Vicki Joan Brunson Stroeker, Katie Brunson, and Angela M. Brunson v. Judith Harold

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REL: 09/14/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2012 2101192 V i c k i Joan Brunson S t r o e k e r , K a t i e Brunson, and Angela M. Brunson v. Judith Harold Appeal from Mobile C i r c u i t Court (DR-92-502361.04) On A p p l i c a t i o n f o r R e h e a r i n g 2110822 V i c k i Joan Brunson S t r o e k e r , K a t i e Brunson, and Angela M. Brunson v. Judith Harold Appeal from Mobile C i r c u i t Court (CV-10-901005) MOORE, J u d g e . On A p r i l 13, no. 2101192, 2012, t h i s c o u r t i s s u e d an o p i n i o n i n a p p e a l affirming a summary judgment entered by the Domestic R e l a t i o n s D i v i s i o n of the M o b i l e C i r c u i t C o u r t domestic-relations Stroeker, Katie hereinafter The Brunson, considering against and that M. Brunson as "the applied application the Joan Angela subsequently the Vicki collectively r e f e r r e d to appellants discovered court") for appellants had for ("the Brunson (sometimes appellants"). rehearing. rehearing, While this also appealed a court judgment e n t e r e d by t h e M o b i l e C i r c u i t C o u r t i n v o l v i n g t h e same g e n e r a l s u b j e c t m a t t e r t o t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t . sponte requested to t h i s 7(6), Ala. Code 2110822 and 2101192 for Accordingly, our submission 1975. in the was The has no. granted, second now appeal was 13, of rendering 2012, 2101192 following i s substituted therefor. 2 opinion is sua appeal pursuant to § 12-2- docketed been c o n s o l i d a t e d w i t h purpose April appeal court supreme c o u r t t r a n s f e r t h a t c o u r t ; that request a p p e a l no. no. t h a t the This as appeal one opinion. on original withdrawn, and the 2 1 0 1 1 9 2 ; 2110822 F a c t u a l and P r o c e d u r a l On A p r i l 19, 1993, the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s court a judgment d i v o r c i n g S t r o e k e r Talmadge B r u n s o n provided, Background ("the f o r m e r w i f e " ) ("the f o r m e r h u s b a n d " ) . from entered Joseph The d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t in pertinent part: "[The f o r m e r h u s b a n d ] s h a l l name t h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n [ K a t i e and A n g e l a B r u n s o n ] as b e n e f i c i a r i e s on h i s p r e s e n t l i f e i n s u r a n c e p r o g r a m and s h a l l furnish s u c h p r o o f t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n have b e e n so d e s i g n a t e d by f u r n i s h i n g a copy o f t h e d e s i g n a t i o n t o [ t h e former w i f e ] w i t h i n t h i r t y days from the d a t e of t h i s Judgment." On S e p t e m b e r 22, 1993, the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t purported to judgment 9, enter an amended confirming a June 1993, a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d and t h e f o r m e r w i f e ; t h a t amended j u d g m e n t d i d n o t m o d i f y t h e f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n i n any respect. I n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h the d i v o r c e judgment, the h u s b a n d d e s i g n a t e d K a t i e B r u n s o n and A n g e l a B r u n s o n former (sometimes h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as " t h e c h i l d r e n " ) , t h e n ages s i x and three years, as t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s of a w h o l e - l i f e insurance p o l i c y p a y i n g $100,000 upon h i s d e a t h . The the former w i f e ' s former former wife's husband's f a m i l y owns an i n s u r a n c e father acted life-insurance 3 as the policy. agent company, to After secure the and the former 2 1 0 1 1 9 2 ; 2110822 h u s b a n d went t o p r i s o n i n 1995, most o f t h e premiums the former w i f e ' s to maintain the p o l i c y . father paid July 31, c h i l d had r e a c h e d the 2009, o v e r a y e a r a f t e r t h e y o u n g e r On age o f m a j o r i t y , t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d c h a n g e d t h e b e n e f i c i a r y on t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y from the c h i l d r e n t o J u d i t h H a r o l d , with whom he h a d h a d a l o n g - s t a n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . The point. former On husband March domestic-relations 10, contracted 2010, court the terminal former a petition cancer wife at filed some in the f o r contempt a g a i n s t the f o r m e r h u s b a n d , a l l e g i n g t h a t he h a d c o n t e m p t u o u s l y v i o l a t e d the life-insurance provision requesting dying the of that that court order the divorce judgment and t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d , who was f r o m c a n c e r , t o i m m e d i a t e l y r e i n s t a t e t h e c h i l d r e n as b e n e f i c i a r i e s on h i s l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . husband