Vicki Joan Brunson Stroeker, Katie Brunson, and Angela Brunson v. Judith Harold

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REL: 04/13/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 2101192 V i c k i Joan Brunson Stroeker, K a t i e Brunson, and Angela Brunson v. Judith Harold Appeal from Mobile C i r c u i t Court (DR-92-502361.04) MOORE, J u d g e . Vicki Joan Brunson Stroeker K a t i e Brunson and Angela Brunson ("the f o r m e r ("the w i f e " ) , and c h i l d r e n " ) appeal from a summary j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d b y t h e M o b i l e C i r c u i t C o u r t ("the 2101192 t r i a l c o u r t " ) i n f a v o r o f J u d i t h H a r o l d and F r a n k H. K r u s e , as a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f the e s t a t e of Joseph Talmadge Brunson former husband"). We ("the affirm. F a c t u a l and P r o c e d u r a l B a c k g r o u n d On April 19, 1993, the trial court entered a d i v o r c i n g t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d and t h e f o r m e r w i f e . judgment p r o v i d e d , i n p e r t i n e n t judgment The divorce part: "[The f o r m e r h u s b a n d ] s h a l l name t h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n as b e n e f i c i a r i e s on h i s p r e s e n t l i f e insurance p r o g r a m and shall furnish such p r o o f t h a t the c h i l d r e n have b e e n so d e s i g n a t e d b y f u r n i s h i n g a copy o f the d e s i g n a t i o n t o [ t h e former w i f e ] w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s f r o m t h e d a t e o f t h i s Judgment." On S e p t e m b e r 22, 1993, the t r i a l c o u r t p u r p o r t e d t o e n t e r an amended j u d g m e n t c o n f i r m i n g a June 9, 1993, the agreement between f o r m e r h u s b a n d and t h e f o r m e r w i f e ; t h a t j u d g m e n t d i d n o t m o d i f y t h e f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n i n any r e s p e c t . I n compliance w i t h the judgment, the former husband d e s i g n a t e d the c h i l d r e n , then ages 6 and 3, as the beneficiaries of a whole-life i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y p a y i n g $100,000 upon h i s d e a t h . The the former w i f e ' s f a m i l y former former wife's father husband's owns an a c t e d as life-insurance h u s b a n d went t o p r i s o n i n 1995, 2 i n s u r a n c e company the policy. agent to After secure the and the former the former w i f e ' s f a t h e r paid 2101192 most o f the premiums 2009, o v e r a y e a r maintain On court had March a 10, he 2010, for that insurance p r o v i s i o n of the had the court order from to 2010, of The On former wife 31, reached the age filed against the divorce the former judgment reinstate and 2010, the the trial husband, the life- requesting f o r m e r h u s b a n d , who immediately M a r c h 11, with i n the violated was dying children former w i f e c o u r t t h a t t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d had and r e q u e s t e d the July c h i l d r e n to Harold, contemptuously t h a t the t r i a l the t r i a l On relationship. contempt alleging beneficiaries. from the a long-standing petition cancer, policy. f o r m e r h u s b a n d c h a n g e d t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s on life-insurance policy whom he had the a f t e r t h e y o u n g e r c h i l d had of m a j o r i t y , the the to as notified d i e d on M a r c h 10, the t r i a l c o u r t to order t h a t the proceeds life-insurance policy be frozen or paid into court. f o r m e r w i f e a l s o moved t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o add t h e c h i l d r e n as p l a i n t i f f s and t o s u b s t i t u t e F r a n k K r u s e , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s e s t a t e , as t h e d e f e n d a n t ; t h a t m o t i o n was granted. The Harold trial as court a defendant. subsequently K r u s e and 3 granted Harold a both motion filed to add answers 2101192 asserting that the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n i n the divorce j u d g m e n t no l o n g e r a p p l i e d a f t e r t h e c h i l d r e n r e a c h e d t h e age of majority. Harold v a l i d l y designated the trial insurance court asserted the former husband had h e r as t h e b e n e f i c i a r y a n d r e q u e s t e d declare proceeds. (hereinafter that that