REL:
7/29/11
Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance
s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r .
R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions,
A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1
((334)
2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made
b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2011
2091038
Michael D. Lockridge
v.
K a r l a D. Lockridge
Appeal
from Etowah C i r c u i t
(DR-08-761)
Court
BRYAN, J u d g e .
Michael
judgment
court")
Karla
D.
entered
Lockridge
("the husband")
by t h e Etowah
that refused t o grant
D. L o c k r i d g e
Circuit
appeals
Court
h i m an a b s o l u t e
("the w i f e " )
and t h a t
from
a
("the t r i a l
divorce
failed
from
t o modify
2091038
c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment t h a t had been
entered
by t h e t r i a l
court
on b e h a l f
o f t h e h u s b a n d and t h e
wife.
Procedural
The
record
indicates
History
that
the p a r t i e s
were
married i n
F e b r u a r y 2001 and t h a t t h e y s e p a r a t e d i n S e p t e m b e r 2008.
The
p a r t i e s were t h e p a r e n t s o f one c h i l d , a s o n , who was b o r n i n
M a r c h 2000.
for
a
On O c t o b e r 3, 2008, t h e w i f e
divorce
incompatibility
alleging
irreconcilable
o f temperament
filed
a complaint
differences
as g r o u n d s f o r t h e
and
divorce.
She r e q u e s t e d , among o t h e r r e l i e f , t h a t t h e p a r t i e s be o r d e r e d
to provide
entered
that
a college education
f o r the son.
a s t a t u s quo p e n d e n t e l i t e
ordered
the p a r t i e s ,
among
order
other
The t r i a l
court
on O c t o b e r 7,
2008,
things,
to
continue
p a y i n g f i x e d m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s i n t h e same manner as t h e y h a d
been p a i d b e f o r e
the divorce
a c t i o n was
filed.
On November 7, 2008, t h e h u s b a n d f i l e d
wife's
c o m p l a i n t and s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t d e s i r e a d i v o r c e ;
h o w e v e r , he a l s o
other
an answer t o t h e
relief,
filed
a counterclaim
that
requested,
a d i v i s i o n of the m a r i t a l property
On M a r c h 23, 2009, t h e w i f e
2
filed
among
and d e b t s .
an amended
complaint
2091038
s e e k i n g a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n from the husband i n accordance w i t h
§ 30-2-40, A l a . Code 1975.
The w i f e a l l e g e d t h a t she h a d h a d
a l i v e r t r a n s p l a n t i n 2005 and t h a t she h a d t o t a k e
"anti-rejection"
medication
the
liver.
transplanted
cost
of
this
husband's
employer's
so t h a t h e r b o d y d i d n o t
The
medication
expensive
wife
was
further alleged that
completely
insurance
reject
covered
provider,
the
by
she
that
the
was
u n e m p l o y e d , and t h a t she h a d n o t b e e n a b l e t o f i n d a h e a l t h insurance
policy
that
r e j e c t i o n medication
On
March
requiring
26,
would
cover
the
cost
of
the
2009,
the
trial
amount o f $164 a w e e k ; o r d e r e d
court
child
support
t h e husband t o c o n t i n u e
and t h e u t i l i t y b i l l s ; and o r d e r e d
p a y f o r " f o o d and i n c i d e n t a l s . "
requested
t o the wife's
an a b s o l u t e
The t r i a l
2009.
order
entered
t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e , t h e w i f e ' s
objected
an
t h a t she n e e d e d .
t h e husband t o pay t h e w i f e
l o a n payment,
anti-
request
i n the
t o pay
automobilethe wife to
On A p r i l 6, 2009, t h e h u s b a n d
for a legal
separation
and
divorce.
c o u r t c o n d u c t e d an o r e t e n u s h e a r i n g
At that hearing,
on May
the wife s t a t e d that the sole
she w a n t e d a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n an a b s o l u t e
3
5,
reason
divorce
2091038
was b e c a u s e she w a n t e d t o keep h e r h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e
under
the
plan
provided
separation.
August
did
husband's
employer.
The
a divorce
and n o t a
legal
The h u s b a n d a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t , due t o t h e w i f e ' s
2005 l i v e r
medication
the
t h a t he w a n t e d
husband m a i n t a i n e d
by
transplant,
the wife
had
to take
liver.
The w i f e
the husband's e m p l o y e r - p r o v i d e d h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e
$5,000 and $6,000 a month on h e r b e h a l f
and
that
r e s t of her l i f e .
she w o u l d n e e d
stated
paid
between
that
medication
f o r the
The w i f e s t a t e d t h a t she h a d r e s e a r c h e d
h i s t o r y , and
health-insurance
she
plan
testified
that
she
that
f o r her p r e s c r i p t i o n
approximate cost of o b t a i n i n g h e a l t h insurance
medical
certain
f o r t h e r e s t o f h e r l i f e t o make s u r e t h a t h e r body
not r e j e c t the t r a n s p l a n t e d
medication
coverage
that
c o n s i d e r i n g her
the lowest
qualified
the
monthly
f o r cost
$600
a
month.
The
w i f e , who
was
36 y e a r s
o l d at that
time,
testified
t h a t she h a d a c o l l e g e d e g r e e i n c o m p u t e r - i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m s
and
that,
computer
$35,000
before
the p a r t i e s married,
programmer
a year,
until
f o r two
years,
she was
laid
she
had
earning
off.
The
worked
as
a
approximately
son was
born
s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , and t h e w i f e d i d n o t r e t u r n t o work a f t e r
4
2091038
g i v i n g b i r t h t o t h e s o n , e x c e p t as a s u b s t i t u t e t e a c h e r
a t the
son's s c h o o l
stated
f o r a c o u p l e o f d a y s i n 2007.
The w i f e
t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h a d n e v e r a s k e d h e r t o go b a c k t o work.
The
h u s b a n d , who was 61 y e a r s
o l d a n d i n good
health,
w o r k e d a s a c o m p t r o l l e r a t V e n t u r a F o o d s , L L C , a n d he " b r o u g h t
home" $4,200 i n income a month.
