Henry Craig Jenkins v. Annette Moss and Antonio Moss

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
REL: 01/07/2011 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 2091070 Henry C r a i g Jenkins v. Annette Moss and Antonio Moss Appeal from Montgomery C i r c u i t (CV-07-1506) Court MOORE, J u d g e . Henry C r a i g J e n k i n s Montgomery motion Circuit appeals Court to s e t aside a f r o m an o r d e r e n t e r e d b y t h e ("the t r i a l default court") judgment that denying h i s was a g a i n s t h i m a n d i n f a v o r o f A n n e t t e Moss a n d A n t o n i o entered Moss. 2091070 On the September 21, trial Mortgage court 2007, t h e Mosses f i l e d asserting various Corporation; H. Craig claims Jenkins; a complaint against Hiram A in Plus Crittenden; C o u n t r y w i d e Home L o a n s , I n c . ; G e o r g e E d w a r d s ; S e c u r i t y L a n d Title, Inc.; subsequently and William H. Grant. A l l the f i l e d answers t o the c o m p l a i n t . defendants On May 29, 2009, t h e M o s s e s and C o u n t r y w i d e , E d w a r d s , S e c u r i t y L a n d T i t l e , Grant filed stating a that settlement of joint those motion parties a l l the and had claims stipulation entered asserted Edwards, S e c u r i t y Land T i t l e , and of into a against G r a n t and c o u r t d i s m i s s the c l a i m s a g a i n s t those the t r i a l court granted October remaining 1, 2009, defendants, the i.e., A attorney Plus of pro that defendants; 2009. record Mortgage, tanto Countrywide, the t r i a l On dismissal requesting t h a t m o t i o n on June 2, and for the Jenkins, and C r i t t e n d e n , f i l e d motions to withdraw from h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h o s e d e f e n d a n t s ; t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d o r d e r s on O c t o b e r 2, 2009, g r a n t i n g t h o s e motions. SJIS [State J u d i c i a l Information c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e c o r d on a p p e a l , order on December 28, 2009, According "Alabama S y s t e m ] Case D e t a i l " the t r i a l setting 2 to the the sheet court entered case against an the 2091070 remaining defendants record on appeal order, and On default does n o t , the S t a t e s h e e t does n o t June 15, for a jury trial however, on June 14, contain J u d i c i a l Information a copy of the trial that court entered served. the f o l l o w i n g judgment: " T h i s m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o an O r d e r i s s u e d on December 28, 2009 s c h e d u l i n g i t f o r a j u r y t r i a l t o commence a t 10:30 a.m. on June 14, 2010. The [ M o s s e s ] and their counsel were p r e s e n t and r e a d y t o p r o c e e d w i t h t r i a l . The c o u r t d e l a y e d t h e commencement o f t h e a c t i o n u n t i l 11:05 a.m. i n an e f f o r t t o d e t e r m i n e i f [ A P l u s M o r t g a g e , J e n k i n s , or C r i t t e n d e n , ] the defendants which are s t i l l p a r t i e s t o t h i s l a w s u i t w o u l d a p p e a r . However, none o f t h e [ r e m a i n i n g ] d e f e n d a n t s a p p e a r e d n o r d i d any r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f any [ r e m a i n i n g ] defendant. A c c o r d i n g l y a j o i n t and s e v e r a l d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was entered i n favor of the [Mosses] against the [ r e m a i n i n g ] defendants, A P l u s Mortgage C o r p o r a t i o n , H. C r a i g J e n k i n s and H i r a m C r i t t e n d e n . "The [ M o s s e s ] s u b m i t t e d an a f f i d a v i t f o r t h e p u r p o s [ e ] o f e s t a b l i s h i n g damages. B a s e d on a r e v i e w o f t h e same, t h e c o u r t h o l d s [ A P l u s M o r t g a g e ' s , J e n k i n s ' s , and C r i t t e n d e n ' s ] c o n d u c t was m a l i c i o u s , w r o n g f u l , i n t e n t i o n a l , g r o s s , w a n t o n and n e g l i g e n t . Thus t h i s H o n o r a b l e C o u r t h e r e b y e n t e r s a j o i n t and s e v e r a l j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r [ o f ] t h e [ M o s s e s ] and a g a i n s t a l l [ r e m a i n i n g ] defendants [A P l u s Mortgage, Jenkins, and Crittenden] in the amount of $100,000.00." 