Vannessa McGlathery v. Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University et al.

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REL: 4/13/12 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 2101017 Vannessa McGlathery v. Alabama A g r i c u l t u r a l and Mechanical U n i v e r s i t y e t a l . Appeal from Madison C i r c u i t (CV-10-901609) Court BRYAN, J u d g e . Vannessa McGlathery appeals from a judgment g r a n t i n g t h e R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., m o t i o n s t o d i s m i s s o f A l a b a m a A g r i c u l t u r a l and M e c h a n i c a l Board of Trustees U n i v e r s i t y ("the of the university u n i v e r s i t y " ) ; the ("the b o a r d " ) ; t h e 2101017 individual their members official of the board capacities; president"), thepresident capacity; director a n d Nancy 1 ("the b o a r d D r . Andrew members"), i n Hugine, Jr. ("the of theu n i v e r s i t y , i n h i s o f f i c i a l Washington o f human r e s o u r c e s , Vaughn, the university's i n her i n d i v i d u a l capacity. We affirm. Procedural History On December 16, 2010, M c G l a t h e r y s u e d t h e u n i v e r s i t y , t h e b o a r d , t h e b o a r d members, t h e p r e s i d e n t , Vaughn, a n d D r . Tommy Coleman, a member o f t h e u n i v e r s i t y ' s f a c u l t y . complaint contained the following 2 McGlathery's pertinent factual allegations: "7. Plaintiff, Vannessa McGlathery employment w i t h t h e U n i v e r s i t y as a A s s i s t a n t i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1998. commenced Technical "8. In approximately 2006, Ms. M c G l a t h e r y was assigned t o serve as A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Support Coordinator at t h e AAMU Research Institute ('AAMURI'). The board members a r e D r . Raymond Burse, James Montgomery, O d y s s e u s M. L a n i e r , Rev. D. Tom B e l l , J r . , Norman H i l l , C h a s i d y P r i v e t t , C h r i s R o b i n s o n , Jerome W i l l i a m s , A n d r e T a y l o r , a n d L u c i e n B. B l a n k e n s h i p . 1 D r . Coleman i s n o t a p a r t y t o t h i s a p p e a l ; t h e r e f o r e , we have o m i t t e d a n y d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t h i m . 2 2 2101017 "9. AAMURI's facilities are located on t h e University's campus, b u t AAMURI i s n o t a s t a t e agency and i s n o t a s u b s i d i a r y o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y . R a t h e r , AAMURI i s a S e c t i o n 501(c)(3) nonprofit c o r p o r a t i o n and i s a p r i v a t e e n t i t y i n d e p e n d e n t o f the U n i v e r s i t y . " "11. W h i l e w o r k i n g a t AAMURI, Ms. M c G l a t h e r y s e r v e d as a d u a l e m p l o y e e o f b o t h t h e U n i v e r s i t y a n d AAMURI. "22. On o r a b o u t J u l y 20, 2010, Nancy W a s h i n g t o n Vaughn i s s u e d a l e t t e r s t a t i n g t h a t Ms. M c G l a t h e r y ' s employment w i t h t h e U n i v e r s i t y w o u l d e n d on A u g u s t 6, 2010. "23. Ms. Vaughn h a s no a u t h o r i t y employee o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y . t o t e r m i n a t e any "24. On o r a b o u t A u g u s t 6, 2010, Ms. M c G l a t h e r y i n s t i t u t e d a g r i e v a n c e a l l e g i n g t h a t h e r employment w i t h t h e U n i v e r s i t y had been i m p r o p e r l y t e r m i n a t e d . "25. On o r a b o u t A u g u s t 11, 2010, Ms. Vaughn i s s u e d a letter t o Ms. M c G l a t h e r y stating that Ms. M c G l a t h e r y was n o t e l i g i b l e t o f i l e a g r i e v a n c e because she h a d n o t b e e n an e m p l o y e e o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y . Ms. Vaughn's l e t t e r t o Ms. M c G l a t h e r y s t a t e d i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t as f o l l o w s : "'The Office o f Human Resources has d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e m a t t e r f o r w h i c h you seek redress i s not subject to the [ u n i v e r s i t y ] g r i e v a n c e procedure because you a r e an e m p l o y e e o f t h e AAMURI. [... ] As an e m p l o y e e o f t h e AAMURI, y o u r employment r i g h t s have n o t [ s i c ] a d v e r s e l y affected due t o a v i o l a t i o n o f [ t h e u n i v e r s i t y ' s ] 3 2101017 p o l i c i e s and p r o c e d u r e s . T h e r e f o r e , [ t h e u n i v e r s i t y ] i s c o n s t r a i n e d from a p p r o v i n g your recent request for a grievance hearing.' "26. The D e f e n d a n t s a r e l e g a l l y b o u n d t o f o l l o w t h e policies set forth i n the U n i v e