Aubrey Dean Williams v. Susan Kaye Williams

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REL: 1/28/11 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions, Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 2090629 Aubrey Dean W i l l i a m s v. Susan Kaye W i l l i a m s Appeal from Etowah C i r c u i t (DR-08-67) Court BRYAN, J u d g e . Aubrey judgment court") wife"). Dean entered that Williams ("the husband") by t h e Etowah divorced him from Circuit Susan appeals Court Kaye from a ("the t r i a l W i l l i a m s ("the 2090629 Procedural History The parties married on May 6, 1995, and two children, b o t h b o y s , were b o r n o f t h e p a r t i e s ' m a r r i a g e : t h e o l d e r was b o r n i n S e p t e m b e r 1999, F e b r u a r y 2003. and t h e y o u n g e r c h i l d was child born i n The p a r t i e s s e p a r a t e d on J a n u a r y 17, 2008, t h e w i f e f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t f o r a d i v o r c e on J a n u a r y 30, In her complaint, the wife sought, d i v o r c e on t h e g r o u n d o f m e n t a l children, order an a w a r d o f c h i l d preventing derogatory division remarks of Collinsville the the pendente l i t e retirement lite lite; awarded and visitation. wife's the complaint of his to the located family children, on Scrougeout benefits. Pursuant of an making Drive in one-half of to various c o u r t , the w i f e the the an e q u i t a b l e p r o p e r t y " ) , and possession from a parties' was marital l o c a t e d on t h e C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y ; t h e primary husband The things, sole custody o r d e r s e n t e r e d by t h e t r i a l pendente was and Collinsville r e s i d e n c e , w h i c h was wife husband property cruelty, other 2008. s u p p o r t , an a w a r d o f a l i m o n y , about her ("the husband's awarded the among and was custody of awarded husband s u b s e q u e n t l y f o r a d i v o r c e , and 2 the children pendente specific pendente lite filed an a n s w e r t o the he filed a counterclaim 2090629 for a divorce seeking, among o t h e r things, joint custody of t h e c h i l d r e n , w i t h t h e h u s b a n d named as t h e p r i m a r y c u s t o d i a l parent, and an Collinsville marital award of property, title which to the and possession husband of was alleged the not property. The t r i a l that court entered divorced t h e p a r t i e s on t h e g r o u n d o f i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y . Paragraph a j u d g m e n t on December 17, 2009, s i x o f t h e j u d g m e n t was labeled "Minimization of E m o t i o n a l Trauma on [ t h e ] ... C h i l d r e n , " and, p u r s u a n t t o t h a t p a r t o f t h e j u d g m e n t , t h e p a r t i e s were f o r b i d d e n or doing anything presented joint periods of v i s i t a t i o n . that periodic alimony, of The p a r t i e s were was issue awarded designated a n d t h e h u s b a n d was a w a r d e d The j u d g m e n t a l s o o r d e r e d , the specific among o t h e r t h a t t h e h u s b a n d p a y t h e w i f e $903 a month i n c h i l d support, 19% action. of the c h i l d r e n , the wife primary c u s t o d i a l parent, things, saying t o i n f l u e n c e t h e c h i l d r e n a b o u t any i n the divorce custody from unpaid Collinsville the husband pay that the wife medical expenses the wife $750 a month as p a y 8 1 % and t h e h u s b a n d p a y of the children, that the p r o p e r t y be s o l d , and t h a t e a c h p a r t y r e c e i v e 5 0 % of the proceeds from the s a l e of t h a t p r o p e r t y . 3 The w i f e was 2090629 a w a r d e d a l l t h e p a r t i e s ' h o u s e h o l d goods e x c e p t personal belongings, a 2000 S i e r r a minivan, t h e husband's and 50% o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s "as d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e v a l u e o f the b e n e f i t s on May 6, 1995." right, party title, and i n t e r e s t was a w a r d e d The h u s b a n d was a w a r d e d a l l to s i xdifferent a l l the f i n a n c i a l v e h i c l e s . Each accounts i n h i s or her name, a n d e a c h p a r t y was o r d e r e d t o p a y a l l t h e d e b t s t h a t h a d been i n c u r r e d i n h i s o r h e r name. ordered Finally, t h e h u s b a n d was t o p a y $1,500 t o w a r d t h e w i f e ' s a t t o r n e y ' s On December 18, 2009, t h e t r i a l fees. court entered a q u a l i f i e d d o m e s t i c - r e l a t i o n s o r d e r t h a t a s s i g n e d t o t h e w i f e an amount equal t o 50% o f t h e husband's accrued retirement under t h e husband's p e n s i o n b e n e f i t s t h a t had p l a n as o f May 6, 1995. The h u s b a n d f i l e d a p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n p u r s u a n t Ala. R. C i v . P., a n d R u l e challenged, order among other 60, A l a . things, R. C i v . P. t h e award r e q u i r i n g him t o pay a share t o R u l e 59, The h u s b a n d of custody, of the c h i l d r e n ' s m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s , t h e award o f c h i l d s u p p o r t , the unpaid the d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e , t h e awards o f p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , t h e award t o t h e w i f e o f a p o r t i o n o f h i s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s t h a t had a c c r u e d before the p a r t i e s ' 4 marriage, and t h e award o f 2090629 p e r i o d i c alimony to the wife. the trial court consider The h u s b a n d a l s o r e q u e s t e d t h a t a d d i t i o n a l testimony at the hearing on h i s p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n . On F e b r u a r y 17, 2010, f o l l o w i n g t h e f i l i n g o f t h e w i f e ' s motion t o c o r r e c t a c l e r i c a l e r r o r , the t r i a l court amended the d i v o r c e judgment t o r e q u i r e t h e husband t o pay 81%, and t o r e q u i r e t h e w i f e t o p a y 19%, o f t h e c h i l d r e n ' s u n p a i d m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s . On F e b r u a r y 23, 2010, t h e h u s b a n d f i l e d an amended postjudgment paragraph motion challenging s i x of the divorce interfered with h i s parental his the constitutionality judgment, rights, asserting of that i t that i t i n t e r f e r e d with r i g h t t o f r e e s p e e c h , t h a t i t was vague a n d a m b i g u o u s , and that i t was Following so b r o a d a hearing where t h e c o u r t older child, relief protected speech. on t h e h u s b a n d ' s p o s t j u d g m e n t motions, i t included took a d d i t i o n a l testimony the t r i a l requested that by court from t h e p a r t i e s ' denied a l l pending postjudgment the husband, and t h e husband issues for this timely appealed. Issues The h u s b a n d p r e s e n t s several court to r e v i e w on a p p e a l : ( 1 ) t h e a w a r d o f s o l e p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f 5 2090629 the c h i l d r e n to the w i f e ; (2) t h e the a l l o c a t i o n of u n p a i d medical property and the award of award of c h i l d s u p p o r t expenses; alimony to and (3) t h e d i v i s i o n the wife; and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of paragraph s i x of the d i v o r c e (4) of the judgment. Facts At 26, the ore tenus hearing t h a t was c o n d u c t e d on 2009, J u n e N i c h o l s , a p s y c h o l o g i s t who c h i l d r e n , t e s t i f i e d t h a t when she f i r s t met c h i l d he was "a v e r y u p