Kevin Stober v. Kimberly Brimer

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Rel: 11/16/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2101186 Kevin Stober v. Kimberly Brimer Appeal from S t . C l a i r C i r c u i t (DR-06-77.01) Court PITTMAN, J u d g e . Kevin Stober ("the f o r m e r judgment of the St. C l a i r contempt of court support husband") Circuit forfailure Court to f u l f i l l o b l i g a t i o n t o h i s daughter. appeals from a holding him i n h i s postminority- 2101186 In A p r i l 2 0 0 9 , K i m b e r l y B r i m e r a petition for a rule nisi ("the f o r m e r w i f e " ) alleging t h a t the former filed husband h a d f a i l e d t o a b i d e b y an A p r i l 2007 c o u r t o r d e r d i r e c t i n g to pay f o r one-half of education f o r the sought attorney's an petition was husband parties' held d i d not up and years daughter. i n September 2009, In October him of The h e a r i n g on appear. ordering four fee. A i s s u e d a judgment f i n d i n g court to the the one-half of wife former at which the former husband t o pay undergraduate former 2009, him also wife's the former trial court i n contempt t h e $14,000 of the f o r m e r w i f e had e x p e n d e d t o w a r d t h e i r d a u g h t e r ' s u n d e r g r a d u a t e e d u c a t i o n . A d d i t i o n a l l y , the c o u r t ordered the former to pay an attorney's f e e i n t h e amount o f $2, 500 husband within 30 days o f t h e d a t e o f t h e o r d e r . On to November 17, 2009, t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d v a c a t e the judgment f i n d i n g him December 9, 2009, the former filed i n contempt husband filed a motion of c o u r t . a On "motion to c o n t i n u e " t h e h e a r i n g on h i s m o t i o n t o v a c a t e , w h i c h t h e trial c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g day. The c a s e was s e t f o r a s t a t u s c o n f e r e n c e on J a n u a r y 13, 2010. On F e b r u a r y 11, 2010, w i t h o u t having ruled on the former husband's motion 2 to vacate, the 2101186 trial court scheduled the case for a "final hearing" on F e b r u a r y 23, 2010. A f t e r c o n d u c t i n g a h e a r i n g , w h i c h began on F e b r u a r y 23 and w h i c h was c o n t i n u e d on o t h e r d a y s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t p u r p o r t e d t o i s s u e a f i n a l o r d e r on June 17, 2011, a g a i n g r a n t i n g the former w i f e ' s p e t i t i o n order, the t r i a l c o u r t d i r e c t e d the former husband specific In that t o pay a l t h o u g h i t d i d g i v e him credit t h e f i n a n c i a l - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s he d e m o n s t r a t e d he fulfilled. The former husband R u l e 59, A l a . R. C i v . P., 17, 2011, order. The t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d a motion to a l t e r , court held under amend, o r v a c a t e t h e a h e a r i n g on the had June former h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n . I t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n on A u g u s t 10, 2011, the former husband filed U n d e r R u l e 59.1, trial a (and h i g h e r ) amount t h a n i t h a d d i r e c t e d h i m t o p a y i n t h e O c t o b e r 2009 j u d g m e n t , for for a rule n i s i . court's that motion and t h i s appeal. A l a . R. C i v . P., j u d g m e n t must be a motion to vacate a r u l e d upon w i t h i n 90 i s deemed d e n i e d by operation of law. days or Further, R u l e 59.1 r e q u i r e s t h e e x p r e s s c o n s e n t o f a l l p a r t i e s i n o r d e r for the r u n n i n g of the 90-day p e r i o d case, both running of parties the d i d not 90-day t o be expressly postjudgment 3 tolled. In this stay the therefore, the consent period; to 2101186 former husband's operation original motion o f l a w on F e b r u a r y 16, to vacate 2010, 1 and was denied the t r i a l by court l o s t j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e c a s e a f t e r t h a t p o i n t . H a r r i s o n v. A l a b a m a Power Co., The February dissent 11, 371 is 2010, So. 2d 19, 21 premised entry on on the ( A l a . 1979). the conclusion trial court's that case-action summary ("the e n t r y " ) , w h i c h s e t t h e c a s e f o r " f i n a l on F e b r u a r y 23, 2010, the amounted t o t h e r e n d i t i o n hearing" o f an o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n t o v a c a t e ; r e l y i n g on t h e trial 23 j u d g e ' s s t a t e m e n t made a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e F e b r u a r y hearing that, entered " f o r the i n October 2009 r e c o r d , " the s h o u l d be judgment set aside previously and that the p a r t i e s were " b a c k a s q u a r e o n e " b e c a u s e t h e c o u r t i n t e n d e d t o conduct a new trial on the m e r i t s of the case, the dissent c o n s t r u e s t h e e n t r y as a g r a n t o f t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n t o v a c a t e . We d i s a g r e e . D e s p i t e any i n t e n t t h e t r i a l j u d g e may The 9 0 t h day f o l l o w i n g t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s f i l i n g o f h i s p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n on November 17, 2009, was Monday, F e b r u a r y 15, 2010, w h i c h was a S t a t e h o l i d a y commemorating G e o r g e W a s h i n g t o n ' s and Thomas J e f f e r s o n ' s b i r t h d a y s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n was deemed d e n i e d on Tuesday, F e b r u a r y 16, 2010. See W i l l i a m s o n v. F o u r t h Ave. S u p e r m a r k e t , I n c . , 12 So. 3d 1200, 1203-04 ( A l a . 