R.J. Schweiger v. Town of Hurtsboro and Rayford Tapley

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REL: 2/04/2011 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 2090947 R.J. Schweiger v. Town o f Hurtsboro and Rayford Tapley Appeal from R u s s e l l C i r c u i t Court (CV-09-339) THOMAS, J u d g e . I n December 2009, R . J . S c h w e i g e r , a c t i n g p r o s e , f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t t h e Town o f H u r t s b o r o a n d i t s mayor, R a y f o r d Tapley (referred to collectively as " t h e Town"), seeking a d e c l a r a t o r y j u d g m e n t a n d an i n j u n c t i o n b a s e d on S c h w e i g e r ' s 2090947 a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t t h e Town h a d b r e a c h e d i t s f i d u c i a r y d u t y t o its c i t i z e n s by failing t o have a y e a r l y a u d i t p e r f o r m e d r e q u i r e d by A l a . Code 1975, derived from the g a s o l i n e maintenance. Art. in See § 11-43-85, and by u s i n g t a x f o r purposes u n r e l a t e d Amendment No. 354, A l a . Const. as moneys to road 1901 (now I V , § 111.06, A l a . C o n s t . 1901 ( O f f . R e c o m p . ) ) ( s t a t i n g , part, that "no l i c e n s e taxes, moneys d e r i v e d from any fee, excises, or l e v i e d by t h e s t a t e , r e l a t i n g t o f u e l s u s e d f o r p r o p e l l i n g ... v e h i c l e s [ u p o n t h e p u b l i c h i g h w a y s ] e x c e p t pump taxes, s h a l l be e x p e n d e d f o r other than cost of administering s u c h l a w s , s t a t u t o r y r e f u n d s and a d j u s t m e n t s a l l o w e d cost of c o n s t r u c t i o n , of public r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , maintenance highways rights-of-way, and bridges, payment o f h i g h w a y costs therein, and of repair highway o b l i g a t i o n s , the cost t r a f f i c r e g u l a t i o n , and t h e e x p e n s e o f e n f o r c i n g s t a t e of traffic and m o t o r v e h i c l e l a w s " ) ; see a l s o O p i n i o n o f t h e J u s t i c e s No. 351, 665 So. "Amendment 354 of motor projects, and 2d 1389, 1391 'earmarks' vehicles s u c h as on ( A l a . 1995) revenue d e r i v e d public highways (concluding from the for r e p a i r of p u b l i c highways and b r i d g e s ' " ) ; 2 operation closely 'construction, reconstruction, that allied maintenance and A l a . Code 2090947 1975, § 40-17-78(3) gasoline t a x when moved t o d i s m i s s (outlining used proper use o f revenue f o r "highway p u r p o s e s " ) . Schweiger's complaint, from The requesting Town i n that motion t h a t the t r i a l court assess s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t Schweiger because fails "the case to equitable rise i s not plead to the i n good f a i t h level of actions i n the State initiating and otherwise legal o f Alabama." and/or I n i t s answer, w h i c h was f i l e d on t h e same d a t e as t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , t h e Town s t a t e d t h a t i t was s e e k i n g and other on the sanctions motion Schweiger's ordered the him to dismiss, complaint, the ordered of the a c t i o n . trial Schweiger costs After a hearing court dismissed t o pay c o s t s , and f e e s were t o become p a r t o f A f t e r h i s p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n was Schweiger appealed t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment o r d e r i n g t o pay t h e Town's t r a n s f e r r e d the appeal jurisdiction over transferred the case 1975, c o s t s , defense against the p l a i n t i f f . " t h a t t h e Town's a t t o r n e y costs denied, "court attorney fees to this court; we t o o u r supreme c o u r t b e c a u s e we l a c k e d the appeal, to this and court, § 12-2-7(6). 