Anniebelle Simmons v. John Simmons and Lori Simmons

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REL: 8/12/11 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2011 2100017 A n n i e b e l l e Simmons v. John Simmons and L o r i Simmons Appeal from Autauga C i r c u i t (CV-08-207) Court PER CURIAM. A n n i e b e l l e Simmons in f a v o r o f J o h n Simmons ("Anniebelle") a p p e a l s from a judgment ("John") a n d L o r i Simmons ("Lori"). We a f f i r m . On S e p t e m b e r 18, 2008, J o h n and L o r i sued Anniebelle, 2100017 alleging that, contract with father, and on F e b r u a r y 6, 1996, D o n a l d J . Simmons Anniebelle, who alleged consideration the house John John and was wife, John's for the ("the h o u s e " ) . J o h n and L o r i contract provided Lori that, as agreeing to convey agreed t o pay Donald and a down payment i n t h e amount o f $10,000 and t o make m o n t h l y payments and the Donald's f o r D o n a l d and A n n i e b e l l e ' s t o them, Anniebelle the that ( " D o n a l d " ) , who was p u r c h a s e o f a house i n P r a t t v i l l e further t h e y had e n t e r e d i n t o a Lori obligations also under on t h e m o r t g a g e alleged that the c o n t r a c t ; encumbering the house. t h e y had that performed D o n a l d had their died; and that, a f t e r Donald died, Anniebelle had c l a i m e d t h a t John and Lori and had been renting the house had no c o n v e y a n c e o f t h e t i t l e t o t h e h o u s e . As r e l i e f , sought a judgment right to J o h n and L o r i (1) d e c l a r i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s and a w a r d i n g damages b a s e d on t h e o r i e s a of b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t (2) and misrepresentation. On O c t o b e r 28, complaint i n which agreed to s e l l 2008, A n n i e b e l l e she (1) d e n i e d t h e house J o h n and L o r i h a d been filed that an answer she t o J o h n and L o r i , and D o n a l d (2) a v e r r e d r e n t i n g t h e h o u s e , and 2 t o the (3) had that asserted, 2100017 among o t h e r On a f f i r m a t i v e defenses, October representing 2008, Anniebelle, Marryann Wingard, titled 31, 1 the Statute of Frauds. Tracy filed Anniebelle's a Birdsong, pleading daughter. the on attorney behalf of T h a t p l e a d i n g was "Notice of Joinder of Party Pursuant t o Rule 19[, A l a . R. C i v . P . ] , " a n d s t a t e d : "COMES NOW M a r r y a n n W i n g a r d b y a n d t h r o u g h c o u n s e l ... a n d h e r e b y g i v e s n o t i c e t h a t s h e i s a n e c e s s a r y p a r t y d e f e n d a n t i n t h e above s t y l e d c a u s e , i n t h a t [ t h e h o u s e ] i s owned j o i n t l y b y A n n i e b e l l e Simmons and Marryann Wingard with right of survivorship." On J a n u a r y 6, 2009, t h e t r i a l court entered an o r d e r i n which i t a p p a r e n t l y t r e a t e d t h e p l e a d i n g f i l e d b y B i r d s o n g on b e h a l f o f W i n g a r d a s a m o t i o n . The o r d e r s t a t e d t h a t , " [ u ] p o n p r o p e r service of complaint, Although attempt the record was made the j o i n d e r motion does [ i s ] t o be g r a n t e d . " not indicate that to formally serve Wingard any subsequent with process, a t t o r n e y K a r e n M a t e r n a f i l e d a n o t i c e o f a p p e a r a n c e on J a n u a r y 29, 2009, w h i c h s t a t e d : "COMES NOW K a r e n M a t e r n a , a n d f i l e s h e r N o t i c e of Appearance as c o u n s e l f o r the Defendants, A n n i e b e l l e Simmons a n d M a r r y a n n W i n g a r d i n t h e Two d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n s o f W i n g a r d ' s g i v e n name a p p e a r i n r e c o r d , i . e . , M a r r y a n n a n d Mary A n n . 