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	<title>White Collar Crime - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
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	<updated>2026-07-31T19:22:33-08:00</updated>
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	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3142/24-3142-2026-07-31.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Ketcher</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-31T07:30:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-31T07:30:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3142/24-3142-2026-07-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Shelly Ketcher was employed as a bookkeeper for South Delta Aviation (SDA) and also managed the personal affairs of the owner, D.R. Over a five-year period, she embezzled about $2.7 million from SDA and D.R. by forging more than a thousand checks, making them payable to herself, family, and friends. Ketcher concealed her extensive criminal history of prior fraud and embezzlement convictions when she was hired. The embezzlement was discovered after D.R. found he was delinquent on property taxes and confronted Ketcher, who attempted to cover up her actions with forged documents.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas handled Ketcher’s guilty plea to one count of money laundering and one count of filing a false federal income tax return. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated an advisory guidelines range of 92 to 115 months. At sentencing, after hearing victim impact statements and arguments from both sides, the court imposed an upward variance, sentencing Ketcher to a total of 156 months in prison—120 months for money laundering and a consecutive 36 months for the tax offense. The court cited the egregiousness of the offense and Ketcher’s repeated similar crimes as aggravating factors, outweighing her mitigating circumstances.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Ketcher argued that her sentence was substantively unreasonable, asserting that the district court gave insufficient weight to mitigating factors, imposed a harsher sentence than similarly situated defendants, and was motivated by personal animosity. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the upward variance, found the court’s reasoning and weighing of factors appropriate, and affirmed the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3142/24-3142-2026-07-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Ketcher" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Shelly Ketcher was employed as a bookkeeper for South Delta Aviation (SDA) and also managed the personal affairs of the owner, D.R. Over a five-year period, she embezzled about $2.7 million from SDA and D.R. by forging more than a thousand checks, making them payable to herself, family, and friends. Ketcher concealed her extensive criminal history of prior fraud and embezzlement convictions when she was hired. The embezzlement was discovered after D.R. found he was delinquent on property taxes and confronted Ketcher, who attempted to cover up her actions with forged documents.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas handled Ketcher’s guilty plea to one count of money laundering and one count of filing a false federal income tax return. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated an advisory guidelines range of 92 to 115 months. At sentencing, after hearing victim impact statements and arguments from both sides, the court imposed an upward variance, sentencing Ketcher to a total of 156 months in prison—120 months for money laundering and a consecutive 36 months for the tax offense. The court cited the egregiousness of the offense and Ketcher’s repeated similar crimes as aggravating factors, outweighing her mitigating circumstances.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Ketcher argued that her sentence was substantively unreasonable, asserting that the district court gave insufficient weight to mitigating factors, imposed a harsher sentence than similarly situated defendants, and was motivated by personal animosity. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the upward variance, found the court’s reasoning and weighing of factors appropriate, and affirmed the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Loken</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-2086/24-2086-2026-07-30.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Gonzalez</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-30T14:00:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-30T14:00:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-2086/24-2086-2026-07-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An individual, born in 1937, assumed the identity of his younger brother, who died in infancy, to fraudulently obtain a second Social Security number and collect retirement benefits under both his own and his brother’s identities. Over the course of nearly two decades, he received Social Security payments in both names and also procured and used U.S. passports issued under his deceased brother’s identity. His scheme unraveled after a state motor vehicle official noticed similarities between two identification cards with different names but similar photos and addresses. Subsequent investigation revealed the use of both identities for benefits and travel, as well as submission of multiple passport applications with false information.

A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maine indicted the defendant on six counts, including identity theft, passport fraud, Social Security fraud, and mail fraud. At trial, the defendant contested the propriety of venue in Maine for two passport fraud counts and challenged the calculation of restitution. The district court submitted the venue question to the jury, which found venue proper for both passport counts and convicted him on all charges. He was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay $175,757 in restitution.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the jury’s venue determinations and the restitution order. The court held that sufficient circumstantial evidence supported venue in Maine for both the false statement in the passport application and the use of a fraudulently obtained passport, applying the appropriate legal standards for each count. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s method for calculating restitution, concluding that the government met its burden of proof regarding the loss amount. The First Circuit affirmed both the convictions and the restitution order. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-2086/24-2086-2026-07-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An individual, born in 1937, assumed the identity of his younger brother, who died in infancy, to fraudulently obtain a second Social Security number and collect retirement benefits under both his own and his brother’s identities. Over the course of nearly two decades, he received Social Security payments in both names and also procured and used U.S. passports issued under his deceased brother’s identity. His scheme unraveled after a state motor vehicle official noticed similarities between two identification cards with different names but similar photos and addresses. Subsequent investigation revealed the use of both identities for benefits and travel, as well as submission of multiple passport applications with false information.

A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maine indicted the defendant on six counts, including identity theft, passport fraud, Social Security fraud, and mail fraud. At trial, the defendant contested the propriety of venue in Maine for two passport fraud counts and challenged the calculation of restitution. The district court submitted the venue question to the jury, which found venue proper for both passport counts and convicted him on all charges. He was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay $175,757 in restitution.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the jury’s venue determinations and the restitution order. The court held that sufficient circumstantial evidence supported venue in Maine for both the false statement in the passport application and the use of a fraudulently obtained passport, applying the appropriate legal standards for each count. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s method for calculating restitution, concluding that the government met its burden of proof regarding the loss amount. The First Circuit affirmed both the convictions and the restitution order.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gustavo Gelpí</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Public Benefits"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1845/25-1845-2026-07-30.html</id>
        	<title>Rennenger v. Aquawood, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-30T07:31:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-30T07:31:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1845/25-1845-2026-07-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Five individuals obtained over $1.8 million in workplace sexual harassment judgments against various related business entities and individuals. When these judgments went unpaid, they brought a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against fifteen defendants, alleging a scheme to evade collection of the judgments. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants orchestrated fraudulent asset transfers and used a sham consignment scheme involving false customs forms to prevent the plaintiffs from seizing assets to satisfy their judgments.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the plaintiffs’ RICO claims based on predicate acts of bankruptcy crimes, money laundering, and obstruction of justice, as well as their claim for declaratory relief regarding alter ego liability. However, the court allowed the RICO claims predicated on wire fraud related to the consignment scheme to proceed. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show proximate causation between the alleged wire fraud and their inability to collect on their judgments, and that they were not entitled to adverse inference sanctions for alleged discovery misconduct.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the consignment scheme was a but-for cause of their injury, as they did not show that any assets subject to seizure belonged to the judgment debtors. The court further concluded that claims based on other predicate offenses failed due to insufficient evidence and lack of particularity. The appellate court also found no error in the district court’s refusal to draw adverse inferences or to allow amendment of the complaints at this stage. The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1845/25-1845-2026-07-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rennenger v. Aquawood, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Five individuals obtained over $1.8 million in workplace sexual harassment judgments against various related business entities and individuals. When these judgments went unpaid, they brought a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against fifteen defendants, alleging a scheme to evade collection of the judgments. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants orchestrated fraudulent asset transfers and used a sham consignment scheme involving false customs forms to prevent the plaintiffs from seizing assets to satisfy their judgments.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the plaintiffs’ RICO claims based on predicate acts of bankruptcy crimes, money laundering, and obstruction of justice, as well as their claim for declaratory relief regarding alter ego liability. However, the court allowed the RICO claims predicated on wire fraud related to the consignment scheme to proceed. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show proximate causation between the alleged wire fraud and their inability to collect on their judgments, and that they were not entitled to adverse inference sanctions for alleged discovery misconduct.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the consignment scheme was a but-for cause of their injury, as they did not show that any assets subject to seizure belonged to the judgment debtors. The court further concluded that claims based on other predicate offenses failed due to insufficient evidence and lack of particularity. The appellate court also found no error in the district court’s refusal to draw adverse inferences or to allow amendment of the complaints at this stage. The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants on all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jonathan Kobes</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1054/25-1054-2026-07-29.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Greebel</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-29T07:00:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-29T07:00:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1054/25-1054-2026-07-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, convicted by a jury of conspiracies to commit wire and securities fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud investors, was ordered to pay over $10 million in restitution to the victim company. To enforce this restitution order, the government sought to garnish the defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. The defendant objected, arguing that various legal provisions, including plan terms and federal statutes, either prohibited or limited garnishment of his accounts. The victim, the financial institutions holding the accounts, and the government ultimately reached a settlement on how the garnishment and tax consequences would be handled.

After the conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered the government’s application for writs of garnishment. The district court rejected the parties’ proposed stipulated orders of garnishment, reasoning that the proposal exceeded the scope of the Second Circuit’s prior mandate by not resolving specific tax issues, and ordered its own procedure for liquidation and distribution of the funds. The district court also denied a stay of distribution, holding that the defendant lacked standing because the funds had been liquidated.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the controversy remained live despite the liquidation of the accounts, and that its previous mandate did not bar the district court from approving the parties’ stipulated orders of garnishment. The court found that the district court erred in its application of the mandate rule and in concluding that the defendant lacked standing. Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to approve the parties’ proposed stipulated orders of garnishment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1054/25-1054-2026-07-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Greebel" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, convicted by a jury of conspiracies to commit wire and securities fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud investors, was ordered to pay over $10 million in restitution to the victim company. To enforce this restitution order, the government sought to garnish the defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. The defendant objected, arguing that various legal provisions, including plan terms and federal statutes, either prohibited or limited garnishment of his accounts. The victim, the financial institutions holding the accounts, and the government ultimately reached a settlement on how the garnishment and tax consequences would be handled.

After the conviction and sentence were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered the government’s application for writs of garnishment. The district court rejected the parties’ proposed stipulated orders of garnishment, reasoning that the proposal exceeded the scope of the Second Circuit’s prior mandate by not resolving specific tax issues, and ordered its own procedure for liquidation and distribution of the funds. The district court also denied a stay of distribution, holding that the defendant lacked standing because the funds had been liquidated.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the controversy remained live despite the liquidation of the accounts, and that its previous mandate did not bar the district court from approving the parties’ stipulated orders of garnishment. The court found that the district court erred in its application of the mandate rule and in concluding that the defendant lacked standing. Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to approve the parties’ proposed stipulated orders of garnishment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alison J. Nathan</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2275/24-2275-2026-07-27.html</id>
        	<title>USA v Dorfman</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-27T11:30:47-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-27T11:30:47-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2275/24-2275-2026-07-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns the owner and CEO of a telemarketing company that sold limited indemnity healthcare insurance plans, which provided fewer benefits than traditional health insurance. The CEO, along with other executives, instructed sales employees to use deceptive and misleading scripts to sell these plans, resulting in customers being misled about the scope of coverage. The government alleged that these practices were designed to create the false impression that customers were purchasing more comprehensive health insurance than they actually received.

The case was first tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. One executive pleaded guilty and testified against the CEO and another defendant, who were tried before a jury. After an eleven-day trial, the jury convicted both remaining defendants on all counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud. The CEO moved for acquittal or a new trial, but the district court denied those motions and sentenced him to 300 months imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 240 months on the other counts, with all terms to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed several challenges to the conviction. The court held that the jury instructions on “scheme to defraud” accurately reflected the law, clarifying that actual falsity is not required and that misleading or deceptive statements, including omissions or half-truths, can support a conviction under the relevant statutes. The court also found no plain error in the admission and use of a training video exhibit during jury deliberations, and rejected claims of constructive amendment and the need for a specific unanimity instruction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2275/24-2275-2026-07-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v Dorfman" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns the owner and CEO of a telemarketing company that sold limited indemnity healthcare insurance plans, which provided fewer benefits than traditional health insurance. The CEO, along with other executives, instructed sales employees to use deceptive and misleading scripts to sell these plans, resulting in customers being misled about the scope of coverage. The government alleged that these practices were designed to create the false impression that customers were purchasing more comprehensive health insurance than they actually received.

The case was first tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. One executive pleaded guilty and testified against the CEO and another defendant, who were tried before a jury. After an eleven-day trial, the jury convicted both remaining defendants on all counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud. The CEO moved for acquittal or a new trial, but the district court denied those motions and sentenced him to 300 months imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 240 months on the other counts, with all terms to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed several challenges to the conviction. The court held that the jury instructions on “scheme to defraud” accurately reflected the law, clarifying that actual falsity is not required and that misleading or deceptive statements, including omissions or half-truths, can support a conviction under the relevant statutes. The court also found no plain error in the admission and use of a training video exhibit during jury deliberations, and rejected claims of constructive amendment and the need for a specific unanimity instruction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>John Z. Lee</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1975/23-1975-2026-07-24.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Irizarry-Irizarry</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-24T13:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-24T13:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1975/23-1975-2026-07-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A lawyer who served as a legal advisor to a Puerto Rican municipality and its mayor became involved in a scheme related to funds awarded to the municipality for trauma center renovations. The municipal legislature had created a for-profit corporation to promote economic development. Following the deposit of $9 million—traceable to the trauma center renovation funds—financial consultants persuaded the mayor to invest the money, promising it would benefit the municipality and be returned after generating interest. However, the consultants and associates, including the defendant, orchestrated a fraudulent transfer of the funds through multiple accounts and corporate entities. The defendant’s company received significant payments from these transactions, for which he fabricated invoices and provided no actual services. He used some of the money for personal expenses. When auditors later questioned the $9 million transfer, the defendant and others falsely asserted that the transaction was lawful and the funds were appropriately invested.

A federal grand jury in Puerto Rico indicted the defendant and several others on charges including wire fraud conspiracy, substantive wire fraud, and money laundering. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence, but the court denied the motions. The jury found him guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment and denied his subsequent pro se motion for a sentence reduction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions, as a reasonable jury could find he knowingly participated in a single overarching conspiracy to defraud the municipality. The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of his sentence reduction motion because no notice of appeal was filed for that order. The court affirmed the convictions and dismissed the sentencing challenge. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1975/23-1975-2026-07-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Irizarry-Irizarry" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A lawyer who served as a legal advisor to a Puerto Rican municipality and its mayor became involved in a scheme related to funds awarded to the municipality for trauma center renovations. The municipal legislature had created a for-profit corporation to promote economic development. Following the deposit of $9 million—traceable to the trauma center renovation funds—financial consultants persuaded the mayor to invest the money, promising it would benefit the municipality and be returned after generating interest. However, the consultants and associates, including the defendant, orchestrated a fraudulent transfer of the funds through multiple accounts and corporate entities. The defendant’s company received significant payments from these transactions, for which he fabricated invoices and provided no actual services. He used some of the money for personal expenses. When auditors later questioned the $9 million transfer, the defendant and others falsely asserted that the transaction was lawful and the funds were appropriately invested.

A federal grand jury in Puerto Rico indicted the defendant and several others on charges including wire fraud conspiracy, substantive wire fraud, and money laundering. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence, but the court denied the motions. The jury found him guilty on all counts. The district court sentenced him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment and denied his subsequent pro se motion for a sentence reduction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions, as a reasonable jury could find he knowingly participated in a single overarching conspiracy to defraud the municipality. The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of his sentence reduction motion because no notice of appeal was filed for that order. The court affirmed the convictions and dismissed the sentencing challenge.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lara Montecalvo</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50800/24-50800-2026-07-21.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Fullerton</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-21T16:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-21T16:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50800/24-50800-2026-07-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael and Tiffany Fullerton participated in a scheme with two others to fraudulently obtain over $3 million from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The conspiracy involved submitting six fraudulent loan applications using defunct or shell companies, falsified tax and employment records, and stolen or fabricated identities. The proceeds were laundered through a series of complex financial transactions, including layered transfers among accounts, use of cashier’s checks, and investments in out-of-state ventures and luxury purchases.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas handled the initial proceedings. Michael pled guilty to eleven counts, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and identity theft, and was sentenced to 286 months in prison after receiving several sentencing enhancements. Tiffany was convicted at trial of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering but acquitted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. She received a 108-month sentence, which included an enhancement for suborning perjury, based on findings that she procured Michael’s false testimony at her trial. Tiffany’s motion for a new trial, based on newly discovered evidence regarding Michael’s prior conduct, was denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed multiple issues. The court affirmed all sentence enhancements for Michael—including those for sophisticated means, sophisticated laundering, leadership role, and obstruction of justice—concluding that each enhancement was supported by distinct and sufficient evidence. The court also upheld Tiffany’s obstruction enhancement, denial of her motion for a new trial, and the calculation of her intended loss amount. However, the court remanded the case solely for correction of a clerical error in Tiffany’s judgment, as she was acquitted of one charge listed in the written judgment. The Fifth Circuit otherwise affirmed the district court’s rulings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-50800/24-50800-2026-07-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Fullerton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael and Tiffany Fullerton participated in a scheme with two others to fraudulently obtain over $3 million from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The conspiracy involved submitting six fraudulent loan applications using defunct or shell companies, falsified tax and employment records, and stolen or fabricated identities. The proceeds were laundered through a series of complex financial transactions, including layered transfers among accounts, use of cashier’s checks, and investments in out-of-state ventures and luxury purchases.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas handled the initial proceedings. Michael pled guilty to eleven counts, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and identity theft, and was sentenced to 286 months in prison after receiving several sentencing enhancements. Tiffany was convicted at trial of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering but acquitted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. She received a 108-month sentence, which included an enhancement for suborning perjury, based on findings that she procured Michael’s false testimony at her trial. Tiffany’s motion for a new trial, based on newly discovered evidence regarding Michael’s prior conduct, was denied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed multiple issues. The court affirmed all sentence enhancements for Michael—including those for sophisticated means, sophisticated laundering, leadership role, and obstruction of justice—concluding that each enhancement was supported by distinct and sufficient evidence. The court also upheld Tiffany’s obstruction enhancement, denial of her motion for a new trial, and the calculation of her intended loss amount. However, the court remanded the case solely for correction of a clerical error in Tiffany’s judgment, as she was acquitted of one charge listed in the written judgment. The Fifth Circuit otherwise affirmed the district court’s rulings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-4711/23-4711-2026-07-21.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Jones</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-21T11:01:16-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-21T11:01:16-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-4711/23-4711-2026-07-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Federal authorities investigated a large gun trafficking operation spanning West Virginia and Pennsylvania, involving straw purchasers who bought firearms in West Virginia to resell them in Pennsylvania. Bisheem Jones was identified as a leader, directing participants, organizing purchases, compensating straw purchasers, and facilitating resale. The scheme involved at least nineteen people and more than one hundred thirty firearms, with many later recovered by law enforcement in Pennsylvania.

A federal grand jury in the Southern District of West Virginia indicted Jones for conspiracy to travel interstate to deal firearms without a license, conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, aiding and abetting interstate travel to deal firearms, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a five-day jury trial, Jones was convicted on all counts except the felon-in-possession charge. He moved for acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence for the promotional money laundering conspiracy, but the District Court denied the motion. At sentencing, several enhancements were applied under the Sentencing Guidelines, including for obliterated serial numbers, number of firearms, and gun trafficking. Jones was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Jones’s appeal. The court found insufficient evidence for the promotional money laundering conspiracy conviction, concluding the government had not shown an agreement between Jones and another participant to funnel illicit proceeds back into the gun trafficking business. The court vacated that conviction, ordered entry of acquittal on that count, and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the District Court’s application of sentencing enhancements relating to obliterated serial numbers, gun trafficking, and the number of firearms, finding no clear error. The remaining convictions for firearm-related conspiracies and aiding and abetting were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/23-4711/23-4711-2026-07-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Jones" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Federal authorities investigated a large gun trafficking operation spanning West Virginia and Pennsylvania, involving straw purchasers who bought firearms in West Virginia to resell them in Pennsylvania. Bisheem Jones was identified as a leader, directing participants, organizing purchases, compensating straw purchasers, and facilitating resale. The scheme involved at least nineteen people and more than one hundred thirty firearms, with many later recovered by law enforcement in Pennsylvania.

A federal grand jury in the Southern District of West Virginia indicted Jones for conspiracy to travel interstate to deal firearms without a license, conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, aiding and abetting interstate travel to deal firearms, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a five-day jury trial, Jones was convicted on all counts except the felon-in-possession charge. He moved for acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence for the promotional money laundering conspiracy, but the District Court denied the motion. At sentencing, several enhancements were applied under the Sentencing Guidelines, including for obliterated serial numbers, number of firearms, and gun trafficking. Jones was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Jones’s appeal. The court found insufficient evidence for the promotional money laundering conspiracy conviction, concluding the government had not shown an agreement between Jones and another participant to funnel illicit proceeds back into the gun trafficking business. The court vacated that conviction, ordered entry of acquittal on that count, and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the District Court’s application of sentencing enhancements relating to obliterated serial numbers, gun trafficking, and the number of firearms, finding no clear error. The remaining convictions for firearm-related conspiracies and aiding and abetting were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nicole Berner</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/25-2278/25-2278-2026-07-21.html</id>
        	<title>In re Avandia Marketing</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-21T09:00:20-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-21T09:00:20-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/25-2278/25-2278-2026-07-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several third-party payors who covered prescriptions for Avandia, a diabetes medication manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline LLC, brought a putative class action alleging that the company misrepresented Avandia’s cardiovascular risks and benefits. They claimed these misrepresentations led health care providers to prescribe Avandia more frequently than less expensive alternatives, causing the payors to reimburse for prescriptions that otherwise would not have been issued. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of entities that paid for Avandia prescriptions during a specified period.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania previously reviewed this case. It denied GlaxoSmithKline’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and the Third Circuit affirmed that denial. Later, the District Court granted summary judgment to GlaxoSmithKline on certain claims, but the Third Circuit reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Most recently, the District Court granted class certification, finding the class ascertainable and concluding that common issues would predominate regarding causation. It relied on evidence of a common scheme to deceive and statistical analyses showing marketing campaigns increased prescriptions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s class certification. The Third Circuit held that while the class is ascertainable, the record does not yet demonstrate that common questions predominate on causation. The court clarified that plaintiffs in pharmaceutical fraud RICO class actions may use statistical evidence to prove causation, but such evidence must establish causation, not merely correlation. Because the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence failed to satisfy this standard, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s class certification and remanded for further fact-finding on predominance under the clarified standard. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/25-2278/25-2278-2026-07-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Avandia Marketing" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several third-party payors who covered prescriptions for Avandia, a diabetes medication manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline LLC, brought a putative class action alleging that the company misrepresented Avandia’s cardiovascular risks and benefits. They claimed these misrepresentations led health care providers to prescribe Avandia more frequently than less expensive alternatives, causing the payors to reimburse for prescriptions that otherwise would not have been issued. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of entities that paid for Avandia prescriptions during a specified period.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania previously reviewed this case. It denied GlaxoSmithKline’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and the Third Circuit affirmed that denial. Later, the District Court granted summary judgment to GlaxoSmithKline on certain claims, but the Third Circuit reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Most recently, the District Court granted class certification, finding the class ascertainable and concluding that common issues would predominate regarding causation. It relied on evidence of a common scheme to deceive and statistical analyses showing marketing campaigns increased prescriptions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s class certification. The Third Circuit held that while the class is ascertainable, the record does not yet demonstrate that common questions predominate on causation. The court clarified that plaintiffs in pharmaceutical fraud RICO class actions may use statistical evidence to prove causation, but such evidence must establish causation, not merely correlation. Because the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence failed to satisfy this standard, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s class certification and remanded for further fact-finding on predominance under the clarified standard.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Thomas Ambro</case:judge>
													<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2380/25-2380-2026-07-21.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Mendoza-Rubio</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-21T07:01:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-21T07:01:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2380/25-2380-2026-07-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Between December 2020 and April 2021, a licensed accountant from Mexico participated in a complex conspiracy to launder over $5.1 million in criminal proceeds. She acted as a broker, converting U.S. cash to Bitcoin for a fee, and coordinated with multiple coconspirators who picked up, deposited, and tracked cash, and purchased Bitcoin for clients. Her involvement was central to directing and managing the steps of the operation, including overseeing cash pickups, maintaining ledgers, directing the conversion of funds, and serving as the sole contact with clients for Bitcoin wallet information. The scheme came to light following an investigation into a theft from a Wisconsin business.

After pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, she entered a binding plea agreement in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, limiting her sentence to between three and six and a half years. The initial presentence report did not recommend a sentencing enhancement for a managerial or supervisory role. However, after the government’s objection, the probation office revised the report to include a three-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court adopted this enhancement, finding that she played a managerial role, and sentenced her to 60 months in prison, which was below the calculated guidelines range but within the plea agreement’s bounds.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in applying the managerial enhancement and in failing to address sentencing disparities among coconspirators. The appellate court held that the record supported the enhancement, as she exercised sufficient control and coordination over others. The court further found that the sentence was reasonable and not procedurally flawed, affirming the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2380/25-2380-2026-07-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Mendoza-Rubio" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Between December 2020 and April 2021, a licensed accountant from Mexico participated in a complex conspiracy to launder over $5.1 million in criminal proceeds. She acted as a broker, converting U.S. cash to Bitcoin for a fee, and coordinated with multiple coconspirators who picked up, deposited, and tracked cash, and purchased Bitcoin for clients. Her involvement was central to directing and managing the steps of the operation, including overseeing cash pickups, maintaining ledgers, directing the conversion of funds, and serving as the sole contact with clients for Bitcoin wallet information. The scheme came to light following an investigation into a theft from a Wisconsin business.

After pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, she entered a binding plea agreement in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, limiting her sentence to between three and six and a half years. The initial presentence report did not recommend a sentencing enhancement for a managerial or supervisory role. However, after the government’s objection, the probation office revised the report to include a three-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court adopted this enhancement, finding that she played a managerial role, and sentenced her to 60 months in prison, which was below the calculated guidelines range but within the plea agreement’s bounds.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in applying the managerial enhancement and in failing to address sentencing disparities among coconspirators. The appellate court held that the record supported the enhancement, as she exercised sufficient control and coordination over others. The court further found that the sentence was reasonable and not procedurally flawed, affirming the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nancy Maldonado</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7019/25-7019-2026-07-20.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Smith</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-20T08:32:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-20T08:32:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7019/25-7019-2026-07-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A police officer in Savanna, Oklahoma, was accused of sexual assault during a traffic stop. After pulling over a vehicle for speeding, the officer activated both his body and dash cameras, then manually deactivated them before ordering a nineteen-year-old passenger to sit in his patrol car, where he sexually assaulted her. The cameras’ deactivation resulted in incomplete or soundless recordings of the incident. Subsequent investigation confirmed the officer had intentionally turned off both cameras during the stop. The victim promptly reported the assault, and the officer’s conduct was corroborated through physical evidence and analysis of the camera devices.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma charged the officer with deprivation of rights under color of law and two counts of falsifying records. After granting two continuances and denying a third, the court held a jury trial. The officer was convicted on all counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of 480 months for deprivation of rights and 240 months for falsifying records. The presentence investigation established the advisory guidelines range, and the district court adopted its findings without objection.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the officer argued the district court erred in denying his third continuance, that manually deactivating the cameras did not violate the falsification statute, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit rejected each argument. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, found that intentionally deactivating the cameras to prevent the creation of a complete record constituted falsification under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, and ruled that the sentence imposed was within the range of rationally available choices. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-7019/25-7019-2026-07-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A police officer in Savanna, Oklahoma, was accused of sexual assault during a traffic stop. After pulling over a vehicle for speeding, the officer activated both his body and dash cameras, then manually deactivated them before ordering a nineteen-year-old passenger to sit in his patrol car, where he sexually assaulted her. The cameras’ deactivation resulted in incomplete or soundless recordings of the incident. Subsequent investigation confirmed the officer had intentionally turned off both cameras during the stop. The victim promptly reported the assault, and the officer’s conduct was corroborated through physical evidence and analysis of the camera devices.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma charged the officer with deprivation of rights under color of law and two counts of falsifying records. After granting two continuances and denying a third, the court held a jury trial. The officer was convicted on all counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of 480 months for deprivation of rights and 240 months for falsifying records. The presentence investigation established the advisory guidelines range, and the district court adopted its findings without objection.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the officer argued the district court erred in denying his third continuance, that manually deactivating the cameras did not violate the falsification statute, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit rejected each argument. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, found that intentionally deactivating the cameras to prevent the creation of a complete record constituted falsification under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, and ruled that the sentence imposed was within the range of rationally available choices. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carolyn McHugh</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3019/24-3019-2026-07-17.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Littlejohn</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-17T06:32:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-17T06:32:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3019/24-3019-2026-07-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Charles Littlejohn, seeking to influence the outcome of a presidential election and raise support for tax policy changes, obtained employment as a consultant with the Internal Revenue Service in 2017 for the purpose of unlawfully accessing and leaking confidential tax returns. He stole and leaked the tax returns of then-President Donald Trump, as well as the tax records of approximately 7,600 wealthy Americans and 600 entities. Littlejohn provided these records to media outlets, including the New York Times and ProPublica, resulting in substantial reputational, economic, and personal harm to numerous victims. He attempted to conceal his actions by destroying evidence and deleting files. The leaks caused ongoing distress, with unpublished data still held by ProPublica, leaving victims fearful of further exposure.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted Littlejohn’s guilty plea to one count of unauthorized disclosure under 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1). The court calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of one to one-and-a-half years, after considering an upward departure due to the scope and harm of the offense. At sentencing, the court imposed the statutory maximum of five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and monetary penalties, citing the targeted nature of the offenses, elaborate planning, and continuing harm to victims.

Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined procedural and substantive challenges to the sentence. The court found no procedural error, determining the district court did not predetermine the sentence, rely on erroneous facts, improperly consider outside influence, or fail to explain its variance. Substantively, the appellate court concluded the sentence was reasonable given the gravity and scope of the offenses. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that both the procedural and substantive aspects of Littlejohn’s sentence satisfied legal standards. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3019/24-3019-2026-07-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Littlejohn" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Charles Littlejohn, seeking to influence the outcome of a presidential election and raise support for tax policy changes, obtained employment as a consultant with the Internal Revenue Service in 2017 for the purpose of unlawfully accessing and leaking confidential tax returns. He stole and leaked the tax returns of then-President Donald Trump, as well as the tax records of approximately 7,600 wealthy Americans and 600 entities. Littlejohn provided these records to media outlets, including the New York Times and ProPublica, resulting in substantial reputational, economic, and personal harm to numerous victims. He attempted to conceal his actions by destroying evidence and deleting files. The leaks caused ongoing distress, with unpublished data still held by ProPublica, leaving victims fearful of further exposure.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia accepted Littlejohn’s guilty plea to one count of unauthorized disclosure under 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1). The court calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of one to one-and-a-half years, after considering an upward departure due to the scope and harm of the offense. At sentencing, the court imposed the statutory maximum of five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and monetary penalties, citing the targeted nature of the offenses, elaborate planning, and continuing harm to victims.

Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined procedural and substantive challenges to the sentence. The court found no procedural error, determining the district court did not predetermine the sentence, rely on erroneous facts, improperly consider outside influence, or fail to explain its variance. Substantively, the appellate court concluded the sentence was reasonable given the gravity and scope of the offenses. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that both the procedural and substantive aspects of Littlejohn’s sentence satisfied legal standards.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Justin Walker</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1956/23-1956-2026-07-15.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Omoruyi</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-15T12:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-15T12:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1956/23-1956-2026-07-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two brothers residing in Massachusetts used fake passports to open numerous bank accounts between 2019 and 2020, including accounts in their own names, names of fabricated individuals, and a fictitious company. These accounts were used to deposit funds acquired from romance scams targeting vulnerable victims and unemployment scams involving stolen identities. The brothers exchanged account information with each other and with overseas collaborators, and withdrew funds using debit cards linked to the fraudulent accounts. The FBI investigated after being alerted by victims, ultimately searching the brothers’ residences and storage facilities, where they found fake identification documents and related materials.

A grand jury indicted the brothers in 2021 on charges of bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. After an eight-day jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, both were convicted on all counts. The district court sentenced Henry to seventy-eight months and Osaretin to seventy-two months of imprisonment, both with two years of supervised release. Restitution was deferred pending a hearing, after which the district court ordered both defendants to pay $615,805.65 in restitution, jointly and severally. The brothers appealed both their convictions and the restitution order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals, addressing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, sentencing enhancements, and restitution orders. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy, that the jury instructions were not plainly erroneous or misleading, and that the sentencing enhancement for possession or use of authentication features was appropriate. The court also concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the restitution order and did not err in making the defendants jointly and severally liable. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the convictions and restitution orders. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1956/23-1956-2026-07-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Omoruyi" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two brothers residing in Massachusetts used fake passports to open numerous bank accounts between 2019 and 2020, including accounts in their own names, names of fabricated individuals, and a fictitious company. These accounts were used to deposit funds acquired from romance scams targeting vulnerable victims and unemployment scams involving stolen identities. The brothers exchanged account information with each other and with overseas collaborators, and withdrew funds using debit cards linked to the fraudulent accounts. The FBI investigated after being alerted by victims, ultimately searching the brothers’ residences and storage facilities, where they found fake identification documents and related materials.

A grand jury indicted the brothers in 2021 on charges of bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. After an eight-day jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, both were convicted on all counts. The district court sentenced Henry to seventy-eight months and Osaretin to seventy-two months of imprisonment, both with two years of supervised release. Restitution was deferred pending a hearing, after which the district court ordered both defendants to pay $615,805.65 in restitution, jointly and severally. The brothers appealed both their convictions and the restitution order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals, addressing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, sentencing enhancements, and restitution orders. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy, that the jury instructions were not plainly erroneous or misleading, and that the sentencing enhancement for possession or use of authentication features was appropriate. The court also concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the restitution order and did not err in making the defendants jointly and severally liable. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the convictions and restitution orders.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lara Montecalvo</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-2073/25-2073-2026-07-15.html</id>
        	<title>RELATOR, LLC V. ERSKINE</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-15T11:01:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-15T11:01:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-2073/25-2073-2026-07-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company operating as a mortgage lender applied for and received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company’s PPP loan was later forgiven. A private party, acting as a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleged that the company and its chief executive officer made several false statements in their loan application and forgiveness process. The key allegations were that the company was ineligible for PPP funds as a financial business primarily engaged in lending, that it misrepresented its use and need for the loan, and that it falsified the number of employees to increase the loan amount. The relator argued that these misrepresentations led the government to approve and forgive the loan improperly.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the relator’s amended complaint. The district court found that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied, reasoning that the necessary information supporting the ineligibility allegation was already publicly available on a government website, specifically concerning the company’s business classification. The district court also concluded that the relator’s allegations regarding the inflated employee count were speculative. The relator was denied leave to further amend the complaint, on the basis that amendment would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the public disclosure bar did not apply because the information on the government website was not “substantially the same” as the relator’s allegations, and the company’s own website did not qualify as “news media” under the statute. The appellate court agreed that the relator’s claim regarding the number of employees was not sufficiently pleaded but found the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-2073/25-2073-2026-07-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "RELATOR, LLC V. ERSKINE" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company operating as a mortgage lender applied for and received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company’s PPP loan was later forgiven. A private party, acting as a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleged that the company and its chief executive officer made several false statements in their loan application and forgiveness process. The key allegations were that the company was ineligible for PPP funds as a financial business primarily engaged in lending, that it misrepresented its use and need for the loan, and that it falsified the number of employees to increase the loan amount. The relator argued that these misrepresentations led the government to approve and forgive the loan improperly.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the relator’s amended complaint. The district court found that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied, reasoning that the necessary information supporting the ineligibility allegation was already publicly available on a government website, specifically concerning the company’s business classification. The district court also concluded that the relator’s allegations regarding the inflated employee count were speculative. The relator was denied leave to further amend the complaint, on the basis that amendment would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the public disclosure bar did not apply because the information on the government website was not “substantially the same” as the relator’s allegations, and the company’s own website did not qualify as “news media” under the statute. The appellate court agreed that the relator’s claim regarding the number of employees was not sufficiently pleaded but found the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Mark Scarsi</case:judge>
													<category term="Banking"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-4218/25-4218-2026-07-14.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Snyder</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-14T11:00:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-14T11:00:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-4218/25-4218-2026-07-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Stephen Snyder, a veteran Maryland attorney, was charged with attempted extortion and Travel Act violations after threatening to launch a damaging media campaign against a hospital unless it paid him $25 million in a personal consultancy deal. Snyder had represented patients in medical malpractice cases against the hospital and, during negotiations, repeatedly demanded the payment, suggesting it would &quot;bury&quot; incriminating findings about the hospital’s transplant program. Despite declining health and cognitive concerns, Snyder insisted on representing himself at trial, supported by standby counsel.

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held two Faretta hearings, where Snyder’s competency and voluntary waiver of counsel were confirmed. Throughout pretrial and trial, Snyder’s health issues became evident, and the court repeatedly advised against self-representation, but Snyder persisted. During the nine-day trial, the court addressed issues including limiting testimony from a witness bound by a nondisclosure agreement, denying Snyder’s request for a reliance-on-counsel jury instruction, and refusing to voir dire the jury after Snyder’s contempt arrest. The jury convicted Snyder on all counts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Snyder’s concession of competence to stand trial precluded his argument for reversal based on self-representation, reaffirming that a defendant competent to stand trial is competent to waive counsel. The court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the reliance-on-counsel instruction, the limitation of testimony due to the nondisclosure agreement, or the refusal to voir dire the jury regarding publicity about Snyder’s contempt. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-4218/25-4218-2026-07-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Snyder" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Stephen Snyder, a veteran Maryland attorney, was charged with attempted extortion and Travel Act violations after threatening to launch a damaging media campaign against a hospital unless it paid him $25 million in a personal consultancy deal. Snyder had represented patients in medical malpractice cases against the hospital and, during negotiations, repeatedly demanded the payment, suggesting it would &quot;bury&quot; incriminating findings about the hospital’s transplant program. Despite declining health and cognitive concerns, Snyder insisted on representing himself at trial, supported by standby counsel.

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held two Faretta hearings, where Snyder’s competency and voluntary waiver of counsel were confirmed. Throughout pretrial and trial, Snyder’s health issues became evident, and the court repeatedly advised against self-representation, but Snyder persisted. During the nine-day trial, the court addressed issues including limiting testimony from a witness bound by a nondisclosure agreement, denying Snyder’s request for a reliance-on-counsel jury instruction, and refusing to voir dire the jury after Snyder’s contempt arrest. The jury convicted Snyder on all counts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Snyder’s concession of competence to stand trial precluded his argument for reversal based on self-representation, reaffirming that a defendant competent to stand trial is competent to waive counsel. The court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the reliance-on-counsel instruction, the limitation of testimony due to the nondisclosure agreement, or the refusal to voir dire the jury regarding publicity about Snyder’s contempt. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Wynn</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2026/b350634m.html</id>
        	<title>People v. Sacco</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-08T12:03:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-08T12:03:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2026/b350634m.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant was charged with several financial crimes, including identity theft, forgery, and grand theft, after opening bank accounts under false pretenses and misappropriating funds that belonged to a local American Legion post. Investigations revealed that he had intercepted a donation check intended for the organization, requested a replacement, and deposited it into an account under his control, among other acts involving fraudulent documents and unauthorized transfers of large sums. The defendant was not a member of the organization but had access to its mail and financial information through his business, which operated in the same building.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. He presented a psychologist’s report diagnosing him with persistent depressive disorder with anxious distress, arguing that his mental condition was a significant factor in the commission of the offenses. The People opposed the motion, contending that his mental disorder did not contribute to his crimes, citing the sophistication and planning involved. The trial court found that, although the defendant had a qualifying mental disorder and was not a public safety risk, the evidence rebutted the statutory presumption that the mental disorder was a significant factor in the offenses, primarily because the expert report did not explain how his symptoms contributed to the criminal conduct and the court found the crimes inconsistent with those symptoms. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant subsequently pled no contest to grand theft.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, considered whether the trial court properly denied the motion for mental health diversion. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, properly applied the statutory presumption, and its finding that the presumption was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2026/b350634m.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "People v. Sacco" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant was charged with several financial crimes, including identity theft, forgery, and grand theft, after opening bank accounts under false pretenses and misappropriating funds that belonged to a local American Legion post. Investigations revealed that he had intercepted a donation check intended for the organization, requested a replacement, and deposited it into an account under his control, among other acts involving fraudulent documents and unauthorized transfers of large sums. The defendant was not a member of the organization but had access to its mail and financial information through his business, which operated in the same building.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. He presented a psychologist’s report diagnosing him with persistent depressive disorder with anxious distress, arguing that his mental condition was a significant factor in the commission of the offenses. The People opposed the motion, contending that his mental disorder did not contribute to his crimes, citing the sophistication and planning involved. The trial court found that, although the defendant had a qualifying mental disorder and was not a public safety risk, the evidence rebutted the statutory presumption that the mental disorder was a significant factor in the offenses, primarily because the expert report did not explain how his symptoms contributed to the criminal conduct and the court found the crimes inconsistent with those symptoms. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant subsequently pled no contest to grand theft.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, considered whether the trial court properly denied the motion for mental health diversion. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, properly applied the statutory presumption, and its finding that the presumption was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>Syda K. Cogliati</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3013/24-3013-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. De Moya</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T07:32:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3013/24-3013-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two business owners in Washington, D.C. sought to reduce their businesses’ tax liabilities by hiring an intermediary who, in turn, paid cash bribes to a supervisor in the D.C. Office of Tax and Revenue. The supervisor used his access to the agency’s tax system to reduce the businesses’ tax obligations without legitimate justification, sometimes using colleagues’ credentials and creating false documents to conceal the scheme. The intermediary relayed proof of these illicit adjustments to his clients, who paid him and the supervisor a share of the savings. The scheme resulted in a loss of approximately $2.3 million to the District of Columbia.

After an audit uncovered suspicious tax reductions without proper documentation, authorities traced the scheme to the supervisor, the intermediary, and the clients. Two of the intermediary’s clients pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case against the intermediary and one client. The jury convicted both defendants of conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, while acquitting one defendant on some wire fraud counts. The district court imposed sentences of 110 months and 30 months, respectively.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the bribery jury instructions, one defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing, and an alleged sentencing penalty for going to trial. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the error in the bribery jury instruction was harmless because the evidence demonstrated a quid pro quo for specific official acts, there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge sentencing policy, and there was no unconstitutional penalty for exercising the right to trial. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3013/24-3013-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. De Moya" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two business owners in Washington, D.C. sought to reduce their businesses’ tax liabilities by hiring an intermediary who, in turn, paid cash bribes to a supervisor in the D.C. Office of Tax and Revenue. The supervisor used his access to the agency’s tax system to reduce the businesses’ tax obligations without legitimate justification, sometimes using colleagues’ credentials and creating false documents to conceal the scheme. The intermediary relayed proof of these illicit adjustments to his clients, who paid him and the supervisor a share of the savings. The scheme resulted in a loss of approximately $2.3 million to the District of Columbia.