3 our pursuant supreme to Ala. court Code 2090947 Neither trial court's j u d g m e n t r e c i t e s t h e l e g a l b a s i s f o r an i m p o s i t i o n o f attorney fees the against Town's pleadings Schweiger. "In nor Alabama, the attorneys' fees are r e c o v e r a b l e o n l y where a u t h o r i z e d by s t a t u t e , when p r o v i d e d i n a contract, where t h e f e e s may (Ala. is or efforts special o f an be p a i d . " 1983). equity, attorney such create as in a a fund E a g e r t o n v. W i l l i a m s , 433 proceeding out So. of which 2d 436, 450 However, an a w a r d o f a t t o r n e y f e e s as a s a n c t i o n authorized ("the by by the Alabama Litigation A L A A " ) , c o d i f i e d a t A l a . Code 1975, Although the Town did not A c c o u n t a b i l i t y Act § 12-19-270 e t reference the ALAA seq. in i t s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s or i n i t s answer, Schweiger t r e a t s the trial c o u r t ' s i m p o s i t i o n o f a t t o r n e y f e e s as an a s s e s s m e n t u n d e r t h e ALAA. Pursuant to the ALAA, a trial court must assess a t t o r n e y f e e s a g a i n s t a p a r t y who b r i n g s an a c t i o n o r a s s e r t s a is claim or justification." defense Ala. that Code 1975, § "without substantial 12-19-272(a). substantial justification" "frivolous, groundless interposed for limitation, t o cause unnecessary d e l a y or needless any i s defined in fact improper 4 or i n the i n law, purpose, or "Without ALAA as being vexatious, including or without increase i n 2090947 the c o s t o f l i t i g a t i o n . " A l a . Code 1975, § 1 2 - 1 9 - 2 7 1 ( 1 ) . a g r e e w i t h S c h w e i g e r t h a t t h e Town's r e q u e s t f o rattorney We fees as a s a n c t i o n a g a i n s t S c h w e i g e r b e c a u s e " t h e c a s e i s n o t p l e a d in good faith initiating Alabama" and o t h e r w i s e legal and/or i s tantamount a c t i o n was i n i t i a t e d fails to rise to the l e v e l of equitable actions i n the State of t o an "without allegation of Schweiger's appeal Schweiger make the attorney first required argues its decision Enters. 409, court that to assess O i l Co. 418 the t r i a l to f e e s u n d e r t h e ALAA. t h e ALAA t o " s p e c i f i c a l l y Thus, we w i l l analyze the support court failed to assessment an of I n d e e d , A l a . Code 1975, § 12¬ court assessing attorney set forth attorney the reasons" fees. See the 'without substantial fees under underlying also (USA) v . H o w e l l P e t r o l e u m C o r p . , ( A l a . 1993) ( " A d d i t i o n a l l y , we w i l l making as u n d e r t h e ALAA. findings 19-273, r e q u i r e s a t r i a l Schweiger's substantial justification," t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n t h e ALAA. merits that Pacific 614 So. 2d require a trial justification' d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o make i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e g r o u n d o r g r o u n d s upon w h i c h i t r e l i e s , a n d t h e l e g a l o r e v i d e n t i a r y s u p p o r t f o r i t s determination, a p a r t o f t h e r e c o r d , e i t h e r by d r a f t i n g a 5 2090947 s e p a r a t e w r i t t e n order o r by h a v i n g these f i n d i n g s t r a n s c r i b e d for the o f f i c i a l record."). The t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t , w h i c h c o n s i s t s of four sentences, this reason alone, we omits the r e q u i r e d f i n d i n g s . would typically reverse the For trial c o u r t ' s judgment a s s e s s i n g a t t o r n e y f e e s a g a i n s t Schweiger and remand t h e cause f o r the t r i a l court f i n d i n g s on t h e r e c o r d t o s u p p o r t fees. See P a c i f i c E n t e r s . t o make t h e r e q u i r e d the assessment of a t t o r n e y O i l Co., 614 So. 2d a t 419. However, S c h w e i g e r a l s o p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e ALAA p r o v i d e s a f u r t h e r requirement pro se explains litigant. f o r assessing Section attorney 12-19-272(e), fees against A l a . Code a 1975, that " [ n ] o p a r t y , e x c e p t an a t t o r n e y l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e l a w i n t h i s s t a t e , who i s a p p e a r i n g without an a t t o r n e y s h a l l be a s s e s s e d