died within hours a f t e r the contempt The former petition f i l e d ; the former w i f e n o t i f i e d the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s was court t h e n e x t day o f t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s d e a t h and r e q u e s t e d t h a t the proceeds into the children o f t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y be court. as The plaintiffs former and wife to 4 also substitute f r o z e n and moved Frank to paid add the Kruse, the 2 1 0 1 1 9 2 ; 2110822 administrator of the former d e f e n d a n t ; t h a t m o t i o n was husband's estate, as the granted. I n A p r i l 2010, H a r o l d moved t o be added as a p a r t y t o t h e action. Although the former wife asserting that Harold action and t h a t court granted Harold both was n o t a p r o p e r p a r t y she l a c k e d standing, Harold's motion. filed objected to that motion, i n t h e contempt the domestic-relations A l s o i n A p r i l 2010, K r u s e and answers a s s e r t i n g t h a t the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n i n t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t no l o n g e r a p p l i e d a f t e r t h e children the r e a c h e d t h e age o f m a j o r i t y . former beneficiary husband had and r e q u e s t e d validly that Harold designated asserted her as the domestic-relations that the court d e c l a r e t h a t she was e n t i t l e d t o t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s . The a p p e l l a n t s the r e p l i e d t h a t t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n was p r o d u c t o f an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e f o r m e r w i f e former husband, that the former husband a g r e e m e n t , a n d t h a t i t s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d had and t h e drafted the so t h a t i t d i d n o t e x p i r e when t h e c h i l d r e n r e a c h e d t h e age o f m a j o r i t y . On May 10, 2010, OM F i n a n c i a l L i f e I n s u r a n c e Company, t h e insurer that issued the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y covering former husband, f i l e d , the p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 22, A l a . R. C i v . P., 5 2101192; 2110822 a complaint Mobile for Circuit asserted Court that appellants ("the i t was and proceeds of interpleader the civil circuit aware of and that Harold the in division court"). the The controversy i t had of the insurer l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y other the interest in no between the t h a n t o pay the p r o p e r b e n e f i c i a r y or b e n e f i c i a r i e s ; i t r e q u e s t e d a judgment declaring insurer the proper named as appellants and beneficiary defendants to or beneficiaries. i t s interpleader action declare her answered the Harold's claim challenged the Harold. H a r o l d answered the c o m p l a i n t r e q u e s t i n g t h a t the court The the proper complaint to the and beneficiary. sought insurance The discovery proceeds. circuit appellants relevant The to appellants t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e 2009 b e n e f i c i a r y d e s i g n a t i o n on the former husband's l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y , a s s e r t i n g t h a t i t had been fraudulently requested Judicial a on Information bench t r i a l In trial or that claim. System, the i n August January made 2011, was a forgery, According c a u s e was to and they the State scheduled for a 2011. the appellants c o m p e t i n g summary-judgment m o t i o n s i n t h e 6 and Harold filed domestic-relations 2101192; 2110822 court. After receiving oral domestic-relations denying the Harold's court court entered the order an on on motions, May ruled that motion. Harold was a matter of law s h o u l d be p a i d t o H a r o l d . m o t i o n t o v a c a t e t h e May The entitled and The 4, to ordered the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s ordered proceeds the with insurer's the depositing to of the prejudice. court denied 1, 2011, testify the 1 On circuit deposit the circuit insurance the c i r c u i t c o u r t then d i s m i s s e d with July the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e that those at the t r i a l proceeds 29, a pending i n c o u r t , on J u l y the 18, life-insurance court. proceeds with Upon the the clerk, the i n s u r e r from the a c t i o n , 2011, the domestic-relations the a p p e l l a n t s ' postjudgment motion. appellants granting judgment. c o u r t , the clerk 2011, appellants immediately f i l e d 2011, insurer the domestic-relations W h i l e t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n was 2011, 4, a p p e l l a n t s ' summary-judgment m o t i o n and summary-judgment p r o c e e d s as argument designated i n the c i r c u i t their expert On August witness to c o u r t on t h e i s s u e o f the The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e i n s u r e r d e p o s i t e d t h e l i f e i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s on J u l y 29, 2011, b u t t h a t t h e circuit c o u r t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e i n s u r e r ' s a c t i o n and d i s m i s s e d i t f r o m t h e a c t i o n on J u l y 16, 2011. The r e c o r d does n o t e x p l a i n t h e discrepancy. 