Porter Capital Corporation and Porter Bridge Loan Company, Inc. v. Dennis R. Thomas, M.D.

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Rel: August 03, 2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may be made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2012 2101203 P o r t e r C a p i t a l C o r p o r a t i o n and P o r t e r Bridge Loan Company, Inc. v. Dennis R. Thomas, M.D. Appeal from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t Court (CV-09-2224) PITTMAN, Judge. Porter Capital Corporation Bridge ("Porter C a p i t a l " ) and P o r t e r L o a n Company, I n c . ( " P o r t e r B r i d g e " ) , appeal order o f the J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t Court denying f r o m an t h e i r motions to 2101203 c o m p e l a r b i t r a t i o n o f t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m s a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t them by D e n n i s R. Thomas, M.D. We affirm. F a c t u a l and P r o c e d u r a l Background On October 10, 2007, commercial-financing Athlon Porter Inc. ("Athlon"). Capital agreed accounts-receivable financing disbursements $3.5 credit. its up Capital entered into a a g r e e m e n t and a s e c u r i t y a g r e e m e n t w i t h Pharmaceuticals, agreements, Porter to to provide and million Pursuant on to a t o those Athlon authorize revolving line with loan of Athlon granted Porter C a p i t a l a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n personal equipment. property, trade fixtures, inventory, and I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f i n a n c i n g agreement and t h e s e c u r i t y agreement, P o r t e r C a p i t a l and A t h l o n a l s o e x e c u t e d a stand-alone arbitration agreement ("the f i r s t arbitration a g r e e m e n t " ) on O c t o b e r 10, 2007. On t h e same d a y , Thomas, a M o b i l e p h y s i c i a n who i s a 5% shareholder obligations guaranty of Athlon, under executed a guaranty the commercial-financing agreement i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g of Athlon's agreement. provision: "19. No J u r y T r i a l - [Thomas] h e r e b y i r r e v o c a b l y and u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y w a i v e s , a n d P o r t e r C a p i t a l b y i t s acceptance o f t h i s Guaranty i r r e v o c a b l y and u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y w a i v e s , any a n d a l l r i g h t t o t r i a l 2 The 2101203 by j u r y i n any a c t i o n , s u i t o r c o u n t e r c l a i m a r i s i n g i n connection with, out of or otherwise r e l a t i n g to t h i s Guaranty." Thomas d i d n o t s i g n an a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t on O c t o b e r 10, 2007. On December 13, 2007, P o r t e r C a p i t a l , executed a "Restated and Amended A t h l o n , a n d Thomas Commercial A g r e e m e n t " r e f l e c t i n g t h a t Thomas h a d p r o v i d e d , collateral Athlon, a mortgage principal executed securing residence Porter Capital's future as a d d i t i o n a l advances i n t h e amount o f $1.4 m i l l i o n i n Mobile. a promissory note On J a n u a r y 30, 2008, Athlon to assigned the note On A p r i l 3, 2008, P o r t e r C a p i t a l , and Thomas e x e c u t e d a s e c o n d " R e s t a t e d to on h i s i n t h e amount o f $1 m i l l i o n Porter C a p i t a l ; Porter C a p i t a l subsequently to P o r t e r Bridge. Financing Athlon, a n d Amended C o m m e r c i a l F i n a n c i n g A g r e e m e n t , " r e f l e c t i n g t h a t Thomas h a d p r o v i d e d , as additional collateral advances t o A t h l o n , million securing Porter Capital's future a s e c o n d m o r t g a g e i n t h e amount o f $1.5 on c o m m e r c i a l p r o p e r t y i n Madison, M i s s i s s i p p i . c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e A p r i l 3, 2008, t r a n s a c t i o n , Thomas In signed an a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t ("the s e c o n d a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t " ) . In July 2008, Thomas refinanced 3 t h e mortgage on t h e 2101203 Mississippi Athlon's property a n d made a payment o f $2.4 m i l l i o n indebtedness t o Porter C a p i t a l . Thomas made a n y f u r t h e r payments September 2008 A t h l o n Bankruptcy seeking Court relief filed f o r the Southern under Chapter Neither Athlon nor to Porter a petition on C a p i t a l , and i n i n the United District States of M i s s i s s i p p i , 11 o f t h e B a n k r u p t c y Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 e t s e q . On J u l y 24, 2009, P o r t e r C a p i t a l f i l e d an a c t i o n i n t h e J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t C o u r t a g a i n s t Thomas, a l l e g i n g b r e a c h o f t h e g u a r a n t y agreement. and counterclaimed, breach of demanding Thomas On S e p t e m b e r a l l e g i n g breach the duty a jury o f good trial Capital's vice president. October adding and i s s u e d 13, 2009, Porter a Porter Bridge and fair claims. notice o f Thomas's duty and dealing and On t h e same d a y , t o Ron W i l l i a m s o n , asserted deposition various notice Capital filed Porter as a p l a i n t i f f ; guaranty 4 affirmative t o Thomas. an amended both moved t o s t r i k e Thomas's j u r y demand, c i t i n g provision answered On O c t o b e r 8, 2009, P o r t e r C a p i t a l the counterclaims, defenses, of f i d u c i a r y faith on t h o s e issued a deposition answered 28, 2009, Thomas agreement. On complaint plaintiffs then the jury-waiver Thomas deposed 2101203 Williamson, Porter Capital's vice president, on O c t o b e r 28, 2009. On January 20, 2010, t h e c i r c u i t court granted C a p i t a l ' s m o t i o n t o s t r i k e Thomas's j u r y demand. 