Jim Skinner Ford, Inc. v. John H. Davis (Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-11-372)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

REL: 12/14/12 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2110859 Jim Skinner Ford, Inc. v. John H. Davis 2110863 Department o f I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s v. John H. Davis Appeals from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t (CV-11-372) Court 2110859/2110863 PER CURIAM. Jim S k i n n e r F o r d , I n c . , and t h e Department o f I n d u s t r i a l Relations ("DIR") s e p a r a t e l y a p p e a l f r o m t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s judgment d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t J o h n H. D a v i s d i d n o t v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t h i s employment a n d t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d t o u n e m p l o y m e n t compensation b e n e f i t s . Following Skinner affirm. t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f h i s employment Ford, Davis applied compensation b e n e f i t s . Skinner Ford appealed Appeals Division. disqualified We with DIR that decision t o DIR's hearing, a entitled to benefits. trial Hearings and i t said, hearing officer concluded he v o l u n t a r i l y F o l l o w i n g a telephone that Davis Davis appealed that of Appeals, which affirmed was decision the d e c i s i o n not to the t o deny Davis then appealed t o the c i r c u i t c o u r t f o r a de n o v o , p u r s u a n t t o § 25-4-95, A l a . Code 1975. At trial, the voluntarily quit had and J i m J i m S k i n n e r F o r d a s s e r t e d t h a t D a v i s was from b e n e f i t s because, him b e n e f i t s . Jim f o r unemployment- D a v i s was g r a n t e d b e n e f i t s , q u i t h i s employment w i t h o u t g o o d c a u s e . DIR's B o a r d from dismissed parties disputed h i s employment him. Section whether Davis had or whether J i m Skinner Ford 25-4-78(2), 2 A l a . Code 1975, 2110859/2110863 p r o v i d e s f o r the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of unemployment-compensation b e n e f i t s i f a c l a i m a n t l e a v e s work " v o l u n t a r i l y cause c o n n e c t e d w i t h such work." that Jim Skinner Ford, as the The without c i r c u i t court employer, bore concluded the burden p r o v i n g t h a t D a v i s had v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t h i s employment. h e a r i n g ore tenus testimony, Davis had because not v o l u n t a r i l y the parties eligibility circuit Jim court concluded t h a t D a v i s was Ford appeal, circuit the otherwise and DIR to J i m S k i n n e r F o r d and DIR voluntarily this the to b e n e f i t s . court, and we f i r s t argue t h a t the appeals. bore disqualified Davis's benefits, entitled appealed court erred i n concluding employer, After Accordingly, dispute unemployment-compensation c o n s o l i d a t e d the On not for Skinner of the c i r c u i t c o u r t determined t h a t q u i t h i s employment. did good from the burden t h a t Jim of Skinner proving that unemployment-compensation quitting work. In concluding Ford, as Davis was benefits for that Jim Skinner F o r d b o r e t h i s b u r d e n , t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t r e l i e d on o u r supreme court's (Ala. the recent 2010) . claimant d e c i s i o n i n Ex parte Rogers, I n Ex p a r t e R o g e r s , t h e was disqualified from 3 68 So. 3d 773 employer a l l e g e d t h a t b e n e f i t s under § 25-4- 2110859/2110863 78(3), A l a . Code misconduct. 