s e t young man." had October counseled the the p a r t i e s ' o l d e r She described him w o r r i e d and s t r e s s e d a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g , and she s t a t e d t h a t source of the o l d e r c h i l d ' s s t r e s s was t h e h u s b a n d and " t h i s going b a c k and t h a t the c h i l d r e n l o v e d both parents felt tension in his t h a t the husband p l a c e d on him. According resolved, and, the of care action, she to because the the saw Nichols those c h i l d r e n had wife during the no reason to stated but t h a t the o l d e r the child h u s b a n d and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the Nichols, the his relationship with forth." relationship with as issues felt younger needed child to be been p r i m a r i l y under pendency change of their the divorce custodial arrangement. The w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t she 6 had f i l e d for a divorce from 2090629 t h e h u s b a n d b e c a u s e he h a d m e n t a l l y a b u s e d h e r , b e c a u s e he was controlling, testified and because that s h e was a f r a i d she h a d been o f him. the primary The caretaker wife of the c h i l d r e n and t h a t t h e husband had t o l d h e r , b e f o r e the older child children was b o r n , t h a t he w o u l d n o t c a r e for their u n t i l t h e c h i l d r e n turned three o r four years o l d because they w o u l d n o t remember who c a r e d wife f o r them b e f o r e that point. a l s o s t a t e d t h a t t h e husband d i d n o t h e l p The the children w i t h t h e i r homework b e c a u s e he d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n s h o u l d have homework u n t i l t h e y were i n t h e f o u r t h g r a d e . She testified, however, that she had h e l p e d the children with t h e i r homework a n d t h a t t h e o l d e r c h i l d h a d made a l l As a n d Bs and t h a t t h e y o u n g e r c h i l d h a d made s t r a i g h t A s . maintained The w i f e t h a t t h e husband had t a l k e d t o t h e c h i l d r e n about the d i v o r c e , t h a t t h e husband and h i s f a m i l y had s a i d t h a t t h e w i f e was c r a z y i n f r o n t o f t h e c h i l d r e n , a n d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d had a l l o w e d the older child t o read h i s counterclaim f o ra divorce. The h u s b a n d a l l e g e d t h a t he h a d c a r e d f o r the children most o f t h e t i m e when t h e y were g r o w i n g up a n d t h a t he p l a y e d sports with t h e c h i l d r e n as o f t e n 7 as p o s s i b l e . The h u s b a n d 2090629 admitted that he h a d t a k e n the c h i l d r e n to h i s attorney's office b e c a u s e he was c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e m , a n d , a l t h o u g h he denied letting he the c h i l d r e n read the divorce pleadings, s t a t e d t h a t he d i d d i s c u s s t h e d i v o r c e w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n . husband a l l e g e d t h a t t h e o l d e r c h i l d had gained 55 pounds since the wife had f i l e d The approximately f o r a d i v o r c e , and t h e husband a t t r i b u t e d t h e o l d e r c h i l d ' s weight g a i n t o t h e o l d e r child's propensity games instead t o spend s e v e r a l hours a day p l a y i n g o f g e t t i n g more alleged that h i s father admitted exercise. The h u s b a n d ("the p a t e r n a l g r a n d f a t h e r " ) video also had been t o the h o s p i t a l s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e w i f e had f i l e d f o r a d i v o r c e and t h a t t h e w i f e had r e f u s e d t o a l l o w t h e c h i l d r e n to visit the paternal grandfather i n t h e h o s p i t a l when i t became c e r t a i n t h a t t h e p a t e r n a l g r a n d f a t h e r t h e w i f e was a w a r d e d p e n d e n t e l i t e p o s s e s s i o n marital residence, t h e husband lived with would d i e . After of the p a r t i e s ' h i s mother from F e b r u a r y 2008 t h r o u g h November 2008, a n d t h e n he moved i n t o a camper on t h e C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y . The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t he s p e n t h i s v i s i t a t i o n t i m e w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n a t h i s m o t h e r ' s home. The parties maintained separate 8 financial accounts 2090629 throughout t h e i r marriage. The e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d that the p a r t i e s h a d two a c c o u n t s w i t h A.G. E d w a r d s , a b r o k e r a g e one account wife's the i n t h e h u s b a n d ' s name a n d one a c c o u n t firm, i n the name, t h a t were c r e a t e d as c o l l e g e - f u n d a c c o u n t s f o r children. accounts with The husband also had three other f i n a n c i a l separate institutions financial -- Merrill L y n c h , Morgan K e e g a n , a n d F i r s t S o u t h e r n Bank -- t h a t were n o t used to benefit $16,500. the marriage, which totaled The h u s b a n d h a d a s a v i n g s a c c o u n t approximately and a c h e c k i n g a c c o u n t w i t h a c o m b i n e d t o t a l o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y $12,700. The h u s b a n d a g r e e d t h a t t h e w i f e s h o u l d be a w a r d e d h e r 2000 S i e r r a m i n i v a n , b u t he a s k e d t o be a w a r d e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y s i x v e h i c l e s that were i n h i s name, asserting that the wife d i d not c o n t r i b u t e any f u n d s t o p u r c h a s e t h e v e h i c l e s a n d t h a t she d i d not use t h e v e h i c l e s . The w i f e was s e l f - e m p l o y e d a n d w o r k e d f r o m t h e home. wife testified, and her 2008 federal income-tax The return r e v e a l e d , t h a t t h e w i f e e a r n e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y $24,000 i n 2008 but that her gross income i n 2008, after proper self- employment d e d u c t i o n s were made, was $12,185, o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1,015 a month. The w i f e a g r e e d w i t h a s t a t e m e n t made b y h e r 9 2090629 a t t o r n e y t h a t she d i d n o t i n c u r any she testified that her mother c h i l d r e n f r o m s c h o o l i f she was of c h i l d - c a r e expenses, was able to retrieve u n a b l e t o do s o . the At the time 1 the h e a r i n g , the husband worked f o r Goodyear T i r e , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he g r o s s e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y approximately The that time. Goodyear and he $1,000 e a c h week, o r $52,000 a y e a r . husband t h r o u g h 1989, and first worked at Goodyear Tire from 1984 and he b e g a n e a r n i n g r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s d u r i n g He was Tire l a i d o f f i n 1989, again in husband's Goodyear T i r e 1994. b u t he b e g a n w o r k i n g The wife r e t i r e m e n t account agreed was that at the i n existence b e f o r e she and t h e h u s b a n d m a r r i e d . The h u s b a n d t e s t i f i e d t h a t he h a d account at the approximately $20,000 i n h i s G o o d y e a r T i r e a t t h e t i m e t h e p a r t i e s m a r r i e d i n May time the w i f e f i l e d her balance i n the account to husband, the he was complaint approximately earned at least 1995 retirement and f o r a d i v o r c e , the $92,000. 