Lindsey Mitchell v. John Brent Thornley, as administrator ad litem for the estate of Fred Webb

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REL: 6/1/12 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 2101127 Lindsey M i t c h e l l v. John Brent Thornley, as a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m f o r the e s t a t e o f Fred Webb Appeal from Walker C i r c u i t (CV-07-900237) Court BRYAN, J u d g e . This a c t i o n a r i s e s from a t h r e e - c a r automobile o c c u r r i n g on S e p t e m b e r 27, 2005, i n v o l v i n g L i n d s e y Fred Webb, a n d C r y s t a l F i e l d s Day. accident Mitchell, I n May 2007, Webb died 2101127 from causes unrelated to the S e p t e m b e r 2 1 , 2007, M i t c h e l l and Day, a l l e g i n g c l a i m s automobile filed accident. a complaint of "negligence complaint were deceased. returned Although complaint, Webb before that Mitchell Webb was filed her See N e l s o n v . E s t a t e o f F r e d e r i c k , 855 So. 2d 1047 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ( " P e r s o n a l - i n j u r y action wantonness." t h e summons a n d a notification died Webb M i t c h e l l ' s c l a i m s s u r v i v e d a g a i n s t Webb's p e r s o n a l representative. 1043, with against and/or When M i t c h e l l a t t e m p t e d t o have Webb s e r v e d , On has been filed survive c l a i m s upon w h i c h no against the personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a d e c e a s e d t o r t f e a s o r , so l o n g a s t h e c l a i m i s n o t o f an e q u i t a b l e n a t u r e . On A p r i l the 13, 2009, more t h a n a y e a r a n d a h a l f a f t e r complaint, appoint § 6-5-462, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . " ) . Mitchell filed a motion i n the t r i a l filing court t o an a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m f o r Webb's e s t a t e " t o s e r v e as t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " o f Webb's e s t a t e " f o r p u r p o s e s of this appointed lawsuit." On October 19, 2009, the t r i a l court John B r e n t T h o r n l e y as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m o f Webb's e s t a t e . Thornley, as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m o f Webb's e s t a t e , moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , a s s e r t i n g , among o t h e r 2 things, 2101127 t h a t M i t c h e l l ' s a c t i o n i s b a r r e d by t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e o f limitations. M i t c h e l l f i l e d a r e s p o n s e t o T h o r n l e y ' s summary- judgment motion, a s s e r t i n g t h a t h e r a c t i o n i s not t i m e - b a r r e d . On M a r c h 8, 2 0 1 1 , t h e t r i a l in Thornley's favor, time-barred. court entered concluding The t r i a l that a summary j u d g m e n t M i t c h e l l ' s claims c o u r t a p p e a r s t o have a p p l i e d a t w o - year l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d t o both the negligence wantonness are c l a i m and t h e claim. Mitchell a p p e a l e d t o t h e supreme court, a n d t h e supreme c o u r t t r a n s f e r r e d t h e a p p e a l t o t h i s c o u r t , p u r s u a n t t o § 122 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975. B e c a u s e M i t c h e l l ' s c l a i m s a g a i n s t Day remained pending i n the t r i a l not certified the summary court and t h e t r i a l judgment as a c o u r t had final judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., t h e summary j u d g m e n t was not a f i n a l , Coating, appealable that final and t h a t judgment parties, See Edmonds Indus. I n c . v . L o l l e y , 863 So. 2d 1121, 1122 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2003) ( s t a t i n g unless judgment. a l l claims, an a p p e a l or a judgment the rights have b e e n d e c i d e d ) . court with jurisdiction ordinarily lies only i s generally or liabilities from not of a final a l l Thus, we r e i n v e s t e d t h e t r i a l f o r 14 d a y s f o r t h a t c o u r t e i t h e r t o 3 2101127 certify 54(b) t h e summary j u d g m e n t as a f i n a l or t o adjudicate The trial c e r t i f i e d t h e summary j u d g m e n t a s a court subsequently the claims judgment under R u l e final judgment under R u l e 5 4 ( b ) . against This appeal Day. does n o t c o n c e r n t h e c l a i m s a g a i n s t Day. "Summary j u d g m e n t i s a p p r o p r i a t e only when ' t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e as t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and ... t h e m o v i n g p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . ' R u l e 5 6 ( c ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., a n d Dobbs v. S h e l b y C o u n t y E c o n . & I n d u s . Dev. A u t h . , 749 So. 2d 425 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . . . . In reviewing a summary j u d g m e n t , an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t , de n o v o , a p p l i e s t h e same s t a n d a r d as t h e t r i a l court. Dobbs, s u p r a . " Bruce v. C o l e , 854 So. 2d 47, 54 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . I n i t i a l l y , we a d d r e s s w h e t h e r T h o r n l e y , ad litem this o f Webb's e s t a t e , was a c t u a l l y made a d e f e n d a n t i n case. As n o t e d , Webb, before Mitchell claims that against Webb's p e r s o n a l trial the administrator commenced Mitchell court t o appoint may the alleged this have action. representative. Thornley Webb Mitchell survived moved t h e an a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m t o s e r v e a s i n that capacity. amended h e r c o m p l a i n t died Any p e r s o n a l - i n j u r y had a g a i n s t the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t h i s case, appointed tortfeasor, and t h e t r i a l court However, M i t c h e l l never t o add Thornley, 4 the proper party i n 2101127 interest, as a defendant. Thornley argues t h a t M i t c h e l l was r e q u i r e d t o amend h e r c o m p l a i n t t o add T h o r n l e y as a defendant a f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t a p p o i n t e d h i m as a d m i n i s t r a t o r that Webb remains ad l i t e m . the nominal defendant. contends, w i t h r e s p e c t t o M i t c h e l l ' s there i s no proper defendant administrator ad litem, defendant i n t h i s case. required to amend he Thus, contends Thornley c l a i m s c o n c e r n i n g Webb, i n this M i t c h e l l a r g u e s t h a t , when t h e t r i a l as Thornley case. Conversely, court appointed Thornley was automatically made a Thus, M i t c h e l l c o n t e n d s , she was n o t her complaint to add Thornley as a defendant. T h o r n l e y was a p p o i n t e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m p u r s u a n t t o § 43-2-250, A l a . Code 1975, w h i c h p r o v i d e s : "When, i n a n y p r o c e e d i n g i n a n y c o u r t , t h e e s t a t e o f a d e c e a s e d p e r s o n must be r e p r e s e n t e d , a n d there i s no e x e c u t o r o r a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f s u c h e s t a t e , o r he i s i n t e r e s t e d a d v e r s e l y t h e r e t o , i t s h a l l be t h e d u t y o f t h e c o u r t t o a p p o i n t an a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m o f such e s t a t e f o r the p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e e d i n g , w i t h o u t b o n d , whenever t h e f a c t s r e n d e r i n g such appointment n e c e s s a r y s h a l l a p p e a r i n t h e r e c o r d o f s u c h c a s e o r s h a l l be made known t o t h e c o u r t b y t h e a f f i d a v i t o f a n y p e r s o n interested therein." No Alabama case appears t o have 5 squarely addressed 2101127 whether the appointment automatically complaint a makes person that an administrator a party or ad However, is division Loving informative plaintiffs v. on this f i l e d a complaint of the Wilson, whether So. 2d In issue. seeking proceeds. 494 68 Loving, During the named d e f e n d a n t s , So. 2d court and at 69. e r r e d by for the two the court The failing estates. i n Loving court to appoint 494 who of the p r o p e r t y supreme So. 2d had t o be concluded an the one sold. that Citing § as to indicates that a t r i a l the action." Id. trial ad litem 43-2-250, ad l i t e m a This Thus, of two Loving c o u r t ' s a p p o i n t i n g an a d m i n i s t r a t o r l i t e m u n d e r § 43-2-250 a u t o m a t i c a l l y makes t h e of the a l s o observed t h a t " [ t ] h e appointment parties an 494 a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ad l i t e m by t h e c o u r t w o u l d have j o i n e d t h e estates a allegedly administrator a t 70. and court to appoint Robert Wilson, in his w i l l a part the proceedings, a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m f o r t h e e s t a t e s o f James W i l s o n , devised the (Ala. a s a l e of p r o p e r t y p l a i n t i f f s u n s u c c e s s f u l l y moved t h e t r i a l the litem must be amended t o add t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m as party. 