The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e
h u s b a n d ' s g r o s s m o n t h l y income was a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 6 , 3 0 0 .
husband p a i d
employer.
$300 a month f o r h e a l t h
The
insurance
through h i s
The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t , c o n s i d e r i n g
the state of
t h e economy, he was n o t g u a r a n t e e d a j o b a t V e n t u r a Foods much
longer.
The
son,
husband s t a t e d
that
he w a n t e d j o i n t
b u t he a g r e e d t h a t t h e w i f e s h o u l d
custody of the
have p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l
custody of the son.
The h u s b a n d t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e
his
name a n d h i s f o r m e r ' s
awarded
the marital
wife
residence
name
and t h a t
i n a prior
was i n
he h a d been
divorce
action.
According
t o t h e h u s b a n d , t h e m o n t h l y m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l
residence
was a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 7 0 6 .
h a d been l i v i n g w i t h
h i s mother
The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he
since
the parties
separated
and t h a t h e r home was a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - q u a r t e r o f a m i l e f r o m
5
2091038
the
m a r i t a l residence.
marital
residence,
The h u s b a n d a s k e d t o be a w a r d e d t h e
and t h e w i f e
stated that
she and t h e son
w o u l d have t o move i n w i t h h e r g r a n d m o t h e r a p p r o x i m a t e l y one
h o u r away f r o m t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e
to remain i n the m a r i t a l residence.
i f s h e was n o t p e r m i t t e d
The h u s b a n d a d m i t t e d
the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e
needed r e p a i r s .
the
paid
wife
had never
that
The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t
any h o u s e h o l d
bills
during
the
marriage.
The
for
h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he h a d b e e n p a y i n g $288 a month
the wife's
2006
Toyota
Camry
automobile.
The h u s b a n d
owned o u t r i g h t a 2002 B u i c k L e S a b r e a u t o m o b i l e .
As o f O c t o b e r
2008, t h e h u s b a n d h a d two c e r t i f i c a t e s
t o t a l e d $16,000.
o f d e p o s i t ("CDs") t h a t
O n l y one o f t h e CDs was h e l d j o i n t l y
with
t h e w i f e , a n d he a d m i t t e d t h a t he h a d removed t h e w i f e ' s
name
from
t h e CD.
retirement
The
husband
stated
that
he
had a
401(k)
account t h r o u g h h i s employer and t h a t t h e b a l a n c e
o f t h a t a c c o u n t was $ 6 6 , 0 0 0 .
The
his
h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he p a i d $180 a week i n a l i m o n y t o
former w i f e .
According
b e h i n d on a n y o f h i s b i l l s
t o t h e h u s b a n d , he h a d n o t f a l l e n
since
the p a r t i e s separated.
He
s t a t e d t h a t a l l t h e m a r i t a l d e b t s were i n h i s name a n d t h a t
6
2091038
h i s m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s were a p p r o x i m a t e l y
equal to h i s monthly
income.
On
May
13, 2009,
the t r i a l
court
entered
a "decree
l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n " that found that the requirements
40(a)(1),
( 2 ) , and
o f § 30-2-
( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975, h a d b e e n met.
p a r t i e s were a w a r d e d j o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y
The
o f t h e s o n , and t h e
w i f e was a w a r d e d p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y
t o t h e husband's v i s i t a t i o n s r i g h t s .
of
o f t h e son s u b j e c t
The h u s b a n d was
allowed
v i s i t a t i o n w i t h t h e s o n " a t a l l r e a s o n a b l e t i m e s and p l a c e s as
agreed
t o by t h e p a r t i e s , "
liberal
The
i n establishing
husband
was
ordered
son,
noncovered medical
" d i r e c t e d t o be
v i s i t a t i o n f o r the [husband]
f o r the
insurance
and t h e w i f e was
to
continue
and
he
was
to
provide
required
e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d on b e h a l f
to
"
health
pay a l l
of the son.
The h u s b a n d was o r d e r e d t o c o n t i n u e t o p a y $164 a week t o t h e
w i f e as c h i l d
The
wife
possession
ordered
support.
was
of
t o pay
awarded
the m a r i t a l
e x c l u s i v e and
residence,
the mortgage,
marital residence.
taxes,
The h u s b a n d was
temporary use
and
and
the
husband
insurance
on
and
was
the
a l s o r e q u i r e d t o pay f o r
a new r o o f f o r t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e and t o p a y f o r r e p a i r s t o
7
2091038
the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e
c a u s e d by
w a t e r damage.
The
pay
t h e m o n t h l y c a r payment on
insurance.
The
The
husband
furniture,
marital
h u s b a n d was
was
appliances,
residence,
household
goods,
residence.
The
pay
the
to
the w i f e ' s
a w a r d e d h i s 2002 B u i c k
awarded
and
and
Camry and
was
ordered
a w a r d e d h e r 2006 T o y o t a Camry, and t h e h u s b a n d was
wife
approximately
LeSabre.
19
items
of
from
the
other personal property
the
wife
f u r n i s h i n g s and
was
awarded
appliances
car
a l l the
i n the
other
marital
t r i a l c o u r t ordered the p a r t i e s to continue
a l l household
bills
as
pendency of the p r o c e e d i n g s .
they
had
been
paid
during
F i n a l l y , the t r i a l c o u r t ' s
to
the
legal-
s e p a r a t i o n judgment s t a t e d :
" T h i s m a t t e r s h a l l be r e v i e w e d i n one y e a r upon
the motion of e i t h e r p a r t y f o r the purpose of
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e employment s t a t u s o f t h e [ w i f e ] and
h e r h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n . The [ c ] o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e
[ w i f e ] i s w e l l e d u c a t e d and a b l e t o s u s t a i n g a i n f u l
employment. The [ w i f e ] s h a l l a c t i v e l y p u r s u e g a i n f u l
employment i m m e d i a t e l y and t h e [ w i f e ' ] s a t t o r n e y i s
o r d e r e d t o make a q u a r t e r l y r e p o r t i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e
same f o r t h e [ c ] o u r t ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . "
The
trial
judgment pursuant
filed
Ala.
court
certified
to Rule
the
5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R.
a postjudgment motion pursuant
R.