r s i t y ' s Staff Handbook, a d o p t e d by t h e B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s on O c t o b e r 29, 1993. "27. The Staff Handbook i s applicable to M c G l a t h e r y ' s employment w i t h t h e U n i v e r s i t y . Ms. "28. On o r a b o u t S e p t e m b e r 1, 2010, Ms. M c G l a t h e r y f i l e d an amended and s u p p l e m e n t a l g r i e v a n c e a l l e g i n g t h a t she was i n d e e d an e m p l o y e e o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y and t h a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y h a d n o t a b i d e d b y i t s adopted p o l i c i e s i n attempting t o t e r m i n a t e her employment. "29. The D e f e n d a n t s have f a i l e d o r r e f u s e d t o r e s p o n d t o Ms. M c G l a t h e r y ' s amended and s u p p l e m e n t a l grievance." Based five on claims those factual allegations, a g a i n s t the u n i v e r s i t y , McGlathery the board, stated the board members, and t h e p r e s i d e n t ( c o l l e c t i v e l y r e f e r r e d t o as " t h e university first defendants") claim McGlathery's and one claim a g a i n s t the u n i v e r s i t y a g a i n s t Vaughn. defendants asserted d i s m i s s a l v i o l a t e d § 16-49-23, A l a . Code The that 1975, b e c a u s e , she a s s e r t e d , t h a t Code s e c t i o n g r a n t e d t h e b o a r d t h e exclusive and n o n d e l e g a b l e authority to dismiss university employees. T h a t c l a i m sought a judgment d e c l a r i n g t h a t § 16- 4 2101017 49-23 granted the authority to dismiss board she was exclusive and u n i v e r s i t y employees, v i o l a t e d § 16-49-23, t h a t and t h a t the she was nondelegable that her d i s m i s s a l e n t i t l e d to reinstatement, e n t i t l e d t o wages and b e n e f i t s she h a d lost as a r e s u l t o f h e r d i s m i s s a l . McGlathery's second defendants also asserted 23 b e c a u s e , claim against the university t h a t her d i s m i s s a l v i o l a t e d § 16-49¬ she a s s e r t e d , t h a t Code s e c t i o n g r a n t e d t h e b o a r d t h e e x c l u s i v e and n o n d e l e g a b l e a u t h o r i t y t o d i s m i s s university e m p l o y e e s ; h o w e v e r , t h e s e c o n d c l a i m s o u g h t a w r i t o f mandamus directing the u n i v e r s i t y defendants to reinstate McGlathery and t o p a y h e r t h e wages and b e n e f i t s she h a d l o s t as a r e s u l t of her d i s m i s s a l . McGlathery's defendants asserted the third claim handbook asserted, she h a d n o t b e e n g i v e n dismissal and president. the university t h a t h e r d i s m i s s a l v i o l a t e d p o l i c y 9.3 university's staff her against dismissal McGlathery's ("policy three had complaint not 9.3") because, weeks' n o t i c e been alleged her by the policy 9.3 stated: " S t a f f e m p l o y e e s a r e e m p l o y e e s a t w i l l and may be t e r m i n a t e d w i t h o u t c a u s e by t h e U n i v e r s i t y upon 5 she of approved that of 2101017 three weeks notice. Such terminations must u l t i m a t e l y be a p p r o v e d by t h e P r e s i d e n t . T e r m i n a t i o n w i t h o u t cause s h a l l not a f f e c t the employee's r i g h t t o r e c o v e r unemployment c o m p e n s a t i o n . " The third claim judgment because declaring had that l o s t as McGlathery's n o t i c e and fourth that w i t h o u t the a breach of contract benefits McGlathery's 9.3, she had fifth t h a t her was against a against d i s m i s s a l was to benefits dismissal. the university three of the p r e s i d e n t as a invalid entitled sought reinstatement lost claim she dismissal without approval and d i s m i s s a l was that claim her sought e n t i t l e d t o wages and a r e s u l t of her defendants asserted asserted u n i v e r s i t y defendants and t h a t she was McGlathery's and the i t violated policy reinstatement, she against result the not of weeks' constituted and her the wages dismissal. university defendants " i n accordance w i t h the l a w s o f t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a o r t h e p o l i c i e s and p r o c e d u r e s o f the U n i v e r s i t y " and university s o u g h t a w r i t o f mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e defendants wages and b e n e f i t s she McGlathery's sole to r e i n s t a t e her had l o s t as a r e s u l t o f h e r claim against and Vaughn to pay her the dismissal. asserted that Vaughn had i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h M c G l a t h e r y ' s b u s i n e s s or contractual relations with 6 the