The she was e n t i t l e d former wife referred to c o l l e c t i v e l y and that to the l i f e the children as " t h e p l a i n t i f f s " ) r e p l i e d t h a t t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n was a p r o d u c t o f an agreement between t h e former w i f e and t h e former husband t h a t t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d h a d d r a f t e d and t h a t i t s h o u l d be construed so t h a t i t d i d n o t e x p i r e when t h e c h i l d r e n r e a c h e d t h e age o f majority. The plaintiffs and Harold eventually filed c o m p e t i n g m o t i o n s f o r a summary j u d g m e n t . On M a r c h 2 1 , 2 0 1 1 , t h e t r i a l the summary-judgment m o t i o n s . entered c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g on The t r i a l court subsequently a j u d g m e n t on May 4, 2 0 1 1 , d e n y i n g t h e m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t f i l e d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f s a n d g r a n t i n g summary-judgment m o t i o n . The t r i a l Harold's court f u r t h e r ordered the c l e r k of the court t o pay H a r o l d the insurance proceeds, which had, civil by t h a t d a t e , been i n t e r p l e a d e d i n t o c o u r t i n a action. The trial court 4 subsequently separate denied the 2101192 plaintiffs' postjudgment motion. n o t i c e of appeal to t h i s c o u r t on The S e p t e m b e r 9, Jurisdictional Before proceeding consider whether wife filed husband a p p r o x i m a t e l y trial contempt court contempt p e t i t i o n Cf^ petition i n the C.J.S. P a r t i e s the former case § 54 (2002) of persons deceased, (footnote omitted)). a c t i o n d i d not jurisdiction only i n persons i n being f i l e d a g a i n s t a d e a d p e r s o n does n o t the against the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r 67A does n o t died, r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t the the sued e x i s t s of the c o u r t . " subject-matter the c a p a c i t y t o be exist first Because invoked court. 1 a l i v e at the time, the f i l i n g of still trial had f o u r h o u r s b e f o r e he d i e d . f o r m e r h u s b a n d was the 2011. their t o t h e m e r i t s o f t h i s a p p e a l , we the a filed Issues j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h i s d i s p u t e . The former plaintiffs invoke the of ("The and so, a suit and jurisdiction A f t e r the former husband abate because the former w i f e s e e k i n g an a d j u d i c a t i o n r e g a r d i n g p r o p e r t y r i g h t s in a was life- The t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t e f f e c t i v e l y d i s p o s e d o f o n l y the p l a i n t i f f s ' claims against Harold. However, f o r t h e r e a s o n s d i s c u s s e d i n f r a , we h a v e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment is final and appealable. Kruse, as a d m i n i s t r a t o r of the former husband's e s t a t e , i s not a p a r t y to t h i s appeal. 1 5 2101192 i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y c r e a t e d by a f i n a l d i v o r c e judgment. p a r t e Thomas, 54 So. 3d 356, 362 n.5 w i f e moved t o s u b s t i t u t e K r u s e , ( A l a . 2010) . See Ex The f o r m e r as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s e s t a t e , as t h e d e f e n d a n t , s e e R u l e 25, A l a . R. C i v . P., w h i c h motion appear that the t r i a l action can proceed was g r a n t e d ; h o w e v e r , court against considered the estate i t does n o t whether a contempt of a deceased former spouse. Our point, research an has unreported Connecticut, revealed opinion Diana v. D i a n a , only from one the case Superior h e r husband prompted for a dissolution the automatic Court on of (No. FA9969335, S e p t . 14, 2001) (Conn. S u p e r . 2001) ( n o t r e p o r t e d i n A . 2 d ) . sued directly issuance In Diana, a wife of the marriage, o f an interlocutory which order p r e v e n t i n g e i t h e r p a r t y f r o m c h a n g i n g t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s on h i s or her l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c i e s . The h u s b a n d d i e d w h i l e t h e a c t i o n was p e n d i n g ; t h e w i f e s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e husband had removed insurance p o l i c y . estate h e r as the b e n e f i c i a r y of h i s life- The w i f e moved t h e c o u r t t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e o f t h e h u s b a n d as a d e f e n d a n t contempt a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e . 