C i v . P.,
w h i c h was
judgment
to Rule
subsequently
8
C i v . P.
as
The
59(a)
denied.
The
a
final
husband
and
(e),
husband
2091038
did
not appeal
the l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment.
Approximately
husband
filed
one
a
year
"Motion
later,
f o r Review
S e p a r a t i o n , " and he r e q u e s t e d
an
absolute
divorce
from
on
May
of
that the t r i a l
the wife
because,
10,
2010,
Entry
of
the
Legal
court grant
him
he a l l e g e d , t h e
w i f e h a d o b t a i n e d employment and he h a d l o s t h i s j o b and h i s
a b i l i t y to maintain the w i f e ' s h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e coverage.
husband
requested
that
support
obligation
and t h e d i v i s i o n
debts,
and he r e q u e s t e d
responsible
the t r i a l
that
court
his
child-
of m a r i t a l property
the t r i a l
f o r her household
modify
The
and
c o u r t make t h e w i f e
bills.
The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d an o r e t e n u s h e a r i n g on May 26,
2010.
The w i f e
stated that
A u g u s t 2009 a t a company
she h a d o b t a i n e d
c a l l e d I B E C i n Hokes B l u f f
$10 an h o u r , o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y
introduced evidence
approximately
month.
1
She
employment i n
$707 e v e r y
indicating
two weeks. The w i f e
that her gross
wages
$948 e v e r y two weeks, o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y
s t a t e d t h a t she h a d s e a r c h e d
earning
f o r more
totaled
$2,054 a
lucrative
We
calculated
the wife's
monthly gross
income by
m u l t i p l y i n g h e r g r o s s b i w e e k l y i n c o m e ($948) by t h e number o f
p a y p e r i o d s i n 1 y e a r (26) a n d d i v i d i n g t h a t number ($24,648)
by 12.
1
9
2091038
employment b u t
did
not
provided
t h a t most o f t h e e m p l o y e r s t h a t she
provide
health
insurance.
health-insurance
The
coverage, w i t h
p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , f o r $200 a m o n t h .
health-insurance
The
were
wife
coverage f o r the
stated
approximately
health-insurance
approximately
had
t o pay
would
be
that
$2,000
cost
of the
reimbursed
The
i n savings
b u t t h a t she
t o pay
The
a
wife
by
no
restrictions
that
her
The
wife
again
absolute divorce.
w i t h h i s m o t h e r and
The
up
had
employer's
f r o n t and
that
or
she
she
health-insurance
approximately
$6,000
needed a s s i s t a n c e from the husband i n
asked
the
trial
court
h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he was
t h a t he w a n t e d t i t l e
the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e .
costs
stated that
the monthly uncovered c o s t of her
husband
included
o n l y 80% o f t h a t c o s t ,
employer's
s t a t e d t h a t she
on
son.
medication
her
found
employer
That c o s t
2
month b u t
$1,600, e a c h month.
the
wife's
prescription-medication
p r o v i d e r would pay
provider.
order
her
had
The
medication.
to
enter
still
an
living
t o and p o s s e s s i o n
of
husband a l s o asked t h a t the w i f e
be
Apparently,
the
wife's
employer's
health-insurance
p r o v i d e r n o t i f i e d h e r t h e week b e f o r e t r i a l t h a t t h e r e w o u l d
no l o n g e r be any r e s t r i c t i o n s on h e r c o v e r a g e , w h i c h s u g g e s t s
t h a t , f r o m A u g u s t 2009 u n t i l s h o r t l y b e f o r e t r i a l i n May
2010,
t h e r e were some r e s t r i c t i o n s .
2
10
2091038
responsible
f o r p a y i n g h e r own m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s .
The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he h a d been d i s c h a r g e d f r o m h i s
job
at
Ventura
performance.
Foods
on
March
9,
2010,
f o r lack
of
The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t h i s e m p l o y e r h a d w a n t e d
h i m t o s p e n d more t i m e a t h i s j o b e v e n t h o u g h , t h e h u s b a n d
stated,
he was
already
s p e n d i n g 12 h o u r s
a d a y a t work,
i n c l u d i n g h i s commute, w h i c h was a b o u t 1 h o u r e a c h way.
husband
received
$25, 200,
four
months
of salary,
or
The
approximately
i n s e v e r a n c e p a y f r o m h i s e m p l o y e r i n A p r i l 2010.
The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t h i s m o t h e r d i d n o t c h a r g e h i m a n y t h i n g
for
rent or u t i l i t i e s .
The
husband
stated
f i n d i n g o t h e r employment
that
he h a d n o t been
successful at
a n d t h a t he d i d n o t e x p e c t t o be a b l e
t o f i n d employment
t h a t was commensurate
i n pay w i t h h i s j o b
at V e n t u r a Foods.
The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he h a d m a i n t a i n e d
h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e f o r t h e w i f e a n d t h e s o n t h r o u g h COBRA, w h i c h
cost
$503
a month.
The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he was e l i g i b l e
f o r COBRA h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e f o r 18 months f r o m t h e d a t e he l o s t
his
job.
support
mother's
The h u s b a n d r e q u e s t e d a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f h i s c h i l d obligation
having
based
obtained
on t h e l o s s
a j o b since
11
o f h i s j o b and the
the last
judgment
was
2091038
entered.
The
husband
stated
that
he
could
begin
drawing
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1,600 a month i n S o c i a l S e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s
that,
i f he
waited
until
he
was
66
y e a r s o l d , he
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $2,300 a month.
The
approximately
401(k)
individual
$100,000
retirement
in
a
The
that
he
could
not
w o u l d have no way
was
no
afford
to
monthly
funds
approximately
The
$11,000
deplete
2010
husband
from
in
an
relying
accounts for h i s retirement
those
two
t r i a l t h a t the
he
There
husband
had
accounts to cover
his
stated
CDs
and
funds because
upon r e t i r e m e n t .
from h i s r e t i r e m e n t
expenses.