After an audit uncovered suspicious tax reductions without proper documentation, authorities traced the scheme to the supervisor, the intermediary, and the clients. Two of the intermediary’s clients pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia tried the case against the intermediary and one client. The jury convicted both defendants of conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud, while acquitting one defendant on some wire fraud counts. The district court imposed sentences of 110 months and 30 months, respectively.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the bribery jury instructions, one defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing, and an alleged sentencing penalty for going to trial. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the error in the bribery jury instruction was harmless because the evidence demonstrated a quid pro quo for specific official acts, there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge sentencing policy, and there was no unconstitutional penalty for exercising the right to trial. The court affirmed the district court’s judgments.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Florence Pan</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-1891/25-1891-2026-07-06.html</id>
        	<title>USA v Eta</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-06T06:00:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-06T06:00:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-1891/25-1891-2026-07-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Federal authorities were investigating an individual suspected of orchestrating transnational cyber fraud and money laundering schemes originating in Nigeria and targeting U.S. nationals. Information from two sources, including a co-conspirator, implicated him as a leader of fraudulent operations. Investigators gathered corroborating evidence, such as suspicious messages, unusually high activity on messaging apps, and bank records showing millions in transactions with no apparent legitimate source. When authorities learned he would return to the U.S. from Nigeria, they requested a manual search of his electronic devices upon arrival at Atlanta’s international airport. Customs officers searched his phones, found evidence of criminal activity, and subsequently seized the devices for forensic imaging. Two days later, law enforcement obtained search warrants for the phones and their extracted data.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence from the warrantless border search of his cell phones, which he argued violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found law enforcement witnesses credible and denied the motion, concluding that the manual search at the border was justified under the border search doctrine. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to wire fraud, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The court reaffirmed that routine, manual searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or individualized suspicion under circuit precedent, specifically United States v. Mendez, and Supreme Court precedent. The court held that the search was routine, reasonable, and justified by the border search exception. Even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the good-faith exception would preclude suppression. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-1891/25-1891-2026-07-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v Eta" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Federal authorities were investigating an individual suspected of orchestrating transnational cyber fraud and money laundering schemes originating in Nigeria and targeting U.S. nationals. Information from two sources, including a co-conspirator, implicated him as a leader of fraudulent operations. Investigators gathered corroborating evidence, such as suspicious messages, unusually high activity on messaging apps, and bank records showing millions in transactions with no apparent legitimate source. When authorities learned he would return to the U.S. from Nigeria, they requested a manual search of his electronic devices upon arrival at Atlanta’s international airport. Customs officers searched his phones, found evidence of criminal activity, and subsequently seized the devices for forensic imaging. Two days later, law enforcement obtained search warrants for the phones and their extracted data.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, reviewed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence from the warrantless border search of his cell phones, which he argued violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found law enforcement witnesses credible and denied the motion, concluding that the manual search at the border was justified under the border search doctrine. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to wire fraud, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The court reaffirmed that routine, manual searches of electronic devices at the border do not require a warrant or individualized suspicion under circuit precedent, specifically United States v. Mendez, and Supreme Court precedent. The court held that the search was routine, reasonable, and justified by the border search exception. Even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the good-faith exception would preclude suppression. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Amy St. Eve</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2136/24-2136-2026-07-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. SHI</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-02T08:01:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-02T08:01:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2136/24-2136-2026-07-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three individuals participated over the course of a year in a complex money laundering operation involving Target gift cards. These cards were obtained through telephone scams, with victims deceived into purchasing the cards and providing the card numbers and access codes to overseas scammers. The defendants received these codes through encrypted messaging, then employed “runners” to quickly use the cards at Target stores—often buying high-value electronics or transferring balances to new gift cards. The merchandise was resold, and most of the proceeds were sent back to the scam’s organizers in China after taking a cut for themselves. One defendant continued to participate in the conspiracy even after being arrested and released on bond.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over their trial. A jury convicted all three of conspiracy to commit money laundering, with one also convicted for continuing the conspiracy while on pretrial release. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence reports, calculated the offense levels based on the scope and nature of their conduct, and applied several enhancements, including those for the amount laundered, sophisticated laundering, aggravated roles, and for being in the business of laundering funds. The court sentenced the defendants to terms below the calculated Guidelines range, but above the mandatory minimums.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s calculation of the loss amount and its application of aggravated and minor role adjustments. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for sophisticated laundering; under the Sentencing Guidelines, this enhancement can only be imposed if a different, specific enhancement was also applied, which did not occur here. The sentences were therefore vacated in part and remanded for limited resentencing to correct the guideline computation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2136/24-2136-2026-07-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. SHI" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three individuals participated over the course of a year in a complex money laundering operation involving Target gift cards. These cards were obtained through telephone scams, with victims deceived into purchasing the cards and providing the card numbers and access codes to overseas scammers. The defendants received these codes through encrypted messaging, then employed “runners” to quickly use the cards at Target stores—often buying high-value electronics or transferring balances to new gift cards. The merchandise was resold, and most of the proceeds were sent back to the scam’s organizers in China after taking a cut for themselves. One defendant continued to participate in the conspiracy even after being arrested and released on bond.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over their trial. A jury convicted all three of conspiracy to commit money laundering, with one also convicted for continuing the conspiracy while on pretrial release. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence reports, calculated the offense levels based on the scope and nature of their conduct, and applied several enhancements, including those for the amount laundered, sophisticated laundering, aggravated roles, and for being in the business of laundering funds. The court sentenced the defendants to terms below the calculated Guidelines range, but above the mandatory minimums.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s calculation of the loss amount and its application of aggravated and minor role adjustments. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for sophisticated laundering; under the Sentencing Guidelines, this enhancement can only be imposed if a different, specific enhancement was also applied, which did not occur here. The sentences were therefore vacated in part and remanded for limited resentencing to correct the guideline computation.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Tallman</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2385/25-2385-2026-07-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Adefusi</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-02T06:30:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-02T06:30:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2385/25-2385-2026-07-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Babajide Adefusi entered a plea agreement with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas in 2018, pleading guilty to aiding and abetting passport fraud. The scheme involved using counterfeit passports with Adefusi’s photo and false identity information to open bank accounts, into which funds from internet scam victims were wired. The total loss from the passport fraud scheme was approximately $2.2 million. The plea agreement included a promise by the “United States” not to pursue additional charges arising out of the scheme alleged in the charging document. The agreement, however, specified that it bound only the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas and not any other U.S. Attorney.

After completing his sentence, Adefusi was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Central District of Illinois in 2023 for conspiring to commit wire fraud related to a scheme defrauding E-MedRx, a pharmacy billing company. Adefusi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the earlier plea agreement barred the Central District of Illinois from prosecuting him due to factual overlap between the two schemes. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied the motion, finding the plea agreement unambiguously bound only the Southern District of Texas office.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Adefusi’s motion to dismiss. Applying principles of contract interpretation to the plea agreement, the Seventh Circuit held that the agreement unambiguously bound only the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas and not other U.S. Attorney’s Offices. Thus, the Central District of Illinois was not barred from prosecuting Adefusi for wire fraud conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2385/25-2385-2026-07-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Adefusi" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Babajide Adefusi entered a plea agreement with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas in 2018, pleading guilty to aiding and abetting passport fraud. The scheme involved using counterfeit passports with Adefusi’s photo and false identity information to open bank accounts, into which funds from internet scam victims were wired. The total loss from the passport fraud scheme was approximately $2.2 million. The plea agreement included a promise by the “United States” not to pursue additional charges arising out of the scheme alleged in the charging document. The agreement, however, specified that it bound only the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas and not any other U.S. Attorney.

After completing his sentence, Adefusi was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Central District of Illinois in 2023 for conspiring to commit wire fraud related to a scheme defrauding E-MedRx, a pharmacy billing company. Adefusi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the earlier plea agreement barred the Central District of Illinois from prosecuting him due to factual overlap between the two schemes. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied the motion, finding the plea agreement unambiguously bound only the Southern District of Texas office.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Adefusi’s motion to dismiss. Applying principles of contract interpretation to the plea agreement, the Seventh Circuit held that the agreement unambiguously bound only the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas and not other U.S. Attorney’s Offices. Thus, the Central District of Illinois was not barred from prosecuting Adefusi for wire fraud conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Doris Pryor</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-1962/25-1962-2026-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Espanola</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-01T07:30:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-01T07:30:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-1962/25-1962-2026-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A contractor for the City of Moline, Illinois, discovered in early 2021 that city payments totaling over $420,000 had been diverted to a fraudulent bank account at Washington Federal Bank. That account belonged to Luisito Espanola, who had opened it under the name GS International, LLC, which he controlled. Investigators found that Espanola quickly moved the stolen funds by depositing checks to a Citibank account, purchasing cryptocurrency, and sending money to other entities. Digital evidence, including WhatsApp messages between Espanola and a co-conspirator, detailed their planning and execution of the fraud.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois tried Espanola on two counts of wire fraud and two counts of money laundering. During discovery, Espanola produced a WhatsApp chat log as a defense exhibit; the government then moved to admit the chat log in its case-in-chief. The district court admitted the messages, relying on their distinctive characteristics and Espanola’s production of them under Rule 16(b)(1)(A). The jury convicted Espanola on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 32 months in prison.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court’s reliance on Espanola’s production of the messages as a basis for authentication under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4) violated his right to testify. The court held that it did not, as the admission of government evidence does not infringe upon the defendant’s right to testify, which is implicated only by the exclusion of defense evidence. The Seventh Circuit further held that, regardless of circumstances of discovery, the WhatsApp messages were authenticated by their content and corroborating records. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-1962/25-1962-2026-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Espanola" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A contractor for the City of Moline, Illinois, discovered in early 2021 that city payments totaling over $420,000 had been diverted to a fraudulent bank account at Washington Federal Bank. That account belonged to Luisito Espanola, who had opened it under the name GS International, LLC, which he controlled. Investigators found that Espanola quickly moved the stolen funds by depositing checks to a Citibank account, purchasing cryptocurrency, and sending money to other entities. Digital evidence, including WhatsApp messages between Espanola and a co-conspirator, detailed their planning and execution of the fraud.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois tried Espanola on two counts of wire fraud and two counts of money laundering. During discovery, Espanola produced a WhatsApp chat log as a defense exhibit; the government then moved to admit the chat log in its case-in-chief. The district court admitted the messages, relying on their distinctive characteristics and Espanola’s production of them under Rule 16(b)(1)(A). The jury convicted Espanola on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 32 months in prison.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court’s reliance on Espanola’s production of the messages as a basis for authentication under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4) violated his right to testify. The court held that it did not, as the admission of government evidence does not infringe upon the defendant’s right to testify, which is implicated only by the exclusion of defense evidence. The Seventh Circuit further held that, regardless of circumstances of discovery, the WhatsApp messages were authenticated by their content and corroborating records. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Amy St. Eve</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2026/s25g1354.html</id>
        	<title>WARNER v. ESPITIA</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-30T09:04:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-30T09:04:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2026/s25g1354.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A former spouse filed a petition for contempt in Cobb County Superior Court, alleging that his ex-wife was behind on child support payments. He also submitted notices to the Georgia Department of Human Services claiming arrears. At a hearing, he admitted uncertainty about the arrears, attributing his calculations to his fiancée. The Cobb County court found his contempt petition frivolous, awarded attorney fees to the ex-wife, and determined the filings were intended to harass and intimidate her. Using this order, the ex-wife then filed a complaint in Paulding County Superior Court against her former spouse and his fiancée, alleging they conspired to file false documents and committed violations under the Georgia RICO Act and other statutes.

The Paulding County Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that there was no evidence they knowingly and willfully filed false documents, as required for the predicate acts under the RICO claim. The trial court concluded that the defendants believed their filings were accurate, and therefore, the RICO action failed. The court also stated that the RICO Act was not intended for civil matters of this nature. The ex-wife appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it would be unreasonable to extend the Georgia RICO Act to “garden-variety domestic disputes.”

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the Georgia RICO Act does not categorically exclude racketeering activity arising from domestic disputes. The Court held that the Act’s plain language applies broadly to “any person” who commits enumerated crimes, regardless of context, and the Act should not be limited by judicial interpretation to exclude domestic disputes. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion and remanded the case for further consideration of the remaining arguments regarding the dismissal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2026/s25g1354.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "WARNER v. ESPITIA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A former spouse filed a petition for contempt in Cobb County Superior Court, alleging that his ex-wife was behind on child support payments. He also submitted notices to the Georgia Department of Human Services claiming arrears. At a hearing, he admitted uncertainty about the arrears, attributing his calculations to his fiancée. The Cobb County court found his contempt petition frivolous, awarded attorney fees to the ex-wife, and determined the filings were intended to harass and intimidate her. Using this order, the ex-wife then filed a complaint in Paulding County Superior Court against her former spouse and his fiancée, alleging they conspired to file false documents and committed violations under the Georgia RICO Act and other statutes.

The Paulding County Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that there was no evidence they knowingly and willfully filed false documents, as required for the predicate acts under the RICO claim. The trial court concluded that the defendants believed their filings were accurate, and therefore, the RICO action failed. The court also stated that the RICO Act was not intended for civil matters of this nature. The ex-wife appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it would be unreasonable to extend the Georgia RICO Act to “garden-variety domestic disputes.”

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the Georgia RICO Act does not categorically exclude racketeering activity arising from domestic disputes. The Court held that the Act’s plain language applies broadly to “any person” who commits enumerated crimes, regardless of context, and the Act should not be limited by judicial interpretation to exclude domestic disputes. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion and remanded the case for further consideration of the remaining arguments regarding the dismissal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Georgia</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Georgia</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sarah Warren</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Family Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Georgia"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-1063/</id>
        	<title>Hunter v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T06:45:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T06:45:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-1063/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Hunter was charged with ten counts of bank and wire fraud, involving a scheme that cost financial institutions approximately $500,000. He entered a written plea agreement with the government, pleading guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud. In exchange, the government dismissed the other nine charges and agreed not to prosecute Hunter for related conduct in the future. The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver, barring him from appealing his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The agreement stipulated that any modification must be in writing and signed by all parties. At sentencing, the District Court imposed 51 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, including a requirement that Hunter participate in a mental-health treatment program and take any prescribed medications. Hunter objected to the medication condition, but the District Court stated he could address any disputes with the probation officer or the court. At the conclusion of sentencing, the court erroneously informed Hunter that he had a right to appeal, without objection from either party.

Hunter appealed, challenging the mandatory-medication condition as violating his fundamental due process rights. The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on the plea agreement’s waiver. Hunter conceded he had knowingly and voluntarily signed the waiver, but argued it was unenforceable because the sentence allegedly infringed on a fundamental constitutional right and that the District Court’s statement at sentencing, coupled with the prosecutor’s silence, voided the waiver. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the District Court’s misstatement did not invalidate the waiver and that Fifth Circuit precedent permitted appeals despite a waiver only in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel or sentences exceeding the statutory maximum.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when its enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice—specifically, when it would leave in place an egregious error undermining the judicial system’s integrity. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration under this miscarriage-of-justice standard. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-1063/" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hunter v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Hunter was charged with ten counts of bank and wire fraud, involving a scheme that cost financial institutions approximately $500,000. He entered a written plea agreement with the government, pleading guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud. In exchange, the government dismissed the other nine charges and agreed not to prosecute Hunter for related conduct in the future. The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver, barring him from appealing his conviction and sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The agreement stipulated that any modification must be in writing and signed by all parties. At sentencing, the District Court imposed 51 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, including a requirement that Hunter participate in a mental-health treatment program and take any prescribed medications. Hunter objected to the medication condition, but the District Court stated he could address any disputes with the probation officer or the court. At the conclusion of sentencing, the court erroneously informed Hunter that he had a right to appeal, without objection from either party.

Hunter appealed, challenging the mandatory-medication condition as violating his fundamental due process rights. The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on the plea agreement’s waiver. Hunter conceded he had knowingly and voluntarily signed the waiver, but argued it was unenforceable because the sentence allegedly infringed on a fundamental constitutional right and that the District Court’s statement at sentencing, coupled with the prosecutor’s silence, voided the waiver. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the District Court’s misstatement did not invalidate the waiver and that Fifth Circuit precedent permitted appeals despite a waiver only in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel or sentences exceeding the statutory maximum.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when its enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice—specifically, when it would leave in place an egregious error undermining the judicial system’s integrity. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration under this miscarriage-of-justice standard.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice, meaning when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Elena Kagan</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5498/24-5498-2026-06-16.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Herrell</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-16T13:00:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-16T13:00:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5498/24-5498-2026-06-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three physicians—Evann Herrell, Mark Grenkoski, and Keri McFarlane—worked at Express Health Care, a clinic claiming to treat opioid addiction but operating as a pill mill. The clinic prescribed controlled substances in high volumes for cash, disregarding legitimate medical standards. Doctors spent minimal time with patients, ignored signs of diversion, and falsified records. EHC also submitted fraudulent Medicare claims by ordering unnecessary drug tests. McFarlane eventually cooperated with the FBI. Herrell, Grenkoski, and McFarlane were among the few who went to trial after most other clinic staff pleaded guilty.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky conducted a 30-day jury trial, resulting in convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, falsifying medical records, wire and health care fraud, and money laundering. The defendants filed post-trial motions for acquittal and new trials, which the district court denied. Each defendant was sentenced to prison and filed timely appeals, raising challenges related to sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, trial severance, and sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the appropriate standards of review—including abuse of discretion for evidentiary and severance decisions and de novo review for legal questions—the court found sufficient evidence to support all convictions. It held the challenged evidentiary rulings were either correct or harmless. The jury instructions appropriately conveyed the required mens rea under Supreme Court precedent. The court determined that denial of severance for McFarlane was not an abuse of discretion and that cumulative error did not warrant reversal. Grenkoski’s challenge to sentencing correction was rejected due to jurisdictional limits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5498/24-5498-2026-06-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Herrell" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three physicians—Evann Herrell, Mark Grenkoski, and Keri McFarlane—worked at Express Health Care, a clinic claiming to treat opioid addiction but operating as a pill mill. The clinic prescribed controlled substances in high volumes for cash, disregarding legitimate medical standards. Doctors spent minimal time with patients, ignored signs of diversion, and falsified records. EHC also submitted fraudulent Medicare claims by ordering unnecessary drug tests. McFarlane eventually cooperated with the FBI. Herrell, Grenkoski, and McFarlane were among the few who went to trial after most other clinic staff pleaded guilty.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky conducted a 30-day jury trial, resulting in convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, falsifying medical records, wire and health care fraud, and money laundering. The defendants filed post-trial motions for acquittal and new trials, which the district court denied. Each defendant was sentenced to prison and filed timely appeals, raising challenges related to sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, trial severance, and sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the appropriate standards of review—including abuse of discretion for evidentiary and severance decisions and de novo review for legal questions—the court found sufficient evidence to support all convictions. It held the challenged evidentiary rulings were either correct or harmless. The jury instructions appropriately conveyed the required mens rea under Supreme Court precedent. The court determined that denial of severance for McFarlane was not an abuse of discretion and that cumulative error did not warrant reversal. Grenkoski’s challenge to sentencing correction was rejected due to jurisdictional limits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Rachel Bloomekatz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2138/24-2138-2026-06-15.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Liounis</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-16T09:00:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-16T09:00:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2138/24-2138-2026-06-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant was convicted in 2014 of multiple counts of fraud and sentenced to nearly 24 years in prison and ordered to pay approximately $3.8 million in restitution. Years later, the government sought to enforce the restitution order by pursuing a writ of garnishment against funds expected from a September 11th Victims Compensation Fund award, which were to be received by a law firm on the defendant’s behalf. After being notified of the garnishment, the defendant, acting pro se, objected and requested, among other things, that proceedings be transferred to the federal district where he resided, as provided for under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied his objections, including the transfer request. The court held that the September 11th funds were not exempt from garnishment, that the defendant was not entitled to a hearing since his objections were meritless, and that transfer of venue was not mandatory but discretionary. The district court relied on its interpretation of the statute and on prior case law, concluding it retained authority to deny transfer requests for good cause.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the statutory language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act makes transfer of a garnishment proceeding mandatory when timely requested by the debtor. The court found that the district court erred by treating transfer as discretionary, and further held that failure to transfer is not subject to harmless error review. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to consider a renewed motion to transfer the proceedings to the district in which the defendant currently resides. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2138/24-2138-2026-06-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Liounis" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant was convicted in 2014 of multiple counts of fraud and sentenced to nearly 24 years in prison and ordered to pay approximately $3.8 million in restitution. Years later, the government sought to enforce the restitution order by pursuing a writ of garnishment against funds expected from a September 11th Victims Compensation Fund award, which were to be received by a law firm on the defendant’s behalf. After being notified of the garnishment, the defendant, acting pro se, objected and requested, among other things, that proceedings be transferred to the federal district where he resided, as provided for under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied his objections, including the transfer request. The court held that the September 11th funds were not exempt from garnishment, that the defendant was not entitled to a hearing since his objections were meritless, and that transfer of venue was not mandatory but discretionary. The district court relied on its interpretation of the statute and on prior case law, concluding it retained authority to deny transfer requests for good cause.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the statutory language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act makes transfer of a garnishment proceeding mandatory when timely requested by the debtor. The court found that the district court erred by treating transfer as discretionary, and further held that failure to transfer is not subject to harmless error review. Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to consider a renewed motion to transfer the proceedings to the district in which the defendant currently resides.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Menashi</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2349/25-2349-2026-06-15.html</id>
        	<title>USA v Pramaggiore</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-15T12:30:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-15T12:30:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2349/25-2349-2026-06-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case centers on two former executives, one the CEO of an Illinois utility company and the other a lobbyist, who were involved in a series of transactions with the Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives and his associates. These transactions included setting up contracts, some of which were for no-show jobs, that funneled over $1.3 million to the Speaker&#039;s associates over several years. The prosecution alleged that these payments were made in exchange for favorable legislative actions, and that the defendants falsified corporate books and records to conceal these arrangements, in violation of federal statutes including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the jury convicted both defendants on all counts, including conspiracy, bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666, and falsification of books and records. The jury’s verdict was general, without specifying which object of the conspiracy formed the basis for conviction. After the trial, but before sentencing, the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. United States, which limited the scope of § 666 to quid pro quo bribery, excluding illegal gratuities. Based on Snyder, the district court vacated the § 666 convictions and denied the defendants&#039; motions for acquittal or a new trial on the remaining conspiracy and FCPA counts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the conspiracy and FCPA convictions. The court held that because the jury instructions allowed conviction based on legally invalid objects (now invalid under Snyder), and it was unclear on which theory the jury relied, the convictions could not stand. The court further rejected the argument that recent case law required acquittal on the FCPA counts, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict. The court remanded for possible retrial at the government’s discretion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2349/25-2349-2026-06-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v Pramaggiore" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case centers on two former executives, one the CEO of an Illinois utility company and the other a lobbyist, who were involved in a series of transactions with the Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives and his associates. These transactions included setting up contracts, some of which were for no-show jobs, that funneled over $1.3 million to the Speaker&#039;s associates over several years. The prosecution alleged that these payments were made in exchange for favorable legislative actions, and that the defendants falsified corporate books and records to conceal these arrangements, in violation of federal statutes including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the jury convicted both defendants on all counts, including conspiracy, bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666, and falsification of books and records. The jury’s verdict was general, without specifying which object of the conspiracy formed the basis for conviction. After the trial, but before sentencing, the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. United States, which limited the scope of § 666 to quid pro quo bribery, excluding illegal gratuities. Based on Snyder, the district court vacated the § 666 convictions and denied the defendants&#039; motions for acquittal or a new trial on the remaining conspiracy and FCPA counts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the conspiracy and FCPA convictions. The court held that because the jury instructions allowed conviction based on legally invalid objects (now invalid under Snyder), and it was unclear on which theory the jury relied, the convictions could not stand. The court further rejected the argument that recent case law required acquittal on the FCPA counts, finding sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict. The court remanded for possible retrial at the government’s discretion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Thomas L. Kirsch II</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Ma</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-15T09:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-15T09:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The United States initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Dongxin Ma and Ma Acupuncture Center, P.C., alleging violations of the False Claims Act. The government claimed that the defendants submitted inflated reimbursement requests for acupuncture services provided to veterans, resulting in improper payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The United States sought substantial damages and civil penalties, while the defendants denied liability and asserted they acted in good faith.

Following mediation, the parties reached significant agreement regarding the terms of settlement. The mediation resulted in an oral agreement that included payment by the defendants of $2.3 million over 42 months, an initial $100,000 payment, dismissal and release of civil claims by the government, reasonable efforts by Dr. Ma to sell certain property, and the government’s right to place liens if obligations were not met. The United States filed a notice of settlement and submitted a written agreement containing additional standard terms. The defendants, later represented by new counsel, contested the validity of the settlement, arguing that the written agreement included material terms not discussed at mediation and that Dr. Ma had not authorized settlement above $1 million.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that the parties had orally agreed to all material terms at mediation and that the additional terms in the written agreement were immaterial. The court amended its judgment to enforce only the material terms agreed orally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement agreement, finding that all material terms were agreed to at mediation and that additional terms in the written agreement were not material. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited certain arguments on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-50067/25-50067-2026-06-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Ma" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The United States initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Dongxin Ma and Ma Acupuncture Center, P.C., alleging violations of the False Claims Act. The government claimed that the defendants submitted inflated reimbursement requests for acupuncture services provided to veterans, resulting in improper payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs. The United States sought substantial damages and civil penalties, while the defendants denied liability and asserted they acted in good faith.

