Ex parte John P. Coble. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: John P. Coble v. Haden Development, L.L.C., d/b/a Hampton Falls, and Sealy Management Co., Inc.)

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REL: 5/6/11 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 2091087 Ex p a r t e John P. Coble PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In r e : John P. Coble v. Haden Development, L.L.C., d/b/a Hampton F a l l s , Management Co., I n c . ) (Madison PER Circuit Court, and S e a l y CV-09-1285) CURIAM. John order P. Coble, of the Madison the p l a i n t i f f Circuit Court below, striking appealed from h i s demand an for a 2091087 jury trial. Because an o r d e r granting or denying a trial by j u r y i s an i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r p r o p e r l y r e v i e w e d b y a p e t i t i o n for a writ Alabama, N.A., elected to mandamus. Civ. App. treat of 67 9 treat See So. the Fowler 1989) see 2d Ex 645, appeal v. parte 647 as a Merkle, SouthTrust Bank ( A l a . 1996), petition 564 (stating that this an a p p e a l a writ mandamus, So. 2d we for a 960, of have writ of 961 ( A l a . c o u r t has t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o f r o m an u n a p p e a l a b l e order as a p e t i t i o n f o r o f mandamus). In June 2008, Coble entered into agreement w i t h Haden D e v e l o p m e n t , L.L.C., a one-year lease d/b/a Hampton Falls ("Haden D e v e l o p m e n t " ) , i n w h i c h C o b l e l e a s e d an a p a r t m e n t f r o m Haden Development. provision legal that That stated: agreement "WAIVER OF expenses and, t o t h e e x t e n t contained a JURY TRIAL. jury-waiver To minimize a l l o w e d by law, [ C o b l e ] and [Haden Development] agree t h a t a t r i a l o f a n y l a w s u i t b a s e d on s t a t u t e [ , ] common l a w , a n d / o r r e l a t e d to this shall be original.) into to a judge not a jury." contained a agreement to rent jury-waiver 2 Contract (Capitalization In J u l y 2009, C o b l e and Haden Development a six-month lease agreement and Lease entered the apartment. provision in containing That the 2091087 same language as the jury-waiver provision in the 2008 agreement. In September 2009, C o b l e sued Haden D e v e l o p m e n t , a l l e g i n g various claims, i n c l u d i n g b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t on a l l e g e d s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s , and claims based demanded a j u r y he and trial. I n December 2009, C o b l e amended h i s c o m p l a i n t defendant interest Sealy to contained Management Haden a Development; demand s u b s e q u e n t l y moved t o on the basis lease of the agreements. granted the motion for a petition Bank, supra, a strike jury strike and Fowler, as successor complaint The j u r y demand. c o u r t , w h i c h we trial in trial Coble Ex p a r t e filed a treat SouthTrust supra. "A w r i t o f mandamus i s an e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e m e d y , and i t w i l l be ' i s s u e d o n l y when t h e r e i s : 1) a c l e a r l e g a l r i g h t i n the p e t i t i o n e r to the order s o u g h t ; 2) an i m p e r a t i v e d u t y u p o n t h e r e s p o n d e n t t o p e r f o r m , a c c o m p a n i e d b y a r e f u s a l t o do s o ; 3) the l a c k of a n o t h e r a d e q u a t e r e m e d y ; and 4) properly i n v o k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t . ' Ex p a r t e U n i t e d Serv. S t a t i o n s , Inc., 628 So. 2d 501 , 503 (Ala. 1993). A writ of mandamus w i l l issue only in s i t u a t i o n s where o t h e r r e l i e f i s u n a v a i l a b l e or i s 3 the court have e l e c t e d to See in defendants contained the a also demand f o r a j u r y hearing, f o r a w r i t o f mandamus. include a trial. provision a the as amended Coble's Following to Inc., the jury-waiver