$6,400
had
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $3,000 i n a
to support himself
i n d i c a t i o n a t t h e May
removed any
account,
h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he was
on t h e f u n d s i n h i s r e t i r e m e n t
draw
h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he
a c c o u n t , and
money-market a c c o u n t .
could
but
that
to
he
repair
had
the
spent
marital
residence.
The
w i f e , who
thought that
residence
she
was
38 y e a r s o l d i n May
c o u l d pay
the
utility
2010,
bills
t h a t t h e h u s b a n d had b e e n p a y i n g b u t
n o t a l s o pay
said that
at the
stated that there
were 13 payments r e m a i n i n g on h e r
12
marital
t h a t she
t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e .
she
could
The
wife
car
loan
2091038
and t h a t i t w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t
and t h e u t i l i t y
p a i d between
wife.
payments.
f o r h e r t o make t h e c a r payment
The h u s b a n d e s t i m a t e d
$700 a n d $800 a month i n u t i l i t y
The h u s b a n d ' s o t h e r
t h a t he h a d
bills
f o r the
monthly expenses i n c l u d e d
month f o r t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e ,
$711 a
$780 month i n
a l i m o n y t o h i s f o r m e r w i f e , $711 a month i n c h i l d s u p p o r t , a n d
$288 a month f o r t h e w i f e ' s
The
had
husband s t a t e d
been
caring
weekday
5:00 p.m.
said that
that,
b e c a u s e he was u n e m p l o y e d , he
f o r t h e son before
and t h a t
between
vehicle.
the wife
picked
a n d 6:00 p.m.
and a f t e r
school
up t h e s o n f r o m h i s home
e a c h weekday.
The h u s b a n d
t h e s o n o c c a s i o n a l l y d i d n o t come t o v i s i t
weekends.
The w i f e
stated
that
h u s b a n d h a d weekend
visitation
son
i t . The w i f e
was " o k a y " w i t h
t h e husband,
understanding that
discretion.
trial
court
the w i f e
and
she
with
also
s e t up a s p e c i f i c
i fthe
t h e son, so l o n g
stated that
stated
as t h e
she u n d e r s t o o d
that
t h e husband's v i s i t a t i o n
She s t a t e d t h a t
h i m on
she d i d n o t m i n d
t h a t i t was h e r j o b t o make s u r e t h e s o n a t t e n d e d
with
each
visitation
i t was h e r
was l e f t
to her
i t would not bother her i f the
visitation
schedule.
s t a t e d t h a t she t h o u g h t i t was f a i r
13
However,
t o l e t h e r have
2091038
weekends w i t h t h e s o n b e c a u s e t h e h u s b a n d w o u l d be c a r i n g f o r
t h e c h i l d d u r i n g t h e d a y e a c h weekday w h i l e t h e c h i l d was n o t
in
school.
The
h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t have a w i l l
and t h a t
he h a d made no o t h e r p r o v i s i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e e d u c a t i o n o f
the son.
On J u n e 22, 2010, t h e t r i a l
the
husband's r e q u e s t
The
trial
court
court entered
f o r a review
a j u d g m e n t on
of the legal
separation.
found t h a t the w i f e had o b t a i n e d
employment
and h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e s i n c e t h e l a s t h e a r i n g b u t t h a t ,
unlike
t h e husband's
health-insurance
coverage,
the wife's
h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i d e r covered only 80% o f the monthly cost
o f t h e w i f e ' s m e d i c a t i o n ; t h a t t h e husband had been d i s c h a r g e d
from h i s j o b a t V e n t u r a
F o o d s a n d t h a t he h a d b e e n p a y i n g t o
m a i n t a i n h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e coverage f o r h i m s e l f , t h e w i f e , and
the
son
retirement
through
COBRA;
accounts
that,
considering
and h i s e l i g i b i l i t y
the
to begin
S o c i a l S e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s , t h e husband had s u f f i c i e n t
continue t o pay c h i l d support
husband's
drawing
assets to
a n d t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l
r e s i d e n c e ; a n d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h a d no w i l l
made "no p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e e d u c a t i o n
14
a n d t h a t he h a d
o f t h e s o n . " B a s e d on
2091038
those
findings
modifications
of fact,
the t r i a l
t o t h e May
2009
w i t h o u t e n t e r i n g an a b s o l u t e
court
made t h e f o l l o w i n g
legal-separation
judgment,
divorce:
" A . The [ w i f e ] , b e g i n n i n g i n J u l y , 2010 s h a l l be
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l u t i l i t y payments a t t h e m a r i t a l
home. The [ w i f e ] s h a l l a l s o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e
i n s u r a n c e on h e r a u t o m o b i l e .
" B . The [ h u s b a n d ] i s o r d e r e d t o p l a c e $10,000.00
t h a t i s i n h i s 401-K p l a n i n a money m a r k e t a c c o u n t
t h a t s h a l l be i n t h e name o f t h e . . . s o n t o be u s e d
f o r h i s c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n . The [ w i f e ] s h a l l a c t as
the t r u s t e e o f s a i d m o n i e s .
" C . The [ h u s b a n d ] i s t o have a d e e d p r e p a r e d a n d
d e l i v e r e d t o [ h i s former] wife that t r a n s f e r s her
i n t e r e s t i n the m a r i t a l residence to the [husband].
"D. A l l o t h e r t e r m s a n d p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e l e g a l
s e p a r a t i o n s h a l l remain i n e f f e c t . "
The
trial
husband
court
subsequently
to this
appealed
the decision
of the
for this
court's
court.
Issues
The
husband
consideration:
presents
five
issues
(1) w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l
t o g r a n t h i s r e q u e s t f o r an a b s o l u t e
court
erred i n refusing
divorce;
(2) w h e t h e r t h e
t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by i n e q u i t a b l y d i v i d i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s e t s ,
debts,
and m a r i t a l expenses
i n the June
2010 j u d g m e n t ; (3)
whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by r e f u s i n g t o modify h i s
15
child-
2091038
support
obligation;
r e q u i r i n g him
trust
court
to place
f o r the
trial
(4)
son's
erred
whether
the
trial
court
erred
by
$10,000 f r o m h i s 4 0 1 ( k ) a c c o u n t i n a
c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n ; and
i n refusing to
set
(5)
whether
a specific
the
visitation
schedule.
