Martin P. Jones and Phillip Jones v. Candace Joines

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REL: 12/21/12 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2110790 M a r t i n P. Jones and P h i l l i p Jones v. Candace J o i n e s Appeal from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t (DR-09-915) Court BRYAN, J u d g e . M a r t i n P. J o n e s appeal trial ("Martin") and P h i l l i p Jones from a judgment o f t h e J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t court") confirming a judicial sale ("Phillip") C o u r t ("the in a domestic- r e l a t i o n s c a s e . We d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l as t o P h i l l i p a n d a f f i r m 2110790 the judgment o f t h e t r i a l court. On S e p t e m b e r 13, 2010, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a j u d g m e n t divorcing Candace Joines ("Candace") and Scott Joines ("Scott") i n t h e d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s a c t i o n i t h a d d o c k e t e d as "Candace DR-09-915." Joines v. Scott Joines, The divorce judgment c o n t a i n e d the f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n s t h a t a r e p e r t i n e n t to t h i s appeal: "ORDERED a n d ADJUDGED b y t h e C o u r t : "20. T h a t [ C a n d a c e ] s h a l l have t h e s o l e u s e a n d occupancy of t h e r e s i d e n c e of t h e p a r t i e s That t h e s a i d r e s i d e n c e o f t h e p a r t i e s s h a l l be s o l d w i t h i n t h r e e h u n d r e d s i x t y (360) d a y s f r o m t h e d a t e o f t h i s F i n a l Judgment o f D i v o r c e a t a p r i v a t e s a l e and t h e n e t p r o c e e d s t h e r e f r o m , a f t e r c o s t s o f s a i d s a l e a r e d e d u c t e d , s h a l l be d i v i d e d e q u a l l y b e t w e e n the p a r t i e s . "That i n t h e event s a i d r e s i d e n c e i s u n s o l d a t the end o f s a i d p e r i o d , t h e C l e r k o f t h i s Court o r h e r d e s i g n e e o r h e r a s s i g n s as s e t o u t i n w r i t i n g s h a l l h o l d a p u b l i c s a l e upon a f f i d a v i t b y e i t h e r p a r t y t h a t s a i d r e s i d e n c e i s u n s o l d and prepayment o f p u b l i c a t i o n c o s t s . E a c h p a r t y h e r e t o s h a l l be a c o m p e t e n t b i d d e r a t same. The n e t p r o c e e d s , a f t e r the d e d u c t i o n o f c o s t s f o r s a i d s a l e , s h a l l be d i v i d e d e q u a l l y between t h e p a r t i e s . " (Emphasis added.) On December 8, 2 0 1 1 , S c o t t filed an a f f i d a v i t t h a t t h e r e s i d e n c e had n o t been s o l d a t a p r i v a t e s a l e 2 stating within 2110790 the 360-day period specified by the divorce judgment and requesting that the t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k s e l l the residence a t a public auction. publishing That same day, Scott prepaid the cost of n o t i c e of the p u b l i c auction. A f t e r p u b l i s h i n g a n o t i c e t h a t t h e r e s i d e n c e w o u l d be s o l d a t a p u b l i c a u c t i o n on January 12, 2012, i n a n e w s p a p e r o f g e n e r a l circulation in J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y on December 17, December 24, a n d December 3 1 , 2011, the t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k conducted a public auction on J a n u a r y 12, 2012. M a r t i n , who i s n o t r e l a t e d t o e i t h e r Candace or Scott, b i d $370,000 f o r the residence, which h i g h e s t a n d b e s t b i d . The t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k a c c e p t e d was the Martin's bid, and M a r t i n p a i d t h e t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k $370,000 on J a n u a r y 12, 2012. A l s o filed her Martin's on report January regarding 12, 2012, t h e t r i a l - c o u r t the s a l e , which b i d o f $370,000 was t h e h i g h e s t M a r t i n had p u r c h a s e d the r e s i d e n c e , trial-court reported and b e s t b i d , clerk that that a n d t h a t he h a d p a i d t h e c l e r k $370,000. On J a n u a r y 23, 2012, M a r t i n a n d P h i l l i p f i l e d a m o t i o n t o intervene ("the m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e " ) i n c a s e no. DR-09-015 i n order to protect t h e i r i n t e r e s t s with respect the and P h i l l i p residence. Martin 3 asserted to the s a l e of that Martin, by 2110790 purchasing t h e r e s i d e n c e a t t h e p u b l i c a u c t i o n , "was