1975, which disqualifies a claimant for In t h a t case, the s p e c i f i c i s s u e under r e v i e w was w h e t h e r t h e " c l a i m a n t has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g t h e a b s e n c e o f a disqualification supreme court concluding the f o r misconduct." answered that t h a t "the employer employee 68 So. 3d a t 773-74. question in has t h e b u r d e n is disqualified [from Skinner Ford and DIR argue a p p l i e s o n l y to the burden of proof 78(3), which concerns does n o t a p p l y negative, of p r o v i n g that r e c e i v i n g unemployment compensation] f o r reasons of misconduct." Jim the Our 68 So. 3d a t 781. that Ex parte Rogers a p p l i c a b l e under § disqualification to the p r o v i s i o n i n t h i s f o r misconduct, case, § 25-4and 25-4-78(2), w h i c h c o n c e r n s d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t t i n g work. In Ex parte distinction Rogers, the supreme between the e l i g i b i l i t y court emphasized p r o v i s i o n s o f § 25-4-77 and t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s o f § 25-4-78. those s e c t i o n s address the a l l o c a t i o n the N e i t h e r of of the burden of p r o o f . Our c a s e l a w i s c l e a r t h a t a c l a i m a n t has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g eligibility; has n o t been however, as clear. the burden regarding In a d d r e s s i n g the disqualification disqualification p r o v i s i o n s , t h e supreme c o u r t , i n a d d i t i o n t o q u o t i n g f r o m t h e 4 2110859/2110863 p r o v i s i o n i n § 25-4-78(3) c o n c e r n i n g m i s c o n d u c t , also quoted p a r t o f t h e s u b s e c t i o n a t i s s u e h e r e , § 2 5 - 4 - 7 8 ( 2 ) , as w e l l as § 25-4-78(1), employment." that which concerns a "labor dispute i n place of The c o u r t t h e n a d d r e s s e d c e r t a i n A l a b a m a suggested that the employee bears the cases burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e absence o f a d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r misconduct. The court observed that " t h o s e c a s e s do n o t a d d r e s s , o r even acknowledge, any d i s t i n c t i o n s eligibility, d i s q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s or f o r what excuses circumstances." as t o t h e b u r d e n would otherwise 68 So. 3d a t 778. be of proving disqualifying The c o u r t t h e n cited a c o n t r a r y l i n e o f A l a b a m a c a s e s t h a t p l a c e s on t h e e m p l o y e r t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f as t o w h e t h e r a claimant i s d i s q u a l i f i e d r e c e i v i n g b e n e f i t s under § 25-4-78(1) because unemployment i s d i r e c t l y due t o a l a b o r d i s p u t e . stated that reconcile i t had not located t h e two l i n e s distinction among of cases cases under position on The c o u r t attempting to a principled the various 68 So. 3d a t 779. supreme c o u r t i n Ex p a r t e R o g e r s "Alabama's the claimant's " o r t o make disqualifications s u b s e c t i o n s o f § 25-4-78." The any from the 5 burden next observed of proof that for 2110859/2110863 d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s contrary or a l l the So. 3d a t 779. other has The "recognize The that placing t h e e m p l o y e r has burden of proof b e t t e r access to the added). most issue. 68 c o u r t g e n e r a l l y n o t e d t h a t many c a s e s f r o m a d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n on imposing the a p p r o a c h a d o p t e d by s t a t e s " t h a t have a d d r e s s e d the jurisdictions proving of other to the on the party relevant evidence." court then broadly the burden of the advantage that generally Id. (emphasis observed: " I m p o s i n g on t h e e m p l o y e r t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f as to a claimant's disqualification for unemployment-compensation purposes is consistent w i t h t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e p r o p o n e n t o f an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e o r s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n has the b u r d e n o f p r o o f as t o t h a t p o s i t i o n as w e l l as w i t h t h e d i s i n c l i n a t i o n o f t h e l a w t o p l a c e upon a p a r t y the burden to prove a n e g a t i v e . " 68 So. 3d a t 780. The supreme c o u r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d , i n b r o a d