Hilda Ruffin v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation

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REL: 4/29/11 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 2090814 Hilda Ruffin v. General Motors Acceptance C o r p o r a t i o n Appeal from Lowndes C i r c u i t (CV-02-164.80) Court PER CURIAM. H i l d a R u f f i n , one o f t h e p l a i n t i f f s b e l o w , a p p e a l s a summary judgment i n favor o f General Motors from Acceptance C o r p o r a t i o n ("GMAC"), t h e d e f e n d a n t b e l o w . We a f f i r m i n p a r t , reverse i n p a r t , a n d remand. 2090814 Factual Background R u f f i n , who i s A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n , b e g a n w o r k i n g f o r GMAC as a l e v e l - 2 c r e d i t c l e r k i n GMAC's Gadsden o f f i c e i n 1985. 1986, was s h e was p r o m o t e d t o a l e v e l - 3 c r e d i t c l e r k . I n 1987, promoted t o a l e v e l - 4 c u s t o m e r - s e r v i c e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . 1994, s h e moved t o GMAC's B i r m i n g h a m became a l e v e l - 4 office. credit office. administrator Birmingham office announced B i r m i n g h a m o f f i c e as p a r t offered a position accepted. R u f f i n June 2001. 1 Also that t o two i t was Atlanta a n d R u f f i n was office, position i n the Atlanta office, applied Hopkins. closing i t s was t h e n " b a n d e d " a s a l e v e l - 5 i n 2001, R u f f i n Birmingham inits of a reorganization, i n GMAC's she promotions") ( " t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 2 0 0 1 , GMAC In positions Caucasian employees, C h r i s t a W i l l i a m s o n and K e l l y In she I n 1996, i n GMAC's I n 1 9 9 9 , GMAC a w a r d e d two l e v e l - 5 In which employee i n for a w h i c h w o u l d have she level-6 constituted a p r o m o t i o n f o r h e r i f i t h a d b e e n a w a r d e d t o h e r ( " t h e 2001 level-6 p r o m o t i o n " ) ; however, that position was a w a r d e d t o When a s k e d i n h e r d e p o s i t i o n what " b a n d i n g " means, R u f f i n t e s t i f i e d t h a t " [ t ] h a t means t h a t e v e r y o n e i n A t l a n t a a l r e a d y were L e v e l 5 s , a n d t h e y h a d t o b r i n g t h e B i r m i n g h a m e m p l o y e e s up t o what o t h e r e m p l o y e e s were a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d . " 1 2 2090814 Donna V e r l i n g , a C a u c a s i a n e m p l o y e e , i n A u g u s t 2 0 0 1 . On August Employment 24, 2001, R u f f i n Opportunity filed Commission with ( " t h e EEOC") the a Equal charge c l a i m i n g t h a t GMAC h a d d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t h e r on t h e b a s i s of h e r r a c e . right-to-sue 2 The EEOC i n v e s t i g a t e d h e r c h a r g e a n d i s s u e d a letter on S e p t e m b e r 18, 2002. Procedural On December 16, 2002, History Ruffin and f i v e A m e r i c a n e m p l o y e e s o f GMAC ( " t h e o t h e r GMAC i n t h e Lowndes C i r c u i t C o u r t . had v i o l a t e d T i t l e The charge. 2 record not contain African- f i v e p l a i n t i f f s " ) sued R u f f i n claimed 3 V I I of the C i v i l does other Rights a copy t h a t GMAC A c t o f 1964, 42 of Ruffin's EEOC Because the other f i v e p l a i n t i f f s are not p a r t i e s t o t h i s a p p e a l , we do n o t d i s c u s s t h e s p e c i f i c s o f t h e i r c l a i m s . 3 3 2090814 U.S.C. § 2000e discriminating respect Ruffin et against seq., 4 and 42 U.S.C. h e r on t h e b a s i s § 1981 of h e r race by 5 with t o job-performance e v a l u a t i o n s , promotions, and pay. a l l e g e d t h a t GMAC h a d d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t h e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o job-performance e v a l u a t i o n s by r a t i n g h e r below t h e 4 42 U.S.C. § 2 0 0 0 e - 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) p r o v i d e s : " I t s h a l l be an u n l a w f u l employment p r a c t i c e f o r an e m p l o y e r -¬ " ( 1 ) t o f a i l o r r e f u s e t o h i r e o r t o d i s c h a r g e any i n d i v i d u a l , o r o t h e r w i s e t o d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t any i n d i v i d u a l w i t h respect t o h i s compensation, terms, c o n d i t i o n s , o r p r i v i l e g e s o f employment, b e c a u s e o f such i n d i v i d u a l ' s race, c o l o r , r e l i g i o n , sex, or national origin." 5 42 U.S.C. § 1 9 8 1 ( a ) p r o v i d e s : " A l l persons w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the United S t a t e s s h a l l h a v e t h e same r i g h t i n e v e r y S t a t e a n d T e r r i t o r y t o make a n d e n f o r c e c o n t r a c t s , t o s u e , be p a r t i e s , g i v e evidence, and t o t h e f u l l and equal b e n e f i t o f a l l laws and proceedings f o r t h e s e c u r i t y o f p e r s o n s a n d p r o p e r t y as i s e n j o y e d b y w h i t e c i t i z e n s , a n d s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o l i k e p u n i s h m e n t , p a i n s , p e n a l t i e s , t a x e s , l i c e n s e s , and e x a c t i o n s o f e v e r y k i n d , a n d t o no o t h e r . " S e c t i o n 42 U.S.C. 1 9 8 1 ( b ) p r o v i d e s : " F o r p u r p o s e s o f t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e t e r m 'make a n d e n f o r c e c o n t r a c t s ' i n c l u d e s t h e making, performance, m o d i f i c a t i o n , and t e r m i n a t i o n o f c o n t r a c t s , and t h e enjoyment o f a l l b e n e f i t s , p r i v i l e g e s , terms, and conditions of the contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p . " 4 2090814 a c t u a l r a t i n g s h e d e s e r v e d b a s e d on h e r j o b p e r f o r m a n c e , w h i c h adversely affected her a b i l i t y to receive p r o m o t i o n s . She a l l e g e d t h a t GMAC h a d d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t h e r w i t h to promotions employees by awarding promotions to f o r which less qualified Ruffin Caucasian was q u a l i f i e d . a l l e g e d t h a t GMAC h a d d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t h e r w i t h t o pay by p a y i n g performing She respect h e r l e s s t h a n C a u c a s i a n e m p l o y e e s who were t h e same j o b a t t h e same g r a d e In January respect level. 2003, GMAC removed t h e a c t i o n t o t h e U n i t e d States D i s t r i c t Court f o r the Middle District o f Alabama. I n F e b r u a r y 2003, t h a t c o u r t remanded t h e a c t i o n t o t h e Lowndes Circuit Court. On M a r c h 5, 2003, GMAC moved t o d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n o r , i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , t o t r a n s f e r the a c t i o n t o a d i f f e r e n t venue. Specifically, GMAC a s s e r t e d t h a t v e n u e was n o t p r o p e r i n t h e Lowndes C i r c u i t C o u r t u n d e r § 6 - 3 - 7 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, a n d , 6 6 Section 6-3-7(a) provides: " ( a ) A l l c i v i l a c t i o n s a g a i n s t c o r p o r a t i o n s may be b r o u g h t i n a n y o f t h e f o l l o w i n g c o u n t i e s : "(1) I n the county i n which a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f the events o r omissions g i v i n g r i s e t o the claim occurred, or a substantial part of real property that i s 5 2090814 therefore, t h a t the 6-5-430, A l a . the action should Code 1 9 7 5 , subject 7 or, of the be i n the dismissed pursuant to a l t e r n a t i v e , should a c t i o n i s s i t u a t e d ; or "(2) In the county corporation's principal office s t a t e ; or of in the this "(3) In the county i n which the p l a i n t i f f r e s i d e d , or i f the p l a i n t i f f i s an e n t i t y o t h e r t h a n an i n d i v i d u a l , where t h e p l a i n t i f f had i t s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e i n t h i s s t a t e , at the time of the a c c r u a l of the cause of a c t i o n , i f such c o r p o r a t i o n does b u s i n e s s by a g e n t i n t h e c o u n t y o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s r e s i d e n c e ; or " ( 4 ) I f s u b d i v i s i o n s ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , o r (3) do n o t a p p l y , i n any c o u n t y i n w h i c h t h e c o r p o r a t i o n was d o i n g b u s i n e s s by a g e n t a t the time of the a c c r u a l of the cause of action." 7 Section 6-5-430 provides: "Whenever, e i t h e r by common l a w o r t h e s t a t u t e s o f a n o t h e r s t a t e or o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s , a c l a i m , e i t h e r upon c o n t r a c t o r i n t o r t has a r i s e n o u t s i d e t h i s s t a t e a g a i n s t any p e r s o n o r c o r p o r a t i o n , s u c h c l a i m may be e n f o r c e a b l e i n t h e c o u r t s o f t h i s s t a t e i n any c o u n t y i n w h i c h j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e d e f e n d a n t can be l e g a l l y o b t a i n e d i n t h e same manner i n w h i c h j u r i s d i c t i o n c o u l d have b e e n o b t a i n e d i f t h e c l a i m had a r i s e n i n t h i s s t a t e ; p r o v i d e d , h o w e v e r , t h e c o u r t s of t h i s s t a t e s h a l l apply the d o c t r i n e of f o r u m non conveniens i n determining whether to a c c e p t o r d e c l i n e t o t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f an a c t i o n b a s e d upon s u c h c l a i m o r i g i n a t i n g o u t s i d e this s t a t e ; and p r o v i d e d f u r t h e r t h a t , i f upon m o t i o n o f 6 § be 2090814 t r a n s f e r r e d t o the J e f f e r s o n 2 1 . 