12, 2010, Thomas d e p o s e d W i l l i a m s o n May 17, 2010, P o r t e r 2010, counsel 18, I n September f o r P o r t e r C a p i t a l and P o r t e r B r i d g e order On to opposing counsel. submitted On November 2010, P o r t e r B r i d g e moved t o s t r i k e Thomas's j u r y demand. On December counterclaim, 13, again 2010, Thomas a l l e g i n g claims filed a s e c o n d amended of breach d u t y and b r e a c h o f t h e d u t y o f good f a i t h but On May 11¬ f o r the second time. C a p i t a l d e p o s e d Thomas. a proposed scheduling Porter adding the following claims, and f a i r f o r which fiduciary dealing, he sought c o m p e n s a t o r y a n d p u n i t i v e damages a n d demanded a j u r y trial: (1) t h a t A t h l o n new of was a mere i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y o f P o r t e r C a p i t a l and Porter Bridge; (2) t h a t P o r t e r C a p i t a l a n d P o r t e r had l i q u i d a t e d Athlon's personal property in a commercially u n r e a s o n a b l e m a n n e r ; (3) t h a t P o r t e r C a p i t a l a n d P o r t e r had made f a l s e induce representations him t o guarantee collateral securing of m a t e r i a l Athlon's that loan, 5 loan which Bridge Bridge f a c t i n order and t o i n c r e a s e to the misrepresentations, 2101203 Thomas a l l e g e d , he h a d d i s c o v e r e d Williamson during the depositions of on O c t o b e r 28, 2009, a n d May 11-12, 2010; (4) t h a t P o r t e r C a p i t a l and P o r t e r B r i d g e had f r a u d u l e n t l y suppressed information that, they communicate t o him, which i n f o r m a t i o n , Thomas said, had been required he a s s e r t e d , he h a d also discovered during the depositions of Williamson; P o r t e r C a p i t a l and P o r t e r B r i d g e to (5) t h a t had n e g l i g e n t l y or wantonly d i s c l o s e d h i s p e r s o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n t o banks w i t h o u t h i s a u t h o r i z a t i o n ; a n d (6) t h a t s u c h d i s c l o s u r e s v i o l a t e d h i s right of privacy. On M a r c h 9, 2 0 1 1 , P o r t e r C a p i t a l a n d P o r t e r B r i d g e to compel arbitration or, i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , to moved strike Thomas's t h i r d j u r y demand. Thomas r e s p o n d e d t o t h e m o t i o n on April that 20, 2011, alleging there was agreement a p p l i c a b l e t o h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m s no arbitration and t h a t , even i f t h e r e w e r e s u c h an a g r e e m e n t , P o r t e r C a p i t a l a n d P o r t e r had waived invoking their right the l i t i g a t i o n to arbitration process. Bridge by s u b s t a n t i a l l y Thomas a s s e r t e d that the i s s u e o f a r b i t r a t i o n h a d n o t b e e n r a i s e d i n any p l e a d i n g M a r c h 9, 2 0 1 1 , 20 months a f t e r t h e p a r t i e s h a d been until actively l i t i g a t i n g t h e c a s e ; t h a t he h a d p a i d l e g a l f e e s a n d e x p e n s e s 6 2101203 o f more t h a n $67,000 costs related would be ( o f w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e l y $5,000 h a d t o d e p o s i t i o n s and substantially arbitrate his claims. filing p r e j u d i c e d i f he t o c o m p e l a r b i t r a t i o n and denying i n p a r t the motion Counsel f o r Porter to s t r i k e Capital l e a r n o f t h e e n t r y o f t h e May 2011. On order July pursuant alternative, 8, 2011, to Rule that he required to 2, and 2, 2011, 22, (a) d e n y i n g (b) g r a n t i n g i n p a r t and Thomas's j u r y Porter 2011, 6 0 ( b ) , A l a . R. demand. Bridge 1 did not order u n t i l June 28, c o u n s e l moved f o r r e l i e f C i v . P., from or, in the the to f i l e a notice of a p p e a l , p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 7 7 ( d ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. On J u l y 13, motion and the circuit extension of 2011, time 2011, f o r an were and F o l l o w i n g a h e a r i n g on A p r i l t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r on May the motion fees); been court denied g r a n t e d t h e R u l e 77(d) motion, the Rule 60(b) e x t e n d i n g the time f o r appeal The circuit court concluded that the j u r y - w a i v e r p r o v i s i o n i n Thomas's g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t was v a l i d f o r any c l a i m a r i s i n g u n d e r t h a t a g r e e m e n t and d e p e n d i n g f o r i t s r e s o l u t i o n upon a r e f e r e n c e t o o r a c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t . The c i r c u i t c o u r t f u r t h e r c o n c l u d e d t h a t o n l y Thomas's f r a u d - i n - t h e - i n d u c e m e n t c l a i m d i d n o t a r i s e under the g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t and that i t alone could, t h e r e f o r e , be t r i e d by a j u r y . 1 7 2101203 to J u l y 13. 2 P o r t e r C a p i t a l and P o r t e r B r i d g e a p p e a l e d t o t h e Supreme C o u r t o f A l a b a m a on J u l y 13, 2011. The supreme c o u r t t r a n s f e r r e d the appeal to t h i s c o u r t pursuant to § Ala. Code 12-2-7(6), 1975. Standard of Review " [ A n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t r e v i e w s ] de novo t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s g r a n t or d e n i a l of a motion t o compel arbitration. Bowen v. S e c u r i t y P e s t C o n t r o l , I n c . , 879 So. 2d 1139, 1141 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . Initially, the p a r t y s e e k i n g t o c o m p e l a r b i t r a t i o n has t h e b u r d e n of p r o v i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n t r a c t c a l l i n g f o r a r b i t r a t i o n and p r o v i n g t h a t t h a t c o n t r a c t e v i d e n c e s a transaction involving interstate commerce. P o l a r i s S a l e s , I n c . v. H e r i t a g e I m p o r t s , I n c . , 87 9 So. 2d 1129, 1132 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . The m o v i n g p a r t y 'must " ' p r o d u c e some e v i d e n c e which tends to establish i t s claim.'"' W o l f f M o t o r Co. v. W h i t e , 869 So. 2d 1129, 1131 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ( q u o t i n g J i m B u r k e A u t o . , I n c . v. B e a v e r s , 674 So. 2d 1260, 1265 ( A l a . 1995), q u o t i n g i n t u r n In re American F r e i g h t Sys., Inc., 164 B.R. 341, 345 (D. Kan. 1 9 9 4 ) ) . Once t h e m o v i n g p a r t y has p r o p e r l y s u p p o r t e d h i s o r h e r motion t o compel a r b i t r a t i o n , the burden then s h i f t s t o t h e nonmovant t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o show that the arbitration agreement is invalid or i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e . P o l a r i s S a l e s , 879 So. 2d a t 1132." Edwards v. C o s t n e r , 979 So. 2d 757, 761 ( A l a . 2007) . The o r i g i n a l d e a d l i n e f o r f i l i n g the n o t i c e of appeal w o u l d h a v e b e e n J u n e 13, 2011 -- 42 d a y s a f t e r May 2, 2011. R u l e 77(d) a l l o w s a t r i a l c o u r t t o e x t e n d t h e t i m e t o f i l e t h e n o t i c e of appeal f o r an a d d i t i o n a l 30 days a f t e r the e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e 42-day p e r i o d . The 3 0 t h day a f t e r J u n e 13, 2011, was J u l y 13, 2011. 