brief, quoted supra. 3 22 2111143 above 6% were u s u r i o u s a n d , t h e r e f o r e , no i n t e r e s t s h o u l d be charged f o r the a p p l i c a b l e p e r i o d . 4 M e i g s , however, f i r s t r a i s e d t h i s argument i n h e r m o t i o n t i t l e d "supplemental more t h a n motion, 4 m o t i o n t o a l t e r , amend, o r v a c a t e , " 30 d a y s a f t e r t h e judgment i t r e f e r e n c e s . M e i g s s o u g h t t o change h e r p o s i t i o n filed In her a n d argument on S e c t i o n 8-8-1 p r o v i d e s : "Except as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by l a w , t h e maximum rate of interest upon the loan or f o r b e a r a n c e o f money, g o o d s , o r t h i n g s i n a c t i o n , e x c e p t b y w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t i s $6 upon $100 f o r one year, and t h e r a t e o f i n t e r e s t by w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t i s n o t t o e x c e e d $8 upon $100 f o r one y e a r a n d a t t h a t r a t e f o r a g r e a t e r o r l e s s sum o r f o r a l o n g e r or s h o r t e r time." S e c t i o n 8-8-12 p r o v i d e s : " ( a ) E x c e p t as o t h e r w i s e p e r m i t t e d b y l a w , a l l c o n t r a c t s f o r t h e payment o f i n t e r e s t upon t h e l o a n o r f o r b e a r a n c e o f g o o d s , money, t h i n g s i n a c t i o n , o r upon any c o n t r a c t w h a t e v e r a t a h i g h e r r a t e t h a n i s p r e s c r i b e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r a r e u s u r i o u s and cannot be e n f o r c e d e x c e p t as t o t h e p r i n c i p a l . "(b) The b o r r o w e r o f money a t a u s u r i o u s r a t e o f i n t e r e s t s h a l l n o t i n any c a s e be r e q u i r e d t o p a y more t h a n t h e p r i n c i p a l sum b o r r o w e d , a n d i f any i n t e r e s t h a s b e e n p a i d , t h e same must be d e d u c t e d from t h e p r i n c i p a l and judgment e n t e r e d f o r t h e b a l a n c e o n l y ; p r o v i d e d , however, t h a t t h e defense o f u s u r y may n o t be p l e a d e d a g a i n s t a h o l d e r i n due c o u r s e o f any n e g o t i a b l e i n s t r u m e n t . " 23 2111143 the i n t e r e s t - r a t e - c a l c u l a t i o n issue and for the first argued t h a t , pursuant to the o r a l c o n t r a c t , a u s u r i o u s i n t e r e s t a p p l i e d f r o m J a n u a r y 2005 f o r w a r d and, amount owed s h o u l d be r e d u c e d t o r e f l e c t no t h e p e r i o d when a u s u r i o u s We Meigs conclude first that Meigs attempted to r a t e of thus, that i n t e r e s t due applied. raised this argument too late. argument i n her second not t i m e l y f i l e d within judgment i t r e f e r e n c e s was entered and t h u s f a i l e d t o i n v o k e t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e t r i a l App. K i m b r e l l v. K i m b r e l l , 965 So. 2007) (a m o t i o n t o a l t e r , R u l e 59, A l a . R. C i v . P., judgment i t r e f e r e n c e s court). In consider motion. new a legal "'"[A] t r i a l legal argument 2d 789, 793 n.6 amend, o r v a c a t e , must be filed court. (Ala. Civ. pursuant w i t h i n 30 d a y s o f to i n v o k e the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the addition, new a trial argument c o u r t has in a court in the is a not d i s c r e t i o n to consider post-judgment motion, but not 416 (Ala. Special Chase L.L.C., 991 So. 2d 668, Assets, 678 24 L.L.C. v. (Ala. 2007), q u o t i n g a is 3d 403, Fin., to postjudgment E s p i n o z a v. R u d o l p h , 46 So. (quoting the required party's to trial r e q u i r e d t o do s o . " ' " 2010) for raise this days from the date the See the T h a t m o t i o n was postjudgment motion. 