Julia W. Faellaci v. Jared S. Faellaci
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REL: 5/4/12 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 2100752 J u l i a W. Faellaci v. J a r e d S. F a e l l a c i Appeal from Houston C i r c u i t Court (DR-08-183) On A p p l i c a t i o n f o r R e h e a r i n g BRYAN, J u d g e . The o p i n i o n o f F e b r u a r y 3, 2012, i s w i t h d r a w n , and t h e following i s substituted therefor. J u l i a W. F a e l l a c i a p p e a l s from a judgment e n t e r e d by t h e 2100752 Houston C i r c u i t C o u r t . B a c k g r o u n d and P r o c e d u r a l This before i s the this court. second See ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011). and history procedural time these Faellaci v. We of History parties Faellaci, have 67 So. s e t f o r t h the p e r t i n e n t this case appeared in Faellaci, which " J u l i a W. F a e l l a c i ( ' t h e w i f e ' ) and J a r e d S. F a e l l a c i ( ' t h e h u s b a n d ' ) were m a r r i e d on J u l y 22, 1995, and t h r e e c h i l d r e n were b o r n d u r i n g the p a r t i e s m a r r i a g e : a boy, b o r n i n May 2 0 0 0 ; and two g i r l s , one b o r n i n September 2002 and t h e s e c o n d born in April 2004 ( c o l l e c t i v e l y referred to h e r e i n a f t e r as 'the c h i l d r e n ' ) . On May 8, 2006, t h e Houston C i r c u i t C o u r t ('the t r i a l c o u r t ' ) e n t e r e d a judgment of l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e d a s e p a r a t i o n agreement t h a t h a d b e e n s i g n e d by t h e p a r t i e s on o r a b o u t A p r i l 10, 2006 ( ' t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement'). P u r s u a n t t o the s e p a r a t i o n agreement, the w i f e e x e r c i s e d s o l e custody of the c h i l d r e n , s u b j e c t t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s t h a t were set forth in the separation agreement. The s e p a r a t i o n agreement a l s o c o n t a i n e d t h e f o l l o w i n g provision regarding the husband's child-support obligation: "'The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t t h e [ h ] u s b a n d ' s income e x c e e d s t h e A l a b a m a C h i l d S u p p o r t G u i d e l i n e s , and the [ h ] u s b a n d agrees t o p r o m p t l y pay c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r the minor c h i l d r e n o f t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e sum of $5,000.00 m o n t h l y . [ T h e h ] u s b a n d f u r t h e r a g r e e s as a d d i t i o n a l c h i l d s u p p o r t , t o p a y we defined opinion.: 2 923 background q u o t e b e l o w , and we u s e t h e t e r m s d e f i n e d t h e r e i n as terms i n t h i s 3d 2100752 5 0 % o f t h e n e t a f t e r t a x income o f any c o m m i s s i o n o r bonus i n e x c e s s o f h i s b a s e s a l a r y and w i l l s u p p l y t h e n e c e s s a r y W-2's o r 1099's a t t h e e n d o f e a c h y e a r as p r o o f of compliance w i t h t h i s p r o v i s i o n . ' "On F e b r u a r y 28, 2008, t h e h u s b a n d f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o s e t a s i d e t h e s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t and a c o m p l a i n t f o r a d i v o r c e . The w i f e f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s the husband's p e t i t i o n t o s e t a s i d e the s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t , an answer t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s c o m p l a i n t f o r a d i v o r c e , and a p e t i t i o n f o r a r u l e n i s i a l l e g i n g t h a t the husband had f a i l e d t o f u l l y comply w i t h the terms o f the s e p a r a t i o n agreement r e g a r d i n g h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n . The h u s b a n d subsequently f i l e d a motion to convert h i s p e t i t i o n t o s e t a s i d e the s e p a r a t i o n agreement t o a p e t i t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t . The husband alleged that a material change of circumstances e x i s t e d to support m o d i f i c a t i o n of the separation agreement regarding child support, c u s t o d y , a n d v i s i t a t i o n . The h u s b a n d r e q u e s t e d j o i n t custody of the c h i l d r e n , expanded v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s , c a l c u l a t i o n of h i s child-support o b l i g a t i o n pursuant t o R u l e 32, A l a . R. J u d . Admin., a n d a d i s s o l u t i o n of the marriage. " F o l l o w i n g a j o i n t m o t i o n f i l e d by t h e p a r t i e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a j u d g m e n t [ , on November 25, 2008,] divorcing the parties and reserving j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r a f i n a l judgment r e s o l v i n g the issues that remained pending before the t r i a l court. The t r i a l c o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t o f legal separation and the provisions of the s e p a r a t i o n agreement r e m a i n e d v a l i d u n t i l a f i n a l j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d . " F o l l o w i n g an o r e entered a judgment awarded t h e p a r t i e s c h i l d r e n , awarded t h e of t h e c h i l d r e n , and tenus hearing, the t r i a l court on November 10, 2009, that j o i n t l e g a l custody of the wife primary p h y s i c a l custody awarded t h e husband s p e c i f i c 3 2100752 v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . The t r i a l c o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h e h u s b a n d t o pay c h i l d s u p p o r t i n t h e amount o f $4, 000 a month, and i t o r d e r e d t h e h u s b a n d t o pay the w i f e h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t arrearage, which was d e t e r m i n e d t o be $100,000. P u r s u a n t t o t h e trial court's judgment, a l l other p r o v i s i o n s of the s e p a r a t i o n agreement remained i n ' f u l l f o r c e and effect.' "The w i f e f i l e d a p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59, A l a . R. C i v . P., a l l e g i n g , among o t h e r things, t h a t the trial c o u r t had exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o a w a r d h e r i n t e r e s t on t h e h u s b a n d ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e . The t r i a l c o u r t conducted a hearing on the w i f e ' s postjudgment m o t i o n on J a n u a r y 5, 2010. On J a n u a r y 6, 2010, the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r t h a t s t a t e d : ' A f t e r hearing, [ t h e w i f e ] ' s m o t i o n f o r a new trial is d e n i e d , e x c e p t i n t e r e s t c a l c u l a t i o n s and t h e two i s s u e s [ r e g a r d i n g v i s i t a t i o n ] upon w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s have a g r e e d . A t t o r n e y s s h a l l s u b m i t [an] amended d e c r e e w i t h i n 14 d a y s . ' The h u s b a n d subsequently filed a 'response t o request for interest on arrearage,' arguing t h a t the he does n o t owe i n t e r e s t on h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e because, based on the child-support language in the s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t , t h e r e was no a s c e r t a i n a b l e due d a t e f o r h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n . The trial c o u r t c o n d u c t e d a h e a r i n g on t h e h u s b a n d ' s m o t i o n on F e b r u a r y 25, 2010, b u t t h e r e c o r d does n o t c o n t a i n any f u r t h e r o r d e r s e n t e r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . The w i f e f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l on A p r i l 16, 2010." 67 So. We a 3d a t 923-25 ( f o o t n o t e omitted). d i s m i s s e d the w i f e ' s appeal n o n f i n a l judgment because the as h a v i n g trial been t a k e n court's postjudgment o r d e r " l e f t s o m e t h i n g more f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o do, enter an order making a determination 4 of the from i . e . , to amount of 2100752 i n t e r e s t owed by t h e h u s b a n d [on h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t arrearage] a n d s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e h u s b a n d ' s m o d i f i e d v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s as a g r e e d upon b y t h e p a r t i e s . " After Faellaci, this court the t r i a l I d . a t 926. issued court a certificate conducted of a hearing judgment on A p r i l in 19, 2011, a n d e n t e r e d a j u d g m e n t on May 3, 2011, t h a t a d o p t e d t h e parties' agreement r e g a r d i n g v i s i t a t i o n i s s u e s and t h a t h e l d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d was t o p a y t h e w i f e $100,000 w i t h i n 120 d a y s t o " c l e a r up and any a l l c l a i m s o f u n p a i d c h i l d s u p p o r t . " The t r i a l c o u r t f u r t h e r h e l d t h a t no i n t e r e s t s h o u l d be a w a r d e d on the child-support provision arrearage because i n t h e s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t was that the [ c ] o u r t cannot determine a date interest on t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e . " requested by t h e p a r t i e s was timely notice of denied, and the child-support "so ambiguous ... f o r the a c c r u a l of A l l other the wife relief filed a appeal. Issues The w i f e appeal: raises five court's (1) w h e t h e r t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e a change i n l e g a l c u s t o d y was issues for this insufficient evidence of the c h i l d r e n ; to support 5 review on to support (2) w h e t h e r there a m o d i f i c a t i o n of the 2100752 husband's child-support insufficient evidence obligation; to (3) w h e t h e r support the trial there was court's d e t e r m i n a t i o n as t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e ; (4) whether the t r i a l court e r r e d by f a i l i n g i n t e r e s t on t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e ; trial court mediation considered inadmissible a g r e e m e n t when r e n d e r i n g t o award t h e w i f e a n d (5) w h e t h e r t h e evidence relating to a i t s judgment. Facts The two trial court days; t h e f i r s t c o n d u c t e d an o r e t e n u s p r o c e e d i n g hearing was h e l d i n A u g u s t 2009 a n d t h e second h e a r i n g was h e l d i n O c t o b e r 2009. 