Following mediation, the parties reached significant agreement regarding the terms of settlement. The mediation resulted in an oral agreement that included payment by the defendants of $2.3 million over 42 months, an initial $100,000 payment, dismissal and release of civil claims by the government, reasonable efforts by Dr. Ma to sell certain property, and the government’s right to place liens if obligations were not met. The United States filed a notice of settlement and submitted a written agreement containing additional standard terms. The defendants, later represented by new counsel, contested the validity of the settlement, arguing that the written agreement included material terms not discussed at mediation and that Dr. Ma had not authorized settlement above $1 million.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that the parties had orally agreed to all material terms at mediation and that the additional terms in the written agreement were immaterial. The court amended its judgment to enforce only the material terms agreed orally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the oral settlement agreement, finding that all material terms were agreed to at mediation and that additional terms in the written agreement were not material. The court also found that the defendants had forfeited certain arguments on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-961/24-961-2026-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>U.S. v. Bankman-Fried</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-12T14:00:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-12T14:00:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-961/24-961-2026-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns actions taken by the former CEO of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange and a related trading firm. The defendant, who exercised substantial control over both entities, was accused of misappropriating billions of dollars of customer funds. These funds, which customers believed would be safely held and used only for authorized transactions, were instead funneled to the trading firm and used for various unauthorized purposes, including investments, political contributions, and purchases of real estate. The collapse of cryptocurrency markets in 2022, followed by a rapid loss of customer confidence and mass withdrawals, ultimately led to the bankruptcy of both the exchange and the trading firm.

After the bankruptcy, the defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on several counts of fraud and conspiracy. The government’s case was supported by testimony from the defendant’s close associates, who described how the defendant orchestrated the transfer and misuse of customer funds, and by business records and communications. The defendant argued that he believed all customers would ultimately be repaid and that he acted in good faith. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 25 years in prison, imposed a three-year term of supervised release, and ordered a forfeiture of approximately $11 billion.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant challenged the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, discovery-related decisions, and the forfeiture order. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, instructions, or discovery decisions, and that the forfeiture was authorized and not constitutionally excessive. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-961/24-961-2026-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "U.S. v. Bankman-Fried" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns actions taken by the former CEO of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange and a related trading firm. The defendant, who exercised substantial control over both entities, was accused of misappropriating billions of dollars of customer funds. These funds, which customers believed would be safely held and used only for authorized transactions, were instead funneled to the trading firm and used for various unauthorized purposes, including investments, political contributions, and purchases of real estate. The collapse of cryptocurrency markets in 2022, followed by a rapid loss of customer confidence and mass withdrawals, ultimately led to the bankruptcy of both the exchange and the trading firm.

After the bankruptcy, the defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on several counts of fraud and conspiracy. The government’s case was supported by testimony from the defendant’s close associates, who described how the defendant orchestrated the transfer and misuse of customer funds, and by business records and communications. The defendant argued that he believed all customers would ultimately be repaid and that he acted in good faith. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 25 years in prison, imposed a three-year term of supervised release, and ordered a forfeiture of approximately $11 billion.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant challenged the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, discovery-related decisions, and the forfeiture order. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, instructions, or discovery decisions, and that the forfeiture was authorized and not constitutionally excessive. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Barrington Parker, Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1056/25-1056-2026-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Hamaed</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-12T11:00:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-12T11:00:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1056/25-1056-2026-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several pharmacists in Michigan and Ohio operated independent pharmacies where they engaged in fraudulent billing practices. Rather than reversing insurance claims for prescriptions that were never picked up by patients, these pharmacists intentionally left the claims uncorrected, thereby receiving payments for medications that were not actually dispensed. They also increased the volume of such claims by waiving copays and substituting generic drugs for brand-name ones while billing for the more expensive medication. An audit by Qlarant, a government contractor, uncovered that the pharmacies had billed Medicare and Medicaid for far more medication than they had purchased, resulting in significant financial losses to insurers.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan tried four of the charged pharmacists after their co-defendants pleaded guilty. A jury convicted all four of conspiracy to commit healthcare and wire fraud, with additional healthcare fraud convictions for two defendants. The district court granted a motion for acquittal on some substantive counts, sentenced the defendants to terms ranging from 24 to 120 months, and imposed restitution obligations commensurate with their roles in the scheme. The defendants appealed, raising issues about the admission of expert testimony, evidentiary rulings, variance from the indictment, jury polling, sentencing enhancements, and restitution orders.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. It held that the admission of the government’s expert testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause, that the district court properly excluded certain defense evidence and did not err in qualifying the expert in front of the jury, and that the evidence supported a single overarching conspiracy. The court also found no error in the calculation of loss amounts, enhancements for sophisticated means, or the procedure and amount of restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1056/25-1056-2026-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Hamaed" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several pharmacists in Michigan and Ohio operated independent pharmacies where they engaged in fraudulent billing practices. Rather than reversing insurance claims for prescriptions that were never picked up by patients, these pharmacists intentionally left the claims uncorrected, thereby receiving payments for medications that were not actually dispensed. They also increased the volume of such claims by waiving copays and substituting generic drugs for brand-name ones while billing for the more expensive medication. An audit by Qlarant, a government contractor, uncovered that the pharmacies had billed Medicare and Medicaid for far more medication than they had purchased, resulting in significant financial losses to insurers.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan tried four of the charged pharmacists after their co-defendants pleaded guilty. A jury convicted all four of conspiracy to commit healthcare and wire fraud, with additional healthcare fraud convictions for two defendants. The district court granted a motion for acquittal on some substantive counts, sentenced the defendants to terms ranging from 24 to 120 months, and imposed restitution obligations commensurate with their roles in the scheme. The defendants appealed, raising issues about the admission of expert testimony, evidentiary rulings, variance from the indictment, jury polling, sentencing enhancements, and restitution orders.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. It held that the admission of the government’s expert testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause, that the district court properly excluded certain defense evidence and did not err in qualifying the expert in front of the jury, and that the evidence supported a single overarching conspiracy. The court also found no error in the calculation of loss amounts, enhancements for sophisticated means, or the procedure and amount of restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andre Mathis</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4634/24-4634-2026-06-09.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Chollet</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-09T10:30:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-09T10:30:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4634/24-4634-2026-06-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three individuals—two tax attorneys, who were partners in a Missouri law firm, and an insurance broker from North Carolina—created and marketed a “Gain Elimination Plan” (GEP) to clients across various states, including North Carolina. The plan purported to enable clients to reduce taxable income by paying business expenses to limited partnerships largely owned by charities. In practice, the government established that these partnerships never actually existed, no services were provided, and the deductions claimed were based on fabricated transactions. The attorneys and the broker helped clients file tax returns with false deductions, resulting in over $22 million in unpaid taxes. The insurance broker also supplied false information to obtain life insurance policies for the plan, sharing commissions with the attorneys. One of the attorneys used the plan to reduce her own reported income, and the attorneys prepared tax returns for the broker that underreported his income.

A jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina convicted all three defendants of conspiracy to defraud the government and multiple counts related to the preparation and filing of false tax returns. The district court sentenced them to imprisonment, supervised release, and restitution. The defendants appealed, challenging the prosecution’s authorization, venue, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the prosecution was properly authorized under the Appointments Clause and relevant statutes, venue in the Western District of North Carolina was proper because conduct elements of the offenses occurred there, and the “literal truth” defense did not apply to false totals derived from fabricated deductions. The appellate court also found no reversible error regarding evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conspiracy and false return charges. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4634/24-4634-2026-06-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Chollet" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three individuals—two tax attorneys, who were partners in a Missouri law firm, and an insurance broker from North Carolina—created and marketed a “Gain Elimination Plan” (GEP) to clients across various states, including North Carolina. The plan purported to enable clients to reduce taxable income by paying business expenses to limited partnerships largely owned by charities. In practice, the government established that these partnerships never actually existed, no services were provided, and the deductions claimed were based on fabricated transactions. The attorneys and the broker helped clients file tax returns with false deductions, resulting in over $22 million in unpaid taxes. The insurance broker also supplied false information to obtain life insurance policies for the plan, sharing commissions with the attorneys. One of the attorneys used the plan to reduce her own reported income, and the attorneys prepared tax returns for the broker that underreported his income.

A jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina convicted all three defendants of conspiracy to defraud the government and multiple counts related to the preparation and filing of false tax returns. The district court sentenced them to imprisonment, supervised release, and restitution. The defendants appealed, challenging the prosecution’s authorization, venue, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the prosecution was properly authorized under the Appointments Clause and relevant statutes, venue in the Western District of North Carolina was proper because conduct elements of the offenses occurred there, and the “literal truth” defense did not apply to false totals derived from fabricated deductions. The appellate court also found no reversible error regarding evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conspiracy and false return charges.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paul Niemeyer</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3118/23-3118-2026-06-01.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Franklin</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-01T07:01:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-01T07:01:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3118/23-3118-2026-06-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		From 2011 to 2019, four individuals—Roy Franklin Jr., Ladele Smith, Gary Toombs, and David Duncan IV—participated in a drug-trafficking conspiracy in Kansas City, Missouri. They operated from a house rented by Toombs, storing firearms and distributing various drugs, including heroin, cocaine, oxycodone, and marijuana. The group, known as &quot;246,&quot; also produced music that referenced drugs and violence. In September 2019, Franklin and Smith carried out a drive-by shooting in response to a perceived threat against Duncan. Law enforcement gathered evidence through social media, surveillance, controlled buys, and wiretaps. Searches uncovered significant quantities of drugs, firearms, and cash, and financial records revealed lavish spending inconsistent with reported income.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied motions to suppress social media and wiretap evidence, and admitted evidence regarding the group’s music and affiliations. The court declined to give requested jury instructions on entrapment and buyer-seller relationships. After a three-week trial, a jury convicted all four defendants of various drug, firearm, and money-laundering offenses. The district court imposed sentences ranging from 151 to 420 months.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the search warrants and wiretap authorizations were supported by probable cause and particularity, and that the necessity requirement for wiretaps was met. The court found no error in the admission of rap lyrics and evidence of gang affiliation, and ruled that statements made by conspirators were admissible under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support all convictions and that the upward variances in sentencing were not substantively unreasonable. The judgments of conviction and sentences were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/23-3118/23-3118-2026-06-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                From 2011 to 2019, four individuals—Roy Franklin Jr., Ladele Smith, Gary Toombs, and David Duncan IV—participated in a drug-trafficking conspiracy in Kansas City, Missouri. They operated from a house rented by Toombs, storing firearms and distributing various drugs, including heroin, cocaine, oxycodone, and marijuana. The group, known as &quot;246,&quot; also produced music that referenced drugs and violence. In September 2019, Franklin and Smith carried out a drive-by shooting in response to a perceived threat against Duncan. Law enforcement gathered evidence through social media, surveillance, controlled buys, and wiretaps. Searches uncovered significant quantities of drugs, firearms, and cash, and financial records revealed lavish spending inconsistent with reported income.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied motions to suppress social media and wiretap evidence, and admitted evidence regarding the group’s music and affiliations. The court declined to give requested jury instructions on entrapment and buyer-seller relationships. After a three-week trial, a jury convicted all four defendants of various drug, firearm, and money-laundering offenses. The district court imposed sentences ranging from 151 to 420 months.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the search warrants and wiretap authorizations were supported by probable cause and particularity, and that the necessity requirement for wiretaps was met. The court found no error in the admission of rap lyrics and evidence of gang affiliation, and ruled that statements made by conspirators were admissible under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support all convictions and that the upward variances in sentencing were not substantively unreasonable. The judgments of conviction and sentences were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jonathan Kobes</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3146/23-3146-2026-05-29.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Miclaus</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-29T12:00:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-29T12:00:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3146/23-3146-2026-05-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Between 2007 and 2016, a group operating from Romania, including the defendant, engaged in a range of cybercrimes targeting U.S. victims. Their activities included an eBay auction fraud scheme, cryptocurrency mining, and identity theft, which together infected tens of thousands of computers and resulted in millions of dollars in losses. The defendant, along with two co-conspirators, was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. One co-conspirator pleaded guilty, while the defendant and another went to trial and were convicted on all counts except for a sentencing enhancement.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially sentenced the defendant to 216 months&#039; imprisonment and did not impose restitution, after the government stated it was not seeking restitution at that time. In contrast, the co-conspirator who pleaded guilty was ordered to pay substantial restitution. The defendant appealed certain sentencing enhancements, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed some enhancements, reversed others, and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court treated the remand as a general one, held a de novo resentencing, and imposed restitution for the first time in the amount of $853,651.99, to be shared jointly and severally with co-defendants. The defendant did not object to restitution at resentencing but subsequently appealed, arguing that restitution had been waived, that he was denied access to the underlying restitution information, and that the imposition of restitution was vindictive.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, under its precedent, a general remand permits the government to seek restitution even if it was previously waived, and that restitution was mandatory under the relevant statute. However, the court found plain error in the process used, as the defendant was not provided with the underlying restitution information as required. The court affirmed the imposition of restitution but vacated and remanded for resentencing on the restitution amount. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3146/23-3146-2026-05-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Miclaus" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Between 2007 and 2016, a group operating from Romania, including the defendant, engaged in a range of cybercrimes targeting U.S. victims. Their activities included an eBay auction fraud scheme, cryptocurrency mining, and identity theft, which together infected tens of thousands of computers and resulted in millions of dollars in losses. The defendant, along with two co-conspirators, was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. One co-conspirator pleaded guilty, while the defendant and another went to trial and were convicted on all counts except for a sentencing enhancement.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially sentenced the defendant to 216 months&#039; imprisonment and did not impose restitution, after the government stated it was not seeking restitution at that time. In contrast, the co-conspirator who pleaded guilty was ordered to pay substantial restitution. The defendant appealed certain sentencing enhancements, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed some enhancements, reversed others, and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court treated the remand as a general one, held a de novo resentencing, and imposed restitution for the first time in the amount of $853,651.99, to be shared jointly and severally with co-defendants. The defendant did not object to restitution at resentencing but subsequently appealed, arguing that restitution had been waived, that he was denied access to the underlying restitution information, and that the imposition of restitution was vindictive.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, under its precedent, a general remand permits the government to seek restitution even if it was previously waived, and that restitution was mandatory under the relevant statute. However, the court found plain error in the process used, as the defendant was not provided with the underlying restitution information as required. The court affirmed the imposition of restitution but vacated and remanded for resentencing on the restitution amount.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Helene White</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2026/e086574.html</id>
        	<title>People v. Rifat</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-27T14:01:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-27T14:01:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2026/e086574.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, an attorney, was indicted in Riverside County for conspiracy to present false or fraudulent claims, multiple counts of making false or fraudulent claims, and numerous counts of money laundering, all allegedly occurring between 2015 and 2018. After several years of litigation, including a jury trial that resulted in a hung jury, the prosecution filed a new criminal complaint in a separate case, charging the defendant with felony acceptance of business with reckless disregard for whether the business intended to violate insurance fraud statutes. On the same day as the new charge, the defendant entered a guilty plea in the new case as part of a plea bargain, under which the original indictment was dismissed as to him. The plea agreement included dismissal of certain worker’s compensation liens and credited him for time served under the original case. The defendant was placed on probation.

After the dismissal of the original indictment, the defendant petitioned the Riverside County Superior Court to seal his arrest and related records under Penal Code section 851.93, arguing that the arrest did not result in a conviction. The People opposed, contending that the conviction in the second case was based on the same conduct as the original charges, making the defendant ineligible for relief under the statute. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding a factual connection between the original arrest and the later conviction.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed whether the lower court erred in denying the petition. The appellate court held that overwhelming evidence demonstrated a causal link between the conduct underlying the original arrest and the subsequent conviction. Because the later conviction was derived from the same behavior that led to the initial arrest, the defendant did not qualify for relief under section 851.93. The order denying the petition was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2026/e086574.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "People v. Rifat" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, an attorney, was indicted in Riverside County for conspiracy to present false or fraudulent claims, multiple counts of making false or fraudulent claims, and numerous counts of money laundering, all allegedly occurring between 2015 and 2018. After several years of litigation, including a jury trial that resulted in a hung jury, the prosecution filed a new criminal complaint in a separate case, charging the defendant with felony acceptance of business with reckless disregard for whether the business intended to violate insurance fraud statutes. On the same day as the new charge, the defendant entered a guilty plea in the new case as part of a plea bargain, under which the original indictment was dismissed as to him. The plea agreement included dismissal of certain worker’s compensation liens and credited him for time served under the original case. The defendant was placed on probation.

After the dismissal of the original indictment, the defendant petitioned the Riverside County Superior Court to seal his arrest and related records under Penal Code section 851.93, arguing that the arrest did not result in a conviction. The People opposed, contending that the conviction in the second case was based on the same conduct as the original charges, making the defendant ineligible for relief under the statute. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding a factual connection between the original arrest and the later conviction.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed whether the lower court erred in denying the petition. The appellate court held that overwhelming evidence demonstrated a causal link between the conduct underlying the original arrest and the subsequent conviction. Because the later conviction was derived from the same behavior that led to the initial arrest, the defendant did not qualify for relief under section 851.93. The order denying the petition was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>Art McKinster</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1281/25-1281-2026-05-27.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Ulibarri</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-27T09:08:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-27T09:08:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1281/25-1281-2026-05-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Colorado dentist operated his practice using an abusive trust-based tax scheme promoted by a third party. Over seven years, he funneled earnings through a series of sham trusts to disguise income and claim personal expenses as tax deductions. The scheme involved assigning most of his business to a trust, which distributed income through family and charitable trusts, ultimately allowing him to retain control over his earnings without paying taxes. Despite repeated warnings from professionals, the defendant persisted. He continued the scheme even after being notified of a criminal investigation, resulting in over $1.6 million in tax losses to the government.

A federal grand jury indicted him for six counts of tax evasion, one for each year from 2017 to 2022. He pleaded guilty to all counts in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. At sentencing, the court calculated the total loss—including uncharged conduct from 2016 and 2023—and determined the base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court added a two-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means and considered mitigating factors such as acceptance of responsibility and zero-point offender status. The advisory guidelines range was set at 33–41 months, and the court imposed a sentence at the top end: 41 months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a fine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. The court held that including the 2023 tax loss and applying the sophisticated means enhancement were proper under the Guidelines. It also found the sentence substantively reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1281/25-1281-2026-05-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Ulibarri" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Colorado dentist operated his practice using an abusive trust-based tax scheme promoted by a third party. Over seven years, he funneled earnings through a series of sham trusts to disguise income and claim personal expenses as tax deductions. The scheme involved assigning most of his business to a trust, which distributed income through family and charitable trusts, ultimately allowing him to retain control over his earnings without paying taxes. Despite repeated warnings from professionals, the defendant persisted. He continued the scheme even after being notified of a criminal investigation, resulting in over $1.6 million in tax losses to the government.

A federal grand jury indicted him for six counts of tax evasion, one for each year from 2017 to 2022. He pleaded guilty to all counts in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. At sentencing, the court calculated the total loss—including uncharged conduct from 2016 and 2023—and determined the base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court added a two-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means and considered mitigating factors such as acceptance of responsibility and zero-point offender status. The advisory guidelines range was set at 33–41 months, and the court imposed a sentence at the top end: 41 months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a fine.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. The court held that including the 2023 tax loss and applying the sophisticated means enhancement were proper under the Guidelines. It also found the sentence substantively reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Paul Kelly</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11254/25-11254-2026-05-22.html</id>
        	<title>Ryan v. USA</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-22T15:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-22T15:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11254/25-11254-2026-05-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two major airline crashes in 2018 and 2019 involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft led to the deaths of hundreds of passengers and crew. Investigations revealed that Boeing had concealed important safety information about modifications to the planes’ flight control system, contributing to the crashes. The Department of Justice (DOJ) charged Boeing with conspiracy to defraud the United States but later entered a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) in 2021, requiring Boeing to pay significant penalties and undertake compliance measures. After Boeing allegedly breached the DPA, the DOJ pursued a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again imposing penalties and compliance obligations in exchange for dismissing the criminal charge. Family members of crash victims challenged both agreements, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that while the DOJ had originally failed to confer with families before the 2021 DPA due to a legal error, there was no bad faith, and the court lacked authority to modify or review the substance of the DPA or NPA. The district court later granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss the prosecution against Boeing after the NPA, finding the DOJ’s actions were not in bad faith and were adequately explained.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the families’ challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot since the agreement was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. Addressing the NPA, the Fifth Circuit concluded the DOJ had fulfilled its obligation to confer with the families and had not misled them. The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review the district court’s dismissal of the prosecution. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-11254/25-11254-2026-05-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ryan v. USA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two major airline crashes in 2018 and 2019 involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft led to the deaths of hundreds of passengers and crew. Investigations revealed that Boeing had concealed important safety information about modifications to the planes’ flight control system, contributing to the crashes. The Department of Justice (DOJ) charged Boeing with conspiracy to defraud the United States but later entered a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) in 2021, requiring Boeing to pay significant penalties and undertake compliance measures. After Boeing allegedly breached the DPA, the DOJ pursued a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) in 2025, again imposing penalties and compliance obligations in exchange for dismissing the criminal charge. Family members of crash victims challenged both agreements, asserting violations of their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that while the DOJ had originally failed to confer with families before the 2021 DPA due to a legal error, there was no bad faith, and the court lacked authority to modify or review the substance of the DPA or NPA. The district court later granted the DOJ’s motion to dismiss the prosecution against Boeing after the NPA, finding the DOJ’s actions were not in bad faith and were adequately explained.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the families’ challenge to the 2021 DPA was moot since the agreement was no longer in effect after Boeing’s breach. Addressing the NPA, the Fifth Circuit concluded the DOJ had fulfilled its obligation to confer with the families and had not misled them. The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction under the CVRA to substantively review the district court’s dismissal of the prosecution. The petitions for writ of mandamus were denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-207/25-207-2026-05-20.html</id>
        	<title>United States of America v. Amazon.com, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-20T06:30:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-20T06:30:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-207/25-207-2026-05-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves allegations by two relators, acting on behalf of the United States, that Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Services, LLC facilitated and conspired with foreign manufacturers to submit false records to the U.S. government. The relators claimed that these manufacturers, who sold fur products via Amazon’s platform, provided false information on Customs Declarations to avoid paying mandatory tariffs and inspection fees on imported fur products. According to the complaint, Amazon was not the importer of record, but the relators alleged that Amazon either knew or should have known about the fraudulent conduct due to discrepancies in documentation and the absence of required forms, and that Amazon nonetheless continued to market, store, and deliver the products.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the relators’ second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court dismissed the claims, concluding that the relators failed to adequately allege that Amazon had the requisite knowledge or causation necessary for liability under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (the “reverse false claims” provision of the False Claims Act), and failed to plead the essential elements of a conspiracy claim under § 3729(a)(1)(C), including an agreement to violate the statute and overt acts in furtherance of such a conspiracy.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Second Circuit held that the relators did not plausibly allege that Amazon had actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard regarding the foreign manufacturers’ false claims, as required by the statute. The court also determined the relators had not alleged facts showing an agreement or overt act necessary to support a conspiracy claim. Thus, the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-207/25-207-2026-05-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States of America v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves allegations by two relators, acting on behalf of the United States, that Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Services, LLC facilitated and conspired with foreign manufacturers to submit false records to the U.S. government. The relators claimed that these manufacturers, who sold fur products via Amazon’s platform, provided false information on Customs Declarations to avoid paying mandatory tariffs and inspection fees on imported fur products. According to the complaint, Amazon was not the importer of record, but the relators alleged that Amazon either knew or should have known about the fraudulent conduct due to discrepancies in documentation and the absence of required forms, and that Amazon nonetheless continued to market, store, and deliver the products.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the relators’ second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court dismissed the claims, concluding that the relators failed to adequately allege that Amazon had the requisite knowledge or causation necessary for liability under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (the “reverse false claims” provision of the False Claims Act), and failed to plead the essential elements of a conspiracy claim under § 3729(a)(1)(C), including an agreement to violate the statute and overt acts in furtherance of such a conspiracy.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Second Circuit held that the relators did not plausibly allege that Amazon had actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard regarding the foreign manufacturers’ false claims, as required by the statute. The court also determined the relators had not alleged facts showing an agreement or overt act necessary to support a conspiracy claim. Thus, the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jose Cabranes</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1223/24-1223-2026-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Perez-Otero</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-15T13:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-15T13:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1223/24-1223-2026-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, the former mayor of Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, was indicted on three federal charges: conspiracy to commit federal-program bribery, federal-program bribery and aiding and abetting, and extortion under color of official right. The indictment alleged that while serving as mayor, he used his authority over municipal contracting to steer contracts to a local construction company owned by another individual, in exchange for cash payments. Some of these payments were characterized by the government as bribes, while the defense argued they were campaign contributions intended to pay off campaign debt.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment and later denied his motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury found him guilty on all counts. The district court found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release, and rejected his arguments regarding defects in the indictment, prejudicial variance, improper jury instructions, and jury bias.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, as well as other challenges. The First Circuit held that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the payments in question were not campaign contributions, and thus the requirements of McCormick v. United States did not apply. The court further held that there was sufficient evidence of a quid pro quo and that the timing and nature of the payments did not convert them into mere gratuities. The court also concluded that there was no prejudicial variance, the jury instructions were not impermissibly biased, and the defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not violated. The First Circuit ultimately affirmed both the convictions and the sentences. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1223/24-1223-2026-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Perez-Otero" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, the former mayor of Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, was indicted on three federal charges: conspiracy to commit federal-program bribery, federal-program bribery and aiding and abetting, and extortion under color of official right. The indictment alleged that while serving as mayor, he used his authority over municipal contracting to steer contracts to a local construction company owned by another individual, in exchange for cash payments. Some of these payments were characterized by the government as bribes, while the defense argued they were campaign contributions intended to pay off campaign debt.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment and later denied his motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury found him guilty on all counts. The district court found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release, and rejected his arguments regarding defects in the indictment, prejudicial variance, improper jury instructions, and jury bias.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, as well as other challenges. The First Circuit held that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the payments in question were not campaign contributions, and thus the requirements of McCormick v. United States did not apply. The court further held that there was sufficient evidence of a quid pro quo and that the timing and nature of the payments did not convert them into mere gratuities. The court also concluded that there was no prejudicial variance, the jury instructions were not impermissibly biased, and the defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not violated. The First Circuit ultimately affirmed both the convictions and the sentences.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Barron</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1650/24-1650-2026-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Sepetu</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-15T13:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-15T13:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1650/24-1650-2026-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Over a period of six years, the two defendants participated in a scheme involving the creation of multiple business entities and bank accounts, which were used to facilitate the transfer of large sums of money. One defendant directed friends and family members to register businesses and open accounts on his behalf, while the other registered a business and opened accounts at his request. The operation purported to involve purchasing goods domestically and exporting them overseas, but most of the funds came from a single victim who was deceived in an online romance scam. The defendants withdrew substantial amounts of cash from these accounts and used the funds for personal expenses, while maintaining little to no legitimate business records.

