Anita Rearick v. Immanuel Sieving and Jeri Sieving

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REL: 08/24/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2012 2110473 Anita Rearick v. Immanuel S i e v i n g and J e r i Appeal from Coffee C i r c u i t (CV-10-193) Sieving Court THOMAS, J u d g e . Anita Court Jeri Rearick appeals a judgment o f t h e C o f f e e ("the t r i a l court") i n favor Sieving. o f Immanuel Circuit S i e v i n g and 2110473 The record i n d i c a t e s the f o l l o w i n g . S i e v i n g s were c o t e r m i n o u s Coffee County. Rearick landowners of p r o p e r t y I n May 2007, R e a r i c k contacted and t h e located i n the Sievings and o f f e r e d t o s e l l them t h e p r o p e r t y on w h i c h she l i v e d ("the property") f o r $50,000. The S i e v i n g s a c c e p t e d some p o i n t w e l l b e f o r e t h e o c c u r r e n c e her o f f e r . of the events At l e a d i n g up to t h i s a c t i o n , R e a r i c k had s o l d the p r o p e r t y t o her daughter, Hope Z o n c a . property, However, R e a r i c k and had c o n t i n u e d i t i s undisputed that to live Rearick was on t h e Zonca's a t t o r n e y - i n - f a c t f o r the purpose of conducting the r e a l - e s t a t e transaction giving rise to this litigation. On o r a b o u t J u l y 3 1 , 2007, R e a r i c k a n d t h e S i e v i n g s met in the o f f i c e of Marty W i l l i a m s , a r e a l - e s t a t e attorney, t o close the r e a l - e s t a t e t r a n s a c t i o n . testified closing, at t r i a l because that Rearick she h a d l i v e d property f o ra long period. transferring Sievings, the property the Sievings The p a r t i e s a n d W i l l i a m s was very emotional i n the mobile home at the on t h e A f t e r t h e p a r t i e s s i g n e d t h e deed i n fee simple from Zonca instructed Williams to to the draft an a g r e e m e n t a l l o w i n g R e a r i c k t o c o n t i n u e l i v i n g on t h e p r o p e r t y . 2 2110473 The separate "Agreement" document drafted by Williams, entitled ("the a g r e e m e n t " ) , s t a t e d , i n p e r t i n e n t part: "We t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , do h e r e b y a g r e e t o a l l o w A n i t a M. R e a r i c k t o l i v e i n t h e p r e s e n t r e s i d e n c e on t h e f o l l o w i n g described property f o r the rest of her n a t u r a l l i f e . T h i s a g r e e m e n t s h a l l be b i n d i n g on Immanuel C. S i e v i n g a n d J e r i B. S i e v i n g a n d t h e i r heirs and a s s i g n s . A n i t a M. R e a r i c k agrees t o maintain the residence i n i t s current condition." A d e s c r i p t i o n of the property and t h e s i g n a t u r e s parties statement. followed t h e above recorded i n the Coffee County probate All p a r t i e s acknowledge t h a t that approximately her family home. The S i e v i n g s allowing and ("the f a m i l y that the p a r t i e s Rearick members") often was v i s i t e d her The S i e v i n g s one month a f t e r agreement, they l e a r n e d agreement office. Rearick adult c h i l d r e n f o r extended periods. The of a l l of the had allowed to reside testified signed members o f i n the mobile f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d that they b e l i e v e d t h e f a m i l y members t o do s o v i o l a t e d the that t h e agreement t h a t t h e y s o u g h t t o c o l l e c t r e n t f r o m t h e f a m i l y members. They t e s t i f i e d t o other occurrences that they also believed v i o l a t e d t h e a g r e e m e n t , s u c h as a l l o w i n g a p e t t o l i v e t h e m o b i l e home a n d p a r k i n g inside an 18 w h e e l t r a n s f e r t r u c k i n t h e yard. 3 2110473 The a Sievings letter from testified an attorney possessed a l i f e - e s t a t e allow other Sievings convey a l i f e that estate they had never heard letter The Rearick from R e a r i c k ' s i n the mobile never intended to Rearick. of a l i f e because i n the property, to live they that, Rearick she c o u l d home. The t h e agreement t o In fact, estate