1986), of ad administrator party. conclusion i s s u p p o r t e d by 6 the t e x t of § 43-2-250, 2101127 which r e q u i r e s litem in a trial court t o appoint i f t h e e s t a t e o f a d e c e a s e d p e r s o n must be "the p a r t i c u l a r proceeding." appoint would seem would unnecessary represented Because the t r i a l to also t o the complaint as a p a r t y c o u r t must i n such proceedings. essentially appointed make the trial I n s . Co., However, in to A l a . Code 700 case, the death appointment court on O c t o b e r 19, Webb as the proper a of a two-year limitations 1975; a n d B o o k e r So. 2d the limitations 1333, 1339 v. 7 and United ( A l a . 1997). period f o r the s i x months u n d e r S e c t i o n 6-2-14 p r o v i d e s : person court claim i s time-barred. c l a i m was t o l l e d f o r an a d d i t i o n a l § 6-2-14, A l a . Code 1975. between amendment argument t h a t t h e t r i a l i s subject 6-2-38(l), American negligence s u c h an ad l i t e m that her negligence claim this an case. erred i n concluding § of When t h e t r i a l replaced We n e x t a d d r e s s M i t c h e l l ' s negligence filing court's i s made. automatically defendant i n t h i s the Requiring T h o r n l e y as a d m i n i s t r a t o r Thornley period. require t o add t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m i n e f f e c t i v e u n t i l an amendment 2009, ad an a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m f o r c e r t a i n p r o c e e d i n g s , i t amendment A an a d m i n i s t r a t o r the grant "The t i m e of letters 2101127 t e s t a m e n t a r y o r o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , n o t e x c e e d i n g s i x months, is not t o be t a k e n as commencement of any part actions administrators." Our by of or supreme allow f o r a p e r i o d up the personal decedent's court name. Nelson, 644 V a n z a n t , 492 So. So. 662 not 2d 855 So. 2d 990, to So. 887 992 or interpreted exceeding, 2d 241, 882, has the executors his for this of the l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d i s representative S a n d e r s v. M a r t i n , Blanton, t o , but time l i m i t e d against s e c t i o n t o mean t h a t t h e r u n n i n g tolled the sue 2d at 245 (Ala. or s i x months to sued i n the be 1047. See also ( A l a . 1995); Jones 1994); ( A l a . 1986) . and Edwards Because t h e r e v. v. were no l e t t e r s t e s t a m e n t a r y o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n g r a n t e d a f t e r Webb's death, the limitations tolled period f o r the negligence claim f o r s i x months. M i t c h e l l ' s c a u s e o f a c t i o n a c c r u e d on S e p t e m b e r 27, when she allegedly accident. accrues See when entitling him limitations suffered N e l s o n , 855 a party or her period 2005, injuries in the 2d a t 1047 ("A cause of a c t i o n an So. suffers or loss to maintain for was six injury an months l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d f o r the negligence 8 action."). under § automobile or damage Tolling the 6-2-14, the c l a i m e x p i r e d on March 2101127 27, 2008, two and o n e - h a l f S e p t e m b e r 27, 2005. March Webb's as a d e f e n d a n t , representative. 27, 2008, to f i l e personal representative. Because there was no p e t i t i o n e d the court that capacity. court 2009, w e l l the accident the proper Thus, of a negligence claim against until Webb's See N e l s o n , 855 So. 2d a t 1047-48. personal representative, Mitchell t o serve i n M i t c h e l l d i d not p e t i t i o n the t r i a l an a d m i n i s t r a t o r ad l i t e m u n t i l after the l i m i t a t i o n s period e x p i r e d on M a r c h 27, 2008. defendant i s M i t c h e l l had t o a p p o i n t an a d m i n i s t r a t o r However, to appoint after As n o t e d , a l t h o u g h M i t c h e l l named Webb, a deceased person, actually years April f o r negligence 13, had The t r i a l c o u r t a p p o i n t e d T h o r n l e y as a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d l i t e m on O c t o b e r 19, 2009, m a k i n g T h o r n l e y a d e f e n d a n t on t h a t for the negligence date, w e l l a f t e r the l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d c l a i m had e x p i r e d . M i t c h e l l a r g u e s , a s she d i d b e f o r e the t r i a l court, that she may u s e f i c t i t i o u s - p a r t y p r a c t i c e t o a v o i d t h e b a r o f t h e statute of l i m i t a t i o n s f o rher negligence and 15(c)(4), the bar of a statute defendants A l a . R. C i v . P., " ' a l l o w for claim. R u l e s 9(h) a plaintiff to avoid o f l i m i t a t i o n s by f i c t i t i o u s l y which actual 9 parties can naming later be 2101127 substituted.'" So. Co., Ex p a r t e 2d 594, 597 C h e m i c a l Lime o f A l a b a m a , I n c . , ( A l a . 