2009 the wife hearing, h u s b a n d t o have j o i n t the stated legal husband had "given over that custody her sole During the August she d i d n o t want t h e o f the c h i l d r e n because custody" i n the separation a g r e e m e n t a n d she d i d n o t s e e a n y r e a s o n why t h a t c u s t o d i a l arrangement s h o u l d c h a n g e . The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he w a n t e d j o i n t l e g a l custody o f t h e c h i l d r e n so t h a t he w o u l d n o t be i n a a v o i c e when i t came t o m a k i n g "vacuum" w i t h o u t concerning The decided decisions the c h i l d r e n . record indicates t o withdraw that the p a r t i e s ' 6 the wife oldest had unilaterally child from p r i v a t e 2100752 school and thought to he begin was homeschooling struggling in the child school. However, i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c h i l d had r e c e i v e d As and Bs and school second-grade years h o m e s c h o o l i n g him. in According before to the because record in his first- wife began the wife, the she she had informed the husband of her d e c i s i o n , but the husband t e s t i f i e d t h a t was not given an opportunity t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had to provide input. The he husband a s k e d t h e w i f e d o z e n s o f t i m e s who the c h i l d r e n ' s d o c t o r s were and t h a t t h e w i f e h a d n o t r e s p o n d e d t o his requests month b e f o r e for that trial. information The repeatedly a s k e d h e r who testified that request for that she wife h o s p i t a l to t h e c h i l d r e n ' s d o c t o r s w e r e , and she responded unusual behavior and tests that to that the the one had information have approximately husband had denied husband's v i a a t e x t message. The a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e w i f e had the until t a k e n one done she had record of the c h i l d r e n to a f t e r the not first child informed exhibited the husband t h a t she h a d t a k e n t h e c h i l d t o t h e h o s p i t a l t o have t h e t e s t s performed. medical said, he According information found out to the regarding t h a t one husband, the the of the 7 wife never c h i l d r e n w i t h him, c h i l d r e n had shared and, he been i n the 2100752 h o s p i t a l from the c h i l d r e n . The w i f e s t a t e d t h a t she does n o t a l l o w t h e h u s b a n d t o e¬ m a i l h e r a n d t h a t she o n l y o c c a s i o n a l l y a n s w e r s h i s calls. The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t t h e w i f e telephone, that that she her v o i c e m a i l rarely wife so t h a t mediation, of the testified the "shadowed admitted wife of after One of the the she s t o p p e d access. parties the parties' asserted, went to custody children at the h o s p i t a l the asserted husband his rights However, on a n o t h e r o c c a s i o n , t h e w i f e children with was to the h o s p i t a l f o r a t o n s i l l e c t o m y , h e r " and had r e p e a t e d l y j o i n t custodian. one that, evidence t h e h u s b a n d t h o u g h t t h a t he h a d j o i n t l e g a l subsequently and, before account t o which the husband had children. leave t o communicate a n d t h a t he h a d bombarded h e r w i t h e - m a i l s wife cannot The w i f e p r e s e n t e d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the husband i s d i f f i c u l t The he telephone, o n l y way he c a n communicate w i t h t h e i s through t e x t messaging. using the e-mail o f f h e r home answers h e r c e l l u l a r i s always f u l l messages, and t h a t they turns telephone to the hospital f o r treatment had as a took of a p o s s i b l e s n a k e b i t e and, when t h e w i f e c o n t a c t e d t h e h u s b a n d , he t o l d h e r t h a t he t r u s t e d h e r judgment a n d a l l o w e d 8 her to 2100752 make t h e d e c i s i o n s a b o u t t r e a t m e n t . hearing, the wife D u r i n g t h e O c t o b e r 2009 s t a t e d that her problem w i t h a l l o w i n g the h u s b a n d t o have j o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d r e n was he became "overly " j u s t extreme." involved" with parenting and t h a t that he was The w i f e s t a t e d t h a t she w a n t e d t o be a b l e t o communicate w i t h t h e h u s b a n d a b o u t t h e c h i l d r e n b u t t h a t t h e husband after made i t d i f f i c u l t the mediation and he when h i s behavior thought he was had much joint worse legal custody. The p a r t i e s p r e s e n t e d testimonial amount of undisputed a significant and documentary, the husband's amount o f i n an e f f o r t child-support evidence, to determine arrearage. t h a t t h e h u s b a n d d i d n o t owe t h e w i f e any the It was arrearage on t h e b a s e amount o f h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n , i . e . , h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o p a y $5,000 a month. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h a d p a i d $5,000 a month i n c h i l d s u p p o r t May 2009, a t which time month i n c h i l d s u p p o r t . was 1 he began paying the wife A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e husband's b a s e d s o l e l y on h i s f a i l u r e t o pay t h e w i f e through $4, 000 a arrearage "50% o f t h e T h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e h u s b a n d began p a y i n g t h e w i f e $4,000 a month i n c h i l d s u p p o r t a f t e r t h e p a r t i e s attended mediation. 1 9 2100752 net a f t e r t a x income o f any his base At 2006, c o m m i s s i o n o r bonus i n e x c e s s salary." the the August 2009 h u s b a n d had hearing, paid her the wife the approximately O c t o b e r 2009 h e a r i n g , her that, $128, 000 in as a $60,000 i n m o n t h l y a m o u n t i n g t o t o t a l c h i l d - s u p p o r t payments i n 2006 i n amount o f paid agreed approximately share of h i s commissions or bonuses p l u s support, of only $188,000. However, during the w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t the husband approximately $184,000 2 i n 2006 and that the had two lump sums i n c l u d e d i n t h a t amount s h o u l d n o t have b e e n a p p l i e d toward the husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n ; she asserted (1) that r e p a y m e n t o f a l o a n she and (2) that $39, 500 had from given those specifically, p a y m e n t s was t o the husband f o r a $5,200 f r o m t h o s e payments was for tithe u s e d t o pay 3 the T h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e h u s b a n d a g r e e d t h a t he had e r r o n e o u s l y i n c l u d e d a payment o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y $4,000 f o r h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e f o r one o f t h e c h i l d r e n as p a r t o f h i s c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n , which accounts f o r the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the amount t h e h u s b a n d t e s t i f i e d he had p a i d t h e w i f e , and w h i c h t h e w i f e a g r e e d he had p a i d d u r i n g t h e A u g u s t 2009 h e a r i n g , and t h e amount t h e w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had b e e n p a i d d u r i n g t h e O c t o b e r 2009 h e a r i n g . 2 The w i f e s u b m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e an e - m a i l f r o m t h e h u s b a n d d a t e d A p r i l 6, 2006, t h a t c o n f i r m e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d had p a i d t h e w i f e $39,500 as a " p a y b a c k l o a n " f r o m t h e parties' joint tithe. 3 10 2100752 oldest parties. child's private-school The w i f e tuition agreed by the s t a t e d t h a t the husband had not p a i d her any s h a r e o f h i s c o m m i s s i o n s o r b o n u s e s The as husband stated that his i n 2007 o r yearly 2008. base pay was a p p r o x i m a t e l y $210,000 and t h a t he was p a i d c o m m i s s i o n s on a quarterly basis. According t o the husband, the tax r a t e on his c o m m i s s i o n s was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 40%, a n d he t e s t i f i e d that his n e t c o m m i s s i o n s e a r n e d i n 2006 e q u a l e d $180,000 and that his n e t c o m m i s s i o n s e a r n e d i n 2007 e q u a l e d $120,000, that he owed the wife $90,000 in 2006 and $60,000 A c c o r d i n g t o t h e h u s b a n d , b a s e d on h i s e s t i m a t i o n commissions i n 2006, $38,000 i n 2006. account, he h a d o v e r p a i d so in 2007. of h i s net the wife approximately T a k i n g h i s a l l e g e d 2006 o v e r p a y m e n t the husband contended that he into owed t h e w i f e $22,000 as a s h a r e o f h i s c o m m i s s i o n s f o r 2007. The only husband r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e l i m i n a t e h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o pay the w i f e 50% o f h i s n e t c o m m i s s i o n s and b o n u s e s and t h a t any change t o h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n be made r e t r o a c t i v e t o February 2008, when he filed h i s complaint. a g r e e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d w o u l d n o t owe his commissions or bonuses in 11 2008 the wife i f the The parties any s h a r e o f trial court 2100752 eliminated bonuses when the husband's obligation t o pay commissions and i n i t s j u d g m e n t a n d made t h e change the husband filed h i s complaint retroactive to f o r a divorce, i . e . , F e b r u a r y 2008. The w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she c a l c u l a t e d t h e h u s b a n d ' s n e t commissions and bonuses in 2006, 2007, and 2008 by e x t r a p o l a t i n g h i s g r o s s income f r o m h i s i n c o m e - t a x r e t u r n s and subtracting then, she his salary said, she to determine reduced the h i s gross commissions; gross c o m m i s s i o n s by a p r o p o r t i o n a t e amount o f t a x e s p a i d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e amount o f his net commissions. 4 She t h e n d i v i d e d t h a t number b y one- h a l f t o d e t e r m i n e how much she b e l i e v e d she s h o u l d have b e e n paid. At t h e O c t o b e r 2009 hearing, the wife presented a summary e x h i b i t o f h e r c a l c u l a t i o n s , a n d she a l l e g e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d owed h e r an a d d i t i o n a l $63,491.19 f o r 2006, for 2007, wife, the and $33,640.30 husband's f o r 2008; thus, child-support $94,161.62 according arrearage to the totaled F o r example, i f t h e husband's g r o s s commissions e q u a l e d h a l f o f h i s g r o s s i n c o m e , she t o o k h a l f o f t h e t o t a l amount o f t a x e s t h e husband p a i d and s u b t r a c t e d t h a t from t h e g r o s s commissions t o determine the husband's n e t commissions. 