1 the 3 2100017 above-styled matter. appearance r e q u e s t s : Counsel, in making her "1. That a l l notices of continuances, trial settings, docket settings, or otherwise, announcements o r n o t i c e s r e g a r d i n g s a i d c a s e be forwarded t o her at her address. "2. T h a t t h e name o f c o u n s e l the a p p r o p r i a t e C o u r t r e c o r d s as c o u n s e l o f r e c o r d . " (Emphasis On be e n t e r e d and she be h e r e i n on designated added.) March 6, 2009, Anniebelle asserted a counterclaim a g a i n s t J o h n and L o r i . I n h e r c o u n t e r c l a i m , A n n i e b e l l e a l l e g e d t h a t t h e r e was no w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s and t h a t J o h n and L o r i were i n u n l a w f u l p o s s e s s i o n of the house. She a s s e r t e d c l a i m s o f e j e c t m e n t and v i o l a t i o n o f t h e A l a b a m a Litigation Accountability Act s e q . , A l a . Code 1975. ("the A L A A " ) , § 12-19-270 e t I n a d d i t i o n , she i n t e r p l e a d e d t h a t J o h n and L o r i h a d s e n t h e r and h a d d e s i g n a t e d payments." A n s w e r i n g the c o u n t e r c l a i m , J o h n and L o r i $2,810.85 as "house admitted t h a t A n n i e b e l l e owned l e g a l t i t l e t o t h e h o u s e and t h a t was t h e p a r t i e s ; however, no w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n averred t h a t they and t h e y unlawful, denied owned an e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t (1) t h a t their possession (2) t h a t A n n i e b e l l e was 4 entitled there they i n the house, of t h e house to possession was of 2100017 t h e h o u s e , and The trial trial on during (3) t h a t t h e y had court December the in-chief, received 14, t r i a l . At v i o l a t e d t h e ALAA. evidence 2009. W i n g a r d the M a t e r n a , who conclusion had filed an ore tenus at testified as o f J o h n and a a bench witness L o r i ' s case¬ a p p e a r a n c e on b e h a l f of b o t h A n n i e b e l l e and W i n g a r d , moved f o r a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r of law, stating: "We a s k f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t above and what i s r e q u i r e d . beyond "As you know -- I'm n o t g o i n g t o q u o t e [ t h e ] s t a t u t e o f f r a u d s t o you, b u t [the] s t a t u t e of f r a u d s i n any t r a n s a c t i o n i n r e a l p r o p e r t y must be done i n w r i t i n g . T h e r e ' s b e e n no w r i t i n g p r o v i d e d i n any o f t h e e x h i b i t s by [John and L o r i ] t h a t t h e y p u r c h a s e d [ t h e ] h o u s e o r owned [ t h e ] h o u s e However, t h e r e i s an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e s t a t u t e o f limitations [sic]; however, case law is very s p e c i f i c , and that exception does n o t a p p l y to f a m i 1 y members. "So we w o u l d a s k f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h a t b a s i s , and a l s o on t h e f a c t t h a t you h e a r d t e s t i m o n y f r o m b o t h [John and L o r i ] h e r e t o d a y who s a i d t h a t t h e y had a v e r b a l a g r e e m e n t w i t h Mr. D o n a l d Simmons and s p e c i f i c a l l y s a i d t h a t t h e y d i d n o t have any v e r b a l communications w i t h [ A n n i e b e l l e ] . " The trial court denied t h e m o t i o n , and the t r i a l proceeded to a c o n c l u s i o n . A s i d e f r o m M a t e r n a ' s s t a t e m e n t t h a t " t h e r e i s an exception law t o the i s very s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s specific, and that 5 [sic]; exception however, does n o t apply case to 2100017 f a m i l y members," t h e r e c o r d does n o t contain t h a t A n n i e b e l l e and Wingard a s s e r t e d i n the John failed and Lori had a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n them and an e x c e p t i o n On to the to prove trial the indication court that alleged oral D o n a l d and A n n i e b e l l e S t a t u t e of S e p t e m b e r 7, 2010, that any f e l l within Frauds. the t r i a l court entered a judgment stating: " T h i s c a u s e c o m i n g on b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t upon t h e Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Breach of C o n t r a c t and M