2 8 2101203 Discussion Porter Capital collectively and Porter Bridge r e f e r r e d t o as " t h e l e n d e r s " ) (hereinafter a r g u e on a p p e a l , t h e y d i d i n t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t , t h a t Thomas's c o u n t e r c l a i m s subject to arbitration under both a r b i t r a t i o n agreements. did in the circuit The the first and the as are second l e n d e r s a c k n o w l e d g e h e r e , as t h e y court, that initially they waived a r b i t r a t i o n by s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n v o k i n g t h e l i t i g a t i o n p r o c e s s . Nevertheless, in the employing the c i r c u i t court, c o u r t has the specifically same argument t h a t t h e y lenders recognized p o i n t out t h a t our s u c h as when u n e x p e c t e d e v e n t s o c c u r d u r i n g the litigation right to that this -- arbitrate been revived. 3 The i s such a case because, they say, amended c o u n t e r c l a i m a d d i n g s i x new significantly right circumstances the course of that the that necessitate a determination has supreme t h a t a waiver of the t o a r b i t r a t e can be r e v o k e d u n d e r e x t r a o r d i n a r y -- advanced lenders Thomas's claims a g a i n s t the contend second lenders c h a n g e d t h e n a t u r e and c o u r s e o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n . S e e Ex p a r t e Hood, 712 So. 2d 341, 344 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) , and Companion L i f e I n s . Co. v. W h i t e s e l l Mfg., I n c . , 670 So. 2d 897, 900-01 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) , b o t h c i t i n g C a b i n e t r e e o f W i s c o n s i n , I n c . v. K r a f t m a i d C a b i n e t r y , I n c . , 50 F.3d 388, 390-91 ( 7 t h C i r . 1995). 3 9 2101203 I n i t s May 2, 2 0 1 1 , o r d e r , the c i r c u i t court l i m i t e d i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e f i r s t a r b i t r a t i o n agreement, s t a t i n g the lenders " d o [ ] n o t [base t h e i r [second] A p r i l [their] motion t o compel] that on t h e 3, 2008, a g r e e m e n t , b u t i n s t e a d a r g u e [ ] that m o t i o n t o c o m p e l i s b a s e d on t h e [ f i r s t ] O c t o b e r 10, 2007, a g r e e m e n t t o w h i c h Thomas was n o t a p a r t y . " The l e n d e r s c l e a r l y r e l i e d upon b o t h a g r e e m e n t s , a n d t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t was mistaken i n s t a t i n g The circuit otherwise. c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t Thomas was n o t b o u n d b y t h e f i r s t a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t b e c a u s e he was a The circuit court d i d not reach revocation-of-waiver and revival the waiver nonsignatory. or the because, issue issue having d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e f i r s t a r b i t r a t i o n agreement d i d n o t a p p l y t o Thomas a n d t h a t the second a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t was n o t a r g u e d as a b a s i s f o r t h e m o t i o n t o c o m p e l , t h e r e was no b a s i s for compelling The arbitration lenders determining maintain i n this that case. the c i r c u i t court t h a t Thomas was n o t b o u n d b y t h e f i r s t erred i n arbitration agreement; t h a t t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o c o n s i d e r the second required arbitration arbitration agreement o f Thomas's 10 and t o d e t e r m i n e counterclaims; that i t and that, 2101203 although the lenders initially waived the right to a r b i t r a t i o n , t h e i r w a i v e r was l a t e r r e v o k e d and t h e i r r i g h t t o a r b i t r a t i o n was r e v i v e d a f t e r Thomas f i l e d t h e s e c o n d amended counterclaim. I. The The F i r s t A r b i t r a t i o n parties do not Agreement disagree that t r a n s a c t i o n i n v o l v e s i n t e r s t a t e commerce. the existence Thomas's of a contract calling claims against the lenders. the underlying They d i s a g r e e a b o u t for arbitration "'"'[A]rbitration of is a m a t t e r o f c o n t r a c t , and a p a r t y c a n n o t be r e q u i r e d t o s u b m i t to arbitration submit.'"'" dispute which he has not agreed so t o Custom P e r f o r m a n c e , I n c . v. Dawson, 57 So. 3d 90, 97 ( A l a . 2010) 869 any ( q u o t i n g C e n t r a l R e s e r v e L i f e I n s . Co. v. F o x , So. 2d 1124, 1127 ( A l a . 2003), quoting i n t u r n AT & T T e c h s . , I n c . v. Commc'ns W o r k e r s o f A m e r i c a , 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986), quoting i n turn Warrior & G u l f N a v i g a t i o n Co., 363 U.S. party t y p i c a l l y manifests signing United Steelworkers of America 574, 582 "A i t s a s s e n t t o a r b i t r a t e a d i s p u t e by the contract c o n t a i n i n g the a r b i t r a t i o n S m i t h v. Mark Dodge, (1960)). v. I n c . , 934 So. 2d 375, 380 11 provision." ( A l a . 2006). 2101203 In t h e present sign the f i r s t case, i t i s undisputed arbitration agreement t h a t Thomas d i d n o t on O c t o b e r 10, 2007. T h a t s t a n d - a l o n e a g r e e m e n t was s i g n e d o n l y b y a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of A t h l o n ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as " t h e b o r r o w e r " ) . "'Generally, "a n o n s i g n a t o r y t o an arbitration a g r e e m e n t c a n n o t be f o r c e d to arbitrate [his] c l a i m s . " ' E d w a r d D. J o n e s & Co. v. V e n t u r a , 907 '' ^'^ Lms."' So. 1035, 1042 ( A l a . 2005) ( q u o t i n g Cook's Pest C o n t r o l , I n c . v. B o y k i n , 807 So. 2d 524, 526 ( A l a . 2001)). However, a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t s may be enforced against a nonsignatory t h i r d p a r t y under either a t h i r d - p a r t y - b e n e f i c i a r y theory o r an intertwined-claims theory." 