6 so she c o u l d p u r s u e The c o u r t said: a 2101192 "A s u b s t i t u t e d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t v i c a r i o u s l y be found i n contempt o f c o u r t f o r v i o l a t i n g court orders d i r e c t e d t o the deceased defendant. In t h i s case, even i f t h e c o u r t found t h e d e f e n d a n t husband t o have b e e n i n c i v i l c o n t e m p t , t h e e x e c u t o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e s t a t e does n o t have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o change t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e d e c e d e n t ' s life insurance p o l i c y nor r e d i s t r i b u t e the death b e n e f i t s p a i d t o t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s b y t h e i n s u r a n c e company. 'The proceeds of a l i f e insurance p o l i c y made p a y a b l e t o a named b e n e f i c i a r y a r e n o t a s s e t s o f t h e e s t a t e , b u t b e l o n g s o l e l y t o t h e b e n e f i c i a r y . ' 31 Am. J u r . 2d, E x e c u t o r s a n d A d m i n i s t r a t o r s 257, § 509 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . See G e n e r a l S t a t u t e § 45a-347. I n s u r a n c e death b e n e f i t s a r e p a i d by t h e i n s u r e r d i r e c t l y t o t h e named b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e p o l i c y . ' I t f o l l o w s , then, that satisfying the b e n e f i c i a r y i s the c o n t r a c t u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the i n s u r e r not the fiduciary responsibility of the [executor].' Equitable Life Insurance S o c i e t y of the United S t a t e s v. S a n d r a P o r t e r - E n g e l h a r t , 867 F.2d 79 ( 1 s t C i r . 1989) Contempt punishment coercion C.G., actions have one of two f o r d e l i b e r a t e disobedience to force compliance with purposes, to court court any c a s e l a w that allows orders orders. the estate or T.L.D. v. 849 So. 2d 200, 205 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 2 ) . located either We have n o t of a deceased p e r s o n t o be p u n i s h e d f o r a l l e g e d c o n t e m p t u o u s a c t s c o m m i t t e d by t h e d e c e a s e d p e r s o n b e f o r e like i n Connecticut, h i s or her death. Furthermore, i n A l a b a m a l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s made payable t o p a r t i e s other than the deceased person, of t h e deceased person, or the personal 7 the estate representative of the 2101192 estate of estate. 1982) the See deceased person Rau ("[B]y v. Rau, virtue 429 of § do So. not become a p a r t 2d 593, 27-14-29, 595 of the (Ala. Civ. [Ala.] Code App. 1975, the proceeds of the p o l i c y of i n s u r a n c e i n t h i s case would not a to part of the estate Kruse, as has i n t e r e s t i n the no the nor therefrom. 202, administrator See 205, 117 i n s u r e d was subject of the creditor's claims."). former husband's l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y or the F i r s t N a t ' l Bank o f M o b i l e So. 2d 174, 176 (1960) v. between beneficiary trustees because "[t]he and proceeds Ala. (holding that estate purported personal estate, Pope, 270 not i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y i n d i s p u t e over proceeds contempt Thus, powers, designation or the compel to pay trial constructive representative Kruse the court to cannot, reform children the of insurance has [ o w n e r s h i p ] i n t e r e s t i n t h e p o l i c i e s as t o r e q u i r e t h a t he made a p a r t y " ) . be the no be through i t s beneficiary life-insurance proceeds. Although estate of completely a a contempt deceased action spouse, will the not trial l i e against court did l a c k a l l power t o a c t on t h e p e t i t i o n f i l e d by f o r m e r w i f e and j o i n e d by t h e c h i l d r e n . 