i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as f i l e d by J o h n and Lori Simmons as against the named Defendant, A n n i e b e l l e Simmons and t h e p a r t i e s a p p e a r i n g with c o u n s e l o f r e c o r d on December 14, 2009 and t e s t i m o n y b e i n g t a k e n o r e t e n u s , a t l e n g t h , and upon h e a r i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y , t h i s C o u r t f i n d s as f o l l o w s : "1. That [John and Lori] and [Anniebelle's] d e c e a s e d husband had an agreement f o r the p u r c h a s e o f t h e [house] and [Anniebelle] was aware o f and a c q u i e s c e d i n t h e a g r e e m e n t f o r [John and L o r i ] t o pay f o r and r e c e i v e t h e t i t l e t o t h i s s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y upon t h e payment s c h e d u l e b e i n g c o m p l e t e d as p e r t h e m o r t g a g e payoff. "2. T h a t upon t h e d e a t h o f [ A n n i e b e l l e ' s ] h u s b a n d , [John and L o r i ] c o n t i n u e d t o pay t h e m o n t h l y payments as per the payment s c h e d u l e and [Anniebelle], outside of [John and Lori's] agreement, p a i d o f f the o u t s t a n d i n g mortgage. "3. That [Anniebelle's] deceased husband had similar transactions with [Anniebelle's] c h i l d r e n as he had w i t h h i s o[w]n s o n , [ J o h n ] . 6 2100017 "4. That [John and L o r i ] p e r f o r m e d under t h e p u r c h a s e agreement. [John] a n d L o r i Simmons o c c u p i e d t h e r e s i d e n c e , i m p r o v e d t h e same, p a i d mortgage payments as s c h e d u l e d [ , ] [ r ] e c e i v e d the payment coupon b o o k [ s ] a s t h e y became replaced[,] [m]aintained t h e r e s i d e n c e and performed under t h e terms o f t h e purchase agreement. "5. That [John and L o r i have] substantially p e r f o r m e d under t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e agreement w i t h [John's] f a t h e r , D o n a l d , and t h e Defendant, Anniebelle Simmons, i s herein e s t o p p e d t o deny t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e c o n t r a c t . "WHEREFORE, t h e p r e m i s e s c o n s i d e r e d , ORDERED, ADJUDGED, a n d DECREED as f o l l o w s : i ti s " T h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t , A n n i e b e l l e Simmons s h a l l e x e c u t e a n d d e l i v e r t o t h e P l a i n t i f f s , J o h n Simmons and L o r i Simmons[,] a W a r r a n t y Deed f o r t h e [ h o u s e ] , upon [ J o h n a n d L o r i ' s ] p a y i n g t o [ A n n i e b e l l e ] t h e b a l a n c e o f t h e m o r t g a g e t h a t was due t o W h i t n e y B a n k ... as o f June, 2008. Balance of mortgage i n d e b t e d n e s s t o be p a i d t o A n n i e b e l l e Simmons i n 30 days. " T h a t t h e Deed e x e c u t e d b y t h e D e f e n d a n t , A n n i e b e l l e Simmons on J u l y 29, 2 0 0 8 i s hereby s e t a s i d e and v a c a t e d . [2] " T h a t a c o p y o f t h i s O r d e r s h a l l be r e c o r d e d i n the O f f i c e o f t h e Judge o f P r o b a t e , A u t a u g a C o u n t y , Alabama and indexed so as to give proper n o t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e v a c a t i o n o f t h e deed r e c o r d e d i n [ R e a l P r o p e r t y Book] 2008, Page 6285 o f t h e same T h e d e e d e x e c u t e d b y A n n i e b e l l e on J u l y 29, 2008, c o n v e y e d t h e h o u s e t o A n n i e b e l l e a n d W i n g a r d as j o i n t t e n a n t s with right of survivorship. 