1 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . denied GMAC's M a r c h alternative, On action trial C i r c u i t C o u r t p u r s u a n t t o § 6-3- On O c t o b e r 20, 2003, t h e t r i a l 8 5, 2003, m o t i o n t o dismiss or, i n the to transfer. August 20, 2004, GMAC again moved or, i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , t o transfer court court t o dismiss the i t ; however, t h e d e n i e d t h a t m o t i o n on December 29, 2004. On J a n u a r y 27, 2005, GMAC p e t i t i o n e d t h e A l a b a m a Supreme any d e f e n d a n t i t i s shown t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a more appropriate forum outside t h i s s t a t e , t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e l o c a t i o n where t h e a c t s g i v i n g r i s e t o the a c t i o n o c c u r r e d , t h e convenience o f the p a r t i e s and w i t n e s s e s , a n d t h e i n t e r e s t s o f j u s t i c e , t h e c o u r t must d i s m i s s the action without prejudice. Such d i s m i s s a l may be c o n d i t i o n e d upon t h e d e f e n d a n t or defendants f i l i n g w i t h the court a consent ( i ) t o submit t o j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e i d e n t i f i e d forum, o r ( i i ) t o w a i v e a n y d e f e n s e b a s e d upon a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i f an a c t i o n on t h e same c a u s e o f a c t i o n i s commenced i n t h e i d e n t i f i e d f o r u m w i t h i n 60 days of the d i s m i s s a l . " 8 In pertinent part, § 6-3-21.1 provides: " ( a ) W i t h r e s p e c t t o c i v i l a c t i o n s f i l e d i n an a p p r o p r i a t e venue, any c o u r t o f g e n e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a l l , f o r the convenience o f p a r t i e s and witnesses, or i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f j u s t i c e , t r a n s f e r any c i v i l a c t i o n o r any c l a i m i n any c i v i l a c t i o n t o any c o u r t of g e n e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n which t h e a c t i o n might have b e e n p r o p e r l y f i l e d a n d t h e c a s e s h a l l p r o c e e d as t h o u g h o r i g i n a l l y f i l e d t h e r e i n . " 7 2090814 Court f o r a w r i t o f mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e Lowndes C o u r t t o g r a n t GMAC's m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s alternative, to transfer On theaction or, i n the i t . The supreme p e t i t i o n w i t h o u t an o p i n i o n court denied the on J u l y 8, 2005. F e b r u a r y 20, 2007, GMAC moved t h e t r i a l summary j u d g m e n t w i t h r e s p e c t other f i v e p l a i n t i f f s . asserted that it (1) R u f f i n ' s said, evaluations, Circuit t o the claims With respect court o f R u f f i n and the to Ruffin's claims, i t was e n t i t l e d t o a summary j u d g m e n t § 1981 c l a i m s for a GMAC because, b a s e d on j o b - p e r f o r m a n c e p r o m o t i o n s , a n d p a y were t i m e - b a r r e d b y t h e t w o - y e a r A l a b a m a s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , w h i c h , GMAC s a i d , t o R u f f i n ' s § 1981 c l a i m s ; applied (2) R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I c l a i m based on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s was t i m e - b a r r e d b e c a u s e , GMAC s a i d , s h e h a d n o t f i l e d h e r EEOC c h a r g e w i t h i n 180 days after the Title 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s were a w a r d e d ; V I I a n d § 1981 c l a i m s no m e r i t b e c a u s e , was (3) R u f f i n ' s b a s e d on t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n h a d GMAC s a i d , s h e c o u l d n e i t h e r p r o v e t h a t s h e q u a l i f i e d f o r a l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n when t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 promotion legitimate, was awarded to Verling nondiscriminatory reason p r o m o t i n g V e r l i n g was a p r e t e x t ; 8 nor prove offered that the b y GMAC f o r (4) R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I a n d § 2090814 1981 no c l a i m s b a s e d on j o b - p e r f o r m a n c e said, e v a l u a t i o n s and pay had merit because, GMAC she c o u l d similarly situated non-African-American not prove employees that received more f a v o r a b l e j o b - p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s o r h i g h e r pay; (5) R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I c l a i m b a s e d on p a y was t i m e - b a r r e d i n s o f a r as i t was b a s e d on p a y s h e r e c e i v e d more t h a n 180 days b e f o r e she f i l e d h e r EEOC c h a r g e ; (6) R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I c l a i m based on p a y was p r o c e d u r a l l y b a r r e d i n s o f a r as i t was b a s e d on p a y she received after and (7) R u f f i n c o u l d n o t p r e v a i l on a n y o f h e r c l a i m s b e c a u s e , GMAC s a i d , t h e EEOC i s s u e d t h e r i g h t - t o - s u e she c o u l d intentionally not prove discriminated African-American. that letter; GMAC p u r p o s e f u l l y a n d a g a i n s t h e r because s h e i s an I n s u p p o r t o f i t s summary-judgment m o t i o n , GMAC s u b m i t t e d , among o t h e r t h i n g s , an a f f i d a v i t s i g n e d by P h i l l i p W i l s o n ("the W i l s o n a f f i d a v i t " ) , a r e t i r e d e m p l o y e e o f GMAC who h a d s e r v e d as Human R e s o u r c e s Southeast Region affidavit Manager f o r GMAC's f r o m 2001 t h r o u g h F e b r u a r y 1, 2005, a n d an s i g n e d b y A s h l e y C i n k ("the C i n k a f f i d a v i t " ) , a GMAC e m p l o y e e who h a d s e r v e d a s Human R e s o u r c e s Manager f o r GMAC's E a s t e r n R e g i o n , w h i c h i n c l u d e d GMAC's S o u t h e a s t R e g i o n , May 2004 t h r o u g h J u l y 2005. 9 from 2090814 On June 6, 2007, R u f f i n f i l e d t h e i r response motion. On plaintiffs affidavit five p l a i n t i f f s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o GMAC's summary-judgment November moved and t h e o t h e r 1, 2007, the t r i a l and t h e Cink Ruffin court and t h e other to strike other affidavit and five plaintiffs' and t h e Cink the other responses five Wilson affidavit. On December 27, 2007, GMAC f i l e d r e s p o n s e s the the five motions affidavit. plaintiffs t o R u f f i n and to strike the Wilson On M a r c h 3 1 , 2008, filed replies Ruffin t o GMAC's t o R u f f i n and t h e other f i v e p l a i n t i f f s ' motions t o s t r i k e t h e W i l s o n a f f i d a v i t a n d t h e C i n k a f f i d a v i t . On May 6, 2008, R u f f i n a n d t h e o t h e r f i v e p l a i n t i f f s s u p p l e m e n t e d motion t o s t r i k e and the other t h e C i n k a f f i d a v i t . On J u l y 7, 2008, five p l a i n t i f f s supplemented t h e i r their Ruffin motion t o s t r i k e t h e C i n k a f f i d a v i t a s e c o n d t i m e . On S e p t e m b e r 5, 2008, GMAC r e s p o n d e d t o t h e s u p p l e m e n t s t o t h e m o t i o n t o s t r i k e t h e Cink affidavit. After taking p r o f f e r e d by R u f f i n May 6, address 2009, the deposition and t h e other supplemented the testimony of five the expert p l a i n t i f f s , GMAC, on i t s summary-judgment of that expert 10 witness witness. motion to 2090814 Following 2009, entered a hearing, an order the trial ("the court, September on 21 September order") 21, granting GMAC's summary-judgment m o t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o R u f f i n ' s c l a i m s but denying i t with plaintiffs. The respect trial to the court claims d i d not of the expressly other rule m o t i o n s t o s t r i k e t h e W i l s o n a f f i d a v i t and t h e C i n k five on the affidavit. M o r e o v e r , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t d i r e c t t h a t t h e S e p t e m b e r 21 o r d e r be entered Ala. Civ. R. stipulated and, ("the as a f i n a l P. to the judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e Subsequently, the d i s m i s s a l of t h e i r on December 15, 2009, t h e December 15 o r d e r " ) trial 54(b), other five plaintiffs claims with prejudice, court entered d i s m i s s i n g the an order c l a i m s of the other five p l a i n t i f f s with prejudice. On Civ. trial J a n u a r y 8, P., 2010, Ruffin filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. postjudgment motion c h a l l e n g i n g the p r o p r i e t y of court's summary j u d g m e n t as t o her c o u r t d i d n o t r u l e on R u f f i n ' s R u l e 59(e) w i t h i n 90 d a y s a f t e r i t was c l a i m s . The R. the trial postjudgment motion f i l e d ; consequently, i t was denied by o p e r a t i o n o f l a w p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 59.1, A l a . R. C i v . P., on April filed of 8, 2010. On May 18, 2010, a p p e a l t o t h e supreme c o u r t . The 11 Ruffin a notice supreme c o u r t t r a n s f e r r e d t h e 2090814 appeal t o t h i s court pursuant t o § 12-2-7(6), Jurisdictional A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . Challenge As a t h r e s h o l d m a t t e r , GMAC a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s c o u r t l a c k s jurisdiction did over R u f f i n ' s appeal b e c a u s e , GMAC s a y s , R u f f i n n o t t i m e l y f i l e h e r n o t i c e o f a p p e a l . GMAC f i r s t t h a t R u f f i n d i d not t i m e l y f i l e h e r n o t i c e o f appeal argues because, GMAC s a y s , s h e d i d n o t f i l e i t w i t h i n 42 d a y s a f t e r t h e e n t r y of t h e September 21 o r d e r granting GMAC's summary-judgment m o t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o R u f f i n ' s c l a i m s . However, " [ a ] n appeal o r d i n a r i l y l i e s o n l y from the e n t r y o f a f i n a l j u d g m e n t . A l a . Code 1975, § 12-22-2; Bean v. C r a i g , 557 So. 2 d 1 2 4 9 , 1253 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) . A judgment i s g e n e r a l l y n o t f i n a l u n l e s s a l l c l a i m s , o r t h e r i g h t s o r l i a b i l i t i e s o f a l l p a r t i e s , have b e e n d e c i d e d . E x p a r t e H a r r i s , 506 So. 2d 1003, 1004 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 8 7 ) . The o n l y e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s r u l e o f f i n a l i t y i s when t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i r e c t s t h e e n t r y o f a f i n a l judgment p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. Bean, 557 So. 2 d a t 1253." H e n n i n g v . H e n n i n g , 999 So. 2 d 523, In 525 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2008) . t h e c a s e now b e f o r e u s , t h e S e p t e m b e r 21 o r d e r d i d n o t adjudicate the claims o f a l l t h e p a r t i e s o r t h e r i g h t s and l i a b i l i t i e s o f a l l the p a r t i e s ; i t a d