4 4 The i n t e r t w i n e d - c l a i m s theory i s not a p p l i c a b l e here. " I n t e r t w i n i n g i s 'where n o n a r b i t r a b l e c l a i m s a r e considered so i n t i m a t e l y f o u n d e d i n a n d c l o s e l y related to claims that are subject to the arbitration agreement that the party opposing arbitration i s equitably estopped t o deny t h e arbitrability o f t h e r e l a t e d c l a i m s . ' Ex p a r t e Tony's T o w i n g , I n c . , 825 So. 2d 96, 97 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) . T h i s e x c e p t i o n i s a p p l i c a b l e when a n o n s i g n a t o r y t o the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement a t t e m p t s t o c l a i m t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e a r b i t r a t i o n agreement and t o compel a signatory to a r b i t r a t e claims i n v o l v i n g the s i g n a t o r y and n o n s i g n a t o r y . See, e . g . , L e w i s v . O a k l e y , 847 So. 2d 307 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ; Ex p a r t e N a p i e r , 723 So. 2d 49 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) . I t i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e , h o w e v e r , when [as i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , ] a s i g n a t o r y a t t e m p t s t o compel a n o n s i g n a t o r y t h i r d party to a r b i t r a t e c l a i m s i t may have a g a i n s t a s i g n a t o r y . [Our supreme c o u r t ] e x p l a i n e d t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n Ex p a r t e Tony's T o w i n g [ , 825 So. 2d at 98]: 12 2101203 Edwards v. C o s t n e r , 979 So. 2d 757, "'[I]n order for a b e n e f i c i a r y of a c o n t r a c t , i n t e n d e d t o bestow 763 person ( A l a . 2007) . to be a third-party t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s must h a v e benefits on t h i r d p a r t i e s . ' " Edwards v. C o s t n e r , 979 So. 2d a t 763 ( q u o t i n g L o c k e v. O z a r k C i t y Bd. o f Educ., 1251 910 So. 2d 1247, (Ala. 2005)). The intended b e n e f i t s must be " ' d i r e c t , as o p p o s e d t o ... i n c i d e n t a l . ' " p a r t e D y e s s , 709 So. 2d 447, 450 ( A l a . 1997) (quoting Ex Weathers "'We have h e r e t o f o r e a d d r e s s e d the d o c t r i n e of i n t e r t w i n i n g in situations where a n o n s i g n a t o r y t o an arbitration agreement seeks arbitration over the o b j e c t i o n of the s i g n a t o r y . In t h i s case a signatory to the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement seeks a r b i t r a t i o n over the o b j e c t i o n of the n o n s i g n a t o r y . [The s i g n a t o r y ] a r g u e s t h a t what i s " s a u c e f o r t h e g o o s e , i s s a u c e f o r the gander." I n o t h e r w o r d s , she a r g u e s that i f a n o n s i g n a t o r y can compel a p l a i n t i f f to a r b i t r a t e , then denying the plaintiff the right to compel a nonsignatory defendant to a r b i t r a t e i s unfair. However, t h i s argument s k i p s o v e r the c r i t i c a l and essential element of e s t o p p e l as t h e b a s i s f o r t h e t h e o r y o f i n t e r t w i n i n g . H e r e , [ t h e n o n s i g n a t o r y ] has n e v e r a g r e e d t o a r b i t r a t e a n y t h i n g and, t h e r e f o r e , i t i s not estopped from a v o i d i n g arbitration.'" Edwards v. C o s t n e r , 979 So. 2d 757, 764 and b r a c k e t e d l a n g u a g e a d d e d ) . 13 ( A l a . 2007) (emphasis 2101203 A u t o G l a s s , I n c . v . A l f a Mut. I n s . Co., 619 So. 2d 1328, 1329 (Ala. 1993)). With r e s p e c t t o the t h i r d - p a r t y - b e n e f i c i a r y i s s u e , the c i r c u i t court determined: "The l o a n a g r e e m e n t o f O c t o b e r 10, 2007, w h i c h i s a t t h e b a s i s o f t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h e c o u r t , was a t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t b e n e f i t t e d [the borrower] d i r e c t l y and o n l y i n d i r e c t l y b e n e f i t t e d [Thomas] as one o f i t s shareholders. Though c o u n s e l a r g u e d t o t h e c o u r t d u r i n g t h e course o f o r a l arguments t h a t [Thomas] was a p r i n c i p a l i n v e s t o r a n d h a d c o m m i t t e d more o f h i s f u n d s , c o m p a r a b l y , t h a n h a d any o f t h e other shareholders, to the corporate e n t e r p r i s e , the d i r e c t b e n e f i c i a r y of the t r a n s a c t i o n remained the corporate entity. Shareholders benefit only i n d i r e c t l y f r o m b e n e f i t s b e s t o w e d upon c o r p o r a t e e n t i t i e s i n w h i c h s h a r e h o l d e r s h a v e a s t a k e , even a sizable stake." The lenders concluding argue that the circuit court erred in t h a t Thomas was n o t a t h i r d - p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r y o f the c o m m e r c i a l - f i n a n c i n g agreement between P o r t e r C a p i t a l and the borrower. The l e n d e r s c o n t e n d the borrower's shareholder s e c u r i t y f o r the borrower's t h a t , b e c a u s e Thomas was who p l e d g e d almost $3 m i l l i o n i n l o a n -- a s h a r e h o l d e r who s t o o d t o b e n e f i t i f t h e l o a n e n a b l e d t h e b o r r o w e r t o become f i n a n c i a l l y successful, and, l i k e w i s e , who risked the loss of valuable a s s e t s i f t h e b o r r o w e r d e f a u l t e d on t h e l o a n -- Thomas h a d a 14 2101203 direct economic interest i n the financing agreement between P o r t e r C a p i t a l and t h e b o r r o w e r . The lenders contend that the circuit court's d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e e x p r e s s terms o f t h e g u a r a n t y agreement t h a t Thomas s i g n e d on O c t o b e r Thomas a c k n o w l e d g e d 10, 2007, t h a t he h a d a " d i r e c t e c o n o m i c i n being a guarantor of the borrower's the g u a r a n t y agreement loan. i n which interest" Paragraph 9 of states: "9. G u a r a n t o r ' s D i r e c t B e n e f i t - The u n d e r s i g n e d hereby r e p r e s e n t and w a r r a n t y t h a t i t i s i n t h e i r d i r e c t economic i n t e r e s t t o a s s i s t t h e Company because o f t h e u n d e r s i g n e d ' s p o s i t i o n ( s ) i n and/or e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n ( s ) w i t h t h e Company." The recital economic i n paragraph interest determinative. 9 t h a t Thomas c o n s i d e r e d i t i n h i s t o guarantee A guarantor the borrower's does not loan gain i s not third-party- b e n e f i c i a r y s t a t u s b e c a u s e he i n t e n d s t o be d i r e c t l y b e n e f i t e d by h i s g u a r a n t y o f a b o r r o w e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n s t o a l e n d e r ; i f he gains that status, -- the contracting executed their guarantor. 