received they before testified, receiving the attorney. S i e v i n g s f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t they sent a l e t t e r t o i n March agreement Rearick stating interest individuals contend t h a t a t some p o i n t t h e y 2010 and g i v i n g stating that h e r 30 d a y s then contacted she h a d b r e a c h e d t h e to vacate the the S i e v i n g s ' attorney, property. who t o l d h e r t h a t t h e S i e v i n g s w o u l d work w i t h h e r i f a d d i t i o n a l t i m e was needed. However, t h e S i e v i n g s t e s t i f i e d t h a t one o f R e a r i c k ' s adult children days after contacted Rearick Sievings, Rearick's the received the l e t t e r . adult child Sievings' attorney, irate. the S i e v i n g s ' attorney The v o i c e - m a i l According from c h a r a c t e r i z e d as Rearick's a l l e g e d l y s t a t e d t h a t R e a r i c k was n o t m o v i n g . 4 to the l e f t a v o i c e - m a i l message f o r which the S i e v i n g s message two t o t h r e e adult child At that point, 2110473 the Sievings testified, they decided to complaint i n the t r i a l Rearick had Sievings property when she According to her before to the the p r o p e r t y . compensate property, i f she made t h e could Sievings and the f o r her value the her testified that she requested Instead, that she she draft stated had She a f o r the r e s t of her l i f e . specifically manner t h a t intended i t would not that to l i v e them t h e she could she on the property. S i e v i n g s had agreed, remain on t h a t she did not residence on the retaining a life drafted the estate property. agreement further t e s t i f i e d that document creating t h a t t h e S i e v i n g s had t o d r a f t a document a l l o w i n g R e a r i c k had continue continued of d u r i n g the r e a l - e s t a t e c l o s i n g . estate. testified o f f e r to s e l l t e s t i m o n y , she was underlying i n t o the p r i c e the S i e v i n g s p a i d f o r the Williams party She R e a r i c k acknowledged at t r i a l nor negotiated at t r i a l . real-estate closing, that the the court. also t e s t i f i e d asked the file to l i v e on t h e a asked no life her property Williams further t e s t i f i e d that to be d r a f t the agreement i n t e r p r e t e d as estate. 5 she i n such creating a a life 2110473 On asking October 13, 2010, t h e S i e v i n g s the t r i a l direct Rearick court to vacate S i e v i n g s ' complaint to terminate filed the complaint t h e agreement the p r o p e r t y . Rearick on December 8, 2 0 1 0 . and t o answered the A bench t r i a l was h e l d on J u n e 22, 2 0 1 1 , a t w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u r t h e a r d e v i d e n c e ore tenus. On November 10, 2 0 1 1 , t h e t r i a l court entered a j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e S i e v i n g s . The j u d g m e n t , i n p e r t i n e n t part, terminated t h e agreement, restored possession property t o t h e S i e v i n g s , and o r d e r e d property i n no more t h a n 30 d a y s . Rearick filed filed a timely Rearick of the postjudgment t o vacate motion; she the also a motion t o s t a y enforcement of t h e judgment pending a hearing. Rearicks January The t r i a l filed a 12, 2 0 1 2 . court response granted to A hearing the motion to stay. the postjudgment was held m o t i o n on J a n u a r y 17, 2 0 1 2 . The t r i a l The motion on on t h e p o s t j u d g m e n t court entered an o r d e r on t h a t same d a y d e n y i n g t h e p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n a n d s e t t i n g aside the order s t a y i n g enforcement of the judgment. filed a t i m e l y appeal with this c o u r t on J a n u a r y 25, 2012. "'"When o r e t e n u s e v i d e n c e i s p r e s e n t e d , a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s as t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s on i s s u e s o f f a c t ; i t s j u d g m e n t b a s e d on t h e s e f i n d i n g s 6 Rearick 2110473 o f f a c t w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d u n l e s s i t i s clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t , or a g a i n s t the great weight of the evidence. J & M B a i l B o n d i n g Co. v. H a y e s , 748 So. 2d 198 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) ; G a s t o n v. Ames, 514 So. 2d 877 ( A l a . 