After law enforcement began investigating, both defendants were questioned about their activities. They denied knowledge of any illegal source of funds and claimed to believe the business was legitimate. Nonetheless, evidence showed inconsistent statements, continued operation after warnings from banks and law enforcement, and a lack of documentation for the purported business transactions. A grand jury indicted both defendants for conspiracy to commit money laundering. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, both defendants testified that they were unaware of the illegal origins of the funds, but a jury found them guilty. One defendant also challenged the government’s arguments at trial and the sentencing calculation.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, both defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding willful blindness and good faith. The First Circuit held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, and that the willful blindness and good faith instructions were proper. The court also found no error in the government’s arguments or in the sentencing calculation, and affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1650/24-1650-2026-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Sepetu" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Over a period of six years, the two defendants participated in a scheme involving the creation of multiple business entities and bank accounts, which were used to facilitate the transfer of large sums of money. One defendant directed friends and family members to register businesses and open accounts on his behalf, while the other registered a business and opened accounts at his request. The operation purported to involve purchasing goods domestically and exporting them overseas, but most of the funds came from a single victim who was deceived in an online romance scam. The defendants withdrew substantial amounts of cash from these accounts and used the funds for personal expenses, while maintaining little to no legitimate business records.

After law enforcement began investigating, both defendants were questioned about their activities. They denied knowledge of any illegal source of funds and claimed to believe the business was legitimate. Nonetheless, evidence showed inconsistent statements, continued operation after warnings from banks and law enforcement, and a lack of documentation for the purported business transactions. A grand jury indicted both defendants for conspiracy to commit money laundering. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, both defendants testified that they were unaware of the illegal origins of the funds, but a jury found them guilty. One defendant also challenged the government’s arguments at trial and the sentencing calculation.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, both defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding willful blindness and good faith. The First Circuit held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, and that the willful blindness and good faith instructions were proper. The court also found no error in the government’s arguments or in the sentencing calculation, and affirmed both the convictions and the sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joshua D. Dunlap</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20002/25-20002-2026-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Kuyoro</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-15T09:30:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-15T09:30:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20002/25-20002-2026-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, an individual applied for disaster relief from FEMA, claiming her Houston residence was damaged and providing supporting documentation for her claim, such as hotel receipts, utility bills, and repair estimates. FEMA awarded her approximately $33,000. Later, federal authorities investigated and alleged that the application was fraudulent, asserting that the listed residence did not exist as described, the applicant never lived in Houston, and the supporting documents were fabricated.

The United States charged the applicant with disaster relief fraud and wire fraud in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. During trial, the government revealed late disclosures of two items: civil recoupment letters sent to the defendant in 2020 and an email to a third-party contractor who had supposedly inspected the property. The defense argued these late disclosures violated the government&#039;s obligations under Brady v. Maryland. The district court ultimately dismissed the indictment without prejudice, citing its supervisory powers and referencing concerns over discovery violations in this and other recent cases before it, despite finding no intentional misconduct by prosecutors.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in dismissing the indictment. The appellate court held there was no Brady violation because the defense failed to show prejudice from the late-disclosed evidence, and the information could have been obtained through reasonable diligence. The court further found that, even assuming a Rule 16 violation, the district court had not properly considered the required factors or imposed the least severe sanction. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment and therefore reversed the dismissal order, remanding with instructions to reinstate the indictment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20002/25-20002-2026-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Kuyoro" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, an individual applied for disaster relief from FEMA, claiming her Houston residence was damaged and providing supporting documentation for her claim, such as hotel receipts, utility bills, and repair estimates. FEMA awarded her approximately $33,000. Later, federal authorities investigated and alleged that the application was fraudulent, asserting that the listed residence did not exist as described, the applicant never lived in Houston, and the supporting documents were fabricated.

The United States charged the applicant with disaster relief fraud and wire fraud in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. During trial, the government revealed late disclosures of two items: civil recoupment letters sent to the defendant in 2020 and an email to a third-party contractor who had supposedly inspected the property. The defense argued these late disclosures violated the government&#039;s obligations under Brady v. Maryland. The district court ultimately dismissed the indictment without prejudice, citing its supervisory powers and referencing concerns over discovery violations in this and other recent cases before it, despite finding no intentional misconduct by prosecutors.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in dismissing the indictment. The appellate court held there was no Brady violation because the defense failed to show prejudice from the late-disclosed evidence, and the information could have been obtained through reasonable diligence. The court further found that, even assuming a Rule 16 violation, the district court had not properly considered the required factors or imposed the least severe sanction. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment and therefore reversed the dismissal order, remanding with instructions to reinstate the indictment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Higginson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4488/24-4488-2026-05-12.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Mhana</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-12T10:30:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-12T10:30:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4488/24-4488-2026-05-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Rami Mhana operated businesses that purchased fraudulently obtained Apple iPhones and other electronics at below-market prices, paying in cash and often shipping these goods overseas in bulk. His suppliers included individuals who acquired electronics using stolen personal information to make purchases from major retailers and wireless carriers. Mhana did not verify his suppliers’ identities or the legitimacy of the goods, nor did he provide receipts. He also paid third-party services to unlock phones, enabling their use on any network. The government’s investigation began after a ruptured overseas shipment revealed the scheme, ultimately leading to the discovery of thousands of fraudulent transactions.

A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina indicted Mhana on multiple counts, including transportation of stolen goods, conspiracy, and money laundering. Following a six-day trial, the jury convicted him on all charges. The indictment included a forfeiture notice, and the jury found a nexus between certain property and Mhana’s crimes. The district court initially granted a preliminary order of forfeiture but, at sentencing, declined to enter a final forfeiture judgment, citing concerns about double payment with restitution. The district court entered final judgment, prompting Mhana to appeal his convictions and the government to cross-appeal the forfeiture ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed Mhana’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and determined that any assumed errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of forfeiture, holding that forfeiture is mandatory under federal law when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, even if restitution is also imposed, and remanded the case for entry of a forfeiture judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4488/24-4488-2026-05-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Mhana" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Rami Mhana operated businesses that purchased fraudulently obtained Apple iPhones and other electronics at below-market prices, paying in cash and often shipping these goods overseas in bulk. His suppliers included individuals who acquired electronics using stolen personal information to make purchases from major retailers and wireless carriers. Mhana did not verify his suppliers’ identities or the legitimacy of the goods, nor did he provide receipts. He also paid third-party services to unlock phones, enabling their use on any network. The government’s investigation began after a ruptured overseas shipment revealed the scheme, ultimately leading to the discovery of thousands of fraudulent transactions.

A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina indicted Mhana on multiple counts, including transportation of stolen goods, conspiracy, and money laundering. Following a six-day trial, the jury convicted him on all charges. The indictment included a forfeiture notice, and the jury found a nexus between certain property and Mhana’s crimes. The district court initially granted a preliminary order of forfeiture but, at sentencing, declined to enter a final forfeiture judgment, citing concerns about double payment with restitution. The district court entered final judgment, prompting Mhana to appeal his convictions and the government to cross-appeal the forfeiture ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed Mhana’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and determined that any assumed errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of forfeiture, holding that forfeiture is mandatory under federal law when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, even if restitution is also imposed, and remanded the case for entry of a forfeiture judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Allison Jones Rushing</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2249/25-2249-2026-04-27.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Madigan</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-27T21:03:47-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-27T21:03:47-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2249/25-2249-2026-04-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A longtime Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives was prosecuted in federal court for engaging in extensive bribery schemes. The first involved a major utility company, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), which, facing financial difficulties, funneled more than $3 million to the defendant’s political associates through intermediaries and sham contracts in exchange for the defendant’s legislative support of ComEd’s agenda over several years. The government presented evidence that these payments resulted in concrete legislative actions by the defendant that benefitted ComEd, including support for specific bills and regulatory changes. The second scheme involved the defendant’s agreement to recommend a Chicago alderman for a state board appointment in exchange for business referrals and benefits to the defendant’s family.

Following a lengthy trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury convicted the defendant on several counts, including conspiracy, federal-program bribery, honest-services wire fraud, and Travel Act violations. The jury acquitted him on some counts and was deadlocked on others. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, then imposed a sentence of imprisonment and a substantial fine.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported each conviction and found no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, including those related to the definition of “official act,” “corruptly,” and the intent elements of bribery. The court also concluded that any potential instructional error regarding state law bribery under the Travel Act was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/25-2249/25-2249-2026-04-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Madigan" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A longtime Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives was prosecuted in federal court for engaging in extensive bribery schemes. The first involved a major utility company, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), which, facing financial difficulties, funneled more than $3 million to the defendant’s political associates through intermediaries and sham contracts in exchange for the defendant’s legislative support of ComEd’s agenda over several years. The government presented evidence that these payments resulted in concrete legislative actions by the defendant that benefitted ComEd, including support for specific bills and regulatory changes. The second scheme involved the defendant’s agreement to recommend a Chicago alderman for a state board appointment in exchange for business referrals and benefits to the defendant’s family.

Following a lengthy trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury convicted the defendant on several counts, including conspiracy, federal-program bribery, honest-services wire fraud, and Travel Act violations. The jury acquitted him on some counts and was deadlocked on others. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, then imposed a sentence of imprisonment and a substantial fine.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported each conviction and found no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, including those related to the definition of “official act,” “corruptly,” and the intent elements of bribery. The court also concluded that any potential instructional error regarding state law bribery under the Travel Act was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and sentence were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael Scudder</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Utilities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1146/25-1146-2026-04-24.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Shafa</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-24T10:30:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-24T10:30:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1146/25-1146-2026-04-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a Massachusetts psychiatrist who owned and operated a clinic providing treatment for addiction with imported drugs. The drugs included naltrexone and disulfiram in forms not approved by the FDA for use in the United States. The shipments were brought in from Hong Kong and falsely described on import documents as “plastic beads in plastic tubes,” with their value understated. The government charged the defendant with several crimes, including international money laundering, unlawful importation of merchandise, and receipt and delivery of misbranded drugs. The jury found the defendant guilty on some counts but acquitted him on others, including all counts against his wife.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted the trial. After the jury’s verdict, the court sentenced the defendant to 36 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and calculated the sentence using the fraud guideline in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its evidentiary rulings, in admitting or excluding certain testimony, and in its application of the Sentencing Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the defendant’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary decisions or in its exclusion of expert testimony. The appellate court vacated the sentence for the misdemeanor misbranding conviction because it exceeded the statutory maximum. The court retained jurisdiction over the appeal and remanded to the district court for clarification regarding the application of the fraud guideline, specifically instructing the lower court to explain the basis for its use of that guideline and to address the impact of recent amendments related to acquitted conduct. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1146/25-1146-2026-04-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Shafa" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a Massachusetts psychiatrist who owned and operated a clinic providing treatment for addiction with imported drugs. The drugs included naltrexone and disulfiram in forms not approved by the FDA for use in the United States. The shipments were brought in from Hong Kong and falsely described on import documents as “plastic beads in plastic tubes,” with their value understated. The government charged the defendant with several crimes, including international money laundering, unlawful importation of merchandise, and receipt and delivery of misbranded drugs. The jury found the defendant guilty on some counts but acquitted him on others, including all counts against his wife.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted the trial. After the jury’s verdict, the court sentenced the defendant to 36 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and calculated the sentence using the fraud guideline in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its evidentiary rulings, in admitting or excluding certain testimony, and in its application of the Sentencing Guidelines.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the defendant’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary decisions or in its exclusion of expert testimony. The appellate court vacated the sentence for the misdemeanor misbranding conviction because it exceeded the statutory maximum. The court retained jurisdiction over the appeal and remanded to the district court for clarification regarding the application of the fraud guideline, specifically instructing the lower court to explain the basis for its use of that guideline and to address the impact of recent amendments related to acquitted conduct.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Barron</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2298/24-2298-2026-04-24.html</id>
        	<title>USA v Melega</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-24T06:30:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-24T06:30:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2298/24-2298-2026-04-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Mitchell Melega, serving as the financial controller for two companies owned by Erik Jones, participated in a scheme to defraud two regional banks. The companies, involved in vehicle sales and property management, submitted false promises and forged documents to secure loan advances for nonexistent projects or vehicles. Melega played a central role in submitting fraudulent documents, directing employees to hide the scheme, and helping divert the funds for unauthorized purposes. The fraudulent activities spanned over a year and caused more than $7,000,000 in losses to the banks. Both Melega and Jones were indicted on multiple counts, but while Jones entered a plea agreement with a set sentencing range and received 54 months&#039; imprisonment, Melega entered an open plea and proceeded to sentencing without a stipulated range.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois calculated Melega’s sentencing range using the 2023 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, applying a two-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means and another two-level enhancement for his role as a supervisor in the offense. The court found Melega directly engaged in complex concealment and management of the fraudulent scheme, including instructing others to provide false information. After considering these enhancements and mitigation evidence, the court sentenced Melega to 75 months, a term below the advisory guideline range.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the enhancements were properly applied, whether the court relied on unreliable facts, and whether there was an unwarranted sentencing disparity compared to Jones. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in applying either enhancement, did not rely on inaccurate or unreliable information, and provided a reasonable basis for the sentencing disparity. The appellate court affirmed Melega’s sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2298/24-2298-2026-04-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v Melega" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Mitchell Melega, serving as the financial controller for two companies owned by Erik Jones, participated in a scheme to defraud two regional banks. The companies, involved in vehicle sales and property management, submitted false promises and forged documents to secure loan advances for nonexistent projects or vehicles. Melega played a central role in submitting fraudulent documents, directing employees to hide the scheme, and helping divert the funds for unauthorized purposes. The fraudulent activities spanned over a year and caused more than $7,000,000 in losses to the banks. Both Melega and Jones were indicted on multiple counts, but while Jones entered a plea agreement with a set sentencing range and received 54 months&#039; imprisonment, Melega entered an open plea and proceeded to sentencing without a stipulated range.

The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois calculated Melega’s sentencing range using the 2023 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, applying a two-level enhancement for the use of sophisticated means and another two-level enhancement for his role as a supervisor in the offense. The court found Melega directly engaged in complex concealment and management of the fraudulent scheme, including instructing others to provide false information. After considering these enhancements and mitigation evidence, the court sentenced Melega to 75 months, a term below the advisory guideline range.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the enhancements were properly applied, whether the court relied on unreliable facts, and whether there was an unwarranted sentencing disparity compared to Jones. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in applying either enhancement, did not rely on inaccurate or unreliable information, and provided a reasonable basis for the sentencing disparity. The appellate court affirmed Melega’s sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael Scudder</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1339/25-1339-2026-04-23.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Keirans</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-23T07:31:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-23T07:31:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1339/25-1339-2026-04-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A man assumed the identity of a former coworker, William Woods, and used that identity for nearly three decades to obtain employment, financial accounts, and legal documents. He paid taxes and conducted virtually all aspects of his life under the stolen identity. When the real Woods, who had become homeless, tried to reclaim his identity after discovering fraudulent activity, he was unable to answer certain security questions at a bank and was mistakenly reported as the impostor. The man using Woods’s identity convinced law enforcement that Woods was the fraudster, leading to Woods’s arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. Woods spent over a year in jail and several months in a mental institution before his identity was finally vindicated through a police investigation and DNA evidence.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa convicted the impostor, Matthew Keirans, after he pleaded guilty to making a false statement to a National Credit Union Administration insured institution and aggravated identity theft. The district court calculated an advisory guidelines range of 12 to 18 months, plus a mandatory 24 months, but imposed an upwardly varied sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment, citing the egregiousness of the conduct and the impact on the real Woods. The court also imposed special conditions of supervised release, requiring mental health and substance abuse evaluations and treatment if recommended, based on Keirans’s history and the deceit involved in maintaining his assumed identity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sentence for substantive reasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing either the lengthy sentence or the special conditions of supervised release, finding both to be justified by the facts and the law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1339/25-1339-2026-04-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Keirans" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A man assumed the identity of a former coworker, William Woods, and used that identity for nearly three decades to obtain employment, financial accounts, and legal documents. He paid taxes and conducted virtually all aspects of his life under the stolen identity. When the real Woods, who had become homeless, tried to reclaim his identity after discovering fraudulent activity, he was unable to answer certain security questions at a bank and was mistakenly reported as the impostor. The man using Woods’s identity convinced law enforcement that Woods was the fraudster, leading to Woods’s arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. Woods spent over a year in jail and several months in a mental institution before his identity was finally vindicated through a police investigation and DNA evidence.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa convicted the impostor, Matthew Keirans, after he pleaded guilty to making a false statement to a National Credit Union Administration insured institution and aggravated identity theft. The district court calculated an advisory guidelines range of 12 to 18 months, plus a mandatory 24 months, but imposed an upwardly varied sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment, citing the egregiousness of the conduct and the impact on the real Woods. The court also imposed special conditions of supervised release, requiring mental health and substance abuse evaluations and treatment if recommended, based on Keirans’s history and the deceit involved in maintaining his assumed identity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sentence for substantive reasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing either the lengthy sentence or the special conditions of supervised release, finding both to be justified by the facts and the law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Gruender</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1829/24-1829-2026-04-22.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Giang</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-22T21:00:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-22T21:00:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1829/24-1829-2026-04-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, who immigrated to the United States from Vietnam, operated a staffing agency that provided temporary laborers to various clients in Massachusetts. She managed most of the agency’s operations, including payroll, and worked closely with her daughter, who had accounting training. Between 2015 and 2019, the defendant withdrew over $3.7 million in cash from business accounts, frequently in increments just below the $10,000 federal reporting threshold, and used this cash to pay workers. Evidence at trial showed that the agency paid employees additional cash wages not reported to tax authorities, resulting in unpaid employment taxes and underreported payroll to the company’s workers’ compensation insurer, which led to lower insurance premiums.

A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted the defendant on four counts of failing to collect or pay employment taxes and one count of mail fraud. After a jury trial, she was convicted on all counts and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. She appealed, challenging the admission of evidence regarding the structuring of cash withdrawals, the district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on implicit bias, the instructions related to tax obligations and good faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mail fraud conviction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that evidence about the structuring of cash withdrawals was properly admitted as intrinsic to the charged offenses and relevant to intent. The refusal to instruct on implicit bias was not an error because the district court’s voir dire and instructions substantially covered the issue. The court found no reversible error in the jury instructions regarding tax law and good faith, and concluded that any error was harmless. Finally, the evidence of mail fraud was found sufficient, as it was reasonably foreseeable that the mail would be used in the insurance audit process. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1829/24-1829-2026-04-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Giang" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, who immigrated to the United States from Vietnam, operated a staffing agency that provided temporary laborers to various clients in Massachusetts. She managed most of the agency’s operations, including payroll, and worked closely with her daughter, who had accounting training. Between 2015 and 2019, the defendant withdrew over $3.7 million in cash from business accounts, frequently in increments just below the $10,000 federal reporting threshold, and used this cash to pay workers. Evidence at trial showed that the agency paid employees additional cash wages not reported to tax authorities, resulting in unpaid employment taxes and underreported payroll to the company’s workers’ compensation insurer, which led to lower insurance premiums.