4 12 2100752 $191,293.11 The f o r 2006, 2007, a n d 2 0 0 8 . husband including estimated stated that his child-support that, after he his monthly obligation, paid o b l i g a t i o n s , he h a d a p p r o x i m a t e l y pay h i s expenses. 5 totaled h i s monthly she expenses had $7,800. not He child-support $120,000 i n y e a r l y income t o The w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e " b a s i c m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s " f o r h e r h o u s e h o l d t o t a l e d $5,165. that expenses, not included for clothing, some of cosmetics, her and The w i f e stated expenses, such haircuts, in as that calculation. Standard of Review In Robinson v. R o b i n s o n , 795 So. 2d 729, 732-33 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 1 ) , t h i s c o u r t s e t f o r t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e standard of r e v i e w o f a judgment t h a t i s e n t e r e d a f t e r t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of ore tenus evidence: "A d i v o r c e judgment t h a t i s b a s e d on e v i d e n c e presented ore tenus i s a f f o r d e d a presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s . Brown v. Brown, 719 So. 2d 228 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 8 ) . T h i s p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s i s b a s e d upon t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s u n i q u e p o s i t i o n t o o b s e r v e t h e p a r t i e s and w i t n e s s e s f i r s t h a n d and t o During the hearing, the wife realized that her c a l c u l a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d an e r r o r , a n d she l a t e r c l a r i f i e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t she was r e q u e s t i n g o n l y $170,683.52 i n child-support arrearages. 5 13 2100752 e v a l u a t e t h e i r demeanor a n d c r e d i b i l i t y . Brown, s u p r a ; H a l l v . M a z z o n e , 486 So. 2d 408 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . A j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t b a s e d on i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t s w i l l be r e v e r s e d o n l y where i t i s s o u n s u p p o r t e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e as t o be p l a i n l y a n d p a l p a b l y w r o n g . Brown, s u p r a . However, t h e r e i s no presumption of correctness i n the t r i a l court's a p p l i c a t i o n o f l a w t o t h e f a c t s . G a s t o n v . Ames, 514 So. 2d 877 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) . " Discussion I. On a p p e a l , Joint Legal the wife first Custody argues that the t r i a l court e r r e d by m o d i f y i n g c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d r e n so t h a t t h e husband was a w a r d e d husband joint failed legal t o prove custody because, a m a t e r i a l change she c o n t e n d s , t h e in circumstances since the p a r t i e s agreed t o allow the wife t o e x e r c i s e sole custody we b e g i n o f t h e c h i l d r e n i n t h e s e p a r a t i o n agreement. our d i s c u s s i o n of the merits must d e t e r m i n e what b u r d e n o f p r o o f request for joint legal custody of t h i s Before argument, we a p p l i e d t o t h e husband's and t h e w i f e ' s request to remain the s o l e c u s t o d i a n o f the c h i l d r e n . The i.e., w i f e argues t h a t , because t h e r e e x i s t e d a judgment, t h e judgment o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n a d o p t i n g separation agreement, awarding her sole the p a r t i e s ' custody of the c h i l d r e n , t h e h u s b a n d was r e q u i r e d t o make a t h r e s h o l d s h o w i n g 14 2100752 of a m a t e r i a l change changing legal i n circumstances custody i n order of the c h i l d r e n . to However, support such a p o s i t i o n i s n o t s u p p o r t e d b y § 30-2-40, A l a . Code 1975, w h i c h sets forth Alabama. party t h e l a w as i t r e l a t e s to legal separations i n S e c t i o n 30-2-40(e) s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e s : " I f e i t h e r to a legal dissolution separation later of the marriage, institutes the best an a c t i o n f o r interest of the c h i l d standard s h a l l apply to the determination of c h i l d A c c o r d i n g t o t h e p l a i n terms o f § 30-2-40(e), has d e t e r m i n e d custody." our l e g i s l a t u r e t h a t t h e c u s t o d i a l terms o f a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t do n o t have t h e same l e g a l e f f e c t as a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of custody i n an o r i g i n a l either party to a legal divorce judgment. separation later Instead, i f decides t o s e e k an absolute divorce, a t r i a l court i s required to apply only "the best interest of the c h i l d standard to the determination of c h i l d c u s t o d y , " w h i c h i s t h e same s t a n d a r d a t r i a l c o u r t must a p p l y i n an o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e a c t i o n . See L o w e r y v . L o w e r y , 72 So. 3d 701, 704 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011) ( c i t i n g Ex p a r t e C o u c h , 521 So. 2 d 987, 989 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) , a n d h o l d i n g t h a t , i n o r i g i n a l divorce actions, the p a r t i e s neither p a r t y has a presumption 15 stand on equal footing of entitlement to and custody; 2100752 instead, the children). (e), the an primary See concern for of the divorce is filed This a p p l i e s the McLendonr, 455 custody Accordingly, of we s i n c e the 2d 863 that a subsection i s applied i f law which r a t h e r t h a n t h e Ex parte current to case 1984),] occur the standard pending a husband d i d not material change in separation of the judgment a d o p t i n g have occurred the p a r t i e s ' extent that the wife argues that there evidence to support a f i n d i n g that joint custody interests legal c h i l d r e n , we a trial would disagree. court's legislative serve the In C l e v e l a n d ( A l a . C i v . App. best v. an Cleveland, was award of of the 18 So. 3d 2009), the w i f e i n t h a t case appealed award of d i v o r c e a c t i o n , and we the legal- agreement. the 952 the circumstances insufficient 950, when divorce."). t o s u p p o r t a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f c u s t o d y had entry the legal (Ala. that of a with arrangements conclude proving sufficient To So. ("Under subsequent 'best i n t e r e s t ' s t a n d a r d burden i s consistent interests c h i l d standard separation. temporary best a l s o Comment t o § 30-2-40 'best i n t e r e s t ' action i s the joint legal c u s t o d y i n an began o u r d i s c u s s i o n "by declaration on 16 the subject" original acknowledging of joint legal 2100752 custody: " ' I t i s the p o l i c y of t h i s state to assure t h a t minor c h i l d r e n have f r e q u e n t a n d c o n t i n u i n g c o n t a c t w i t h p a r e n t s who have shown t h e a b i l i t y to a c t i n the best i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n and t o encourage parents t o share i n the r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of rearing their children after the parents have separated or d i s s o l v e d t h e i r marriage ' "Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-150. P u r s u a n t to that p o l i c y , A l a . Code 1975, § 30-3-152, r e q u i r e s t r i a l c o u r t s t o c o n s i d e r i n every d i v o r c e case whether awarding j o i n t custody w i l l serve the best i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d . I n m a k i n g t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t r i a l courts "'shall consider the same factors c o n s i d e r e d i n awarding s o l e l e g a l and p h y s i c a l custody and a l l o f t h e f o l l o w i n g -P ^ 4- ^ ^ f a c t o r s :. " ' ( 1 ) The a g r e e m e n t o r l a c k of a g r e e m e n t o f t h e p a r e n t s on j o i n t custody. " ' ( 2 ) The p a s t a n d p r e s e n t ability of the parents to cooperate w i t h each o t h e r and make d e c i s i o n s j o i n t l y . "'(3) The a b i l i t y of the parents t o encourage the s h a r i n g of l o v e , a f f e c t i o n , a n d c o n t a c t between t h e c h i l d and t h e o t h e r parent. "'(4) Any h i s t o r y of or p o t e n t i a l f o r c h i l d abuse, spouse abuse, o r k i d n a p p i n g . 17 2100752 "'(5) The geographic p r o x i m i t y of the parents to each other as this r e l a t e s to the p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of j o i n t p h y s i c a l custody.' "Ala. Id. at Code 1975, § 30-3-152(a)." 952-53. The wife allowing the contends that the husband to e x e r c i s e c h i l d r e n would not serve the evidence joint best indicated legal custody of i n t e r e s t s of the h u s b a n d and record made by the wife. case, in this the and trial-court We we have t h o r o u g h l y judge d u r i n g the ore between reviewed have t a k e n n o t e o f t h e tenus that h u s b a n d and there existed t h e w i f e and a power struggle the comments hearings, e s p e c i a l l y t h e comments i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l - c o u r t believed the children b e c a u s e i t w o u l d p r o m o t e more d i s s e n s i o n and d i s p u t e s the that judge between the t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n were t h e ones t h a t were b e n e f i t i n g t h e l e a s t f r o m t h e c u s t o d i a l a r r a n g e m e n t t h a t e x i s t e d at the time of t r i a l , custody. A l t h o u g h the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t the w i f e d i d want t o s h a r e j o i n t l e g a l 3-152(b), A l a . award a i . e . , the w i f e ' s e x e r c i s i n g s o l e form of c u s t o d y w i t h t h e h u s b a n d , see Code 1975 (providing that joint even custody 18 a i f both trial § not 30- court may p a r t i e s do not 2100752 agree, so l o n g as t h e b e s t interests of the c h i l d r e n are s e r v e d ) , and t h a t the p a r t i e s had a h i s t o r y o f b e i n g unable t o communicate court's effectively, we j u d g m e n t i s so u n s u p p o r t e d p l a i n l y o r p a l p a b l y wrong. of cannot this state conclude that the trial b y t h e e v i d e n c e as t o be As n o t e d a b o v e , i t i s t h e p o l i c y " t o share i n the r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f r e a r i n g t h e i r c h i l d r e n " § 30-3-150. With and considering the conclude joint that t o encourage this policy evidence the t r i a