university and sought 2101017 compensatory and p u n i t i v e damages. The u n i v e r s i t y d e f e n d a n t s and Vaughn f i l e d R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) motions to dismiss, and McGlathery 2011, entered Because the in 21, a judgment g r a n t i n g i t d i d not dispose Coleman, pleading t h e t r i a l c o u r t , on A p r i l opposition. Following a hearing, trial court a the Rule 12(b)(6) motions. of McGlathery's c l a i m against certified judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , In filed i t s judgment, the t r i a l t h e j u d g m e n t as A l a . R. court I , § 14, A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1901 a final C i v . P. concluded that ("§ Dr. 14"), barred Article a l l of McGlathery's claims against the u n i v e r s i t y defendants i n s o f a r as those claims sought wages and b e n e f i t s . The further concluded that McGlathery's f i r s t the u n i v e r s i t y defendants declaratory because § authority relief and 16-49-23 failed a writ authorized to dismiss two trial claims to state a v a l i d of the mandamus, board u n i v e r s i t y employees. court against claim for respectively, to delegate The trial its court concluded that McGlathery's t h i r d c l a i m against the u n i v e r s i t y defendants relief failed because the to state staff a valid handbook claim did " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n " f o r purposes 7 not for declaratory constitute of the an declaratory- 2101017 r e l i e f exception t o § 14. The t r i a l court concluded that the f o u r t h c l a i m against the u n i v e r s i t y defendants f a i l e d t o state a v a l i d c l a i m f o r a w r i t o f mandamus b e c a u s e p o l i c y 9.3 s t a t e d t h a t s t a f f e m p l o y e e s o f t h e u n i v e r s i t y were e m p l o y e e s a t w i l l who c o u l d be d i s m i s s e d that dismissals w i t h o u t cause and t h e language s t a t i n g without cause were t o be made weeks' n o t i c e and w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e a p p r o v a l did with three of the president not c o n s t i t u t e c o n t r a c t u a l l y binding promises that support a breach-of-contract The trial court would claim. concluded that the f i f t h claim against the u n i v e r s i t y defendants f a i l e d t o s t a t e a v a l i d c l a i m f o r a writ o f mandamus because McGlathery's dismissal d i d not v i o l a t e § 16-49-23 a n d t h e l a n g u a g e o f p o l i c y 9.3 s t a t i n g t h a t dismissals without c a u s e were t o be made w i t h n o t i c e and w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e a p p r o v a l constitute The contractually binding trial intentional relations relief court interference against could McGlathery, concluded with Vaughn f a i l e d three weeks' of the president d i d not promises. that McGlathery's business or claim of contractual t o s t a t e a c l a i m upon which be g r a n t e d b e c a u s e Vaughn, as a c o - e m p l o y e e o f was n o t a " t h i r d party" 8 or a "stranger" to the 2101017 r e l a t i o n s h i p between M c G l a t h e r y and t h e u n i v e r s i t y and because Vaughn was e n t i t l e d t o s t a t e - a g e n t i m m u n i t y . On May 20, 2 0 1 1 , M c G l a t h e r y f i l e d a p o s t j u d g m e n t motion, w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d on J u n e 15, 2 0 1 1 . M c G l a t h e r y t h e n t i m e l y a p p e a l e d t o t h i s c o u r t . Due t o l a c k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n , we t r a n s f e r r e d t h e a p p e a l t o t h e supreme c o u r t , w h i c h t r a n s f e r r e d i t b a c k t o t h i s c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975. S t a n d a r d o f Review "On a p p e a l , a d i s m i s s a l i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s . Jones v. Lee County C o m m i s s i o n , 394 So. 2d 928, 930 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) ; A l l e n v. J o h n n y B a k e r H a u l i n g , I n c . , 545 So. 2d 771, 772 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 8 9 ) . The a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w u n d e r R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) i s w h e t h e r , when t h e allegations of the complaint are viewed most s t r o n g l y i n the p l e a d e r ' s f a v o r , i t appears t h a t the p l e a d e r c o u l d p r o v e any s e t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t w o u l d e n t i t l e h e r t o r e l i e f . R a l e y v. C i t i b a n c o f A l a b a m a / A n d a l u s i a , 474 So. 2d 640, 641 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ; H i l l v. F a l l e t t a , 589 So. 2d 746 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 1 ) . I n m a k i n g t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h i s C o u r t does not c o n s i d e r whether t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l u l t i m a t e l y p r e v a i l , b u t o n l y w h e t h e r she may p o s s i b l y p r e v a i l . F o n t e n o t v. B r a m l e t t , 470 So. 2d 669, 671 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ; R i c e v. U n i t e d I n s . Co. o f A m e r i c a , 465 So. 2d 1100, 1101 ( A l a . 