terms: " F i n a l l y , to the e x t e n t t h a t , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g a l l t h e f o r e g o i n g , any u n c e r t a i n t y r e m a i n s as t o who s h o u l d bear the burden of p r o v i n g the e x i s t e n c e of a disqualifying condition, we note that the 'Unemployment C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f i n s u r a n c e f o r t h e u n e m p l o y e d w o r k e r and i s i n t e n d e d t o be a r e m e d i a l measure f o r h i s b e n e f i t [and] should be liberally construed i n f a v o r of the c l a i m a n t and t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f r o m b e n e f i t s s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d n a r r o w l y . ' [ D e p a r t m e n t o f I n d u s . R e l a t i o n s v.] J a c o , 337 So. 2d [374,] 376 [(Ala. C i v . App. 1976) ( o v e r r u l e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s by Ex parte Rogers)]. See a l s o Ex p a r t e S a r g e n t , 634 So. 6 2110859/2110863 2d 1008, 1009 ( A l a . 1993) ('Disqualification p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e Unemployment C o m p e n s a t i o n Act s h o u l d be n a r r o w l y c o n s t r u e d . ' ) . " 68 So. 3d a t 780-81. ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . concluded t h a t the employer The supreme c o u r t t h e n i n Ex p a r t e R o g e r s h a d t h e of p r o v i n g t h a t the employee i s d i s q u a l i f i e d the p a r t i c u l a r basis for disqualification burden f o r misconduct, at issue in that case. B a s e d on t h e r e a s o n i n g and s w e e p i n g l a n g u a g e o f Ex p a r t e R o g e r s , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h a t c a s e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e employer has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g t h a t a c l a i m a n t i s d i s q u a l i f i e d receiving unemployment-compensation benefits from because the c l a i m a n t v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t work, p u r s u a n t t o § 2 5 - 4 - 7 8 ( 2 ) . and J i m S k i n n e r F o r d a r g u e t h a t t h i s c a s e s i s n o t by Ex parte Rogers but by certain older DIR controlled Alabama cases. S e v e r a l of those cases are f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h i s case i n that cause" when voluntarily. they concern i t is clear ( 1 9 5 9 ) ; M c N e a l e y v. 664 2d 913 H e a l t h Dep't, the c l a i m a n t had that or she he had S t a t e Dep't o f I n d u s . ( A l a . C i v . App. 501 So. 2d 468 "good left See A n d a l a Co. v. Ganus, 269 A l a . 571, 2d 123 So. whether 115 work So. Relations, 1 9 9 5 ) ; N o w e l l v. M o b i l e C n t y . ( A l a . C i v . App. 7 1 9 8 6 ) ; D a v i s v. 2110859/2110863 Hoggle, 392 So. 2d 1190 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1980); I n d u s . R e l a t i o n s v. Meeks, 40 A l a . App. (1959); Ala. and App. M o r r i s o n v. 475, 48 Department So. 2d 72 of 231, "When t h e e v i d e n c e 110 So. 2d 643 Indus. Relations, 35 The following is (1950). i n d i c a t i v e of the a l l o c a t i o n of the burden cases: Department of as s t a t e d i n t h o s e shows t h a t a c l a i m a n t l e f t h i s or h e r employment v o l u n t a r i l y , c l a i m a n t has t h e b u r d e n o f showing good c a u s e c o n n e c t e d w i t h s u c h work f o r l e a v i n g . " Department of I n d u s . R e l a t i o n s v. Meeks, 40 A l a . App. 110 at 645. However, i n t h i s voluntarily rather, he left work argued had a good cause So. 2d that case, Davis d i d not argue but t h a t he a t 233, he f o r doing so; fired. That d i d n o t q u i t b u t was i s , the i s s u e concerns the f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n § 25-4-78(2) whether the employee v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t consideration T h u s , we w h e t h e r t h e r e was not voluntarily inapplicable here, l i g h t Ex p a r t e Two good c a u s e and that the o f i n i t i a l l y p r o v i n