118, 122 i t i s because parties contract, -- t h e l e n d e r and t h e borrower intended, t o bestow a t the time a direct benefit C f . UBS F i n . S e r v s . , I n c . v . J o h n s o n , ( A l a . 2006) ("Absent 15 a showing that they on t h e 943 So. 2d [financial- 2101203 services firm] and [ i t s customer] intended to b e n e f i t [the c u s t o m e r ' s s i s t e r ] when t h e y e x e c u t e d t h e a g r e e m e n t on o p e n i n g [the customer's] considered a account, third-party customer's s i s t e r ] of the present Therefore, parties intended Accordingly, to d i r e c t . 393 merely t o bestow and i n the loan documents a direct benefit on those Thomas. any b e n e f i t t o Thomas was i n c i d e n t a l , as o p p o s e d See, e . g . , M c K i n n e y - G r e e n , I n c . v . D a v i s , (Fla. Dist. an nothing and t h e b o r r o w e r i n d i c a t e s t h a t C t . App. g u a r a n t o r , a 50% s h a r e h o l d e r incidental construction-loan 1992) (holding that 606 So. proposed of s u b d i v i s i o n corporation, beneficiary agreement w i t h of was corporation's mortgage b r o k e r ) ; Numerica Bank, F.S.B. v . M o u n t a i n Lodge I n n C o r p . , 134 N.H. 505, 596 A . 2 d 131 (1991) ( h o l d i n g t h a t g u a r a n t o r , a 5 0 % of [the [the f i n a n c i a l - s e r v i c e s firm] case, e x e c u t e d by t h e l e n d e r s Sav. ... customer]."). In 2d beneficiary. c a n n o t be i s n o t bound by t h e a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n t h e agreement between [its [the customer's s i s t e r ] corporation, was not a third-party shareholder beneficiary of c o r p o r a t i o n ' s o r i g i n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n - l o a n agreement w i t h b a n k ) ; and J o h n s t o n v. Oregon Bank, 285 Or. 423, 591 P.2d 746 (1979) 16 2101203 (holding that guarantor, owner o f stock company, was t h e m a n a g i n g d i r e c t o r and i n corporation only an incidental company's l o a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h The was circuit t h a t was a partner in beneficiary lumber of lumber bank). c o u r t d i d not e r r i n determining t h a t Thomas not a t h i r d - p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r y of the c o n t r a c t between lenders and the borrower arbitration agreement arbitration" of See and, was not therefore, a 1132 In order the The the first calling against the for lenders. I m p o r t s , I n c . , 879 So. 2d Second A r b i t r a t i o n Agreement to determine whether the c i r c u i t lenders' motion to compel d e c i d e w h e t h e r Thomas's c o u n t e r c l a i m s within the the ( A l a . 2003). II. denying that "contract Thomas's c o u n t e r c l a i m s P o l a r i s S a l e s , I n c . v. H e r i t a g e 1129, scope of the consider. but court erred i n arbitration, we must a g a i n s t the lenders second a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t t h a t Thomas s i g n e d not principal t h a t the agreement circuit fall -- court an did 5 We a r e n o t p r e c l u d e d f r o m c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m a t t e r f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l b e c a u s e i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g arbitrability, " ' i n c l u d [ i n g ] t h o s e r e l a t i n g t o t h e s c o p e , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and a p p l i c a t i o n of the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement,'" are q u e s t i o n s of l a w , f o r w h i c h o u r r e v i e w i s de novo. See E r n s t & Young, LLP 5 17 2101203 "The d i s p u t e t h e movant s e e k s t o a r b i t r a t e must f a l l w i t h i n the scope of the a r b i t r a t i o n agreement. See Cook's P e s t C o n t r o l v. B o y k i n , 807 So. 2d 524, 527 ( A l a . 2001) ( a r b i t r a t i o n n o t c o m p e l l e d where movant a t t e m p t e d 'to e n f o r c e the [arbitration] c l a u s e b e y o n d i t s s c o p e ' ) ; W.L. Petrey Wholesale Co. , [941 So. 2d 234 ( A l a . 2006)] (claims not a r b i t r a b l e because they f e l l o u t s i d e the scope of the agreement c o n t a i n i n g the a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e ) . " Edwards M o t o r s , 2006). (Ala. Inc. v. Hudgins, 957 So. 2d 444, 447 I n Homes o f L e g e n d , I n c . v. M c C o l l o u g h , 776 So. (Ala. 2d 741 2 0 0 0 ) , o u r supreme c o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e p r e s u m p t i o n s and r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t apply an a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t . The i n determining court the scope of stated: "Questions of a r b i t r a b i l i t y t h a t i s , whether the p a r t i e s agreed to submit t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r d i s p u t e to a r b i t r a t i o n -- 'must be a d d r e s s e d w i t h a h e a l t h y regard for the federal policy favoring a r b i t r a t i o n , ' [ M o s e s H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. M e r c u r y C o n s t r . C o r p . , 460 U.S. 1,] 24, 103 S. C t . 927 [(1983)]; but, i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether the p a r t i e s a g r e e d t o a r b i t r a t e a d i s p u t e , [an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ] 'should apply o r d i n a r y s t a t e - l a w p r i n c i p l e s that govern the f o r m a t i o n of c o n t r a c t s . ' F i r s t Options of C h i c a g o , I n c . v. K a p l a n , 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S. C t . 1920, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; a c c o r d Q u a l i t y T r u c k & A u t o S a l e s , I n c . v. Y a s s i n e , 730 So. 2d 1164, 1167-68 (Ala. 1999). Consequently, 'in a p p l y i n g general s t a t e - l a w p r i n c i p l e s of c o n t r a c t interpretation to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of an v. T u c k e r , 940 So. 2d 269, 281 ( A l a . 2006) ( q u o t i n g P o l a r i s S a l e s , I n c . v. H e r i t a g e I m p o r t s , I n c . , 879 So. 2d a t 1133, c i t i n g i n t u r n J i m B u r k e A u t o . , I n c . v. McGrue, 826 So. 2d 122, 132 ( A l a . 2002)) . 