h i s s o n [ P h i l l i p ] i n t h e way o f b r i d g e son to purchase financing to allow h i s the [ r e s i d e n c e ] " ; that the residence e n c u m b e r e d by a m o r t g a g e w i t h an u n p a i d b a l a n c e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y stated that distributed the assisting was i n t h e amount $170,000; t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t "net proceeds" of the sale t o Candace and S c o t t , t h e g r o s s were to be proceeds of the s a l e , i . e . , t h e $370,000 M a r t i n h a d p a i d t h e t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k f o r t h e r e s i d e n c e , s h o u l d be u s e d n o t o n l y t o p a y t h e c o s t s o f the s a l e but a l s o t o pay o f f t h e mortgage b e f o r e of the remaining and balance distribution t o Candace and S c o t t ; and t h a t M a r t i n P h i l l i p s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o i n t e r v e n e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f seeking a determination that the gross proceeds of the sale s h o u l d be u s e d t o p a y o f f t h e m o r t g a g e b e f o r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f any of the proceeds support of the sale t o Candace and Scott. o f t h e m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e , M a r t i n and P h i l l i p W o o d r u f f v. W o o d r u f f , 23 So. 3d 1149, 1153 In cited ( A l a . C i v . App. 2009), which, they s a i d , had h e l d t h a t the term "net p r o c e e d s " means t h e g r o s s p r o c e e d s o f a s a l e l e s s t h e c o s t s o f t h e s a l e and mortgage intervene payoffs. f o r hearing The trial court s e t the on J a n u a r y 26, 2012. 4 motion to 2110790 On January 31, 2012, Martin and Phillip o b j e c t i o n to the c o n f i r m a t i o n of the s a l e They o b j e c t e d filed an ("the o b j e c t i o n " ) . on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e n o t i c e o f t h e s a l e h a d o m i t t e d any m e n t i o n o f t h e m o r t g a g e e n c u m b e r i n g t h e r e s i d e n c e , that that omission had m i s l e d them into b e l i e v i n g that the r e s i d e n c e was f r e e and c l e a r o f l i e n s ; and t h a t t h e y w o u l d be damaged b y t h a t o m i s s i o n u n l e s s t h e g r o s s p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e were u s e d t o p a y o f f t h e m o r t g a g e b e f o r e any o f t h e p r o c e e d s were d i s t r i b u t e d t o Candace and S c o t t . The t r i a l c o u r t s e t t h e objection f o r hearing The trial court on January intervene granted filed on F e b r u a r y 22, 2012. held 26, a hearing 2012, t h a t m o t i o n . However, a motion asking regarding and, on the motion to February 3, on F e b r u a r y 21, 2012, the t r i a l court 2012, Candace (1) t o s e t aside the o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e and ( 2 ) t o c o n f i r m t h e sale ("the m o t i o n to set aside and to confirm"). Candace supported t h e m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e and t o c o n f i r m w i t h a b r i e f in she which subject-matter asserted that jurisdiction the trial court over the motion d i d not to have intervene b e c a u s e M a r t i n and P h i l l i p h a d n o t p a i d a f i l i n g f e e when t h e y filed that motion and that the 5 sale should be confirmed 2110790 because Martin existence of and P h i l l i p the mortgage had encumbering M a r t i n purchased the residence recorded public constructive notice the of the residence when b e c a u s e t h e m o r t g a g e h a d been i n the Probate Court of J e f f e r s o n County b e f o r e the auction. On F e b r u a r y 22, 2012, M a r t i n and P h i l l i p filed a brief in o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e and t o c o n f i r m i n w h i c h t h e y a s s e r t e d t h a t , because t h e d i v o r c e judgment p r o v i d e d the "net proceeds" of the sale Candace and S c o t t , t h e g r o s s were distributed to proceeds of the s a l e should be used t o pay o f f t h e mortgage b e f o r e distributed t o Candace and Scott t o be that any o f t h e p r o c e e d s were because, they said, "net p r o c e e d s " meant t h e g r o s s p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e l e s s t h e c o s t s o f t h e s a l e and t h e m o r t g a g e p a y o f f . I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , asserted that, i