j u d i c a t e d o n l y the claims of R u f f i n . Moreover, t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t d i r e c t t h a t t h e S e p t e m b e r 21 o r d e r be e n t e r e d as a f i n a l j u d g m e n t p u r s u a n t t o Rule 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. C o n s e q u e n t l y , 12 an a p p e a l could not 2090814 lie to f r o m t h e S e p t e m b e r 21 o r d e r , a n d R u f f i n was n o t r e q u i r e d f i l e h e r n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w i t h i n 42 days a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f the S e p t e m b e r 21 o r d e r . See H e n n i n g . Second, GMAC a r g u e s t h a t R u f f i n d i d n o t t i m e l y f i l e h e r n o t i c e o f appeal because, GMAC s a y s , she d i d n o t f i l e 5 9 ( e ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., m o t i o n toll "within 30 days t h e time f o r h e r t o appeal the C i r c u i t a Rule i n order t o C o u r t ' s summary j u d g m e n t r u l i n g , as r e q u i r e d b y A l a . R. C i v . P. 5 9 ( e ) . " GMAC's b r i e f a t p. 20. G i v e n t h a t R u f f i n f i l e d h e r R u l e 59(e) on J a n u a r y 8, 2010, of t h e December w h i c h was w i t h i n 30 days a f t e r t h e e n t r y 15 o r d e r , GMAC a p p e a r s Ruffin d i d not timely f i l e did not f i l e motion i t within t o be a r g u i n g that h e r R u l e 59(e) m o t i o n b e c a u s e s h e 30 days after the entry of the S e p t e m b e r 21 o r d e r . However, t h e supreme c o u r t h a s h e l d that a R u l e 59(e) m o t i o n may be made o n l y i n r e f e r e n c e t o a f i n a l , appealable judgment: "By i t s e x p r e s s t e r m s , R u l e 59(e) a p p l i e s o n l y where there i s a 'judgment.' That term i s s p e c i f i c a l l y d e f i n e d i n A l a . R. C i v . P. 5 4 ( a ) , a s ' a d e c r e e a n d a n y o r d e r f r o m w h i c h an a p p e a l l i e s . ' (Emphasis added.) Rule 59 does not apply t o i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r s , because such o r d e r s remain ' w i t h i n t h e b r e a s t o f t h e c o u r t . ' Rheams v . Rheams, 378 So. 2 d 1125, 1128 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 7 9 ) . A ' R u l e 59 m o t i o n may be made o n l y i n r e f e r e n c e t o a f i n a l j u d g m e n t o r o r d e r . ' M a l o n e v . G a i n e y , 726 So. 2 d 13 2090814 725, 725 n.2 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1999); see also A n d e r s o n v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 ( 1 0 t h Cir. 1 9 8 8 ) ; Momar, I n c . v. S c h n e i d e r , 823 So. 2d 701, 704 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2001) (a R u l e 59(e) ' m o t i o n may be t a k e n o n l y f r o m a f i n a l j u d g m e n t ' ) . " Ex p a r t e T r o u t m a n S a n d e r s , L L P , 866 So. 2d 547, 549-50 ( A l a . 2003). Thus, b e c a u s e an a p p e a l c o u l d n o t l i e f r o m t h e S e p t e m b e r 21 o r d e r , see H e n n i n g , file the R u l e 59(e) d i d n o t r e q u i r e t h a t Ruffin h e r R u l e 59(e) m o t i o n w i t h i n 30 days a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f September 21 o r d e r ; i t r e q u i r e d t h a t R u f f i n f i l e h e r R u l e 59(e) m o t i o n w i t h i n 30 days a f t e r t h e e n t r y o f t h e December 15 o r d e r , w h i c h was t h e f i n a l , trial court. within 30 Ruffin days after a p p e a l a b l e judgment e n t e r e d by the did timely file her Rule 59(e) motion t h e e n t r y o f t h e December 15 o r d e r . I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , R u l e 4 ( a ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. App. P., p r o v i d e s : "The f i l i n g o f a p o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e s 50, 52, 55 o r 59 o f t h e A l a b a m a R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e (ARCP) s h a l l s u s p e n d t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e t i m e f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l . I n c a s e s where post-judgment motions are f i l e d , the f u l l time f i x e d f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l s h a l l be computed f r o m the d a t e o f t h e e n t r y i n t h e c i v i l d o c k e t o f an order g r a n t i n g or denying such motion. I f such p o s t judgment motion is deemed denied under the p r o v i s i o n s o f R u l e 59.1 o f t h e A l a b a m a R u l e s o f C i v i l Procedure, then the time f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l s h a l l be c o m p u t e d f r o m t h e d a t e o f d e n i a l of s u c h m o t i o n b y o p e r a t i o n o f l a w , as p r o v i d e d f o r i n R u l e 59.1." 14 2090814 Ruffin's timely f i l i n g the running o f the time her m o t i o n was d e n i e d 59.1 on on A p r i l o f h e r R u l e 59(e) for f i l i n g that this of law pursuant She t i m e l y f i l e d May 18, 2 0 1 0 . A c c o r d i n g l y , argument her n o t i c e o f appeal by operation 8, 2 0 1 0 . court we f i n d lacks motion suspended until t o Rule her n o t i c e of appeal no m e r i t jurisdiction over i n GMAC's Ruffin's appeal. Venue Challenge GMAC a l s o a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s c o u r t s h o u l d d i s m i s s R u f f i n ' s a p p e a l b e c a u s e , GMAC s a y s , t h e Lowndes C i r c u i t C o u r t became an i m p r o p e r venue f o r R u f f i n ' s c l a i m s upon t h e e n t r y o f t h e trial c o u r t ' s December 15 o r d e r b e c a u s e , GMAC s a y s , t h e December 15 order dismissed with prejudice the claims of the only p l a i n t i f f who was a r e s i d e n t o f Lowndes C o u n t y . However, a r g u m e n t h a s no m e r i t b e c a u s e , " [ a ] s f r e q u e n t l y held, proper this [ t h e supreme c o u r t ] h a s venue f o r an a c t i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d a t t h e commencement o f t h e a c t i o n . " E x p a r t e O v e r s t r e e t , 748 So. 2d 194, 196 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . Standard o f Review " T h i s C o u r t ' s r e v i e w o f a summary j u d g m e n t i s de n o v o . W i l l i a m s v . S t a t e Farm Mut. A u t o . I n s . Co., 886 So. 2 d 72, 74 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . We a p p l y t h e same s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w as t h e t r i a l court applied. 15 2090814 S p e c i f i c a l l y , we must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e movant has made a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s a n d t h a t t h e movant i s e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . R u l e 5 6 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P.; B l u e C r o s s & B l u e S h i e l d o f A l a b a m a v . H o d u r s k i , 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 ( A l a . 2004). I n making s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , we must r e v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e nonmovant. W i l s o n v . Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . Once t h e movant makes a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e b u r d e n t h e n s h i f t s t o t h e nonmovant t o produce ' s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ' as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. S o u t h T r u s t Bank o f B a l d w i n C o u n t y , 538 So. 2 d 794, 797-98 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) ; A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , § 12-21-12. ' [ S ] u b s t a n t i a l evidence i s evidence o f such weight and q u a l i t y t h a t f a i r - m i n d e d p e r s o n s i n t h e e x e r c i s e of i m p a r t i a l judgment can r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f a c t s o u g h t t o be p r o v e d . ' West v . F o u n d e r s L i f e A s s u r . Co. o f F l a . , 547 So. 2d 870, 871 ( A l a . 1989) Dow v. Alabama (Ala. Democratic Party, 897 So. 2 d 1035, 1038-39 2004). Analysis A. W h e t h e r R u f f i n ' s § 1981 c l a i m s b a s e d on j o b - p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s , promotions, and pay a r e t i m e - b a r r e d . GMAC a r g u e d t h a t i t was e n t i t l e d t o a summary j u d g m e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o a l l R u f f i n ' s § 1981 c l a i m s b e c a u s e , those claims limitations. were Ruffin b a r r e d b y Alabama's argued two-year i t said, statute of t h a t GMAC was n o t e n t i t l e d to a summary j u d g m e n t on t h a t g r o u n d b e c a u s e , s h e s a i d , a f o u r - y e a r 16 2090814 s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a p p l i e d t o those Section 1981 does not contain claims. an e x p r e s s statute of limitations. "Prior t o 1990, i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e p r o p e r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , f e d e r a l c o u r t s were t o a p p l y t h e most a n a l o g o u s s t a t e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s t o § 1981 c l a i m s , w h i c h , i n t h i s c a s e , was two y e a r s u n d e r A l a b a m a l a w . See Goodman v. L u k e n s S t e e l Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660-61, 107 S . C t . 2617, 2620-21, 96 L.Ed. 2d 572 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , s u p e r s e d e d b y s t a t u t e as s t a t e d i n J o n e s v. R.R. D o n n e l l e y & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 124 S . C t . 1836, 158 L . E d . 2d 645 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; s e e a l s o Moore v . L i b e r t y N a t . L i f e I n s . Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1219 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2001) ( a p p l y i n g A l a b a m a ' s t w o - y e a r statute of l i m i t a t i o n s for personal-injury t o r t s to § 1981 c l a i m ) . I n 1990, C o n g r e s s e n a c t e d § 1 6 5 8 ( a ) , which created a d e f a u l t four-year l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d for f e d e r a l causes o f a c t i o n c r e a t e d a f t e r t h a t d a t e . See 28 U.S.C. § 1658. One y e a r l a t e r , as p a r t o f t h e C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1 9 9 1 , C o n g r e s s amended § 1981 t o i n c l u d e a c a u s e o f a c t i o n f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f employment as w e l l as d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e making and enforcement o f c o n t r a c t s . See 42 U.S.C. § 1 9 8 1 . "The Supreme C o u r t s u b s e q u e n t l y d e t e r m i n e d i n J o n e s v . R.R. D o n n e l l e y & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 124 S . C t . 