18 2101203 arbitration agreement w i t h i n the scope of the [ F e d e r a l A r b i t r a t i o n ] A c t [ ( ' F A A ' ) ] , due r e g a r d must be g i v e n t o t h e f e d e r a l p o l i c y f a v o r i n g a r b i t r a t i o n , and a m b i g u i t i e s as t o t h e s c o p e o f t h e a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e i t s e l f r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r of a r b i t r a t i o n . ' V o l t I n f o r m a t i o n S c i e n c e s , I n c . v. B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s of Leland S t a n f o r d J u n i o r Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76, 109 S. C t . 1248, 103 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1989) (citation omitted). "However, the federal policy favoring a r b i t r a t i o n does n o t r e q u i r e [an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ] t o i g n o r e the c o n t r a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s . See V o l t I n f o r m a t i o n S c i e n c e s , I n c . , 489 U.S. at 478-79, 109 S. C t . 1248; M a s t r o b u o n o v. S h e a r s o n Lehman H u t t o n , I n c . , 514 U.S. 52, 57, 115 S. C t . 1212, 131 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1995). Instead, '[our supreme c o u r t ] has c l e a r l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t a p a r t y c a n n o t be r e q u i r e d to submit to arbitration any d i s p u t e he has not agreed to submit.' Ex p a r t e S t a l l i n g s & Sons, I n c . , 670 So. 2d 861, 862 ( A l a . 1995) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n marks and c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ; a c c o r d AT & T T e c h n o l o g i e s , I n c . v. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s W o r k e r s o f A m e r i c a , 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S. C t . 1415, 89 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1986). The FAA ' s i m p l y r e q u i r e s c o u r t s t o e n f o r c e p r i v a t e l y negotiated agreements to a r b i t r a t e , like other c o n t r a c t s , i n accordance w i t h t h e i r terms,' and ' p a r t i e s are g e n e r a l l y f r e e to s t r u c t u r e t h e i r arbitration a g r e e m e n t s as they see f i t . ' Volt I n f o r m a t i o n S c i e n c e s , I n c . , 489 U.S. a t 478-79, 109 S. Ct. 1248. Accordingly, 'as with any other c o n t r a c t , the p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t i o n s c o n t r o l , but those i n t e n t i o n s a r e g e n e r o u s l y c o n s t r u e d as t o i s s u e s o f arbitrability.' M i t s u b i s h i M o t o r s C o r p . v. S o l e r C h r y s l e r - P l y m o u t h , I n c . , 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S. C t . 3346, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1985). "Under general Alabama rules of contract interpretation, the i n t e n t of the contracting p a r t i e s i s d i s c e r n e d from the whole of the c o n t r a c t . See Loerch v. National Bank of Commerce of 19 2101203 B i r m i n g h a m , 624 So. 2d 552, 553 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) . Where there i s no i n d i c a t i o n that the terms of the c o n t r a c t are used i n a s p e c i a l or t e c h n i c a l sense, they w i l l be given their ordinary, plain, and n a t u r a l meaning. See Ex p a r t e Dan Tucker Auto S a l e s , I n c . , 718 So. 2d 33, 36 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) . I f the c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s t h a t t h e t e r m s a r e unambiguous ( s u s c e p t i b l e o f o n l y one r e a s o n a b l e m e a n i n g ) , t h e n t h e c o u r t w i l l presume t h a t t h e p a r t i e s intended what t h e y s t a t e d and w i l l e n f o r c e t h e c o n t r a c t as written. See i d . a t 36; V o y a g e r L i f e I n s . Co. v. W h i t s o n , 703 So. 2d 944, 948 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) . On the o t h e r hand, i f the c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s t h a t the terms are ambiguous (susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning), then the court must use established rules of contract construction to r e s o l v e the a m b i g u i t y . See W h i t s o n , 703 So. 2d a t 948. Under t h o s e e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s o f contract c o n s t r u c t i o n , where t h e r e i s a c h o i c e b e t w e e n a v a l i d c o n s t r u c t i o n and an i n v a l i d c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e c o u r t has a d u t y t o a c c e p t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t w i l l u p h o l d , r a t h e r t h a n d e s t r o y , t h e c o n t r a c t and t h a t w i l l g i v e e f f e c t and m e a n i n g t o a l l o f i t s t e r m s . See i d . a t 948-49; S u l l i v a n , L o n g & H a g e r t y v. S o u t h e r n E l e c . G e n e r a t i n g Co., 667 So. 2d 722, 725 ( A l a . 1995). A d d i t i o n a l l y , ' i f there e x i s t s i n c o n s i s t e n c y b e t w e e n two clauses of a contract w h i c h c a n n o t be r e c o n c i l e d , t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y must be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r o f t h e p r i o r c l a u s e , u n l e s s an intention to thereafter qualify is plainly e x p r e s s e d . ' C i t y o f F a i r h o p e v. Town o f Daphne, 282 Ala. 51, 58, 208 So. 2d 917, 924 (1968); see W h i t s o n , 703 So. 2d a t 949. Last, i f a l l other r u l e s of c o n t r a c t c o n s t r u c t i o n f a i l to r e s o l v e the ambiguity, then, under the rule of contra p r o f e r e n t e m , any a m b i g u i t y must be c o n s t r u e d a g a i n s t t h e d r a f t e r o f t h e c o n t r a c t . See L a c k e y v. C e n t r a l Bank o f t h e S o u t h , 710 So. 2d 419, 422 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) . " Homes o f L e g e n d , 776 So. 2d a t 20 745-46. 