3% According interest r e t i r e m e n t a c c o u n t , and he e s t i m a t e d t h a t he had e a r n e d in interest on the r e t i r e m e n t funds that, t h a t he had on his $8,400 accumulated We n o t e h o w e v e r , t h a t an e x h i b i t e n t e r e d i n t o e v i d e n c e by t h e w i f e s e t t i n g f o r t h h e r m o n t h l y e x p e n s e s i n c l u d e d $100 a month f o r d a y - c a r e e x p e n s e s . 1 10 2090629 before the p a r t i e s married. The Collinsville residence and property approximately consisted 65 acres of of the m a r i t a l land, and t h e a p p r a i s e d v a l u e o f t h e C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y was $235,000. was undisputed that the p a r t i e s had l i v e d i n the m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e s i n c e t h e y m a r r i e d i n 1995. A c c o r d i n g when the p a r t i e s married, t h e husband C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y was " o u r s . " It told to the wife, her that the O n l y t h e h u s b a n d ' s name was on t h e d e e d t o t h e C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y , b u t t h e w i f e s t a t e d that only t h e husband's name was on e v e r y t h i n g they owned, including her vehicle. The C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y was once owned b y t h e h u s b a n d ' s mother and f a t h e r , residence husband's l o c a t e d on t h e C o l l i n s v i l l e mother Collinsville and property the deed r e c o r d e d that b u t t h e husband testified approximately operated gave living property him i n the i n 1989. The t h e deed to the i n 1 9 9 1 , b u t t h e h u s b a n d d i d n o t have i n h i s name u n t i l the C o l l i n s v i l l e husband father began property that the 1997. The h u s b a n d was worth marital opined $180,000. residence The was on one a c r e o f l a n d a n d t h a t he a n d h i s f a t h e r h a d a cattle business on t h e r e m a i n i n g 11 acreage i nthe 2090629 Collinsville property. participate i n raising funds The w i f e cattle from t h e husband's b e n e f i t of the marriage. admitted with cattle that she d i d n o t t h e h u s b a n d a n d t h a t no business were u s e d The h u s b a n d s t a t e d t h a t t h e m a r i t a l residence a n d o n e - a c r e o f l a n d s h o u l d be s e p a r a t e d remaining acreage raising cattle other than f o r the because the wife from t h e d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n a n d s h e r a r e l y u s e d any p a r t o f t h e 65 a c r e s t h e a r e a where t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e was l o c a t e d . The w i f e owned a home b e f o r e t h e p a r t i e s m a r r i e d , a n d s h e netted approximately while $19,000 f r o m t h e s a l e o f t h a t t h e p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d . According t o t h e w i f e , she used t h e s a l e proceeds t o pay b i l l s and t o purchase for the m a r i t a l residence. A t the time residence furniture the p a r t i e s married, t h e w i f e owed a d e b t t o t h e I n t e r n a l Revenue S e r v i c e a n d t o a credit-card parties company. However, had agreed t h a t the w i f e made f r o m h e r j o b as s p e n d i n g she according had i n h e r i t e d could money. keep t h e income she The w i f e t e s t i f i e d that a home f r o m h e r f a t h e r , who d i e d i n M a r c h 2008, a n d , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e t r i a l , listed to the wife, the t h e h o u s e was a p p a r e n t l y f o r s a l e f o r $58,000. According t o t h e w i f e , t h e r e was a s a f e 12 i n the m a r i t a l 2090629 r e s i d e n c e t h a t c o n t a i n e d a t l e a s t $10,000; h o w e v e r , she s t a t e d that she d i d n o t have access to that safe. The husband t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was n o t s u r e how much money was i n t h e s a f e at the m a r i t a l residence. The h u s b a n d s u b m i t t e d an e x h i b i t , w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n , t h a t he d e s c r i b e d as a l i s t o f h i s p e r s o n a l property t h a t he was r e q u e s t i n g included approximately which, according allegedly were were g i f t s The the that the or sets exhibit award t o him. of items, entered owned b y t h e h u s b a n d b e f o r e into It some o f evidence, the marriage or t o t h e husband from h i s f a t h e r . trial hearing to 44 i t e m s the court court agreed t o take on t h e h u s b a n d ' s hearing, the older a d d i t i o n a l testimony postjudgment motions, child testified that and, a t he w a n t e d t o s p e n d most o f h i s t i m e w i t h t h e h u s b a n d . Standard o f Review "'When o r e t e n u s e v i d e n c e i s p r e s e n t e d , a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s as t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s on i s s u e s o f f a c t ; i t s j u d g m e n t based on t h e s e findings of fact will n o t be d i s t u r b e d unless i t i s c l e a r l y erroneous, without supporting evidence, m a n i f e s t l y unjust, or against the g r e a t weight of t h e evidence. J & M B a i l Bonding Co. v. Hayes, 748 So. 2d 198 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) ; G a s t o n v . Ames, 514 So. 2d 877 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) . When t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n a n o n j u r y case e n t e r s a judgment w i t h o u t making s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s of f a c t , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t " w i l l assume t h a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e made t h o s e 13 at 2090629 findings necessary to support the judgment." T r a n s a m e r i c a C o m m e r c i a l F i n . C o r p . v. AmSouth Bank, 608 So. 2d 375, 378 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) . M o r e o v e r , " [ u ] n d e r t h e o r e t e n u s r u l e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t and a l l i m p l i c i t f i n d i n g s necessary to support i t c a r r y a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s . " T r a n s a m e r i c a , 608 So. 2d a t 378. However, when t h e t r i a l c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y a p p l i e s t h e l a w t o [ t h e ] f a c t s , no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s as t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t . A l l s t a t e I n s . Co. v. S k e l t o n , 675 So. 2d 377 ( A l a . 