Michael D. Lockridge v. Karla D. Lockridge

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REL: 7/29/11 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2011 2091038 Michael D. Lockridge v. K a r l a D. Lockridge Appeal from Etowah C i r c u i t (DR-08-761) Court BRYAN, J u d g e . Michael judgment court") Karla D. entered Lockridge ("the husband") by t h e Etowah that refused t o grant D. L o c k r i d g e Circuit appeals Court h i m an a b s o l u t e ("the w i f e " ) and t h a t from a ("the t r i a l divorce failed from t o modify 2091038 c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f a l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment t h a t had been entered by t h e t r i a l court on b e h a l f o f t h e h u s b a n d and t h e wife. Procedural The record indicates History that the p a r t i e s were married i n F e b r u a r y 2001 and t h a t t h e y s e p a r a t e d i n S e p t e m b e r 2008. The p a r t i e s were t h e p a r e n t s o f one c h i l d , a s o n , who was b o r n i n M a r c h 2000. for a On O c t o b e r 3, 2008, t h e w i f e divorce incompatibility alleging irreconcilable o f temperament filed a complaint differences as g r o u n d s f o r t h e and divorce. She r e q u e s t e d , among o t h e r r e l i e f , t h a t t h e p a r t i e s be o r d e r e d to provide entered that a college education f o r the son. a s t a t u s quo p e n d e n t e l i t e ordered the p a r t i e s , among order other The t r i a l court on O c t o b e r 7, 2008, things, to continue p a y i n g f i x e d m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s i n t h e same manner as t h e y h a d been p a i d b e f o r e the divorce a c t i o n was filed. On November 7, 2008, t h e h u s b a n d f i l e d wife's c o m p l a i n t and s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t d e s i r e a d i v o r c e ; h o w e v e r , he a l s o other an answer t o t h e relief, filed a counterclaim that requested, a d i v i s i o n of the m a r i t a l property On M a r c h 23, 2009, t h e w i f e 2 filed among and d e b t s . an amended complaint 2091038 s e e k i n g a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n from the husband i n accordance w i t h § 30-2-40, A l a . Code 1975. The w i f e a l l e g e d t h a t she h a d h a d a l i v e r t r a n s p l a n t i n 2005 and t h a t she h a d t o t a k e "anti-rejection" medication the liver. transplanted cost of this husband's employer's so t h a t h e r b o d y d i d n o t The medication expensive wife was further alleged that completely insurance reject covered provider, the by she that the was u n e m p l o y e d , and t h a t she h a d n o t b e e n a b l e t o f i n d a h e a l t h insurance policy that r e j e c t i o n medication On March requiring 26, would cover the cost of the 2009, the trial amount o f $164 a w e e k ; o r d e r e d court child support t h e husband t o c o n t i n u e and t h e u t i l i t y b i l l s ; and o r d e r e d p a y f o r " f o o d and i n c i d e n t a l s . " requested t o the wife's an a b s o l u t e The t r i a l 2009. order entered t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e , t h e w i f e ' s objected an t h a t she n e e d e d . t h e husband t o pay t h e w i f e l o a n payment, anti- request i n the t o pay automobilethe wife to On A p r i l 6, 2009, t h e h u s b a n d for a legal separation and divorce. c o u r t c o n d u c t e d an o r e t e n u s h e a r i n g At that hearing, on May the wife s t a t e d that the sole she w a n t e d a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n an a b s o l u t e 3 5, reason divorce 2091038 was b e c a u s e she w a n t e d t o keep h e r h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e under the plan provided separation. August did husband's employer. The a divorce and n o t a legal The h u s b a n d a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t , due t o t h e w i f e ' s 2005 l i v e r medication the t h a t he w a n t e d husband m a i n t a i n e d by transplant, the wife had to take liver. The w i f e the husband's e m p l o y e r - p r o v i d e d h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e $5,000 and $6,000 a month on h e r b e h a l f and that r e s t of her l i f e . she w o u l d n e e d stated paid between that medication f o r the The w i f e s t a t e d t h a t she h a d r e s e a r c h e d h i s t o r y , and health-insurance she plan testified that she that f o r her p r e s c r i p t i o n approximate cost of o b t a i n i n g h e a l t h insurance medical certain f o r t h e r e s t o f h e r l i f e t o make s u r e t h a t h e r body not r e j e c t the t r a n s p l a n t e d medication coverage that c o n s i d e r i n g her the lowest qualified the monthly f o r cost $600 a month. The w i f e , who was 36 y e a r s o l d at that time, testified t h a t she h a d a c o l l e g e d e g r e e i n c o m p u t e r - i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m s and that, computer $35,000 before the p a r t i e s married, programmer a year, until f o r two years, she was laid she had earning off. The worked as a approximately son was born s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , and t h e w i f e d i d n o t r e t u r n t o work a f t e r 4 2091038 g i v i n g b i r t h t o t h e s o n , e x c e p t as a s u b s t i t u t e t e a c h e r a t the son's s c h o o l stated f o r a c o u p l e o f d a y s i n 2007. The w i f e t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h a d n e v e r a s k e d h e r t o go b a c k t o work. The h u s b a n d , who was 61 y e a r s o l d a n d i n good health, w o r k e d a s a c o m p t r o l l e r a t V e n t u r a F o o d s , L L C , a n d he " b r o u g h t home" $4,200 i n income a month. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d ' s g r o s s m o n t h l y income was a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 6 , 3 0 0 . husband p a i d employer. $300 a month f o r h e a l t h The insurance through h i s The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t , c o n s i d e r i n g the state of t h e economy, he was n o t g u a r a n t e e d a j o b a t V e n t u r a Foods much longer. The son, husband s t a t e d that he w a n t e d j o i n t b u t he a g r e e d t h a t t h e w i f e s h o u l d custody of the have p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l custody of the son. The h u s b a n d t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e his name a n d h i s f o r m e r ' s awarded the marital wife residence name and t h a t i n a prior was i n he h a d been divorce action. According t o t h e h u s b a n d , t h e m o n t h l y m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l residence was a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 7 0 6 . h a d been l i v i n g w i t h h i s mother The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he since the parties separated and t h a t h e r home was a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - q u a r t e r o f a m i l e f r o m 5 2091038 the m a r i t a l residence. marital residence, The h u s b a n d a s k e d t o be a w a r d e d t h e and t h e w i f e stated that she and t h e son w o u l d have t o move i n w i t h h e r g r a n d m o t h e r a p p r o x i m a t e l y one h o u r away f r o m t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e to remain i n the m a r i t a l residence. i f s h e was n o t p e r m i t t e d The h u s b a n d a d m i t t e d the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e needed r e p a i r s . the paid wife had never that The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t any h o u s e h o l d bills during the marriage. The for h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he h a d b e e n p a y i n g $288 a month the wife's 2006 Toyota Camry automobile. The h u s b a n d owned o u t r i g h t a 2002 B u i c k L e S a b r e a u t o m o b i l e . As o f O c t o b e r 2008, t h e h u s b a n d h a d two c e r t i f i c a t e s t o t a l e d $16,000. o f d e p o s i t ("CDs") t h a t O n l y one o f t h e CDs was h e l d j o i n t l y with t h e w i f e , a n d he a d m i t t e d t h a t he h a d removed t h e w i f e ' s name from t h e CD. retirement The husband stated that he had a 401(k) account t h r o u g h h i s employer and t h a t t h e b a l a n c e o f t h a t a c c o u n t was $ 6 6 , 0 0 0 . The his h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he p a i d $180 a week i n a l i m o n y t o former w i f e . According b e h i n d on a n y o f h i s b i l l s t o t h e h u s b a n d , he h a d n o t f a l l e n since the p a r t i e s separated. He s t a t e d t h a t a l l t h e m a r i t a l d e b t s were i n h i s name a n d t h a t 6 2091038 h i s m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s were a p p r o x i m a t e l y equal to h i s monthly income. On May 13, 2009, the t r i a l court entered a "decree l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n " that found that the requirements 40(a)(1), ( 2 ) , and o f § 30-2- ( 3 ) , A l a . Code 1975, h a d b e e n met. p a r t i e s were a w a r d e d j o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y The o f t h e s o n , and t h e w i f e was a w a r d e d p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y t o t h e husband's v i s i t a t i o n s r i g h t s . of o f t h e son s u b j e c t The h u s b a n d was allowed v i s i t a t i o n w i t h t h e s o n " a t a l l r e a s o n a b l e t i m e s and p l a c e s as agreed t o by t h e p a r t i e s , " liberal The i n establishing husband was ordered son, noncovered medical " d i r e c t e d t o be v i s i t a t i o n f o r the [husband] f o r the insurance and t h e w i f e was to continue and he was to provide required e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d on b e h a l f to " health pay a l l of the son. The h u s b a n d was o r d e r e d t o c o n t i n u e t o p a y $164 a week t o t h e w i f e as c h i l d The wife possession ordered support. was of t o pay awarded the m a r i t a l e x c l u s i v e and residence, the mortgage, marital residence. taxes, The h u s b a n d was temporary use and and the husband insurance on and was the a l s o r e q u i r e d t o pay f o r a new r o o f f o r t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e and t o p a y f o r r e p a i r s t o 7 2091038 the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e c a u s e d by w a t e r damage. The pay t h e m o n t h l y c a r payment on insurance. The The husband furniture, marital h u s b a n d was was appliances, residence, household goods, residence. The pay the to the w i f e ' s a w a r d e d h i s 2002 B u i c k awarded and and Camry and was ordered a w a r d e d h e r 2006 T o y o t a Camry, and t h e h u s b a n d was wife approximately LeSabre. 19 items of from the other personal property the wife f u r n i s h i n g s and was awarded appliances car a l l the i n the other marital t r i a l c o u r t ordered the p a r t i e s to continue a l l household bills as pendency of the p r o c e e d i n g s . they had been paid during F i n a l l y , the t r i a l c o u r t ' s to the legal- s e p a r a t i o n judgment s t a t e d : " T h i s m a t t e r s h a l l be r e v i e w e d i n one y e a r upon the motion of e i t h e r p a r t y f o r the purpose of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e employment s t a t u s o f t h e [ w i f e ] and h e r h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n . The [ c ] o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e [ w i f e ] i s w e l l e d u c a t e d and a b l e t o s u s t a i n g a i n f u l employment. The [ w i f e ] s h a l l a c t i v e l y p u r s u e g a i n f u l employment i m m e d i a t e l y and t h e [ w i f e ' ] s a t t o r n e y i s o r d e r e d t o make a q u a r t e r l y r e p o r t i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e same f o r t h e [ c ] o u r t ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " The trial judgment pursuant filed Ala. court certified to Rule the 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. a postjudgment motion pursuant R. C i v . P., w h i c h was judgment to Rule subsequently 8 C i v . P. as The 59(a) denied. The a final husband and (e), husband 2091038 did not appeal the l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n judgment. Approximately husband filed one a year "Motion later, f o r Review S e p a r a t i o n , " and he r e q u e s t e d an absolute divorce from on May of that the t r i a l the wife because, 10, 2010, Entry of the Legal court grant him he a l l e g e d , t h e w i f e h a d o b t a i n e d employment and he h a d l o s t h i s j o b and h i s a b i l i t y to maintain the w i f e ' s h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e coverage. husband requested that support obligation and t h e d i v i s i o n debts, and he r e q u e s t e d responsible the t r i a l that court his child- of m a r i t a l property the t r i a l f o r her household modify The and c o u r t make t h e w i f e bills. The t r i a l c o u r t c o n d u c t e d an o r e t e n u s h e a r i n g on May 26, 2010. The w i f e stated that A u g u s t 2009 a t a company she h a d o b t a i n e d c a l l e d I B E C i n Hokes B l u f f $10 an h o u r , o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y introduced evidence approximately month. 1 She employment i n $707 e v e r y indicating two weeks. The w i f e that her gross wages $948 e v e r y two weeks, o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y s t a t e d t h a t she h a d s e a r c h e d earning f o r more totaled $2,054 a lucrative We calculated the wife's monthly gross income by m u l t i p l y i n g h e r g r o s s b i w e e k l y i n c o m e ($948) by t h e number o f p a y p e r i o d s i n 1 y e a r (26) a n d d i v i d i n g t h a t number ($24,648) by 12. 1 9 2091038 employment b u t did not provided t h a t most o f t h e e m p l o y e r s t h a t she provide health insurance. health-insurance The coverage, w i t h p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , f o r $200 a m o n t h . health-insurance The were wife coverage f o r the stated approximately health-insurance approximately had t o pay would be that $2,000 cost of the reimbursed The i n savings b u t t h a t she t o pay The a wife by no restrictions that her The wife again absolute divorce. w i t h h i s m o t h e r and The up had employer's f r o n t and that or she she health-insurance approximately $6,000 needed a s s i s t a n c e from the husband i n asked the trial court h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he was t h a t he w a n t e d t i t l e the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e . costs stated that the monthly uncovered c o s t of her husband included o n l y 80% o f t h a t c o s t , employer's s t a t e d t h a t she on son. medication her found employer That c o s t 2 month b u t $1,600, e a c h month. the wife's prescription-medication p r o v i d e r would pay provider. order her had The medication. to enter still an living t o and p o s s e s s i o n of husband a l s o asked t h a t the w i f e be Apparently, the wife's employer's health-insurance p r o v i d e r n o t i f i e d h e r t h e week b e f o r e t r i a l t h a t t h e r e w o u l d no l o n g e r be any r e s t r i c t i o n s on h e r c o v e r a g e , w h i c h s u g g e s t s t h a t , f r o m A u g u s t 2009 u n t i l s h o r t l y b e f o r e t r i a l i n May 2010, t h e r e were some r e s t r i c t i o n s . 2 10 2091038 responsible f o r p a y i n g h e r own m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s . The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he h a d been d i s c h a r g e d f r o m h i s job at Ventura performance. Foods on March 9, 2010, f o r lack of The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t h i s e m p l o y e r h a d w a n t e d h i m t o s p e n d more t i m e a t h i s j o b e v e n t h o u g h , t h e h u s b a n d stated, he was already s p e n d i n g 12 h o u r s a d a y a t work, i n c l u d i n g h i s commute, w h i c h was a b o u t 1 h o u r e a c h way. husband received $25, 200, four months of salary, or The approximately i n s e v e r a n c e p a y f r o m h i s e m p l o y e r i n A p r i l 2010. The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t h i s m o t h e r d i d n o t c h a r g e h i m a n y t h i n g for rent or u t i l i t i e s . The husband stated f i n d i n g o t h e r employment that he h a d n o t been successful at a n d t h a t he d i d n o t e x p e c t t o be a b l e t o f i n d employment t h a t was commensurate i n pay w i t h h i s j o b at V e n t u r a Foods. The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he h a d m a i n t a i n e d h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e f o r t h e w i f e a n d t h e s o n t h r o u g h COBRA, w h i c h cost $503 a month. The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he was e l i g i b l e f o r COBRA h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e f o r 18 months f r o m t h e d a t e he l o s t his job. support mother's The h u s b a n d r e q u e s t e d a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f h i s c h i l d obligation having based obtained on t h e l o s s a j o b since 11 o f h i s j o b and the the last judgment was 2091038 entered. The husband stated that he could begin drawing a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1,600 a month i n S o c i a l S e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s that, i f he waited until he was 66 y e a r s o l d , he a p p r o x i m a t e l y $2,300 a month. The approximately 401(k) individual $100,000 retirement in a The that he could not w o u l d have no way was no afford to monthly funds approximately The $11,000 deplete 2010 husband from in an relying accounts for h i s retirement those two t r i a l t h a