l both parents consideration presented at i n mind, trial, c o u r t e r r e d by awarding we cannot the husband l e g a l custody of the c h i l d r e n . The wife also argues that t h e award c u s t o d y s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l of joint legal c o u r t was u n d e r t h e e r r o n e o u s i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e h u s b a n d n e e d e d t o be a w a r d e d j o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y i n o r d e r t o have a c c e s s t o t h e c h i l d r e n ' s medical o r s c h o o l r e c o r d s . See § 30-3-154, (providing A l a . Code 1975 t h a t a l l r e c o r d s and i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g to a c h i l d a r e e q u a l l y a c c e s s i b l e by b o t h p a r e n t s i n a l l t y p e s o f custody statute). arrangements, Although unless some prohibited comments by made b y court the order trial-court judge d u r i n g the h e a r i n g s suggest t h a t t h e t r i a l - c o u r t 19 or judge 2100752 t h o u g h t t h e h u s b a n d s h o u l d be a w a r d e d j o i n t t h a t he c o u l d have a c c e s s already concluded custody was misunderstanding to t o t h e c h i l d r e n ' s r e c o r d s , we that the t r i a l supported on R. App. P. appeal only "probably c o u r t ' s award o f j o i n t other grounds; so have legal thus, any on t h e p a r t o f t h e t r i a l - c o u r t j u d g e r e l a t i n g t h e s c o p e o f § 30-3-154 was Ala. l e g a l custody h a r m l e s s e r r o r . See R u l e 45, ( p r o v i d i n g t h a t a j u d g m e n t w i l l be r e v e r s e d on i f the error injuriously committed affected by the trial substantial rights court of the parties"). The custody the wife f u r t h e r argues that must be r e v e r s e d parties' mediation t h e award o f j o i n t because the t r i a l agreement court wherein legal considered the wife agreed t o a l l o w the husband t o e x e r c i s e j o i n t l e g a l custody when i t a w a r d e d t h e h u s b a n d j o i n t that the t r i a l court considered legal custody. the terms 6 of the had -¬ Assuming parties' The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t became p r i v y t o t h e p a r t i e s ' m e d i a t i o n a g r e e m e n t when t h e h u s b a n d f i l e d a m o t i o n t o e n f o r c e t h e agreement, w i t h the agreement a t t a c h e d , i n June 2009; t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n . However, as n o t e d a b o v e , t h e w i f e ' s t e s t i m o n y c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t she had agreed t o a l l o w the husband t o e x e r c i s e j o i n t legal custody during the mediation proceedings a n d t h a t she h a d changed h e r mind s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r because o f the husband's behavior. 6 20 2100752 mediation parties' agreement joint a g r e e m e n t was when m a k i n g legal custody erroneous, we i t s decision to and award the t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of still cannot conclude that that the a w a r d o f j o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d b e c a u s e , as we s t a t e d above, the t r i a l on the evidence custody Rule presented would serve a t t r i a l , t h a t an a w a r d o f j o i n t the best interests of the legal children. the w i f e argues t h a t , i f the t r i a l on t h e t e s t i m o n y husband j o i n t See l e g a l custody, trial right s u c h r e l i a n c e was to confront the child's However, b a s e d on o u r of the o l d e s t c h i l d ' s testimony testimony, review was benefited the wife never discouraged Accordingly, even the i f the trial 21 over the leave wife's o f t h e r e c o r d , none to support the child court visiting erred testified, the by the child's a s s e r t e d , t h a t the w i f e c h i l d r e n from the violated I f a n y t h i n g , the because c o n t r a r y t o what t h e h u s b a n d h a d was the w i f e necessary t r i a l court's custody determination. testimony relied e r r o r because a witness c o u r t made t h e h u s b a n d and courtroom during objection. court of the p a r t i e s ' o l d e s t c h i l d i n awarding constitutional because the the based only 45. Finally, her c o u r t c o u l d have f o u n d , had husband. making the 2100752 h u s b a n d and the wife c h i l d ' s testimony, leave the courtroom s u c h e r r o r was during harmless. See the Rule oldest 45. A c c o r d i n g l y , we a f f i r m t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t a w a r d e d t h e p a r t i e s j o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y II. Next, modifying the wife of the c h i l d r e n . C h i l d Support argues that the trial court erred by t h e h u s b a n d ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n f r o m $5,000 a month t o $4,000 a month and by e l i m i n a t i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n i n the p a r t i e s ' l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement t h a t a l l o w e d the to wife c o l l e c t 50% o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s n e t c o m m i s s i o n s and b o n u s e s as c h i l d support. The w i f e contends t h a t the husband f a i l e d p r o v e t h a t t h e r e had b e e n a m a t e r i a l change i n to circumstances s u f f i c i e n t t o support m o d i f y i n g the c h i l d - s u p p o r t terms of the l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement. the was wife's However, as we d i d w i t h r e g a r d t o a r g u m e n t t h a t a m a t e r i a l change i n necessary to modify custody, we must a p p r o p r i a t e b u r d e n o f p r o o f f o r a p a r t y who his or action her child-support f o l l o w i n g the o b l i g a t i o n i n an entry of circumstances determine the seeks to e s t a b l i s h original divorce a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment. 7 I n her a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g , the w i f e argues t h a t t h i s a p p e a l does n o t p r o c e e d f r o m an o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e a c t i o n . We d i s a g r e e . T h i s c a s e was i n s t i t u t e d by t h e h u s b a n d when he 7 22 2100752 We conclude that, i n an original divorce action, a party n o t r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e a m a t e r i a l change i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s the entry of separation was a legal-separation j u d g m e n t was i n operation even when t h e since if a legal- divorce action filed. Section court Rule 3 0 - 2 - 4 0 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975, to enter 32, Ala. an R. legal separation. in judgment is order Jud. for child requires a support i n compliance A d m i n . , when i t e n t e r s trial with a judgment However, u n l i k e a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of of custody a d i v o r c e a c t i o n f o l l o w i n g the e n t r y of a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n j u d g m e n t , § 30-2-40 does n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s what b u r d e n o f p r o o f s h o u l d be a p p l i e d t o a d e t e r m i n a t i o n in of c h i l d support a d i v o r c e a c t i o n f o l l o w i n g the e n t r y of a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment. f i l e d a divorce complaint. A l t h o u g h the husband s u b s e q u e n t l y s t y l e d h i s amended c o m p l a i n t as a p e t i t i o n to modify the legal-separation judgment, the styling of his amended c o m p l a i n t d i d n o t change t h e n a t u r e o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g . The trial court subsequently entered an o r d e r divorcing the p a r t i e s b u t r e s e r v i n g t h e i s s u e s o f c u s t o d y , v i s i t a t i o n , and s u p p o r t . Thus, t h a t o r d e r was n o t a f i n a l j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e i t d i d n o t r e s o l v e e a c h i s s u e p e n d i n g b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t . See B l a n k e n s h i p v. B l a n k e n s h i p , 963 So. 2d 112, 114 (Ala. Civ. App. 2 0 0 7 ) . A f i n a l j u d g m e n t d i v o r c i n g t h e p a r t i e s was not e n t e r e d u n t i l t h e t r i a l c o u r t had a d d r e s s e d e a c h i s s u e p e n d i n g b e f o r e i t , i n c l u d i n g t h e c u s t o d y , v i s i t a t i o n , and support issues. 23 2100752 As we a have d i s c u s s e d a l r e a d y , a c u s t o d i a l arrangement i n l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t does n o t bind the parties in a s u b s e q u e n t a c t i o n f o r a d i v o r c e -- i . e . , n e i t h e r p a r t y has to meet t h e an action burden to judgment. of change Instead, proof a that would custodial the otherwise exist determination legislature has in in a prior determined that the c u s t o d y o f any c h i l d r e n i n q u e s t i o n s h o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d b a s e d on the same divorce standard action. agreement are of proof Likewise, not bound that applies parties by the to terms a in an initial legal-separation of the separation a g r e e m e n t r e l a t i n g t o a l i m o n y and d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y unless the p a r t i e s agree t o i n c o r p o r a t e those terms i n t o a subsequent d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t . See § 3 0 - 2 - 4 0 ( d ) , A l a . Code 1975 however, that a trial legal-separation settlement in the may consider agreement r e l a t i n g terms upon f i n a l d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e m a r r i a g e ) . to be c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may the the t o a l i m o n y and Comment t o § 30-2-40, a " l e g a l intended into court (providing, temporary separation Thus, well exist" at the the property As noted is usually "different time the p a r t i e s l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement "than i f the 24 of enter parties or 2100752 c o u r t were p e r m a n e n t l y d i s s o l v i n g t h e m a r r i a g e . " I d . As we concluded above regarding the 8 child-custody p r o v i s i o n s o f a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t , we c o n c l u d e that t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t t e r m s o f a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t do n o t have t h e same l e g a l e f f e c t as a c h i l d - s u p p o r t j u d g m e n t i n an o r i g i n a l divorce action for a action. divorce Therefore, following we c o n c l u d e t h a t , i n an the entry of a judgment a d o p t i n g a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement, t h e n o n c u s t o d i a l parent i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e a m a t e r i a l change i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s order to "modify" Accordingly, the t r i a l the d e t e r m i n a t i o n without or her child-support obligation. c o u r t was r e q u i r e d t o a p p l y R u l e 32 t o o f the husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t obligation, c o n s i d e r i n g whether t h e r e had been a m a t e r i a l in circumstances parties' his in change s i n c e t h e e n t r y o f t h e judgement a d o p t i n g l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement. the 9 Consideration of the temporary nature of legal s e p a r a t i o n s i s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t i n c a s e s s u c h as t h i s , i n w h i c h t h e c o m b i n e d g r o s s income o f t h e p a r t i e s e x c e e d s t h e uppermost l i m i t o f the s c h e d u l e o f c h i l d support found i n the a p p e n d i x t o R u l e 32, A l a . R. J u d . Admin., and t h e amount o f c h i l d s u p p o r t t h e n o n c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t must p a y i s , t h u s , a d i s c r e t i o n a r y m a t t e r . See R u l e 3 2 ( C ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. J u d . Admin. 