1 7 2101192; 2110822 authenticity of the beneficiary designation. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r , H a r o l d moved t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t t o e n f o r c e 4, 2011, j u d g m e n t entered by the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s asserting that doctrines o f r e s j u d i c a t a and/or September 9, 2011, t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t g r a n t e d to enforce the c i r c u i t - c o u r t the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s explanation. The a p p e l l a n t s t h e May filed action was collateral court's their court, barred by estoppel. 2 the On Harold's motion judgment, without n o t i c e of appeal of t h e d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t ' s May 4, 2011, j u d g m e n t t h a t same day. On September 15, 2011, the a p p e l l a n t s amend, o r v a c a t e t h e c i r c u i t court denied that motion court's on moved t o judgment. September 30, The 2011, alter, circuit and a p p e l l a n t s t i m e l y a p p e a l e d t h a t j u d g m e n t t o o u r supreme the court, w h i c h as n o t e d e a r l i e r , s u b s e q u e n t l y t r a n s f e r r e d t h e a p p e a l t o this court. H a r o l d t h e n amended h e r answer t o a s s e r t t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s o f r e s j u d i c a t a and c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l , and she supplemented her motion t o enforce the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t ' s judgment. 2 8 2101192; 2110822 Analysis I. We The begin Estate our i s not a Proper analysis by Appellee dismissing Kruse, a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s e s t a t e , as an As stated above, a g a i n s t the moved to the appellants former husband b e f o r e s u b s t i t u t e the defendant. Although filed a administrator of appellee. contempt h i s d e a t h and his the action subsequently estate as the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t g r a n t e d a that motion, i t appears from the r e c o r d t h a t the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t d i d not consider the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e of whether a c o n t e m p t a c t i o n can p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e o f a d e c e a s e d person. Our point, research an unreported Connecticut, D i a n a v. (Conn. S u p e r . 2001) sued her prompted has husband the revealed opinion Diana, only from (No. one the case Superior automatic Court FA9969335, S e p t . 14, (not r e p o r t e d i n A . 2 d ) . for a directly on of 2001) In Diana, a w i f e dissolution of the issuance an i n t e r l o c u t o r y order of marriage, which p r e v e n t i n g e i t h e r p a r t y f r o m c h a n g i n g t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s on h i s or her life-insurance policies. a c t i o n was The husband d i e d w h i l e pending; the w i f e subsequently 9 discovered that the the 2101192; 2110822 husband had removed insurance p o l i c y . estate of contempt the The her the b e n e f i c i a r y of his life- w i f e moved t h e c o u r t t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e h u s b a n d as action against Connecticut as a defendant the estate. so she The could pursue Superior Court a of said: "A s u b s t i t u t e d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t v i c a r i o u s l y be found i n contempt of c o u r t f o r v i o l a t i n g court o r d e r s d i r e c t e d to the deceased defendant. In t h i s case, even i f the c o u r t found the d e f e n d a n t husband t o have b e e n i n c i v i l c o n t e m p t , t h e e x e c u t o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e s t a t e does n o t have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o change t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e d e c e d e n t ' s life i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y nor r e d i s t r i b u t e the death b e n e f i t s p a i d t o t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s by t h e i n s u r a n c e company. 'The proceeds of a l i f e insurance p o l i c y made p a y a b l e t o a named b e n e f i c i a r y a r e n o t a s s e t s o f t h e e s t a t e , b u t b e l o n g s o l e l y t o t h e b e n e f i c i a r y . ' 31 Am. J u r . 