1836, 1845, 158 L . E d . 2d 645 ( 2 0 0 4 ) , t h a t C o n g r e s s ' s 1990 e n a c t m e n t o f § 1658 c h a n g e d t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d t o f o u r y e a r s f o r some c l a i m s u n d e r § 1 9 8 1 . See i d ^ a t 377-80, 124 S . C t . a t 1842-44. The Supreme C o u r t a l s o e x p l a i n e d t h a t , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e C i v i l R i g h t s A c t o f 1991 c r e a t e d new c a u s e s o f a c t i o n n o t p r e v i o u s l y c o g n i z a b l e u n d e r § 1981, such c l a i m s a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e f o u r - y e a r ' c a t c h - a l l ' s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o f § 1658. See i d . a t 380-83, 124 S . C t . a t 1844-45." P r i c e v . M&H V a l v e Co., (No. 05-15205, A p r i l 17 7, 2006) ( 1 1 t h 2090814 Cir. 2006) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) In her b r i e f t o t h i s c o u r t , R u f f i n argues t h a t the four- y e a r s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o f 28 U.S.C. § 1658 a p p l i e s t o h e r § 1981 claim Patterson v. based on McLean the 1999 Credit level-5 Union, 491 promotions. U.S. 164 s u p e r s e d e d by s t a t u t e as s t a t e d i n J o n e s v. R.R. Sons Co., before 1991, if new 541 U.S. 369 a failure-to-promote the promotion and employer." distinct Id. at (1989), Donnelley & ( 2 0 0 4 ) , w h i c h a p p l i e d t o § 1981 t h e amendments c o n t a i n e d i n the c l a i m was rose "to the l e v e l relation between Civil actionable Under Rights claims Act under § o f an o p p o r t u n i t y the employee 1981 for a and 185. "In P a t t e r s o n , the Court sought t o d i s t i n g u i s h between routine increases in salary or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w h i c h a r e c l e a r l y p a r t o f an o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t o f employment and p r o m o t i o n s w h i c h s i g n a l a new c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n e m p l o y e e and employer. In determining whether a particular p r o m o t i o n r i s e s t o t h e l e v e l o f a new and d i s t i n c t r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n e m p l o y e r and e m p l o y e e , t h e c o u r t must compare t h e n a t u r e o f t h e e m p l o y e e ' s current duties, compensation, and benefits [with the] duties, compensation, [and] benefits in the d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n i n q u e s t i o n . As an e x a m p l e o f one change i n employment p o s i t i o n w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a new and d i s t i n c t r e l a t i o n , t h e C o u r t c i t e s H i s h o n v. K i n g and S p a u l d i n g , 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed. 2d 59 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . The p l a i n t i f f i n H i s h o n was an 18 of the 2090814 a s s o c i a t e i n a l a w f i r m who a l l e g e d t h a t she was d e n i e d p a r t n e r s h i p s t a t u s b e c a u s e she i s a woman. The C o u r t ' s e x a m p l e i s i n s t r u c t i v e . The d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n [ t h e ] r i g h t s , d u t i e s , and c o m p e n s a t i o n o f associates and partners in a law firm are significant. While both the a s s o c i a t e and the p a r t n e r are a t t o r n e y s , the r o l e of the p a r t n e r i s s u p e r v i s o r y and c a r r i e s i n c r e a s e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t may a l s o i n v o l v e p e r s o n a l l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e f i r m . The method o f c o m p e n s a t i o n and amount o f b e n e f i t s a t t e n d a n t t o an a s s o c i a t e p o s i t i o n differ from those of a partner. In applying Patterson, t h e F o u r t h C i r c u i t has r u l e d t h a t a promotion from b i l l i n g c l e r k t o s u p e r v i s o r i s the t y p e o f p r o m o t i o n w h i c h a l s o e n g e n d e r s a new and d i s t i n c t r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n e m p l o y e e and employer c o v e r e d by § 1981. M a l l o r y v. B o o t h R e f r i g e r a t i o n S u p p l y Co., I n c . , 882 F.2d 908, 911 (4th C i r . 1989)." Harrison 198 v. A s s o c i a t e s C o r p . o f N o r t h A m e r i c a , 917 F.2d 195, (5th C i r . 1990). If R u f f i n had promotions, she been would awarded e i t h e r of the have been promoted 1999 from a level-5 level-4 administrative p o s i t i o n to a level-5 administrative p o s i t i o n . Such a p r o m o t i o n w o u l d n o t have i n v o l v e d a p r o m o t i o n f r o m administrative, nonsupervisory position p o s i t i o n ; to the c o n t r a r y , been a promotion from to a an supervisory s u c h a p r o m o t i o n w o u l d have m e r e l y one administrative, nonsupervisory position to another a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , nonsupervisory p o s i t i o n t h a t was one l e v e l higher. Moreover, 19 there i s no e v i d e n c e i n 2090814 the record indicating responsibility that that would the increases have been promotion. and o c c a s i o n e d by such p r o m o t i o n w o u l d have r i s e n t o t h e l e v e l r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n salary a o f s i g n a l i n g a new R u f f i n a n d GMAC i f s h e h a d r e c e i v e d t h e Accordingly, we conclude that the four-year " c a t c h - a l l " s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s u n d e r § 1658 was a p p l i c a b l e t o R u f f i n ' s § 1981 c l a i m b a s e d on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s and, t h e r e f o r e , that c l a i m was n o t t i m e - b a r r e d . B e c a u s e R u f f i n f i l e d h e r a c t i o n w i t h i n f o u r months a f t e r GMAC a w a r d e d § t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n t o V e r l i n g , 1981 c l a i m based on t h a t regardless of limitations o r t h e § 1658 f o u r - y e a r applies In to that t h e Alabama performance i s not time-barred two-year statute statute of of limitations claim. her p r i n c i p a l b r i e f specifically Tucker, whether promotion Ruffin's argued that evaluations [Ms. 1081424, to this court, Ruffin h e r § 1981 c l a i m s based and pay a r e t i m e l y . J a n . 28, 2011] ( A l a . 2 0 1 1 ) , t h e supreme c o u r t on job- I n Scrushy v. So. 3d stated: "'In order t o secure a r e v e r s a l ,"the appellant h a s an a f f i r m a t i v e duty of s h o w i n g e r r o r upon t h e r e c o r d . " T u c k e r v . N i c h o l s , 431 So. 2d 1263, 1264 ( A l a . 1 9 8 3 ) . 20 has n o t , 2090814 It i s a f a m i l i a r p r i n c i p l e of law: "'"When an a p p e l l a n t c o n f r o n t s an i s s u e below t h a t t h e a p p e l l e e contends w a r r a n t s a judgment i n i t s f a v o r and t h e t r i a l court's o r d e r does n o t s p e c i f y a b a s i s for i t s r u l i n g , the omission of any a r g u m e n t on a p p e a l as t o t h a t issue in the appellant's principal brief constitutes a waiver with respect to the issue." " ' F o g a r t y v. S o u t h w o r t h , 953 So. 2d 1225, 1232 ( A l a . 2006) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). T h i s w a i v e r , namely, t h e f a i l u r e of the appellant t o discuss i n the o p e n i n g b r i e f an i s s u e on w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u r t m i g h t have r e l i e d a s a b a s i s f o r i t s j u d g m e n t , r e s u l t s i n an a f f i r m a n c e o f t h a t judgment. I d . That i s s o , because " t h i s c o u r t w i l l n o t presume s u c h e r r o r on t h e p a r t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . " R o b e r s o n v. C.P. A l l e n C o n s t r . Co., 50 So. 3 d 471, 478 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2010) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . See a l s o Young v. S o u t h e r n L i f e & H e a l t h I n s . Co., 495 So. 2 d 601 ( A l a . 1 9 8 6 ) . " S o u t u l l o v. M o b i l e County, 17, 2010] So. 3 d , [Ms. 1090041, September (Ala. 2010)." A c c o r d i n g l y , b e c a u s e GMAC a s s e r t e d b e f o r e t h e t r i a l that Ruffin's § 1981 claims based e v a l u a t i o n s a n d p a y were t i m e - b a r r e d , did not judgment specify the basis motion with on respect t o those 21 job-performance because the t r i a l f o ri t s granting court court GMAC's summary- claims, and because 2090814 R u f f i n has n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y this the court that argued i n h e r p r i n c i p a l b r i e f t o those claims are not time-barred, summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r claims. o f GMAC w i t h we a f f i r m respect t o those See S c r u s h y . B. W h e t h e r R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I c l a i m s b a s e d on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s a n d p a y s h e r e c e i v e d more t h a n 180 days b e f o r e s h e f i l e d h e r c h a r g e w i t h t h e EEOC a r e t i m e - b a r r e d . "A p l a i n t i f f may n o t s u e u n d e r T i t l e V I I u n l e s s she f i r s t e x h a u s t s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s b y f i l i n g a t i m e l y charge o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h t h e Equal Employment O p p o r t u n i t y Commission ('EEOC'). See W i l k e r s o n v . G r i n n e l l C o r p . , 270 F . 3 d 1314, 1317 (11th C i r . 2001). I n a n o n - d e f e r r a l s t a t e such as A l a b a m a , t h e d e a d l i n e f o r f i l i n g i s 180 days a f t e r t h e a l l e g e d d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a c t . See L e d b e t t e r v . G o o d y e a r T i r e a n d R u b b e r Co., 421 F . 