8 I n L o c k r i d g e v. L o c k r i d g e , 77 So. 3d 148 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011), the t r i a l court entered a judgment t h a t modified c e r t a i n t e r m s o f an e x i s t i n g s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t i n s t e a d o f 9 25 2100752 In her a p p l i c a t i o n for rehearing, t h i s conclusion overlooks Code 1975, the wife argues that or misapprehends § 30-2-40(c), A l a . and R u l e 3 2 ( A ) ( 3 ) ( b ) , A l a . R. J u d . Admin. We will address each i n t u r n . Section 30-2-40(c) provides: " I f a p a r t y f i l e s a complaint f o r a decree of l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n r a t h e r than a decree of d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e , t h e c o u r t may g r a n t t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n . The t e r m s o f a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n can be m o d i f i e d o r d i s s o l v e d o n l y by w r i t t e n c o n s e n t o f b o t h p a r t i e s and r a t i f i c a t i o n by t h e c o u r t o r by c o u r t o r d e r upon proof o f a m a t e r i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A proceeding or judgment f o r l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n s h a l l not bar e i t h e r p a r t y from l a t e r i n s t i t u t i n g an e n t e r i n g a j u d g m e n t d i v o r c i n g t h e p a r t i e s , as r e q u e s t e d by t h e h u s b a n d i n t h a t c a s e . We r e v e r s e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t and remanded t h e c a u s e w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o e n t e r a judgment d i v o r c i n g the p a r t i e s . In t h a t case, the h u s b a n d a l s o a r g u e d on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t had e r r e d by f a i l i n g t o m o d i f y h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e r e had b e e n s e v e r a l m a t e r i a l c h a n g e s i n h i s and t h e w i f e ' s circumstances s i n c e the e n t r y of the judgment a d o p t i n g the p a r t i e s ' l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement. We r e v e r s e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t , i n s o f a r as i t f a i l e d t o m o d i f y t h e t e r m s o f the husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n , because the trial c o u r t had erroneously considered funds i n the husband's retirement accounts i n determining that his child-support o b l i g a t i o n was n o t due t o be m o d i f i e d . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t our opinion i n Lockridge suggests that p a r t i e s to a legals e p a r a t i o n agreement, i n a subsequent a c t i o n f o r a d i v o r c e , must p r o v e a m a t e r i a l change i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i n c e t h e e n t r y of the judgment a d o p t i n g the s e p a r a t i o n agreement i n o r d e r t o m o d i f y t h e n o n c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n , we c o n c l u d e t h a t s u c h a s u g g e s t i o n i s e r r o n e o u s and i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i n t e n t o f § 30-2-40. 26 2100752 a c t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of the We an cannot conclude t h a t § 30-2-40(c) r e q u i r e s a p a r t y i n original divorce circumstances in order parent's not, action trial court child-support the of parties the terms of seek agreement agreement, b e f o r e on rehearing plead and a material that prove establish the Section of 32(A)(3)(b) in the noncustodial 30-2-40(c) argues, apply a modification while to they are a c t i o n has of the terms operating 32(A)(3)(b) a material parties' the been change that the argument husband i n circumstances in to this child-support judgment. provides: "(A) Child-Support Guidelines Established. G u i d e l i n e s f o r c h i l d support are hereby e s t a b l i s h e d f o r use i n any a c t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h o r m o d i f y c h i l d support, whether temporary or permanent. 27 the filed. required legal-separation of under a r e n o t p e r s u a d e d by t h e w i f e ' s Rule does a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement o r i g i n a l d i v o r c e a c t i o n i n order to "modify" the terms change has b e e n f i l e d ; § 30-2-40 (c) a p p l i e s a divorce F u r t h e r m o r e , we to implicitly a f t e r a divorce complaint separation prove obligation. wife "modification" the to s i n c e the e n t r y of a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment f o r the as when marriage." Rule 2100752 "(3) M o d i f i c a t i o n s . The guidelines s h a l l be u s e d by t h e p a r t i e s as t h e b a s i s for p e r i o d i c updates of child-support obligations. II "(b) A party seeking a modification of child support must p l e a d and p r o v e t h a t t h e r e has o c c u r r e d a m a t e r i a l change i n circumstances that i s s u b s t a n t i a l and continuing s i n c e the last order of c h i l d support." Certainly, any other i n an a c t i o n t o m o d i f y a d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t , judgment establishing an initial child-support obligation, a p e t i t i o n i n g p a r e n t must p r o v e t h e e x i s t e n c e a change material i n circumstances that is substantial c o n t i n u i n g s i n c e the e n t r y of the l a s t order of c h i l d in order to modify obligation. the noncustodial However, m o d i f i c a t i o n of the in initial those parent's cases, or of and support child-support any subsequent child-support obligation i s part o f t h e same a c t i o n . A d i v o r c e a c t i o n f i l e d a f t e r t h e e n t r y of a an legal-separation judgment is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e because action i n w h i c h a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment i s e n t e r e d wholly separate proceeding from a d i v o r c e a c t i o n . Pursuant F o r example, i n t h i s case, the l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a c t i o n a s s i g n e d c a s e no. DR-06-400, w h i l e t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n was 1 0 was 1 0 is a 28 2100752 to § 30-2-40(c), a t r i a l modify c o u r t has c o n t i n u i n g the terms of a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n parties are separated. divorce, a n d a new However, action j u r i s d i c t i o n to agreement once one p a r t y while files i s commenced, a t r i a l the for a court must o p e r a t e p u r s u a n t t o i t s a u t h o r i t y u n d e r § 3 0 - 2 - 1 , A l a . Code 1975 (granting a circuit court t h e power to divorce parties f r o m t h e bonds o f m a t r i m o n y upon a c o m p l a i n t f i l e d by one o f the p a r t i e s ) . The same l e g a l s t a n d a r d s a n d b u r d e n s o f p r o o f apply i n every divorce action i n this state. 2-40 only -- i . e . , the separations i n Alabama legal-separation burdens of proof divorce, -- i n d i c a t e s judgment t o be dissolve a marriage. agreement statutory are free, changes applied authority that the in a any other parties conclude following of a standards and to legal-separation who file the issues for a presented a c t i o n , t h e y a r e n o t bound by t h e terms o f the l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement i n t h e d i v o r c e we legal subsequent a c t i o n Although p a r t i e s to a like on the existence legal t o r e a c h an a g r e e m e n t r e g a r d i n g i n the divorce N o t h i n g i n § 30¬ that the entry the entry o f an initial of a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a s s i g n e d c a s e no. DR-08-183. 