f the t r i a l court determined that they the "net p r o c e e d s " t o be d i s t r i b u t e d t o Candace and S c o t t d i d n o t mean t h e g r o s s p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e l e s s t h e c o s t s o f t h e s a l e and the mortgage p a y o f f , t h e s a l e s h o u l d be s e t a s i d e . A l s o on F e b r u a r y 22, 2012, t h e t r i a l c o u r t h e l d a h e a r i n g regarding ( 1 ) t h e m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e and t o c o n f i r m a n d (2) t h e o b j e c t i o n . The day a f t e r t h a t h e a r i n g , M a r t i n and P h i l l i p 6 2110790 filed a brief i n which they asserted h o l d i n g i n Hayes v. B e t t s , 227 A l a . 630, (1933), that, 634, based 151 on the So. 692, 695 t h e y were made q u a s i p a r t i e s as t o m a t t e r s regarding t h e s a l e o f t h e r e s i d e n c e by v i r t u e o f t h e t r i a l - c o u r t clerk's a c c e p t i n g M a r t i n ' s b i d o f $370,000 a t t h e p u b l i c a u c t i o n o r , in the alternative, that Candace had o b j e c t t o t h e m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e by before the t r i a l On March 8, c o u r t had 2012, waived failing her right to to object to i t granted i t . Scott filed a motion to order the t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k t o pay t h e c o s t s o f t h e s a l e , t o pay o f f t h e mortgage encumbering the residence, and to remaining proceeds of the s a l e i n equal shares distribute the t o Candace and Scott. On March 14, 2012, the trial court entered an order s e t t i n g aside i t s order g r a n t i n g the motion to i n t e r v e n e . April 5, 2012, the t r i a l court entered a judgment confirming the s a l e of the r e s i d e n c e , o r d e r i n g the t r i a l - c o u r t execute a deed c o n v e y i n g clerk the r e s i d e n c e to the r e s i d e n c e t o M a r t i n , o r d e r i n g the t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k t o d e d u c t 1% o f t h e $370,000 M a r t i n had for On as t h e t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k ' s commission, paid and o r d e r i n g the t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k to d i s t r i b u t e the remainder of 7 2110790 t h e $370,000 t o C a n d a c e and 10, to and 2012, order the t r i a l Scott the t r i a l - c o u r t 11, conveying shares. On c o u r t amended i t s A p r i l 5, 2012, 2012, the April judgment c l e r k t o e x e c u t e the deed t o t o d i s b u r s e t h e f u n d s due April i n equal C a n d a c e and trial-court the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e clerk Martin S c o t t f o r t h w i t h . On executed a deed t o M a r t i n " s u b j e c t t o any and a l l e n c u m b r a n c e s a g a i n s t t h e p r o p e r t y " and d e l i v e r e d t h e d e e d t o M a r t i n on A p r i l On May 16, 12, 2012, 2012. Martin agreement d a t e d A p r i l 16, and 2012, Phillip residence Scott pro and tanto. Martin Also and on a settlement i n w h i c h S c o t t had pay o n e - h a l f o f t h e u n p a i d b a l a n c e the filed of the mortgage encumbering Phillip May 16, agreed to had 2012, agreed release and Martin to Phillip f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l t o t h i s c o u r t f r o m t h e A p r i l 5, judgment c o n f i r m i n g the C a n d a c e as t h e appellee. only sale. C a n d a c e a r g u e s t h a t we 1 Their n o t i c e of appeal 2012, should d i s m i s s the appeal she s a y s , M a r t i n and P h i l l i p ' s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was named because, not t i m e l y The A p r i l 5, 2012, j u d g m e n t c o n f i r m i n g t h e s a l e was a f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t . See J e t t o n v. J e t t o n , 502 So. 2d 756, 759 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ; and T a y l o r v. T a y l o r , 398 So. 2d 267, 269 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . 1 8 2110790 filed because, she says, the trial court's March 14, order s e t t i n g a s i d e the order g r a n t i n g the motion to was to a f i n a l , appealable 2012, intervene j u d g m e n t and M a r t i n and P h i l l i p failed f i l e t h e i r n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w i t h i n 42 d a y s a f t e r t h e o f t h a t j u d g m e n t . An final, appealable entry order denying a motion to intervene i s a judgment r e g a r d l e s s of whether the motion s e e k s i n t e r v e n t i o n o f r i g h t , see T h r a s h e r v. B a r t l e t t , 424 2d 604, 607-608 ( A l a . 