3 d 1169, 1178 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2005) ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t Alabama i s a non-deferral state, such that only unlawful p r a c t i c e s o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n 180 days o f t h e o p e r a t i v e EEOC c h a r g e c a n g i v e r i s e t o T i t l e V I I l i a b i l i t y ) . " Carter v. U n i v e r s i t y o f South Alabama C h i l d r e n ' s & Women's Hosp., 510 F.Supp. 2d 596, 606 (S.D. A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) . GMAC a r g u e d t h a t with respect i t was e n t i t l e d to Ruffin's Title t o a summary j u d g m e n t V I I c l a i m based on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s b e c a u s e , GMAC s a i d , R u f f i n d i d n o t f i l e h e r charge w i t h t h e EEOC w i t h i n 180 days a f t e r those promotions occurred. Although the t r i a l court d i d not state i t sr a t i o n a l e for granting GMAC's summary-judgment m o t i o n , R u f f i n , i n h e r 22 2090814 principal brief to this VII c o u r t , has n o t argued t h a t h e r T i t l e c l a i m b a s e d on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s was n o t t i m e - barred despite her failure to f i l e h e r charge w i t h t h e EEOC within 180 days a f t e r t h o s e p r o m o t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , she has w a i v e d t h a t i s s u e , a n d we a f f i r m t h e summary judgment o f GMAC w i t h r e s p e c t 1999 i n favor t o R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I c l a i m b a s e d on t h e l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s . See S c r u s h y . GMAC also argued judgment w i t h r e s p e c t that i t was e n t i t l e d t o a summary t o R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I pay claim i n s o f a r as i t was b a s e d on p a y s h e r e c e i v e d more t h a n 180 days she filed h e r charge with t h e EEOC b e c a u s e , GMAC s a i d , i t was t i m e - b a r r e d . trial on A u g u s t before 24, 2 0 0 1 , R u f f i n argues t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n s o f a r a s i t may have g r a n t e d t h e summary- judgment m o t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f t h a t a r g u m e n t b e c a u s e , R u f f i n says, her Title V I I pay claim was t i m e l y i n s o f a r as i t was b a s e d on p a y she r e c e i v e d more t h a n 180 d a y s b e f o r e she f i l e d h e r c h a r g e w i t h t h e EEOC b y v i r t u e o f t h e L i l l y L e d b e t t e r Pay A c t o f 2009 ("the F P A " ) , Pub. L. No. 111-2, In Ledbetter (2007), v. Goodyear the United Ledbetter's Title T i r e & Rubber States Supreme V I I claim based 23 Court Fair 123 S t a t . 5. Co., 550 U.S. 618 held on p a y was that Lilly time-barred 2090814 b e c a u s e s h e d i d n o t f i l e an EEOC c h a r g e w i t h i n 180 d a y s a f t e r each allegedly communicated paychecks discriminatory t o h e r and t h a t that pay d e c i s i o n her employer's made and issuance of r e f l e c t e d those a l l e g e d l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y pay d e c i s i o n s d u r i n g t h e 180 days b e f o r e did was not a l t e r that she f i l e d h e r EEOC c h a r g e result: "The EEOC c h a r g i n g p e r i o d i s t r i g g e r e d when a discrete unlawful p r a c t i c e takes place. A new v i o l a t i o n does n o t o c c u r , a n d a new c h a r g i n g p e r i o d does n o t commence, upon t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f s u b s e q u e n t nondiscriminatory acts that e n t a i l adverse e f f e c t s r e s u l t i n g from t h e past d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . "... L e d b e t t e r s h o u l d have f i l e d an EEOC c h a r g e w i t h i n 180 d a y s a f t e r e a c h a l l e g e d l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p a y d e c i s i o n was made a n d c o m m u n i c a t e d t o h e r . She d i d n o t do s o , a n d t h e p a y c h e c k s t h a t were i s s u e d t o h e r d u r i n g t h e 180 d a y s p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g o f h e r EEOC c h a r g e do n o t p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r o v e r c o m i n g that prior f a i l u r e . " Ledbetter, 550 U.S. a t 628-29. Congress 9 responded t o Ledbetter In pertinent part, Section by p a s s i n g t h e FPA. 2 o f t h e FPA p r o v i d e s : "(1) The Supreme C o u r t i n L e d b e t t e r v. G o o d y e a r Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), s i g n i f i c a n t l y impairs statutory protections against discrimination i n compensation that Congress e s t a b l i s h e d a n d t h a t have b e e n b e d r o c k p r i n c i p l e s o f A m e r i c a n l a w f o r d e c a d e s . The L e d b e t t e r decision undermines those s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n s by u n d u l y r e s t r i c t i n g the time p e r i o d i n which v i c t i m s of 24 9 2090814 Among other Rights Act things, of t h e FPA amended § 7 0 6 ( e ) 1964, which i s codified as of the 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e), t o add t h e f o l l o w i n g : " ( 3 ) ( A ) F o r p u r p o s e s o f t h i s s e c t i o n , an u n l a w f u l employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation ... , when a discriminatory compensation decision or other p r a c t i c e i s a d o p t e d , when an i n d i v i d u a l becomes subject t o a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y compensation d e c i s i o n or o t h e r p r a c t i c e , o r when an i n d i v i d u a l i s a f f e c t e d b y application of a discriminatory compensation d e c i s i o n or o t h e r p r a c t i c e , i n c l u d i n g each time wages, b e n e f i t s , o r o t h e r c o m p e n s a t i o n i s p a i d , r e s u l t i n g i n whole o r i n p a r t from such a d e c i s i o n or other p r a c t i c e . "(B) I n a d d i t i o n t o any r e l i e f a u t h o r i z e d b y s e c t i o n 1977A o f t h e R e v i s e d S t a t u t e s (42 U.S.C. 1 9 8 1 a ) , l i a b i l i t y may a c c r u e a n d an a g g r i e v e d p e r s o n may o b t a i n r e l i e f as p r o v i d e d i n subsection (g)(1), i n c l u d i n g r e c o v e r y o f b a c k p a y f o r up t o two y e a r s preceding the f i l i n g o f t h e c h a r g e , where t h e unlawful employment p r a c t i c e s t h a t have o c c u r r e d during the charge f i l i n g p e r i o d a r e s i m i l a r or r e l a t e d t o u n l a w f u l employment p r a c t i c e s w i t h r e g a r d discrimination can c h a l l e n g e and recover f o r discriminatory compensation decisions or other p r a c t i c e s , c o n t r a r y t o the i n t e n t of Congress. "(2) The l i m i t a t i o n i m p o s e d b y t h e C o u r t on t h e f i l i n g of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y compensation claims ignores t h e r e a l i t y o f wage d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d i s a t odds w i t h t h e r o b u s t a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c i v i l r i g h t s laws t h a t Congress i n t e n d e d . " Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 S t a t . 5. 25 Civil § 2090814 to d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n compensation t h a t o u t s i d e the time f o r f i l i n g a charge." Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, Thus, t h e FPA in Ledbetter has and 123 Stat. 5 (emphasis added). superseded the provides that occurred supreme c o u r t ' s the issuance of a holding paycheck r e f l e c t i n g a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y pay d e c i s i o n o r p r a c t i c e i s i t s e l f an u n l a w f u l FPA employment p r a c t i c e u n d e r T i t l e V I I . M o r e o v e r , the p r o v i d e s t h a t i f the i s s u a n c e of paychecks r e f l e c t i n g the discriminatory pay decision during the 180 p l a i n t i f f f i l e d h i s o r h e r EEOC c h a r g e was to unlawful in " s i m i l a r or r e l a t e d the occurred outside plaintiff can recover the time f o r f i l i n g " b a c k pay f o r up years p r e c e d i n g the f i l i n g of the charge." Pub. § provides 3, 123 "take[s] Stat. 5. Furthermore, the e f f e c t as i f e n a c t e d on May FPA 28, L. No. 2007 and ... t h a t a r e p e n d i n g on o r a f t e r t h a t d a t e . " Pub.L. No. a two 111-2, appl[ies] claims on to that all § 6, 123 the employment p r a c t i c e s w i t h r e g a r d t o d i s c r i m i n a t i o n compensation that charge," days b e f o r e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n compensation under T i t l e i t to VII 111-2, S t a t . 5. Thus, b e c a u s e R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I c l a i m b a s e d pay was claim. p e n d i n g on Id. Accordingly, the May 28, FPA provides 26 2007, t h e that FPA applies Ruffin's to her Title VII 2090814 c l a i m b a s e d on p a y i s n o t t i m e - b a r r e d r e c e i v e d up t o two y e a r s b e f o r e she c a n p r o v e 180 days with respect t o p a y she s h e f i l e d h e r EEOC c h a r g e i f (1) t h a t GMAC i s s u e d h e r a p a y c h e c k d u r i n g t h e before she f i l e d h e r EEOC c h a r g e t h a t reflected a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p a y d e c i s i o n a n d (2) t h a t t h e i s s u a n c e paycheck was "similar practices with occurred 111-2, regard outside § 3, or related to unlawful of that employment t o d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n compensation t h e time f o r f i l i n g 123 S t a t . 5. GMAC that a c h a r g e . " Pub. L. No. d i d not submit evidence e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t R u f f i n c o u l d n o t p r o v e t h a t s h e was e n t i t l e d to recover b a c k p a y f o r up t o two y e a r s b e f o r e EEOC c h a r g e . T h e r e f o r e , with respect she f i l e d h e r we c a n n o t a f f i r m t h e summary judgment to Ruffin's Title V I I p a y c l a i m i n s o f a r as i t i s b a s e d on p a y R u f f i n r e c e i v e d up t o two y e a r s b e f o r e her EEOC Moreover, summary Title charge GMAC on t h e ground d i d not assert judgment with respect that that i t is she f i l e d time-barred. i t was e n t i t l e d to that portion to a of Ruffin's V I I p a y c l a i m on t h e g r o u n d t h a t s h e c o u l d n o t p r o v e h e r p r i m a f a c i e c a s e a n d , t h e r e f o r e , GMAC n e v e r s h i f t e d t o R u f f i n the burden t o prove h e r prima f a c i e case w i t h r e s p e c t t o that portion of her T i t l e Sizzlin V I I p a y c l a i m . Kennedy v . W e s t e r n 27 2090814 C o r p . , 857 So. 2d 7 1 , 78 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . I n Kennedy, t h e supreme court stated: " ' " [ A ] p a r t y s e e k i n g a summary judgment a l w a y s bears the i n i t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of informing the [ t r i a l ] court of the basis of i t s motion."' Rector v. B e t t e r H o u s e s , I n c . , 820 So. 2 d 75, 80 ( A l a . 