30 rate time Home i n turn 2111143 G r e e n T r e e A c c e p t a n c e , I n c . v. B l a l o c k , 525 (Ala. 1988)). B a s e d on the foregoing So. 2d 1366, 1369 l e g a l a u t h o r i t y , Meigs f a i l e d t o r a i s e t h i s a r g u m e n t i n a t i m e l y manner, and we not address j u d g m e n t as Next, i t further. to the Meigs Accordingly, c a l c u l a t i o n of contends that interest is the oral c o n t a i n an a c c e l e r a t i o n c l a u s e and acceleration clause, court the trial Co., 527 So. acceleration entered. 2d 704, of 705 trial court's affirmed. contract 5 did not t h a t , i n the absence of should j u d g m e n t t o t h e m o n t h l y payments t h a t had t h e j u d g m e n t was the will have l i m i t e d t h e a c c r u e d at the Meigs c i t e s R o s e n f e l d time v. C i t y P a p e r ( A l a . 1988), f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n unaccrued payments i s not an to be read that into payment c o n t r a c t s by i m p l i c a t i o n . In Rosenfeld, agreement f o r the the parties payment o f acceleration clause. money t h a t In R o s e n f e l d , the p r o m i s s o r y note at i s s u e entered into d i d not a written contain an the p e r t i n e n t language of read: "'In the event t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n [ R o s e n f e l d / p a y o r ] and [ C i t y P a p e r Company/payee] t e r m i n a t e s , regardless of We n o t e t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t o o t h e r a r g u m e n t s t h e e s t a t e makes as t o t h i s i s s u e i n i t s b r i e f on a p p e a l , i t reads M e i g s ' s p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n as h a v i n g " a c t u a l l y a s k e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o a p p l y a 6% i n t e r e s t r a t e . " 5 25 2111143 the reason for such termination, outstanding balance then due on o b l i g a t i o n e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n s h a l l be and p a y a b l e , w i t h o u t i n t e r e s t , i n f i v e equal annual i n s t a l l m e n t s , beginning year from the date of the t e r m i n a t i o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the p a r t i e s . ' " 527 So. 2d a t 704-05. Apparently, other the the due (5) one of Rosenfeld i s s u e s , the trial breached court entered the agreement. Among a summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r C i t y P a p e r Company b a s e d on t h e f u l l amount o f t h e e v e n t h o u g h o n l y two of the f i v e i n s t a l l m e n t s had at the time of the e n t r y of the reversed with the j u d g m e n t as t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s to b a s e d on t h e sum 2d at 704. a p p l i c a t i o n of for the o f two In so trial Our i s s u e and court to supreme remanded t h e enter the doing, our supreme court the issue, Id. at our court case judgment So. rejected the contracts 705. supreme c o u r t reasoned, part: "City Paper Company a g r e e s that the note c o n t a i n s no a c c e l e r a t i o n c l a u s e , and t h a t t h e c a s e law, generally speaking, supports Rosenfeld's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t ' a c c e l e r a t i o n of the m a t u r i t y of u n a c c r u e d p a y m e n t s ' i s n o t t o be r e a d i n t o payment c o n t r a c t s by i m p l i c a t i o n . F o r a c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e 26 due 527 " a n t i c i p a t o r y breach" to u n i l a t e r a l analyzing become accrued annual i n s t a l l m e n t s . t h e payment o f money o n l y . In judgment. note, in 2111143 c a s e s so h o l d i n g , s e e 10 C.J.S., B i l l s a t 1160 ( 1 9 3 8 ) . ... & N o t e s § 529 " " ' A n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h ' has a f i e l d o f o p e r a t i o n where t h e n o n d e f a u l t i n g p a r t i e s r e m a i n l i a b l e f o r c e r t a i n o b l i g a t i o n s under a b i l a t e r a l contract. To r e q u i r e t h e n o n d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y t o continue the discharge of h i s c o n t r a c t u a l d u t i e s , i n face of a c l e a