1984) . We n o t e t h a t a R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) d i s m i s s a l i s p r o p e r o n l y when i t a p p e a r s b e y o n d d o u b t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f c a n p r o v e no s e t o f f a c t s i n support of the c l a i m t h a t would e n t i t l e the p l a i n t i f f t o r e l i e f . G a r r e t t v. Hadden, 495 So. 2d 616, 617 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) ; H i l l v . K r a f t , I n c . , 496 So. 2d 768, 769 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . " Nance v. M a t t h e w s , 622 So. 2d 297, 299 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) . 9 2101017 Analysis Initially, appeal that we note the t r i a l that court McGlathery erred has n o t a r g u e d i n concluding that on § 14 b a r r e d h e r c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e u n i v e r s i t y d e f e n d a n t s i n s o f a r as those claims s o u g h t wages and b e n e f i t s . T h e r e f o r e , she h a s waived the i s s u e whether the t r i a l court e r r e d i n t h a t See regard. B o s h e l l v. K e i t h , 418 So. 2d 89, 92 ( A l a . 1982) ("When an a p p e l l a n t f a i l s t o a r g u e an i s s u e i n i t s b r i e f , t h a t i s s u e i s w a i v e d . " ) . C o n s e q u e n t l y , we a f f i r m t h e t r i a l i n s o f a r as i t c o n c l u d e d t h a t § 14 b a r r e d against the u n i v e r s i t y defendants court's judgment McGlathery's insofar as t h o s e claims claims s o u g h t wages a n d b e n e f i t s . We that also note the t r i a l that court McGlathery erred has n o t argued on i n dismissing her claims appeal against t h e u n i v e r s i t y d e f e n d a n t s i n s o f a r as t h o s e c l a i m s were b a s e d on t h e u n i v e r s i t y d e f e n d a n t s ' a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n o f p o l i c y 9.3. Therefore, erred she h a s w a i v e d t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l i n that court's regard. court I d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , we a f f i r m t h e t r i a l j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t d i s m i s s e d McGlathery's claims a g a i n s t t h e u n i v e r s i t y d e f e n d a n t s i n s o f a r as t h o s e c l a i m s were based on the u n i v e r s i t y defendants' 10 alleged violation of 2101017 policy 9.3. McGlathery concluding does argue that the t r i a l 3 erred in t h a t § 16-49-23 a u t h o r i z e d t h e b o a r d t o d e l e g a t e i t s a u t h o r i t y t o d i s m i s s u n i v e r s i t y employees. 2011, court B e f o r e June 9, § 16-49-23 p r o v i d e d : "The b o a r d o f t r u s t e e s has t h e power t o o r g a n i z e t h e u n i v e r s i t y by a p p o i n t i n g a p r e s i d e n t , whose s a l a r y s h a l l be f i x e d b y t h e b o a r d , and by e m p l o y i n g a c o r p s o f i n s t r u c t o r s , who s h a l l be n o m i n a t e d t o t h e b o a r d i n w r i t i n g b y t h e p r e s i d e n t a n d who s h a l l be s t y l e d t h e f a c u l t y o f t h e u n i v e r s i t y a n d s u c h o t h e r i n s t r u c t o r s a n d o f f i c e r s as t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e u n i v e r s i t y may r e q u i r e ; a n d t o remove any s u c h i n s t r u c t o r s o r o t h e r o f f i c e r s , and t o f i x t h e i r s a l a r i e s o r compensation and i n c r e a s e o r reduce t h e same a t i t s d i s c r e t i o n ; t o r e g u l a t e , a l t e r o r m o d i f y t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e u n i v e r s i t y , as i t may deem advisable; to p r e s c r i b e courses of i n s t r u c t i o n , r a t e s o f t u i t i o n and f e e s ; t o c o n f e r s u c h a c a d e m i c and h o n o r a r y d e g r e e s as a r e u s u a l l y c o n f e r r e d by institutions of s i m i l a r character; a n d t o do w h a t e v e r e l s e i t may deem b e s t f o r p r o m o t i n g t h e i n t e r e s t of the u n i v e r s i t y . " (Emphasis added.) McGlathery argues that the language of § 16-49-23 p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e b o a r d "has t h e power ... t o remove any s u c h i n s t r u c t o r s or other o f f i c e r s " grants the board the e x c l u s i v e and nondelegable 3 authority to dismiss university employees. S e c t i o n 16-49-23 was amended e f f e c t i v e J u n e 9, 2011. 