2d, E x e c u t o r s and A d m i n i s t r a t o r s 257, § 509 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . See G e n e r a l S t a t u t e § 45a-347. I n s u r a n c e d e a t h b e n e f i t s a r e p a i d by t h e i n s u r e r d i r e c t l y t o t h e named b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e p o l i c y . ' I t f o l l o w s , then, that satisfying the beneficiary is the c o n t r a c t u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the i n s u r e r not the fiduciary responsibility of the [executor].' Equitable Life Insurance S o c i e t y of the United S t a t e s v. S a n d r a P o r t e r - E n g e l h a r t , 867 F.2d 79 ( 1 s t Cir. 1989) Contempt punishment coercion C.G., 849 located actions for to So. any have one of two d e l i b e r a t e disobedience force compliance with 2d 200, Alabama 205 purposes, to court court 2002) . orders caselaw that 10 allows the We or T.L.D. orders. ( A l a . C i v . App. either v. have not estate of a 2101192; 2110822 d e c e a s e d p e r s o n t o be p u n i s h e d f o r a l l e g e d c o n t e m p t u o u s committed by t h e deceased Furthermore, proceeds person, like made i n Connecticut, payable the estate representative to parties before h i s or her death. i n Alabama l i f e - i n s u r a n c e other than of the deceased person, of the estate become a p a r t o f t h e e s t a t e . 595 person acts the deceased or the personal of the deceased person do n o t See Rau v. Rau, 429 So. 2d 593, ( A l a . C i v . App. 1982) ("[B]y v i r t u e o f § 27-14-29, [ A l a . ] Code 1975, t h e p r o c e e d s case would creditor's n o t be a claims."). of the p o l i c y of insurance part of the estate Kruse, i n this nor subject as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r to of the f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s e s t a t e , h a s no i n t e r e s t i n t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e policy or the proceeds therefrom. See F i r s t N a t ' l Bank o f Mobile v. Pope, 270 A l a . 202, 205, 117 So. 2d 174, 176 (1960) ( h o l d i n g t h a t e s t a t e o f i n s u r e d was n o t i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y i n dispute over purported insurance constructive proceeds between beneficiary trustees because "[t]he and personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s no [ o w n e r s h i p ] i n t e r e s t i n t h e p o l i c i e s as to require relations t h a t he be made a p a r t y " ) . court Thus, t h e d o m e s t i c - c o u l d n o t have, t h r o u g h i t s contempt powers, 11 2 1 0 1 1 9 2 ; 2110822 compelled Kruse to reform the b e n e f i c i a r y d e s i g n a t i o n or to pay t h e c h i l d r e n t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s . In short, jurisdiction contempt during the to f o r any his designation. domestic-relations find actions lifetime 3 the estate of undertaken with regard court the by to did former the the have in husband beneficiary T h u s , b e c a u s e t h e e s t a t e has no i n t e r e s t i n t h e as a p a r t y appeal. II. The husband former l i f e - i n s u r a n c e proceeds, Kruse i s hereby dismissed to t h i s not The Domestic-relations appellants argue at length C o u r t ' s Judgment in their brief to this c o u r t i n a p p e a l no. 2101192 t h a t t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n We n o t e t h a t t h e d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t d i d n o t r u l e on t h e c o n t e m p t m o t i o n a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e , w h i c h o r d i n a r i l y would render i t s judgment n o n f i n a l . However, b e c a u s e any r u l i n g on t h e c o n t e m p t m o t i o n w o u l d have b e e n v o i d f o r l a c k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n anyway, we c o n s i d e r t h e summary j u d g m e n t t o have disposed of a l l matters p r o p e r l y pending before the domesticrelations court. 3 We a l s o n o t e t h a t , on May 11, 2010, t h e a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d a m o t i o n t o c o m p e l t h e e s t a t e t o p a y an a l l e g e d c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e o f $120,000, w h i c h the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t d i d not adjudicate. However, only a probate court has j u r i s d i c t i o n over a c h i l d - s u p p o r t - a r r e a r a g e c l a i m a g a i n s t the e s t a t e of a deceased o b l i g o r parent. See g e n e r a l l y S m i t h v. E s t a t e o f Baucom, 682 So. 2d 1065 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1996) . H e n c e , t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t t o r u l e on t h a t c l a i m does n o t r e n d e r i t s j u d g m e n t n o n f i n a l . 