r , unequivocal repudiation of the c o n t r a c t by t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y , i s a s e n s e l e s s requirement that unduly penalizes the nondefaulting party. "The m a j o r i t y o f j u r i s d i c t i o n s f a c e d w i t h t h i s i s s u e have drawn t h e d i s t i n c t i o n a n d have n o t allowed the ' a n t i c i p a t o r y breach' doctrine t o apply to unilateral contracts, particularly f o r the payment o f money o n l y . The ' s e t t l e d ' r u l e was s u c c i n c t l y e x p r e s s e d b y J u s t i c e C a r d o z o i n Smyth v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 302 U.S. 329 a t 356, 58 S . C t . 248 a t 253 (1937): "'[T]he d o c t r i n e o f a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h has i n g e n e r a l no a p p l i c a t i o n t o u n i l a t e r a l contracts, and particularly to such c o n t r a c t s f o r t h e payment o f money o n l y . ' "Some o f t h e c a s e s cited above reference Professor W i l l i s t o n ' s t r e a t i s e f o r the r a t i o n a l e that r e j e c t s the a p p l i c a t i o n of the ' a n t i c i p a t o r y breach' doctrine to installment contracts that c o n t a i n no a c c e l e r a t i o n c l a u s e : '[A]llowing the promissee immediate recovery i s n o t h i n g b u t a d i r e c t bonus t o t h e p r o m i s s e e b e y o n d what he was p r o m i s e d and a d i r e c t p e n a l t y t o t h e p r o m i s s o r . ' See, f o r e x a m p l e , M a b e r y v. W e s t e r n C a s u a l t y & S u r e t y Co., 173 Kan. 586, 250 P.2d 824, 828-29 ( 1 9 5 2 ) , c i t i n g 5 W i l l i s t o n on C o n t r a c t s § 1328 ( r e v . e d . 1937) . 27 2111143 "Indeed, the use of the 'acceleration of m a t u r i t y o f payment' c l a u s e i s i n r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e n o n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h d o c t r i n e in installment payment contracts. Once the p r o m i s s e e has done a l l t h e r e i s f o r him t o do u n d e r the contract and the p r o m i s s o r ' s o b l i g a t i o n i s c o n f i n e d t o payment by i n s t a l l m e n t s as s p e c i f i e d by the c o n t r a c t , the d o c t r i n e of a n t i c i p a t o r y b r e a c h has no f i e l d o f o p e r a t i o n and w i l l n o t i n t e r c e d e t o r e s c u e the p r o m i s s e e from the consequences of the a b s e n c e o f an a c c e l e r a t i o n c l a u s e . " W h i l e C i t y P a p e r Company's ' j u d i c i a l economy' argument has i t s a p p e a l , t h e r i g h t o f t h e p a r t i e s t o the protection of the rule of law cannot be s a c r i f i c e d on t h e a l t a r o f j u d i c i a l e f f i c i e n c y . " R o s e n f e l d , 527 We recognize agreement involves money. So. for an 2d a t 705-06 the payment o f oral issue whether oral unilateral money, and u n i l a t e r a l agreement the agreement payments for payment of requirement that of a an money. borrower an the acceleration into such a w r i t t e n agreement s h o u l d a p p l y t o a b o r r o w e r under reading the read in in to be payments o r a l agreement. agree the can the us have f o u n d no A l a b a m a c a s e s i n v o l v i n g of for case b e f o r e of i n f a i r n e s s , the must s p e c i f i c a l l y the payment acceleration and omitted). that Rosenfeld involved a written u n i l a t e r a l However, we Logically, (footnote T h e r e f o r e , we h o l d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t acceleration agreement b e f o r e us. of Accordingly, 28 payments we reverse into the erred oral the judgment as 2111143 to this issue. On remand, t h e t r i a l t h e amount owed b a s e d of Finally, determine on t h e a c c r u e d p a y m e n t s as o f t h e d a t e t h e judgment and n o t t h e f u l l loan balance. court should amount o f t h e o u t s t a n d i n g 6 Meigs contends that the t r i a l court f a i l e d to c r e d i t h e