g t h a t he o r she quit. we second for quitting. do n o t r e a d t h e c a s e s above as i n d i c a t i n g c l a i m a n t bears the burden did and n o t t h e Therefore, need not those d i s c u s s those cases are cases in Rogers. o f t h e c a s e s c i t e d by DIR and J i m S k i n n e r F o r d , 8 Tolin 2110859/2110863 v. 837 Director, Department of ( A l a . C i v . App. A l a . App. 558, t h i s case Industrial Relations, 2 0 0 0 ) , and A l a b a m a Power Co. 60 So. 2d 858 775 issue fired. v o l u n t a r i l y leaves her job and then to avoid d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f s h o w i n g t h a t she l e f t a t 839. T o l i n d i d not s t a t e t h a t a c l a i m a n t proving t h a t he instance. the o r she Thus, we reasoning d i d not do n o t in this his A l a . App. a t 559, be 60 So. r e a d as p l a c i n g a b u r d e n on o r she d i d not Jim Ford and court erred i n determining his employment. disqualification As from the with court c a s t on t h e c l a i m a n t the I n s o f a r as t h a t c a s e claimant voluntarily quit, i t is Skinner first unemployment c o m p e n s a t i o n . " 2d a t 860. DIR next 2d the burden of I n A l a b a m a Power Co. the her So. r e a d t h a t c a s e as c o n f l i c t i n g case. r i g h t to 775 v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t i n the n o t e d t h a t " [ t ] h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f was establish has in claimant seeks j o b f o r 'good c a u s e ' n o t c o n n e c t e d w i t h h e r work." 36 In T o l i n , t h i s c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t "[a]n employment-compensation who 2d v. A t k i n s , (1952), concerned the w h e t h e r an e m p l o y e e q u i t o r was So. to prove that to 36 may he overruled. argue that the circuit t h a t Davis d i d not v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t noted, § 25-4-78(2) receiving 9 provides for the unemployment-compensation 2110859/2110863 benefits i f a claimant leaves work v o l u n t a r i l y w i t h o u t c a u s e c o n n e c t e d w i t h s u c h work. The Davis voluntarily quit. DIR and Jim Skinner Davis voluntarily and Davis Davis does n o t doing so. The trial. quit, a r g u e t h a t he issue i s simply good argues q u i t b u t had whether Ford argue that he that did not. a "good c a u s e " f o r r e c o r d on a p p e a l does n o t c o n t a i n a t r a n s c r i p t o f However, t h e r e a p p e a r s t o be essential facts of the case, little which the dispute over circuit summarized i n i t s judgment: "Davis was f i r s t e m p l o y e d by [Jim] Skinner [ F o r d , an a u t o m o t i v e d e a l e r s h i p , ] i n 1963 and w o r k e d t h e r e u n t i l September o f 2009. He was a s s i g n e d t h e position of F l e e t Manager around 1969. Davis t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had an employment c o n t r a c t b u t i t was n e v e r o f f e r e d i n t o e v i d e n c e and t h e c o u r t h e a r d o f no r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g r e s i g n a t i o n , employment, o r termination procedures. In the absence of such proof, the Court concludes t h a t Davis was an employee a t w i l l . " D a v i s ' p o s i t i o n was q u i t e p r o f i t a b l e and he was p a i d w e l l i n t o t h e s i x f i g u r e s . He r e c e i v e d 36% o f t h e f l e e t p r o f i t s as h i s c o m p e n s a t i o n , a l o n g w i t h t h e use o f two v e h i c l e s w i t h f u e l e x p e n s e s , and $1050 a month. He was w e l l p a i d f o r h i s work. "Davis testified t h a t t h e r e were o n l y two e m p l o y e e s i n t h e F l e e t D e p a r t m e n t when he l e f t on h i s June 2009 v a c a t i o n . The o t h e r e m p l o y e e [was] Shannon D i c k e r s o n , [who] ... w o r k e d u n d e r D a v i s ' supervision. 