3 the System c a s e - d e t a i l i n d i c a t e upon whom t h a t o r d e r was 2010, 2010; 2091070 The copy indicates of the that d e f a u l t judgment a copy of the the judgment a t t o r n e y f o r t h e M o s s e s and " a l l p r o On J u l y 2, 2010, in se record was on appeal served on parties." " H e n r y C r a i g J e n k i n s dba A P l u s M o r t g a g e C o r p . " f i l e d a motion t o s e t a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment had been e n t e r e d pertinent against Jenkins. " 1 . D e f e n d a n t ' s C o u n s e l was on O c t o b e r 1, 2 0 0 9 . allowed to withdraw " 2 . D e f e n d a n t J e n k i n s was u n r e p r e s e n t e d a t t e n d a h e a r i n g d u r i n g December 2 0 0 9 . and did " 3 . A t t h a t h e a r i n g , t h e r e was much d i s c u s s i o n a b o u t t h i s c a s e h a v i n g no m e r i t a g a i n s t me. I r e c e i v e d no n o t i c e o f a t r i a l setting. "5. On June 15, 2010 a j u d g m e n t was rendered a g a i n s t me by d e f a u l t f o r f a i l u r e t o a p p e a r . "6. The d e f a u l t i s a product n e g l e c t as I d i d n o t p r o v i d e t o t h e c o u r t my home a d d r e s s . of excusable C l e r k of t h i s "7. T h i s m i s t a k e c o u l d happen t o a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n as d i d t o me f o r I am n o t an a t t o r n e y and was n o t aware t h a t I w o u l d n o t r e c e i v e n o t i c e s o f any future court hearings. "8. I have m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e s t o t h e c l a i m s a g a i n s t me and i f t h i s m o t i o n i s g r a n t e d , I have a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e o f p r e v a i l i n g on s a i d m e r i t s a t trial. 4 that That motion a s s e r t e d , part: "4. the in 2091070 "9. No p a r t y w i l l be p r e j u d i c e d b y a l l o w i n g t h i s m a t t e r t o p r o c e e d a n d go t o t r i a l . " Jenkins's a f f i d a v i t was a t t a c h e d t o the motion t o s e t aside the d e f a u l t judgment; i n t h a t a f f i d a v i t Jenkins stated: "1. My name i s H e n r y C r a i g J e n k i n s , S r . a n d I am o v e r t h e age o f m a j o r i t y . "2. I r e s i d e [ o n ] West F a r m i n g t o n T r a c e i n P i k e Road, A l a b a m a . "3. I am a D e f e n d a n t i n Case Moss v. A P l u s M o r t g a g e e t a l . CV-2007-1506 Montgomery County, Alabama. "4. I was u n r e p r e s e n t e d but d i d attend h e a r i n g d u r i n g December 2009. "5. A t t h a t h e a r i n g , t h e r e was much d i s c u s s i o n a b o u t t h i s c a s e h a v i n g no m e r i t a g a i n s t me. T h e r e was f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c a s e b e i n g d i s m i s s e d as a waste o f t h e C o u r t ' s t i m e a l t h o u g h t h e c a s e was n o t d i s m i s s e d . "6. T h e r e was aware. "7. I r e c e i v e d no n o t i c e o f a t r i a l "8. On June against appear. "9. The d e f a u l t i s a p r o d u c t of excusable n e g l e c t as I d i d n o t p r o v i d e t o t h e C l e r k o f t h i s c o u r t my home a d d r e s s . "10. T h i s m i s t a k e c o u l d happen t o a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n a s d i d t o me f o r I am n o t an a t t o r n e y a n d was n o t aware t h a t I w o u l d n o t no trial setting that a I was setting. 15, 2 010 a j u d g m e n t was r e n d e r e d me b y d e f a u l t f o r f a i l u r e t o 5 2091070 receive notices hearings. "11. of any future court I have m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e s t o t h e c l a i m s a g a i n s t me and i f t h i s m o t i o n i s g r a n t e d , I have a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e o f p r e v a i l i n g on said merits at t r i a l . " On J u l y 8, 2010, the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r d e n y i n g t h e motion to s e t a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment; t h a t order stated: "A d e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d on June [ 1 5 ] , 2010 when [ t h e r e m a i n i n g ] D e f e n d a n t s failed to a p p e a r f o r t r i a l . D e f e n d a n t J e n k i n s moves t o s e t aside that judgment a s s e r t i n g t h a t he d i d n o t r e c e i v e n o t i c e o f t h e t r i a l d a t e b e c a u s e he f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e an a d d r e s s t o t h e C o u r t . T h i s m a t t e r was set f o r j u r y t r i a l on O c t o b e r 19, 2009. The C o u r t c a l l e d t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l and a l l p a r t i e s and t h e i r a t t o r n e y s were p r e s e n t . The C o u r t spoke w i t h [ t h e M o s s e s ' ] c o u n s e l , [ t h e r e m a i n i n g ] d e f e n d a n t s , and [the r e m a i n i n g ] d e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n s e l and u r g e d t h e [ M o s s e s ] t o determine whether they c o u l d c o l l e c t a v e r d i c t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t s t r u c k a j u r y and s p e n t s e v e r a l d a y s i n t r i a l . The C o u r t n e v e r o f f e r e d an o p i n i o n