2005) (quoting F u l m e r v. C l a r k 654 So. 2d 45, 46 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) ) . 916 Equip. R u l e 9(h) p r o v i d e s : "When a p a r t y i s i g n o r a n t o f t h e name o f an o p p o s i n g p a r t y a n d so a l l e g e s i n t h e p a r t y ' s p l e a d i n g , t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y may be d e s i g n a t e d b y any name, a n d when t h a t p a r t y ' s t r u e name i s d i s c o v e r e d , t h e p r o c e s s and a l l p l e a d i n g s and p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e a c t i o n may be amended b y s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e t r u e name." Rule 15(c)(4) s t a t e s : "An amendment o f a p l e a d i n g r e l a t e s b a c k t o t h e d a t e o f t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g when ... r e l a t i o n b a c k i s permitted by principles p r a c t i c e pursuant t o Rule In h e r c o m p l a i n t , a defendant, applicable to fictitious 9(h)." M i t c h e l l , i n a d d i t i o n t o n a m i n g Webb a s designated a fictitiously named defendant d e s c r i b e d as " t h a t p e r s o n , f i r m , c o r p o r a t i o n , o r o t h e r or successor wantonly, i n i n t e r e s t who and/or Mitchell's] or which wrongfully injuries caused ... made jointly, or the basis M i t c h e l l maintains that Thornley, litem, "successor i s Webb's that, when Thornley of t h i s 10 separately, [to lawsuit." a s Webb's a d m i n i s t r a t o r a d i n interest" was entity contributed designated f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t i n t h e c o m p l a i n t . argues party appointed as a Thus, M i t c h e l l administrator ad 2101127 litem, Thornley defendant the substituted i n the complaint. negligence original was claim f o r the f i c t i t i o u s l y T h e r e f o r e , M i t c h e l l argues against Thornley c o m p l a i n t and t h a t named the claim relates back that to the i s n o t b a r r e d by t h e statute of l i m i t a t i o n s . F i c t i t i o u s - p a r t y p r a c t i c e does n o t a p p l y t o t h e s i t u a t i o n in this case. appointment Mitchell's to the f i l i n g attempt t o r e l a t e back Thornley's of the complaint a c t u a l l y concerns t h e s e p a r a t e r e l a t i o n - b a c k p r a c t i c e o f R u l e 1 5 ( c ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. Civ. P., n o t t h e f i c t i t i o u s - p a r t y p r a c t i c e o f R u l e s 9(h) a n d 15(c)(4). " U n l i k e some, i f n o t i n d e e d most, j u r i s d i c t i o n s , A l a b a m a h a s two a l t e r n a t i v e k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n b a c k o f amendments as t o p a r t i e s . One i s t h e o r d i n a r y , u n p r e d i c a t e d k i n d o f r e l a t i o n back [ p r o v i d e d f o r i n Rule 1 5 ( c ) ( 3 ) ] and f a m i l i a r t o t h e a t t o r n e y s o f perhaps every other j u r i s d i c t i o n . The o t h e r i s , from t h e n a t i o n a l p o i n t o f view, a perhaps less familiar kind of relation back. Known as ' f i c t i t i o u s p a r t y p r a c t i c e ' o r 'Doe p r a c t i c e , ' i t i s p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e a l l e g a t i o n o f f i c t i t i o u s names in the pre-bar pleading[, i . e . , pleading f i l e d b e f o r e the s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s has run,] which a p a r t y now w i s h e s t o amend. Rule 15(c) addresses both k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n back, b u t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s for changing parties and t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r substituting fictitious parties ... a r e q u i t e different. Thus, an amendment w h i c h c h a n g e s a p a r t y under Rule 15(c)(3) r e l a t e s back o n l y i f the requirements of that p r o v i s i o n are s a t i s f i e d , while an amendment w h i c h s u b s t i t u t e s a t r u e name f o r a 11 2101127 f i c t i t i o u s name u n d e r R u l e 1 5 ( c ) ( 4 ) r e l a t e s b a c k only when the requirements of Rule 9(h) a r e satisfied." Jerome A. H o f f m a n , Alabama Civil Procedure § 4.26 (3d e d . 