11 2101017 The trial court, the language of power ... to regulate, university, power to § on 16-49-23 as i t may other hand, providing concluded "has the a l t e r or modify the deem a d v i s a b l e , " delegate the the that that its authority board government of grants to the dismiss the board the university employees. In 602 So. IMED C o r p . v. 2d 344, 346 Systems E n g i n e e r i n g ( A l a . 1992), the Associates supreme c o u r t Corp., stated: "The f u n d a m e n t a l r u l e o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o a s c e r t a i n and g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n e n a c t i n g t h e s t a t u t e . Words u s e d i n a s t a t u t e must be given their natural, plain, o r d i n a r y , and commonly u n d e r s t o o d m e a n i n g , and where p l a i n language i s used a c o u r t i s bound t o i n t e r p r e t t h a t l a n g u a g e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s . I f t h e language of the s t a t u t e i s unambiguous, then t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n and t h e c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e must be given e f f e c t . T u s c a l o o s a C o u n t y Comm'n v. D e p u t y S h e r i f f s ' A s s ' n o f T u s c a l o o s a C o u n t y , 589 So. 2d 687 (Ala. 1991)." Section provided 16-49-23, as t h a t t h e b o a r d "has instructors or modify government the advisable." other Section i t existed t h e power ... officers" of before the 6-49-23 and "to not 9, 2011, t o remove any regulate, university, did June as contain alter i t may any such or deem language p r o h i b i t i n g t h e b o a r d f r o m d e l e g a t i n g i t s a u t h o r i t y " t o remove 12 2101017 any such instructors or other o f f i c e r s , " and g r a n t i n g t h e b o a r d t h e power " t o r e g u l a t e , government of the b r o a d enough t o "to remove include any A c c o r d i n g l y , we determining authority university, such that the did the had to dismiss u n i v e r s i t y not have dismiss university b e f o r e June 9, 2011. the the June power the 9, is its other authority officers." c o u r t d i d not power to err delegate to amendment o f 2011, § indicates delegate employees under § As deem a d v i s a b l e , " its 16-49-23 that the i t s authority 16-49-23 as amended e f f e c t i v e June 9, it 2011, to existed § 49-23 p r o v i d e s : "The b o a r d s h a l l n o t engage i n a c t i v i t y t h a t i n t e r f e r e s w i t h the day-to-day o p e r a t i o n of the u n i v e r s i t y . The p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e b o a r d o f t r u s t e e s i s t o s e t p o l i c y f o r t h e u n i v e r s i t y and p r e s c r i b e r a t e s o f t u i t i o n and f e e s . The b o a r d a l s o has the power to organize the university by a p p o i n t i n g a p r e s i d e n t , whose s a l a r y s h a l l be f i x e d by t h e b o a r d . The p r e s i d e n t s h a l l a p p o i n t a c o r p s o f i n s t r u c t o r s who s h a l l be s t y l e d t h e f a c u l t y and s u c h o t h e r i n s t r u c t o r s and o f f i c e r s as t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e u n i v e r s i t y may r e q u i r e , remove any instructors o r o f f i c e r s , f i x t h e i r s a l a r i e s o r c o m p e n s a t i o n , and d e f i n e the a u t h o r i t y or d u t y of such i n s t r u c t o r s or o f f i c e r s . The p r e s i d e n t may regulate, alter, and 13 in employees. argues that on the or trial language a l t e r or modify delegate instructors board became e f f e c t i v e board i t may power t o conclude that McGlathery also that the as the 16- 2101017 modify the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the u n i v e r s i t y , subject to review and c o n c u r r e n c e of the board. The president s h a l l p r e s c r i b e courses of i n s t r u c t i o n w i t h i n a c a d e m i c p r o g r a m s t h a t have b e e n a p p r o v e d b y t h e b o a r d . The p r e s i d e n t may c o n f e r a c a d e m i c d e g r e e s and s u c h h o n o r a r y d e g r e e s as a