29 action. divorce Therefore, judgment judgment i s n o t a 2100752 "modification" action i s a separate initial action, divorce action Because gross of the l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n income i t was and the uppermost February 2008 when divorce, " t h e amount o f c h i l d 973 the law a p p l i c a b l e t h a t the husband's support schedule i n the appendix t o an levels of adjusted the child- t o R u l e 32, as i t e x i s t e d i n the husband d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l a divorce applies. undisputed exceeded judgment; filed support h i s complaint for a s h o u l d be l e f t to the c o u r t . " Dyas v Dyas, 683 So. 2d 971, ( A l a . C i v . App. 1995) ( c i t i n g R u l e 3 2 ( C ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. J u d . Admin.). "When t h e c o m b i n e d a d j u s t e d g r o s s income e x c e e d s the uppermost l i m i t of the c h i l d support s c h e d u l e , t h e amount o f c h i l d s u p p o r t a w a r d e d must r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e a n d n e c e s s a r y needs o f t h e c h i l d , t a k i n g i n t o account the l i f e s t y l e to which t h e c h i l d was a c c u s t o m e d a n d t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g t h e c h i l d e n j o y e d b e f o r e t h e d i v o r c e , and must r e a s o n a b l y r e l a t e t o t h e o b l i g o r ' s a b i l i t y t o pay f o r t h o s e n e e d s . ... To a v o i d a f i n d i n g o f an abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n on a p p e a l , a t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t o f c h i l d s u p p o r t must s a t i s f y b o t h p r o n g s . " Id. a t 973-74 The (footnote omitted). husband's ability t o pay $4, 000 a month, $5,000 a month, i n c h i l d s u p p o r t i s n o t i n d i s p u t e . the w i f e contends t h a t the undisputed evidence 30 or even However, presented to 2100752 the trial (for court i n d i c a t e d " t h a t the b a s i c household expenses recurring c h i l d r e n and wife's that expenses and b r i e f a t p. those 34.) However, t h e children. Instead, she expenses," and, that and only wife. testified that she some o f her expenses h a i r c u t s , the $4,000 of judgment $5,165." the such as trial court could cost of s e t t i n g the find no husband's error testify needs the of the "household calculation expenses have a t t r i b u t a b l e to the three we (The t h a t her for concluded wife's basic children and a t t r i b u t a b l e to r e m a i n d e r o f t h o s e e x p e n s e s was Accordingly, the d i d not $5,165 the for t h e y were testified h o u s e h o l d e x p e n s e s was t h a t the to although include clothing wife r e l a t e d only were not alone) t h e home i n w h i c h t h e y r e s i d e was expenses did necessities the in the child-support trial court's obligation at $4,000 a month. The reversed court w i f e a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t a w a r d must be because the considered determining record the c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t the parties' mediation the husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t trial agreement obligation. in Indeed, t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t , as t h e t r i a l - c o u r t j u d g e i s s u e d i t s ruling from the bench at the 31 end of the second ore tenus 2100752 hearing, the trial-court child-support obligation immediately thereafter, judge would stated be "ya'll that $4,000 the and agreed to t h a t . " husband's then stated, There i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e d t o an amount of child was support other than i n the m e d i a t i o n agreement that a t t a c h e d t o the husband's motion t o e n f o r c e the m e d i a t i o n a g r e e m e n t . See n o t e 6, s u p r a . R u l e 11, A l a . C i v . C t . Med. R., s t a t e s t h a t , except f o r c e r t a i n e x c e p t i o n s not a p p l i c a b l e i n the present case, "a court s h a l l r e c e i v e i n f o r m a t i o n about in mediation inquire into the p o s i t i o n s of the p a r t i e s proceedings extent t h a t the t r i a l neither " Rule 11(c). Thus, c o u r t r e l i e d on t h e p a r t i e s ' nor taken to the mediation agreement t o determine the husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n , we c o n c l u d e t h a t s u c h r e l i a n c e was a b o v e , t h i s c o u r t may only i f the error However, as noted r e v e r s e the judgment o f the t r i a l court committed by error. the trial court "probably i n j u r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s " o f t h e w i f e . See R u l e 45. After considering the r e c o r d and the scant evidence p r e s e n t e d r e g a r d i n g t h e r e a s o n a b l e and n e c e s s a r y needs o f t h e c h i l d r e n , we ordering cannot conclude t h a t the t r i a l t h e h u s b a n d t o pay child 32 support c o u r t ' s judgment i n the amount of 2100752 $4,000 a month i s so u n s u p p o r t e d by p l a i n l y or p a l p a b l y wrong. c o m m i t t e d by court's the trial judgment presented by was Thus, we otherwise support the the argues child-support trial by abuse o f of that there was determination arrearage the trial discretion court, trial court's 2008) ( q u o t i n g Hayes v H a y e s , 949 Civ. App. a Moreover, child-support burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g the arrearage." (Ala. C i v . App. The was Id. 998 So. 2d the "'[T]he i s w i t h i n the sound a showing 1072, 1076 So. 2d 150, wife, as be 152 (Ala. "[t]he party 404 has the amount o f the ( c i t i n g Tanana v A l e x a n d e r , an (Ala. Civ. exists[,] and of not judgment w i l l that So. 2d 61, 63 1981)). r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t the e x i s t e n c e undisputed; to husband's arrearage existence evidence the absent App.. that evidence $100,000. Hall 2006)). Hall, and no that totaled reversed.'" alleging v. the the Arrearage d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a c h i l d - s u p p o r t arrearage discretion be trial. wife court's to error Child-Support trial as conclude t h a t the supported III. Next, evidence harmless because the c o u r t was the p a r t i e s at the however, the amount 33 of o f an that arrearage arrearage was 2100752 disputed. The determination trial wife argues i s unsupported that by the c o u r t c o u l d n o t have r e l i e d regarding his determination of because the husband's t e s t i m o n y her testimony figures should trial evidence and on t h e h u s b a n d ' s his child-support that the testimony arrearage c o n s i s t e d of e s t i m a t i o n s w h i l e the husband's documents. income-tax I n e s s e n c e , she returns and argues t h a t t h i s reweigh the d i s p u t e d evidence p r e s e n t e d c o n t e n d s , h e r f i g u r e s were more r e l i a b l e . other court regarding the because, she amount o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e has court's c o n s i s t e d o f a summary e x h i b i t t h a t e x t r a p o l a t e d from financial the However, t h i s court held: " ' I t was w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s , t o draw r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s f r o m t h e i r t e s t i m o n y and f r o m t h e d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l , and t o assign such weight to various aspects of the evidence as i t reasonably may have deemed appropriate In order t o r e v e r s e the t r i a l c o u r t we w o u l d have t o make o u r own credibility determinations and we w o u l d have t o r e w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e , n e i t h e r o f w h i c h we a r e a l l o w e d t o do.'" Vestlake Cmtys. December 9, Prop. 2011] Owners' A s s ' n So. 3d , v. Moon, [Ms. ( A l a . C i v . App. ( q u o t i n g M i l l e r v. A s s o c i a t e d G u l f L a n d C o r p . , 941 990 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2005)). 34 2100327, So. 2d 2011) 982, 2100752 F u r t h e r m o r e , o u r r e v i e w o f t h e summary e x h i b i t presented by t h e w i f e r e v e a l s c e r t a i n u n e x p l a i n e d e r r o r s , i n a d d i t i o n t o the error revealed during t r i a l (see n o t e 5, supra), w i f e ' s c a l c u l a t i o n of the husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t in arrearage. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e h u s b a n d ' s g r o s s income as s t a t e d by t h e in each a p p l i c a b l e year amount o f g r o s s returns. the does n o t calculation c o m m i s s i o n s -- of specifically, amount net method o f a p p o r t i o n i n g the n o t an a c c u r a t e r e f l e c t i o n t a x e s p a i d by t h e h u s b a n d -- was the that husband's of her of the income-tax c o u r t c o u l d have c o n c l u d e d the wife c o r r e l a t e to income s e t f o r t h i n t h e h u s b a n d ' s Moreover, the t r i a l wife's directly the t h e amount o f t a x e s t h e h u s b a n d p a i d on h i s c o m m i s s i o n s , w h i c h are generally taxed S u f f i c e i t to say, the wife's arrearage In equal to exhibit rate than c o u r t had of the his base salary. reasons not to husband's accept child-support in i t s entirety. court's because higher the t r i a l summary his brief trial at he appeal, the testified and that his he that husband of determination $60, 000 erroneously on the arrearage owed n e t record c o u n t e d $39,500 he had 35 contends is commissions that the correct in i n d i c a t e d t h a t he 2007 had g i v e n t o t h e w i f e i n 2006 2100752 as a c h i l d - s u p p o r t payment. concluded that the approximately Thus, t h e t r i a l husband $100,000, as a wife $99,500, child-support testimony as t r u e i n i t s e n t i r e t y , t h e n t h e t r i a l totaled only that $22,000. had the husband's 11 accepted the husband's court would child-support I f the t r i a l court or arrearage. i f the determined court the However, have trial owed c o u r t c o u l d have arrearage considered the e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t $39,500 o f t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t payments made t o t h e w i f e i n 2006 was a c t u a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e r e p a y m e n t o f a l o a n , t h e n t h e t r i a l c o u r t w o u l d have c o n c l u d e d , b a s e d on the husband's arrearage 12 t h e husband's Thus, i t i s c l e a r f r o m o u r r e v i e w the t r i a l wife's that child-support was $1,500 i n 2006 a n d $60,000 i n 2007, f o r a t o t a l of $61,500. that testimony, court testimony of the record a c c e p t e d n e i t h e r t h e husband's nor t h e and/or evidentiary materials in their entirety. T h e h u s b a n d ' s t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e d t h a t he h a d o v e r p a i d t h e w i f e $38,000 i n 2006 a n d t h a t he owed h e r $60,000 i n 2007. 11 I f t h e t r i a l c o u r t had c o n c l u d e d t h a t the husband had e r r o n e o u s l y i n c l u d e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y $5,200 ( t u i t i o n ) a n d $4,000 ( i n s u r a n c e ) i n t h o s e c a l c u l a t i o n s as w e l l , t h e t r i a l court would have concluded that the husband's child-support a r r e a r a g e t o t a l e d $70,700. 