12 2 1 0 1 1 9 2 ; 2110822 in the divorce voluntary judgment should property-settlement wife and the former husband. Ala. 43, 158 So. 2d 901 be viewed agreement between In W i l l i a m s 4 (1963), the as v. part the of a former Williams, supreme c o u r t h e l d 276 that s u c h an a g r e e m e n t , when i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t , could create proceeds. a The vested equitable record in this f o l l o w i n g an o r e t e n u s h e a r i n g , unilaterally i t s A p r i l 19, imposed the 1993, interest case in shows, life-insurance however, that, the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s court l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n as p a r t d i v o r c e judgment. The former husband of and H a r o l d a s s e r t s t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t s have r a i s e d t h i s argument f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l and, t h u s , t h a t t h i s c o u r t may n o t c o n s i d e r i t . See S h i v e r v. B u t l e r C n t y . Bd. o f Educ., 797 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) ( " G e n e r a l l y , a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t c a n n o t c o n s i d e r a r g u m e n t s made f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l . " ) . We n o t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t s a s s e r t e d i n t h e i r postjudgment motion t h a t the p r o v i s i o n a t i s s u e was n o t i n t h e n a t u r e o f a c h i l d - s u p p o r t a w a r d , as H a r o l d has a s s e r t e d . " ' " [ A ] t r i a l c o u r t has t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o c o n s i d e r a new l e g a l argument i n a p o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n , b u t i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o do s o . " ' " E s p i n o z a v. R u d o l p h , 46 So. 3d 403, 416 ( A l a . 2010) ( q u o t i n g S p e c i a l A s s e t s , L.L.C. v. Chase Home F i n . , L.L.C., 991 So. 2d 668, 678 ( A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n G r e e n T r e e A c c e p t a n c e , I n c . v. B l a l o c k , 525 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Ala. 1988)). In denying the a p p e l l a n t s ' postjudgment motion, the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t had c o n s i d e r e d t h e a r g u m e n t s p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l f o r t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' p o s t j u d g m e n t motion. We w i l l t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r t h e a p p e l l a n t s ' argument on a p p e a l . 4 13 2101192; 2110822 the former wife agreement dated court purported attempted June 9, to modify 1993, which that the d i d not insurance provision. alter any The of the original language provision since i t s i n c e p t i o n ; the subsequent former wife and the former amounts m e r e l y must a b i d e by t h e t e r m s agreement. an domestic-relations intact c a n n o t be by t o c o n f i r m on S e p t e m b e r 22, 1993; h o w e v e r , t h e agreement provision judgment husband to their to of has the life- remained agreement of the the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e acknowledgment of the o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e that they judgment c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h o s e t e r m s 5 Thus, d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s When a t r i a l we conclude that Williams is and by not case. court i n a domestic-relations an o b l i g o r s p o u s e t o d e s i g n a t e action orders c h i l d r e n o f t h e m a r r i a g e as t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s of a l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y , the s o l e purpose of We f u r t h e r n o t e t h a t , i f t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n was p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r e d p a r t o f a m a r i t a l - p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n , as t h e a p p e l l a n t s a r g u e , t h e d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t w o u l d have l o s t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o m o d i f y t h a t p r o v i s i o n a f t e r 30 d a y s . Dunn v. Dunn, 12 So. 3d 704, 709 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2008) . A d d i t i o n a l l y , " p a r t i e s t o a d i v o r c e d e c r e e may n o t change o r m o d i f y t h e d e c r e e m e r e l y by an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s . " H o l l a n d v. H o l l a n d , 406 So. 2d 877, 879 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . Hence, any p u r p o r t e d m o d i f i c a t i o n by t h e o r d e r e n t e r e d on S e p t e m b e r 22, 1993, w o u l d have b e e n i n e f f e c t i v e . 5 14 2101192; 2110822 t h a t p r o v i s i o n i s t o s e c u r e t h e payment o f c h i l d s u p p o r t . Whitten v. "[m]inor c h i l d r e n a r e commonly d e s i g n a t e d life Whitten, insurance pursuant to ( q u o t i n g H. United supra, order an as divorce." of C l a r k , J r . , The States 67 Ky. 718-19 L . J . 