r e u s u a l l y c o n f e r r e d by institutions of s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r upon t h e recommendation o f t h e f a c u l t y . " The June 9, 2 0 1 1 , amendment o f § 16-49-23 g r a n t e d t h e p r e s i d e n t some o f t h e p o w e r s t h a t i t s p r e d e c e s s o r h a d g r a n t e d t o t h e b o a r d ; h o w e v e r , i t c o n t a i n s no l a n g u a g e i n d i c a t i n g its predecessor authority prohibited the board to dismiss university from employees. that delegating i t s Accordingly, we f i n d no m e r i t i n M c G l a t h e r y ' s argument t h a t t h e June 9, 2 0 1 1 , amendment i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e b o a r d d i d n o t have t h e power t o d e l e g a t e i t s a u t h o r i t y t o d i s m i s s u n i v e r s i t y employees b e f o r e June 9, 2 0 1 1 . McGlathery correctly delegate also argues concluded that its authority that, even i f the t r i a l court § 16-49-23 a u t h o r i z e d t h e b o a r d t o to dismiss university employees, i t e r r e d b y a s s u m i n g t h a t a d e l e g a t i o n o f t h a t power b y t h e b o a r d had o c c u r r e d i n t h e absence o f any e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h i n g i t had o c c u r r e d . S p e c i f i c a l l y , McGlathery argues: "There i s no e v i d e n c e Vaughn h a s a u t h o r i t y t o t e r m i n a t e e m p l o y e e s on b e h a l f o f t h e B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s . To t h e c o n t r a r y , M c G l a t h e r y a l l e g e d i n 14 that 2101017 p a r a g r a p h 23 o f h e r C o m p l a i n t , t h a t 'Ms. Vaughn has no a u t h o r i t y t o t e r m i n a t e any e m p l o y e e o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y . ' (C. 20.) Thus, even a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e Board of Trustees could delegate termination a u t h o r i t y , t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t h a t M c G l a t h e r y was t e r m i n a t e d pursuant t o a v a l i d d e l e g a t i o n of such authority." M c G l a t h e r y ' s p r i n c i p a l b r i e f a t p. However, whole, was the viewed i n the 27. c o n t e x t of import of paragraph 23 her complaint of McGlathery's as a complaint t h a t Vaughn d i d n o t have a u t h o r i t y t o d i s m i s s u n i v e r s i t y e m p l o y e e s b e c a u s e , a c c o r d i n g t o M c G l a t h e r y , § 16-49-23 g r a n t e d the board the exclusive u n i v e r s i t y employees. and nondelegable power to dismiss P a r a g r a p h 23 does n o t a l l e g e t h a t , i f § 16-49-23 p e r m i t s t h e b o a r d t o d e l e g a t e t h e power t o d i s m i s s university employees, Vaughn was u n i v e r s i t y employees because not authorized to dismiss t h e b o a r d h a d t a k e n no a c t i o n t o d e l e g a t e i t s a u t h o r i t y t o d i s m i s s u n i v e r s i t y employees t o h e r . Therefore, whether the McGlathery's board had complaint taken d i d not any action raise to the issue delegate i t s a u t h o r i t y t o d i s m i s s u n i v e r s i t y e m p l o y e e s t o Vaughn, and t h u s that issue was not b e f o r e the find no m e r i t i n M c G l a t h e r y ' s e r r e d by a s s u m i n g trial court. Accordingly, argument t h a t t h e t r i a l we court t h a t t h e b o a r d had d e l e g a t e d i t s power t o 15 2101017 dismiss u n i v e r s i t y employees. McGlathery a l s o argues t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d on the ground t h a t i t s t a t e d i n i t s judgment t h a t , " i f [ M c G l a t h e r y ' s ] contentions delegate [that § 16-49-23 did not permit the board i t s p o w e r s ] were c o r r e c t , t h e n [ M c G l a t h e r y ] must a l s o a l l e g e t h a t h e r employment w i t h t h e U n i v e r s i t y was t h e B o a r d . " However, b e c a u s e we a p p r o v e d by have c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e c o u r t c o r r e c t l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t § 16-49-23 p e r m i t t e d to delegate the to trial i t s powers, the court McGlathery i s s u e whether t h a t the trial board statement of i s c o r r e c t i s moot. next argues that the trial court erred in d i s m i s s i n g her c l a i m of i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h b u s i n e s s or contractual capacity r e l a t i o n s against because, McGlathery Vaughn says, in she her individual alleged in c o m p l a i n t t h a t Vaughn's a c t i o n s were b e y o n d h e r a u t h o r i t y malicious. Faye M. I n H e n d e r s o n v. E a r l y , 555 Henderson attempted to business or state sued a claim contractual complaint attempting a So. co-employee, of 2d 130 Mary The to state that claim A. Early, portion alleged: "'INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 16 and ( A l a . 