2101203 The second a r b i t r a t i o n agreement, a s t a n d - a l o n e t h a t Thomas s i g n e d on A p r i l 3, 2008, p r o v i d e d , document in pertinent part: "READ THIS AGREEMENT CAREFULLY. IT L I M I T S CERTAIN RIGHTS, INCLUDING YOUR RIGHT TO GO TO COURT. In t h i s a g r e e m e n t t o a r b i t r a t e ( t h i s ' A g r e e m e n t ' ) , (1) ' T r a n s a c t i o n ' means any one o r more p a s t , p r e s e n t , o r f u t u r e ... (c) e x t e n s i o n s o f c r e d i t ... from PORTER CAPITAL CORPORATION, i t s successors or a s s i g n s , ('Lender') t o ATHLON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. ( ' B o r r o w e r ' ) , i n c l u d i n g t h i s T r a n s a c t i o n , and (2) ' C l a i m ' means any c a s e , c o n t r o v e r s y , d i s p u t e , t o r t , disagreement, l a w s u i t , c l a i m , or c o u n t e r c l a i m , and o t h e r m a t t e r s i n q u e s t i o n now o r h e r e a f t e r e x i s t i n g between Lender ( i n c l u d i n g Lender's c o r p o r a t e p a r e n t , affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, employees, lawyers, officers, directors, successors and a s s i g n s ) and B o r r o w e r . A Claim includes, without l i m i t a t i o n , a n y t h i n g a r i s i n g out o f , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h , o r r e l a t i n g t o : (a) t h i s A g r e e m e n t ; (b) t h e advertisement, solicitation, application, p r o c e s s i n g , c l o s i n g or s e r v i c i n g of t h i s T r a n s a c t i o n o r any i n s t r u m e n t s e x e c u t e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h i t ( c o l l e c t i v e l y t h e 'Loan A g r e e m e n t s ' i n c l u d i n g b u t not limited to the terms of the loan, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , promises, undertakings or covenants made r e l a t i n g t o the Loan, or Loan Agreements executed in conjunction with the Commercial F i n a n c i n g A g r e e m e n t and t h e S e c u r i t y Instrument, s e r v i c e s p r o v i d e d u n d e r t h e L o a n A g r e e m e n t s , and t h e v a l i d i t y and c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e L o a n A g r e e m e n t s ; (c) any Transaction; ... ( f ) any documents or instruments that contain information about or document any T r a n s a c t i o n , i n s u r a n c e , s e r v i c e , o r product; and (g) any a c t o r o m i s s i o n by L e n d e r r e g a r d i n g any C l a i m . 21 2101203 "Claims E x c l u d e d from A r b i t r a t i o n . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the f o r e g o i n g , n e i t h e r Borrower, you, n o r Lender can r e q u i r e t h e o t h e r t o a r b i t r a t e ... ( i i i ) a n y C l a i m where L e n d e r s e e k s damages o r o t h e r r e l i e f b e c a u s e of Borrower's d e f a u l t under t h e terms of a T r a n s a c t i o n . Enforcement of t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l not waive the r i g h t to arbitrate any o t h e r Claim, i n c l u d i n g a C l a i m a s s e r t e d as a c o u n t e r c l a i m i n a l a w s u i t brought under t h i s a c t i o n . " The scope of the second a r b i t r a t i o n construction term o f two s e n t e n c e s agreement t u r n s on t h e t h a t d e f i n e and d e s c r i b e t h e "claim": S e n t e n c e One " ' C l a i m ' means a n y c a s e , c o n t r o v e r s y , d i s p u t e , t o r t , disagreement, l a w s u i t , c l a i m , o r c o u n t e r c l a i m , and o t h e r m a t t e r s i n q u e s t i o n now o r h e r e a f t e r e x i s t i n g between Lender ( i n c l u d i n g Lender's c o r p o r a t e p a r e n t , affiliates, subsidiaries, agents, employees, lawyers, officers, directors, successors and a s s i g n s ) and Borrower." Sentence Two "A C l a i m i n c l u d e s , w i t h o u t limitation, anything a r i s i n g out of, i n connection with, or r e l a t i n g t o : (a) this Agreement; (b) the advertisement, s o l i c i t a t i o n , a p p l i c a t i o n , processing, c l o s i n g or s e r v i c i n g o f t h i s T r a n s a c t i o n o r any i n s t r u m e n t s executed i n conjunction w i t h i t ( c o l l e c t i v e l y the 'Loan A g r e e m e n t s ' i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o t h e terms of the loan, representations, promises, u n d e r t a k i n g s o r c o v e n a n t s made r e l a t i n g t o t h e L o a n , o r Loan A g r e e m e n t s e x e c u t e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e Commercial F i n a n c i n g Agreement and t h e S e c u r i t y Instrument, services provided under the Loan Agreements, and t h e v a l i d i t y and c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the Loan A g r e e m e n t s ; (c) a n y T r a n s a c t i o n ; ... ( f ) any 22 2101203 documents o r i n s t r u m e n t s t h a t c o n t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n about or document any Transaction, insurance, s e r v i c e , o r p r o d u c t ; and (g) any a c t o r o m i s s i o n by L e n d e r r e g a r d i n g any C l a i m . " (Emphasis added.) indicate, the As first Two of lender latent, the plain specific that any (but qualify manner, i . e . , that a borrower. i n t h e two "'If a in One, and as the claim There not a is a i s no dispute reading, the court will not twist The rule, in arbitration that out in between the patent or ( A l a . 1991). ambiguities the language Johnston, a p p l i e d by through the clauses 581 in So. federal will be i n f a v o r o f a r b i t r a t i o n , a r i s e s o n l y i f t h e r e i s _ an ambiguity." 1998) without sentences. 2d construed set ambiguity, S h a d r i c k v. courts, "claim," t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e c o n t r a c t can be d i s c e r n e d 810 and all-inclusive) definition order to create ambiguities.' 805, provision: a i n c o n t r o v e r s y between the l e n d e r several things contradicting, Sentence One the second sentence i s a d e s c r i p t i v e p r o v i s i o n enumerates examples i n Sentence L i k e w i s e , as t h e e m p h a s i z e d words i n S e n t e n c e indicate, that e m p h a s i z e d words sentence i s a d e f i n i t i o n a l " c l a i m " means a m a t t e r the borrower. the Ex parte Hagan, 721 (emphasis added; f o o t n o t e 23 So. 2d omitted). 167, 173-74 (Ala. 2101203 "'Where c o n t r a c t t e r m s a r e unambiguous, [an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t does] n o t l o o k b e y o n d t h e p l a i n language of the contract to second-guess the i n t e n t i o n s of the p a r t i e s ; nor w i l l [ i t ] s p e c u l a t e a b o u t what may have b e e n t h e s u b j e c t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s of the p a r t i e s . See H a r b i s o n v. S t r i c k l a n d , 900 So. 2d 385, 391 ( A l a . 2004) ( " ' [ I ] t i s e l e m e n t a r y t h a t i t i s the terms o f the w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t , not t h e mental operations o f one of the p a r t i e s , that control i t s interpretation.'" ( q u o t i n g Kinmon v. J . P . K i n g A u c t i o n Co., 290 A l a . 