239 in Whitten, 842 (Ala. (2d Civ. App. in 'an Law ed. and court noted aspect of 592 So. child 2d support' at 1988), and citing Note, B a s e d i n p a r t on t h a t held a c t i o n does n o t Jordan, that a 688 case That reason, "because the n.4 trial the Child Divorce language So. 2d court 839, in a have t o s t a t e i t s r e a s o n s m a n d a t i n g l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n s l i k e t h e one this 186 of Domestic R e l a t i o n s i n i n J o r d a n v. 1997), that as b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e U n i f o r m M a r r i a g e and (1978)). this court, domestic-relations for supreme policies Support, L i f e Insurance, Act, our In reason w i l l a l w a y s be at issue identical. q u i t e o b v i o u s l y , i s to i n s u r e t h a t minor c h i l d r e n w i l l r e c e i v e support i n the event the s u p p o r t i n g p a r e n t d i e s . " Under Alabama law, i n a p p l i c a b l e h e r e , see (Ala. 1989) educational (Ala. 1983) Ex p a r t e (authorizing support), with two notable B a y l i s s , 550 courts to award exceptions So. 2d postminority 15 support 991 postminority- and Ex p a r t e B r e w i n g t o n , 445 (allowing 986, for So. 2d 294 disabled 2101192; 2110822 c h i l d r e n ) , a p a r e n t g e n e r a l l y does n o t owe c h i l d s u p p o r t the date when Whitten, a supra, reverse a child attains o u r supreme circuit court's t h e age court of majority. seized judgment on t h a t that had point negated past In to the h u s b a n d ' s change o f b e n e f i c i a r y f r o m t h e c h i l d o f h i s f o r m e r marriage judgment, full t o other relatives. t h e husband Based on a d e f a u l t i n W h i t t e n was r e q u i r e d f o r c e and e f f e c t a l l l i f e insurance divorce t o "'keep i n on h i s l i f e w i t h t h e p a r t i e s ' m i n o r c h i l d as t h e i r r e v o c a b l e b e n e f i c i a r i e s [ s i c ] o f such i n s u r a n c e . ' " 592 So. 2d a t 184. The supreme c o u r t held t h a t t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n amounted t o a c h i l d - s u p p o r t a w a r d t h a t d i d n o t c r e a t e an i n d e f e a s i b l e , e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t in the the proceeds of the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y that l a s t e d past point supreme "[T]he when t h e c h i l d court trial therefore court's r e a c h e d t h e age o f m a j o r i t y . reversed award the judgment, of the proceeds to The stating: [the c h i l d ] a f t e r he h a d a t t a i n e d t h e age o f m a j o r i t y i n e f f e c t amounted t o an [ u n a u t h o r i z e d ] award o f p o s t m i n o r i t y support." 592 So. 2d a t 186; s e e a l s o Brown v. Brown, 604 So. 2d a t 369 ( h o l d i n g t h a t c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t i n favor of the minor c h i l d a p p l i e d t o life-insurance p r o c e e d s b a s e d on a p r o v i s i o n i n t h e d i v o r c e 16 2101192; 2110822 judgment t h a t o b l i g a t e d the the father to designate irrevocable beneficiary during In states this only case, that the the life-insurance provision former child husband "shall r e q u i r e t h a t the life at issue name t h e minor insurance"; former husband t h e c h i l d r e n as i r r e v o c a b l e b e n e f i c i a r i e s . the minority term of the "minor" d e s c r i b i n g the c h i l d r e n , and could c h i l d r e n , not beneficiary status. insurance be the The l i f e - i n s u r a n c e appellants reasonably provisions argue support, The to like as only their the one in this case believed of the postminority the appellants beneficiaries remain the m i n o r i t y of the b e n e f i t e d c h i l d r e n secure which i s not subjectively that l i m i t i n g the p e r i o d of as construed u n l e s s the judgment e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e s t h a t the l i f e intended through However, W h i t t e n i m p l i e s t h a t a l l l i f e - i n v i o l a t e only during is the designate p r o v i s i o n does n o t e x p r e s s l y s t a t e t h a t i t l a s t s o n l y the as child's minority). c h i l d r e n as b e n e f i c i a r i e s on h i s p r e s e n t p r o v i s i o n does n o t the Bayliss or insurance Brewington case here. also state the that the children would life-insurance policy former remain after m i n o r i t y e n d e d and t h a t t h e f o r m e r w i f e ' s f a m i l y a c t e d on 17 wife the their that 2101192; 2110822 belief by paying the premiums due on the policy. a p p e l l a n t s argue t h a t t h i s p a r o l evidence c r e a t e s a o f f a c t as t o t h e i n t e n t o f t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d and the wife i n using language However, provision. the the contained The question former i n the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e domestic-relations court, not the f o r m e r h u s b a n d and t h e f o r m e r w i f e , c r a f t e d t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e provision, and their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o v i s i o n are i m m a t e r i a l . the terms of that I f a judgment i s ambiguous, a c o u r t can c o n s i d e r i t s m e a n i n g i n l i g h t o f t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d , b u t i t c a n n o t r e s o r t t o p a r o l e v i d e n c e f r o m t h e p a r t i e s as i f i t was construing intent. 