n o t i c e of a p p e a l to t h i s as Co., to 2091087 i n a d e q u a t e , a n d i t c a n n o t be u s e d as a s u b s t i t u t e for a p p e a l . Ex p a r t e D r i l l P a r t s & S e r v . Co., 590 So. 2 d 252 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) . " Ex parte (Ala. Empire Fire & Marine argues that the demand f o r a j u r y t r i a l . contends Tenant that Act, § prohibits the Alabama jury-waiver Section provides "[a] rental tenant ... So. 893, 894 in striking such 163(b), agrees to the 2d his Ala. Code 1975. is a "limitation the I t appears Act. Our the N a t i o n a l See that legislature Residential Landlord Laws. t h a t argument, Coble Uniform provision a " ("the part of of any Coble of no ... the liability" Alabama adapted that the case g e n e r a l l y 2 R. of Commissioners Powell, 4 Powell on Act, that § of 35-9A- jury-waiver the Uniform Property under this Uniform drafted in on the provides addressed from a n d T e n a n t A c t , w h i c h was Conference the prohibited has Act lease liability The A c t f u r t h e r argues and Act"), i n the not p r o v i d e limitation law 1975 contained a g r e e m e n t may ... first Residential Landlord a prohibited provision i s unenforceable. provision issue. erred 35-9A-163(a)(4), l a n d l o r d a r i s i n g under that court 35-9A-101 e t s e q . , A l a . Code the that trial In making agreements. by 720 1998). Coble the I n s . Co., § 1972 State 16.01 2091087 (2000). of Section 35-9A-163(a)(4) i s i d e n t i c a l to § the Uniform Residential Landlord s t a t e s have adopted v e r s i o n s Ala. Code jurisdiction, jury-waiver 1975. and Coble our under a waiver under § before a j u r y or b e f o r e be based. waiver cites similar to legal I f the provision have included See, e.g., our Inc. J., enforced supreme v. with § a limitation Coble's a judge without a Gen. Act in Stephens, 404 a Laws c h . a g a i n s t him court of of action the Gaylord So. 2d three J u s t i c e s concurring 5 liability jury- liability is tried affect would i t could doing provision standard Stores ( A l a . 1981) and a so. 15F. Department 586 other liability clearly jury-waiver b a s e d on t h e any to p r o h i b i t a j u r y - provision § of § 35-9A- a j u r y does not intended 186, Table The r e s i d e n t i a l - l e a s e agreement, the Several construing 35-9A-163(a)(4). Whether Next, Coble argues that n o t be none, o b l i g a t i o n s upon w h i c h within Mass. a u t h o r i t y from reveals l e g i s l a t u r e had in no case i s not 35-9A-163(a)(4). defendants' a c t . See a prohibited limitation provision in this the provision Act. Been A d o p t e d , p r e c e d i n g research p r o v i s i o n as Tenant of t h a t u n i f o r m J u r i s d i c t i o n s W h e r e i n A c t Has 101, and 1.403(a)(4) one should announced of by Alabama, (per Faulkner, Justice concurring 2091087 in the r e s u l t ) , note that which of has t h e burden the right party we w i l l discuss our research reveals party courts which that to a jury have no A l a b a m a was made. the issue the cases Federal Fin. Tex cited Practice therein; However, most have 2002). 1977). U.S. In Gaylord, Rental, Hendrix, 389 waiver (1937), Aetna observed of the right that burden. J. (3d e d . 2 0 1 0 ) , (3d e d . 2 0 0 2 ) ; a n d RDO 2d 8 1 1 , 813-14 court relied 565 F.2d trial. on 255 (N.D. National (2d Co. v . K e n n e d y , a presumption to a jury 1 Miller, Insurance that federal a n d A. 191 F. S u p p . Hendrix, waiver concluded that the Wright § 2321 o u r supreme L t d . v. citing C. we determining a valid § 38.52[1][d] 9 and Procedure S e r v s . Co. v . P o w e l l , Equipment the cases seeking to enforce the waiver carries Moore, Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and Initially, of p r o v i n g whether trial addressed below. exists Because C i r . 