2 0 0 9 ) ; F i r s t A l a b a m a S t a t e Bank v. McGowan, 758 So. 2d 1116 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 0 ) ; and R i c h b u r g v. C r o m w e l l , 428 So. 2d 621 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) . 1 4 2101186 have h a d t o b e g i n anew b y v a c a t i n g t h e O c t o b e r 2009 j u d g m e n t and commencing a new scheduled a " f i n a l the trial, the t r i a l judge h e a r i n g " f o r F e b r u a r y 23. As o f t h e d a t e e n t r y was made, no h e a r i n g h a d b e e n h e l d husband's motion hearing on t h a t former motion husband's therefore, term had been judge filing hearing" conference of the motion since to vacate. I t , that the t r i a l to refer scheduled c o n t i n u e d ; the p a r t i e s had f o r a status reasonably follows "final on t h e f o r m e r t o vacate because the p r e v i o u s l y o n l y met w i t h t h e t r i a l the nonetheless judge used the t o a h e a r i n g on t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n t o v a c a t e . Though t h e a p p a r e n t i n t e n t o f t h e trial to j u d g e may be a f a c t o r p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r e d i n a t t e m p t i n g i n t e r p r e t ambiguous a c t i o n t a k e n b y a t r i a l j u d g e , we a r e n o t p r e s e n t e d h e r e w i t h an a m b i g u i t y . I n d e e d , t h e e n t r y r e f e r s to the proceeding the t r i a l j u d g e i n t e n d e d t o s c h e d u l e as a " f i n a l h e a r i n g " a n d does n o t e m p l o y t h e t e r m s " t r i a l " o r "new" or the " g r a n t . " T h e r e i s no r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t entry setting s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d as d o i n g a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a h e a r i n g on t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n . Moreover, b e c a u s e t h e e n t r y s u g g e s t s no b a s i s on w h i c h t o c o n c l u d e t h a t the trial judge granted the motion 5 to vacate, the only 2101186 evidence i n the record that c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e e n t r y was, to vacate i s the t r i a l hearing; we are which the t r i a l C i v . App. one however, permitted to the rely to motion statements at the February as n o t e d e a r l i e r , on 23 those 90-day p e r i o d d u r i n g c o u r t c o u l d have g r a n t e d a new on F e b r u a r y 16, 2010. (Ala. prompt i n e f f e c t , a g r a n t of the judge's not, remarks because, could possibly t r i a l expired See S t a r r v. W i l s o n , 11 So. 3d 846, 850 2008). M o r e o v e r , e v e n i f we were p e r m i t t e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e trial judge's s t a t e m e n t s a t t h e F e b r u a r y 23 h e a r i n g i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether the trial c a s e - a c t i o n summary i n c l u d e d j u d g e meant t o be a notation i n t e r p r e t e d as a g r a n t o f t h e by the former h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n t o v a c a t e , t h e r e e x i s t s no c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the t r i a l suggest judge's that the s t a t e m e n t s on F e b r u a r y 23 and t h e e n t r y t o trial judge's c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e e n t r y was to v a c a t e , as reflects the i s urged by statements an i m p l i c i t g r a n t o f t h e the d i s s e n t . c o n t r a r y . For support example, In f a c t , when the the motion the r e c o r d trial judge s c h e d u l e d p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e m a t t e r t o be c o n d u c t e d a f t e r February 23 "completion hearing, of he testimony," identified "case[s]," 6 the proceedings "trial," and the as "bench 2101186 trial"; t h e o n l y subsequent proceeding t h e judge scheduled t h a t was i d e n t i f i e d as a " h e a r i n g " was a h e a r i n g s c h e d u l e d t o a d d r e s s a s p e c i f i c i s s u e i n t h e c a s e . The f a c t t h a t t h e c o u r t h e l d a number o f p r o c e e d i n g s b e t w e e n F e b r u a r y 23, 2010, a n d A u g u s t 10, 2 0 1 1 , when t h e c a s e was p u r p o r t e d l y c o n c l u d e d , a n d identified only one o f t h o s e scheduled t o address inconsistent with proceedings a specific the issue dissents -- that i m p l i c i t l y g r a n t e d t h e former husband's motion Additionally, permitted the t r i a l to rely on one -- as a " h e a r i n g " i s position s c h e d u l e d a new t r i a l . the only the