8 In her p e t i t i o n , the not the the 2101192 former w i f e requested "any and a l l n e c e s s a r y r e l i e f as may judged a p p r o p r i a t e under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " Ala. R. relief Civ. of her a ("[E]very t o which the entitled and P. ...."). party I n Rau v. final Rau, See R u l e 5 4 ( c ) , judgment i n whose f a v o r 429 So. shall judgment r e q u i r i n g the grant 2d 593, an is ex-wife the p r o v i s i o n s ex-husband to f o r c e a p o l i c y of l i f e i n s u r a n c e w i t h the c h i l d r e n as b e n e f i c i a r i e s ; t h e y the i t i s rendered c h i l d r e n b r o u g h t an a c t i o n t o e n f o r c e divorce be keep in designated s o u g h t a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t as t o the p r o c e e d s o f a l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y t h a t had b e e n p a i d t o the e x - h u s b a n d ' s widow. Pittman, 429 419 So. 2d 1376 of a c t i o n ) . 2010), our So. 2d a t 594-95; see a l s o P i t t m a n ( A l a . 1982) v. ( a s s e r t i n g s i m i l a r causes I n Ex p a r t e Thomas, 54 So. 3d 356, 362 n.5 supreme c o u r t a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t p r o c e d u r e (Ala. without commenting on i t s v a l i d i t y , b u t i t a p p e a r s t o us t h a t , b e c a u s e a l l p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n t r o v e r s y were b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i t had the i n h e r e n t power t o i n t e r p r e t i t s j u d g m e n t , J a r d i n e J a r d i n e , 918 c o u r t has enforce So. 2d 127, the i t s own 131 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2005) ("[A] inherent a u t h o r i t y to i n t e r p r e t , v. trial implement, or j u d g m e n t s . " ) , and t h e e q u i t a b l e power t o m o l d an a p p r o p r i a t e remedy c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 9 See 2101192 A i t h e r v. Estate (recognizing remedy that deceased contempt of A i t h e r , power beneficiary court 180 that husband's but Vt. had i t designation 913 divorced change that 472, of A.2d 376 parties (2006) could not beneficiaries through potentially restore could through equitable powers of enforcement). In r e a c h i n g vast majority this conclusion, filed by has the company. Bank & P r o t e c t i v e L i f e I n s . Co., W h i t t e n v. Whitten, Nat'l Ins. U.S. Life Williams, 276 the ever 2d 537 So. 496 So. Ala. In f a c t , 43, that 158 2d 2d So. See, 952 183 915 731 So. action Hanner v. Metro v. Ohio ( A l a . 1989); Frawley v. ( A l a . 1986); W i l l i a m s v. So. Nevertheless, 10 the ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ; Ray 901 interpleader be ( A l a . 2006); (1963); 2d 849 a separate interpleader an to 2d 1056 2d case. the judgment, interpleader e.g., o f A m e r i c a , 383 insurer in this held So. Co., P r u d e n t i a l I n s . Co. 1980). 592 Co., S t e e l Min. i n a divorce b e e n d e c i d e d t h r o u g h an insurance the have a r i s e n o v e r a life-insurance policy alleged to c o n t r o l l i n g p r o v i s i o n s controversy acknowledge t h a t , i n of cases i n which d i s p u t e s p r o p e r b e n e f i c i a r y of subject we and Posey (Ala. Civ. a c t i o n was filed no A l a b a m a c a s e action constitutes v. App. by has the 2101192 e x c l u s i v e method f o r d e c i d i n g a c o n t r o v e r s y See of t h i s nature. Brown v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 365 ( A l a . 1992) ( a p p e a l constructive-trust action insured's Finding widow). brought that by former the t r i a l wife court from against h a d ample i n h e r e n t a n d e q u i t a b l e a u t h o r i t y t o d e c i d e t h e c o n t r o v e r s y , we need not decide whether i t could have presided over an i n t e r p l e a d e r a c t i o n as w e l l . Having concluded jurisdiction as that the t r i a l t o a d j u d i c a t e t h e c o n t r o v e r s y among t h e p a r t i e s to the appropriate l i f e - i n s u r a n c e proceeds, b e n e f i c i a r y of the former we n e x t a f i n a l judgment i n t h e case. f i l e d a "Motion Child c o u r t had s u b j e c t - m a t t e r husband's c o n s i d e r whether i t e n t e r e d On May 11, 2010, t h e p l a i n t i f f s t o Compel E s t a t e t o Pay E x p e n s e s a n d P a s t Due Support," alleging that the former husband had a c c u m u l a t e d a c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e o f o v e r $120,000 b e f o r e h i s death. T h a t m o t i o n a c t u a l l y amounted t o a supplementation o f t h e c o n t e m p t p e t i t i o n t o a d d a new c l a i m , w h i c h K r u s e moved to dismiss on, among o t h e r jurisdiction. expressly dismiss. grounds, lack of subject-matter I n i t s May 4, 2 0 1 1 , j u d g m e n t , t h e t r i a l reserved jurisdiction Only a probate to rule on court the motion to c o u r t can a d j u d i c a t e a c h i l d - s u p p o r t - 11 2101192 arrearage spouse. 