1982), or p e r m i s s i v e Universal Underwriters (Ala. the i n t e r v e n e was trial-court i n t e r v e n t i o n , see I n s . Co. v. A n g l e n , 630 So. 2d 441, 442 court's r u l i n g regarding 1 9 9 3 ) . However, t h e t r i a l motion to the moot w i t h respect c l e r k ' s acceptance of to Martin Martin's because bid amount o f $370,000 made M a r t i n a q u a s i p a r t y t o t h e in c o n f i r m t h e s a l e , and he was e n t i t l e d t o a p p e a r and his r i g h t s i n that proceeding r e g a r d l e s s of whether the Betts, 227 or denied Ala. at t h e m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e . See 634, 151 So. at M e r c h a n t s ' & M e c h a n i c s ' T r u s t & Sav. 86 So. 52, 52-53 (1920). In 695; and Bank, 204 Hayes, the protect trial Hayes v. Harduval A l a . 187, supreme explained: " [ T ] h i s c o u r t , i n t h e c a s e o f H a r d u v a l e t a l . v. M e r c h a n t s ' & M e c h a n i c s ' T r u s t & S a v i n g s Bank e t a l . , 9 the proceeding to court granted So. v. 188, court 2110790 204 A l a . 187, 86 So. 52, o b s e r v e d : 'A p u r c h a s e r a t a judicial sale, that i s , one whose o f f e r t o purchase i s a c c e p t e d by t h e o f f i c e r a u t h o r i z e d t o make t h e s a l e , s u b j e c t t o c o n f i r m a t i o n b y t h e c o u r t i n due c o u r s e , acquires vested r i g h t s which are e n t i t l e d t o p r o t e c t i o n . T h e n c e f o r w a r d he i s a q u a s i p a r t y t o t h e p r o c e e d i n g , i s bound by t h e d e c r e e o f c o n f i r m a t i o n o r r e j e c t i o n , and s u b j e c t t o t h e o r d e r s o f t h e c o u r t w i t h r e s p e c t t h e r e t o . 16 R.C.L. 113, § 81; H a r a l s o n v. G e o r g e , 56 A l a . 295 [ ( 1 8 7 6 ) ] . He may, o f c o u r s e , a p p e a l f r o m any f i n a l o r d e r o r d e c r e e i n j u r i o u s l y a f f e c t i n g h i s r i g h t as p u r c h a s e r . G l e n n o n v. M i t t e n i g h t , 86 A l a . 455, 5 So. 772 [ ( 1 8 8 9 ) ] ; B l o s s o m v. M i l w a u k e e , e t c . , R. Co., 1 Wall. 655, 17 L. E d . 673 [ ( 1 8 6 3 ) ] . A n d he i s e n t i t l e d t o have t h e s a l e c o n f i r m e d , i n t h e a b s e n c e of i r r e g u l a r i t y , misconduct, f r a u d , mistake, or gross inadequacy of p r i c e amounting i n i t s e l f t o f r a u d . L i t t e l l v. Z u n t z , 2 A l a . 256, 36 Am. Dec. 415 [ ( 1 8 4 1 ) ] ; C o c k r e l l v . C o l e m a n ' s Adm'r, 55 A l a . 583 [ ( 1 8 7 6 ) ] ; G l e n n o n v. M i t t e n i g h t , 86 A l a . 455, 5 So. 772; H e l e n a C o a l Co. v. S i b l e y , 132 A l a . 5 6 1 , 32 So. 718 [ ( 1 9 0 2 ) ] . ' " I n 16 R.C.L. page 113, § 81, t h e r u l e on t h e above subject i s thus stated: 'Bidders and p u r c h a s e r s a t a j u d i c i a l s a l e under a d e c r e t a l order make themselves parties i n interest to the p r o c e e d i n g s f o r some p u r p o s e s , t h e y were n o t p a r t i e s o r i g i n a l l y . They s u b j e c t t h e m s e l v e s q u o a d h o c to t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t i n t h a t s u i t as t o a l l m a t t e r s c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e s a l e o r r e l a t i n g t o them i n the character of purchasers. Accordingly, they have t h e r i g h t t o i n t e r f e r e i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s f o r their own b e n e f i t a n d p r o t e c t i o n a n d f o r t h e c o r r e c t i o n of mistakes, and t o appear, represent t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , a n d c l a i m a t t h e hands o f t h e [ 2 ] A c c o r d i n g t o B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 1368 ( 9 t h e d . 