1989), intentional interference relations. her of and with her 2101017 P l a i n t i f f a v e r s t h a t D e f e n d a n t , Mary A. E a r l y , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , d e l i b e r a t e l y , m a l i c i o u s l y , and wilfully i n t e r f e r e d w i t h her long time b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h C e n t r a l Bank o f t h e S o u t h t h e r e b y c a u s i n g h e r damage. "'... P l a i n t i f f a v e r s she was w r o n g f u l l y and u n j u s t l y d i s c h a r g e d b e c a u s e o f t h e c r i t i c a l comments o f D e f e n d a n t , Mary A. E a r l y , as s a i d comments were f a b r i c a t e d and f a l s e , and were made t o f u r t h e r Mary A. E a r l y ' s own p e r s o n a l g o a l s . "'... Because of a c t i o n s P l a i n t i f f was 555 So. 2d a t 131 Henderson's appealed, elements with claim pursuant a prima business court's ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . The contending of or Defendant, Mary terminated.'" to that her facie case contractual judgment, the Rule trial Early's court 12(b)(6), complaint of A. dismissed and Henderson alleged the stated: "To s u p p o r t a c l a i m b a s e d on the tort intentional interference with business c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s , t h e p l a i n t i f f must p r o v e following: " ' " ( 1 ) The existence of a c o n t r a c t or business relation; (2) defendant's knowledge of the contract or business r e l a t i o n ; (3) i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e by the defendant w i t h the c o n t r a c t or b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n ; and (4) damage t o t h e p l a i n t i f f as a r e s u l t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e r f e r e n c e . However, d e f e n d a n t has an o p p o r t u n i t y to prove justification as an affirmative defense to p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m . " ' 17 the intentional interference relations. Affirming supreme c o u r t all of or the trial 2101017 "Hickman v. W i n s t o n C o u n t y Hosp. B d . , 508 So. 2d 237, 238 ( A l a . 1987) ( q u o t i n g Lowder R e a l t y , I n c . v . Odom, 495 So. 2d 23, 25 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) ) . "In an a c t i o n against a co-employee, t h e p l a i n t i f f must a l s o p r o v e t h a t t h e c o - e m p l o y e e was n o t a c t i n g on b e h a l f o f t h e e m p l o y e r o r o t h e r w i s e w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f t h e c o - e m p l o y e e ' s employment a n d t h a t t h e c o - e m p l o y e e was a c t i n g w i t h a c t u a l m a l i c e . H i c k m a n , a t 239. "In t h i s case, Henderson f a i l e d t o a l l e g e i n h e r c o m p l a i n t a l l t h e components f o r a c a u s e o f a c t i o n b a s e d on t h e t o r t o f i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h business or contractual relations. Therefore, Henderson f a i l e d t o s t a t e a c l a i m f o r which r e l i e f can be g r a n t e d u n d e r a n y p r o v a b l e s e t o f f a c t s o r c o g n i z a b l e t h e o r y o f l a w i n Alabama. F o n t e n o t [v. B r a m l e t t , 470 So. 2d 669 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ] . " I d . a t 131-32 (emphasis added). Henderson's c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d the f o u r e s s e n t i a l elements common t o a l l c l a i m s o f i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h b u s i n e s s or c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s , and i t a l l e g e d t h a t E a r l y had a c t e d maliciously. However, although the complaint alleged that E a r l y ' s "'comments were f a b r i c a t e d a n d f a l s e , a n d were made t o further allege Mary that employment A. Early's Early was own p e r s o n a l acting goals,'" outside i t d i d not t h e scope of her i n m a k i n g t h e comments a n d t h u s f a i l e d t o a l l e g e an e s s e n t i a l element of a c l a i m o f i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e business or contractual r e l a t i o n s against 18 with a co-employee. I d . 