A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted the defendant on four counts of failing to collect or pay employment taxes and one count of mail fraud. After a jury trial, she was convicted on all counts and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. She appealed, challenging the admission of evidence regarding the structuring of cash withdrawals, the district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on implicit bias, the instructions related to tax obligations and good faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mail fraud conviction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that evidence about the structuring of cash withdrawals was properly admitted as intrinsic to the charged offenses and relevant to intent. The refusal to instruct on implicit bias was not an error because the district court’s voir dire and instructions substantially covered the issue. The court found no reversible error in the jury instructions regarding tax law and good faith, and concluded that any error was harmless. Finally, the evidence of mail fraud was found sufficient, as it was reasonably foreseeable that the mail would be used in the insurance audit process.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lara Montecalvo</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1227/24-1227-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Brown</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T06:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T06:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1227/24-1227-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant engaged in a scheme from 2017 through 2020 in which he impersonated an attorney to obtain personally identifiable information from prisoners. Using this information, he filed unauthorized tax returns in the names of at least nine prisoners, receiving $136,672 in fraudulent refunds from the Internal Revenue Service. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was already under community supervision for a similar offense and had a significant criminal history, including prior convictions for fraud-related and other offenses.

A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York indicted the defendant on multiple fraud and theft charges. He pleaded guilty to fourteen counts of making false claims and one count of theft of government funds. The district court sentenced him to forty-six months in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered forfeiture and restitution. The supervised release included standard and special conditions, one of which allowed for electronic monitoring of all devices capable of accessing the internet, unannounced examinations of such devices, and monitoring of any work-related devices as permitted by his employer. The defendant did not object to these conditions at sentencing but challenged them on appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in imposing the special condition of electronic monitoring. The appellate court found the condition was reasonable in light of the nature of the offenses and the defendant’s history, was not overbroad, and did not amount to an impermissible occupational restriction under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the monitoring requirements did not prohibit the defendant from pursuing any occupation and were necessary to protect the public. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1227/24-1227-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant engaged in a scheme from 2017 through 2020 in which he impersonated an attorney to obtain personally identifiable information from prisoners. Using this information, he filed unauthorized tax returns in the names of at least nine prisoners, receiving $136,672 in fraudulent refunds from the Internal Revenue Service. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was already under community supervision for a similar offense and had a significant criminal history, including prior convictions for fraud-related and other offenses.

A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York indicted the defendant on multiple fraud and theft charges. He pleaded guilty to fourteen counts of making false claims and one count of theft of government funds. The district court sentenced him to forty-six months in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered forfeiture and restitution. The supervised release included standard and special conditions, one of which allowed for electronic monitoring of all devices capable of accessing the internet, unannounced examinations of such devices, and monitoring of any work-related devices as permitted by his employer. The defendant did not object to these conditions at sentencing but challenged them on appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in imposing the special condition of electronic monitoring. The appellate court found the condition was reasonable in light of the nature of the offenses and the defendant’s history, was not overbroad, and did not amount to an impermissible occupational restriction under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court concluded that the monitoring requirements did not prohibit the defendant from pursuing any occupation and were necessary to protect the public. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Sullivan</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4596/24-4596-2026-04-14.html</id>
        	<title>US v. Lawrence</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-14T10:30:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-14T10:30:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4596/24-4596-2026-04-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant owned and operated a company that provided paycard services to restaurant employees, allowing them to receive wages on debit cards. Over time, he misused the funds entrusted to his company by transferring payroll money to his personal brokerage account and engaging in risky options trading, without disclosing these actions to his clients. When losses mounted and funds were missing, he misled both the client company and cardholders about the shortfall, imposed new fees retroactively, and restricted access to account information under the guise of privacy concerns. After the business relationship ended and his company lost its only client, he applied for a Paycheck Protection Program loan using falsified bank records, misrepresenting his company’s operations, and diverted those funds to his brokerage account as well.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted him on multiple counts of wire and mail fraud based on both the paycard and PPP loan schemes. He moved to sever the count relating to the PPP loan, arguing that combining the two schemes in one trial was improper and prejudicial, but the district court denied severance, finding the counts properly joined and prejudice curable. After a jury convicted him on all counts, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement for the use of sophisticated means, resulting in an 87-month prison sentence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of fraudulent intent and that the sophisticated-means sentencing enhancement was supported by the record. The court also found that joinder of the paycard and PPP fraud schemes was proper, as there were material overlaps in method and evidence, and affirmed the district court’s discretion in denying severance. The judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4596/24-4596-2026-04-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US v. Lawrence" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant owned and operated a company that provided paycard services to restaurant employees, allowing them to receive wages on debit cards. Over time, he misused the funds entrusted to his company by transferring payroll money to his personal brokerage account and engaging in risky options trading, without disclosing these actions to his clients. When losses mounted and funds were missing, he misled both the client company and cardholders about the shortfall, imposed new fees retroactively, and restricted access to account information under the guise of privacy concerns. After the business relationship ended and his company lost its only client, he applied for a Paycheck Protection Program loan using falsified bank records, misrepresenting his company’s operations, and diverted those funds to his brokerage account as well.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted him on multiple counts of wire and mail fraud based on both the paycard and PPP loan schemes. He moved to sever the count relating to the PPP loan, arguing that combining the two schemes in one trial was improper and prejudicial, but the district court denied severance, finding the counts properly joined and prejudice curable. After a jury convicted him on all counts, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement for the use of sophisticated means, resulting in an 87-month prison sentence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of fraudulent intent and that the sophisticated-means sentencing enhancement was supported by the record. The court also found that joinder of the paycard and PPP fraud schemes was proper, as there were material overlaps in method and evidence, and affirmed the district court’s discretion in denying severance. The judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Julius Richardson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-767/24-767-2026-04-07.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Goklu</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-07T06:00:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-07T06:00:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-767/24-767-2026-04-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant operated a business exchanging bitcoin for cash, advertising his services online and charging commission fees. Over several months, undercover DEA agents arranged multiple transactions with the defendant, exchanging large amounts of bitcoin for cash. During these exchanges, the agent initially claimed the bitcoin came from an online business but later said it was from drug sales. Despite this disclosure, the defendant continued the exchanges. Ultimately, he was arrested after arranging another large transaction.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York indicted the defendant on charges of money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. During jury selection, the defense objected to the seating of a juror who expressed positive views toward law enforcement and negative views about financial crimes. The court denied the challenge for cause, empaneling the juror. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. At sentencing, the court included all transactions with the undercover agent in calculating the offense level and imposed a term of imprisonment and supervised release.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed several issues. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling the challenged juror, given the juror’s assurances of impartiality. The court further held that exchanging bitcoin for cash constitutes “money transmitting” under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and its implementing regulations, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s supplemental jury instruction clarifying that such exchanges qualify as transfers of funds. Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s sentencing challenges as moot because he had completed his prison term and raised no issues regarding supervised release. The judgment of the district court was otherwise affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-767/24-767-2026-04-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Goklu" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant operated a business exchanging bitcoin for cash, advertising his services online and charging commission fees. Over several months, undercover DEA agents arranged multiple transactions with the defendant, exchanging large amounts of bitcoin for cash. During these exchanges, the agent initially claimed the bitcoin came from an online business but later said it was from drug sales. Despite this disclosure, the defendant continued the exchanges. Ultimately, he was arrested after arranging another large transaction.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York indicted the defendant on charges of money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. During jury selection, the defense objected to the seating of a juror who expressed positive views toward law enforcement and negative views about financial crimes. The court denied the challenge for cause, empaneling the juror. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts. At sentencing, the court included all transactions with the undercover agent in calculating the offense level and imposed a term of imprisonment and supervised release.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed several issues. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling the challenged juror, given the juror’s assurances of impartiality. The court further held that exchanging bitcoin for cash constitutes “money transmitting” under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and its implementing regulations, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s supplemental jury instruction clarifying that such exchanges qualify as transfers of funds. Finally, the court dismissed the defendant’s sentencing challenges as moot because he had completed his prison term and raised no issues regarding supervised release. The judgment of the district court was otherwise affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael H. Park</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1333/24-1333-2026-04-06.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Tew</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-06T10:05:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-06T10:05:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1333/24-1333-2026-04-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A married couple, Michael and Kimberley, became involved in a fraudulent scheme targeting Michael’s employer, National Air Cargo, a company seeking financial stability after bankruptcy. Michael, initially hired as a contractor and later promoted to CFO, began abusing his position by submitting false invoices, with the help of an internal accomplice, resulting in over $5 million in fraudulent payments. Kimberley, who suffered significant gambling and cryptocurrency losses, played an active role by motivating and coercing the accomplice and leveraging her relationship with Michael. The scheme was uncovered after creditors contacted National, leading to internal investigations and the eventual involvement of federal authorities.

After the criminal conduct was exposed, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado became involved. Michael was initially arrested and entered into proffer agreements with the government, as did Kimberley. Both provided statements incriminating the other. The government indicted Michael, Kimberley, and their accomplice, Yioulos, on charges including conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering, and tax fraud. The couple’s legal representation shifted multiple times, with periods of joint and separate counsel, and both filed motions seeking severance of their trials based on antagonistic defenses. The district court denied these motions, finding either no sufficient prejudice or that the motions were untimely.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the Apple cloud search warrant used to obtain Kimberley’s personal data was sufficiently particular and if the district court erred in denying severance. The court found the search warrant lacked sufficient particularity, but concluded the good faith exception applied, so suppression was not warranted. The court also held that neither defendant was entitled to severance, as their motions were untimely and the legal standards for severance were not met. The Tenth Circuit affirmed both convictions and sentences. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1333/24-1333-2026-04-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Tew" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A married couple, Michael and Kimberley, became involved in a fraudulent scheme targeting Michael’s employer, National Air Cargo, a company seeking financial stability after bankruptcy. Michael, initially hired as a contractor and later promoted to CFO, began abusing his position by submitting false invoices, with the help of an internal accomplice, resulting in over $5 million in fraudulent payments. Kimberley, who suffered significant gambling and cryptocurrency losses, played an active role by motivating and coercing the accomplice and leveraging her relationship with Michael. The scheme was uncovered after creditors contacted National, leading to internal investigations and the eventual involvement of federal authorities.

After the criminal conduct was exposed, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado became involved. Michael was initially arrested and entered into proffer agreements with the government, as did Kimberley. Both provided statements incriminating the other. The government indicted Michael, Kimberley, and their accomplice, Yioulos, on charges including conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering, and tax fraud. The couple’s legal representation shifted multiple times, with periods of joint and separate counsel, and both filed motions seeking severance of their trials based on antagonistic defenses. The district court denied these motions, finding either no sufficient prejudice or that the motions were untimely.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the Apple cloud search warrant used to obtain Kimberley’s personal data was sufficiently particular and if the district court erred in denying severance. The court found the search warrant lacked sufficient particularity, but concluded the good faith exception applied, so suppression was not warranted. The court also held that neither defendant was entitled to severance, as their motions were untimely and the legal standards for severance were not met. The Tenth Circuit affirmed both convictions and sentences.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Federico</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3104/24-3104-2026-04-06.html</id>
        	<title>Duncan v. Bayer CropScience LP</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-06T07:01:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-06T07:01:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3104/24-3104-2026-04-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of farmers and farming entities brought suit against several manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of seeds and crop-protection chemicals, alleging that these defendants conspired to obscure pricing data for these “crop inputs.” The plaintiffs claimed that this conspiracy, which included a group boycott of electronic sales platforms and price-fixing activities, forced them to pay artificially high prices. They sought to represent a class of individuals who had purchased crop inputs from the defendants or their authorized retailers dating back to January 1, 2014. The plaintiffs asserted violations of the Sherman Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various state laws, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.

After the cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, the defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act because they did not adequately allege parallel conduct among the defendants. The RICO claims were also dismissed with prejudice, and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The district court dismissed the antitrust claim with prejudice, noting that the plaintiffs had prior notice of the deficiencies and had multiple opportunities to amend.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead parallel conduct or provide sufficient factual detail connecting specific defendants to particular acts. It concluded that the complaint’s group pleading and conclusory allegations did not meet the plausibility standard required to survive a motion to dismiss. The court also ruled that the dismissal with prejudice was proper given the plaintiffs’ repeated failures to cure the deficiencies. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3104/24-3104-2026-04-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Duncan v. Bayer CropScience LP" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of farmers and farming entities brought suit against several manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of seeds and crop-protection chemicals, alleging that these defendants conspired to obscure pricing data for these “crop inputs.” The plaintiffs claimed that this conspiracy, which included a group boycott of electronic sales platforms and price-fixing activities, forced them to pay artificially high prices. They sought to represent a class of individuals who had purchased crop inputs from the defendants or their authorized retailers dating back to January 1, 2014. The plaintiffs asserted violations of the Sherman Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various state laws, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.

After the cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, the defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act because they did not adequately allege parallel conduct among the defendants. The RICO claims were also dismissed with prejudice, and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The district court dismissed the antitrust claim with prejudice, noting that the plaintiffs had prior notice of the deficiencies and had multiple opportunities to amend.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead parallel conduct or provide sufficient factual detail connecting specific defendants to particular acts. It concluded that the complaint’s group pleading and conclusory allegations did not meet the plausibility standard required to survive a motion to dismiss. The court also ruled that the dismissal with prejudice was proper given the plaintiffs’ repeated failures to cure the deficiencies.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Colloton</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2199/24-2199-2026-04-03.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Miller</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-03T10:00:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-03T10:00:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2199/24-2199-2026-04-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Between April 2020 and September 2021, the defendant orchestrated a scheme to defraud federal relief programs, including the Paycheck Protection Program, Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, and Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program, leading to losses exceeding $2 million. He submitted multiple fraudulent loan applications using his own identity, corporate entities, his wife’s and neighbor’s information, and the personal information of at least thirteen other family members and associates. These individuals provided their details to facilitate the fraud and, upon receiving illicit funds, paid kickbacks to the defendant. The defendant’s wife was found to have gone beyond simply providing her information, including contacting a lender and fleeing with the defendant to avoid law enforcement. His neighbor also played a more active role and later pleaded guilty to wire fraud.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and unlawful monetary transactions. At sentencing, the District Court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), finding that the scheme was “otherwise extensive,” and included at least three “participants” (the defendant, his wife, and his neighbor), plus thirteen non-participants. The court overruled the defendant’s objections, adopted the Presentence Investigation Report, and imposed a 149-month sentence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly applied the four-level enhancement, specifically whether the wife and neighbor qualified as “participants.” The appellate court held that the phrase “otherwise extensive” in the guideline is ambiguous, and that the District Court’s reliance on the commentary and prior precedent was ultimately appropriate. The Third Circuit found any legal error by the District Court was harmless and affirmed the sentence, holding that the enhancement was properly applied under the correct legal standard. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2199/24-2199-2026-04-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Miller" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Between April 2020 and September 2021, the defendant orchestrated a scheme to defraud federal relief programs, including the Paycheck Protection Program, Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, and Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program, leading to losses exceeding $2 million. He submitted multiple fraudulent loan applications using his own identity, corporate entities, his wife’s and neighbor’s information, and the personal information of at least thirteen other family members and associates. These individuals provided their details to facilitate the fraud and, upon receiving illicit funds, paid kickbacks to the defendant. The defendant’s wife was found to have gone beyond simply providing her information, including contacting a lender and fleeing with the defendant to avoid law enforcement. His neighbor also played a more active role and later pleaded guilty to wire fraud.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and unlawful monetary transactions. At sentencing, the District Court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), finding that the scheme was “otherwise extensive,” and included at least three “participants” (the defendant, his wife, and his neighbor), plus thirteen non-participants. The court overruled the defendant’s objections, adopted the Presentence Investigation Report, and imposed a 149-month sentence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed whether the District Court correctly applied the four-level enhancement, specifically whether the wife and neighbor qualified as “participants.” The appellate court held that the phrase “otherwise extensive” in the guideline is ambiguous, and that the District Court’s reliance on the commentary and prior precedent was ultimately appropriate. The Third Circuit found any legal error by the District Court was harmless and affirmed the sentence, holding that the enhancement was properly applied under the correct legal standard.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Marjorie Rendell</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3175/23-3175-2026-04-02.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Otuonye</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-02T07:32:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-02T07:32:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3175/23-3175-2026-04-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, a pharmacist and owner of a retail pharmacy, was implicated in a federal investigation after concerns arose about the prescribing patterns of a local physician whose patients often filled prescriptions at the defendant’s pharmacy. The government alleged that the defendant improperly filled prescriptions for controlled substances and fraudulently billed Medicaid and Medicare by instituting a policy requiring customers to fill three non-controlled prescriptions for every controlled substance prescription (the “3:1 Policy”), thereby submitting claims for prescriptions that were not medically necessary.

Following indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the defendant’s trial. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts related to the unlawful distribution of controlled substances and two counts of healthcare fraud. On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. After the Supreme Court clarified the intent requirement for drug distribution offenses in Ruan v. United States, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to a jury instruction about the scienter requirement for distributing controlled substances. The district court vacated the distribution counts but denied relief on the healthcare fraud counts, finding no prejudice as to those.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the challenged jury instruction affected the convictions for healthcare fraud. The court held that the instruction at issue pertained only to the distribution counts and did not impact the fraud counts, which were based on separate conduct and legal standards. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the healthcare fraud counts, concluding that any error in the jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant regarding those convictions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/23-3175/23-3175-2026-04-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Otuonye" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, a pharmacist and owner of a retail pharmacy, was implicated in a federal investigation after concerns arose about the prescribing patterns of a local physician whose patients often filled prescriptions at the defendant’s pharmacy. The government alleged that the defendant improperly filled prescriptions for controlled substances and fraudulently billed Medicaid and Medicare by instituting a policy requiring customers to fill three non-controlled prescriptions for every controlled substance prescription (the “3:1 Policy”), thereby submitting claims for prescriptions that were not medically necessary.

Following indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas presided over the defendant’s trial. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts related to the unlawful distribution of controlled substances and two counts of healthcare fraud. On direct appeal, the convictions were affirmed. After the Supreme Court clarified the intent requirement for drug distribution offenses in Ruan v. United States, the defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to a jury instruction about the scienter requirement for distributing controlled substances. The district court vacated the distribution counts but denied relief on the healthcare fraud counts, finding no prejudice as to those.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the challenged jury instruction affected the convictions for healthcare fraud. The court held that the instruction at issue pertained only to the distribution counts and did not impact the fraud counts, which were based on separate conduct and legal standards. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on the healthcare fraud counts, concluding that any error in the jury instruction did not prejudice the defendant regarding those convictions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1203/25-1203-2026-04-01.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Ponzo</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-01T12:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-01T12:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1203/25-1203-2026-04-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two brothers operated an energy-conservation contracting business and, beginning in 2013, engaged in a bribery scheme involving the Mass Save program, a state-mandated initiative to promote energy efficiency. One brother owned CAP Electric, Inc., and recruited the other to establish Air Tight Solutions, LLC as a Mass Save contractor with the assistance of a CLEAResult employee, who was responsible for selecting and overseeing contractors. The brothers paid this employee, and later another, regular bribes in cash and gifts to secure contracts, favorable treatment, and advance warning of audits. Air Tight performed little or no work directly, subcontracted projects, and disguised employees and payments to conceal the scheme. Over several years, their companies received multi-million dollar payments from the program.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts accepted their guilty pleas to conspiracy, honest-services wire fraud, making false statements, and (for one brother) aiding and assisting false tax returns. The district judge sentenced both to 27 months in prison (above-guidelines for one), and ordered forfeiture of $13.2 million and $3.6 million respectively. The brothers challenged the sentences and forfeitures on several grounds, including alleged errors in calculating tax loss, application of sentencing enhancements, and the process and proportionality of the forfeiture orders.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in calculating tax loss or applying sentencing enhancements for sophisticated means, obstruction of justice, and aggravating role. The appellate court also held that the district court correctly found a sufficient connection between the criminal conduct and the forfeited proceeds, and that any procedural errors in the forfeiture process were harmless. Finally, the court determined that the forfeiture orders were not unconstitutionally excessive. The First Circuit affirmed the sentences and forfeiture orders. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1203/25-1203-2026-04-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Ponzo" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two brothers operated an energy-conservation contracting business and, beginning in 2013, engaged in a bribery scheme involving the Mass Save program, a state-mandated initiative to promote energy efficiency. One brother owned CAP Electric, Inc., and recruited the other to establish Air Tight Solutions, LLC as a Mass Save contractor with the assistance of a CLEAResult employee, who was responsible for selecting and overseeing contractors. The brothers paid this employee, and later another, regular bribes in cash and gifts to secure contracts, favorable treatment, and advance warning of audits. Air Tight performed little or no work directly, subcontracted projects, and disguised employees and payments to conceal the scheme. Over several years, their companies received multi-million dollar payments from the program.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts accepted their guilty pleas to conspiracy, honest-services wire fraud, making false statements, and (for one brother) aiding and assisting false tax returns. The district judge sentenced both to 27 months in prison (above-guidelines for one), and ordered forfeiture of $13.2 million and $3.6 million respectively. The brothers challenged the sentences and forfeitures on several grounds, including alleged errors in calculating tax loss, application of sentencing enhancements, and the process and proportionality of the forfeiture orders.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in calculating tax loss or applying sentencing enhancements for sophisticated means, obstruction of justice, and aggravating role. The appellate court also held that the district court correctly found a sufficient connection between the criminal conduct and the forfeited proceeds, and that any procedural errors in the forfeiture process were harmless. Finally, the court determined that the forfeiture orders were not unconstitutionally excessive. The First Circuit affirmed the sentences and forfeiture orders.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3462/24-3462-2026-03-27.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Kaeding</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-27T07:01:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-27T07:01:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3462/24-3462-2026-03-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a defendant who, during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, submitted multiple fraudulent applications for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) using false information and forged documents. The defendant, with family members, obtained over $650,000 in loan proceeds by falsely representing the status and finances of various companies. The fraudulent scheme was uncovered when a lender alerted authorities to suspicious details in one application. Law enforcement executed a search warrant at the defendant’s home, conducted an interview, and discovered evidence of fraud. After initial plea negotiations failed, the defendant traveled to Colombia and did not return voluntarily, prompting an international effort that resulted in his apprehension and extradition to the United States.