1065 claim See against the estate of a App. 1996). Therefore, remains pending w i t h i n the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r court, the May 4, 2011 judgment j u d g m e n t u n d e r § 12-22-2, A l a . Code Proper The court plaintiffs that judgment obligor g e n e r a l l y S m i t h v. E s t a t e o f Baucom, 682 (Ala. Civ. trial deceased the should be 2 viewed no 2d claim j u r i s d i c t i o n of constitutes a the final 1975. Beneficiary at length in their life-insurance provision property-settlement former husband. argue because So. as part of a in brief the voluntary to divorce marital a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e f o r m e r w i f e and In W i l l i a m s v. Williams, 276 Ala. this 43, the 158 H a r o l d a s s e r t s t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s have r a i s e d t h i s argument f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l and, t h u s , t h a t t h i s c o u r t may n o t c o n s i d e r i t . See S h i v e r v. B u t l e r C n t y . Bd. o f Educ., 797 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) ( " G e n e r a l l y , a r e v i e w i n g c o u r t c a n n o t c o n s i d e r a r g u m e n t s made f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l . " ) . We n o t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s a s s e r t e d i n t h e i r postjudgment motion t h a t the p r o v i s i o n a t i s s u e was n o t i n t h e n a t u r e o f a c h i l d - s u p p o r t a w a r d , as H a r o l d has a s s e r t e d . " ' " [ A ] t r i a l c o u r t has t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o c o n s i d e r a new l e g a l argument i n a p o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n , b u t i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o do s o . " ' " E s p i n o z a v. R u d o l p h , 46 So. 3d 403, 416 ( A l a . 2010) ( q u o t i n g S p e c i a l A s s e t s , L.L.C. v. Chase Home F i n . , L.L.C., 991 So. 2d 668, 678 ( A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n G r e e n T r e e A c c e p t a n c e , I n c . v. B l a l o c k , 525 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Ala. 1988)). In denying the p l a i n t i f f s ' p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t had c o n s i d e r e d t h e a r g u m e n t s p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l f o r t h e p a r t i e s 2 12 2101192 So. 2d 901 (1963), the supreme a g r e e m e n t , when i n c o r p o r a t e d court into held a divorce that such judgment, an could create a vested e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n l i f e - i n s u r a n c e proceeds. The r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e shows, h o w e v e r , t h a t , f o l l o w i n g an o r e tenus hearing, the t r i a l c o u r t u n i l a t e r a l l y imposed the of i t s A p r i l 19, 1993, life- insurance p r o v i s i o n as p a r t divorce judgment. The f o r m e r h u s b a n d and t h e f o r m e r w i f e a t t e m p t e d t o m o d i f y t h a t j u d g m e n t by an a g r e e m e n t d a t e d June 9, 1993, which the 1993; trial court purported to confirm on S e p t e m b e r 22, however, the agreement d i d not a l t e r any the original life-insurance provision. The of the language provision remained i n t a c t s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n ; the subsequent of the former insurance wife and the former p r o v i s i o n amounts m e r e l y husband to their to of has agreement the life- acknowledgment t h a t t h e y must a b i d e b y t h e t e r m s o f t h e o r i g i n a l j u d g m e n t and c a n n o t be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h o s e t e r m s by a t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n . We w i l l t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' argument on a p p e a l . 