t the he There husband had accounts to cover his stated CDs and funds because upon r e t i r e m e n t . from h i s r e t i r e m e n t expenses. $6,400 had a p p r o x i m a t e l y $3,000 i n a to support himself i n d i c a t i o n a t t h e May removed any account, h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he was on t h e f u n d s i n h i s r e t i r e m e n t draw h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he a c c o u n t , and money-market a c c o u n t . could but that to he repair had the spent marital residence. The w i f e , who thought that residence she was 38 y e a r s o l d i n May c o u l d pay the utility 2010, bills t h a t t h e h u s b a n d had b e e n p a y i n g b u t n o t a l s o pay said that at the stated that there were 13 payments r e m a i n i n g on h e r 12 marital t h a t she t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e . she could The wife car loan 2091038 and t h a t i t w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t and t h e u t i l i t y p a i d between wife. payments. f o r h e r t o make t h e c a r payment The h u s b a n d e s t i m a t e d $700 a n d $800 a month i n u t i l i t y The h u s b a n d ' s o t h e r t h a t he h a d bills f o r the monthly expenses i n c l u d e d month f o r t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e , $711 a $780 month i n a l i m o n y t o h i s f o r m e r w i f e , $711 a month i n c h i l d s u p p o r t , a n d $288 a month f o r t h e w i f e ' s The had husband s t a t e d been caring weekday 5:00 p.m. said that that, b e c a u s e he was u n e m p l o y e d , he f o r t h e son before and t h a t between vehicle. the wife picked a n d 6:00 p.m. and a f t e r school up t h e s o n f r o m h i s home e a c h weekday. The h u s b a n d t h e s o n o c c a s i o n a l l y d i d n o t come t o v i s i t weekends. The w i f e stated that h u s b a n d h a d weekend visitation son i t . The w i f e was " o k a y " w i t h t h e husband, understanding that discretion. trial court the w i f e and she with also s e t up a s p e c i f i c i fthe t h e son, so l o n g stated that stated as t h e she u n d e r s t o o d that t h e husband's v i s i t a t i o n She s t a t e d t h a t h i m on she d i d n o t m i n d t h a t i t was h e r j o b t o make s u r e t h e s o n a t t e n d e d with each visitation i t was h e r was l e f t to her i t would not bother her i f the visitation schedule. s t a t e d t h a t she t h o u g h t i t was f a i r 13 However, t o l e t h e r have 2091038 weekends w i t h t h e s o n b e c a u s e t h e h u s b a n d w o u l d be c a r i n g f o r t h e c h i l d d u r i n g t h e d a y e a c h weekday w h i l e t h e c h i l d was n o t in school. The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t have a w i l l and t h a t he h a d made no o t h e r p r o v i s i o n t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e e d u c a t i o n o f the son. On J u n e 22, 2010, t h e t r i a l the husband's r e q u e s t The trial court court entered f o r a review a j u d g m e n t on of the legal separation. found t h a t the w i f e had o b t a i n e d employment and h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e s i n c e t h e l a s t h e a r i n g b u t t h a t , unlike t h e husband's health-insurance coverage, the wife's h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e p r o v i d e r covered only 80% o f the monthly cost o f t h e w i f e ' s m e d i c a t i o n ; t h a t t h e husband had been d i s c h a r g e d from h i s j o b a t V e n t u r a F o o d s a n d t h a t he h a d b e e n p a y i n g t o m a i n t a i n h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e coverage f o r h i m s e l f , t h e w i f e , and the son retirement through COBRA; accounts that, considering and h i s e l i g i b i l i t y the to begin S o c i a l S e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s , t h e husband had s u f f i c i e n t continue t o pay c h i l d support husband's drawing assets to a n d t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e ; a n d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h a d no w i l l made "no p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e e d u c a t i o n 14 a n d t h a t he h a d o f t h e s o n . " B a s e d on 2091038 those findings modifications of fact, the t r i a l t o t h e May 2009 w i t h o u t e n t e r i n g an a b s o l u t e court made t h e f o l l o w i n g legal-separation judgment, divorce: " A . The [ w i f e ] , b e g i n n i n g i n J u l y , 2010 s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l u t i l i t y payments a t t h e m a r i t a l home. The [ w i f e ] s h a l l a l s o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i n s u r a n c e on h e r a u t o m o b i l e . " B . The [ h u s b a n d ] i s o r d e r e d t o p l a c e $10,000.00 t h a t i s i n h i s 401-K p l a n i n a money m a r k e t a c c o u n t t h a t s h a l l be i n t h e name o f t h e . . . s o n t o be u s e d f o r h i s c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n . The [ w i f e ] s h a l l a c t as the t r u s t e e o f s a i d m o n i e s . " C . The [ h u s b a n d ] i s t o have a d e e d p r e p a r e d a n d d e l i v e r e d t o [ h i s former] wife that t r a n s f e r s her i n t e r e s t i n the m a r i t a l residence to the [husband]. "D. A l l o t h e r t e r m s a n d p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n s h a l l remain i n e f f e c t . " The trial husband court subsequently to this appealed the decision of the for this court's court. Issues The husband consideration: presents five issues (1) w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l t o g r a n t h i s r e q u e s t f o r an a b s o l u t e court erred i n refusing divorce; (2) w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by i n e q u i t a b l y d i v i d i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s e t s , debts, and m a r i t a l expenses i n