Standard
The
trial
court
entered
of Review
i t s judgment a f t e r
t e n u s e v i d e n c e . "When a t r i a l
hearing
ore
c o u r t 'makes f i n d i n g s o f
fact
b a s e d on e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d o r e t e n u s , an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t
will
presume
that
the
trial
court's
judgment
based
on
those
f i n d i n g s i s c o r r e c t , and i t w i l l r e v e r s e t h a t j u d g m e n t o n l y i f
it
837
i s f o u n d t o be p l a i n l y and p a l p a b l y w r o n g . ' " C.P.
So.
Byars,
2d
794
860,
So.
864
( A l a . C i v . App.
2d 345,
347
(Ala.
2002)
v.
W.M.,
( q u o t i n g Ex
parte
2001)).
Discussion
First,
the husband argues t h a t the t r i a l
court erred i n
e n t e r i n g a j u d g m e n t o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n i n s t e a d o f an
divorce.
wife
had
o b t a i n e d employment and h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e by t h e
time
o f t h e May
his
The
2010
husband
contends
that
because
h e a r i n g , and b e c a u s e he had
the
absolute
lost his job
and
a b i l i t y to m a i n t a i n h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e coverage f o r the w i f e
16
2091038
beyond
what
COBRA
justification
would
allow,
there
was
no
longer
f o r a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n an
any
absolute
divorce.
" L e g a l s e p a r a t i o n s i n A l a b a m a a r e g o v e r n e d by §
30-2-40, A l a . Code 1975. T h a t s e c t i o n o f t h e A l a b a m a
Code was a d o p t e d by t h e A l a b a m a L e g i s l a t u r e w i t h an
e f f e c t i v e d a t e o f J a n u a r y 1, 1999. P u r s u a n t t o t h a t
statute,
a
legal
separation
is
a
'court
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f
a h u s b a n d and w i f e a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e m a r i t a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p , ' and a ' l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n d o e s n o t
t e r m i n a t e t h e m a r i t a l s t a t u s o f t h e p a r t i e s . ' See §
3 0 - 2 - 4 0 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975."
D.L.J. v. B . R . J . , 887
Before
January
mensa e t t h o r o ,
w h i c h was
So.
1,
2d 242,
1999,
246
( A l a . C i v . App.
Alabama r e c o g n i z e d
a l s o known as a d i v o r c e
C i v . App.
and
1985)
board,
continue
is a
legal
separation
court considered
a mensa
whether
the t r i a l
this
and
So.
a
board,
separation.
2d 974,
976 ( A l a .
( " D i v o r c e a mensa e t t h o r o , a d i v o r c e f r o m b e d
divorce
legal
from bed
allowing
the
marriage
as t o e v e r y t h i n g n o t w i t h d r a w n by t h e d e c r e e . " ) .
D . L . J ., t h i s
of
a divorce
t h e common-law p r e d e c e s s o r t o a l e g a l
I d . See a l s o Drummond v. Drummond, 466
2003).
et
thoro
under
In
Alabama p r e c e d e n t c o n c e r n i n g a
i n deciding,
c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n
separation
to
i n the a f f i r m a t i v e ,
to modify
§ 30-2-40. I d . a t 247.
judgments
However,
c o u r t r e j e c t e d t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t § 30-2-40 c o d i f i e d a l l
17
2091038
preexisting
thoro.
common l a w t h a t r e l a t e d
to a divorce
a mensa e t
I d . a t 248.
B e f o r e t h e e n a c t m e n t o f § 30-2-40, w h i c h became e f f e c t i v e
on
January
1, 1999, t h i s
court
c o u r t has b e f o r e i t a r e q u e s t
and
a divorce
from
had h e l d
" t h a t when a
trial
f o r a d i v o r c e from bed and b o a r d
t h e bonds
o f matrimony,
the court
can
e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n and d e t e r m i n e w h i c h type o f d i v o r c e i s
b e s t f o r the p a r t i e s under the f a c t s o f t h e i r case."
466
So.
provides
legal
2d
at
976.
Section
30-2-40(c),
that " [ i ] f a party f i l e s
separation
rather
than
a
A l a . Code
a complaint
decree
of
dissolution
t h e c o u r t may g r a n t t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n . "
added.)
Accordingly,
of §
1975,
f o r a decree of
marriage,
the enactment
Drummond,
of
(Emphasis
30-2-40(c)
is a
c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e common-law r u l e t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n w h e t h e r
t o g r a n t a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n o r an a b s o l u t e d i v o r c e l i e s w i t h i n
the
sound d i s c r e t i o n
of the t r i a l
not r e v e r s e a p a r t of a t r i a l
its
discretion
unless
court.
i t i s shown
i t s discretion
or that
palpably
wrong."
v . A.V.F.,
2011]
So. 3d
,
will
c o u r t ' s judgment t h a t i s l e f t t o
exceeded
B.R.F.
"[T]his court
that
the
t h e judgment
trial
court
i s p l a i n l y or
[Ms. 2090872,
March
4,
( A l a . C i v . App. 2011) ( c i t i n g Romano
18
2091038
v. Romano, 703 So. 2d 374, 375 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 7 ) ) .
The
husband
argues
basis
f o r continuing
could
elect
that
the t r i a l
the l e g a l
t o continue
court
separation
health-insurance
h a d no
because
legal
the wife
coverage
through
COBRA w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s were d i v o r c e d o r o p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e
l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n . S e e , g e n e r a l l y , 29 U.S.C. § 1162 a n d § 1163.
I t was u n d i s p u t e d
to
the t r i a l
separated,
t h a t , u n d e r t h e f a c t s as t h e y were
presented
c o u r t , even i f t h e p a r t i e s remained o n l y
the wife's
(and t h e husband's)
legally
health-insurance
c o v e r a g e t h r o u g h COBRA w o u l d e n d 18 months a f t e r t h e h u s b a n d ' s
employment w i t h V e n t u r a Foods was
At t r i a l
terminated.