1 2 36 2100752 What i s n o t clear from the husband's or the w i f e ' s t e s t i m o n y reach the i t s conclusion. record whether record i s what p a r t of the t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e l i e d on to F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n the trial court applied the husband's request to modify h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n r e t r o a c t i v e l y . I n summary, t h i s court court the determined arrearage. to i s u n a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e how amount o f the husband's from the record on appeal a r r i v e d at i t s child-support-arrearage court's proceedings. judgment App. 2010) 923 ( A l a . C i v . App. court child-support remand recalculation the a w a r d , we the cause 2009)) trial arrearage and of the court's child-support the arrearage a f t e r a review of the evidence, the further 823 So. 2d (Ala. 920, Hildesheim, determination remanded court reverse 3d 817, ( i n b o t h M u l l i n s and the trial for ( c i t i n g H i l d e s h e i m v. V e l a s k i , 769 reversed child-support unable, and how See M u l l i n s v. S e l l e r s , 58 So. Civ. this trial G e n e r a l l y , i n cases i n which t h i s court i s unable determine trial the 1 3 of a case for "when we were to determine 'how the O u r c a l c u l a t i o n s do n o t a c c o u n t f o r any c r e d i t t h e t r i a l c o u r t may have a p p l i e d t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s o v e r p a y m e n t o f c h i l d s u p p o r t f r o m M a r c h 2008 t h r o u g h May 2009, when t h e h u s b a n d b e g a n p a y i n g $4,000 a month. 13 37 2100752 trial court reached arrearage,'" holdings i t s total 58 So. 3d a t 8 2 3 ) . i n Mullins when i t calculated Accordingly, and H i l d e s h e i m , we b a s e d on o u r reverse the c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t and remand t h e c a u s e f o r f u r t h e r IV. failing the wife The argues t h a t the t r i a l determined that record indicates the p a r t i e s ' arrearage Arrearage court t o a w a r d h e r i n t e r e s t on t h e h u s b a n d ' s arrearage. trial proceedings. I n t e r e s t on t h e C h i l d - S u p p o r t Finally, that that the e r r e d by child-support trial court l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t was ambiguous b e c a u s e i t d i d n o t s t a t e when t h e h u s b a n d ' s p a y m e n t s b a s e d on h i s c o m m i s s i o n s a n d b o n u s e s were due t o t h e w i f e and, thus, that i t was u n a b l e interest due contends on that, the t o d e t e r m i n e how child-support f o l l o w i n g the t r i a l t o c a l c u l a t e the arrearage. court's The reasoning, h u s b a n d w o u l d have n e v e r owed h e r an a r r e a r a g e wife the b a s e d on t h e p a y m e n t s owed on c o m m i s s i o n s a n d b o n u s e s b e c a u s e t h e l e g a l separation payments a g r e e m e n t does n o t c o n t a i n a conclusion considering that the t r i a l that a due d a t e surely cannot f o r those be true c o u r t determined t h a t the husband owed a c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e b a s e d on h i s f a i l u r e t o p a y t h e w i f e 50% o f h i s n e t c o m m i s s i o n s a n d b o n u s e s p e r t h e s e p a r a t i o n 38 2100752 agreement. The w i f e determination it tax requires does not challenge the t r i a l court's t h a t t h e l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t , i n s o f a r as t h e husband t o pay t h e w i f e income o f any c o m m i s s i o n o r bonus "50% o f t h e n e t a f t e r i n excess o f h i s base s a l a r y , " i s ambiguous t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t does n o t i n d i c a t e when s u c h a payments a r e due. She a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l court c o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement obligating t h e husband W-2's 1099's the or at compliance" i n conjunction end to "supply of each year the necessary as proof of w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e agreement o b l i g a t i n g t h e h u s b a n d t o p a y 50% o f h i s n e t c o m m i s s i o n s a n d bonuses t o t h e w i f e due as c h i l d support i n order t o determine a date. The h u s b a n d c o n t e n d s t h a t , b e c a u s e u n p a i d judgments bear interest from the date each child-support child-support i n s t a l l m e n t i s due, a n d b e c a u s e i t i s u n c l e a r when e a c h c h i l d support i n s t a l l m e n t at issue was due, i t was i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e how t o c a l c u l a t e t h e i n t e r e s t due on t h e h u s b a n d ' s u n p a i d c h i l d - s u p p o r t agree that regarding support the p r o v i s i o n t h e payment i s ambiguous, obligation. A l t h o u g h we of the l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n agreement o f commissions and bonuses as i . e . , susceptible than 39 t o more child one 2100752 m e a n i n g , see (Ala. Civ. Dillard's, App. M c C o l l o u g h , 776 that the 2010 So. Inc. t h a t may Gallups, (quoting 2d 741, husband d i d not arrearage v. 746 owe Homes 58 of So. have b e e n due on we The 201 Inc. v. cannot agree any child-support s i m p l y because the o f h i s a g r e e d - u p o n c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n was the f a c e of the agreement. 196, Legend, (Ala. 2000)), interest 3d due date not p l a i n requirement that a t r i a l court a w a r d i n t e r e s t on u n p a i d c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s i s one t h e more w e l l - s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e s o f f a m i l y l a w . C o r w i n , 29 So. erred by failing i n t e r e s t due v. C.G., failing 3d 913, 849 914 to ( A l a . C i v . App. compute the So. 2d 200, 204 (Ala. Civ. court erroneously on (trial So. App. with ("[A] trial proceedings to enforce authority to an court earlier waive the imposed postjudgment i n t e r e s t postjudgment App. the due, i t was without 2d 943, 945 jurisdiction imposition of to waive the (Ala. Civ. over judgment i s statutorily upon s u c h p a y m e n t s . " ) . 40 ("By child-support child-support authority T.L.D. 2002) once t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a c h i l d - s u p p o r t was court a p p l i e d the law t o f a c t s . " ) ; and W a l k e r v. W a l k e r , 828 without of of C o r w i n v. on t h e f a t h e r ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e ) ; the t r i a l 2002) 2009) amount to award postjudgment i n t e r e s t arrearage, See on Thus, arrearage payment of 2100752 statutorily imposed c h i l d support. We due interest C o r w i n , 29 understand the on So. trial the 3d a t unpaid determined ambiguous, the established that court's trial rules ambiguity.'" the terms court of reluctance Dillard's, Inc. of the had trial "'use to 58 to resolve So. 3d 776 at So. 2d the 201 at A c c o r d i n g l y , because w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d law h o l d s t h a t a c o u r t may installments n o t w a i v e i m p o s i t i o n o f i n t e r e s t on of c h i l d support, we reverse the unpaid instruct installments the construction payments trial to were of court determine due. After child to support. apply when the the the On rules court on remand, we of contract and bonus determines amount o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e , the t r i a l court's n o t due commission trial past-due trial j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i n t e r e s t was any trial duty a Gallups, a were ( q u o t i n g Homes o f L e g e n d , I n c . v. M c C o l l o u g h , 746). insert agreement construction v. to However, once t h e then contract of 914. d a t e i n t o an ambiguous a g r e e m e n t . court installments we instruct c o u r t t o a p p l y the s t a t u t o r i l y mandated i n t e r e s t each unpaid i n s t a l l m e n t of c h i l d the to support. Conclusion The trial court's judgment 41 is affirmed i n s o f a r as i t 2100752 awarded t h e husband j o i n t legal ordered him t o pay c h i l d support month. We determined reverse the t r i a l t h e husband's custody o f t h e c h i l d r e n and i n t h e amount o f $4,000 a c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t child-support arrearage, and, i n a d d i t i o n , we r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t h e l d t h a t t h e legal-separation interest due. a g r e e m e n t was ambiguous and t h a t , t h u s , on p a s t - d u e i n s t a l l m e n t s o f c h i l d This proceedings c a u s e i s remanded to the t r i a l consistent with this support court no w o u l d be for further opinion. The w i f e ' s r e q u e s t f o r an a t t o r n e y - f e e a w a r d on a p p e a l i s denied. APPLICATION 2012, FOR REHEARING GRANTED; OPINION OF FEBRUARY 3, WITHDRAWN; REVERSED OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED IN PART; IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, P . J . , a n d P i t t m a n Moore, J . , c o n c u r s a n d Thomas, J J . , c o n c u r . i n the r e s u l t , with 42 writing. 2100752 MOORE, J u d g e , concurring i n the result. I n P a r s o n s v . P a r s o n s , 45 A l a . App. 5 4 3 , 233 So. 2 d 237 (Civ. 1970), divorce Lillie Belle a mensa e t t h e r o , Parsons "a l e g a l obtained a separation judgment o f from bed and b o a r d , " Mahoney v . Mahoney, 568 So. 2 d 832, 832 ( A l a . App. 1990), Lillie f r o m M.H. Belle residence. Parsons the right M.H. i n 1965. The j u d g m e n t t o use and occupy subsequently m o d i f y t h e 1965 j u d g m e n t , filed several petitions t o use and occupy Lillie an a b s o l u t e divorce. § 22(1) (Recomp. to i n c l u d i n g one i n 1969 i n w h i c h he had occurred s u c h t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n i n t h e 1965 j u d g m e n t a l l o w i n g terminated. gave the marital a s s e r t e d t h a t a m a t e r i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s Belle Civ. the marital residence B e l l e responded by f i l i n g empowered should be a petition for A t t h a t t i m e , A l a . Code 1940, 1958), Lillie the courts T i t l e 34, t o grant an a b s o l u t e d i v o r c e t o e i t h e r p a r t y when t h e r e h a d b e e n a d e c r e e of separate maintenance or a divorce e f f e c t f o r more t h a n two y e a r s . from b e d and b o a r d i n The c i r c u i t c o u r t i n P a r s o n s c o n s o l i d a t e d M.H.'s m o d i f i c a t i o n p e t i t i o n w i t h L i l l i e B e l l e ' s p e t i t i o n f o r an a b s o l u t e d i v o r c e . 1969, the c i r c u i t divorcing court the parties U l t i m a t e l y , on O c t o b e r 2 1 , entered and awarding 43 a judgment Lillie Belle absolutely exclusive 2100752 title to the m a r i t a l M.H. appealed residence. the 1969 judgment, asserting c i r c u i t c o u r t h a d e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o m o d i f y t h e 1965 and i n awarding L i l l i e residence. Belle exclusive t i t l e alimony i n gross i n the So. 2d a t 239. modify the 1965 As 1969 judgment. to the f a i l u r e judgment, t h i s court the judgment to the m a r i t a l On a p p e a l , t h i s c o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e c i r c u i t had p r o p e r l y awarded the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e 233 that court to L i l l i e B e l l e 45 A l a . App. of the c i r c u i t at as 545, court to stated: "We have s t a t e d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n t o m o d i f y i s moot i f t h e trial c o u r t was legally correct in granting a d i v o r c e t o a p p e l l e e . The g r a n t i n g of a d i v o r c e t e r m i n a t e s r i g h t s g r a n t e d under a decree of separate m a i n t e n a n c e . Maddox v. Maddox, [276 A l a . 