2001) ( q u o t i n g C e l o t e x C o r p . v . C a t r e t t , 477 U.S. 317, 3 2 3 , 106 S . C t . 2548, 91 L . E d . 2d 265 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ) . When a m o t i o n f o r a summary judgment i s b a s e d on a f a i l u r e o f t h e nonmovant's e v i d e n c e , t h e m o v i n g p a r t y must i n d i c a t e where t h e nonmovant's c a s e s u f f e r s an e v i d e n t i a r y f a i l u r e . I d . " 857 So. 2 d a t 78. C o n s e q u e n t l y , judgment w i t h r e s p e c t we reverse t h e summary t o R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I pay claim i n s o f a r as i t i s b a s e d on p a y c h e c k s i s s u e d t o h e r w i t h i n two y e a r s o f her filing h e r EEOC c h a r g e . However, we a f f i r m judgment w i t h r e s p e c t t h e summary t o R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I pay claim i n s o f a r as i t i s b a s e d on p a y c h e c k s i s s u e d t o h e r more t h a n two y e a r s b e f o r e she f i l e d h e r EEOC c h a r g e b e c a u s e that portion of her T i t l e V I I p a y c l a i m i s n o t t i m e l y u n d e r t h e FPA. C. W h e t h e r R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I p a y c l a i m i s p r o c e d u r a l l y b a r r e d i n s o f a r as i t i s b a s e d on p a y s h e r e c e i v e d a f t e r t h e EEOC issued the right-to-sue l e t t e r . GMAC also argued judgment w i t h r e s p e c t that i t was e n t i t l e d to a summary t o R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I pay c l a i m i n s o f a r as i t was b a s e d on p a y s h e r e c e i v e d a f t e r t h e EEOC i s s u e d i t s right-to-sue letter because, GMAC s a i d , 28 that portion of her 2090814 Title V I I pay c l a i m was p r o c e d u r a l l y barred because, GMAC s a i d , R u f f i n c o u l d n o t p r o v e t h a t i t was r e a s o n a b l y r e l a t e d t o the charge trial she f i l e d court erred with t h e EEOC. R u f f i n a r g u e s insofar judgment m o t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t VII pay c l a i m EEOC i s s u e d portion (5th GMAC's summary- was b a s e d on p a y she r e c e i v e d of her claim letter i s "'like because, Title a f t e r the she s a y s , that or r e l a t e d t o ' the o r i g i n a l t h e EEOC." R u f f i n ' s principal brief a t p. 58 Gamble v . B i r m i n g h a m S. R.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678, 689 Cir. contain i t granted to the portion of Ruffin's the right-to-sue charge before (quoting that as that the 1975)). However, the record a copy o f h e r o r i g i n a l on a p p e a l charge before does n o t t h e EEOC. "An a p p e l l a t e c o u r t does n o t presume e r r o r ; t h e a p p e l l a n t has t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d u t y o f showing e r r o r . A p p e l l a t e review i s l i m i t e d t o the r e c o r d and cannot be a l t e r e d b y s t a t e m e n t s i n b r i e f s . E r r o r a s s e r t e d on a p p e a l must be a f f i r m a t i v e l y d e m o n s t r a t e d b y t h e r e c o r d . I f t h e r e c o r d does n o t d i s c l o s e t h e f a c t s upon w h i c h t h e a s s e r t e d e r r o r i s b a s e d , t h e e r r o r w i l l n o t be c o n s i d e r e d on a p p e a l . " Greer v. Greer, (citations charge consider pay 624 So. 2d 1076, 1077 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1993) omitted). before Accordingly, t h e EEOC because R u f f i n ' s i s not i n the record, we original cannot R u f f i n ' s argument t h a t t h e p o r t i o n o f h e r T i t l e V I I c l a i m b a s e d on p a y she r e c e i v e d a f t e r t h e EEOC i s s u e d i t s 29 2090814 right-to-sue l e t t e r i s " l i k e or r e l a t e d t o " her o r i g i n a l c h a r g e . Thus, we a f f i r m t h e t r i a l EEOC c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t as t o t h i s p o r t i o n of R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I pay c l a i m . D. W h e t h e r R u f f i n e s t a b l i s h e d a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e w i t h r e s p e c t t o h e r § 1981 c l a i m b a s e d on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s . T i t l e V I I a n d § 1981 "have t h e same r e q u i r e m e n t s o f p r o o f and use t h e same analytical framework Standard v. A.B.E.L. S e r v s . , I n c . , 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 8 ) . "When a p l a i n t i f f o f f e r s c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e a T i t l e V I I c l a i m , we u s e t h e a n a l y t i c a l f r a m e w o r k e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e Supreme C o u r t i n M c D o n n e l l D o u g l a s C o r p . v . G r e e n , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L . E d . 2d 668 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . Under t h i s f r a m e w o r k , t h e p l a i n t i f f must e s t a b l i s h a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a prima facie case creates a presumption of discrimination. The employer must then offer legitimate, n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y reasons f o r the employment a c t i o n t o r e b u t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n . I f t h e employer s u c c e s s f u l l y r e b u t s t h e presumption, the burden s h i f t s back t o t h e p l a i n t i f f t o d i s c r e d i t the p r o f f e r e d n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y reasons by showing t h a t t h e y a r e p r e t e x t u a l . I d . , a t 802-04, 93 S . C t . a t 1824-25." S t a n d a r d , 161 F.3d a t 1 3 3 1 . In order to establish discriminatory failure "the she was the a prima facie case t o promote, p l a i n t i f f must d e m o n s t r a t e o n l y t h a t : ( i ) he o r b e l o n g e d t o a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s ; ( i i ) he o r she q u a l i f i e d f o r and a p p l i e d f o r a p o s i t i o n t h a t e m p l o y e r was s e e k i n g t o f i l l ; (iii) despite 30 of 2090814 q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , he o r s h e was r e j e c t e d ; a n d ( i v ) t h e p o s i t i o n was f i l l e d w i t h an i n d i v i d u a l o u t s i d e t h e p r o t e c t e d c l a s s . McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S . C t . 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)." Vessels Cir. v . A t l a n t a I n d e p . S c h . S y s . , 408 F . 3 d 763, 768 ( 1 1 t h 2005). In this case, summary-judgment GMAC d i d n o t a s s e r t motion that Ruffin as a ground could of not prove i t s an e s s e n t i a l element o f h e r prima f a c i e case w i t h r e s p e c t t o h e r § 1981 c l a i m b a s e d on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s . Therefore, GMAC producing never shifted substantial evidence facie See Kennedy, case. summary j u d g m e n t w i t h to Ruffin t h e burden o f any o f t h e elements supra. respect Therefore, of of that prima we r e v e r s e t h e t o R u f f i n ' s § 1981 c l a i m based on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s . E. W h e t h e r R u f f i n e s t a b l i s h e d a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e w i t h r e s p e c t t o h e r § 1981 a n d T i t l e V I I c l a i m s b a s e d on t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n a n d , i f s o , w h e t h e r GMAC met i t s b u r d e n o f o f f e r i n g a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason f o r awarding that promotion t o V e r l i n g . GMAC a r g u e d with respect the that i t was e n t i t l e d t o a summary judgment t o R u f f i n ' s § 1981 a n d T i t l e V I I c l a i m s b a s e d on 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n on t h e g r o u n d s that Ruffin could n e i t h e r p r o v e t h a t s h e was q u a l i f i e d f o r a l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n 31 2090814 when t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n was a w a r d e d t o V e r l i n g n o r prove that the l e g i t i m a t e , n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y reason o f f e r e d by GMAC f o r p r o m o t i n g V e r l i n g was a p r e t e x t . the trial court motion with erred i n granting Ruffin GMAC's argues that summary-judgment r e s p e c t t o h e r T i t l e V I I a n d § 1981 c l a i m s based on t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n b e c a u s e , s h e s a y s , s h e d i d make a prima facie showing that s h e was qualified p r o m o t i o n when i t was a w a r d e d t o V e r l i n g meet i t s b u r d e n of offering a legitimate, f o r that a n d GMAC f a i l e d t o nondiscriminatory reason f o r awarding that promotion t o V e r l i n g . GMAC argued that Ruffin d i d n o t make a prima s h o w i n g t h a t s h e was q u a l i f i e d f o r t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 because, that GMAC s a i d , level-6 (1) R u f f i n position was a w a r d e d t o V e r l i n g admitted i n herdeposition be at least was a l e v e l - 4 facie promotion employee when a n d (2) R u f f i n t h a t a GMAC e m p l o y e e w o u l d have t o a level-5 employee promotion t o a l e v e l - 6 i n order position. However, t h e W i l s o n a f f i d a v i t that, s u b m i t t e d b y GMAC for to a level-five 2001 l e v e l - 6 employee." I t i s undisputed p r o m o t i o n was a w a r d e d t o V e r l i n g 32 a states " [ i ] n June 2 0 0 1 , P l a i n t i f f R u f f i n was r e - b a n d e d level-four the to qualify from a that i n August 2090814 2001. In reviewing evidence a summary