1987) . When t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n a n o n j u r y case e n t e r s a judgment w i t h o u t making s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s of f a c t , the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ' w i l l assume t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e made t h o s e f i n d i n g s n e c e s s a r y t o support the judgment.' T r a n s a m e r i c a Commercial F i n . C o r p . v. AmSouth Bank, 608 So. 2d 375, 378 (Ala. 1992). Moreover, '[u]nder the ore t e n u s r u l e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t and a l l i m p l i c i t f i n d i n g s necessary to support [ i t ] c a r r y a presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s . ' T r a n s a m e r i c a , 608 So. 2d a t 378. However, when t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y a p p l i e s t h e law t o [the] facts, no p r e s u m p t i o n of c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s as t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t . A l l s t a t e I n s . Co. v. S k e l t o n , 675 So. 2d 377 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ; M a r v i n ' s , I n c . v. R o b e r t s o n , 608 So. 2d 391 ( A l a . 1992); G a s t o n , 514 So. 2d a t 878; S m i t h v. S t y l e A d v e r t i s i n g , I n c . , 470 So. 2d 1194 (Ala. 1 9 8 5 ) ; L e a g u e v. M c D o n a l d , 355 So. 2d 695 (Ala. 1978).'Questions of law are not subject to the ore tenus standard of review.' Reed v. B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s for A l a b a m a S t a t e U n i v . , 778 So. 2d 791, 793 n. 2 (Ala. 2000). A t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s on l e g a l i s s u e s c a r r y no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s on a p p e a l . Ex p a r t e C a s h , 624 So. 2d 576, 577 ( A l a . 1993) . T h i s c o u r t r e v i e w s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f l a w t o f a c t s de novo. A l l s t a t e , 675 So. 2d a t 379 ('[W]here the facts before the trial court are e s s e n t i a l l y u n d i s p u t e d and t h e c o n t r o v e r s y i n v o l v e s q u e s t i o n s of law f o r the c o u r t t o consider, the [trial] court's judgment c a r r i e s no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s . ' ) . " ' 7 2110473 " [ F a r m e r s I n s u r a n c e Co. v. P r i c e - W i l l i a m s A s s o c s . , I n c . , ] 873 So. 2d [252,] 254-55 [ ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 3 ) ] ( q u o t i n g C i t y o f P r a t t v i l l e v. P o s t , 831 So. 2d 622, 627-28 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 2 ) ) . " Kellis App. v. E s t a t e 983 So. 2d 408, 412 (Ala. C i v . 2007). On a p p e a l , its of Schnatz, discretion Rearick asserts that the t r i a l by: (1) considering i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e agreement, restoring the property parol trial revocable evidence t o t h e S i e v i n g s , a n d (3) determining estate. c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e agreement c r e a t e d a l i c e n s e , as o p p o s e d t o a l i f e e s t a t e . of t h e t r i a l when (2) t e r m i n a t i n g t h e a g r e e m e n t a n d t h a t t h e agreement d i d n o t convey a l i f e The court exceeded court provided, The j u d g m e n t i n pertinent part: "In c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e f o r e g o i n g and a l l o t h e r relevant matters presented, t h e Agreement o f t h e p a r t i e s c a n be c o n s i d e r e d only a r e a l property l i c e n s e which conveyed unto [Rearick] a p e r s o n a l p r i v i l e g e t o l i v e i n t h e r e s i d e n c e l o c a t e d on t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y d u r i n