10 the the court 2110859/2110863 " D a v i s ' t e s t i m o n y i s t h a t when he r e t u r n e d f r o m h i s June v a c a t i o n , he f o u n d t h a t a new office m a n a g e r / c o m p t r o l l e r , L a t o s h a s Mack, had b e e n h i r e d . Jimmy and Bobby S k i n n e r [ , t h e owners o f J i m S k i n n e r F o r d , ] had p l a c e d h e r i n c h a r g e o f a l l e m p l o y e e s , i n c l u d i n g D a v i s and D i c k e r s o n . " D u r i n g D a v i s ' a b s e n c e , Ms. Mack a r r i v e d and i n v e s t i g a t e d the F l e e t Department. Without even t a l k i n g t o D a v i s , she d e c i d e d t h a t t h e d e p a r t m e n t was i n need of immediate m o d e r n i z a t i o n . The e x t e n s i v e p a p e r work was done on t y p e w r i t e r and n o t computers. When D a v i s r e t u r n e d he found his d e p a r t m e n t was i n t r a n s i t i o n and he met w i t h Mack t o f i n d o u t what was h a p p e n i n g . He r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e t r a n s i t i o n be p l a c e [ d ] on h o l d o r p h a s e d i n t o a l l o w h i m and D i c k e r s o n t o c o m p l e t e t h e f i l i n g o f a $5.5 m i l l i o n ... c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , w h i c h was due by t h e end o f J u l y . Mack r e f u s e d t o g r a n t any o f D a v i s ' r e q u e s t s , l e a d i n g t o Davis a p p e a l i n g t o Bobby S k i n n e r . He t o l d Davis that Mack's d e c i s i o n s were n o t t o be q u e s t i o n e d and i f h i s c o m p l a i n t s i n v o l v e d Mack, t h e r e was n o t h i n g f o r them t o d i s c u s s . "As D a v i s was c o m p l e t i n g t h e f i l i n g s f o r t h e $5.5 million deal i n the end of July, Mack e l i m i n a t e d D i c k e r s o n ' s f l e x hour p r i v i l e g e s . This f u r t h e r f r u s t r a t e d Davis because i t d i s t u r b e d h i s a s s i s t a n t who had r e l i e d on t h a t s y s t e m b e c a u s e o f c h i l d care i s s u e s . A f t e r another unsatisfactory m e e t i n g w i t h Mack, D a v i s a g a i n a p p e a l e d t o Bobby S k i n n e r , c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t Mack l a c k e d e x p e r i e n c e and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e f l e e t o p e r a t i o n . He s o u g h t a meeting w i t h John G a l e s e [ , Jim Skinner Ford's attorney]. In making his repeated appeals throughout J u l y and A u g u s t , D a v i s t h r e a t e n e d t o r e s i g n i f t h e owners w o u l d n o t meet t o d i s c u s s t h e changes. "Ms. D i c k e r s o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t d u r i n g t h a t t i m e , D a v i s t w i c e m e n t i o n e d t h a t he had r e s i g n e d , b u t t h a t 11 2110859/2110863 she h a d n e v e r s e e n a document i n d i c a t i n g t h a t he quit. He d i d n o t b e h a v e as i f he h a d r e s i g n e d o r been f i r e d , a n d d i d n o t p a c k h i s b e l o n g i n g s n o r s t o p h i s work. "Galese t e s t i f i e d t h a t Davis had c a l l e d him v i a phone a n d r e s i g n e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e i r c o n v e r s a t i o n due t o d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h M r s . Mack. G a l e s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he a n d t h e S k i n n e r s met w i t h Davis i n August. A t t h a t meeting Davis t h r e a t e n e d t o r e s i g n i f t h e i s s u e s r e g a r d i n g Ms. Mack's c h a n g e s were not addressed. He was told that h i s r e s i g n a t i o n w o u l d be a c c e p t e d i f i t was o f f e r e d a n d D a v i s r e s p o n d e d by s a y i n g t h a t he w o u l d g e t b a c k t o them. " F i n a l l y , i n l a t e August, Galese c a l l e d Davis i n t o a meeting and t o l d him t h a t h i s r e s i g n a t i o n had b e e n a c c e p t e d . D a v i s s a i d [ ' ] o k a y [ ' ] a n d t h a t he w o u l d s t a y a r o u n d l o n g enough t o c o l l e c t t h e money due t h e d e a l e r s h i p f r o m t h e C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m . He then walked o u t . " D a v i s t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was