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota presided over pretrial matters, including the defendant’s motions to suppress statements made during the home search, requests for new counsel, and pretrial detention issues. The court denied motions to suppress, finding the defendant was not in custody during the interview, and conducted extensive Faretta hearings to confirm the defendant’s voluntary waiver of counsel and decision to proceed pro se. The defendant’s requests for continuances and additional trial accommodations were denied, and the trial proceeded with standby counsel reappointed partway through. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the court applied a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on the defendant’s actions in fleeing to Colombia.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the defendant was not in custody during the initial interview, his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, the denial of continuances and trial accommodations did not deprive him of a fair trial, and the obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement was properly applied. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-3462/24-3462-2026-03-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Kaeding" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a defendant who, during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, submitted multiple fraudulent applications for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) using false information and forged documents. The defendant, with family members, obtained over $650,000 in loan proceeds by falsely representing the status and finances of various companies. The fraudulent scheme was uncovered when a lender alerted authorities to suspicious details in one application. Law enforcement executed a search warrant at the defendant’s home, conducted an interview, and discovered evidence of fraud. After initial plea negotiations failed, the defendant traveled to Colombia and did not return voluntarily, prompting an international effort that resulted in his apprehension and extradition to the United States.

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota presided over pretrial matters, including the defendant’s motions to suppress statements made during the home search, requests for new counsel, and pretrial detention issues. The court denied motions to suppress, finding the defendant was not in custody during the interview, and conducted extensive Faretta hearings to confirm the defendant’s voluntary waiver of counsel and decision to proceed pro se. The defendant’s requests for continuances and additional trial accommodations were denied, and the trial proceeded with standby counsel reappointed partway through. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the court applied a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on the defendant’s actions in fleeing to Colombia.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the defendant was not in custody during the initial interview, his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, the denial of continuances and trial accommodations did not deprive him of a fair trial, and the obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement was properly applied. The district court’s judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lavenski Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-11322/23-11322-2026-03-24.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Alexander</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-24T11:03:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-24T11:03:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-11322/23-11322-2026-03-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An orthopedic surgeon partnered with a medical supply businessman to form a durable medical equipment company. The company was formally listed under the surgeon’s mother’s name, even though she had no actual ownership or management role. The surgeon provided his mother’s personal information to his partner, who submitted Medicare enrollment forms on the company’s behalf. In January 2019, the company submitted a Medicare form notifying a change in business hours, but it falsely listed the mother as the sole owner and manager. The company ceased operations after Medicare began to suspect fraud.

A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted the surgeon on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and pay health care kickbacks, and making a false statement relating to health care matters. The jury acquitted him of conspiracy but convicted him of making a false statement. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced him to thirty-three months in prison, imposed three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $315,704.52 in restitution and to forfeit $125,000. The defendant challenged several aspects of his conviction and sentence, including venue, the sufficiency of the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, forfeiture, and restitution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all grounds except restitution. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the false statement conviction and found no error in the jury instructions or the forfeiture order. However, the court determined that the government had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the false statement actually caused the losses for which restitution was ordered. The restitution order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings on that issue. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-11322/23-11322-2026-03-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An orthopedic surgeon partnered with a medical supply businessman to form a durable medical equipment company. The company was formally listed under the surgeon’s mother’s name, even though she had no actual ownership or management role. The surgeon provided his mother’s personal information to his partner, who submitted Medicare enrollment forms on the company’s behalf. In January 2019, the company submitted a Medicare form notifying a change in business hours, but it falsely listed the mother as the sole owner and manager. The company ceased operations after Medicare began to suspect fraud.

A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted the surgeon on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and pay health care kickbacks, and making a false statement relating to health care matters. The jury acquitted him of conspiracy but convicted him of making a false statement. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced him to thirty-three months in prison, imposed three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $315,704.52 in restitution and to forfeit $125,000. The defendant challenged several aspects of his conviction and sentence, including venue, the sufficiency of the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, forfeiture, and restitution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all grounds except restitution. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the false statement conviction and found no error in the jury instructions or the forfeiture order. However, the court determined that the government had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the false statement actually caused the losses for which restitution was ordered. The restitution order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings on that issue.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Charles Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/20-1275/20-1275-2026-03-20.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Rosario-Orangel</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-20T13:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-20T13:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/20-1275/20-1275-2026-03-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three defendants were charged following a federal investigation into La Asociación Ñeta, an organization originally founded to advocate for prisoners’ rights in Puerto Rico, but later alleged to have evolved into a criminal enterprise engaged in drug trafficking and violence. The defendants were accused of conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, and of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The indictment described La Ñeta as an enterprise whose members facilitated drug transactions and other criminal conduct. The defendants were tried jointly before a jury and convicted on both counts.

After conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Their appeals were consolidated with those of several codefendants. In an earlier opinion, the First Circuit rejected most challenges but found that it could not resolve whether certain hearsay statements used at trial were admissible under United States v. Petrozziello because the District Court had not made the required findings. The First Circuit remanded for the District Court to make explicit findings about whether the statements were made by coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and retained jurisdiction over the appeals.

After the District Court made its findings, the First Circuit reviewed the record and supplemental briefs. The court held that the challenged statements were properly admitted under Petrozziello or, where any error occurred, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also rejected a cumulative error argument, finding no basis to overturn the convictions. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions of all three defendants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/20-1275/20-1275-2026-03-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Rosario-Orangel" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three defendants were charged following a federal investigation into La Asociación Ñeta, an organization originally founded to advocate for prisoners’ rights in Puerto Rico, but later alleged to have evolved into a criminal enterprise engaged in drug trafficking and violence. The defendants were accused of conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, and of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The indictment described La Ñeta as an enterprise whose members facilitated drug transactions and other criminal conduct. The defendants were tried jointly before a jury and convicted on both counts.

After conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Their appeals were consolidated with those of several codefendants. In an earlier opinion, the First Circuit rejected most challenges but found that it could not resolve whether certain hearsay statements used at trial were admissible under United States v. Petrozziello because the District Court had not made the required findings. The First Circuit remanded for the District Court to make explicit findings about whether the statements were made by coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and retained jurisdiction over the appeals.

After the District Court made its findings, the First Circuit reviewed the record and supplemental briefs. The court held that the challenged statements were properly admitted under Petrozziello or, where any error occurred, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also rejected a cumulative error argument, finding no basis to overturn the convictions. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions of all three defendants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Barron</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-3173/25-3173-2026-03-19.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Golobic</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-19T06:00:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-19T06:00:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-3173/25-3173-2026-03-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An agent employed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement supervised participants in an Alternatives-to-Detention program, which allowed him significant discretion over their conditions, such as monitoring protocols and the handling of their passports. The agent engaged in sexual relations with multiple women under his supervision, violating agency policy. After one participant reported his behavior, an investigation revealed further evidence of misconduct, including deleted photos and communications. The agent attempted to impede the investigation by providing lenient supervision to a participant in exchange for her silence. One supervisee accused the agent of sexual assault, testifying to repeated coerced encounters.

A jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio convicted the agent on several counts, including depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law, obstructing a sex-trafficking investigation, witness tampering, and destruction of records. The district court sentenced him to 144 months in prison. During trial, the court excused an ill juror during deliberations, which the defendant challenged as an abuse of discretion. He also argued that multiple counts were improperly multiplicitous, raising double jeopardy concerns, and challenged several sentencing enhancements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the juror due to medical necessity. The appellate court found no plain error regarding multiplicity, as each contested count required proof of distinct elements or conduct. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancements, finding no error in applying an obstruction of justice enhancement to pre-investigation conduct under the amended Sentencing Guidelines, no impermissible double counting, and no error regarding the sentencing guidelines in relation to statutory maximums. The requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender was also affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence in all respects. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-3173/25-3173-2026-03-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Golobic" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An agent employed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement supervised participants in an Alternatives-to-Detention program, which allowed him significant discretion over their conditions, such as monitoring protocols and the handling of their passports. The agent engaged in sexual relations with multiple women under his supervision, violating agency policy. After one participant reported his behavior, an investigation revealed further evidence of misconduct, including deleted photos and communications. The agent attempted to impede the investigation by providing lenient supervision to a participant in exchange for her silence. One supervisee accused the agent of sexual assault, testifying to repeated coerced encounters.

A jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio convicted the agent on several counts, including depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law, obstructing a sex-trafficking investigation, witness tampering, and destruction of records. The district court sentenced him to 144 months in prison. During trial, the court excused an ill juror during deliberations, which the defendant challenged as an abuse of discretion. He also argued that multiple counts were improperly multiplicitous, raising double jeopardy concerns, and challenged several sentencing enhancements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the juror due to medical necessity. The appellate court found no plain error regarding multiplicity, as each contested count required proof of distinct elements or conduct. The court also upheld the sentencing enhancements, finding no error in applying an obstruction of justice enhancement to pre-investigation conduct under the amended Sentencing Guidelines, no impermissible double counting, and no error regarding the sentencing guidelines in relation to statutory maximums. The requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender was also affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence in all respects.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jeffrey Sutton</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Rights"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2180/24-2180-2026-03-17.html</id>
        	<title>ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM OF WEST V. ABBVIE INC.</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-17T08:01:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-17T08:01:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2180/24-2180-2026-03-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A healthcare provider operating as a covered entity under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program purchased pharmaceuticals from several drug manufacturers. The provider alleged that these manufacturers engaged in a fraudulent scheme by knowingly charging prices for drugs that exceeded the statutory ceiling, resulting in inflated reimbursement claims submitted to Medicaid, Medicare, and other government-funded programs. The provider did not seek compensation for its own overcharges, but instead brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), seeking to recover losses on behalf of the federal and state governments.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It reasoned that, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, Section 340B does not confer a private right of action for covered entities to sue drug manufacturers over pricing disputes; such claims must instead be pursued through the Section 340B Administrative Dispute Resolution process. The district court concluded that the provider’s FCA claims were essentially attempts to enforce Section 340B and should therefore be barred.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the provider’s FCA claims were not barred by the absence of a private right of action under Section 340B or by the Astra decision, because the action was brought to remediate fraud against the government and not to recover personal losses or enforce Section 340B directly. The court further found that the provider had plausibly pleaded falsity under the FCA. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2180/24-2180-2026-03-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM OF WEST V. ABBVIE INC." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A healthcare provider operating as a covered entity under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program purchased pharmaceuticals from several drug manufacturers. The provider alleged that these manufacturers engaged in a fraudulent scheme by knowingly charging prices for drugs that exceeded the statutory ceiling, resulting in inflated reimbursement claims submitted to Medicaid, Medicare, and other government-funded programs. The provider did not seek compensation for its own overcharges, but instead brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), seeking to recover losses on behalf of the federal and state governments.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It reasoned that, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, Section 340B does not confer a private right of action for covered entities to sue drug manufacturers over pricing disputes; such claims must instead be pursued through the Section 340B Administrative Dispute Resolution process. The district court concluded that the provider’s FCA claims were essentially attempts to enforce Section 340B and should therefore be barred.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the provider’s FCA claims were not barred by the absence of a private right of action under Section 340B or by the Astra decision, because the action was brought to remediate fraud against the government and not to recover personal losses or enforce Section 340B directly. The court further found that the provider had plausibly pleaded falsity under the FCA. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Roopali Desai</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3207/24-3207-2026-03-16.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Lyttle</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-16T10:00:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-16T10:00:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3207/24-3207-2026-03-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A resident of New York, originally from Jamaica, ran a fraudulent scheme with several family members. The operation targeted elderly Americans by falsely informing them they had won a Publishers Clearing House lottery, but required them to pay taxes or fees in advance to claim their prizes. Victims were instructed to send cash, wire money, or ship car parts to the group’s businesses in New York, which were then used to launder the proceeds through various bank accounts and entities in the United States and Jamaica.

Following an investigation initiated by a victim’s family, the United States Postal Inspection Service uncovered the network. Multiple individuals, including the defendant, his ex-wife, his son, and a former partner, were indicted. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held a jury trial, resulting in convictions on charges including conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, transportation of fraudulently obtained goods, and conspiracy to launder money. The District Court sentenced the defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution, also applying a sentencing enhancement for his managerial role.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the defendant had not preserved his argument regarding the foreseeability of a victim’s use of a credit card for a wire fraud conviction, and regardless, the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The appellate court also held that the District Court did not err in applying the managerial sentencing enhancement, as evidence showed the defendant exercised control over others in the criminal activity. Finally, the court determined that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting two evidentiary exhibits related to the defendant’s knowledge of lottery scams. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3207/24-3207-2026-03-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Lyttle" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A resident of New York, originally from Jamaica, ran a fraudulent scheme with several family members. The operation targeted elderly Americans by falsely informing them they had won a Publishers Clearing House lottery, but required them to pay taxes or fees in advance to claim their prizes. Victims were instructed to send cash, wire money, or ship car parts to the group’s businesses in New York, which were then used to launder the proceeds through various bank accounts and entities in the United States and Jamaica.

Following an investigation initiated by a victim’s family, the United States Postal Inspection Service uncovered the network. Multiple individuals, including the defendant, his ex-wife, his son, and a former partner, were indicted. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held a jury trial, resulting in convictions on charges including conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, transportation of fraudulently obtained goods, and conspiracy to launder money. The District Court sentenced the defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution, also applying a sentencing enhancement for his managerial role.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the defendant had not preserved his argument regarding the foreseeability of a victim’s use of a credit card for a wire fraud conviction, and regardless, the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The appellate court also held that the District Court did not err in applying the managerial sentencing enhancement, as evidence showed the defendant exercised control over others in the criminal activity. Finally, the court determined that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting two evidentiary exhibits related to the defendant’s knowledge of lottery scams. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Thomas Hardiman</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1793/24-1793-2026-03-13.html</id>
        	<title>United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-13T11:00:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-13T11:00:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1793/24-1793-2026-03-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A former employee of a pharmaceutical manufacturer brought a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company improperly calculated and reported its “Best Price” for certain drugs to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), as required under the Medicaid Rebate Statute. The plaintiff claimed that, during a period from 2005 to 2014, the company failed to aggregate multiple rebates and discounts given to different entities on the same drug, resulting in inflated “Best Price” reports and underpayment of rebates owed to Medicaid. The complaint asserted that the company was subjectively aware that CMS interpreted the statute to require aggregation of all such discounts, especially after the company’s communications with CMS during a 2006–2007 rulemaking process and the company’s subsequent internal audit.

After the government and several states declined to intervene, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the amended complaint, finding that, even under the subjective scienter standard established in United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the company acted with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of its reports. The district court also suggested that ambiguity in the statute precluded a finding of falsity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegations—including the company’s awareness of CMS’s interpretation of the rule, its targeted audit and compliance efforts, and its continued use of non-aggregated reporting—plausibly alleged the requisite subjective scienter under the False Claims Act. The court clarified that statutory ambiguity does not, at the pleading stage, negate scienter or falsity, and remanded for the district court to address other elements, including falsity, in the first instance. The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1793/24-1793-2026-03-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A former employee of a pharmaceutical manufacturer brought a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company improperly calculated and reported its “Best Price” for certain drugs to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), as required under the Medicaid Rebate Statute. The plaintiff claimed that, during a period from 2005 to 2014, the company failed to aggregate multiple rebates and discounts given to different entities on the same drug, resulting in inflated “Best Price” reports and underpayment of rebates owed to Medicaid. The complaint asserted that the company was subjectively aware that CMS interpreted the statute to require aggregation of all such discounts, especially after the company’s communications with CMS during a 2006–2007 rulemaking process and the company’s subsequent internal audit.

After the government and several states declined to intervene, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the amended complaint, finding that, even under the subjective scienter standard established in United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the company acted with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of its reports. The district court also suggested that ambiguity in the statute precluded a finding of falsity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegations—including the company’s awareness of CMS’s interpretation of the rule, its targeted audit and compliance efforts, and its continued use of non-aggregated reporting—plausibly alleged the requisite subjective scienter under the False Claims Act. The court clarified that statutory ambiguity does not, at the pleading stage, negate scienter or falsity, and remanded for the district court to address other elements, including falsity, in the first instance. The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nicole Berner</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1043/25-1043-2026-03-12.html</id>
        	<title>Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-12T10:02:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-12T10:02:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1043/25-1043-2026-03-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of Iraq alleged that, between October and December 2003, they were subjected to severe abuse by military police. The plaintiffs claimed that employees of CACI Premier Technology, Inc., a contractor providing interrogation services to the U.S. military, conspired with military personnel to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, resulting in torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). While CACI’s contract required its personnel to operate under military supervision, evidence suggested inadequate oversight and that CACI employees directed some of the abusive tactics. Plaintiffs did not allege direct physical abuse by CACI interrogators, but asserted conspiracy liability.

The case was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, advancing claims under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and state law. Over time, the plaintiffs narrowed their suit to ATS claims for torture, CIDT, and war crimes, proceeding on conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories. The district court dismissed some claims and parties, and after two trials—one ending in mistrial—the jury found CACI liable for conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT, awarding significant compensatory and punitive damages.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed multiple legal challenges by CACI, including justiciability, immunity, preemption, and the state secrets privilege. The court held that application of the ATS was proper because the conduct at issue occurred within U.S.-controlled territory (Abu Ghraib during the CPA regime), was actionable under universal jurisdiction principles, and enough domestic conduct was involved. The court found that conspiracy liability and corporate liability are recognized under the ATS, and rejected CACI’s defenses and challenges regarding sovereign immunity, political question doctrine, preemption, and evidentiary rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against CACI, vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States on third-party claims due to sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1043/25-1043-2026-03-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of Iraq alleged that, between October and December 2003, they were subjected to severe abuse by military police. The plaintiffs claimed that employees of CACI Premier Technology, Inc., a contractor providing interrogation services to the U.S. military, conspired with military personnel to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, resulting in torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). While CACI’s contract required its personnel to operate under military supervision, evidence suggested inadequate oversight and that CACI employees directed some of the abusive tactics. Plaintiffs did not allege direct physical abuse by CACI interrogators, but asserted conspiracy liability.

The case was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, advancing claims under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and state law. Over time, the plaintiffs narrowed their suit to ATS claims for torture, CIDT, and war crimes, proceeding on conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories. The district court dismissed some claims and parties, and after two trials—one ending in mistrial—the jury found CACI liable for conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT, awarding significant compensatory and punitive damages.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed multiple legal challenges by CACI, including justiciability, immunity, preemption, and the state secrets privilege. The court held that application of the ATS was proper because the conduct at issue occurred within U.S.-controlled territory (Abu Ghraib during the CPA regime), was actionable under universal jurisdiction principles, and enough domestic conduct was involved. The court found that conspiracy liability and corporate liability are recognized under the ATS, and rejected CACI’s defenses and challenges regarding sovereign immunity, political question doctrine, preemption, and evidentiary rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against CACI, vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States on third-party claims due to sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Henry Floyd</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Military Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20275/24-20275-2026-02-24.html</id>
        	<title>Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. 1st Choice</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-24T16:30:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-24T16:30:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20275/24-20275-2026-02-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of insurance companies sued various medical providers and related individuals in federal court, alleging that the providers engaged in a fraudulent scheme in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Specifically, the insurance companies claimed that the defendants submitted fraudulent reports and billing documents for patients involved in car accidents, seeking payments under insurance policies. The allegations included overbilling, billing for services not rendered, and unnecessary procedures.

After the insurance companies filed their initial complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the parties held several conferences to address potential deficiencies. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to adequately allege the existence of a RICO “enterprise,” particularly a consensual decision-making structure among the alleged participants. The insurance companies amended their complaint, but the defendants again moved to dismiss, challenging the sufficiency of the RICO allegations. The magistrate judge recommended granting dismissal due to the complaint’s failure to plead an adequate enterprise. The district court agreed, granting dismissal but allowing the plaintiffs to file a post-judgment motion to amend.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in denying leave to further amend the complaint after judgment. The appellate court held that even though the district court referenced the Rule 59(e) standard rather than the more liberal Rule 15(a) standard for amendment, it was appropriate to affirm if there were “ample and obvious” reasons for denial, such as undue delay. The Fifth Circuit found that the insurance companies had delayed seeking amendment and stood by their pleading’s sufficiency despite repeated notice of its deficiencies, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. The judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20275/24-20275-2026-02-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. 1st Choice" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of insurance companies sued various medical providers and related individuals in federal court, alleging that the providers engaged in a fraudulent scheme in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Specifically, the insurance companies claimed that the defendants submitted fraudulent reports and billing documents for patients involved in car accidents, seeking payments under insurance policies. The allegations included overbilling, billing for services not rendered, and unnecessary procedures.

After the insurance companies filed their initial complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the parties held several conferences to address potential deficiencies. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to adequately allege the existence of a RICO “enterprise,” particularly a consensual decision-making structure among the alleged participants. The insurance companies amended their complaint, but the defendants again moved to dismiss, challenging the sufficiency of the RICO allegations. The magistrate judge recommended granting dismissal due to the complaint’s failure to plead an adequate enterprise. The district court agreed, granting dismissal but allowing the plaintiffs to file a post-judgment motion to amend.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in denying leave to further amend the complaint after judgment. The appellate court held that even though the district court referenced the Rule 59(e) standard rather than the more liberal Rule 15(a) standard for amendment, it was appropriate to affirm if there were “ample and obvious” reasons for denial, such as undue delay. The Fifth Circuit found that the insurance companies had delayed seeking amendment and stood by their pleading’s sufficiency despite repeated notice of its deficiencies, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. The judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Priscilla Richman</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3971/23-3971-2026-02-24.html</id>
        	<title>USA V. MOTLEY</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-24T09:01:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-24T09:01:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3971/23-3971-2026-02-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant operated two companies that provided durable medical equipment, both of which were enrolled as Medicare providers under the names of her mother and nephew. The defendant orchestrated a scheme where patient information was used to submit fraudulent claims for unnecessary medical equipment and repairs, with the assistance of other employees and marketers. Over a ten-year period, the companies submitted more than $24 million in claims, of which Medicare paid approximately $13 million.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. The defendant was indicted and, after a second trial, convicted by a jury of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, healthcare fraud, and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), based on the use of her relatives’ names during the commission of health care fraud. The district court sentenced her to a total of 180 months in custody, including a mandatory consecutive two-year term for aggravated identity theft. The defendant appealed her convictions for aggravated identity theft.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the use of her relatives’ names constituted aggravated identity theft under the standard clarified in Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023). The Ninth Circuit held that the government failed to show that the use of the relatives’ names was “at the crux” of the fraud—meaning that the use itself was fraudulent or deceitful and critical to the scheme’s success, as required by Dubin. The court vacated the defendant’s sentence for aggravated identity theft and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The healthcare fraud and other convictions were not in dispute. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3971/23-3971-2026-02-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA V. MOTLEY" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant operated two companies that provided durable medical equipment, both of which were enrolled as Medicare providers under the names of her mother and nephew. The defendant orchestrated a scheme where patient information was used to submit fraudulent claims for unnecessary medical equipment and repairs, with the assistance of other employees and marketers. Over a ten-year period, the companies submitted more than $24 million in claims, of which Medicare paid approximately $13 million.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. The defendant was indicted and, after a second trial, convicted by a jury of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, healthcare fraud, and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), based on the use of her relatives’ names during the commission of health care fraud. The district court sentenced her to a total of 180 months in custody, including a mandatory consecutive two-year term for aggravated identity theft. The defendant appealed her convictions for aggravated identity theft.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the use of her relatives’ names constituted aggravated identity theft under the standard clarified in Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023). The Ninth Circuit held that the government failed to show that the use of the relatives’ names was “at the crux” of the fraud—meaning that the use itself was fraudulent or deceitful and critical to the scheme’s success, as required by Dubin. The court vacated the defendant’s sentence for aggravated identity theft and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The healthcare fraud and other convictions were not in dispute.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jay Bybee</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3003/24-3003-2026-01-30.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Abrams</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-23T11:00:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-23T11:00:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3003/24-3003-2026-01-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a defendant who, as the sole operator of a clean energy startup, misled investors by supplying them with altered documents, forged signatures, and false financial information to exaggerate his company’s position and prospects. After obtaining nearly $1 million from a university-affiliated incubator and several individual investors, he quickly withdrew large sums, routed money through his own accounts in suspicious transfers, and used most of the funds to purchase a personal residence. He repeatedly lied to investors and federal agents to conceal his activities. Despite red flags, the investors disbursed funds based on his representations.