r f o r c e r t a i n payments s h e c l a i m s t o have made a f t e r I n h e r i n i t i a l b r i e f t o t h i s c o u r t , Meigs a l s o contends t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e d t o reduce t h e monthly payments from $750 t o $500, a n d s h e r e q u e s t s t h a t t h i s c o u r t r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t on t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n - o f - p a y m e n t s i s s u e a n d i n s t r u c t t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o e n t e r a j u d g m e n t b a s e d on payments i n t h e amount o f $500 p e r month t h a t h a d a c c r u e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e e n t r y o f t h e j u d g m e n t . However, M e i g s f a i l s t o c i t e any l e g a l a u t h o r i t y i n support of her a s s e r t i o n that the p a r t i e s agreed to m o d i f y t h e o r a l agreement i n h e r i n i t i a l a p p e l l a t e b r i e f . R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. App. P., r e q u i r e s t h a t a p a r t y ' s " a r g u m e n t " be s u p p o r t e d b y c i t a t i o n s t o l e g a l a u t h o r i t y . I n o t h e r w o r d s , i n o r d e r t o be c o n s i d e r e d a p r o p e r " a r g u m e n t " f o r purposes o f Rule 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , c i t a t i o n s t o l e g a l a u t h o r i t y are required. Horn v. F a d a l M a c h i n i n g C t r s . , L L C , 972 So. 2d 63, 80 ( A l a . 2007) ( t h e f a i l u r e t o c i t e l e g a l a u t h o r i t y h a s t h e same e f f e c t as i f no a r g u m e n t h a d b e e n made). A r g u m e n t s n o t r a i s e d i n t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s i n i t i a l b r i e f a r e deemed w a i v e d ; a r g u m e n t s made f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n t h e r e p l y b r i e f a r e n o t a d d r e s s e d by t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s . H u n t l e y v . R e g i o n s Bank, 807 So. 2d 512, 515 n.15 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . A l t h o u g h Meigs c i t e s l e g a l authority i n her reply b r i e f f o r the proposition that " [ s ] u b s e q u e n t m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e o r i g i n a l agreement a r e a l l o w e d , " t h o s e c i t a t i o n s come t o o l a t e b e c a u s e R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) r e q u i r e s c o m p l i a n c e i n an a p p e l l a n t ' s i n i t i a l b r i e f . See H u n t l e y v. R e g i o n s Bank; s e e a l s o L . J . K . v. S t a t e , 942 So. 2d 854, 868-69 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 2005) ( R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) r e q u i r e s c i t a t i o n s t o l e g a l a u t h o r i t y and s p e c i f i c a l l e g a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o i n e f f e c t i v e - l e g a l - c o u n s e l t o be made i n i n i t i a l a p p e l l a n t b r i e f ; s u c h c i t a t i o n s a n d s p e c i f i c a l l e g a t i o n s may n o t be i n c l u d e d f o r f i r s t time i n r e p l y b r i e f ) . 6 29 2111143 J u l y 8, 2009. S p e c i f i c a l l y , Meigs contends t h a t the E x h i b i t 8, w h i c h was her for eight Exhibit 22, The the w h i c h a l s o was trial found, loan balance calculations, amount owed, c r e d i t e d $1,000 a f t e r J u l y 8, testimony $250 admitted into E x h i b i t 8 r e f l e c t s , and court outstanding estate's admitted i n t o evidence, f a i l e d to p a y m e n t s t o t a l i n g $2,000, as estate's and that as totaled the trial Meigs f o r 2009. July court, brief, July the a r r i v i n g at the brief, that following July 8, 2009; s p e c i f i e d , except to court entered the See calculations. estate's the the on i t s post-hearing M e i g s made the say Dale's dates that The judgment of four those Meigs began record is based clear on the