197, 160 So. 2d 481 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ] . We f i n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t i n g r a n t i n g a p p e l l e e a d i v o r c e under a u t h o r i t y of T i t l e 34, S e c t i o n 2 2 ( 1 ) , as amended. The e n t r y o f t h i s decree terminated the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the decree of separate maintenance e n t e r e d i n the f i r s t i n 1965, and t h u s t h e r e was n o t h i n g l e f t t o m o d i f y . The c o u r t c o u l d n o t be i n e r r o r f o r f a i l u r e to modify." 45 A l a . App. a t 545, In Parsons, this 233 So. 2d a t 239-40 c o u r t h e l d t h a t , when a p a r t y a c i r c u i t court to convert a l e g a l divorce, the (emphasis added). circuit court may s e p a r a t i o n i n t o an make such petitions absolute maintenance p r o v i s i o n s as a l l o w e d u n d e r i t s g e n e r a l e q u i t a b l e p o w e r s i n an 44 2100752 o r i g i n a l divorce proceeding. "terminate[s] the effectiveness" maintenance provisions separation. Accordingly, whether material any since the entry have warranted judgment. The s u b s e q u e n t d i v o r c e in a of prior a circuit change of court of has legal consider occurred judgment t h a t w o u l d the P a r s o n s has s i n c e b e e n c i t e d of need not circumstances modification inconsistent judgment of the l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n a any judgment legal-separation f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that "[a] judgment o f d i v o r c e , w i t h i t s a t t e n d i n g f i n a l i t y and c o n c l u s i v e n e s s , g e n e r a l l y abates a l l judgments o f s e p a r a t i o n , including a l l incidents f l o w i n g from such judgment o f s e p a r a t i o n . " 27C C.J.S. D i v o r c e Since this repealed thoro court (2005). decided Parsons, the statute that allowed and r e p l a c e d provides § 1201 i t with our l e g i s l a t u r e f o r a divorce a mensa e t § 30-2-40, A l a . Code 1975, w h i c h f o r a judgment o f l e g a l separation. The l a w r e m a i n s , h o w e v e r , t h a t e i t h e r p a r t y t o a m a r r i a g e may a circuit court f o r a divorce provides Section still petition judgment i f a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n j u d g m e n t has b e e n i n e f f e c t f o r two y e a r s . Code 1975. has See § 30-2-2, A l a . 3 0 - 2 - 4 0 ( c ) , A l a . Code 1975, specifically t h a t "[a] p r o c e e d i n g o r judgment o f l e g a l 45 separation 2100752 shall for not bar either party dissolution of the from l a t e r instituting marriage." In any an action later divorce action, " [ t ] h e c o u r t s h a l l order t h a t the terms of the l e g a l separation relating to alimony or a property s e t t l e m e n t be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a f i n a l divorce d e c r e e o n l y i f a g r e e d t o by t h e p a r t i e s . O t h e r w i s e , t h e c o u r t may c o n s i d e r , b u t i s n o t b o u n d by, the p r o v i s i o n s of the legal separation relating to alimony or a p r o p e r t y settlement upon a final d i s s o l u t i o n of the marriage." § 30-2-40(d), Ala. Code 1975. scheme, t h e l a w as d e c i d e d a b s e n t an express maintenance Under t h e statutory i n Parsons remains i n t a c t today agreement of the provisions present contained p a r t i e s to the in a contrary, legal-separation j u d g m e n t a r e n o t b i n d i n g on t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t i n a s u b s e q u e n t divorce action, circumstances is so no required proof in of a order material to deviate change from of those provisions. Parsons did not however, l i k e alimony, directly deal c h i l d support with App. support 1992) . support; i s a form of maintenance. See g e n e r a l l y C u l w e l l v. C u l w e l l , 615 So. Civ. child 2d 631, I t f o l l o w s t h a t , under 633-34 ( A l a . Parsons, a child- p r o v i s i o n i n a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment i s not res j u d i c a t a i n a subsequent d i v o r c e a c t i o n such t h a t a d i f f e r e n t 46 2100752 child-support change court p r o v i s i o n c a n be made o n l y b a s e d on a m a t e r i a l of circumstances. would generally be free applicable any criteria abate prior legal-separation therefore, in under t o determine would modification Rather, Parsons, child support child-support j u d g m e n t a n d moot any The question to circuit based and i t s judgment thus inconsistent petition. a obtained provision in a child-supportbe resolved, i s whether the r e a s o n i n g i n Parsons s t i l l the context of c h i l d on support under the p r e s e n t applies statutory scheme. Section 30-2-40(a)(3), legal-separation judgment support i n compliance with A l a . Code every f o r an a w a r d o f to provide 1975, r e q u i r e s child R u l e 32, A l a . R. J u d . A d m i n . , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e c o u r t has j u r i s d i c t i o n 30-2-40 does n o t f u r t h e r e x p r e s s l y support award subsequent in action a s t a t u t o r y scheme d e c l a r e s that judgment divorce. child-support l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment a r e b i n d i n g child- has Nothing in i n a subsequent a i n the provisions a c t i o n a b s e n t a m a t e r i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Ala. Section state the e f f e c t a legal-separation f o r an a b s o l u t e t o do s o . in a divorce Rule 32(A), R. J u d . A d m i n . , g e n e r a l l y p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s apply i n every a c t i o n "to e s t a b l i s h or modify 47 child 2100752 support," but R u l e 32 does n o t a c t i o n f o l l o w i n g the entry explicitly classify a divorce of a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment e i t h e r an a c t i o n " t o e s t a b l i s h " o r an a c t i o n " t o m o d i f y " support. it G i v e n t h e a b s e n c e o f s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n on f o l l o w s t h a t the as child point, a n a l y s i s employed i n Parsons governs the decision. As Julia application Faellaci for a ("the mother") rehearing, Jared d e n o m i n a t e d h i s p e t i t i o n as one provisions m o t h e r and as a of the parties the t r i a l points Faellaci in ("the to "modify" the legal-separation out father") child-support judgment. c o u r t a l s o t r e a t e d the f a t h e r ' s child-support-modification nomenclature used by a substance of a pleading. I n c . v. Hometown R e a l t y , party petition. does C e n t u r y 21 LLC, 34 So. not prevail over Paramount R e a l 662 The petition However, 3d 658, her the the Estate, (Ala. 2009). In substance, i n the d i v o r c e a c t i o n , the f a t h e r p e t i t i o n e d the Houston C i r c u i t Court and reasonable ("the trial child-support income. Moreover, decision of e v e n one not the "[t]he trial the t r i a l judge." to e s t a b l i s h a award i n l i g h t appellate court p r e s e n t e d by court") courts i f i t is right a party or will So. his current sustain f o r any considered Ex p a r t e W i g i n t o n , 743 48 of or 2d 1071, fair the reason, cited by 1072-73 2100752 (Ala. 1999). argued In her that the initial b r i e f to t h i s child-support court, award c o u l d not the be mother sustained a b s e n t e v i d e n c e o f a m a t e r i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s . court correctly held trial court change child of d i d not that, have t o circumstances support originally in a g r e e d and t h a t the the order which the 1995) for a divorce, evidence to that the f a t h e r d i d not parties c o u r t had contest Dyas v. Dyas, 683 exceeds the established her month i n o r d e r So. uppermost i n Rule rehearing 2d 971, 973 t o meet limit 32, of Ala. "monthly living she which Jud. Admin., The "the reasonable ability mother p r e s e n t e d included t o meet a variety i t e m s t h a t e i t h e r f a c i a l l y w o u l d n o t q u a l i f y as c h i l d 49 gross child-support n e e d e d $5,165 i n o r d e r expenses," App. the R. f o r those needs"). their (Ala. Civ. n e c e s s a r y needs o f t h e c h i l d r e n as w e l l as t o t h e evidence i n d i c a t i n g that had evidence i n d i c a t i n g that amount o f c h i l d s u p p o r t a w a r d e d must r e l a t e t o t h e o f t h e o b l i g o r t o pay of incorporated ( s t a t i n g t h a t when t h e p a r t i e s ' c o m b i n e d a d j u s t e d schedule her material award mother a l s o argues i n her a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a See income and a e s t a b l i s h an to which trial of the judgment. c h i l d r e n n e e d e d $5,165 p e r needs. action receive d i f f e r e n t than into i t s legal-separation The i n an This of support, 2100752 such as tithes, care, or i n c l u d e d c o s t s t h a t a l s o s u p p o r t e d the mother's p o s i t i o n . The trial court and every expense reasonable The charitable obviously required the mother complains alleged reference c o u r t has that to lawn accept each the the awarded. record does not contain t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h e $4,000award, o t h e r to the excluded d e t e r m i n e d was However, e v e n i n h e r m o t h e r does n o t and m o t h e r when d e t e r m i n i n g amount o f c h i l d s u p p o r t t o be per-month c h i l d - s u p p o r t . not a d v o c a t e d by e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g how this was donations, than the mediation trial court's agreement, which harmless e r r o r . So. 3d application for a rehearing, at the s e r i o u s l y c o n t e n d t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l needs t h e c h i l d r e n c a n n o t be met $4,000 p e r month. of b a s e d on t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t a w a r d o f I f i n d no b a s i s t o r e v e r s e a child-support j u d g m e n t t h a t does n o t p r e j u d i c e t h e r i g h t s o f t h e c h i l d r e n a t issue. For the foregoing reasons, 50 I concur i n the result.
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