301 against there i s a p r e s u m p t i o n a g a i n s t w a i v e r , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g the enforcement o f t h e w a i v e r has t h e burden of proving that The r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l i n c i v i l c a s e s i n f e d e r a l c o u r t i s g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e S e v e n t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Constitution. The S e v e n t h A m e n d m e n t d o e s n o t a p p l y t o s t a t e courts. G a s p e r i n i v . C e n t e r f o r H u m a n i t i e s , I n c . , 518 U.S. 4 1 5 , 418 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . However, Alabama c a s e s have s t a t e d t h a t t h e S e v e n t h Amendment i s n o t m a t e r i a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m A r t i c l e I , § 11, o f t h e Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1901. Eason v. Bynon, 781 S o . 2 d 2 3 8 , 2 4 1 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) . 1 6 2091087 the waiver light of the right of the standard We emphasize to a jury established that our trial was v a l i d l y made i n i n Gaylord. holding does not apply to a r b i t r a t i o n clauses, which n e c e s s a r i l y include a waiver ofthe right to a jury t r i a l . I n an a r b i t r a t i o n case, " ' [ t ] h e p a r t y seeking t o compel a r b i t r a t i o n has t h e i n i t i a l burden of proving the existence of a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t c a l l i n g f o r a r b i t r a t i o n and p r o v i n g that that contract evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce.' Polaris Sales, I n c . v. H e r i t a g e I m p o r t s , I n c . , 879 S o . 2 d 1 1 2 9 , 1 1 3 2 ( A l a . 2003). ' " ' [ A ] f t e r a motion t o compel a r b i t r a t i o n h a s b e e n made a n d s u p p o r t e d , t h e b u r d e n i s o n t h e non-movant t o p r e s e n t evidence that the supposed a r b i t r a t i o n agreement i s n o t v a l i d o r does n o t a p p l y to the dispute i n question.'"' Kenworth of B i r m i n g h a m , I n c . v . L a n g l e y , 828 S o . 2 d 288 , 290 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Fleetwood Enters., I n c . v. B r u n o , 784 S o . 2 d 2 7 7 , 2 8 0 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n J i m B u r k e A u t o . , I n c . v . B e a v e r s , 674 S o . 2 d 1260, 1 2 6 5 n.1 ( A l a . 1995))." I.C.E. Contractors, I n c . v. M a r t i n 1 08 0 61 9, Sept. 17, 2010] Recently o u r supreme whether a jury-waiver of a corporation, waiver court, & Cobey C o n s t r . So. 3d , i n the context C o . , [Ms. (Ala. of determining provision applies to nonsignatory addressed the d i s t i n c t i o n p r o v i s i o n a n d an a r b i t r a t i o n 2010). between agents a jury- clause: "[I]n In re Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage C a p i t a l , L . L . C . , 2 7 3 S.W.3d 8 4 3 , 8 4 7 - 4 8 ( T e x . A p p . 2008), a Texas c o u r t a p p l i e d t h e f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s : 7 2091087 fl I A r b i t r a t i o n agreements waivers are subject to presumptions: and j u r y opposite " ' " U n l i k e a r b i t r a t i o n agreements, which are s t r o n g l y f a v o r e d under Texas law, the r i g h t to a j u r y t r i a l i s so s t r o n g l y f a v o r e d t h a t contractual jury waivers are s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d and w i l l not be l i g h t l y i n f e r r e d o r extended. Before a jury waiver will be enforced, such waiver must be f o u n d t o be a v o l u n t a r y , k n o w i n g , a n d i n t e l l i g e n t a c t t h a t was d o n e w i t h s u f f i c i e n t awareness of the r e l e v a n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s and l i k e l y consequences." "'[In re Credit Suisse First Boston M o r t g a g e C a p i t a l , L . L . C . , 257 S.W.3d 4 8 6 , ] 490 [ ( T e x . A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) ] ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . "We a g r e e w i t h t h e r e a s o n i n g o f t h e T e x a s c o u r t that analogy to a r b i t r a t i o n cases i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e because of the inapplicability of the Supremacy C l a u s e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n b a s e d on cases from the United States Supreme Court c o n s t r u i n g t h e F e d e r a l A r b i t r a t i o n A c t , 9 U.S.C. § 1 e t s e q . , and t h e r e s u l t i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of o p p o s i t e presumptions i n i n t e r p r e t i n g a r b i t r a t i o n and jurywaiver p r o v i s i o n s . " Ex p a r t e C a r t e r , (Ala. [Ms. 10 9 1 1 9 6 , D e c . 2010). 8 30, 2010] So. 3d , 2091087 We jury now address trial discussed based factors jury-waiver Coble's on to Gaylord. be provision Stephens, a pharmacist, Department to Stores operate agreement a trial contained demand, verdict. and On jury-waiver a Gaylord, considered should be our enforced. Inc., In department i n which in Gaylord's judgment our provision was court whether that a case, Gaylord Stephens Gaylord's a agreed store. Stephens The later o f c o n t r a c t and conversion. The motion to s t r i k e Stephens's jury subsequently supreme c o u r t in to supreme i n determining a jury-waiver provision. appeal, is entitled e n t e r e d i n t o an a g r e e m e n t w i t h a l l e g i n g breach court denied In of Alabama, pharmacy sued Gaylord, a r g u m e n t t h a t he the entered addressed agreement should on a whether have enforced: " A r t i c l e I , § 11, C o n s t i t u t i o n 1901, provides that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. M o r e o v e r , R u l e 3 8 ( a ) , [ A l a . R. C i v . P . ] , p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e r i g h t o f t r i a l by j u r y as d e c l a r e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f A l a b a m a , o r as given by s t a t u t e o f t h i s S t a t e s h a l l be p r e s e r v e d to the parties inviolate. While this precious right of t r i a l b y j u r y may be w a i v e d , was i t p r o p e r l y w a i v e d in this p a r t i c u l a r case? "The v a l i d i t y of w a i v e r of a j u r y t r i a l i n a c o n t r a c t a c t i o n has b e e n r e c o g n i z e d i n a number o f j u r i s d i c t i o n s , including Connecticut, Massachusetts, New J e r s e y , New York, and O h i o . See 73 A.L.R.2d 9 jury the been 2091087 1333. The S u p r e m e C o u r t o f F l o r i d a , c o n s t r u i n g New York law, upheld the j u r y waiver p r o v i s i o n i n a written contract. Central Investment Associates, I n c . v . L e a s i n g S e r v i c e C o r p . , 362 S o . 2 d 702 ( F l a . 1978). However, a l l o f t h e s e C o u r t s u p h o l d i n g jury waivers follow a general rule that since the right o f j u r y t r i a l i s h i g h l y f a v o r e d , a w a i v e r w i l l be strictly construed. In Edsaid Realty Corp. v. S a m u e l s , C i t y C t . , 92 N . Y . S . 2 d 897 (1 94 9 ) , t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e w a i v e r must be c l e a r a n d e x p l i c i t a n d l e a v e no r o o m f o r d o u b t a b o u t t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e parties. And i n N a t i o n a l Equipment R e n t a l L t d . v. H e n d r i x , 565 F . 