2008). The Ala. C o m m i t t e e Comments on t h e 1973 A d o p t i o n o f R u l e 15, R. C i v . P, i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f R u l e 1 5 ( c ) ( 3 ) "permit[] real an amendment t o r e l a t e b a c k w h i c h party added.) relates i n interest Such an f o r a named amendment, which Conversely, party for a fictitiously changes an amendment named merely party p r o v i s i o n s o f R u l e 9(h) a r e s a t i s f i e d . 1973 plaintiff." back o n l y i f t h e requirements met. substitutes the a of Rule (Emphasis named 15(c)(3) are substituting relates party, back a i f real the C o m m i t t e e Comments on Adoption. In h e r c o m p l a i n t , M i t c h e l l named Webb, a d e c e a s e d person, as a d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e ; h o w e v e r , t h e p r o p e r d e f e n d a n t was Webb's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , n o t Webb. N e l s o n , 855 So. 2d a t 1047. To c o r r e c t t h a t s i t u a t i o n , M i t c h e l l court appoint an a d m i n i s t r a t o r appointed as a d m i n i s t r a t o r defendant i n this case. requested that the t r i a l ad l i t e m , ad l i t e m and T h o r n l e y t o r e p l a c e Webb a s t h e T h o r n l e y was s u b s t i t u t e d 12 was f o r Webb, 2101127 not fora fictitiously t o Webb. not named d e f e n d a n t t o be s u e d i n a d d i t i o n Thus, t h e r e l a t i o n - b a c k p r a c t i c e o f R u l e fictitious-party practice, controls this 15(c)(3), case. T h i s c a s e i s p r o c e d u r a l l y a n a l o g o u s t o S a n d e r s v. M a r t i n , 662 So. 2d 241 Martin, 662 ( A l a . 1995). I n Sanders, the was i n v o l v e d i n an a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t So. 2d a t 2 4 2 . negligence Martin plaintiff, with Elkins. sued E l k i n s , a l l e g i n g c l a i m s o f and wantonness, and M a r t i n sued E l k i n s ' s f a t h e r , a l l e g i n g c l a i m s o f n e g l i g e n t and wanton e n t r u s t m e n t . However, s i m i l a r t o t h i s case, E l k i n s had d i e d before the complaint was filed. administrator of Sanders Elkins's estate. against his was e v e n t u a l l y appointed 662 So. 2d a t 2 4 3 . As t o t h e c l a i m s t h e d e c e a s e d E l k i n s , M a r t i n d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o amend complaint expiration limitations. t o name of the a proper period defendant allowed by until the a f t e r the statute of The i s s u e i n S a n d e r s was w h e t h e r t h a t amendment r e l a t e d back t o t h e o r i g i n a l f i l i n g of t h e complaint avoid filed the bar of the statute of l i m i t a t i o n s . so as t o 662 So. 2d a t 242. I n S a n d e r s , as i n t h i s c a s e , a p r o p e r p a r t y n e e d e d t o be substituted f o r a named d e f e n d a n t who was d e c e a s e d when t h e 13 2101127 complaint was f i l e d . The supreme c o u r t e x a m i n e d w h e t h e r s u c h an amendment t o t h e c o m p l a i n t , limitations original period, complaint. would f i l e d a f t e r the running of the r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g of the Our supreme c o u r t stated: " R u l e 1 5 ( c ) [ , A l a . R. C i v . P.,] s t a t e s : "'Whenever the claim or defense a s s e r t e d i n t h e amended p l e a d i n g a r o s e o u t of the conduct, t r a n s a c t i o n or occurrence s e t f o r t h o r a t t e m p t e d t o be s e t f o r t h i n the original pleading, the amendment r e l a t e s back t o the date of the o r i g i n a l pleading except a s may be otherwise provided i n Rule 13(c). An amendment c h a n g i n g t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d r e l a t e s back i f the f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n i s s a t i s f i e d and, w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d p r o v i d e d b y l a w f o r commencing t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i m , t h e p a r t y t o be b r o u g h t i n b y amendment (1) h a s r e c e i v e d such notice of the i n s t i t u t i o n of the a c t i o n that he will n o t be prejudiced in m a i n t a i n i n g h i s d e f e n s e on t h e m e r i t s , a n d (2) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t , b u t f o r a mistake concerning the i d e n t i t y of the p r o p e r p a r t y , t h e a c t i o n w o u l d have b e e n brought a g a i n s t him.' "Under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e r e c a n be no r e l a t i o n back, because t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f E l k i n s ' s e s t a t e , ... S a n d e r s , was n o t a p p o i n t e d u n t i l a f t e r the statutory limitations period had r u n and, t h e r e f o r e , c o u l d n o t have h a d k n o w l e d g e o f M a r t i n ' s complaint u n t i l a f t e r the l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d had run." 662 So. 2d a t 243 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . 14 2101127 The t e x t o f R u l e 1 5 ( c ) was amended f o l l o w i n g S a n d e r s ; t h e a b o v e - e m p h a s i z e d p o r t i o n o f t h e r u l e upon w h i c h t h e c o u r t i n Sanders r e l i e d 15(c)(3). i s substantially similar Similar 1 defendant t o take to Sanders, the place to the current Thornley o f Webb the Rule proper was n o t a p p o i n t e d to r e p r e s e n t Webb's e s t a t e u n t i l a f t e r t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d h a d run. the Thus, as i n S a n d e r s , t h e r e filing of the complaint. c a n be no r e l a t i o n b a c k t o The concluded that M i t c h e l l ' s negligence 1 Rule 15(c) c u r r e n t l y p r o v i d e s , trial court correctly claim i s barred i n pertinent by the part: " ( c ) R e l a t i o n B a c k o f Amendments. An amendment of a p l e a d i n g r e l a t e s back t o the date of the o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g when " "(3) t h e amendment, o t h e r t h a n one naming a p a r t y u n d e r t h e p a r t y ' s t r u e name a f t e r h a v i n g b e e n i n i t i a l l y s u e d u n d e r a f i c t i t i o u s name, c h a n g e s t h e p a r t y o r t h e n a m i n g o f t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d i f t h e f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n (2) i s s a t i s f i e d and, w i t h i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e p e r i o d o f l i m i t a t i o n s o r one h u n d r e d t w e n t y (120) d a y s o f t h e commencement o f t h e a c t i o n , w h i c h e v e r comes l a t e r , t h e p a r t y t o be b r o u g h t i n b y amendment (A) h a s r e c e i v e d such n o t i c e of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e a c t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t y w i l l n o t be p r e j u d i c e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g a d e f e n s e on t h e m e r i t s , a n d (B) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t , b u t f o r a m i s t a k e c o n c e r n i n g the i d e n t i t y of the proper p a r t y , the a c t i o n would have b e e n b r o u g h t a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y " 15 2101127 statute of l i m i t a t i o n s . However, Mitchell's clarified we come wantonness that to a claim. a wantonness limitations period, different conclusion Recently, claim parte Capstone prospectively, applies. Ex t h e supreme c o u r t Building applied the six-year suffered i t s limitations period i n Ex decision applies to M i t c h e l l ' s cause o f a c t i o n f o r injuries N e l s o n , 855 So. 2d a t 1047. six-year court in the automobile accident. On O c t o b e r 19, 2009, w e l l limitations period then applicable, a p p o i n t e d T h o r n l e y as t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r wantonness ad l i t e m . was commenced against trial At Because Thornley, the proper defendant, w i t h i n the six-year l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d that must be a p p l i e d claim within the t h a t t i m e , T h o r n l e y became a d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e . the parte So. 3d However, b e c a u s e Corp. case w a n t o n n e s s c l a i m a c c r u e d on S e p t e m b e r 27, 2005, when she allegedly the t o a two-year [Ms. 1090966, M a r c h 16, 2012] M i t c h e l l ' s wantonness c l a i m . her court o v e r r u l i n g a p r e v i o u s supreme c o u r t Capstone Bldg. Corp., 2012) . o u r supreme i s subject t h a t had i n d i c a t e d t h a t a s i x - y e a r p e r i o d (Ala. regarding t o M i t c h e l l ' s c l a i m u n d e r Ex p a r t e B u i l d i n g Corp., the t r i a l court 16 erred i n concluding Capstone that the 2101127 wantonness c l a i m s i s t i m e - b a r r e d . We claim. affirm t h e summary judgment as to the negligence We r e v e r s e t h e summary j u d g m e n t as t o t h e w a n t o n n e s s c l a i m , and we remand t h e c a s e . AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. Thompson, concur. P . J . , and P i t t m a n , 17 Thomas, a n d Moore, J J . ,

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