j u d g m e n t , "we must v i e w a l l t h e i n a light most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e nonmovant a n d we must e n t e r t a i n a l l r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s favor from t h e e v i d e n c e i n o f t h e nonmovant," F i r s t F i n . I n s . Co. v . T i l l e r y , 626 So. 2 d 1252, 1254 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , w h i c h , i n t h i s c a s e , i s R u f f i n . Accordingly, b a s e d on t h e W i l s o n a f f i d a v i t , a genuine Ruffin issue of material was r e - b a n d e d fact exists we c o n c l u d e regarding whether as a l e v e l - 5 e m p l o y e e b e f o r e t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n was a w a r d e d t o V e r l i n g and, t h e r e f o r e , a genuine issue of material fact R u f f i n made a p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g that promotion. that exists regarding that whether t h a t s h e was q u a l i f i e d f o r Therefore, the t r i a l court could n o t have p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d GMAC's summary-judgment m o t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f GMAC's a r g u m e n t t h a t R u f f i n was n o t q u a l i f i e d f o r t h e 2001 level-6 promotion because s h e was s t i l l a level-4 employee when t h a t p r o m o t i o n was a w a r d e d t o V e r l i n g . See S t a n d a r d , 161 F.3d a t 1331. Thus, we must determine material fact e x i s t s regarding nondiscriminatory reason promotion t oV e r l i n g . Id. whether a genuine issue of w h e t h e r GMAC h a d a l e g i t i m a t e , f o r awarding t h e 2001 level-6 GMAC d e s i g n a t e d W i l s o n as i t s R u l e 33 2090814 30(b)(6), A l a . R. C i v . P., r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o give testimony regarding, GMAC's "employment decisions relevant deposition, Wilson among o t h e r to this gave things, lawsuit the following deposition " During the 30(b)(6) testimony regarding GMAC's a w a r d i n g t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n t o V e r l i n g i n s t e a d of R u f f i n : "Q. Does t h e company h a v e a r e a s o n f o r d e n y i n g H i l d a Ruffin the Level 6 supervisor p o s i t i o n i n Atlanta? "A. I d o n ' t know. "Q. Does t h e company h a v e a r e a s o n f o r d e n y i n g H i l d a R u f f i n t h e L e v e l 6 s u p e r v i s o r y p o s i t i o n t h a t was g i v e n t o Donna V e r l i n g ? "A. I d o n ' t know." In t h e Wilson a f f i d a v i t , Wilson attested: " I n June 2 0 0 1 , P l a i n t i f f R u f f i n was r e - b a n d e d f r o m a l e v e l - f o u r t o a l e v e l - f i v e e m p l o y e e . Donna V e r l i n g , b y c o n t r a s t , h a d been a l e v e l - s i x employee s i n c e 1994. A d d i t i o n a l l y , as a l e v e l - s i x e m p l o y e e , Donna V e r l i n g h a d r a t e d ' s u p e r i o r ' on p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s s i n c e a t l e a s t 1996. I n A u g u s t 2 0 0 1 , Donna V e r l i n g moved f r o m a l e v e l - s i x p o s i t i o n i n Orlando, F l o r i d a t o a l e v e l - s i x p o s i t i o n i n the A t l a n t a a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c e n t e r . A copy o f P l a i n t i f f R u f f i n ' s employment h i s t o r y a n d Donna V e r l i n g ' s employment h i s t o r y i s E x h i b i t K h e r e t o . II " I n c h o o s i n g among c a n d i d a t e s t o f i l l a v a i l a b l e p o s i t i o n s , GMAC c h o s e t h e most q u a l i f i e d c a n d i d a t e s . Although the ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n ' c r i t e r i a v a r i e d by 34 2090814 p o s i t i o n , GMAC c o n s i s t e n t l y c h o s e t h e most q u a l i f i e d c a n d i d a t e s . Race was n o t a f a c t o r i n p r o m o t i o n d e c i s i o n s o r a n y o t h e r employment d e c i s i o n s . " The Wilson affidavit change i n W i l s o n ' s argues that offered testimony the t r i a l such an e x p l a n a t i o n . because, even strike erred i n failing the t o grant her a f f i d a v i t b a s e d on t h e a b s e n c e o f However, we n e e d n o t r e a c h i f the t r i a l for s i n c e h i s d e p o s i t i o n , and R u f f i n court motion t o s t r i k e the Wilson no e x p l a n a t i o n court that issue did not err i n f a i l i n g to the portions of the Wilson affidavit that constitute unexplained changes i n W i l s o n ' s unexplained changes c r e a t e a j u r y q u e s t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s credibility. " ' I t goes w i t h o u t deposition testimony, s a y i n g t h a t "'"a those c o u r t may n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f w i t n e s s e s on a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t . " ' " ' D i x o n v . B o a r d o f W a t e r & Sewer Comm'rs o f t h e C i t y o f M o b i l e , 865 So. 2d 1161, 1166 n. 2 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . " v. 965 So. 2 d 1076, Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., Davis 1089 ( A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) . Thus, a j u r y q u e s t i o n e x i s t s r e g a r d i n g w h e t h e r GMAC h a d a l e g i t i m a t e , n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y reason f o r a w a r d i n g t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 promotion t o V e r l i n g i n s t e a d of R u f f i n . Because issue jury whether questions Ruffin exist with was q u a l i f i e d 35 respect t o both the f o r t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 2090814 promotion and t h e i s s u e nondiscriminatory Verling, we reason reverse whether GMAC f o r awarding t h e summary had a that judgment legitimate, promotion with respect to to R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I a n d § 1981 c l a i m s b a s e d on t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n awarded t o V e r l i n g . F. W h e t h e r R u f f i n e s t a b l i s h e d a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e w i t h r e s p e c t t o h e r T i t l e V I I p a y c l a i m b a s e d on p a y s h e r e c e i v e d b e t w e e n t h e 1 8 0 t h d a y b e f o r e s h e f i l e d h e r c h a r g e w i t h t h e EEOC a n d t h e d a t e t h e EEOC i s s u e d t h e r i g h t - t o - s u e l e t t e r a n d , i f s o , whether GMAC offered evidence of a legitimate, n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y reason f o r paying R u f f i n l e s s than s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d non-African-American employees. GMAC a r g u e d t h a t i t was e n t i t l e d t o a summary judgment w i t h r e s p e c t t o R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I p a y c l a i m i n s o f a r as i t was b a s e d on p a y s h e r e c e i v e d filed the h e r charge w i t h right-to-sue b e t w e e n t h e 1 8 0 t h d a y b e f o r e she t h e EEOC a n d t h e d a t e t h e EEOC l e t t e r b e c a u s e , GMAC s a i d , R u f f i n c o u l d n o t prove that s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d non-African-American received higher issued employees p a y than she d i d and she c o u l d n o t prove that GMAC p u r p o s e f u l l y a n d i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t h e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o p a y b e c a u s e s h e i s an A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n . Ruffin a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n s o f a r a s i t g r a n t e d GMAC's summary-judgment m o t i o n w i t h respect T i t l e V I I p a y c l a i m because, she says, 36 to that portion of her she produced evidence 2090814 e s t a b l i s h i n g a prima f a c i e case o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h to that portion of her T i t l e V I I pay c l a i m by evidence i n d i c a t i n g that s i x s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d American Phyllis than employees, Waldrep, Ruffin J a n Wood, Pamela L o r d , a n d GMAC Daniel, introducing non-African- Sandy Dorrill, a n d J o y Ryan, were p a i d failed legitimate, nondiscriminatory African-American Lisa respect to offer any evidence more of a reason f o r p a y i n g those s i x non- e m p l o y e e s more t h a n i t p a i d h e r . A p l a i n t i f f e s t a b l i s h e s a prima f a c i e case o f a T i t l e V I I v i o l a t i o n b a s e d on a d i s p a r i t y i n wages b y s h o w i n g t h a t she occupies a j o b s i m i l a r t o that are outside Learning Ruffin the protected Centers, offered of higher indicating that, on t h e 1 8 0 t h d a y b e f o r e the and ending i n June Kindercare 1413, 1422 (M.D. A l a . beginning EEOC e m p l o y e e s who c l a s s . See P a s s m o r e v. 979 F.Supp. evidence paid during she f i l e d 1997). the period her charge with 2001 when s h e was r e b a n d e d a l e v e l - 5 e m p l o y e e , t h e r e were s i x n o n - A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n l e v e l - 4 employees, who Wood, D a n i e l , performed jobs that Dorrill, were Waldrep, Lord, similar to Ruffin's r e c e i v e d higher pay than R u f f i n . A c c o r d i n g l y , a n d Ryan, j o b and we c o n c l u d e t h a t R u f f i n e s t a b l i s h e d a prima f a c i e case o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h 37 2090814 respect t o pay during t h e p e r i o d b e g i n n i n g on t h e 1 8 0 t h day b e f o r e she f i l e d h e r EEOC c h a r g e a n d e n d i n g w i t h h e r r e b a n d i n g as a l e v e l - 5 e m p l o y e e i n June 2 0 0 1 . See P a s s m o r e . Thus, the burden s h i f t e d t o GMAC t o p r o d u c e evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i t had a l e g i t i m a t e , n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y for paying the s i x non-African-American employees reason cited by R u f f i n more t h a n i t p a i d R u f f i n . S t a n d a r d , 161 F.3d a t 1331. As GMAC's R u l e 30(b)(6) representative, his deposition Wilson t e s t i f i e d i n as f o l l o w s : "Q. ... D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1999 a n d 2 0 0 1 , do you know w h e t h e r J a n Wood made more money t h a n H i l d a Ruffin? "A. Don't know. "Q. A s s u m i n g t h a t she d i d , does t h e company have a r e a s o n why J a n Wood made more money t h a n H i l d a Ruffin? "A. Don't know. "Q. Do you know L i s a D a n i e l ? t h a t name? Have you e v e r h e a r d o f "A. Y e s . "Q. Do you know w h e t h e r Hilda Ruffin? she made more money than "A. Don't know. "Q. A s s u m i n g t h a t s h e d i d , does t h e company have a r e a s o n f o r why L i s a D a n i e l made more money t h a n 38 2090814 Hilda R u f f i n during t h a t p e r i o d from '99 t o 2001? "A. Don't know. "Q. Do you know Sandy "A. I ' v e s e e n t h a t "Q. Dorrill? name. D-o-r-r-i-l-l. "A. I ' v e s e e n t h e name. "Q. Do you know how much money Sandy D o r r i l l d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d f r o m '99 t o 2001? made "A. No, I d o n ' t . "Q. A s s u m i n g t h a t she made more money t h a n H i l d a R u f f i n , does t h e company h a v e a r e a s o n why Sandy D o r r i l l made more money t h a n H i l d a R u f f i n d u r i n g that p e r i o d of time? "A. No, I d o n ' t . "Q. Phyllis Waldr[e]p? Waldr[e]p, "A. I ' v e a l s o s e e n t h a t do you know Phyllis name. "Q. Do you know how much money she made i n comparison t o H i l d a R u f f i n during t h a t p e r i o d of t i m e , '99 t o 2001? "A. No, I d o n ' t . "Q. A s s u m i n g t h a t she made more t h a n H i l d a R u f f i n , does t h e company h a v e a r e a s o n why H i l d a R u f f i n was p a i d l e s s than P h y l l i s Waldr[e]p during that p e r i o d of time? "A. No, I d o n ' t . 