on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c a s e . "... [T]he Court allowed [the remaining d e f e n d a n t s ' ] c o u n s e l t o w i t h d r a w and i n f o r m e d t h e p a r t i e s t h a t t h e c a s e w o u l d be r e - s e t . B e f o r e t h e parties left [ t h e October hearing], the Clerk i n f o r m e d them t h a t i f t h e c a s e n e e d e d t o be r e - s e t , i t w o u l d l i k e l y n o t be u n t i l June 2010. On December 29, 2009 the Court issued an Amended Trial S c h e d u l i n g O r d e r r e - s e t t i n g t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l on June 14, 2010. The C i r c u i t C l e r k ' s o f f i c e m a i l e d t h e o r d e r s t o t h e a d d r e s s e s i t h a d on f i l e i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h the Alabama R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e . "The c a s e was c a l l e d f o r t r i a l on June 14, 2010. Defendant J e n k i n s contends that his failure to 6 2091070 provide a current address i s excusable neglect. E x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t does n o t i n c l u d e p r e t e n d i n g t h e case does not e x i s t . When [ t h e remaining] D e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n s e l was a l l o w e d t o w i t h d r a w a n d [ t h e r e m a i n i n g ] d e f e n d a n t s chose t o p r o c e e d p r o s e , they had a d u t y t o p r o v i d e t h e C i r c u i t C l e r k ' s O f f i c e w i t h v a l i d c o n t a c t i n f o r m a t i o n and t o f a m i l i a r i z e themselves with t h e Alabama Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e . D u r i n g t h e f i v e a n d a h a l f month p e r i o d f r o m December 29, 2009 t o June 14, 2010, [ J e n k i n s ] c o u l d have c o n t a c t e d t h e C o u r t , t h e C l e r k ' s O f f i c e , or even o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l to inquire about t h e pending case a g a i n s t him. "[Jenkins's] h e r e b y DENIED." MOTION TO SET A S I D E ( C a p i t a l i z a t i o n i no r i g i n a l . ) Supreme Court; that court JUDGMENT i s J e n k i n s a p p e a l e d t o the Alabama t r a n s f e r r e d the appeal to this c o u r t , p u r s u a n t t o ยง 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1975. On a p p e a l , its Jenkins asserts that the t r i a l court exceeded d i s c r e t i o n by denying h i s motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment e n t e r e d against him. This court discussed a trial c o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment i n F u l l e r v. F u l l e r , 991 So. 2 d 285, 288 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 8 ) : " ' I n K i r t l a n d v . F o r t Morgan A u t h . Sewer. S e r v . , I n c . , 524 So. 2 d 600 ( A l a . 1988), t h i s Court h e l d t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t has b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t o g r a n t o r deny a d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment, b u t t h a t t h a t d i s c r e t i o n i s not boundless. The t r i a l c o u r t must b a l a n c e two c o m p e t i n g p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e f a u l t judgments 7 2091070 -- j u d i c i a l economy and t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o d e f e n d on t h e m e r i t s . K i r t l a n d , 524 So. 2d a t 604. These i n t e r e s t s must be b a l a n c e d under the two-step p r o c e s s s e t out in Kirtland. "'Under K i r t l a n d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must f i r s t presume t h a t c a s e s s h o u l d be d e c i d e d on t h e m e r i t s w h e n e v e r i t i s p r a c t i c a b l e t o do so S e c o n d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must apply a three-factor analysis in determining whether to set a s i d e a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t : i t must c o n s i d e r "1) w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t has a m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e ; 2) w h e t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l be unfairly p r e j u d i c e d i f the d e f a u l t judgment i s s e t a s i d e ; and 3) w h e t h e r t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t was a result of the defendant's own c u l p a b l e c o n d u c t . " K i r t l a n d , 524 So. 2d a t 605.' "[Sampson v. C a n s l e r , 726 So. 2d 632,] 633 [(Ala. 1 9 9 8 ) ] . An a n a l y s i s u n d e r t h e K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s i s one r e q u i r i n g a b a l a n c i n g a p p r o a c h t h a t w e i g h s t h e f a c t o r s a g a i n s t one a n o t h e r . S u m l i n v. S u m