3
i n May 2009, t h e w i f e u n e q u i v o c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t
t h e o n l y r e a s o n s h e d e s i r e d a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n was i n o r d e r t o
maintain
and
health insurance.
d i d n o t have
employer.
At t r i a l
access
A t t h a t t i m e s h e was u n e m p l o y e d
to health
insurance
i n May 2 0 1 0 , t h e w i f e
through
an
d i d not i n d i c a t e
I t i s possible that, i f the p a r t i e s divorced, the wife
w o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o an a d d i t i o n a l 18 months o f COBRA
c o v e r a g e . See 29 U.S.C. § 1 1 6 2 ( 2 ) ( A ) ( i i ) ( s p e c i a l r u l e f o r
multiple qualifying events).
However, b e c a u s e n e i t h e r p a r t y
p r e s e n t e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h t h i s a r g u m e n t , we w i l l n o t
c o n s i d e r i t i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t exceeded
i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y f a i l i n g t o g r a n t t h e h u s b a n d an a b s o l u t e
divorce.
3
19
2091038
t h a t she t h o u g h t a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n
only
stated
employer's
assistance
her
that,
i f she
was
health-insurance
was s t i l l
required
n e c e s s a r y ; she
to
coverage,
utilize
would
she
her
need
from t h e husband i n f i n a n c i n g t h e monthly c o s t o f
medication.
The w i f e
s t a t e d t h a t s h e h a d enough
savings
so t h a t s h e d i d n o t n e e d t h e h u s b a n d t o p a y t h e u p - f r o n t
cost
of
some
$2, 000
a
month
f o r her medication.
i n d i c a t i o n d u r i n g t h e May 2010 t r i a l
There
was
that the p a r t i e s thought
t h a t i t w o u l d be more e c o n o m i c a l f o r t h e h u s b a n d t o c o n t i n u e
to pay h e a l t h
insurance
than pay f o r s i n g l e
also
pay t h e w i f e ' s
f o r t h e f a m i l y t h r o u g h COBRA
coverage
f o r himself
$400-a-month
through
medication
COBRA a n d
expense.
understand t h a t such reasoning
may have b e e n t h e t r i a l
justification
the legal
there
f o r continuing
separation;
We
court's
however,
i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t -- t h e h u s b a n d ' s
p a y i n g f o r f a m i l y c o v e r a g e t h r o u g h COBRA w h i l e
was
rather
a v a i l a b l e -- c o u l d n o t have b e e n u t i l i z e d
were d i v o r c e d
Based
husband
longer
on
that,
r a t h e r than o p e r a t i n g
the evidence
a t the time
that
i f the parties
under a l e g a l
presented,
we
coverage
separation.
agree
o f t h e May 2010 t r i a l ,
with
there
the
no
e x i s t e d any b a s i s t o s u p p o r t t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n and
20
2091038
that
the t r i a l
enter
a
court
judgment
Accordingly,
we
e n t e r an a b s o l u t e
with
e x c e e d e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n by
d i s s o l v i n g the marriage
reverse
t h e judgment
of
insofar
failing
to
the p a r t i e s .
i t failed
to
j u d g m e n t o f d i v o r c e , a n d we remand t h e c a u s e
instructions to
the
trial
court
to
enter
a
judgment
court
erred i n
d i v o r c i n g the p a r t i e s .
The
husband
also
argues that
the t r i a l
d i v i d i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s e t s , d e b t s , and m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s i n
t h e June 2010 j u d g m e n t .
in
light
of the f a c t
We p r e t e r m i t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s
that
we
are reversing
t h e June
issue
2010
judgment c o n t i n u i n g t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o
the
trial
court
to
enter
a
final
judgment
of
divorce.
P u r s u a n t t o § 3 0 - 2 - 4 0 ( d ) , A l a . Code 1975, n e i t h e r t h e
c o u r t n o r t h e p a r t i e s a r e "bound b y
legal separation
trial
[] t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e
r e l a t i n g t o alimony or a property
settlement
upon a f i n a l d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e m a r r i a g e . " See a l s o D.L.J. v.
B . R . J . , 887 So. 2d a t 248.
Accordingly,
on remand, t h e t r i a l
court i s free to exercise i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n c r a f t i n g a divorce
judgment t h a t e q u i t a b l y d i v i d e s t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e .
The
failing
husband
also
argues t h a t
the t r i a l
to modify h i s child-support
21
court
erred i n
o b l i g a t i o n b a s e d on t h e
2091038
e v i d e n c e o f t h e change i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i n c e t h e e n t r y o f t h e
May
2009
that,
the
legal-separation
judgment.
i n l i g h t of the wife's
increased
cost
contends
m o n t h l y g r o s s income o f $2,054,
of health
job, h i s child-support
The h u s b a n d
insurance,
and t h e l o s s o f h i s
o b l i g a t i o n was due t o be
modified.
"An a w a r d o f c h i l d s u p p o r t may be m o d i f i e d o n l y
upon p r o o f o f a m a t e r i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s
t h a t i s s u b s t a n t i a l and c o n t i n u i n g . Browning v.
B r o w n i n g , 626 So. 2d 649 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 3 ) . The
parent seeking the m o d i f i c a t i o n bears the burden o f
p r o o f . Cunningham v . Cunningham, 641 So. 2d 807
(Ala.
C i v . App.
1994).
Whether
circumstances
j u s t i f y i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n of support e x i s t i s a matter
w i t h i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . I d . We w i l l n o t
d i s t u r b t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on a p p e a l u n l e s s
there i s a showing t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused t h a t
d i s c r e t i o n o r t h a t t h e judgment i s p l a i n l y and
p a l p a b l y w r o n g . I d . ; D o u g l a s s v . D o u g l a s s , 669 So.
2d 928, 930 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 5 ) . "
Romano v. Romano, 703 So. 2d 374, 375 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 7 ) .