2 d 2 5 5 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , t h e C o u r t h e l d a waiver of j u r y t r i a l i n e f f e c t i v e , w h e r e i t was b u r i e d i n t h e e l e v e n t h paragraph, and there appeared gross inequality i n bargaining power between t h e p a r t i e s , a n d i t d i d n o t a p p e a r t h a t t h e w a i v e r was k n o w i n g l y a n d i n t e n t i o n a l l y made. We o p i n e that these statements are a p p l i c a b l e here. "The contract between Stephens and Gaylord a p p e a r s t o b e a New J e r s e y f o r m c o n t r a c t w i t h b o i l e r plate provisions. The j u r y w a i v e r provision i s buried i n paragraph thirty-four in a contract containing f o r t y - s i x paragraphs; the e q u a l i t y of the b a r g a i n i n g power o f t h e p a r t i e s i s q u e s t i o n a b l e ; and i t d o e s n o t a p p e a r t h a t t h e w a i v e r b y S t e p h e n s was i n t e l l i g e n t l y o r k n o w i n g l y made." Gaylord, Our Gaylord The 404 S o . 2 d a t 5 8 8 . supreme court i n Mall "three contractual whether first applied the test established i n i n M a l l , I n c . v . R o b b i n s , 412 S o . 2 d 1197 ( A l a . 1 9 8 2 ) . established a court stated the court factors i n determining waiver the waiver that of the right i s buried deep 10 i n Gaylord whether to a trial in a long by to had enforce jury: (1) contract; (2) 2091087 whether the b a r g a i n i n g whether the waiver So. 2d a t 1199. controversy provision unenforceable. facts Regarding In M a l l , t h e supreme c o u r t c a s e was therefore, However, of that case the and was i n t e n t i o n a l l y a n d k n o w i n g l y made." i n that and, power of t h e p a r t i e s i s e q u a l ; outside that the in light first the scope the Mall waiver court of the test Gaylord concluded factor, 412 that the of the waiver provision was examined the also stated the (3) in Gaylord. court in Mall observed: "The c o n t r a c t u a l w a i v e r i n t h e l e a s e i s i n s e c t i o n 10.4, w h i c h i s e n t i t l e d 'Waiver o f T r i a l by J u r y : T e n a n t N o t To C o u n t e r c l a i m . ' Since the s e c t i o n i s t i t l e d so as t o c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e w a i v e r o f j u r y trial in the lease, the waiver is not i n c o n s p i c u o u s l y b u r i e d deep i n t h e c o n t r a c t . " 412 S o . 2 d a t 1 1 9 9 . Regarding the second Gaylord court that and that other did only i n M a l l noted the tenant stores. " t h e p a r t i e s were b o t h seeking a jury I d . Thus, t h e c o u r t trial concluded not have u n e q u a l b a r g a i n i n g power. Alabama case that has owned applied that factor, businessmen" s i x or jury-waiver seven the p a r t i e s M a l l a p p e a r s t o be t h e the Gaylord test. seems t o s u g g e s t t h a t , w e r e i t n o t f o r t h e c o n t r o v e r s y case being the Mall i n that o u t s i d e the scope of the j u r y - w a i v e r p r o v i s i o n , the provision i n that case would have been 11 enforced. 2091087 Regarding case are s i m i l a r observed so the f i r s t The lease waiver and size i n this i n favor next consider agreement. consider the little parties. We bankruptcy attorney, least some p r o v i s i o n was the waiver note, degree was " n o t In 33 o f a 4 3 - i n that clause (Capitalization attention to provision Hence, t h e f i r s t of the jury-waiver Gaylord i s easily Gaylord however, factor, which a that is of the practicing he h a s a c q u i r e d would we materials that s o p h i s t i c a t i o n that 12 The power suggests factor i.e., the bargaining Coble print provision. power o f t h e p a r t i e s . about in the jury-waiver "so as t o c a l l second this "MISCELLANEOUS." paragraph titled this "titled Id. i n clause TRIAL." clearly of enforcing reveal court of the p r o v i s i o n i s i n the normal the bargaining us JURY is titled The and t h e t e x t We before case Id. of the lease weighs i n Mall S i m i l a r to the p r o v i s i o n i n Mall, waiver." found, OF The 33 i s l a b e l e d p r o v i s i o n i s a separate original.) the provision i s located "WAIVER of i n the contract." agreement; c l a u s e is titled provision deep the facts i n Mall. the jury-waiver buried the waiver clause factor, a t t e n t i o n t o " the waiver, inconspicuously case, to the f a c t s t h a t , because as t o c a l l Gaylord at a i d him i n 2091087 dealing with indicate lease it that landlord. Coble originally The attempted agreement o r t h a t was not a materials he h a d t o s i g n presented. i s an (M.D. regarding F l a . 