a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s u n l e s s t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e p a r t y c l e a r l y knew o r r e a s o n a b l y s h o u l d have known t h a t h i s a c t i o n , c l a i m or defense o r any p a r t thereof was without substantial justification." Alabama has y e t t o c o n s t r u e o f t h e ALAA. when f i r s t caselaw See this particular However, we a r e n o t w i t h o u t construing construing Tidwell or apply v. guidance. t h e ALAA, o u r supreme c o u r t a Colorado Waldrop, statute similar 583 So. 6 2d 243, 244 section I n 1991, relied on t o t h e ALAA. ( A l a . 1991) 2090947 (relying App. on Lincicome, 737 P.2d 440, 441 (Colo. 1987)). The Colorado C o l o . Rev. to R u f f i n g v. counterpart S t a t . Ann. that contained to § 12-19-272 of the ALAA, § 13-17-102(6), c o n t a i n s wording s i m i l a r i n our s t a t u t e : "No p a r t y who i s a p p e a r i n g w i t h o u t an a t t o r n e y s h a l l be a s s e s s e d a t t o r n e y f e e s u n l e s s t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e p a r t y c l e a r l y knew o r r e a s o n a b l y should have known t h a t h i s a c t i o n o r d e f e n s e , o r any p a r t t h e r e o f , was s u b s t a n t i a l l y f r i v o l o u s , s u b s t a n t i a l l y g r o u n d l e s s , or s u b s t a n t i a l l y v e x a t i o u s ; except t h a t t h i s s u b s e c t i o n (6) s h a l l n o t a p p l y t o s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h an a t t o r n e y l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e l a w i n t h i s s t a t e i s a p p e a r i n g w i t h o u t an a t t o r n e y , i n w h i c h c a s e , he s h a l l be h e l d t o t h e s t a n d a r d s e s t a b l i s h e d for attorneys elsewhere i n t h i s a r t i c l e . " (Emphasis added.) subsection, attorney finding A concluding fees against required by Colorado that a pro the or defense A r t e s - R o y v. Artes-Roy because necessary Lyman, 833 court of was the se has court litigant that construed could not without the pro this assess making se substantial P.2d 64 62, the of the trial of court her justification. ( C o l o . App. assessment the litigant s h o u l d have known" t h a t h i s o r without reversed failure trial statute " c l e a r l y knew o r r e a s o n a b l y claim a court 1992). The attorney fees to make the f i n d i n g , and i t v a c a t e d t h e j u d g m e n t a s s e s s i n g f e e s . 7 2090947 Artes-Roy, between 833 P.2d a t 64. Colorado's statute Schweiger t h a t the t r i a l Thus, b a s e d and our on t h e own, similarity we agree with c o u r t was a l s o r e q u i r e d b y t h e ALAA t o make a f i n d i n g t h a t he " c l e a r l y knew o r r e a s o n a b l y should have known" t h a t t h e a c t i o n he f i l e d was w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l justification. § 12-19-272(e). Schweiger Dickerson 2003), further v. D i c k e r s o n , that that have court that 1 his on was action attorney failed filed a n d t h a t he " c l e a r l y known" justification. assessing h i s action justification based 885 So. 2d 160, 168 t h e judgment v a c a t e d because the t r i a l findings argues, our holding ( A l a . C i v . App. fees should be t o make t h e r e q u i s i t e without substantial knew o r r e a s o n a b l y was in without Schweiger i s c o r r e c t i n arguing should substantial t h a t we d i d I n h i s b r i e f , Schweiger s t a t e s t h a t the t r i a l court failed t o make a finding that he filed h i s action " i n t e n t i o n a l l y without substantial j u s t i f i c a t i o n . " Schweiger a p p a r e n t l y e q u a t e s t h e r e q u i r e d f i n d i n g i n § 1 2 - 1 9 - 2 7 2 ( e ) -¬ t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p r o se l i t i g a n t knew o r should have known that h i s action lacked substantial j u s t i f i c a t i o n -- w i t h a f i n d i n g o f i n t e n t on t h e p a r t o f t h e p r o se p l a i n t i f f . The s t a t u t e