Concerning
child
support,
the t r i a l
court's
judgment
stated:
"The
[husband]
testified
that
he
has
some
$100,000.00 t o $120,000.00 i n a 401-K a c c o u n t , a l o n g
w i t h a p o r t i o n o f t h e s e v e r a n c e p a c k a g e o f some
$28,000.00 t h a t was p a i d t o h i m i n A p r i l o f t h i s
y e a r . He i s a l s o e l i g i b l e t o b e g i n d r a w i n g some
$1,600.00 p e r month i n S o c i a l S e c u r i t y
pension
b e n e f i t s . The [husband] h a s s u f f i c i e n t a s s e t s t o
continue t o pay c h i l d support
"
The
husband,
citing
Rule
22
32(B)(1)
and
( 2 ) ( a ) , A l a . R.
2091038
Jud. Admin., argues t h a t the t r i a l
c o u r t e r r e d by
considering
his
i n savings
determining
retirement
moneys s t i l l
held
t h a t h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n was
The
n o t due
in
t o be
modified.
a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s i n R u l e 32 i s
f o u n d e d on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
their
assets.
See
Rule
of the p a r e n t s '
32(B)(1)
g r o s s income,
(defining
"income"
p u r p o s e s o f t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s as t h e " a c t u a l
income
of
definition
a
parent
of "gross
").
Rule
i n c o m e , " as
32(B)(2)
provides
not
for
gross
the
follows:
"(a)
'Gross i n c o m e ' i n c l u d e s income f r o m any
source,
and
i n c l u d e s , but
i s not
limited
to,
s a l a r i e s , wages, c o m m i s s i o n s , b o n u s e s , d i v i d e n d s ,
s e v e r a n c e pay,
pensions,
i n t e r e s t , t r u s t income,
annuities, c a p i t a l gains, S o c i a l Security benefits,
w o r k e r s '
c o m p e n s a t i o n
b e n e f i t s ,
u n e m p l o y m e n t - i n s u r a n c e
b e n e f i t s ,
d i s a b i l i t y - i n s u r a n c e b e n e f i t s , g i f t s , p r i z e s , and
p r e e x i s t i n g p e r i o d i c alimony.
"(b)
'Gross i n c o m e ' does n o t
include
child
support r e c e i v e d f o r o t h e r c h i l d r e n or b e n e f i t s
received
from
means-tested
public-assistance
programs, i n c l u d i n g , but not l i m i t e d t o , Temporary
A s s i s t a n c e f o r Needy F a m i l i e s , S u p p l e m e n t a l S e c u r i t y
Income, f o o d s t a m p s , and g e n e r a l a s s i s t a n c e . "
In the present
of
trial
that
the
c a s e , t h e r e was
husband
was
no
i n d i c a t i o n at the
drawing
a c c o u n t s as a f o r m o f income o r t h a t t h e
and
was
planning
t o use
his retirement
23
on
his
retirement
h u s b a n d was
a c c o u n t s as
time
retired
his
sole
2091038
s o u r c e o f income
f o r h i s own
support.
To t h e c o n t r a r y ,
the
r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h a d l o s t h i s j o b a n d t h a t he
was
searching
for
employment.
Under
these
particular
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , we a g r e e w i t h t h e h u s b a n d t h a t t h e t r i a l
e r r e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e money i n h i s r e t i r e m e n t
court
accounts i n
d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n was n o t due t o
be
modified.
We
4
further
agree
with
the
that
i n the t r i a l
the w i f e ' s
i n c r e a s e d g r o s s income o r t h e h u s b a n d ' s
costs,
see
judgment t h a t
there
indication
health-insurance
court's
husband
Rule
32(C)(2),
is
no
i t considered
increased
A l a . R.
Jud.
Admin., i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e h u s b a n d ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n .
Accordingly,
we
judgment t h a t
obligation,
reverse
refused
and we
that
part
of
the
t o m o d i f y t h e husband's
trial
court's
child-support
remand t h e c a u s e t o t h e t r i a l
court f o r
c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n p u r s u a n t
to Rule
32.
5
We n o t e t h a t t h e r e was no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s
judgment t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n t e n d e d t o d e v i a t e from the
a p p l i c a t i o n of the c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s pursuant to Rule
3 2 ( A ) ( i i ) , A l a . R. J u d . Admin.
4
We
deviate
5
note t h a t the t r i a l court, i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n ,
may
f r o m t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e R u l e 32 c h i l d - s u p p o r t
24
2091038
The
husband a l s o argues t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t exceeded i t s
d i s c r e t i o n by
r e q u i r i n g him
account
in
trust
husband
argues
a
classified
that
only
as
support pursuant
1 9 8 9 ) , and
of
the
the
this
an
t o Ex
t h a t an
on b e h a l f o f t h e
light
for
to place
college
part
award
parte
of
of
the
Bayliss,
that
award of p o s t m i n o r i t y
son was
there
was
judgment
550
So.
2d
986
educational
evidence
support.
to
We
not
have
a
that
(Ala.
support
he
had
not
husband
otherwise
made
p r o v i s i o n f o r the c o l l e g e education
o f the son. A l t h o u g h
court
may
obtain
has
held
life
that
insurance
a
trial
to
court
insure
s u p p o r t e d i n the event of the
J o r d a n v.
the
trial
Jordan,
688
court
went
So.
2d
that
require
a minor
supporting
839,
further
and
842
an
agree.
c o u r t , i n i t s judgment, found t h a t the
and
be
support
trial
will
can
educational
The
did
The
premature, e s p e c i a l l y i n
no
educational
401(k)
education.
postminority
award of p o s t m i n o r i t y
10-year-old
fact
son's
$10,000 f r o m h i s
a parent
child
parent's
will
death,
( A l a . C i v . App.
specifically
this
to
be
see
1997),
ordered
the
g u i d e l i n e s i f i t concludes t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n of the g u i d e l i n e s
w o u l d be u n j u s t o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e . See R u l e 3 2 ( A ) ( i i ) , A l a . R.
J u d . Admin. ( s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r d e v i a t i n g f r o m
the c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s ) .