2 7 2100017 office." [ 3 ] Anniebelle t i m e l y a p p e a l e d t o t h i s c o u r t . Due j u r i s d i c t i o n , we t r a n s f e r r e d t h e a p p e a l t o t h e supreme which t r a n s f e r r e d the § appeal back to 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code Anniebelle to l a c k this court of court, pursuant to 1975. first argues that the trial court erred in e n t e r i n g a j u d g m e n t w i t h o u t j o i n i n g W i n g a r d as a p a r t y t o the a c t i o n . However, t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t W i n g a r d was as a party. Anniebelle, the trial party filed court to interest After the a pleading and on the attorney behalf because house, the she trial was representing of Wingard t h e p a r t i e s t h a t W i n g a r d was action i n the Birdsong, claiming court, joined a an apparently notifying necessary ownership treating t h e p l e a d i n g as a m o t i o n , o r d e r e d t h a t W i n g a r d w o u l d be as a party upon h e r being served with process. joined Although r e c o r d does n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t any s u b s e q u e n t a t t e m p t was to process, formally serve a p p e a r a n c e on b e h a l f Wingard with Materna o f W i n g a r d . R u l e 4 ( h ) , A l a . R. the made filed an Civ. P., T h e d e e d r e c o r d e d i n R e a l P r o p e r t y Book 2008, Page 6285 of the r e c o r d s i n t h e O f f i c e o f t h e Judge o f P r o b a t e o f A u t a u g a C o u n t y was t h e d e e d e x e c u t e d by A n n i e b e l l e on J u l y 29, 2008, w h i c h c o n v e y e d t h e h o u s e t o A n n i e b e l l e and W i n g a r d as j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p . 3 8 2100017 provides that " [ a ] d e f e n d a n t may a c c e p t o r w a i v e s e r v i c e o f process." conclude We appearance on b e h a l f that Materna's a notice constituted o f Wingard filing a waiver of s e r v i c e o f p r o c e s s by Wingard and e f f e c t e d Wingard's as a party. first Accordingly, we find no m e r i t of joinder i n Anniebelle's argument. Moreover, even i f Wingard had n o t been j o i n e d as a p a r t y by waiving judgment holding 889, service of process, of the t r i a l court o f t h e supreme c o u r t 891-92 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) , M o s l e y v. B u i l d e r s Civ. she w o u l d i n this case be b o u n d anyway u n d e r t h e i n Owen v. M i l l e r , and the h o l d i n g by t h e 414 So. 2d of this court i n S o u t h , I n c . , 41 So. 3d 806, 811-15 ( A l a . App. 2 0 1 0 ) . W i n g a r d h a d a c t u a l n o t i c e o f J o h n a n d L o r i ' s action, as e v i d e n c e d b y t h e p l e a d i n g s f i l e d on h e r b e h a l f b y Birdsong trial. and Materna and by h e r t e s t i f y i n g as a w i t n e s s a t Moreover, B i r d s o n g and Materna b o t h appeared a t t r i a l and r e p r e s e n t e d t h e i n t e r e s t o f A n n i e b e l l e , who c l a i m e d t o own the h o u s e j o i n t l y w i t h W i n g a r d a n d whose i n t e r e s t i n o p p o s i n g the c l a i m s o f J o h n a n d L o r i was t h u s i d e n t i c a l w i t h W i n g a r d ' s . " I n Owen v . M i l l e r , 414 So. 2d 889 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) , a d i v o r c i n g husband and h i s s i s t e r h e l d j o i n t l e g a l t i t l e t o s e v e r a l b a n k a c c o u n t s . The s i s t e r a p p e a r e d at the divorce t r i a l f o r the purposes of attempting 9 2100017 to g a i n ownership o f those accounts. A l s o , the s i s t e r f i l e d a s u c c e s s f u l motion with the divorce c o u r t t o r e l e a s e funds i n a bank a c c o u n t she s i n g l y owned t h a t t h e d i v o r c e court had mistaken f o r m a r i t a l property. A f t e r the t r i a l , the divorce court awarded ownership o f t h e d i s p u t e d bank a c c o u n t s t o t h e w i f e a n d t h e c h i l d r e n o f t h e h u s b a n d . 