the June 2010 j u d g m e n t ; (3) whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by r e f u s i n g t o modify h i s 15 child- 2091038 support obligation; r e q u i r i n g him trust court to place f o r the trial (4) son's erred whether the trial court erred by $10,000 f r o m h i s 4 0 1 ( k ) a c c o u n t i n a c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n ; and i n refusing to set (5) whether a specific the visitation schedule. Standard The trial court entered of Review i t s judgment a f t e r t e n u s e v i d e n c e . "When a t r i a l hearing ore c o u r t 'makes f i n d i n g s o f fact b a s e d on e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d o r e t e n u s , an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t will presume that the trial court's judgment based on those f i n d i n g s i s c o r r e c t , and i t w i l l r e v e r s e t h a t j u d g m e n t o n l y i f it 837 i s f o u n d t o be p l a i n l y and p a l p a b l y w r o n g . ' " C.P. So. Byars, 2d 794 860, So. 864 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2d 345, 347 (Ala. 2002) v. W.M., ( q u o t i n g Ex parte 2001)). Discussion First, the husband argues t h a t the t r i a l court erred i n e n t e r i n g a j u d g m e n t o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n i n s t e a d o f an divorce. wife had o b t a i n e d employment and h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e by t h e time o f t h e May his The 2010 husband contends that because h e a r i n g , and b e c a u s e he had the absolute lost his job and a b i l i t y to m a i n t a i n h e a l t h - i n s u r a n c e coverage f o r the w i f e 16 2091038 beyond what COBRA justification would allow, there was no longer f o r a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n an any absolute divorce. " L e g a l s e p a r a t i o n s i n A l a b a m a a r e g o v e r n e d by § 30-2-40, A l a . Code 1975. T h a t s e c t i o n o f t h e A l a b a m a Code was a d o p t e d by t h e A l a b a m a L e g i s l a t u r e w i t h an e f f e c t i v e d a t e o f J a n u a r y 1, 1999. P u r s u a n t t o t h a t statute, a legal separation is a 'court d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f a h u s b a n d and w i f e a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , ' and a ' l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n d o e s n o t t e r m i n a t e t h e m a r i t a l s t a t u s o f t h e p a r t i e s . ' See § 3 0 - 2 - 4 0 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975." D.L.J. v. B . R . J . , 887 Before January mensa e t t h o r o , w h i c h was So. 1, 2d 242, 1999, 246 ( A l a . C i v . App. Alabama r e c o g n i z e d a l s o known as a d i v o r c e C i v . App. and 1985) board, continue is a legal separation court considered a mensa whether the t r i a l this and So. a board, separation. 2d 974, 976 ( A l a . ( " D i v o r c e a mensa e t t h o r o , a d i v o r c e f r o m b e d divorce legal from bed allowing the marriage as t o e v e r y t h i n g n o t w i t h d r a w n by t h e d e c r e e . " ) . D . L . J ., t h i s of a divorce t h e common-law p r e d e c e s s o r t o a l e g a l I d . See a l s o Drummond v. Drummond, 466 2003). et thoro under In Alabama p r e c e d e n t c o n c e r n i n g a i n deciding, c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n separation to i n the a f f i r m a t i v e , to modify § 30-2-40. I d . a t 247. judgments However, c o u r t r e j e c t e d t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t § 30-2-40 c o d i f i e d a l l 17 2091038 preexisting thoro. common l a w t h a t r e l a t e d to a divorce a mensa e t I d . a t 248. B e f o r e t h e e n a c t m e n t o f § 30-2-40, w h i c h became e f f e c t i v e on January 1, 1999, t h i s court c o u r t has b e f o r e i t a r e q u e s t and a divorce from had h e l d " t h a t when a trial f o r a d i v o r c e from bed and b o a r d t h e bonds o f matrimony, the court can e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n and d e t e r m i n e w h i c h type o f d i v o r c e i s b e s t f o r the p a r t i e s under the f a c t s o f t h e i r case." 466 So. provides legal 2d at 976. Section 30-2-40(c), that " [ i ] f a party f i l e s separation rather than a A l a . Code a complaint decree of dissolution t h e c o u r t may g r a n t t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n . " added.) Accordingly, of § 1975, f o r a decree of marriage, the enactment Drummond, of (Emphasis 30-2-40(c) is a c o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e common-law r u l e t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n w h e t h e r t o g r a n t a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n o r an a b s o l u t e d i v o r c e l i e s w i t h i n the sound d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l not r e v e r s e a p a r t of a t r i a l its discretion unless court. i t i s shown i t s discretion or that palpably wrong." v . A.V.F., 2011] So. 3d , will c o u r t ' s judgment t h a t i s l e f t t o exceeded B.R.F. "[T]his court that the t h e judgment trial court i s p l a i n l y or [Ms. 2090872, March 4, ( A l a . C i v . App. 2011) ( c i t i n g Romano 18 2091038 v. Romano, 703 So. 2d 374, 375 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 7 ) ) . The husband argues basis f o r continuing could elect that the t r i a l the l e g a l t o continue court separation health-insurance h a d no because legal the wife coverage through COBRA w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s were d i v o r c e d o r o p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n . S e e , g e n e r a l l y , 29 U.S.C. § 1162 a n d § 1163. I t was u n d i s p u t e d to the t r i a l separated, t h a t , u n d e r t h e f a c t s as t h e y were presented c o u r t , even i f t h e p a r t i e s remained o n l y the wife's (and t h e husband's) legally health-insurance c o v e r a g e t h r o u g h COBRA w o u l d e n d 18 months a f t e r t h e h u s b a n d ' s employment w i t h V e n t u r a Foods was At t r i a l terminated. 