n e v e r h i s i n t e n t t o r e s i g n and t h a t h i s t h r e a t t o r e s i g n i n t h e August m e e t i n g was o n l y a b a r g a i n i n g c h i p . H i s r e s p o n s e t o G a l e s e when he s a i d 'okay' was t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t o f h i s b e i n g caught c o m p l e t e l y o f f - g u a r d . "Galese testified that during the August m e e t i n g , t h e S k i n n e r s a n d he d i s c u s s e d w h e t h e r t o do a n y t h i n g t o r e t a i n D a v i s ' employment, b u t d e c i d e d against i t . The r e c o r d shows t h e y d e c i d e d t o a c c e p t Davis' ' r e s i g n a t i o n . ' In the l a t e August meeting, and a g a i n i n t h e S e p t e m b e r 3, 2009, m e e t i n g , G a l e s e t o l d D a v i s t h a t h i s r e s i g n a t i o n h a d been a c c e p t e d . D u r i n g t h e S e p t e m b e r 3, 2009 m e e t i n g , w h i c h was r e c o r d e d and e n t e r e d into evidence ... Galese accepted Davis' r e s i g n a t i o n a second time. " G a l e s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he a n d t h e S k i n n e r s d i d not ask Davis t o s i g n a r e s i g n a t i o n l e t t e r , although 12 2110859/2110863 he a d m i t t e d t h a t i t w o u l d have been a g o o d i d e a . G a l e s e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was n o t an a g e n t o f J i m S k i n n e r F o r d , t h a t he d i d n o t have a u t h o r i t y t o s i g n documents on b e h a l f o f [ J i m ] S k i n n e r [Ford], but t h a t he a c c e p t e d Mr. D a v i s ' r e s i g n a t i o n . Itis undisputed that Davis n e i t h e r signed nor submitted a w r i t t e n r e s i g n a t i o n a n d began c l e a n i n g o u t h i s o f f i c e i n S e p t e m b e r o f 2009." B a s e d on t h a t e v i d e n c e , t h e c i r c u i t court found " t h a t t h e employer has f a i l e d t o r e a s o n a b l y s a t i s f y the court that Davis voluntarily left his employment. The C o u r t i s convinced that what h a p p e n e d i s t h a t [Jim] S k i n n e r [ F o r d ] s o u g h t g r e a t e r p r o f i t a b i l i t y from D a v i s ' department and c o n c l u d e d t h a t he was m a k i n g t o o much money. [ J i m ] S k i n n e r [Ford] conveniently misconstrued h i s threat of r e s i g n a t i o n as a b i n d i n g , v o l u n t a r y r e s i g n a t i o n , i n order t o a c h i e v e i t s ends. " D a v i s ' e a r n i n g s were f a r b e y o n d t h e norm a n d [Jim] S k i n n e r [ F o r d ] was aware o f t h a t b e f o r e h i s threat to resign. The e v i d e n c e i s that Ms. D i c k e r s o n now makes 20% a n d 2 5 % o f p r o f i t s f r o m t h e f l e e t o p e r a t i o n , f a r l e s s t h a n D a v i s was m a k i n g . D a v i s ' t h r e a t t o r e s i g n was j u s t a b a r g a i n i n g t o o l . Testimony shows that Galese cannot accept r e s i g n a t i o n s a t S k i n n e r and S k i n n e r ' s failure to obtain a written resignation. The e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e r e were m u l t i p l e r e s i g n a t i o n a c c e p t a n c e s [ ] h e l p s a t i s f y the Court that Davis d i d not v o l u n t a r i l y offer a resignation. " I n s o f a r as t h e e v i d e n c e shows, D a v i s was an e m p l o y e e - a t - w i l l and S k i n n e r had a l e g a l r i g h t under A l a b a m a employment l a w t o t e r m i n a t e h i s employment f o r any r e a s o n w h a t s o e v e r , r e g a r d l e s s o f h i s many years of f a i t h f u l s e r v i c e . II 13 2110859/2110863 "The S k i n n e r s e x e r c i s e d t h a t r i g h t t o D a v i s ' employment. He was f i r e d . " terminate Mr. Our standard of review follows: in this case i s as "Where e v i d e n c e i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r e t e n u s , we presume t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s i s s u e s o f f a c t a r e c o r r e c t , and we w i l l n o t d i s t them u n l e s s t h e y a r e c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , without s u p p o r t i n g evidence, m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t , or a g a i n s t the g r e a t weight of the evidence. However, when t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y a p p l i e s t h e law t o t h e f a c t s , l the no presumption of correctness attaches to the c o u r t ' s judgment." -I- ^-^ ^ -r -! ^ ^-^ -I- ^-P ^ -r -r -! ^ Ex p a r t e Lamar A d v e r t i s i n g Co., 2002) (citations ^ ^ 849 ^ TT ^ So. -r T ^ -r -r ^ -.