2101017 a t 131. and The a l l e g a t i o n t h a t E a r l y ' s "'comments were f a b r i c a t e d false, personal a n d were goals,'" made to further was n o t t a n t a m o u n t Mary A. Early's own t o an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t E a r l y was a c t i n g o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f h e r employment when s h e made t h e comments. Shield Autrey, o f Alabama, I d . ; see A u t r e y v. B l u e 481 So. 2d 345, 347-48 t h e supreme c o u r t Cross (Ala. & Blue 1985) . I n stated: "'"The l i a b i l i t y o f a c o r p o r a t i o n f o r t h e t o r t s o f i t s employees, whether agent o r s e r v a n t , i s g r o u n d e d upon t h e p r i n c i p l e o f 'respondeat s u p e r i o r , ' not the p r i n c i p l e s o f a g e n c y . The f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n t o be determined i s whether or not t h e a c t c o m p l a i n e d o f was done, e i t h e r b y a g e n t o r s e r v a n t , w h i l e a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e l i n e and s c o p e o f h i s employment. The c o r p o r a t i o n o r p r i n c i p a l may be l i a b l e i n t o r t f o r t h e a c t s o f i t s s e r v a n t s o r a g e n t s , done w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f employment, r e a l o r a p p a r e n t , even though i t d i d n o t a u t h o r i z e o r r a t i f y s u c h a c t s o r e v e n e x p r e s s l y f o r b a d e them."' ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.) " N a t i o n a l S t a t e s I n s u r a n c e Co. v. J o n e s , 393 So. 2d 1361, 1367 ( A l a . 1980) ( q u o t i n g f r o m O l d S o u t h e r n L i f e I n s u r a n c e Co. v. M c C o n n e l l , 52 A l a . App. 58 9, 296 So. 2d 183, 186 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ) . " Id. ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . Thus, an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t an e m p l o y e e h a s acted without tantamount outside h i s or t o an her employer's a l l e g a t i o n that authority t h e employee o f t h e s c o p e o f h i s o r h e r employment. I d . 19 i s not has acted 2101017 In t h e p r e s e n t case, M c G l a t h e r y ' s c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d that Vaughn was t h e u n i v e r s i t y ' s d i r e c t o r o f human r e s o u r c e s and thus a co-employee o f M c G l a t h e r y . Therefore, M c G l a t h e r y was r e q u i r e d t o a l l e g e n o t o n l y t h e f o u r e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s common to a l l claims contractual of i n t e n t i o n a l interference r e l a t i o n s but also with business or t h e two a d d i t i o n a l e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s a p p l i c a b l e when s u c h a c l a i m i s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t a c o employee malice the -- i.e., that t h e co-employee acted with actual a n d t h a t t h e c o - e m p l o y e e "was n o t a c t i n g on b e h a l f o f employer or otherwise within the scope of the c o - e m p l o y e e ' s employment." H e n d e r s o n , 555 So. 2d 132 ( e m p h a s i s added). A l t h o u g h M c G l a t h e r y ' s c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d t h a t Vaughn lacked a u t h o r i t y t o dismiss McGlathery, i t d i d not a l l e g e that Vaughn's a c t i o n s were o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f h e r employment w i t h the u n i v e r s i t y . Therefore, the t r i a l court d i d not e r r i n dismissing McGlathery's claim of i n t e n t i o n a l interference with business or contractual r e l a t i o n s against McGlathery also argues that Vaughn. the t r i a l court erred i n dismissing her claim of i n t e n t i o n a l interference with business or contractual r e l a t i o n s against Vaughn was e n t i t l e d t o s t a t e - a g e n t 20 Vaughn on t h e g r o u n d that i m m u n i t y . However, b e c a u s e 2101017 we have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h a t c l a i m i s due to be a f f i r m e d on t h e g r o u n d t h a t M c G l a t h e r y f a i l e d t o a l l e g e an e s s e n t i a l element of a c l a i m of i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e with b u s i n e s s o r c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s a g a i n s t a c o - e m p l o y e e , we not reach McGlathery's argument regarding do state-agent immunity. For court's the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial judgment. AFFIRMED. Thompson, P . J . , and P i t t m a n and Moore, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e 21 Thomas, J J . , c o n c u r . r e s u l t , without writing.

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