does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e p r o se l i t i g a n t i n t e n d e d t o f i l e an a c t i o n w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n b e f o r e an a s s e s s m e n t o f a t t o r n e y f e e s c a n be made; a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e p r o se l i t i g a n t s h o u l d have known o f t h e l a c k o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h i s o r h e r a c t i o n w i l l s u f f i c e t o p e r m i t an a s s e s s m e n t o f 1 8 2090947 vacate the attorney-fee assessment against t h e mother i n D i c k e r s o n i n s t e a d o f r e v e r s i n g t h e judgment a s s e s s i n g fees and remanding t h e cause f o r t h e t r i a l attorney court to state i t s b a s i s f o r t h e a w a r d ; h o w e v e r , we d i d s o a f t e r a r e v i e w of the e x t e n s i v e h i s t o r y o f t h e ongoing l i t i g a t i o n between t h e mother and t h e f a t h e r i n a h i g h l y c o n t e s t e d p o s t m i n o r i t y - e d u c a t i o n a l support case, which, we determined, d i d not support a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e m o t h e r ' s p e t i t i o n s a n d m o t i o n s were f i l e d without substantial justification. Dickerson, 885 So. 2d a t In c o n t r a s t w i t h the r e c o r d i n Dickerson, the record i n 168. the present present and appeal appeal that The r e c o r d i n the r e f l e c t s only t h a t Schweiger f i l e d h i s a c t i o n t h e Town expenditures i s f a r more s p a r s e . opposed of which i t on Schweiger the basis that (1) t h e complained d i d not v i o l a t e Amendment 354 b a s e d on an a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l ' s o p i n i o n a n d (2) t h a t t h e a u d i t S c h w e i g e r demanded h a d b e e n d e l a y e d b e c a u s e o f t h e Town's f i n a n c i a l i n a b i l i t y t o p a y f o r one. A t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e Town's m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , t h e t r i a l a r g u m e n t s f r o m t h e Town's c o u n s e l attorney fees against that entertained and Schweiger and litigant. 9 court accepted 2090947 exhibits, including the attorney general's t h e Town r e l i e d , b u t no t e s t i m o n y was t a k e n . from the sparse Schweiger's record action before was us brought o p i n i o n on w h i c h We c a n n o t g l e a n 2 i n this case without whether substantial j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d , i f i t was, w h e t h e r S c h w e i g e r " c l e a r l y knew o r r e a s o n a b l y s h o u l d have known" o f t h e l a c k o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i s action. In make addition, we n o t e the r e q u i s i t e that the t r i a l f i n d i n g s t o support leaves this court court's failure to i t s assessment of attorney fees without the ability determine t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w on a p p e a l . to The We n o t e t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f m a t t e r s o u t s i d e t h e p l e a d i n g s b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o u l d have c o n v e r t e d t h e Town's m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t o a m o t i o n f o r a summary judgment. See R u l e 1 2 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. ( " I f , on a m o t i o n a s s e r t i n g t h e d e f e n s e numbered (6) t o d i s m i s s f o r f a i l u r e o f t h e p l e a d i n g t o s t a t e a c l a i m upon w h i c h r e l i e f c a n be g r a n t e d , m a t t e r s o u t s i d e t h e p l e a d i n g a r e p r e s e n t e d t o and n o t e x c l u d e d b y t h e c o u r t , t h e m o t i o n s h a l l be t r e a t e d as one f o r summary j u d g m e n t a n d d i s p o s e d o f as p r o v i d e d i n R u l e 56, [ A l a . R. C i v . P.] a n d a l l p a r t i e s s h a l l be g i v e n reasonable o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t a l l m a t e r i a l made p e r t i n e n t t o s u c h a m o t i o n b y R u l e 5 6 . " ) ; B o l e s v . B l a c k s t o c k , 484 So. 2d 1077, 1079 ( A l a . 