13 2101192 agreement. Thus, 3 d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s we conclude that Williams is case. When a d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t o r d e r s an o b l i g o r to not spouse d e s i g n a t e c h i l d r e n o f t h e m a r r i a g e as t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s of a l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y , the s o l e purpose of t h a t p r o v i s i o n i s to secure the payment of child support. In Whitten v. W h i t t e n , s u p r a , o u r supreme c o u r t n o t e d t h a t " [ m ] i n o r c h i l d r e n are commonly d e s i g n a t e d as p o l i c i e s as of divorce." The Law beneficiaries of life insurance 'an a s p e c t o f c h i l d s u p p o r t ' p u r s u a n t t o an o r d e r 592 of Domestic So. 2d a t 186 n.4 ( q u o t i n g H. Clark, J r . , R e l a t i o n s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 718-19 (2d ed. 1988) , and c i t i n g N o t e , C h i l d S u p p o r t , L i f e I n s u r a n c e , and t h e U n i f o r m M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t , 67 Ky. L . J . 239 Based i n p a r t on that J o r d a n v. J o r d a n , 688 language So. 2d 839, i n Whitten, 842 this (1978)). court, ( A l a . C i v . App. in 1997), We f u r t h e r n o t e t h a t , i f t h e l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n was p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r e d p a r t o f a m a r i t a l - p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n , as the p l a i n t i f f s argue, the t r i a l c o u r t would have lost j u r i s d i c t i o n t o m o d i f y t h a t p r o v i s i o n a f t e r 30 d a y s . Dunn v. Dunn, 12 So. 3d 704, 709 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2008) . A d d i t i o n a l l y , " p a r t i e s t o a d i v o r c e d e c r e e may n o t change o r m o d i f y t h e d e c r e e m e r e l y by an a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e m s e l v e s . " H o l l a n d v. H o l l a n d , 406 So. 2d 877, 879 ( A l a . 1981) . Hence, any p u r p o r t e d m o d i f i c a t i o n b y t h e o r d e r e n t e r e d on S e p t e m b e r 22, 1993, w o u l d have b e e n i n e f f e c t i v e . 3 14 2101192 h e l d t h a t d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s c o u r t s do n o t have t o s t a t e t h e i r reasons f o r mandating l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n s l i k e at issue in identical. minor this case "because That reason, children supporting will receive See support will in the ( A l a . C i v . App. and J o r d a n as " c h a r a c t e r i z i n g as c h i l d s u p p o r t " event (construing Alabama law, i n a p p l i c a b l e h e r e , see 1989) educational with Ex p a r t e (authorizing support), 1983) the 888 Whitten similar life- two notable Bayliss, courts to 550 exceptions So. award 2d postminority support So. for 2d the of when Whitten, supra, a a child our circuit attains supreme court's the court age seized judgment that majority. on had 294 disabled c h i l d support date 991 postminority- and Ex p a r t e B r e w i n g t o n , 445 (allowing 986, c h i l d r e n ) , a p a r e n t g e n e r a l l y does n o t owe reverse be provisions). Under (Ala. 2004) one that a l s o M c K n i g h t v. M c K n i g h t , 2d (Ala. always i s to insure So. insurance 1261 reason quite obviously, parent dies." 1251, the the that point negated past In to the d i v o r c e d h u s b a n d ' s change o f b e n e f i c i a r y f r o m t h e c h i l d o f h i s former marriage to other relatives. Based on d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t , t h e d i v o r c e d h u s b a n d i n W h i t t e n was 15 a default required 2101192 t o "'keep i n f u l l life with the beneficiaries The supreme amounted to f o r c e and parties' effect a l l life minor child as [ s i c ] of such i n s u r a n c e . ' " court a held that child-support the award insurance the 592 on his irrevocable So. 2d a t 184. life-insurance provision that did not create an i n d e f e a s i b l e , e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t i n the proceeds of the life- insurance child reached p o l i c y that the age of l a s t e d past majority. The r e v e r s e d the judgment, s t a t i n g : the proceeds to majority in postminority Brown, 604 point supreme support." 