^ 2d 928, -r T^-^ ^ v-^ 929-30 ( A l a . omitted). "The Unemployment C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t i s ' i n s u r a n c e f o r t h e u n e m p l o y e d w o r k e r and i s i n t e n d e d t o be a r e m e d i a l measure f o r h i s b e n e f i t . ' D e p a r t m e n t o f I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s v. J a c o , 337 So. 2d 374, 376 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1976) [ ( o v e r r u l e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s by Ex p a r t e R o g e r s , 68 So. 3d 773 ( A l a . 2 0 1 0 ) ) ] . ' I t s h o u l d be l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d i n [ t h e ] c l a i m a n t ' s f a v o r and t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f r o m b e n e f i t s s h o u l d be n a r r o w l y c o n s t r u e d . ' D e p a r t m e n t o f Industrial R e l a t i o n s v. S m i t h , 360 So. 2d 726, 727 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . ) , c e r t . den., 360 So. 2d 728 ( A l a . 1 9 7 8 ) . " S t a t e Dep't o f I n d u s . R e l a t i o n s v. B r y a n t , 697 So. 2d 469, ( A l a . C i v . App. 1997). "The w o r d ' v o l u n t a r y ' i s n o t d e f i n e d i n A l a . Code 1975, § 25-4-78. 'The rules of s t a t u t o r y construction r e q u i r e t h a t t h e words u s e d i n a s t a t u t e be g i v e n t h e i r p l a i n , n a t u r a l , o r d i n a r y , and commonly u n d e r s t o o d m e a n i n g . ' Ex P a r t e New England M u t u a l L i f e I n s . Co., 663 So. 2d 952, 955 ( A l a . 1995) ( c i t i n g A l a b a m a Farm B u r e a u M u t u a l C a s u a l t y 14 470 2110859/2110863 Co. v. C i t y o f H a r t s e l l e , 460 So. 2d 1219, 1224 (Ala. 1984)). The w o r d ' v o l u n t a r y ' i m p l i e s t h e m a k i n g o f a d e c i s i o n by one's own a c c o r d o r c h o i c e . 'Voluntary' i s d e f i n e d as ' [ r ] e s u l t i n g f r o m f r e e choice, without compulsion or solicitation.' B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 1575 ( 6 t h ed. 1 9 9 0 ) . " D i r e c t o r , Dep't o f I n d u s . R e l a t i o n s v. F o r d , 1390 ( A l a . C i v . App. A l t h o u g h we a recent Arizona P.3d case Arizona her can f i n d no A l a b a m a c a s e d i r e c t l y from A r i z o n a (Ariz. Ct. considered employment t h a t case, the for i s informative. App. 2011), w h e t h e r an the she but denied quitting,' definitely quitting.'" The did not was going she r e c e i v e her bonus c h e c k by would g i v e her point, Figueroa 548, 260 not r e c e i v e her bonus. the The end purposes. In that ever saying 260 employee " s a i d [ t h a t Thursday] of the Id. ... that P.3d at i f 'she that she Three workweek i f she employee d i d not 15 of quit other t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e n o t i f i e d them t h a t n o t i c e by v. Appeals supervisor to g i v e her n o t i c e of q u i t t i n g . ' " employees t e s t i f i e d of 227 A r i z . a t 549, employer a l l e g e d t h a t the on became " u p s e t a b o u t her 1114. 1388, voluntarily unemployment-compensation 'advised 'she was 2d Ariz. Court e m p l o y e e had e m p l o y e e a l l e g e d t h a t she consider In 227 [ n o t r e c e i v i n g a] bonus and may So. 1997). Department of Economic S e c u r i t y , 1113 700 she did r e c e i v e a bonus. 