l i n , 931 So. 2d 40, 45 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 5 ) . A l s o , a l l t h r e e factors must be considered, but there is no r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a l l t h r e e f a c t o r s be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r o f t h e movant i n o r d e r t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment. I d . " On appeal, Jenkins d i s c u s s e s each of the f a c t o r s s e t out i n K i r t l a n d v. F o r t Morgan A u t h o r i t y Sewer S e r v i c e , I n c . , 524 So. case, and court erred i n f a i l i n g to set aside the 2d 600 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) , a p p l i e s them t o t h e p r e s e n t argues t h a t the t r i a l default t h a t the judgment e n t e r e d trial court a g a i n s t him. failed Jenkins also asserts t o address each of the 8 Kirtland 2091070 factors i n i t s order, and he cites a number o f cases r e s u l t e d i n the r e v e r s a l of a d e n i a l of a motion to s e t that aside a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t when e a c h o f t h e K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s were a d d r e s s e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . So. 3d 747, 754 See, ( A l a . C i v . App. So. J o n e s v. J o n e s , 717 2d 434, CHO (Ala. Real The trial 2d 345, 349 v. Integrity ( A l a . C i v . App. 435 ( A l a . C i v . App. I n c . v. W y a t t , Estate Holding, C i v . App. R.J.G. v. S.S.W., 42 2009); Richardson B i b l e C h u r c h , I n c . , 897 So. e.g., not 680 So. 2004); 1998); 2d 372, and 372 1996). court's order i n the present case indicates t h a t t h e c o u r t b a s e d i t s d e c i s i o n t o deny J e n k i n s ' s m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t on J e n k i n s ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e the circuit apprise clerk with himself of the a current address s t a t u s of the case. or to otherwise Thus, t h e trial c o u r t seemingly c o n s i d e r e d the t h i r d K i r t l a n d f a c t o r r e g a r d i n g Jenkins's c u l p a b l e conduct. the c o u r t presumed t h a t the trial the m e r i t s , t h a t the t r i a l The o r d e r does n o t c a s e s h o u l d be court considered K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s r e g a r d i n g whether Jenkins defense or whether default judgment is the set Mosses would aside, 9 reflect or be that decided t h e two has on remaining a meritorious prejudiced the that trial i f the court 2091070 d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n a g a i n s t a d e f a u l t judgment had been overcome. In Richardson, this court stated: "In t h i s case, there i s nothing t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the trial court considered the three factors s p e c i f i e d i n K i r t l a n d . We t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l court's d e n i a l of Richardson's motion t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment e n t e r e d a g a i n s t him and remand t h e c a u s e ' f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r the K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t o s e t aside t h e d e f a u l t judgment.' BankAmerica Hous. S e r v s . r v . M a t t h e w s ] , 718 So. 2d [86,] 88 [ ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 8 ) ] . As i n W h i t e [ v . W e s t m o r e l a n d , 680 So. 2d 348 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 6 ) ] , h o w e v e r , o u r mandate i n t h i s c a s e ' i s n o t t o be c o n s t r u e d t o mean t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t must s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t , [but] o n l y t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t must a p p l y the K i r t l a n d f a c t o r s i n d e c i d i n g whether t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t . ' 680 So. 2d a t 3 4 9 . " 897 So. 2d a t 349. trial court's remanded w i t h As i n R i c h a r d s o n , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t i s due t o be r e v e r s e d i n s t r u c t i o n s that the t r i a l K i r t l a n d analysis i n f u l l i n determining the d e f a u l t judgment e n t e r e d and t h e cause court apply the whether t o s e t a s i d e against Jenkins. B e c a u s e we a r e r e v e r s i n g b a s e d on t h i s i s s u e , we p r e t e r m i t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e remaining i s s u e s r a i s e d by Jenkins on a p p e a l . REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, P . J . , and P i t t m a n , concur. 10 Bryan, a n d Thomas, JJ.,

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.