2 0 0 9 ) , "quoad h o c " means " [ a ] s t o t h i s ; w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h i s ; so f a r as t h i s i s c o n c e r n e d . " 2 10 2110790 c o u r t s u c h r e l i e f as t h e r u l e s o f e q u i t y p r o c e e d i n g s e n t i t l e d them t o . They become s u b j e c t t o t h e f u t u r e o r d e r s o f t h e c o u r t , a r e b o u n d as p a r t i e s by t h e decree of the c o u r t c o n f i r m i n g or s e t t i n g a s i d e the s a l e , and can be c o m p e l l e d by summary p r o c e s s e s o f t h e c o u r t , so l o n g as t h e c o u r t ' s c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c a u s e and t h e p a r t i e s c o n t i n u e s , t o p e r f o r m t h e i r agreement s p e c i f i c a l l y or o t h e r w i s e . H i s inchoate r i g h t s a c q u i r e d by b i d d i n g o f f t h e p r o p e r t y e n t i t l e t h e p u r c h a s e r t o a h e a r i n g upon t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e s a l e s h a l l be s u b s e q u e n t l y s e t a s i d e . B u t b e i n g a p a r t y to a l l matters connected w i t h the s a l e , the p u r c h a s e r must t a k e n o t i c e o f t h e r e p o r t o f s a l e , a l l proceedings w i t h r e f e r e n c e t h e r e t o , and the c o n f i r m a t i o n o r r e j e c t i o n o f t h e s a l e . ... B i d d e r s and p u r c h a s e r s a t j u d i c i a l s a l e s may at a proper stage of the case appeal from decrees a f f e c t i n g their interests.'" 227 A l a . a t 634, 151 So. a t 695 (emphasis altered). Thus, b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k a c c e p t e d M a r t i n ' s b i d in t h e amount o f $370,000 a t t h e p u b l i c a u c t i o n , M a r t i n was quasi party residence as to and was a l l matters r e l a t e d to the sale e n t i t l e d t o a p p e a r and p r o t e c t h i s of the interest w i t h r e s p e c t to those matters r e g a r d l e s s of whether the trial c o u r t g r a n t e d o r d e n i e d h i s m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e . See Hayes Harduval. Moreover, he was entitled to appeal a the and trial c o u r t ' s judgment c o n f i r m i n g the s a l e r e g a r d l e s s of whether the t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d or denied h i s motion to i n t e r v e n e . I d . The n o t i c e of appeal the A p r i l 5, 2012, was f i l e d w i t h i n 42 d a y s o f t h e e n t r y o f f i n a l judgment c o n f i r m i n g the s a l e . 11 Therefore, 2110790 w i t h r e s p e c t t o M a r t i n , Candace's argument t h a t the n o t i c e of appeal was untimely Phillip, on accepted by the the Consequently, has no merit. o t h e r hand, d i d n o t make a b i d t h a t trial-court he did not clerk become at a the quasi matters r e l a t e d to the s a l e . I d . Therefore, c o u r t d i d not him, grant public party he d i d n o t become a p a r t y t o t h e p r o c e e d i n g n o t have s t a n d i n g to appeal Mars H i l l (Ala. Missionary B a p t i s t Church, 1 9 9 9 ) . I n Mars H i l l , regarding the 761 to and t h u s does Alabama, So. supreme c o u r t trial respect from the judgment c o n f i r m i n g s a l e . See Mars H i l l B a p t i s t C h u r c h o f A n n i s t o n , v. auction. because the the motion to i n t e r v e n e w i t h was 2d 975, the Inc. 980 stated: "The l a w i n t h e a r e a o f s t a n d i n g f o r p u r p o s e s o f a p p e a l i s w e l l s e t t l e d . One must have b e e n a p a r t y t o t h e j u d g m e n t b e l o w i n o r d e r t o have s t a n d i n g t o appeal any i s s u e a r i s i n g out of t h a t judgment. T r i p l e J C a t t l e , I n c . v. Chambers, 621 So. 2d 1221 ( A l a . 1993) . When a c o u r t d e n i e s a n o n p a r t y ' s m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e i n an a c t i o n , t h a t n o n p a r t y c a n n o t appeal from the final judgment i n t h a t a c t i o n b e c a u s e [he] n e v e r became a p a r t y t o t h a t a c t i o n . Duncan v. F i r s t N a t ' l Bank o f J a s p e r , 573 So. 2d 270, 273 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) . " 761 So. 2d a t 980 Of c o u r s e , court's final, (emphasis added). Phillip had appealable standing to appeal March 12 14, 2012, from the judgment trial setting 2110790 aside its order Universal granting Underwriters F o r d - M e r c u r y , I n c . , 574 the Ins. motion to v. East Co. So. 2d 716, 727 intervene, Cent. ( A l a . 