1986) ( r e v i e w i n g a j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d on a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s as a summary j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e m a t t e r s o u t s i d e t h e p l e a d i n g s had c o n v e r t e d t h e motion t o d i s m i s s t o a motion f o r a summary j u d g m e n t ) . However, b e c a u s e S c h w e i g e r does n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e d i s m i s s a l o f h i s a c t i o n on a p p e a l , we n e e d n o t determine whether the t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a d i s m i s s a l o r a summary j u d g m e n t . 2 10 2090947 s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w o f an a s s e s s m e n t o f a t t o r n e y f e e s u n d e r t h e ALAA v a r i e s , d e p e n d i n g on w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l t h e a c t i o n t o be w i t h o u t is "groundless "frivolous," purpose." the law," i n law" or because i t i s "groundless "vexatious," court concludes or "interposed O i l Co., f o r an review conclusion "groundless purpose" action "vexatious," i s based is or "interposed on f a c t u a l Id. more stated fact," Id. that an a c t i o n "frivolous," that "vexatious," improper purpose" w i l l in f i n d i n g s the t r i a l d e f e r e n t i a l standard. a conclusion be r e v e r s e d Our or fact," improper court on a p p e a l supreme under has i s "groundless in "interposed on a p p e a l only evidence, for any i f i ti s supporting unjust, weight of the evidence.'" the great must court " ' c l e a r l y erroneous, without or against in However, a f o r any make, w h i c h f i n d i n g s a r e , n a t u r a l l y , r e v i e w e d a If t h a t c o n c l u s i o n de novo of law. an improper 614 So. 2d a t 418. because i t i n v o l v e s a pure q u e s t i o n that i n fact," that the a c t i o n i s "groundless t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t may "frivolous," determines s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n because i t P a c i f i c Enters. trial court manifestly Id. ( q u o t i n g Cove C r e e k Dev. C o r p . v. APAC-Alabama, I n c . , 588 So. 11 2090947 2d 458, 461 (Ala. 1991)). whether a pro L i k e w i s e , because a se l i t i g a n t "clearly determination knew o r r e a s o n a b l y should have known" o f t h e l a c k o f s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n or her such a c t i o n c o n t a i n s a f a c t u a l component, we a determination s t a n d a r d and, should t h e r e f o r e , may be reviewed the conclude under sparse record before that the n o t be r e v e r s e d on a p p e a l t h a t c o n c l u s i o n i s u n s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . Thus, b a s e d on for his same unless See i d . us and the fact t h a t we c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n this i n s t a n c e , we d e c l i n e Schweiger's request a s s e s s m e n t o f a t t o r n e y f e e s as we as our supreme court did in to vacate d i d i n Dickerson. Pacific Enters. the Instead, O i l Co., we r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s o f a r as i t a s s e s s e d a t t o r n e y f e e s a g a i n s t S c h w e i g e r , and we the trial brought remand t h e c a u s e f o r c o u r t to determine whether Schweiger's a c t i o n without substantial whether Schweiger e i t h e r justification, "clearly knew o r and, reasonably i f was so, should have known" t h a t h i s a c t i o n l a c k e d s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n and f o r the t r i a l record or by c o u r t t o make t h e n e c e s s a r y separate a s s e s s m e n t i t may make on order to remand. 12 support f i n d i n g s on any the attorney-fee 2090947 REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, P . J . , and P i t t m a n , concur. 13 Bryan, and Moore, JJ.,

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