414 So. 2d a t 890. The s i s t e r t h e n f i l e d an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e wife, t h e c h i l d r e n , and t h e bank h o l d i n g t h e accounts, c l a i m i n g ownership o f t h e funds i n the a c c o u n t s . Our supreme c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e s i s t e r h a d n e v e r b e e n made a p a r t y t o t h e d i v o r c e p r o c e e d i n g s , s h e was b o u n d b y t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t u n d e r t h e d o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a as ' [ a ] n o n - p a r t y who h a s an i n t e r e s t s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e t o the matter litigated a n d who h a d an a d e q u a t e opportunity to l i t i g a t e the issue i n the p r i o r p r o c e e d i n g . ' 414 So. 2d a t 8 9 1 . " M o s l e y , 41 So. 3d a t 811-12. In Mosley, this court held that a corporation that had b e e n s o l e l y owned b y a d i v o r c i n g w i f e a n d h u s b a n d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i r d i v o r c e was b o u n d b y t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t i t h a d n o t b e e n made a p a r t y t o t h e d i v o r c e action b e c a u s e t h e c o r p o r a t i o n was "a n o n p a r t y who h a d an i n t e r e s t sufficiently action] issue close to the matter litigated [in the divorce a n d who h a d an a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y to l i t i g a t e the [ w h e t h e r i t s a s s e t s s h o u l d be d i v i d e d as m a r i t a l a s s e t s o f t h e d i v o r c i n g w i f e a n d husband] i n t h e [ d i v o r c e 41 action]." So. 3d a t 812. Because Wingard had a c t u a l 10 notice of John and L o r i ' s 2100017 a c t i o n and an a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y t o l i t i g a t e t h e v a l i d i t y her c l a i m t o own tenant t h e h o u s e j o i n t l y w i t h A n n i e b e l l e as a w i t h r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , she by t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l service party. of process See Owen and and joint w o u l d have b e e n b o u n d c o u r t e v e n i f she had thereby of effected her not waived joinder as a Mosley. Anniebelle also argues that we should judgment of the trial reverse the c o u r t b e c a u s e , she says, J o h n and Lori f a i l e d to prove t h a t the a l l e g e d o r a l c o n t r a c t f o r the s a l e of t h e h o u s e t o them f a l l s w i t h i n t h e p a r t - p e r f o r m a n c e to the Statute of Frauds. Specifically, the p a r t - p e r f o r m a n c e e x c e p t i o n t h a t the p a r t y the s a l e of seeking l a n d be she an o r a l i n possession of contract the land there i s caselaw h o l d i n g t h a t such p o s s e s s i o n familial contract. 4 Thus, according (1) that things, regarding and (2) w i l l not that satisfy i f i t c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d t o a between I n S m i t h v. S m i t h , 466 supreme c o u r t s t a t e d : 4 the relationship argues r e q u i r e s , among o t h e r to enforce the p a r t - p e r f o r m a n c e e x c e p t i o n exception to So. the parties Anniebelle, 2d 922, to John 924-25 and oral Lori's ( A l a . 1985), "The possession requirement of the performance e x c e p t i o n ' to the requirement 11 the 'part of a 2100017 w r i t i n g i n l a n d s a l e s c o n t r a c t s was a d d r e s s e d i n H o u s t o n v. M c C l u r e , 425 So. 2d 1114 ( A l a . 1983) . I n t h a t c a s e , we r e v e r s e d a summary j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d i n a s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e s u i t b e c a u s e t h e r e was a f a c t u a l i s s u e as t o w h e t h e r t h e a c t s o f p o s s e s s i o n i n t h e c a s e were ' r e f e r a b l e e x c l u s i v e l y t o t h e contract.' T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i s m e n t i o n e d i n Hagood v. S p i n k s , 219 A l a . 503, 122 So. 815 ( 1 9 2 9 ) , i n which the Court s a i d : "'To t a k e a c a s e o u t o f t h e s t a t u t e o f frauds ... upon the ground of part p e r f o r m a n c e , t h e a c t s o f p o s s e s s i o n must be clear and definite, and referable exclusively to the contract, and by a u t h o r i t y o f t h e v e n d o r . The e x i s t e n c e o f the contract and i t s t e r m s s h o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d b y c o m p e t e n t p r o o f t o be c l e a r , d e f i n i t e , and u n e q u i v o c a l i n a l l i t s terms. I f i t s terms, or the necessary a c t s of p a r t performance, are not sustained by s a t i s f a c t o r y proof, s p e c i f i c performance w i l l n o t be d e c r e e d . ' ( C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ) "219 A l a . a t 504, 122 So. a t 816. The m e a n i n g o f was 'referable exclusively to the contract' d i s c u s s e d i n J o n e s v. J o n e s , 219 A l a . 