3 i n May 2009, t h e w i f e u n e q u i v o c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n s h e d e s i r e d a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n was i n o r d e r t o maintain and health insurance. d i d n o t have employer. At t r i a l access A t t h a t t i m e s h e was u n e m p l o y e d to health insurance i n May 2 0 1 0 , t h e w i f e through an d i d not i n d i c a t e I t i s possible that, i f the p a r t i e s divorced, the wife w o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o an a d d i t i o n a l 18 months o f COBRA c o v e r a g e . See 29 U.S.C. § 1 1 6 2 ( 2 ) ( A ) ( i i ) ( s p e c i a l r u l e f o r multiple qualifying events). However, b e c a u s e n e i t h e r p a r t y p r e s e n t e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i t h t h i s a r g u m e n t , we w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r i t i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n b y f a i l i n g t o g r a n t t h e h u s b a n d an a b s o l u t e divorce. 3 19 2091038 t h a t she t h o u g h t a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n only stated employer's assistance her that, i f she was health-insurance was s t i l l required n e c e s s a r y ; she to coverage, utilize would she her need from t h e husband i n f i n a n c i n g t h e monthly c o s t o f medication. The w i f e s t a t e d t h a t s h e h a d enough savings so t h a t s h e d i d n o t n e e d t h e h u s b a n d t o p a y t h e u p - f r o n t cost of some $2, 000 a month f o r her medication. i n d i c a t i o n d u r i n g t h e May 2010 t r i a l There was that the p a r t i e s thought t h a t i t w o u l d be more e c o n o m i c a l f o r t h e h u s b a n d t o c o n t i n u e to pay h e a l t h insurance than pay f o r s i n g l e also pay t h e w i f e ' s f o r t h e f a m i l y t h r o u g h COBRA coverage f o r himself $400-a-month through medication COBRA a n d expense. understand t h a t such reasoning may have b e e n t h e t r i a l justification the legal there f o r continuing separation; We court's however, i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t -- t h e h u s b a n d ' s p a y i n g f o r f a m i l y c o v e r a g e t h r o u g h COBRA w h i l e was rather a v a i l a b l e -- c o u l d n o t have b e e n u t i l i z e d were d i v o r c e d Based husband longer on that, r a t h e r than o p e r a t i n g the evidence a t the time that i f the parties under a l e g a l presented, we coverage separation. agree o f t h e May 2010 t r i a l , with there the no e x i s t e d any b a s i s t o s u p p o r t t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n and 20 2091038 that the t r i a l enter a court judgment Accordingly, we e n t e r an a b s o l u t e with e x c e e d e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n by d i s s o l v i n g the marriage reverse t h e judgment of insofar failing to the p a r t i e s . i t failed to j u d g m e n t o f d i v o r c e , a n d we remand t h e c a u s e instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment court erred i n d i v o r c i n g the p a r t i e s . The husband also argues that the t r i a l d i v i d i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s e t s , d e b t s , and m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s i n t h e June 2010 j u d g m e n t . in light of the f a c t We p r e t e r m i t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s that we are reversing t h e June issue 2010 judgment c o n t i n u i n g t h e l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the trial court to enter a final judgment of divorce. P u r s u a n t t o § 3 0 - 2 - 4 0 ( d ) , A l a . Code 1975, n e i t h e r t h e c o u r t n o r t h e p a r t i e s a r e "bound b y legal separation trial [] t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e r e l a t i n g t o alimony or a property settlement upon a f i n a l d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e m a r r i a g e . " See a l s o D.L.J. v. B . R . J . , 887 So. 2d a t 248. Accordingly, on remand, t h e t r i a l court i s free to exercise i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n c r a f t i n g a divorce judgment t h a t e q u i t a b l y d i v i d e s t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . The failing husband also argues t h a t the t r i a l to modify h i s child-support 21 court erred i n o b l i g a t i o n b a s e d on t h e 2091038 e v i d e n c e o f t h e change i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i n c e t h e e n t r y o f t h e May 2009 that, the legal-separation judgment. i n l i g h t of the wife's increased cost contends m o n t h l y g r o s s income o f $2,054, of health job, h i s child-support The h u s b a n d insurance, and t h e l o s s o f h i s o b l i g a t i o n was due t o be modified. "An a w a r d o f c h i l d s u p p o r t may be m o d i f i e d o n l y upon p r o o f o f a m a t e r i a l change o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t i s s u b s t a n t i a l and c o n t i n u i n g . Browning v. B r o w n i n g , 626 So. 2d 649 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 3 ) . The parent seeking the m o d i f i c a t i o n bears the burden o f p r o o f . Cunningham v . Cunningham, 641 So. 2d 807 (Ala. C i v . App. 1994). Whether circumstances j u s t i f y i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n of support e x i s t i s a matter w i t h i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . I d . We w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on a p p e a l u n l e s s there i s a showing t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused t h a t d i s c r e t i o n o r t h a t t h e judgment i s p l a i n l y and p a l p a b l y w r o n g . I d . ; D o u g l a s s v . D o u g l a s s , 669 So. 2d 928, 930 