2010) the contractual trial). We cannot parties had unequal power o f t h e company's waiver does similar of services. 680 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 2 8 7 , the the facts bargaining agreement as i s a company a n d t h e o t h e r (applying say that of the bargaining C o l l i n s v . C o u n t r y w i d e Home L o a n s , I n c . , 1295-96 do n o t the lease Unequal i n d i v i d u a l i n need us t h e terms to negotiate e x i s t m e r e l y b e c a u s e one p a r t y party before federal law to a jury that the right demonstrate power regarding the lease agreement. We the next waiver initially whether which was that the t h i r d Gaylord intelligently the court a waiver separate waiver address was and knowingly i n Mall i n determining provision. However, test e n f o r c e a b i l i t y of a jury-waiver from the Gaylord test for on We the a as a jury- federal law, determining provision slightly note question made to enforce relied as c h a r a c t e r i z e d 13 made. and knowingly whether Gaylord the i . e . , whether characterized intelligently factor characterizes factor, the differently by t h e c o u r t i n Mall. 2091087 Under f e d e r a l l a w , a j u r y - w a i v e r provision will be e n f o r c e d i f t h e w a i v e r was made k n o w i n g l y , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , a n d v o l u n t a r i l y . See 8 Moore, Moore's cases cited whether factors, Practice Under federal therein. the bargaining Federal provision i s buried power o f t h e p a r t i e s , are factors was i n t e l l i g e n t l y factor. that factors, that law, factors in a indicate such contract i . e . , the f i r s t the t h i r d as d i r e c t i n g in and t h e two whether addition to the t r i a l the first Gaylord court two as and the Gaylord the waiver a n d k n o w i n g l y made, i . e . , t h e t h i r d I t appears characterized would § 38.52[3][a], Gaylord factor may to consider Gaylord be any factors, t o u c h i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e w a i v e r was i n t e l l i g e n t l y a n d k n o w i n g l y made. In this succinct, case, and (Capitalization the i t was labeled i n original.) National provision "WAIVER Coble p a g e on w h i c h t h e j u r y - w a i v e r that provision See the jury-waiver OF initialed provision was JURY 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1 9 9 1 ) the waiver provision was a jury-waiver set o f f i n i t s 14 TRIAL." i s c o n t a i n e d , and B a n k , U.S.A. v . R o s s , (enforcing and the bottom of i s l e s s t h a n two i n c h e s above C o b l e ' s Westminster clear own initials. 130 B.R. 6 5 6 , provision paragraph when less 2091087 than two lease inches above agreements the containing Those f a c t s , and two factors, Gaylord signature the trial court waived his suggest d i d not right same Coble jury-waiver signed to that Coble the first intelligently to a j u r y t r i a l . err i n determining a jury two provision. f a c t s d i s c u s s e d above r e g a r d i n g knowingly waived his right the the line). We and conclude that Coble that validly trial. Coble a l s o argues t h a t , even i f the j u r y - w a i v e r p r o v i s i o n is enforceable, the waiver. not a l l of h i s c l a i m s Because the right to are a favored, a jury-waiver Gaylord, 404 alleging jury " [ h ] a r a s s m e n t by t h e L a n d l o r d the contract waiver of to 2d and clause." referring Code So. his "The Alabama 588. therefore Coble's first Alabama, Harassment." provision will at That Coble claim, 1975 claim at of scope is strictly the that scope Coble is titled Access) and alleges, in pertinent Defendants are i n m a t e r i a l Code Section 35-9A-303.