entry t o v a c a t e and e v e n t h o u g h we a r e n o t judge's statement at the F e b r u a r y 23, 2010, h e a r i n g , t h e j u d g e a t t h a t h e a r i n g s t a t e d that h i s October 2009 j u d g m e n t was "hereby" s e t a s i d e and "we're b a c k a t s q u a r e one"; t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s were made i n t h e present tense and, thus, indicate that the judge was p u r p o r t i n g t o g r a n t t h e m o t i o n t o v a c a t e a n d t o commence a new t r i a l on F e b r u a r y 23, 2010, a week a f t e r t h e 90-day p e r i o d h a d expired. B e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n , i t s J u n e 17, 2011, o r d e r was v o i d . (Ala. C i v . App. 2004) See J.B. v. A.B., 888 So. 2d 528, 532 ("An o r d e r 7 e n t e r e d by a t r i a l court 2101186 without j u r i s d i c t i o n is a nullity."). "A v o i d j u d g m e n t w i l l n o t s u p p o r t an a p p e a l , and ' a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t must d i s m i s s an attempted Colburn, appeal such a 14 So. 3d 176, 179 Vann v. Cook, Accordingly, instruct from void (Ala. 989 So. 2d 556, 559 we dismiss the t r i a l the judgment.'" Colburn C i v . App. 2009) (quoting ( A l a . C i v . App. 2008)). former husband's appeal c o u r t t o v a c a t e any o r d e r s e n t e r e d F e b r u a r y 16, 2010 i n t h i s APPEAL DISMISSED WITH matter. INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, P . J . , a n d B r y a n a n d Thomas, J J . , c o n c u r . Moore, J . , d i s s e n t s , w i t h w r i t i n g . 8 v. and after 2101186 MOORE, J u d g e , Because ("the dissenting. I c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e a p p e a l f i l e d by K e v i n S t o b e r former husband") was timely filed, I respectfully dissent. On O c t o b e r 22, 2009, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a judgment f i n d i n g t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d i n c o n t e m p t and o r d e r i n g him t o p a y o n e - h a l f o f t h e amount K i m b e r l y B r i m e r ("the f o r m e r w i f e " ) h a d expended On toward the c o l l e g e November 17, 2009, postjudgment motion, s e e k i n g a new trial. period following postjudgment notation for the expenses former of the p a r t i e s ' husband pursuant to Rule the motion, filing the of trial the court on t h e c a s e - a c t i o n - s u m m a r y February 59, A l a . R. filed Civ. a P., On F e b r u a r y 11, 2010, d u r i n g t h e 90-day 23, 2010, at the former made a husband's handwritten sheet s e t t i n g a " f i n a l h e a r i n g " on F e b r u a r y 23, On timely child. the cause that final 2010. b e g i n n i n g of h e a r i n g , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t i t s p r e v i o u s j u d g m e n t was set aside and "we're b a c k to square one." The trial court t h e n p r o c e e d e d t o c o n d u c t a new t r i a l t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r former husband pay one-half s h o u l d be h e l d i n c o n t e m p t of the child's college 9 for his failure expenses; ore the to tenus 2101186 evidence was received at had that after testimony been trial court entered a f i n a l h u s b a n d i n c o n t e m p t and toward the timely child's filed conclude over o r d e r i n g him 10, 2011. that June several days, motion, The former husband which the trial as 2010, handwritten notation court i m p l i c i t l y on own the matter comments at the granted e v i d e n c e d by the for a final beginning of Ala. postjudgment R. Civ. motion P., the before the rendering the The The trial February of expiration trial i t s February case-action-summary hearing. the motion w i t h i n the hearing further support that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 59.1, court denial. 90-day p e r i o d a l l o w e d b y R u l e 59.1, A l a . R. C i v . P. granted that motion former former husband then f i l e d h i s trial court the amounts expenses. The 2011, certain f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s November 2009 p o s t j u d g m e n t setting 17, t o pay 42 d a y s o f t h a t the On judgment a g a i n f i n d i n g the college n o t i c e of appeal w i t h i n I continued a postjudgment d e n i e d on A u g u s t hearing. 11, sheet court's 23, 2010, Pursuant to Rule an of order the 90th on a day p r e v e n t s t h e a u t o m a t i c d e n i a l o f t h a t m o t i o n by o p e r a t i o n o f law, a l t h o u g h t h e o r d e r must s t i l l w i t h R u l e 58, A l a . R. C i v . P., be entered i n accordance f o r purposes of c a l c u l a t i n g the 10 2101186 t i m e f o r t a k i n g an a p p e a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 4, A l a . R. App. P. See C o m m i t t e e Comments t o Amendment t o R u l e 59.1, E f f e c t i v e October the t r i a l 24, 2008. Because I conclude that t i m e l y g r a n t e d t h e f o r m e r h u s b a n d ' s November 2009 motion, I respectfully dissent former husband's a p p e a l . 11 from court postjudgment the dismissal of the

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