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 5 ) . " Romano v. Romano, 703 So. 2d 374, 375 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 7 ) . Concerning child support, the t r i a l court's judgment stated: "The [husband] testified that he has some $100,000.00 t o $120,000.00 i n a 401-K a c c o u n t , a l o n g w i t h a p o r t i o n o f t h e s e v e r a n c e p a c k a g e o f some $28,000.00 t h a t was p a i d t o h i m i n A p r i l o f t h i s y e a r . He i s a l s o e l i g i b l e t o b e g i n d r a w i n g some $1,600.00 p e r month i n S o c i a l S e c u r i t y pension b e n e f i t s . The [husband] h a s s u f f i c i e n t a s s e t s t o continue t o pay c h i l d support " The husband, citing Rule 22 32(B)(1) and ( 2 ) ( a ) , A l a . R. 2091038 Jud. Admin., argues t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by considering his i n savings determining retirement moneys s t i l l held t h a t h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n was The n o t due in t o be modified. a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s i n R u l e 32 i s f o u n d e d on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n their assets. See Rule of the p a r e n t s ' 32(B)(1) g r o s s income, (defining "income" p u r p o s e s o f t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s as t h e " a c t u a l income of definition a parent of "gross "). Rule i n c o m e , " as 32(B)(2) provides not for gross the follows: "(a) 'Gross i n c o m e ' i n c l u d e s income f r o m any source, and i n c l u d e s , but i s not limited to, s a l a r i e s , wages, c o m m i s s i o n s , b o n u s e s , d i v i d e n d s , s e v e r a n c e pay, pensions, i n t e r e s t , t r u s t income, annuities, c a p i t a l gains, S o c i a l Security benefits, w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s , u n e m p l o y m e n t - i n s u r a n c e b e n e f i t s , d i s a b i l i t y - i n s u r a n c e b e n e f i t s , g i f t s , p r i z e s , and p r e e x i s t i n g p e r i o d i c alimony. "(b) 'Gross i n c o m e ' does n o t include child support r e c e i v e d f o r o t h e r c h i l d r e n or b e n e f i t s received from means-tested public-assistance programs, i n c l u d i n g , but not l i m i t e d t o , Temporary A s s i s t a n c e f o r Needy F a m i l i e s , S u p p l e m e n t a l S e c u r i t y Income, f o o d s t a m p s , and g e n e r a l a s s i s t a n c e . " In the present of trial that the c a s e , t h e r e was husband was no i n d i c a t i o n at the drawing a c c o u n t s as a f o r m o f income o r t h a t t h e and was planning t o use his retirement 23 on his retirement h u s b a n d was a c c o u n t s as time retired his sole 2091038 s o u r c e o f income f o r h i s own support. To t h e c o n t r a r y , the r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e h u s b a n d h a d l o s t h i s j o b a n d t h a t he was searching for employment. Under these particular c i r c u m s t a n c e s , we a g r e e w i t h t h e h u s b a n d t h a t t h e t r i a l e r r e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e money i n h i s r e t i r e m e n t court accounts i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t h i s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n was n o t due t o be modified. We 4 further agree with the that i n the t r i a l the w i f e ' s i n c r e a s e d g r o s s income o r t h e h u s b a n d ' s costs, see judgment t h a t there indication health-insurance court's husband Rule 32(C)(2), is no i t considered increased A l a . R. Jud. Admin., i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e h u s b a n d ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n . Accordingly, we judgment t h a t obligation, reverse refused and we that part of the t o m o d i f y t h e husband's trial court's child-support remand t h e c a u s e t o t h e t r i a l court f o r c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e husband's c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n p u r s u a n t to Rule 32. 5 We n o t e t h a t t h e r e was no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n t e n d e d t o d e v i a t e from the a p p l i c a t i o n of the c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s pursuant to Rule 3 2 ( A ) ( i i ) , A l a . R. J u d . Admin. 4 We deviate 5 note t h a t the t r i a l court, i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , may f r o m t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e R u l e 32 c h i l d - s u p p o r t 24 2091038 The husband a l s o argues t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n by r e q u i r i n g him account in trust husband argues a classified that only as support pursuant 1 9 8 9 ) , and of the the this an t o Ex t h a t an on b e h a l f o f t h e light for to place college part award parte of of the Bayliss, that award of p o s t m i n o r i t y son was there was judgment 550 So. 2d 986 educational evidence support. to We not have a that (Ala. support he had not husband otherwise made p r o v i s i o n f o r the c o l l e g e education o f the son. A l t h o u g h court may obtain has held life that insurance a trial to court insure s u p p o r t e d i n the event of the J o r d a n v. the trial Jordan, 688 court went So. 2d that require a minor supporting 839, further and 842 an agree. c o u r t , i n i t s judgment, found t h a t the and be support trial will can educational The did The premature, e s p e c i a l l y i n no educational 401(k) education. postminority award of p o s t m i n o r i t y 10-year-old fact son's $10,000 f r o m h i s a parent child parent's will death, ( A l a . C i v . App. specifically this to be see 1997), ordered the g u i d e l i n e s i f i t concludes t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n of the g u i d e l i n e s w o u l d be u n j u s t o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e . See R u l e 3 2 ( A ) ( i i ) , A l a . R. J u d . Admin. ( s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r d e v i a t i n g f r o m the c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s ) . 