199 6 ) ; M a r v i n ' s , I n c . t s o n , 608 So. 2d 391 -,4on o n - - - (Ala. 1 9 9 2 ) ; G a s t o n , 514 So. 2d a t 878; . S ¢m;i!t!h. v. S t y l e A d v e r t i s i n g , I n c . , 470 So. 2d 1194 (Ala. 1 9 8 5 ) ; League v. M c D o n a l d , 355 So. 2d 695 (Ala. 1978). " Q u e s t i o n s of law are not s u b j e c t t o the ore t e n u s s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w . " Reed v. B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s f o r A l a b a m a S t a t e U n i v . , 778 So. 2d 791, 793 n. 2 (Ala. 2 0 0 0 ) . A t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s on l e g a l issues c a r r y no presumption of correctness on a p p e a l . Ex p a r t e C a s h , 624 So. 2d 576, 577 (Ala. 1993). T h i s c o u r t reviews the a p p l i c a t i o n of law t o f a c t s de novo. A l l s t a t e , 675 So. 2d a t 379 ("[W]here the f a c t s b e f o r e the t r i a l c o u r t are e s s e n t i a l l y u n d i s p u t e d and t h e c o n t r o v e r s y i n v o l v e s q u e s t i o n s o f law f o r the c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r , the [ t r i a l ] c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t c a r r i e s no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s . " ) . ' " F a r m e r s I n s . Co. 252, v. v. P r i c e - W i l l i a m s Assocs., 254-55 ( A l a . C i v . App Post, 831 So. 2d 622, Inc., 873 .2003) ( q u o t i n g C i t y o f 627-28 ( A l a . C i v . App. So. 2d Prattville 2002)). Discussion I. On erred appeal, by Custody Determination the husband f i r s t argues t h a t the t r i a l awarding the wife sole c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e s u c h an a w a r d was 14 physical custody court of the c o n t r a r y t o t h e l a w and the 2090629 evidence o f t h e case and because i n t e r e s t of the children. joint a n d i t d e s i g n a t e d t h e w i f e as the "primary c u s t o d i a l parent." correctly notes not i n the best The t r i a l c o u r t a w a r d e d t h e p a r t i e s custody of the c h i l d r e n , husband i t was that I n h i s b r i e f on a p p e a l , t h e the term "primary p a r e n t " i s n o t d e f i n e d i n t h e Alabama j o i n t - c u s t o d y § 3 0 - 3 - 1 5 1 , A l a . Code 1975, 2 2 and t h a t t h i s custodial statute, c o u r t has urged S e c t i o n 30-3-151 p r o v i d e s : " F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s a r t i c l e [ T i t l e 30, C h a p t e r 3, A r t i c l e 7, § 30-3-150 t h r o u g h § 30-3-157, e n t i t l e d ' J o i n t C u s t o d y ' ] t h e f o l l o w i n g words s h a l l have t h e f o l l o w i n g m e a n i n g s : "(1) J o i n t c u s t o d y . J o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y a n d j o i n t p h y s i c a l custody. "(2) J o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y . B o t h p a r e n t s have e q u a l r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r major decisions concerning the c h i l d , including, but not l i m i t e d t o , t h e e d u c a t i o n of the c h i l d , h e a l t h c a r e , a n d r e l i g i o u s t r a i n i n g . The c o u r t may d e s i g n a t e one p a r e n t t o have s o l e power t o make c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n s while both parents r e t a i n e q u a l r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r other decisions. "(3) Joint physical custody. Physical c u s t o d y i s s h a r e d b y t h e p a r e n t s i n a way t h a t assures the c h i l d f r e q u e n t and s u b s t a n t i a l contact with each parent. Joint physical c u s t o d y does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean p h y s i c a l custody of equal durations of time. 15 2090629 trial c o u r t s t o use t h e t e r m i n o l o g y when c r a f t i n g c u s t o d y 2d 257, 262 directs this that the custody court's j u d g m e n t s . See S m i t h ( A l a . C i v . App. 2003) . court failure contained i n § 30-3-151 v. S m i t h , However, t o no a u t h o r i t y t o s u p p o r t 887 So. t h e husband h i s argument a w a r d s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d b a s e d on t h e t r i a l to use the appropriate child-custody t e r m i n o l o g y i n t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t . See R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. App. P.; a n d E x p a r t e S h o w e r s , 812 So. 2d 277, 281 2001). trial M o r e o v e r , as t h e h u s b a n d a p p a r e n t l y (Ala. recognizes, the c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as a w a r d i n g t h e parties joint wife l e g a l custody sole p h y s i c a l custody o f t h e c h i l d r e n and awarding t h e of the c h i l d r e n . 3 C f . Combs v. "(4) S o l e l e g a l c u s t o d y . One p a r e n t has s o l e r i g h t s a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o make m a j o r d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e c h i l d , including, but not l i m i t e d t o , the e d u c a t i o n o f t h e c h i l d , h e a l t h c a r e , and religious training. "(5) S o l e p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y . One p a r e n t h a s s o l e p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y and t h e o t h e r p a r e n t has rights of v i s i t a t i o n except as otherwise p r o v i d e d by t h e c o u r t . " A l t h o u g h t h e h u s b a n d , i n h i s i n i t i a l b r i e f on a p p e a l , argues t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by awarding t h e w i f e s o l e p h y s i c a l custody of the c h i l d r e n , i n h i s r e p l y b r i e f the h u s b a n d a r g u e s t h a t t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t s h o u l d n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d as a w a r d i n g t h e w i f e s o l e p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f t h e 3 16 2090629 Combs, 4 So. 3d 1141, the in a parties custody and custodian," 1145, divorce the 1151 ( A l a . C i v . App. action husband were was designated that as (when joint awarded interpreted t h i s court 2008) legal the "primary a w a r d t o be an award of p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l custody, or s o l e p h y s i c a l custody, to the husband). "When the trial determination, neither his or her favor, standard w i l l 604 1147 and ( A l a . C i v . App. 686, 696-97 list initial party generally 602, a court ( A l a . C i v . App. of "[t]he initial custody i s e n t i t l e d to a presumption the 'best child' Steed, 877 So. 2d v. Nye, 785 So. 2d I n Ex p a r t e D e v i n e , 398 So. 2d 2003) interest S t e e d v. ( c i t i n g Nye of factors a trial in the apply." 2000)). an ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) , t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t s e t award of children, makes court may c u s t o d y b a s e d on the consider best forth i n making i n t e r e s t of an the including sex and age of the children ... the children. I n s t e a d , he a r g u e s i n h i s r e p l y b r i e f t h a t the d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as a w a r d i n g t h e p a r t i e s j o i n t c u s t o d y -- i . e . , j o i n t l e g a l c u s t o d y and j o i n t p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y -of the c h i l d r e n . Although t h i s court cannot c o n s i d e r a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n an a p p e l l a n t ' s r e p l y b r i e f , see B y r d v. Lamar, 846 So. 2d 334, 341 (Ala. 2 0 0 2 ) , we d i s a g r e e t h a t t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t e s t a b l i s h e d a j o i n t - c u s t o d y arrangement. 