g h e r l i f e t i m e . That l i c e n s e was n o t c o u p l e d w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n t h e l a n d a n d i s t h e r e f o r e r e v o c a b l e by [the S i e v i n g s ] a t t h e i r s o l e discretion. The [ S i e v i n g s ] , i n e x e r c i s i n g such d i s c r e t i o n , have e x p r e s s e d t h e i r d e s i r e t o r e v o k e the l i c e n s e o r o t h e r w i s e annul t h e Agreement." We must first determine i f the t r i a l court erred by c o n s i d e r i n g p a r o l e v i d e n c e when i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e a g r e e m e n t . 8 2110473 Rearick argues i n h e r b r i e f t h a t " [ t ] h e p l a i n language of t h e 'Agreement' estate." i s consistent with the d e f i n i t i o n of a life We a g r e e t h a t " f o r t h e r e s t o f h e r n a t u r a l l i f e " i s l a n g u a g e o f t e n i n d i c a t i n g t h e c o n v e y a n c e o f a l i f e e s t a t e . See generally Barnett (Ala. v. E s t a t e 2007)(holding that of Anderson, t h e language 966 So. 2d 915, 919 "'shall n o t be sold d u r i n g t h e terms o f [the d a u g h t e r s ' ] n a t u r a l l i v e s and twentyone years thereafter'" (emphasis omitted), coupled with a p r o v i s i o n e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e m a i n d e r i n t e r e s t , was s u f f i c i e n t t o create a life estate); see also Restatement (First) of P r o p e r t y § 107, Comment e. ( 1 9 3 6 ) ( " T h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h e r u l e stated i n this Section that the conveyance measure the d u r a t i o n o f t h e c r e a t e d e s t a t e , i n s p e c i f i c words, by t h e l i f e o f one o r more human b e i n g s , particular "[w]e phrase o r words ... do h e r e b y granting agree of a revocable Homeowners Ass'n, 55 does n o t r e q u i r e t h e u s e o f any of a r t . " ) . to allow" However, t h e p h r a s e i s consistent l i c e n s e . See Chancy So. 3d 287, 295 with the v . Chancy Lake ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 1 0 ) ( " ' I n c o n t r a s t , " [ a ] l i c e n s e d e n o t e s t h e ' g i v i n g o f one's c o n s e n t ' t o do o r p e r f o r m a s p e c i f i e d a c t i v i t y 9 "'"(quoting 2110473 Blackburn v. L e f e b v r e , 976 So. 2d 482, 490 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2007), q u o t i n g i n t u r n other c a s e s ) ) . Our r e s e a r c h does n o t y i e l d any A l a b a m a c a s e l a w d i r e c t l y a d d r e s s i n g w h e t h e r an a g r e e m e n t t o a l l o w a p e r s o n t o l i v e real property f o r h i s or her e s t a t e or a l i c e n s e . to the proper However, natural life creates a on life t h i s c o u r t ' s p r i o r a n a l y s i s as i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f agreements c r e a t i n g l i c e n s e s or easements i s i n s t r u c t i v e . " ' F i r s t , " ' [ t ] h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a w r i t t e n document i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t . ' " J e h l e - S l a u s o n C o n s t r . Co. v. H o o d - R i c h , A r c h i t e c t s & C o n s u l t i n g E n g ' r s , 435 So. 2d 716, 720 ( A l a . 1983) ( q u o t i n g W h e e l e r v. F i r s t A l a b a m a Bank o f B i r m i n g h a m , 364 So. 2d 1190, 1194 ( A l a . 1 9 7 8 ) ) . " I n t h e a b s e n c e o f f r a u d o r m i s t a k e , i t i s o n l y where t h e i n s t r u m e n t i s d o u b t f u l of meaning, o r i t s l a n g u a g e a m b i g u o u s , t h a t t h e c o u r t may l o o k beyond the 'four c o r n e r s ' of the instrument to give clarity and specificity of m e a n i n g . " Camp v. M i l a m , 291 A l a . 