39 2090814 "Q. Do you know J o y Ryan? "A. I'm n o t f a m i l i a r with that name. "Q. Do you know how much she made d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d from '99 t h r o u g h 2001? "A. No. "Q. A s s u m i n g t h a t she made e a c h y e a r more t h a n H i l d a R u f f i n , does t h e company have a r e a s o n why J o y Ryan made more money t h a n H i l d a R u f f i n d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d of time? "A. N o . " 10 However, i n t h e W i l s o n a f f i d a v i t , Wilson attested: "Pursuant to i t s 'pay f o r performance' philosophy, GMAC made d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g p a y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h e m p l o y e e s ' p e r f o r m a n c e . Under GMAC's r a t i n g s y s t e m , e m p l o y e e p e r f o r m a n c e i s r a t e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g descending s c a l e : outstanding, superior, highly effective, g o o d c o m p e t e n t , needs slight i m p r o v e m e n t a n d needs much i m p r o v e m e n t . " The Wilson affidavit offered testimony no f o r the change i n Wilson's argues that Wilson a f f i d a v i t b a s e d on t h e a b s e n c e o f s u c h an e x p l a n a t i o n . the t r i a l court However, we n e e d n o t r e a c h trial the since explanation erred that 1 0 Wilson affidavit that in failing issue court d i d not e r r i n f a i l i n g Wilson h i s deposition. t o s t r i k e the because, to strike 40 regarding even i fthe the portions of c o n s t i t u t e unexplained was n o t q u e s t i o n e d Ruffin Pamela changes i n Lord. 2090814 his d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y , t h o s e u n e x p l a i n e d changes jury question question with exists regarding nondiscriminatory Waldrep, respect reason a n d Ryan Therefore, whether GMAC Thus, a j u r y had a legitimate, f o r p a y i n g Wood, D a n i e l , more we r e v e r s e to his credibility. than i t paid create a Ruffin. Dorrill, See t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r Davis. o f GMAC w i t h r e s p e c t t o R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I p a y c l a i m b a s e d on p a y s h e received beginning charge w i t h on t h e 1 8 0 t h day before t h e EEOC a n d e n d i n g when she f i l e d h e r s h e was r e b a n d e d as a l e v e l - 5 e m p l o y e e i n June 2 0 0 1 . G. W h e t h e r R u f f i n e s t a b l i s h e d a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e w i t h r e s p e c t t o h e r T i t l e V I I c l a i m b a s e d on j o b - p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s . GMAC a s s e r t e d t h a t i t was e n t i t l e d t o a summary j u d g m e n t with respect performance to Ruffin's evaluations Title V I I claim because, GMAC s a i d , based on job- she c o u l d n o t prove that s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d non-African-American employees r e c e i v e d more f a v o r a b l e than she did and she c o u l d job-performance evaluations not prove that GMAC p u r p o s e f u l l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y discriminated against her with respect performance e v a l u a t i o n s because s h e i s an to job- African-American. 1 1 GMAC d i d n o t a s s e r t t h a t R u f f i n ' s T i t l e V I I c l a i m b a s e d on j o b - p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s was t i m e - b a r r e d o r p r o c e d u r a l l y 11 41 2090814 An employee can establish a prima facie case d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b a s e d on j o b - p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s b y that "(1) [she] b e l o n g s t o a p r o t e c t e d t o do t h e j o b ; qualified class; subjected employment a c t i o n ; and (3) (4) [she] was [her] employer situated employees outside Braswell v. 586 2008). The Allen, United F. States [her] Supp. Court 1297, of Appeals more an employee to a raise of any to was adverse similarly favorably." 1305 (M.D. f o r the C i r c u i t has h e l d " t h a t an e v a l u a t i o n t h a t d i r e c t l y showing [she] treated class 2d (2) of Ala. Eleventh disentitles s i g n i f i c a n c e i s an adverse employment a c t i o n u n d e r T i t l e V I I , " G i l l i s v. G e o r g i a Dep't o f Corr., 400 F.3d 883, 888 (11th C i r . 2005), f o r purposes of e s t a b l i s h i n g a prima f a c i e case. Ruffin performance testified evaluation that, of in "highly " s u p e r i o r " ; t h a t she d i s a g r e e d she considered 1997, she received effective" a instead w i t h t h a t e v a l u a t i o n ; and i t discriminatory. However, R u f f i n jobof that testified t h a t she was s a t i s f i e d w i t h h e r j o b - p e r f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s i n 1998, 1999, evidence barred. 2000, and establishing 2001. that Ruffin her 42 1997 did not produce evaluation any directly 2090814 d i s e n t i t l e d her t o a r a i s e o f any s i g n i f i c a n c e o r a p r o m o t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , we c o n c l u d e t h a t R u f f i n f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t her 1997 e v a l u a t i o n was an a d v e r s e T i t l e V I I and, t h e r e f o r e , failed employment a c t i o n under t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e case o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to job evaluations under T i t l e V I I . C o n s e q u e n t l y , we a f f i r m t h e summary j u d g m e n t respect to her T i t l e VII claim based on with job-performance evaluations. H. W h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g GMAC's summaryjudgment motion w i t h r e s p e c t t o R u f f i n ' s c l a i m s w h i l e d e n y i n g the motion w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c l a i m s o f t h e other five plaintiffs. Finally, granting Ruffin argues that the t r i a l GMAC's summary-judgment m o t i o n w i t h c l a i m s because, she s a y s , the t r i a l judgment m o t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t some o f t h e o t h e r five erred i n respect toher c o u r t d e n i e d t h e summary- to identical plaintiffs. court claims a s s e r t e d by However, R u f f i n h a s n o t c i t e d any l e g a l a u t h o r i t y i n s u p p o r t o f t h a t argument. " R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. App. P., p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e appellant's brief shall contain ' [ a ] n argument containing the contentions of the appellant/petitioner with respect to the issues presented, and t h e reasons t h e r e f o r , w i t h c i t a t i o n s to t h e cases, s t a t u t e s , other a u t h o r i t i e s , and p a r t s of t h e r e c o r d r e l i e d on.' I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t ' " [ w ] h e r e an a p p e l l a n t f a i l s t o c i t e a n y a u t h o r i t y f o r an a r g u m e n t , t h i s C o u r t may a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t 43 2090814 as t o t h o s e i s s u e s , f o r i t i s n e i t h e r t h i s C o u r t ' s duty nor i t s f u n c t i o n t o perform a l l the l e g a l r e s e a r c h f o r an a p p e l l a n t . " ' S p r a d l i n v. B i r m i n g h a m A i r p o r t A u t h . , 613 So. 2d 347, 348 ( A l a . 1993) ( q u o t i n g Sea Calm S h i p p i n g Co., S.A. v . C o o k s , 565 So. 2d 212, 216 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) ) . " Mantiply v. Therefore, Mantiply, 951 So. 2d 638, 653 ( A l a . 2006). we d e c l i n e t o c o n s i d e r R u f f i n ' s a r g u m e n t regarding t h e d e n i a l o f t h e summary-judgment m o t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t claims of the other five to the plaintiffs. Conclusion I n summary, we r e v e r s e GMAC w i t h respect t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t o R u f f i n ' s § 1981 c l a i m b a s e d on t h e 1999 l e v e l - 5 p r o m o t i o n s , h e r T i t l e V I I a n d § 1981 c l a i m s b a s e d on t h e 2001 l e v e l - 6 p r o m o t i o n , a n d h e r T i t l e V I I p a y c l a i m b a s e d on paychecks i s s u e d t o h e r up t o two y e a r s b e f o r e h e r EEOC c h a r g e a n d p a y c h e c k s i s s u e d t o h e r d u r i n g beginning w i t h t h e 180th day b e f o r e she filed the period she f i l e d h e r EEOC c h a r g e and e n d i n g when she was r e b a n d e d t o a l e v e l - 5 e m p l o y e e i n June 2001, and we remand the cause for further proceedings c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . I n a l l o t h e r r e s p e c t s , we a f f i r m the summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f GMAC. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. All the judges concur. 44

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