399 a to ascertain their R e a d i n g v. B a l l , ( C t . App. Whitten, contract the 1987). 291 divorce minority, so 492, 496, 354 More t o t h e p o i n t , we judgment f o r m e r h u s b a n d t o name t h e their S.C. understanding there c h i l d r e n as i s no S.E.2d find that, unambiguously and 397, under required the b e n e f i c i a r i e s during need t o resort to extrinsic e v i d e n c e t o d e t e r m i n e the meaning of i t s terms. The attained changed policy. undisputed the the age evidence of m a j o r i t y beneficiary According to shows that both long before designation Whitten, 18 of which children had the former the life-insurance we are husband required to 2101192; 2110822 follow, see interest § the 12-3-16, A l a . Code children obtained e n d e d on t h e i r 1 9 t h b i r t h d a y s . was free violating to change the his 1975, i n the whatever 6 life-insurance policy Thereafter, beneficiary life-insurance equitable the former husband designation provision in without the divorce judgment. C o n s e q u e n t l y , once t h e c h i l d r e n a t t a i n e d t h e age majority, the domestic-relations court over the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e proceeds. 186 ("Because t h e the proceeds of date trial the J e f f r e y Whitten W h i t t e n was policy that court's lacked See W h i t t e n , equitable p o l i c y terminated a t t a i n e d the age on of f r e e , t h e r e a f t e r , t o make any he deemed proper."). of jurisdiction 592 So. jurisdiction June 21, 1990, majority, 2d at over the William d i s p o s i t i o n of h i s Thus, its judgment We n o t e t h a t , i n W h i t t e n , t h e supreme c o u r t d i d n o t have b e f o r e i t a c a s e i n w h i c h t h e d e c e a s e d o b l i g o r had died l e a v i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e , as has b e e n a l l e g e d i n t h i s case. Nevertheless, we do n o t consider whether a p p l y i n g W h i t t e n to t h i s case thwarts the purpose of the life-insurance provision by leaving an arrearage u n s e c u r e d . The a p p e l l a n t s have n o t a r g u e d t h a t p o i n t i n t h e i r b r i e f to t h i s court. See Hood v. Hood, 72 So. 3d 666, 677 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011) ("Because t h e w i f e has n o t a r g u e d t h a t i s s u e on a p p e a l , i t i s w a i v e d . " ) . 6 19 2101192; 2110822 purporting void. t o award the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e proceeds to Harold is 7 We find the procedural posture of this case d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h a t o f T u r e n n e v. T u r e n n e , 884 So. 2d 844 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) , i n w h i c h t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d b r o u g h t an a c t i o n against his former w i f e and several business entities c o n t r o l l e d by h e r . The f o r m e r h u s b a n d i n T u r e n n e a l l e g e d c o n t r a c t and t o r t c l a i m s stemming f r o m an a l l e g e d b r e a c h by the former w i f e of a s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t t h a t had been e n t e r e d b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s a d d r e s s i n g how t h e y w o u l d d i v i d e t h e i r v a r i o u s business i n t e r e s t s i n t h e i r d i v o r c e a c t i o n ; the p a r t i e s ' s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t had b e e n i n c o r p o r a t e d and merged i n t o t h e i r d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t , w h i c h was e n t e r e d by t h e D o m e s t i c R e l a t i o n s D i v i s i o n o f t h e Montgomery C i r c u i t C o u r t . I d . at 847. 7 I n T u r e n n e , when b o t h t h e d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s d i v i s i o n and the c i v i l d i v i s i o n d i s m i s s e d the former husband's c l a i m s , f i n d i n g t h a t t h e y had b e e n f i l e d i n an i m p r o p e r f o r u m , t h e former husband appealed. I d . a t 846. Our supreme c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s c l a i m s were p r o p e r l y h e a r d i n the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s d i v i s i o n r a t h e r than i n the c i v i l d i v i s i o n because the c l a i m s a l l arose from a l l e g e d breaches of the p a r t i e s ' property division as stated in a marital s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h had b e e n merged i n t o t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d by t h e d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s d i v i s i o n . I d . at 849. Our supreme c o u r t s t a t e d : " [ J ] u r i s d i c t i o n o f a l l m a t t e r s a r i s i n g from the d i v o r c e judgment, i n c l u d i n g the p r o v i s i o n s of the m a r i t a l s e t t l e m e n t agreement, remains w i t h the d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s d i v i s i o n ... w h