17 2090629 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and needs o f e a c h c h i l d , i n c l u d i n g their emotional, social, moral, material and e d u c a t i o n a l n e e d s ; t h e r e s p e c t i v e home e n v i r o n m e n t s o f f e r e d by t h e p a r t i e s ; t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h o s e seeking custody, including age, character, s t a b i l i t y , m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l h e a l t h ; t h e capacity and i n t e r e s t of each p a r e n t t o p r o v i d e f o r the e m o t i o n a l , s o c i a l , m o r a l , m a t e r i a l and educational needs of the children; the interpersonal r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n e a c h c h i l d and e a c h p a r e n t ; t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c h i l d r e n ; the e f f e c t on t h e c h i l d o f d i s r u p t i n g o r c o n t i n u i n g an e x i s t i n g c u s t o d i a l s t a t u s ; the p r e f e r e n c e of each child, i f the child i s of sufficient age and maturity; the report and recommendation of any e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s or o t h e r independent i n v e s t i g a t o r ; available alternatives; and any other relevant m a t t e r t h e e v i d e n c e may disclose." The husband abandonment o f children, the argues the that factors children, the w i f e ' s n e g l e c t of such wife's the as cruelty children, c h i l d ' s c u s t o d i a l p r e f e r e n c e weighed i n favor sole physical that t h e r e i s no that the husband's filing custody wife of abandoned that for a divorce. the tenus hearing children husband to wife the paternal 18 the the and we alleged him in we the note the by of the the ore allow the at not him finding simply cruelty did grandfather older reject presented wife the of awarding abandoned testimony that and to support a children, wife's toward Initially, record R e g a r d i n g the cites the the the indicating see children. e v i d e n c e i n the argument wife, the the hospital 2090629 before he d i e d . neglect The h u s b a n d a l s o of the wife, pounds d u r i n g alleges that, due t o t h e t h e o l d e r c h i l d g a i n e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 55 t h e pendency o f t h e d i v o r c e action. Although s u c h e v i d e n c e c o u l d have s u p p o r t e d an a w a r d o f s o l e physical c u s t o d y t o t h e husband, t h e t r i a l evidence that supported a finding c h i l d r e n w o u l d be s e r v e d that court heard other the best interest by a w a r d i n g t h e w i f e custody of the c h i l d r e n . Nichols, who t e s t i f i e d as an e x p e r t , sole the children's the older counselor i n l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t she h a d b e e n t h e i r p r i m a r y c a r e t a k e r . that physical s t a t e d t h a t she saw no r e a s o n t o remove c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d r e n f r o m t h e w i f e testified of the child had u n r e s o l v e d Nichols also interpersonal i s s u e s w i t h t h e h u s b a n d t h a t , she i n d i c a t e d , c a u s e d t h e o l d e r child a great deal of stress. i n d i c a t e d t h a t the w i f e had p r o v i d e d of t h e c h i l d r e n by h e l p i n g them w i t h the husband had not c o n s i d e r e d should Finally, other evidence f o rthe educational needs t h e i r homework a n d t h a t homework s o m e t h i n g t h e c h i l d r e n be r e q u i r e d t o c o m p l e t e u n t i l t h e y were i n t h e f o u r t h grade. F u r t h e r m o r e , a l t h o u g h "an e x p r e s s e d p r e f e r e n c e of a c h i l d t o l i v e w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r p a r e n t i s a f a c t o r t o be considered 19 2090629 by the trial Bassett court, v. Brown, 598 see a l s o L a d d e n v. So. 3d only to , 10 live custody 2d 936, [Ms. the 937 ( A l a . C i v . App. The 16, the trial 1992); 2010] older c h i l d court was preferred could have and N i c h o l s ' s t e s t i m o n y that u n d e r a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f s t r e s s , the t o be g i v e n determinative." t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t h e o l d e r c h i l d ' s age, that not 2010) . t i m e he husband; are 2081010, A p r i l ( A l a . C i v . App. with determining wishes Ladden, o l d e r c h i l d was n o t due So. years o l d at the considered the such older child's considerable determination. in expressed preference weight i n making the Accordingly, we conclude was initial that the t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment a w a r d i n g the w i f e s o l e p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d r e n i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e and i s due to be affirmed. II. C h i l d S u p p o r t and Unpaid Medical Expenses Next, the husband argues t h a t the award of c h i l d is c o n t r a r y to the law and the evidence p r e s e n t e d support insofar as i t does n o t c o n f o r m t o t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s s e t forth as In 2008, a CS-41 an before appendix the trial to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin. i n t h i s matter, both p a r t i e s filed C h i l d - S u p p o r t - O b l i g a t i o n Income S t a t e m e n t / A f f i d a v i t f o r m 20 ("CS- 2090629 41 f o r m " ) , and t h o s e f o r m s a p p e a r i n t h e r e c o r d . the w i f e ' s J a n u a r y 2008 CS-41 According to f o r m , she e a r n e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y $2,000 a month and p a i d $347 a month f o r c h i l d - c a r e A c c o r d i n g t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s November 2008 CS-41 a p p r o x i m a t e l y $4,325 a month and p a i d $78 insurance expenses. the parties testified testimony contained that f o r m , he e a r n e d a month i n h e a l t h - However, a t t h e h e a r i n g i n O c t o b e r 2009, offered information expenses. in her their that conflicted with the forms. The wife CS-41 self-employment income a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1,015 a month, and t h e t r i a l totaled c o u r t c o u l d have c o n c l u d e d t h a t she d i d n o t i n c u r any c h i l d - c a r e e x p e n s e s . The husband was testified that, at the time of the hearing, he e a r n i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y $52,000 a y e a r , o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y $4,333 a month. Support Using this Guidelines i n s u r a n c e expense child-support information form, and t o complete using f r o m h i s 2008 CS-41 obligation as the the husband's form, trial a CS-42 4 Childhealth- we r e a c h t h e same court did, $903 a A c c o r d i n g t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s 2008 CS-41 f o r m , t h e h u s b a n d was e m p l o y e d a t G o o d y e a r T i r e , w h i c h was where he was e m p l o y e d at the time of t r i a l . 4 21 2090629 month. The 5 improperly Rule c a l c u l a t e d her 32(B)(3), Because the his h u s b a n d does n o t A l a . R Jud. a r g u e on gross monthly Admin. h u s b a n d ' s a r g u m e n t on contention appeal that the wife income p u r s u a n t (self-employment income). appeal i s based s o l e l y on t h a t the c h i l d - s u p p o r t award i s u n s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d and t h a t i t d i d n o t c o m p l y w i t h child-support guidelines appended to Rule 32, there i s evidence to support the c h i l d - s u p p o r t the trial to court's child-support determination and the because determination, i s due to be affirmed. The of the husband a l s o argues t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s children's unpaid medical expenses is allocation "inconsistent We n o t e t h a t , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e w i f e f i l e d her c o m p l a i n t f o r a d i v o r c e i n J a n u a r y 2008, b e f o r e R u l e 32 was amended e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1, 2009, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e v i d e n t l y u s e d t h e c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s as amended e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1, 2009, i n m a k i n g a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n . However, we w i l l n o t r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s c h i l d - s u p p o r t d e t e r m i n a t i o n b a s e d on g r o u n d s t h a t t h e i m p r o p e r c h i l d - s u p p o r t g u i d e l i n e s were u t i l i z e d b e c a u s e t h e h u s b a n d d i d n o t p r e s e n t t h i s a r g u m e n t t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t . See Andrews v. M e r r i t t O i l Co., I n c . , 612 So. 2d 409, 410 ( A l a . 