12, 16-17, 277 So. 2d 95, 98 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; see a l s o D a v i d Lee B o y k i n F a m i l y T r u s t v. B o y k i n , 661 So. 2d 245, 251 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1995) ("The s u b s t a n t i v e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g l i c e n s e s are the same as those governing contracts."). "'The c r i t i c a l f a c t o r i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r p a r t i e s c r e a t e d an easement o r a l i c e n s e i s t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t . James v. B r e w s t e r , 954 So. 2d 594, 600 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2006) ( c i t i n g B o y c e v. C a s s e s e , 941 So. 2d 932, 941 ( A l a . 2006)). In 10 2110473 d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s c r e a t e d an easement o r a l i c e n s e , we a l s o l o o k t o t h e s u r r o u n d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . See Drummond Co. v. W a l t e r I n d u s . , I n c . , 962 So. 2d 753 ( A l a . 2006) ( c i t i n g Jon W. B r u c e and James W. E l y , J r . , The Law of Easements & L i c e n s e s § 11:1 (West 2 0 0 1 ) ) . ' " C h a n c y , 55 So. So. 2d a t 4 8 9 ) ( e m p h a s i s Rearick 219 3d a t 295 (1968), exceeded cites (quoting Blackburn S l a t e n v. Loyd, of her i t s discretion by daughter by two of 219-20. The 213 In S l a t e n , the g r a n t o r s to deeds c l a u s e s and habendum c l a u s e s . at A l a . 485, So. a s s e r t i o n t h a t the t r i a l property separate 282 their son and conveyed whether the their granting 282 A l a . a t 486-87, 213 i s s u e i n S l a t e n was when to containing similar 2d court c o n s i d e r i n g p a r o l evidence i n t e r p r e t i n g the agreement. parcels 976 added). i n support separate v. L e f e b v r e , So. 2d subsequent c o n d u c t o f t h e g r a n t o r s r e g a r d i n g t h e d e e d t o t h e son c o u l d be considered i n determining the daughter. The had the e s t a t e conveyed i n the deed t o Id. a p p e l l a n t s i n S l a t e n a s s e r t e d t h a t the erred by considering grantors i n determining a s t a t u t e and the subsequent trial conduct court of the i n t e n t of the conveyances, caselaw i n support 11 of t h e i r p o s i t i o n . 282 the citing Ala. 2110473 at 488, 213 So. 2d at 221. In answer, our supreme court s t a t e d t h a t , "'[w]here a deed i s ambiguous, subsequent a c t s of the parties, on the are e n t i t l e d to great weight i n determining instrument, showing what the p a r t i e s intended, t r u e one, So. 2d the and construction s u c h c o n s t r u c t i o n may 745, put be deemed t h e u n l e s s t h e c o n t r a r y i s shown.'" 282 A l a . a t 488, at 221 (quoting 26 C.J.S. Deeds § c o u r t f u r t h e r q u o t e d I r w i n v. B a g g e t t , So. they 746 93). The 231 A l a . 324, 213 supreme 326, 164 with the (1935): "'Many of the rules that are pertinent, and to be applied in the construction of ambiguous clauses in conveyances, l e a s e s , and other written c o n t r a c t s , a r e c o l l e c t e d i n L o w e r y v. May, 213 A l a . 66, 104 So. 5 [ ( 1 9 2 5 ) ] . They a r e aids in ascertaining the expressed i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s ; the g e n e r a l r u l e b e i n g to construe the l e a s e a c c o r d i n g to t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t i o n as g a t h e r e d f r o m t h e w h o l e i n s t r u m e n t , and, i f t h e l a n g u a g e i s not c l e a r , the circumstances a t t e n d i n g i t s e x e c u t i o n and t h e s u b s e q u e n t a c t s o f t h e parties.'" Id. (emphasis added). In i t s holding the c o n c l u s i o n of the t r i a l g r a n t o r and g r a n t e e Slaten court "agree[d] court t h a t subsequent conduct of i n the deed t o 12 [the grantee] was the properly 2110473 considered and i n d i c a t e d t h e i n t e n t o f b o t h p a r t i e s t o t h e d e e d and t h e q u i t c l a i m i n d i c a t e d a f e e s i m p l e A l t h o u g h we a g r e e t h a t the present arguments. case, Slaten we Slaten disagree i s indeed t i t l e . " Id. instructive i n i t supports the t r i a l supports that court's "'circumstances decision to consider the execution and t h e s u b s e q u e n t a c t s o f t h e p a r t i e s ' " i n o r d e r t o construe t h e agreement. (quoting Irwin (1935)). v. attending Rearick's [the agreement's] 282 A l a . a t 488, 213 So. 2d a t 221 Baggett, 231 A l a . a t 326, Because t h e language 164 o f t h e agreement 746 i s open t o more t h a n one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , we h o l d t h a t t h e t r i a l not So. court d i d e x c e e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y c o n s i d e r i n g e v i d e n c e p a r o l when i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e agreement. B e c a u s e we have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e t r i a l improperly the trial consider court p a r o l evidence, as whether life, Tenant." B l a c k ' s held only usu[ally] f o r the duration the possessor's. estate" of a s p e c i f i e d ... Law D i c t i o n a r y 628 ( 9 t h e d . 2 0 0 9 ) . 13 that e s t a t e and b y t e r m i n a t i n g B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s a " l i f e "[a]n estate person's we n e x t a d d r e s s exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n by d e t e r m i n i n g the agreement d i d n o t c r e a t e a l i f e the agreement. court d i d not See Life A "life 2110473 tenant" is defined beneficially as entitled e s t a t e . " I d . a t 1011. "[a] p e r m i s s i o n , would otherwise the be 1002. property; until holder be the an erred. court a agreement l i c e n s o r ' s l a n d t o do illegal, agreement, the s u c h as Sievings hunting life as that (not some a c t game." I d . "agree[d] r e s i d e n c e " on t h e language i s i n d i c a t i v e of a r e v o c a b l e App. of is that i t i s lawful to allow property. license. R e a r i c k r e l i e s on H a r r e l l v. McMeans, 598 Civ. death, t o commit some a c t a prendre) ... R e a r i c k t o l i v e i n t h e p r e s e n t This the esp[ecially], or p r o f i t licensee to enter In the who, In c o n t r a s t , a " l i c e n s e " i s d e f i n e d unlawful; t h a t would otherwise at to person usu[ally] revocable, amounting to a l e a s e for "[a] 2d 957 (Ala. 1992), to support her a s s e r t i o n t h a t the t r i a l court Again, her r e l i a n c e i s misplaced. So. In H a r r e l l , stated: "Under A l a b a m a l a w , e v e r y g r a n t o f an e s t a t e i n l a n d s i s p r e s u m e d t o be i n f e e s i m p l e and a l l d o u b t s a r e t o be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r o f t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n . H a c k e r v. C a r l i s l e , 388 So. 2d 947 ( A l a . 1980) . An i n t e n t t o c r e a t e a l e s s e r e s t a t e must be e x p r e s s e d i n l u c i d , unambiguous l a n g u a g e . S l a t e n v. L o y d , 282 A l a . 485, 213 So. 2d 219 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . I f p o s s i b l e , t h e i n t e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s must be a s c e r t a i n e d f r o m t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d i n t h e i n s t r u m e n t as a w h o l e . W i l l i s v. James, 287 A l a . 653, 254 So. 2d 717 (1971). Where t h e g r a n t i n g o f an e s t a t e i s n o t made i n p l a i n l a n g u a g e , i t i s f o r the f i n d e r of f a c t t o determine the e x t e n t 14 this 2110473 o f t h e i n t e r e s t i n t e n d e d t o be g r a n t e d , a n d i t s j u d g m e n t on t h e m a t t e r w i l l n o t be r e v e r s e d u n l e s s p l a i n l y a n d p a l p a b l y w r o n g . H a r t f o r d A c c i d e n t v. Morgan C o u n t y A s s ' n , 454 So. 2d 960 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) . " Id. a t 959. in R e a r i c k i n c l u d e s an e x c e r p t f r o m t h e q u o t e above her b r i e f "'[i]f p o s s i b l e , the intent of the p a r t i e s must be a s c e r t a i n e d f r o m t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d i n t h e i n s t r u m e n t as a w h o l e . ' " taken We a g r e e . as a w h o l e , permit indicates that Rearick t o continue convey t o h e r a l i f e Further, any the Sievings living intended i n the mobile to home, n o t t o estate i n the property. Harrell states the finder of fact w i l l resolve c o n f u s i o n as t o t h e e x t e n t o f t h e i n t e r e s t i n t e n d e d t o be granted. 