1990) see Alabama (affirming d e n i a l of n o n p a r t y ' s m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e ) ; however, the n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was n o t f i l e d w i t h i n 42 d a y s a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f that j u d g m e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , b e c a u s e P h i l l i p d i d n o t become a q u a s i p a r t y , b e c a u s e he was not a p a r t y w i t h s t a n d i n g to appeal from t h e f i n a l j u d g m e n t c o n f i r m i n g t h e s a l e , and b e c a u s e t h e of a p p e a l was final untimely with respect to the March 14, Hayes; supra; invoke Harduval; i f the the Martin ordered Mars Hill; Thrasher, and R u l e 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. App. dismissed notice jurisdiction argues t h a t of appeal of the the P. was supra; ("An not Phillip. Anglen, appeal s h a l l timely to appellate court."). trial court erred i n s o f a r as i t the t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k t o d i s t r i b u t e the b a l a n c e of trial-court divorce be filed p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e t o Candace and S c o t t a f t e r d e d u c t i n g the 2012, judgment s e t t i n g a s i d e the o r d e r g r a n t i n g the m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e , we must d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l w i t h r e s p e c t t o See notice c l e r k ' s 1% judgment p r o v i d e d distributed t o them and, c o m m i s s i o n b e c a u s e , he t h a t the according 13 the only says, the " n e t p r o c e e d s " were t o to Martin, the term be "net 2110790 proceeds" as used proceeds of mortgage payoff. Woodruff, the i n the sale In divorce less support the of j u d g m e n t meant costs his of the the sale argument, gross and Martin the cites supra. In Woodruff, t h i s c o u r t c o n s t r u e d as u s e d i n t h e the term "net f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n of a d i v o r c e proceeds" judgment: "'4. The p a r t i e s j o i n t l y own r e a l e s t a t e l o c a t e d [on] W i l l o u g h b y Road, B i r m i n g h a m , A l a b a m a . The r e a l t y s h a l l be p l a c e d on t h e m a r k e t and s o l d , w i t h t h e n e t p r o c e e d s d i v i d e d w i t h F i f t y P e r c e n t (50%) t o t h e [ w i f e ] and F i f t y P e r c e n t (50%) t o t h e [ h u s b a n d ] . Pending such sale, the [husband] shall be responsible f o r and pay the mortgage payments, t a x e s , and i n s u r a n c e due on s a i d r e a l t y , and s h a l l i n d e m n i f y and h o l d h a r m l e s s t h e [ w i f e ] therefrom.'" 23 So. 3d at 1151 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . The Woodruff c o n t a i n e d term 1153. the "net no proceeds" judgment i n language i n d i c a t i n g the meaning of as used i n that judgment. 23 So. 3d the at Given the absence of such language, t h i s c o u r t h e l d t h a t term Woodruff "net proceeds" meant "'gross mortgage p a y o f f s . ' " 712, divorce 715 n.3 Id. as divorce less (quoting Brown v. ( A l a . C i v . App. language i n the proceeds However, i n t h e p r e s e n t contain used judgment c l o s i n g expenses Brown, 960 So. in and 2d 2006)). case, the i n d i c a t i n g the 14 divorce meaning of j u d g m e n t does the term "net 2110790 p r o c e e d s " as u s e d i n t h a t judgment. the divorce judgment The p e r t i n e n t s e n t e n c e o f i n the p r e s e n t case states: The "net p r o c e e d s , a f t e r t h e d e d u c t i o n o f c o s t s f o r s a i d s a l e , s h a l l be d i v i d e d e q u a l l y b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s . " (Emphasis added.) Thus, the divorce judgment clearly and i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e t e r m " n e t p r o c e e d s " as unambiguously in the present case used i n t h a t j u d g m e n t means t h e g r o s s p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e l e s s t h e costs of the s a l e only. A c c o r d i n g l y , is Woodruff not c o n t r o l l i n g precedent i n the present case. Moreover, in we c o n c l u d e t h a t because we conclude that the divorce t h e p r e s e n t c a s e c l e a r l y and u n a m b i g u o u s l y the less judgment indicates that t e r m " n e t p r o c e e d s " means t h e g r o s s p r o c e e d s o f t h e sale the costs of the s a l e only, we conclude that the trial court d i d not e r r i n o r d e r i n g the t r i a l - c o u r t c l e r k t o deduct only h e r 1% commission before d i s t r i b u t i n g the remainder t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e i n e q u a l s h a r e s t o Candace and Accordingly, we a f f i r m t h e judgment of the t r i a l APPEAL DISMISSED AS TO of Scott. court. P H I L L I P JONES; AFFIRMED. Thompson, P . J . , and P i t t m a n J . , c o n c u r . Thomas writings. and Moore, J J . , concur 15 i n the result, without

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