1992) (an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t may c o n s i d e r a r g u m e n t s made on a p p e a l o n l y i f t h o s e a r g u m e n t s were f i r s t c o n s i d e r e d by t h e t r i a l court). 5 22 2090629 with the parties' pro rata share of expenses." In the o r d e r e d t o pay 19% o f t h e c h i l d r e n ' s u n p a i d m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s and t h e h u s b a n d was d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t , as amended, t h e w i f e was 6 r e q u i r e d t o pay 81% o f t h e c h i l d r e n ' s u n p a i d m e d i c a l The wife's parties' gross combined gross monthly gross monthly children's parties' income. expenses; gross income monthly is equal income, and to 19% the income. A c c o r d i n g l y , the medical percentage share husband expenses of raises of the a l l o c a t i o n their no of the is the combined allocation of the identical to the combined other of husband's income i s e q u a l t o 8 1 % o f t h e p a r t i e s ' unpaid The reversal monthly expenses. gross argument children's monthly to support unpaid medical a c c o r d i n g l y , t h a t a s p e c t o f t h e j u d g m e n t i s due to be a f f i r m e d . III. D i v i s i o n o f P r o p e r t y and A w a r d o f Alimony On a p p e a l , t h e h u s b a n d c h a l l e n g e s t h e a w a r d o f a p o r t i o n o f h i s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s t o t h e w i f e , t h e awards o f p e r s o n a l property, the award of alimony to the wife, and the The husband's argument i s t a k e n from a quote i n h i s i n i t i a l b r i e f on a p p e a l ; we c o n s t r u e t h e h u s b a n d ' s argument as a challenge to the percentage a l l o c a t i o n of unpaid medical expenses because i t i s inconsistent w i t h the parties' percentage share of t h e i r c h i l d - s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n . 6 23 2090629 d i s p o s i t i o n of the C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y . that the award of a portion of the b e n e f i t s t o t h e w i f e must be r e v e r s e d division of property reconsidered, the The the husband's and, award will consider A. division we and B e c a u s e we that Retirement conclude retirement therefore, that of alimony aspect of must the property Benefits husband argues t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n awarding wife a portion (1) of because his the retirement wife retirement b e n e f i t s were v e s t e d Ala. 1975; Code (2) because benefits failed as the to prove r e q u i r e d by wife for failed § to three that prove of h i s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s as r e q u i r e d by § 2-51(b); and judgment (3) because the awarded the p o r t i o n o f h i s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s t h a t had a c c u m u l a t e d parties of g o v e r n e d by married, in retirement violation benefits of in wife the 30a before § 30-2-51(b)(2). The a marital is § 3 0 - 2 - 5 1 ( b ) , A l a . Code 1975, estate which s t a t e s : "The j u d g e , a t h i s o r h e r d i s c r e t i o n , may i n c l u d e i n t h e e s t a t e o f e i t h e r s p o u s e t h e p r e s e n t v a l u e o f any f u t u r e or c u r r e n t r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s , t h a t a spouse may have a v e s t e d i n t e r e s t i n o r may be r e c e i v i n g on the date the a c t i o n f o r d i v o r c e i s f i l e d , provided t h a t the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s are met: 24 his 30-2-51(b), present value division be first. reasons: the the 2090629 "(1) The p a r t i e s have b e e n m a r r i e d a p e r i o d o f 10 y e a r s d u r i n g w h i c h r e t i r e m e n t was b e i n g a c c u m u l a t e d . for the "(2) The c o u r t s h a l l n o t i n c l u d e i n t h e e s t a t e t h e v a l u e o f any retirement b e n e f i t s a c q u i r e d p r i o r to the marriage i n c l u d i n g any i n t e r e s t o r a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the b e n e f i t s . "(3) The total amount of the r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s payable to the nonc o v e r e d s p o u s e s h a l l n o t e x c e e d 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s t h a t may be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e c o u r t . " Initially, we note t h a t our review t h a t the husband d i d not argue b e f o r e wife f a i l e d to present retirement n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t a r g u m e n t . See So. appellate 2d 806, the purpose of court the t r i a l 821 accordingly, S t a t e Farm Mut. So. "cannot c o n s i d e r r e v e r s i n g the 2d 82, judgment of first husband's may Auto. Ins. Co. failed 25 to present v. ( A l a . 2003)) trial t i m e on However, t h e h u s b a n d d i d p r o p e r l y p r e s e r v e wife the court a trial c o n s i d e r a t i o n o r were r a i s e d f o r t h e the this 97 to the that court that arguments advanced t h o s e a r g u m e n t s were n e v e r p r e s e n t e d argument reveals ( A l a . 2005) ( c i t i n g C r u t c h e r Wendy's o f N o r t h A l a b a m a , I n c . , 857 (an record evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the b e n e f i t s were v e s t e d ; v. M o t l e y , 909 of the court court for when for appeal"). f o r review evidence of the the 2090629 present value of h i s retirement b e n e f i t s . that the husband's retirement benefits with began a c c u m u l a t i n g before testified had accumulated t h a t he I t was undisputed Goodyear the p a r t i e s married. The approximately Tire husband $20,000 in r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s a t t h e t i m e t h e p a r t i e s m a r r i e d on May 6, 1995, a n d t h a t t h e minimum i n t e r e s t retirement account calculations, on the According to approximately funds that existed also testified $92,000 the $8,400 husband The approximately 3%. he h a d e a r n e d retirement married. was rate applicable to h i s before in interest the that i n h i s r e t i r e m e n t account t h e w i f e f i l e d f o r a d i v o r c e i n J a n u a r y 2008. husband's parties there was at the time B e c a u s e we must assume t h a t t h e h u s b a n d ' s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s were v e s t e d , t h e trial c o u r t was calculated presented the present evidence value retirement benefits marriage. A c c o r d i n g l y , we argument that that the wife from which of accumulated find failed the husband's during no m e r i t to present i t c o u l d have the future parties' i n t h e husband's evidence of the present value of h i s retirement b e n e f i t s . Finally, awarding t h e husband argues t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by t h e w i f e t h e v a l u e o f 50% o f h i s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s 26 2090629 "as d e t e r m i n e d by t h e v a l u e which i s the date o f t h e b e n e f i t s on May t h e p a r t i e s were married. implement t h i s p r o v i s i o n of the d i v o r c e court entered assigned to a qualified the wife "an equal 1995," In order judgment, t h e domestic-relations amount 6, to trial order ... 