2110859/2110863 That Friday, the employer began t o change t h e l o c k s d o o r s and a s k e d t h e e m p l o y e e t o l e a v e . The c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e f a c t s only that at Id. "supported a [ t h e e m p l o y e e ] s a i d she p l a n n e d t o q u i t . " 1116, 260 P.3d a t 5 5 1 . on t h e The c o u r t f u r t h e r finding 227 A r i z . concluded that t h e e m p l o y e e n e v e r a c t u a l l y a c t e d t o s e p a r a t e f r o m employment. I n s t e a d , the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e d t h a t the employer cause the s e p a r a t i o n from t h e employment. had a c t e d t o Thus, the court c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e d i d n o t q u i t h e r employment. I d . Similarly, circuit his in this court's finding employment. The case, the evidence supports the that Davis d i d not v o l u n t a r i l y circuit court noted that quit Galese, the attorney f o r Jim Skinner Ford, t e s t i f i e d that Davis "resigned" to him during circuit court two telephone also conversations. observed that Galese r e s i g n a t i o n s " on b e h a l f o f J i m S k i n n e r F o r d . However, "cannot the accept Apparently after the t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n s , D a v i s had a meeting w i t h G a l e s e and t h e S k i n n e r s a t w h i c h he t h r e a t e n e d t o r e s i g n i f c e r t a i n of h i s c o n c e r n s were n o t a d d r e s s e d . his r e s i g n a t i o n would indicated that When D a v i s was t o l d be a c c e p t e d i f i t were o f f e r e d , "he w o u l d g e t b a c k t o them." 16 However, that Davis Davis 2110859/2110863 did not offer his r e s i g n a t i o n , and the circuit court found c r e d i b l e h i s e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t he u s e d h i s t h r e a t t o r e s i g n as simply a bargaining purported was no these to l a t e r chip. "accept" resignation offer facts, Thus, Davis's on the did n o t v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t b u t was worked under Davis, t h a t he "had assigned time little Davis fired, resigned." there Ford, testified In p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t Davis as i f he was w i t h i n the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s p r o v i n c e to various 2d 982, 990 mentioned the evidence noting that at had resigned or ( A l a . C i v . App. 2005). was n o r s t o p h i s work." It "to a s s i g n such weight as i t may have deemed By a c t i n g as i f he had So. not "resigned," c o n s i s t e n t w i t h someone u s i n g t h e 17 the been M i l l e r v. A s s o c i a t e d G u l f L a n d C o r p . , 941 behavior that Dickerson, twice r e s i g n e d e v e n a f t e r t e l l i n g a c o w o r k e r t h a t he had Davis's not However, t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t e v i d e n t l y behave of on T h a t i s , he some e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t i n g and d i d n o t p a c k h i s b e l o n g i n g s aspects Based discharged. weight to that testimony, " d i d not appropriate." supra. instead D a v i s had i n f a c t v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t . who Ford f r o m h i s employment was of h i s " f r e e c h o i c e . " r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e was Jim t a b l e to accept. separation result Skinner resignation offer, Davis's the We when threat 2110859/2110863 o f r e s i g n a t i o n as a " b a r g a i n i n g I n c o n c l u s i o n , we h o l d of p r o v i n g that a claimant compensation benefits v o l u n t a r i l y q u i t work. determining that employment. Our chip." t h a t t h e employer has t h e burden i s d i s q u a l i f i e d f r o m unemployment- on the basis that the claimant We a f f i r m t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t Davis did decision not voluntarily pretermits Jim quit Skinner his Ford's argument t h a t , i f D a v i s d i d i n f a c t q u i t h i s employment, d i d so w i t h o u t good c a u s e . 2110859 -- AFFIRMED. 2110863 -- AFFIRMED. All the judges concur. 18 he

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.