i c h , i n a p r o p e r e x e r c i s e o f i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , had e n t e r e d a j u d g m e n t d i v o r c i n g [ t h e p a r t i e s ] . " Id. We f i n d no c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n T u r e n n e and o u r h o l d i n g i n t h i s c a s e . The p a r t i e s and t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d i n T u r e n n e were u n q u e s t i o n a b l y w i t h i n the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n of the D o m e s t i c R e l a t i o n s D i v i s i o n o f t h e Montgomery C i r c u i t C o u r t . The domestic-relations division retained jurisdiction to e n f o r c e i t s j u d g m e n t , w h i c h t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d a l l e g e d had 20 2101192; 2110822 "An o r d e r is entered a nullity." App. 2 0 0 4 ) . by a t r i a l J.B. v. A.B., court without jurisdiction 888 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala. Civ. "A v o i d j u d g m e n t w i l l n o t s u p p o r t an a p p e a l , and 'an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t must d i s m i s s an a t t e m p t e d a p p e a l f r o m s u c h a void (Ala. judgment.'" C o l b u r n v. C o l b u r n , C i v . App. 2009) 559 ( A l a . C i v . App. no. 14 So. 3d 176, ( q u o t i n g Vann v. Cook, The circuit interpleader proceeds. its Accordingly, The C i r c u i t C o u r t ' s court action by entered a awarding dismiss final Harold judgment had a l r e a d y decided that in the the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c i r c u i t court appeal Judgment j u d g m e n t s o l e l y on H a r o l d ' s c o n t e n t i o n relations we 989 So. 2d 556, 2101192. III. 2008)). 179 court based that the domesticshe was the proper b e n e f i c i a r y o f t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y and t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e been b r e a c h e d . See, e.g., Rau v. Rau, s u p r a ; P i t t m a n v. P i t t m a n , s u p r a ; Ex p a r t e Thomas, 54 So. 3d a t 362 n.5; and J a r d i n e v. J a r d i n e , 918 So. 2d a t 131 ("[A] t r i a l c o u r t h a s the i n h e r e n t a u t h o r i t y t o i n t e r p r e t , implement, or enforce i t s own j u d g m e n t s . " ) . I n t h i s case, however, t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n was i n c l u d e d i n t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t f o r t h e s o l e purpose of securing the former husband's child-support obligation. Upon t h e d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t ' s determining t h a t t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n had e x p i r e d , t h a t c o u r t had no f u r t h e r a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y or the proceeds of that p o l i c y . Whitten, supra. 21 2101192; 2110822 of res judicata or the doctrine of above, the domestic-relations determine that controversy. collateral estoppel r e n d e r e d by Lloyd Noland 784, and a 793 court Found., ( A l a . 2007) collateral apply of court only v. lacked when and a jurisdiction prior the Corp., elements of recognizing See, that 979 res an could have b e e n d e c i d e d competent j u r i s d i c t i o n ) . lacked jurisdiction, preclusive effect and in a prior a c t i o n by So. the judgment circuit could court erred 2d judicata essential been a court Because the d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s its was e.g., e l e m e n t o f b o t h d o c t r i n e s i s t h a t t h e c l a i m o r i s s u e has or to judgment jurisdiction. HealthSouth (reciting estoppel explained The d o c t r i n e s o f r e s j u d i c a t a and competent Inc. estoppel However, as prevented r e l i t i g a t i o n of t h a t i s s u e . collateral not of court have any in relying on it. Therefore, we remand t h e r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t i n a p p e a l no. and we cause for further proceedings, the a d j u d i c a t i o n of whether the 8 2110822, including former husband d i d , i n fact, B a s e d on o u r c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f a p p e a l nos. 2101192 and 2110822, we deny H a r o l d ' s m o t i o n t o s t r i k e . B a s e d on our r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e i s s u e s a s s e r t e d i n a p p e a l no. 2110822, we deny H a r o l d ' s m o t i o n f o r damages, f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 38, A l a . R. App. P. 8 22 2101192; 2110822 properly change insurance policy, 2101192 2012, the beneficiary designation on the life- an i s s u e n o t y e t d e c i d e d b y a n y c o u r t . APPLICATION GRANTED; OPINION OF A P R I L 13, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; APPEAL DISMISSED. 2110822 REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. P i t t m a n a n d Thomas, J J . , c o n c u r . Thompson, P . J . , and Bryan, without w r i t i n g s . 23 J . , concur i n the r e s u l t ,

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