25 2091038 husband t o p l a c e $10,000 i n t r u s t f o r t h e c h i l d f o r h i s f u t u r e college education. That p a r t 6 husband t o s e t a s i d e $10,000 o f t h e judgment r e q u i r i n g t h e f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e son can u n d o u b t e d l y be l a b e l e d as " s u p p o r t " f o r t h e s o n . However, have involve held that "[c]hild support determinations we the p a r e n t ' s p r e s e n t a b i l i t y t o meet t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t needs and are not subject need." B u t t s 1992) to speculation v. B u t t s , ( c i t i n g Morrison App. regarding future 600 So. 2d 1038, 1041 a b i l i t y or ( A l a . C i v . App. v. K i r k l a n d , 567 So. 2d 363 (Ala. Civ. 1990)). I n B u t t s , we h e l d t h a t an a w a r d o f a d e f i n i t e postminority children educational [we]re not evidence presented yet support of regarding was college premature age and o r t h e w i f e . " 600 So. 2d a t 1042 So. 2d 839, 841 when there the a n t i c i p a t e d future e x p e n s e s o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 'undue h a r d s h i p ' 574 amount o f 1990)). was no college on t h e h u s b a n d ( c i t i n g T h r a s h e r v. ( A l a . C i v . App. "the Wilburn, Similarly, in I f t h e j u d g m e n t had r e q u i r e d t h e h u s b a n d t o s e t a s i d e money as a g u a r a n t y t h a t t h e c h i l d w o u l d be s u p p o r t e d i n t h e e v e n t o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s d e a t h , t h i s c o u r t may have d e c i d e d t h e issue d i f f e r e n t l y . B u t , b e c a u s e t h e money was s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n a t e d f o r t h e s o n ' s c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n , we must c o n c l u d e t h a t s u c h an a w a r d i s an a w a r d o f p o s t m i n o r i t y educational support. 6 26 2091038 M a r t i n v. M a r t i n , 624 So. 2d 192, 193 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 3 ) , t h i s court reversed postminority an o r d e r educational r e q u i r i n g t h e husband t o pay t h e expenses o f h i s three were ages 11, 13, a n d 16 a t t h e t i m e o f t r i a l , children, who when "[a] r e v i e w o f t h e t e s t i m o n y reveal[ed] t h a t no e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d regarding the a n t i c i p a t e d e x p e n s e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h a c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n f o r any o f t h e c h i l d r e n , o r w h e t h e r t h e h u s b a n d w o u l d be a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c o s t o f s u c h an e d u c a t i o n when e a c h c h i l d was r e a d y t o a t t e n d college. F u r t h e r , t h e r e c o r d [wa]s d e v o i d o f any e v i d e n c e o f the c h i l d r e n ' s grades or t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o a t t e n d college." As record award we d i d i n Butts i s devoid of o f any e v i d e n c e postminority Accordingly, that husband t o "place and M a r t i n , part educational we conclude sufficient to support support o f t h e judgment that the at that this an time. required $10,000.00 t h a t i s i n h i s 401-K p l a n the in a money m a r k e t a c c o u n t ... i n t h e name o f t h e ... s o n t o be u s e d for h i s college education" trial court i s instructed i s reversed, to vacate a n d , on remand, t h e that portion ofi t s judgment. Finally, in failing behalf. t h e husband contends t h a t t h e t r i a l to set a specific visitation court schedule erred on h i s The May 2009 l e g a l - s e p a r a t i o n j u d g m e n t s e t f o r t h t h e 27 2091038 visitation parameters [husband] shall reasonable times In f o r the as visitation have husband with the and p l a c e s P r a t t v. P r a t t , follows: "The [son] a t a l l as a g r e e d b y t h e p a r t i e s . " 56 So. 3d 638, 644 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 1 0 ) , t h i s c o u r t h e l d t h a t " [ t ] h e p r o p r i e t y o f [a v i s i t a t i o n ] judgment depends sufficient, on w h e t h e r specified the noncustodial visitation schedule independent o f the c u s t o d i a l parent's noted that "[t]his court ... parent to rely discretion." has has a affirmed upon, We also awards of unspecified visitation b a s e d on t h e a g r e e m e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s when also the t r i a l disagreement, court 'standard provides visitation' v i s i t a t i o n w o u l d be i m p o s e d . " I d . that, i n the event o r some o t h e r Although of specified the t r i a l court's j u d g m e n t a l s o d i r e c t e d t h e w i f e t o be l i b e r a l i n e s t a b l i s h i n g visitation with erroneously visitation t h e h u s b a n d , we a g r e e failed to provide f o r some a specific the t r i a l form of court specific f o r t h e husband i n t h e event t h e p a r t i e s c o u l d n o t a g r e e on t h e h u s b a n d ' s v i s i t a t i o n . the t r i a l that Accordingly, we reverse c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t f a i l e d t o s e t f o r t h visitation schedule f o r t h e h u s b a n d , a n d we remand the cause w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e t r i a l 28 court to set forth a 2091038 "sufficient, to s p e c i f i e d v i s i t a t i o n schedule r e l y upon, i n d e p e n d e n t [ f o r t h e husband] of the [wife]'s d i s c r e t i o n . " I d . Conclusion The cause judgment i s remanded of the t r i a l court f o r proceedings i s r e v e r s e d , and t h e consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Thompson, concur. P . J . , and Pittman, 29 Thomas, a n d Moore, J J . ,

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