323, 325, 276 So. 2d 569, 570 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ) ) ; T u r n e r v. West R i d g e A p a r t m e n t s , I n c . , 893 So. 2d 332, 335 ( A l a . 2004) ("'[A] c o u r t s h o u l d g i v e t h e terms o f t h e agreement t h e i r c l e a r and p l a i n m e a n i n g and s h o u l d presume t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d what t h e t e r m s o f t h e a g r e e m e n t c l e a r l y s t a t e . ' " ( q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e Dan T u c k e r A u t o S a l e s , I n c . , 718 So. 2d 33, 36 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) ) ) . . . . ' " Alabama T i t l e 2011) L o a n s , I n c . v. W h i t e , 80 So. 3d 887, (quoting T i t l e So. 2d 1050, Max of Birmingham, 1054-55 n.1 ( A l a . 2007)). I n Cook's P e s t (Ala. 2001), 893 ( A l a . I n c . v. E d w a r d s , C o n t r o l , I n c . v. B o y k i n , the p l a i n t i f f sued 807 a h o s p i t a l and So. 973 2d 524 Cook's, the hospital's pest-control-services provider, alleging that while she was ants. a p a t i e n t i n t h e h o s p i t a l she h a d b e e n b i t t e n by fire Cook's p r o d u c e d i t s s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e h o s p i t a l , which c o n t r a c t contained an a r b i t r a t i o n compel a r b i t r a t i o n o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a u s e , and moved t o claims. The t r i a l court d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n , and o u r supreme c o u r t a f f i r m e d , h o l d i n g (1) that the t h e p a t i e n t was not a t h i r d - p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r y of 24 2101203 contract between patient's claims hospital's the hospital Cook's; were n o t i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h contract with scope o f t h e a r b i t r a t i o n basis and f o r a f f i r m i n g the t r i a l court's that or r e l a t e d C o o k ' s ; a n d (3) t h a t agreement s e r v e s (2) "[t]he holding 807 So. 2d a t 527. The c o u r t to the narrow as an i n d e p e n d e n t order denying m o t i o n t o compel a r b i t r a t i o n o f [the p a t i e n t ' s ] c l a i m s Cook's." explained Cook's against the t h i r d as f o l l o w s : "The text of the a r b i t r a t i o n clause limits i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g b e t w e e n Cook's a n d t h e ' c u s t o m e r ' [ t h e h o s p i t a l ] . ... T h i s C o u r t has h e l d t h a t a nonsignatory cannot r e q u i r e a r b i t r a t i o n of a c l a i m by t h e s i g n a t o r y a g a i n s t t h e n o n s i g n a t o r y when t h e s c o p e o f t h e a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t i s l i m i t e d t o t h e s i g n a t o r i e s t h e m s e l v e s . See S o u t h e r n E n e r g y Homes, I n c . v. G a r y , 774 So. 2d 521 ( A l a . 2000). Here, a s i g n a t o r y (Cook's) i s t r y i n g t o r e q u i r e a r b i t r a t i o n by a n o n s i g n a t o r y [the p a t i e n t ] , where t h e s c o p e o f t h e a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t c a n be r e a d as b e i n g l i m i t e d t o d i s p u t e s b e t w e e n Cook's a n d [ t h e h o s p i t a l ] . We have r e c o g n i z e d that the rule r e q u i r i n g t h a t a c o n t r a c t be c o n s t r u e d most s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y who d r a f t e d i t a p p l i e s t o an agreement t o a r b i t r a t e . See Homes o f L e g e n d , I n c . v. M c C o l l o u g h , 776 So. 2d 741 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . We c o n c l u d e t h a t Cook's i s a t t e m p t i n g t o e n f o r c e t h e c l a u s e beyond i t s scope, and t h e m o t i o n t o compel a r b i t r a t i o n f a i l s f o r t h i s reason. Although [the p a t i e n t ] d i d n o t r a i s e t h i s i n h e r arguments t o t h i s C o u r t , we c a n a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r f o r any v a l i d l e g a l r e a s o n . See S m i t h v. E q u i f a x Servs., I n c . , 537 So. 2d 463, 465 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) . " Id. (emphasis added). 25 the 2101203 We h o l d t h a t t h e s e c o n d a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t i s l i m i t e d to disputes therefore, [it] between the lender and the borrower, and, i t " i s n o t s u s c e p t i b l e o f an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n covers that t h e a s s e r t e d d i s p u t e " b e t w e e n t h e l e n d e r and t h e borrower's shareholder guarantor. See Ex p a r t e C o l q u i t t , 808 So. 2d 1018, 1024 ( A l a . 2001) the lender and the borrower's ("[A] m o t i o n t o c o m p e l a r b i t r a t i o n s h o u l d n o t be 'unless i t may arbitration that be clause covers Steelworkers U.S. or the with positive assurance i s n o t s u s c e p t i b l e o f an asserted dispute.'" o f A m e r i c a v. W a r r i o r 574, 582-83 Despite said that the interpretation (quoting United & G u l f N a v i g a t i o n Co., 3 63 (1960))). the f a c t that the c i r c u i t court d i d not consider t h e s e c o n d a r b i t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t , o u r de novo r e v i e w us t h a t denied the c i r c u i t court's ultimate conclusion -- convinces that no a g r e e m e n t r e q u i r e d Thomas t o a r b i t r a t e h i s c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e lenders trial -- was correct. court's "[An a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ] judgment c o n t e m p l a t e d by the t r i a l for any court. Court, L.L.C., 903 So. 2d 82, 88 affirm a trial court's reason, See Turner ( A l a . 2004) even v. one a not Westhampton ('This C o u r t c a n j u d g m e n t f o r any r e a s o n , 26 can a f f i r m but only i f 2101203 t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l e v i d e n c e s t h e f a c t t h a t i s t h e b a s i s f o r the 1013 941 affirmance.') (citing (Ala. 2000)))." Carroll So. 2d 234, 240 n.6 Our lenders Ex p a r t e v. W.L. Accordingly, 773 So. 2d 1 0 1 1 , Petrey W h o l e s a l e Co., (Ala. 2006). d i s p o s i t i o n of the f i r s t makes Ryals, i t unnecessary to two i s s u e s reach t h e judgment of t h e J e f f e r s o n the r a i s e d by t h e third Circuit issue. Court i s affirmed. AFFIRMED. Thompson, P . J . , and Bryan, concur. 27 Thomas, and Moore, J J . ,

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