62, 121 So. 78 ( 1 9 2 9 ) . The C o u r t s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : "'The cases also hold that the possession of the purchaser must be e x c l u s i v e l y r e f e r a b l e t o t h e c o n t r a c t ... " t h a t i s t o s a y , i t must be s u c h p o s s e s s i o n that an outsider, knowing a l l the c i r c u m s t a n c e s a t t e n d i n g i t save o n l y the one f a c t , t h e a l l e g e d o r a l c o n t r a c t , w o u l d n a t u r a l l y a n d r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r t h a t some contract e x i s t e d r e l a t i n g to the land, of t h e same g e n e r a l n a t u r e as t h e c o n t r a c t a l l e g e d " (36 C y c . 660) ' 12 2100017 possession o f t h e house d i d n o t s a t i s f y t h e p a r t - p e r f o r m a n c e e x c e p t i o n because a f a m i l i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t e d between John and Lori, on t h e one h a n d , a n d D o n a l d a n d A n n i e b e l l e , o t h e r , and, t h e r e f o r e , John and L o r i ' s p o s s e s s i o n could be a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h a t on t h e o f t h e house relationship rather than the a l l e g e d o r a l c o n t r a c t f o r t h e s a l e o f t h e h o u s e . However, t h e o n l y i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t t h i s a r g u m e n t was p r e s e n t e d to the t r i a l that "there court i s Materna's i s an e x c e p t i o n statement during to the statute the t r i a l of l i m i t a t i o n s "219 A l a . a t 63-64, 121 So. a t 78. The J o n e s went on t o s a y t h a t Court "'... t h e p o s s e s s i o n must be r e f e r a b l e t o t h e p r o m i s e a n d n o t t o some d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e v e n d o r a n d v e n d e e . 36 C y c . 660, n o t e 77 ' "219 A l a . a t 64, 121 So. a t 78. The C o u r t further i n adopting the f o l l o w i n g excerpt: " ' I n 36 C y c . 660, i s t h e f o l l o w i n g : "If the possession ... c o u l d be a c c o u n t e d for j u s t as w e l l b y some o t h e r r i g h t o r t i t l e a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g i n t h e vendee's f a v o r , o r b y some r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n h i m a n d the vendor other than the a l l e g e d o r a l c o n t r a c t , i t i s n o t s u c h a p o s s e s s i o n as the d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e s . " ' "219 (Footnote A l a . a t 64, 121 So. a t 79." omitted.) 13 went 2100017 [ s i c ] ; h o w e v e r , c a s e l a w i s v e r y s p e c i f i c , and t h a t e x c e p t i o n does not cryptic apply to family members." We statement d i d not s u f f i c i e n t l y conclude that this present to the trial c o u r t t h e argument r e g a r d i n g t h e p a r t - p e r f o r m a n c e e x c e p t i o n t o the We S t a t u t e o f F r a u d s t h a t A n n i e b e l l e now p r e s e n t s on a p p e a l . cannot c o n s i d e r an sufficiently present argument to the that trial M e r r i t t O i l Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 the a p p e l l a n t court. See ( A l a . 1992) d i d not Andrews v. ("This C o u r t c a n n o t c o n s i d e r a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l ; r a t h e r , o u r r e v i e w i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e e v i d e n c e and a r g u m e n t s considered by the t r i a l court."). Consequently, because we c a n n o t c o n s i d e r t h i s a r g u m e n t , we must a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t o f the trial court. AFFIRMED. All the judges concur. 14

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