50% to that of the [husband]'s e n t i r e r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t which had a c c r u e d under t h e 1950 P e n s i o n P l a n as o f May 6, 1995." The h u s b a n d , § 30-2-51(b)(2), j u d g m e n t awards t h e wife argues t h a t the d i v o r c e the p o r t i o n of the husband's s h o u l d have b e e n e x c l u d e d , accumulated before retirement citing benefits that i . e . , the retirement b e n e f i t s that t h e p a r t i e s ' m a r r i a g e on May 6, 1995. We agree w i t h the husband t h a t the language used i n the d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t , as w e l l as t h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e q u a l i f i e d relations order, awarded t h e w i f e domestic- 50% o f t h e amount o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s t h a t h a d a c c r u e d up t o t h e d a t e of the p a r t i e s ' Accordingly, marriage, that part in violation of the divorce of § judgment t h a t the w i f e a p o r t i o n of the husband's r e t i r e m e n t had a c c r u e d b e f o r e 30-2-51(b)(2). awarded benefits that t h e i r m a r r i a g e on May 6, 1995, i s due t o be reversed. B e c a u s e t h e h u s b a n d has a p p e a l e d t h e a w a r d o f a l i m o n y t o 27 2090629 the wife remand and o t h e r the cause aspects to the of the d i v i s i o n trial court we instructions with of property, to r e c o n s i d e r i t s a w a r d o f a l i m o n y and i t s d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y in light of the impact of the retirement b e n e f i t s to the w i f e . 843 So. 2d 759, 762 change in the award property (Ala. the case ( A l a . C i v . App. 2002) division); f o r the and trial Dunn v. of See T o m p k i n s v. T o m p k i n s , 8 ( r e v e r s i n g an a w a r d of r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s t h a t exceeded the s t a t u t o r y l i m i t remanding 7 court Dunn, to 891 and reconsider i t s So. 2d 891, 895 C i v . App. 2 0 0 4 ) . As p a r t of h i s appeal of the d i v i s i o n of the p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i n t h e d i v o r c e judgment, the husband argues t h a t the d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t i s v a g u e , a m b i g u o u s , and n o n f i n a l b e c a u s e i t i s u n c l e a r f r o m t h e j u d g m e n t what p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y was a w a r d e d t o t h e h u s b a n d . The p a r t o f t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t t h a t d i v i d e d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y s t a t e s as f o l l o w s : "[The w i f e ] i s awarded a l l of the household furniture, furnishings, a p p l i a n c e s , e t c . , i n the m a r i t a l [residence] except [the h u s b a n d ] ' s p e r s o n a l b e l o n g i n g s . " T h i s c o u r t does n o t e x p e c t a t r i a l c o u r t t o e n t e r a j u d g m e n t t h a t s p e c i f i c a l l y awards e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l i t e m o f p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y owned by t h e p a r t i e s , and we d i s a g r e e t h a t t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t i s n o n f i n a l f o r f a i l i n g t o do s o . However, f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n d i v o r c e p r o c e e d i n g s , s p e c i f i c judgments are always p r e f e r r e d . 7 On remand, w h i l e r e c o n s i d e r i n g i t s d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t may, i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n and s u b j e c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f § 30-2-51 ( b ) , a w a r d t h e w i f e a p o r t i o n o f t h e husband's r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s . 8 28 2090629 B. D i v i s i o n of the C o l l i n s v i l l e Although we have remanded t h e Property case w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s to the t r i a l c o u r t to r e c o n s i d e r i t s p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n , i n c l u d i n g the award of alimony to h u s b a n d ' s argument on was the appeal wife, we t h a t the division will address Collinsville because i t was the property not subject to part of separate estate. S e c t i o n 3 0 - 2 - 5 1 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, his allows a t r i a l c o u r t t o d i v i d e " p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by one p a r t y b e f o r e the marriage the common i f 'the p r o p e r t y benefit of S u m e r l i n v. S u m e r l i n , (emphasis omitted) the 964 ... has b e e n u s e d r e g u l a r l y f o r p a r t i e s during So. 2d 47, 49 the marriage.'" ( A l a . C i v . App. 2007) ( a f f i r m i n g a judgment awarding t o the wife t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e t h a t was p u r c h a s e d by t h e h u s b a n d b e f o r e the parties' marriage and that was used as his place of business). The evidence p r o p e r t y was presented given indicated that t o t h e h u s b a n d by the Collinsville h i s parents p a r t i e s m a r r i e d and t h a t t h e p a r t i e s l i v e d on t h e property the f o r the evidence composed the entire before Collinsville l e n g t h of t h e i r marriage. indicated that Collinsville the majority property 29 was of used the the for Although land a that cattle 2090629 business that was operated by the husband and his father, t h e r e was o n l y one d e e d t o a l l t h e C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y . husband small argues t h a t part of because the w i f e the Collinsville residence and t h e s u r r o u n d i n g marriage, she s h o u l d be p a r t of the C o l l i n s v i l l e only r e g u l a r l y used a property -- the marital o n e - a c r e o f l a n d -- d u r i n g entitled The to only a portion their of that property. In r e s p o n s e t o the husband's argument, the w i f e , R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., a r g u e s t h a t t h i s citing court should d i s r e g a r d t h e h u s b a n d ' s argument b e c a u s e t h e h u s b a n d f a i l e d t o cite any court authority erred by to support considering w h o l e and b y c o n c l u d i n g to d i v i s i o n . 815, 822 the C o l l i n s v i l l e the trial property t h a t i t was m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y See Latham v. D e p a r t m e n t o f C o r r . , court failure will disregard a party's considered argument t o comply w i t h R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) ) . e v i d e n t l y concluded that the C o l l i n s v i l l e as a subject 927 So. on 2d appeal The t r i a l property common b e n e f i t be that r e g u l a r l y had been u s e d f o r of the p a r t i e s during 30 court should as a w h o l e and t h a t , b e c a u s e i t was u n d i s p u t e d part of the C o l l i n s v i l l e property the that ( A l a . 2005) ( c i t i n g t h e w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e t h a t an appellate for h i s argument the marriage, the 2090629 C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y was m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y . "Whether p r o p e r t y i s m a r i t a l o r s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y i s a 'matter fact [to decide] after reviewing f o rthe t r i e r of a l l the evidence i n each c a s e . ' " W o l f v. W o l f , 666 So. 2d 17, 18 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1995) ( q u o t i n g S h i r l e y v. S h i r l e y , App. 1992)). 