592 2d a t 369 to So. an when t h e court "[T]he t r i a l [ t h e c h i l d ] a f t e r he had e f f e c t amounted So. the therefore c o u r t ' s award of a t t a i n e d the 2d a t 186; see of award [unauthorized] age of a l s o Brown v. (holding that constructive t r u s t in f a v o r of minor c h i l d a p p l i e d to l i f e - i n s u r a n c e proceeds based on provision designate in child divorce as judgment irrevocable that obligated beneficiary father during to child's minority). In states this only children as case, that the the life-insurance provision former husband b e n e f i c i a r i e s on his present minor life w i t h o u t e v e n r e q u i r i n g t h a t t h e y be d e s i g n a t e d 16 issue name t h e "shall at insurance," as i r r e v o c a b l e 2101192 beneficiaries. expressly life-insurance as l i m i t i n g t h e p e r i o d Whitten implies one this child that case reaches expressly the that the the of t h e i r b e n e f i c i a r y necessarily age of majority provides that the life Bayliss or status. plaintiffs also could not However, like the the benefited unless the judgment insurance Brewington is intended to support, which is state policy after former w i f e ' s f a m i l y premiums on the that the former their minority a c t e d on policy. f o r m e r h u s b a n d and The ended t h a t b e l i e f by plaintiffs the life-insurance f o r m e r h u s b a n d and provision, and 17 their this intent trial crafted interpretation of language However, t h e the former w i f e , and paying argue t h a t former w i f e i n u s i n g the c o n t a i n e d i n the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n . not the wife the c h i l d r e n would remain b e n e f i c i a r i e s life-insurance the court, the when p a r o l e v i d e n c e c r e a t e s a q u e s t i o n o f f a c t as t o t h e the of children, provisions terminate the subjectively believed the not case here. The on only describing a l l life-insurance secure postminority not does the p l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t the term "minor" r e a s o n a b l y c o n s t r u e d as in provision s t a t e t h a t i t l a s t s o n l y through the m i n o r i t y c h i l d r e n , and be The of the the 2101192 terms of that provision ambiguous, a c o u r t can are immaterial. consider If a judgment i t s meaning i n l i g h t of is the e n t i r e r e c o r d , but i t cannot r e s o r t to p a r o l e v i d e n c e from the p a r t i e s as i f i t was understanding 354 construing a contract to a s c e r t a i n t h e i r and i n t e n t . S.E.2d 397, 399 ( C t . App. f i n d t h a t , under Whitten, required the beneficiaries former during R e a d i n g v. B a l l , 291 1987). the d i v o r c e husband to their minority, S.C. More t o t h e 492, point, 496, we judgment unambiguously name so the children there i s no need as to r e s o r t t o e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e t o d e t e r m i n e the meaning of i t s terms. The attained changed policy. follow, undisputed the the age of m a j o r i t y beneficiary According see evidence to § 12-3-16, shows that both long before designation Whitten, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , had the former the on which children life-insurance we 4 are husband required whatever to equitable We n o t e t h a t , i n W h i t t e n , t h e supreme c o u r t d i d n o t have b e f o r e i t a c a s e i n w h i c h t h e d e c e a s e d o b l i g o r had died l e a v i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e , as has b e e n a l l e g e d i n t h i s case. Nevertheless, we do n o t consider whether a p p l y i n g W h i t t e n to t h i s case thwarts the purpose of the life-insurance provision by leaving an arrearage u n s e c u r e d . The p l a i n t i f f s have n o t a r g u e d t h a t p o i n t i n t h e i r b r i e f to t h i s court. See Hood v. Hood, 72 So. 3d 666, 677 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011) ("Because t h e w i f e has n o t a r g u e d t h a t i s s u e on a p p e a l , i t i s w a i v e d . " ) . 4 18 2101192 interest the c h i l d r e n obtained e n d e d on t h e i r 1 9 t h b i r t h d a y s . was free to change violating the judgment. The t r i a l i n the l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y T h e r e a f t e r , the former husband his beneficiary life-insurance court designation provision in the without divorce d i d not e r r i n f o l l o w i n g Whitten and i n e n t e r i n g a summary j u d g m e n t i n H a r o l d ' s favor. AFFIRMED. Thompson, P . J . , and Pittman, concur. 19 Bryan, and Thomas, J J . ,

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