[ ] 2 of highly construed. his i s o u t s i d e the 16. which (Abuse be trial contends outside brief w i t h i n the of scope any appears "§ claim of jury to be 35-9A-303, the Tort of part: violation of Management Among o t h e r t h i n g s , § 3 5 - 9 A - 3 0 3 , A l a . Code 1975, provides t h a t "[a] l a n d l o r d s h a l l not abuse the r i g h t of a c c e s s o r use i t to harass the tenant." § 35-9A-303(c). 2 15 2091087 inspections (which at f i r s t were supposed to be 'annual') have been h e l d on February 18 , 2 0 0 9 ; A u g u s t 4, 2 0 0 9 a n d S e p t e m b e r 11, 2009. Per the lease f o r these apartments, any such inspection n o t i c e was t o show a ' t i m e , ' n o t a ' d a t e ' o r a ' p a r t of a day.' [Coble] complained each time. [Coble] went to great expense to have someone at the apartment two out of the three of these inspections." The The jury-waiver p r o v i s i o n waives statute[,] In provision Ex 1198, common l a w , parte AIG 1201 (Ala. jury-waiver contract to court jury a "of case any is very lawsuit broad. based Orange 49 broader Beach Wharf, our supreme applying scope "arising to claims than from" court a a L.L.C., explained "related jury-waiver contract. So. 3d that a to" a provision Our supreme stated: " I n Ex p a r t e C u p p s , [ 7 8 2 So. 2d 772 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , ] this Court examined the scope of a jury-waiver provision. We n o t e d t h a t a p r o v i s i o n a p p l y i n g o n l y to claims 'arising from' or 'arising under' a c o n t r a c t has a n a r r o w s c o p e and ' e x c l u d e [ d ] claims that did not require a reference to, or a c o n s t r u c t i o n of, the u n d e r l y i n g c o n t r a c t . ' 782 So. 2d a t 776. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a p r o v i s i o n a p p l y i n g to claims '"arising out of or relating to"' a c o n t r a c t -- s u c h as t h e p r o v i s i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t case -'"has a broader a p p l i c a t i o n " ' than a provision '"that refers only to claims 'arising from' the agreement."' 782 So. 2 d a t 776 (quoting Reynolds on Contract." 2010), claims trial this and/or r e l a t e d to t h i s Lease provision has applying Baker a in & Reynolds Co. v. 16 King Automobiles, Inc., 2091087 689 S o . 2 d 1, 2-3 (Ala. 1996)). C f . Vann v. F i r s t C m t y . C r e d i t C o r p . , 834 So. 2d 7 5 1 , 754 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t t h e p h r a s e 'any c o n t r o v e r s y o r c l a i m a r i s i n g out of or r e l a t i n g t o ' c o v e r s a broad range of disputes); Beaver C o n s t r . Co. v. Lakehouse, L . L . C . , 742 So. 2d 1 5 9 , 165 ( A l a . 1999) (noting that ' " r e l a t i n g - t o " l a n g u a g e has been h e l d t o c o n s t i t u t e a r e l a t i v e l y broad a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n ' ) . " Ex p a r t e AIG Baker, Coble's defendants the first 49 So. claim 3d is at 1201. based e n t e r e d h i s apartment on more l e a s e agreements and i n v i o l a t i o n allegations times than of the A c t . that allowed We a jury to the lease agreements, to Coble's The trial i n any first trial lawsuit a jury t r i a l . the jury-waiver provision PETITION All the a statute or related claim. c o u r t d i d not deny C o b l e ' s on right i s s u f f i c i e n t l y b r o a d enough to a p p l y for we based by conclude that the j u r y - w a i v e r p r o v i s i o n , which b r o a d l y waived the to the err in striking Coble waived h i s r i g h t petition i s due for a writ DENIED. judges t o be concur. 17 of Coble's demand to a jury t r i a l , enforced. mandamus. and Therefore,

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