25
2091038
husband t o p l a c e
$10,000 i n t r u s t f o r t h e c h i l d f o r h i s f u t u r e
college education.
That p a r t
6
husband t o s e t a s i d e
$10,000
o f t h e judgment r e q u i r i n g t h e
f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e son can
u n d o u b t e d l y be l a b e l e d as " s u p p o r t " f o r t h e s o n .
However,
have
involve
held
that
"[c]hild
support
determinations
we
the
p a r e n t ' s p r e s e n t a b i l i t y t o meet t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t needs and
are
not subject
need." B u t t s
1992)
to speculation
v. B u t t s ,
( c i t i n g Morrison
App.
regarding
future
600 So. 2d 1038, 1041
a b i l i t y or
( A l a . C i v . App.
v. K i r k l a n d , 567 So. 2d 363
(Ala. Civ.
1990)).
I n B u t t s , we h e l d t h a t an a w a r d o f a d e f i n i t e
postminority
children
educational
[we]re
not
evidence presented
yet
support
of
regarding
was
college
premature
age
and
o r t h e w i f e . " 600 So. 2d a t 1042
So.
2d 839,
841
when
there
the a n t i c i p a t e d future
e x p e n s e s o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 'undue h a r d s h i p '
574
amount o f
1990)).
was
no
college
on t h e h u s b a n d
( c i t i n g T h r a s h e r v.
( A l a . C i v . App.
"the
Wilburn,
Similarly,
in
I f t h e j u d g m e n t had r e q u i r e d t h e h u s b a n d t o s e t a s i d e
money as a g u a r a n t y t h a t t h e c h i l d w o u l d be s u p p o r t e d i n t h e
e v e n t o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s d e a t h , t h i s c o u r t may have d e c i d e d t h e
issue d i f f e r e n t l y .
B u t , b e c a u s e t h e money was s p e c i f i c a l l y
d e s i g n a t e d f o r t h e s o n ' s c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n , we must c o n c l u d e
t h a t s u c h an a w a r d i s an a w a r d o f p o s t m i n o r i t y
educational
support.
6
26
2091038
M a r t i n v. M a r t i n ,
624 So. 2d 192, 193 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 3 ) ,
t h i s court reversed
postminority
an o r d e r
educational
r e q u i r i n g t h e husband t o pay t h e
expenses o f h i s three
were ages 11, 13, a n d 16 a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l ,
children,
who
when
"[a] r e v i e w o f t h e t e s t i m o n y
reveal[ed]
t h a t no
e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d
regarding the a n t i c i p a t e d
e x p e n s e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h a c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n f o r any
o f t h e c h i l d r e n , o r w h e t h e r t h e h u s b a n d w o u l d be
a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c o s t o f s u c h an e d u c a t i o n
when e a c h c h i l d
was r e a d y t o a t t e n d
college.
F u r t h e r , t h e r e c o r d [wa]s d e v o i d o f any e v i d e n c e o f
the c h i l d r e n ' s grades or t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o a t t e n d
college."
As
record
award
we
d i d i n Butts
i s devoid
of
o f any e v i d e n c e
postminority
Accordingly,
that
husband t o "place
and M a r t i n ,
part
educational
we
conclude
sufficient
to support
support
o f t h e judgment
that the
at
that
this
an
time.
required
$10,000.00 t h a t i s i n h i s 401-K p l a n
the
in a
money m a r k e t a c c o u n t ... i n t h e name o f t h e ... s o n t o be u s e d
for
h i s college education"
trial
court
i s instructed
i s reversed,
to vacate
a n d , on remand, t h e
that
portion
ofi t s
judgment.
Finally,
in
failing
behalf.
t h e husband contends t h a t t h e t r i a l
to set a
specific
visitation
court
schedule
erred
on h i s
The May 2009 l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n j u d g m e n t s e t f o r t h t h e
27
2091038
visitation
parameters
[husband]
shall
reasonable
times
In
f o r the
as
visitation
have
husband
with
the
and p l a c e s
P r a t t v. P r a t t ,
follows:
"The
[son] a t
a l l
as a g r e e d b y t h e p a r t i e s . "
56 So. 3d 638, 644
( A l a . C i v . App.
2 0 1 0 ) , t h i s c o u r t h e l d t h a t " [ t ] h e p r o p r i e t y o f [a v i s i t a t i o n ]
judgment
depends
sufficient,
on w h e t h e r
specified
the noncustodial
visitation
schedule
independent o f the c u s t o d i a l parent's
noted
that
"[t]his
court
...
parent
to
rely
discretion."
has
has a
affirmed
upon,
We
also
awards
of
unspecified visitation
b a s e d on t h e a g r e e m e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s
when
also
the t r i a l
disagreement,
court
'standard
provides
visitation'
v i s i t a t i o n w o u l d be i m p o s e d . " I d .
that,
i n the event
o r some o t h e r
Although
of
specified
the t r i a l
court's
j u d g m e n t a l s o d i r e c t e d t h e w i f e t o be l i b e r a l i n e s t a b l i s h i n g
visitation
with
erroneously
visitation
t h e h u s b a n d , we a g r e e
failed
to provide
f o r some
a specific
the t r i a l
form
of
court
specific
f o r t h e husband i n t h e event t h e p a r t i e s c o u l d n o t
a g r e e on t h e h u s b a n d ' s v i s i t a t i o n .
the t r i a l
that
Accordingly,
we
reverse
c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t f a i l e d t o s e t f o r t h
visitation
schedule
f o r t h e h u s b a n d , a n d we remand
the cause w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e t r i a l
28
court to set forth a
2091038
"sufficient,
to
s p e c i f i e d v i s i t a t i o n schedule
r e l y upon, i n d e p e n d e n t
[ f o r t h e husband]
of the [wife]'s d i s c r e t i o n . " I d .
Conclusion
The
cause
judgment
i s remanded
of the t r i a l
court
f o r proceedings
i s r e v e r s e d , and t h e
consistent
with
this
opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thompson,
concur.
P . J . , and
Pittman,
29
Thomas,
a n d Moore, J J . ,