second p o s t - h e a r i n g supra. Meigs d i r e c t s Exhibit Based m a i n t a i n s , per trial quoted, 2009, $250 payments t o t a l i n g m a k i n g t h o s e payments i n O c t o b e r 2011. estate's in indicates estate payments were n o t the 8, $27,515. four her evidence. the r e c o r d of credit reflected in The payments that estate's us to the following checks l i s t e d in 22: 17, 2009 Check 4105 $250 J u l y 24, 2009 Check 4114 $250 30 her 2111143 October Check 2450 $250 November 25, 2 011 Check 2562 $250 December 20, 2011 Check 3071 $250 J a n u a r y 19, 2012 Check 3070 $250 F e b r u a r y 15, 2012 Check 3130 $250 M a r c h 23, 2012 Check 3164 $250 Meigs's 1, 2011 E x h i b i t 22 shows t h e f r o n t o f a l l t h o s e checks, b u t i t o n l y shows t h e b a c k s , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h o s e c h e c k s h a d c l e a r e d , o f o n l y some o f t h e c h e c k s . the evidence, i t was conclude t h a t Meigs's reasonable B a s e d on o u r r e v i e w o f f o r the trial court to E x h i b i t 22 s u b s t a n t i a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g $250 p a y m e n t s c l e a r e d a f t e r J u l y 8, 2009: December 20, 2011 C h e c k 3071 $250 J a n u a r y 19, 2012 C h e c k 3070 $250 F e b r u a r y 15, 2012 C h e c k 3130 $250 B a s e d on o u r r e v i e w o f t h e e v i d e n c e , for the t r i a l not i t was court t o conclude t h a t Meigs's substantiate that the following $250 reasonable E x h i b i t 22 does checks cleared f o l l o w i n g J u l y 8, 2009: J u l y 17, 2009 7 This check appears C h e c k 4105 $250 t o be d a t e d J a n u a r y 25, 2012. 31 7 2111143 J u l y 24, 2009 Check 4114 $250 O c t o b e r 1, 2011 Check 2450 $250 November 25, 2011 Check 2562 $250 M a r c h 23, 2012 Check 3164 $250 Based court on t h e f o r e g o i n g , erred following i n finding that July 8, 2009, amount o f $1,000, payments. cannot say t h a t M e i g s made four the $250 9 trial payments and i n g i v i n g Meigs c r e d i t i n t h e instead Therefore, we 8 o f $2,000 f o r post-July 8, 2009, t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t c r e d i t s M e i g s w i t h m a k i n g f o u r $250 payments (totaling $1,000) a f t e r J u l y 8, 2009, i s a f f i r m e d . M e i g s ' s E x h i b i t 22 r e f l e c t s check had n o t c l e a r e d . 8 that t h e O c t o b e r 1, 2 0 1 1 , T h i s c h e c k a p p e a r s t o be d a t e d M a r c h 22, 2012. We n o t e t h a t M e i g s r e f e r s t h i s c o u r t o n l y t o h e r E x h i b i t 22 f o r evidence that t h e p a y m e n t s h a d been made, a n d i t was reasonable f o rthe t r i a l court t o determine that that e x h i b i t e s t a b l i s h e s o n l y t h a t t h r e e p a y m e n t s were made a f t e r J u l y 8, 2009. P u r s u a n t t o R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. App. P., i t i s M e i g s ' s d u t y t o d e v e l o p h e r argument w i t h , among o t h e r t h i n g s , " p a r t s o f t h e r e c o r d r e l i e d upon." I t i s n o t t h e d u t y o f t h i s c o u r t t o search t h e voluminous documentary evidence i n t h e r e c o r d t o s e e i f " t u c k e d away" i n some o t h e r e x h i b i t t h e r e i s o t h e r e v i d e n c e v e r i f y i n g t h a t o t h e r a d d i t i o n a l c h e c k s have cleared. See Brown v. Brown, 719 So. 2d 228, 230 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 8 ) . 9 32 2111143 Accordingly, t h e judgment o f t h e t r i a l i n p a r t and r e v e r s e d i n p a r t , and t h i s t h e e n t r y o f an o r d e r AFFIRMED court i s affirmed c a u s e i s remanded f o r consistent with the opinion. IN PART; REVERSED I N PART; AND REMANDED INSTRUCTIONS. Pittman, Thomas, a n d D o n a l d s o n , J J . , c o n c u r . Moore, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r e s u l t , 33 without writing. WITH

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