598 So. 2d a t 959. the present the The l a n g u a g e i n t h e a g r e e m e n t , when case interest issued i n t h e agreement. a judgment holding revocable license, and t h a t The trial Williams, the testified that the t r i a l court i n t o make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n as t o t h e e x t e n t o f conveyed unless p l a i n l y R e a r i c k asked that The trial t h e agreement judgment "will court conveyed n o t be a reversed and p a l p a b l y wrong." I d . court heard drafter testimony of i t was n e v e r estate to Rearick. In f a c t , the agreement. their they 15 from a l l t h e p a r t i e s and intent The Sievings t o convey further testified a life that the 2110473 decision to allow Rearick t o continue home was made o n l y a f t e r t h e y w i t n e s s e d the r e a l - e s t a t e c l o s i n g . not draft the separately creating the tenus to that estate Rearick convey a state at life she d r a f t e d and, t h e r e f o r e , to the property evidence, Sievings her emotional estate. t h e agreement f r o m t h e d e e d s o t h a t i t w o u l d n o t be m i s t a k e n a s agreement, live agreement a life title i n the mobile W i l l i a m s a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t she d i d she t e s t i f i e d Specifically, living court d i d not intend but, i n the future. i n addition the t r i a l potentially B a s e d on t h i s o r e to the p l a i n could to create rather, t o grant have a life encumber language determined estate t h e i r permission of the that the i n favor of to Rearick to i n t h e m o b i l e home i n t h e f o r m o f a r e v o c a b l e license. Rearick also asserts i n her b r i e f that the Sievings wanted to undo what compensating Rearick." no had "'A unenforceable, because James, for there lacking in i s an a b s e n c e t o the other that with the mutuality, is of consideration N o r t h c o m , L t d . v. 694 So. 2d 1329, 1335 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) ( q u o t i n g 16 without court, or received i n connection contract, m o v i n g , f r o m one p a r t y bargained We n o t e , as d i d t h e t r i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n was g i v e n agreement. been "just M a r c r u m v. 2110473 Embry, 291 A l a . 400, there no was 403, 282 consideration So. 2d 49, given, 51 there (1973)). was no 1 Because bargain to a t t r i a l and the "undo." B a s e d on t h e o r e t e n u s e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e a g r e e m e n t , we in the i t s conclusion conduct of t h a t both the the p a r t i e s i n d i c a t e d the l i c e n s e i n s t e a d of a l i f e the court i s t h e r e f o r e due court language of the agreement revocable trial agree w i t h the t r i a l i n t e n t to estate. t o be The and create judgment a of affirmed. AFFIRMED. Thompson, P.J., and Pittman, Bryan, and Moore, JJ., concur. We n o t e t h a t A l a . Code 1975, § 35-4-34, p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h a t "[n]o deed or other conveyance c r e a t i n g o r t r a n s f e r r i n g any i n t e r e s t i n l a n d s h a l l be i n v a l i d o r i n e f f e c t i v e b e c a u s e o f t h e f a c t t h a t i t does n o t r e c i t e a good o r v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o r no s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n e x i s t s o r is given " However, " ' [ d ] e e d ' and ' c o n v e y a n c e ' i n t h e i r most common l e g a l u s a g e r e f e r t o a t r a n s f e r o f t i t l e t o l a n d f r o m one p e r s o n t o a n o t h e r . " C r o w l e y v. B a s s , 445 So. 2d 902, 904 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) . B e c a u s e t h e a g r e e m e n t d i d n o t t r a n s f e r t i t l e f r o m t h e S i e v i n g s t o R e a r i c k , § 35-4-34 i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e . 1 17

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