600 So. 2d 284, 287 The h u s b a n d h a s p r o v i d e d t h i s (Ala.C i v . c o u r t no b a s i s t o support a r e v e r s a l of the t r i a l court's determination that the Collinsville property Accordingly, we a f f i r m the Collinsville division. should be the t r i a l property was considered as a whole. court's determination marital property that subject to 9 IV. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f P a r a g r a p h S i x Finally, divorce t h e husband judgment, paragraph, argues specifically that paragraph the f i r s t s i x of the sentence i s ambiguous; t h a t i t v i o l a t e s h i s F i r s t of that Amendment The h u s b a n d , c i t i n g § 30-2-51 ( a ) , a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e w i f e ' s s e p a r a t e e s t a t e when i t awarded h e r o n e - h a l f o f t h e p r o c e e d s from t h e s a l e o f t h e Collinsville property. This a r g u m e n t i s b a s e d on h i s a s s e r t i o n that the C o l l i n s v i l l e property i s h i s separate estate. Because we have affirmed the t r i a l court's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e C o l l i n s v i l l e p r o p e r t y as a w h o l e was n o t p a r t o f h i s s e p a r a t e e s t a t e , we r e j e c t t h e h u s b a n d ' s a r g u m e n t s made i n h i s i n i t i a l b r i e f on a p p e a l that are p r e m i s e d upon t h a t a s s e r t i o n . 9 31 2090629 constitutional right to free speech; that i t violates his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s c h i l d r e n ; and that i t is overly broad. Paragraph six of the divorce judgment s t a t e s , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "6. Minimization of Emotional Trauma on Child/Children: Neither party shall do or say a n y t h i n g t o [ t h e ] ... c h i l d r e n o f t h e p a r t i e s , o r i n [ t h e ] ... c h i l d r e n [ ' ] ( s ) p r e s e n c e and h e a r i n g [ , ] t o i n f l u e n c e [ t h e ] ... c h i l d r e n a b o u t t h e o t h e r p a r t y o r a b o u t any i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s a c t i o n . " We the cannot agree w i t h divorce paragraph trauma reveals the judgment i s ambiguous. s i x i n mind, i . e . , the on the the children, a trial court's plain the i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d harm t h e c h i l d r e n by support Keeping the minimization reading i n t e n t i o n to a b i l i t y t o do o r s a y a n y t h i n g In husband t h a t p a r a g r a p h of purpose of limit of emotional paragraph the six parties' to i n f l u e n c e the c h i l d r e n about i n t h e d i v o r c e a c t i o n i n a way causing s i x of emotional t h a t would trauma. of h i s argument t h a t p a r a g r a p h six violates h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o f r e e s p e e c h and h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the c h i l d r e n , the husband the main o p i n i o n ( A l a . C i v . App. JJ., concurring i n J a c k s o n v. Jackson, 999 So. 2d 488, cites 494 2007) (per Moore, J . , w i t h P i t t m a n and Thomas, i n the result), 32 which recognized a parent's 2090629 "constitutional children," right citing to a relationship with Quillion v. W a l c o t t , [ h i sor] her 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and h e l d t h a t " [ t ] h e s t a t e s h o u l d n o t i n t r u d e on [a p a r e n t ' s ] constitutional compelling r i g h t s a n y more So. from harm. See Ex p a r t e So. 3d E.H.G. v . E.R.G., 3d recognized that protecting i t s children saying the d i v o r c e divorce [Ms. 2091171, ( A l a . C i v . App. 2010) [Ms. 2071061, M a r c h 12, 2010] the state 2010)) has from s i x of the divorce anything M.J.W., , ( A l a . C i v . App. paragraph a i n t e r e s t i n protecting the children of November 12, 2010] (citing to protect The h u s b a n d does n o t c o n t e n d t h a t t h e s t a t e does n o t have a c o m p e l l i n g state necessary s t a t e i n t e r e s t , " c i t i n g M.L.B. v. S . L . J . , 519 U.S. 102 ( 1 9 9 6 ) . this than a ("[T]his compelling harm."). judgment He court has interest i n argues precludes him that from t o t h e c h i l d r e n about any i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i n a c t i o n and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , p a r a g r a p h s i x o f t h e judgment i s so b r o a d that i t i n t e r f e r e s with h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i n a manner t h a t i s more t h a n n e c e s s a r y to protect the state's compelling i n t e r e s t i n keeping the c h i l d r e n f r o m harm. However, a plain reading of paragraph 33 s i x does n o t , as 2090629 the husband argues, f o r b i d the husband whatsoever to the c h i l d r e n divorce action. a b o u t any from s a y i n g issue anything presented i n the P a r a g r a p h s i x p r e c l u d e s t h e h u s b a n d and t h e w i f e from s a y i n g a n y t h i n g t o " i n f l u e n c e the c h i l d r e n about ... any i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s a c t i o n , " f o r t h e s t a t e d p u r p o s e o f minimizing emotional trauma on protecting t h e c h i l d r e n f r o m harm. that constitutional the his relationship with the permitted to influence the divorce action e m o t i o n a l trauma. and thus The h u s b a n d does n o t a r g u e rights children children to would the c h i l d r e n free speech require and a he be related to that about i s s u e s i n a manner t h a t w o u l d c a u s e t h e children T h e r e f o r e , b e c a u s e p a r a g r a p h s i x does n o t , as t h e h u s b a n d s u g g e s t s , f o r b i d a l l c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n husband divorce, and t h e c h i l d r e n we r e g a r d i n g any need not d e c i d e whether issue a divorce related the to the judgment that d i d so w o u l d v i o l a t e a p a r e n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o f r e e speech and Accordingly, f i n d no e r r o r a relationship based on with his the husband's or argument i n paragraph s i x of the divorce her on children. appeal, we judgment. Conclusion The a w a r d o f r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s 34 to the w i f e i s reversed 2090629 and t h e c a u s e i s remanded f o rthe t r i a l court to reconsider i t s d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y and t h e award o f a l i m o n y t o t h e w i f e . All other aspects AFFIRMED o f t h e d i v o r c e judgment a r e a f f i r m e d . I N PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Thompson, P . J . , and Pittman a n d Thomas, Moore, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e r a t i o n a l e in the result, with writing. 35 J J . , concur. i n p a r t and c o n c u r s 2090629 MOORE, J u d g e , concurring concurring i n the r e s u l t . I concur determination property i n the that subject result the to in the to rationale affirm Collinsville division the property i n Part III.B. in part and trial court's was marital of the main o p i n i o n , a n d I c o n c u r i n t h e r e s u l t t o a f f i r m as t o p a r a g r a p h six of the d i v o r c e judgment i n P a r t I concur i n t h e remainder o f t h e main 36 IV o f t h e m a i n opinion. opinion.

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