A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania indicted him on multiple counts, including wire fraud, mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, money laundering, unlawful monetary transactions, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. At trial, the defendant made a generalized motion for acquittal under Rule 29, which the District Court denied. The jury found him guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to 72 months in prison and imposed over $1.1 million in restitution, later amended to include attorneys’ fees incurred by the victims.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the defendant raised sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, argued instructional error regarding the aggravated identity theft counts, and disputed the restitution award for attorneys’ fees. The Third Circuit held that a non-specific Rule 29 motion does not preserve all sufficiency arguments for appeal and that, under plain-error review, the evidence supported all convictions. The court found no instructional error or constitutional vagueness in the aggravated identity theft statute. However, it held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act does not authorize restitution for attorneys’ fees. The convictions and sentence were affirmed, the restitution order for attorneys’ fees was vacated, and the case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3003/24-3003-2026-01-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Abrams" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a defendant who, as the sole operator of a clean energy startup, misled investors by supplying them with altered documents, forged signatures, and false financial information to exaggerate his company’s position and prospects. After obtaining nearly $1 million from a university-affiliated incubator and several individual investors, he quickly withdrew large sums, routed money through his own accounts in suspicious transfers, and used most of the funds to purchase a personal residence. He repeatedly lied to investors and federal agents to conceal his activities. Despite red flags, the investors disbursed funds based on his representations.

A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania indicted him on multiple counts, including wire fraud, mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, money laundering, unlawful monetary transactions, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. At trial, the defendant made a generalized motion for acquittal under Rule 29, which the District Court denied. The jury found him guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to 72 months in prison and imposed over $1.1 million in restitution, later amended to include attorneys’ fees incurred by the victims.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the defendant raised sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, argued instructional error regarding the aggravated identity theft counts, and disputed the restitution award for attorneys’ fees. The Third Circuit held that a non-specific Rule 29 motion does not preserve all sufficiency arguments for appeal and that, under plain-error review, the evidence supported all convictions. The court found no instructional error or constitutional vagueness in the aggravated identity theft statute. However, it held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act does not authorize restitution for attorneys’ fees. The convictions and sentence were affirmed, the restitution order for attorneys’ fees was vacated, and the case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Brooks Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1520/24-1520-2026-02-20.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Yoon</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-20T13:00:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-20T13:00:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1520/24-1520-2026-02-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Chang Goo Yoon, a licensed physical therapist operating clinics in Massachusetts, engaged in a scheme over four years to submit more than one million dollars in fraudulent claims to private health insurers, including Blue Cross Blue Shield and Aetna, for services he did not actually provide. He fabricated treatment notes, sometimes under another provider&#039;s name, and submitted false personal injury claims to his own car insurer, MAPFRE. Yoon manipulated patient addresses to ensure reimbursement checks were sent directly to him, avoiding detection by patients. His fraudulent conduct was eventually uncovered, and a jury convicted him on two counts of health care fraud, with Count One involving Blue Cross and Aetna, and Count Two concerning MAPFRE.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the trial. Before trial, Yoon moved to exclude evidence related to insurance company investigations into his billing, including a 2015 Blue Cross investigation and a 2007 Colorado licensing investigation. The district court limited the evidence to Yoon’s knowledge of the investigations, excluding their outcomes. The court also redacted key documents and provided limiting instructions to the jury. At trial, witnesses testified about insurance procedures and Yoon’s billing practices. Yoon challenged the admissibility of this evidence, as well as testimony from insurance investigators, arguing it was unduly prejudicial and improperly admitted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Yoon’s appeal. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, holding that evidence of Yoon’s knowledge of prior investigations was highly probative of his specific intent and not unduly prejudicial given the safeguards imposed. The court also affirmed the application of two sentencing enhancements: one for intended loss based on the total amount billed, and another for abuse of a position of trust, finding both were supported by the record and correctly applied. Yoon’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1520/24-1520-2026-02-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Yoon" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Chang Goo Yoon, a licensed physical therapist operating clinics in Massachusetts, engaged in a scheme over four years to submit more than one million dollars in fraudulent claims to private health insurers, including Blue Cross Blue Shield and Aetna, for services he did not actually provide. He fabricated treatment notes, sometimes under another provider&#039;s name, and submitted false personal injury claims to his own car insurer, MAPFRE. Yoon manipulated patient addresses to ensure reimbursement checks were sent directly to him, avoiding detection by patients. His fraudulent conduct was eventually uncovered, and a jury convicted him on two counts of health care fraud, with Count One involving Blue Cross and Aetna, and Count Two concerning MAPFRE.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the trial. Before trial, Yoon moved to exclude evidence related to insurance company investigations into his billing, including a 2015 Blue Cross investigation and a 2007 Colorado licensing investigation. The district court limited the evidence to Yoon’s knowledge of the investigations, excluding their outcomes. The court also redacted key documents and provided limiting instructions to the jury. At trial, witnesses testified about insurance procedures and Yoon’s billing practices. Yoon challenged the admissibility of this evidence, as well as testimony from insurance investigators, arguing it was unduly prejudicial and improperly admitted.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Yoon’s appeal. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, holding that evidence of Yoon’s knowledge of prior investigations was highly probative of his specific intent and not unduly prejudicial given the safeguards imposed. The court also affirmed the application of two sentencing enhancements: one for intended loss based on the total amount billed, and another for abuse of a position of trust, finding both were supported by the record and correctly applied. Yoon’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Seth R. Aframe</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4478/24-4478-2026-02-19.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Umeti</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-19T11:30:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-19T11:30:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4478/24-4478-2026-02-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant was charged with several offenses arising from a scheme in which he and others conspired to commit wire fraud by deceiving businesses into transferring funds to accounts they controlled. The conspirators, operating from Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, used phishing emails containing malware to access business computers and steal money. The government linked the defendant to the conspiracy using evidence including overlapping social media handles, email accounts, IP addresses, and testimony connecting his online activity to fraud-related accounts. The government also introduced evidence that one company suffered financial losses and response costs due to the crimes.

A grand jury indicted the defendant and his co-conspirators, but only the defendant proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. During jury selection, a prospective juror mentioned familiarity with the defendant and the case due to his work in cybersecurity. The court struck this juror for cause and repeatedly instructed the panel on impartiality. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, including sentencing enhancements. The defendant moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing that the prospective juror’s comments affected jury impartiality and that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the scheme or to establish the necessary $5,000 loss for an enhanced sentence. The district court denied these motions and sentenced the defendant to 120 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a new trial, finding no prejudicial error in the jury selection process and holding that there was sufficient evidence linking the defendant to the fraud. However, the appellate court reversed the sentencing enhancement for intentional damage to a protected computer, concluding that the government failed to prove $5,000 in qualifying losses as required by statute. The case was remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4478/24-4478-2026-02-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Umeti" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant was charged with several offenses arising from a scheme in which he and others conspired to commit wire fraud by deceiving businesses into transferring funds to accounts they controlled. The conspirators, operating from Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, used phishing emails containing malware to access business computers and steal money. The government linked the defendant to the conspiracy using evidence including overlapping social media handles, email accounts, IP addresses, and testimony connecting his online activity to fraud-related accounts. The government also introduced evidence that one company suffered financial losses and response costs due to the crimes.

A grand jury indicted the defendant and his co-conspirators, but only the defendant proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. During jury selection, a prospective juror mentioned familiarity with the defendant and the case due to his work in cybersecurity. The court struck this juror for cause and repeatedly instructed the panel on impartiality. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, including sentencing enhancements. The defendant moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing that the prospective juror’s comments affected jury impartiality and that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the scheme or to establish the necessary $5,000 loss for an enhanced sentence. The district court denied these motions and sentenced the defendant to 120 months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a new trial, finding no prejudicial error in the jury selection process and holding that there was sufficient evidence linking the defendant to the fraud. However, the appellate court reversed the sentencing enhancement for intentional damage to a protected computer, concluding that the government failed to prove $5,000 in qualifying losses as required by statute. The case was remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Agee</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10482/24-10482-2026-02-19.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Hernandez</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-19T08:33:43-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-19T08:33:43-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10482/24-10482-2026-02-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Javier Hernandez was a participant in a transnational criminal operation that smuggled Cuban migrants into Mexico for eventual entry into the United States. His primary role involved stealing boats from Southwest Florida, which he delivered to co-conspirators in Mexico. These vessels were used to transport migrants from Cuba or were sold to support the smuggling enterprise, including bribing law enforcement. Hernandez also transported stolen vehicles to Mexico for similar purposes. He was compensated for each delivery and admitted to earning substantial profits from these activities.

Federal authorities identified Hernandez through investigative techniques including cell-site location tracking and the recovery of his cell phone, which had been seized by Mexican authorities. The government obtained and executed a warrant to search his phone, extracting relevant data. After initial technical difficulties, a second extraction was performed after the warrant’s nominal expiration date but while the phone was still in government custody. Hernandez was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on five counts, including conspiracy to encourage unlawful entry, transportation of stolen vessels, trafficking in vehicles with altered VINs, and money laundering. He moved to suppress the evidence from the second extraction, but the district court denied the motion, applied several sentencing enhancements, and imposed a sentence of ninety-five months.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the second extraction did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 or the Fourth Amendment, as Rule 41(e)(2)(B) allows for off-site copying and review of electronic information after the warrant period. The court also found that even if there were a procedural violation, suppression would not be warranted due to the agents’ good faith and lack of prejudice. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain all convictions and found no reversible error in the sentencing calculations or guideline enhancements. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-10482/24-10482-2026-02-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Hernandez" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Javier Hernandez was a participant in a transnational criminal operation that smuggled Cuban migrants into Mexico for eventual entry into the United States. His primary role involved stealing boats from Southwest Florida, which he delivered to co-conspirators in Mexico. These vessels were used to transport migrants from Cuba or were sold to support the smuggling enterprise, including bribing law enforcement. Hernandez also transported stolen vehicles to Mexico for similar purposes. He was compensated for each delivery and admitted to earning substantial profits from these activities.

Federal authorities identified Hernandez through investigative techniques including cell-site location tracking and the recovery of his cell phone, which had been seized by Mexican authorities. The government obtained and executed a warrant to search his phone, extracting relevant data. After initial technical difficulties, a second extraction was performed after the warrant’s nominal expiration date but while the phone was still in government custody. Hernandez was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on five counts, including conspiracy to encourage unlawful entry, transportation of stolen vessels, trafficking in vehicles with altered VINs, and money laundering. He moved to suppress the evidence from the second extraction, but the district court denied the motion, applied several sentencing enhancements, and imposed a sentence of ninety-five months.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the second extraction did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 or the Fourth Amendment, as Rule 41(e)(2)(B) allows for off-site copying and review of electronic information after the warrant period. The court also found that even if there were a procedural violation, suppression would not be warranted due to the agents’ good faith and lack of prejudice. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain all convictions and found no reversible error in the sentencing calculations or guideline enhancements. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stanley Marcus</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Immigration Law"/>
							<category term="Admiralty &amp; Maritime Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5085/24-5085-2026-02-17.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Tajwar</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-17T13:30:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-17T13:30:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5085/24-5085-2026-02-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case centers on an individual who immigrated to the United States and became involved in a transnational drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracy. His role was to travel across the country collecting large sums of drug proceeds, which he then laundered through a business that purchased used cell phones. These phones were sent to a contact in China as payment for precursor chemicals vital to the drug operation. During one such trip, law enforcement observed him receiving nearly $200,000 in cash and, upon stopping his vehicle, discovered an unloaded firearm and loaded magazine in the van. He admitted to bringing the gun for protection due to the large sums of money he was transporting.

He was convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to launder money in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, receiving a 90-month prison sentence and three years of supervised release. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. While his appeal was pending, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to allow certain first-time offenders a two-level reduction in offense level, with exceptions including possession of a firearm “in connection with” the offense. He moved for a sentence reduction under the new provision, but the district court denied the request, finding his possession of the firearm during the offense made him ineligible.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The appellate court held that the “in connection with” language should be interpreted broadly and that the close proximity of the firearm to the drug proceeds, along with the defendant’s own admission that the gun was for protection during his criminal activity, established the necessary nexus. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no error in deeming him ineligible for the reduced sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5085/24-5085-2026-02-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Tajwar" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case centers on an individual who immigrated to the United States and became involved in a transnational drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracy. His role was to travel across the country collecting large sums of drug proceeds, which he then laundered through a business that purchased used cell phones. These phones were sent to a contact in China as payment for precursor chemicals vital to the drug operation. During one such trip, law enforcement observed him receiving nearly $200,000 in cash and, upon stopping his vehicle, discovered an unloaded firearm and loaded magazine in the van. He admitted to bringing the gun for protection due to the large sums of money he was transporting.

He was convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to launder money in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, receiving a 90-month prison sentence and three years of supervised release. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. While his appeal was pending, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to allow certain first-time offenders a two-level reduction in offense level, with exceptions including possession of a firearm “in connection with” the offense. He moved for a sentence reduction under the new provision, but the district court denied the request, finding his possession of the firearm during the offense made him ineligible.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The appellate court held that the “in connection with” language should be interpreted broadly and that the close proximity of the firearm to the drug proceeds, along with the defendant’s own admission that the gun was for protection during his criminal activity, established the necessary nexus. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no error in deeming him ineligible for the reduced sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Chad Readler</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2109/24-2109-2026-02-17.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Beckner</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-17T08:32:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-17T08:32:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2109/24-2109-2026-02-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant orchestrated a fraudulent scheme to secure loans and investments, ostensibly to finance a truck stop in Deming, New Mexico. The operation involved multiple domestic and foreign corporations, and the defendant concealed his control and financial interest in the truck stop using aliases and shell companies. Funds obtained through fraud were not used as promised, and the defendant misled lenders and investors regarding his identity and financial history. The scheme also involved directing loan proceeds to offshore accounts beneficially owned by his girlfriend, and leveraging personal relationships to facilitate aspects of the fraud.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of bank fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit bank, mail, and wire fraud. The district court admitted evidence showing the defendant’s control over the scheme, including his direction of a confederate to engage in a sham marriage, his ties and travel to Central American countries, and the distribution of loan proceeds to an offshore company owned by his girlfriend. The court sentenced the defendant to 210 months’ imprisonment, applying enhancements for being a leader of extensive criminal activity and for employing sophisticated means.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the conviction and sentence. The court rejected the defendant’s challenges to the district court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of control, foreign ties, and financial distributions. The court affirmed the application of guideline enhancements for leadership and sophisticated means, and found the sentence substantively reasonable despite disparity with a codefendant, due to greater culpability and aggravating factors. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and granted the defendant’s request to supplement the record. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-2109/24-2109-2026-02-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Beckner" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant orchestrated a fraudulent scheme to secure loans and investments, ostensibly to finance a truck stop in Deming, New Mexico. The operation involved multiple domestic and foreign corporations, and the defendant concealed his control and financial interest in the truck stop using aliases and shell companies. Funds obtained through fraud were not used as promised, and the defendant misled lenders and investors regarding his identity and financial history. The scheme also involved directing loan proceeds to offshore accounts beneficially owned by his girlfriend, and leveraging personal relationships to facilitate aspects of the fraud.

The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico presided over a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of bank fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit bank, mail, and wire fraud. The district court admitted evidence showing the defendant’s control over the scheme, including his direction of a confederate to engage in a sham marriage, his ties and travel to Central American countries, and the distribution of loan proceeds to an offshore company owned by his girlfriend. The court sentenced the defendant to 210 months’ imprisonment, applying enhancements for being a leader of extensive criminal activity and for employing sophisticated means.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the conviction and sentence. The court rejected the defendant’s challenges to the district court’s evidentiary rulings, finding no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of control, foreign ties, and financial distributions. The court affirmed the application of guideline enhancements for leadership and sophisticated means, and found the sentence substantively reasonable despite disparity with a codefendant, due to greater culpability and aggravating factors. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and granted the defendant’s request to supplement the record.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harris Hartz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1396/25-1396-2026-02-11.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Carroll</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-11T08:31:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-11T08:31:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1396/25-1396-2026-02-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Christopher Carroll and Whiskey Dix Big Truck Repair, LLC (“WDBTR”) were charged with multiple offenses after Carroll, with an associate, falsely represented the use of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds, which were instead used for personal expenses and to start WDBTR. Additional charges included tampering with Clean Air Act (CAA) monitoring devices on company trucks and witness tampering related to efforts to impede the investigation. Carroll’s prior parole status was relevant to the government’s allegation that he concealed this on the PPP application by omitting his name and submitting the application in his wife’s name.

A United States Magistrate Judge recommended denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the grand jury had been improperly instructed to use a probable cause standard and that a higher standard should apply. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri adopted this recommendation, referencing Supreme Court precedent affirming probable cause as the standard for grand jury indictments. The district court also denied Carroll’s motion to exclude evidence of his prior conviction and parole status, determining it was relevant to Carroll’s intent to defraud and not unduly prejudicial. After trial, Carroll was convicted on multiple fraud, CAA, and witness tampering counts, and WDBTR was convicted on CAA charges.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that the probable cause standard governs grand jury indictments, consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Carroll’s parole status, as it was probative of intent and any error would have been harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/25-1396/25-1396-2026-02-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Carroll" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Christopher Carroll and Whiskey Dix Big Truck Repair, LLC (“WDBTR”) were charged with multiple offenses after Carroll, with an associate, falsely represented the use of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds, which were instead used for personal expenses and to start WDBTR. Additional charges included tampering with Clean Air Act (CAA) monitoring devices on company trucks and witness tampering related to efforts to impede the investigation. Carroll’s prior parole status was relevant to the government’s allegation that he concealed this on the PPP application by omitting his name and submitting the application in his wife’s name.

A United States Magistrate Judge recommended denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the grand jury had been improperly instructed to use a probable cause standard and that a higher standard should apply. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri adopted this recommendation, referencing Supreme Court precedent affirming probable cause as the standard for grand jury indictments. The district court also denied Carroll’s motion to exclude evidence of his prior conviction and parole status, determining it was relevant to Carroll’s intent to defraud and not unduly prejudicial. After trial, Carroll was convicted on multiple fraud, CAA, and witness tampering counts, and WDBTR was convicted on CAA charges.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that the probable cause standard governs grand jury indictments, consistent with longstanding Supreme Court precedent. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Carroll’s parole status, as it was probative of intent and any error would have been harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The convictions and sentences were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bobby Shepherd</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-11822/24-11822-2026-02-10.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Mullings</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-10T08:34:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-10T08:34:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-11822/24-11822-2026-02-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A man was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and seven counts of money laundering after opening numerous bank accounts and using them to launder millions of dollars in fraud proceeds for a group operating romance and business email scams. He also recruited and supervised a co-conspirator, helping that person set up a similar laundering operation. The laundered funds were ultimately sent to Africa. Following his arrest, the defendant attempted to cooperate with the government but did not enter into a plea agreement. At his first change-of-plea hearing, he hesitated and the hearing was postponed. At the second hearing, with two lawyers present, he pleaded guilty to all charges, affirming he did so knowingly and voluntarily.

Before sentencing, the defendant’s bond was revoked after he was arrested for assaulting his girlfriend. While in custody, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging one of his lawyers coerced him into pleading guilty and that he was not aware of a co-conspirator’s cooperation with the government. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held an evidentiary hearing, found the attorneys credible and the defendant not credible, and denied the motion to withdraw the plea.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the calculation of the loss amount, several sentencing enhancements, the denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the substantive reasonableness of the 120-month sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, did not err in its application of sentencing enhancements and guidelines, and that the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-11822/24-11822-2026-02-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Mullings" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A man was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and seven counts of money laundering after opening numerous bank accounts and using them to launder millions of dollars in fraud proceeds for a group operating romance and business email scams. He also recruited and supervised a co-conspirator, helping that person set up a similar laundering operation. The laundered funds were ultimately sent to Africa. Following his arrest, the defendant attempted to cooperate with the government but did not enter into a plea agreement. At his first change-of-plea hearing, he hesitated and the hearing was postponed. At the second hearing, with two lawyers present, he pleaded guilty to all charges, affirming he did so knowingly and voluntarily.

Before sentencing, the defendant’s bond was revoked after he was arrested for assaulting his girlfriend. While in custody, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging one of his lawyers coerced him into pleading guilty and that he was not aware of a co-conspirator’s cooperation with the government. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held an evidentiary hearing, found the attorneys credible and the defendant not credible, and denied the motion to withdraw the plea.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the calculation of the loss amount, several sentencing enhancements, the denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the substantive reasonableness of the 120-month sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, did not err in its application of sentencing enhancements and guidelines, and that the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Elizabeth L. Branch</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4362/24-4362-2026-02-05.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. McDonald</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-06T09:01:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-06T09:01:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4362/24-4362-2026-02-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An individual who served as Executive Director of a local economic development authority in Virginia was indicted on thirty-four counts stemming from multiple fraudulent schemes. These included wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, and aggravated identity theft. The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant used forged documents and misrepresentations to divert public funds for personal gain. One scheme involved a $2 million wire transfer, where the defendant lied to both her employer and others, using another person’s identity to facilitate the movement of funds. The trial was repeatedly delayed due to health issues experienced by the defendant and her counsel, resulting in significant breaks and several motions for mistrial by the defense.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia presided over the trial, ultimately entering judgments of acquittal on four counts of bank fraud but allowing the remaining convictions to stand. The court denied the defendant’s motions for mistrial, a new trial, and to introduce certain grand jury testimony. After the jury returned guilty verdicts on the remaining counts, the defendant was sentenced accordingly. The defendant appealed, challenging the aggravated identity theft conviction, the handling of trial delays, evidentiary rulings, and a supplemental jury instruction given after closing arguments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under Dubin v. United States, the aggravated identity theft conviction could not stand because the use of another’s identity was not at the “crux” of the predicate wire fraud offense. The court vacated the conviction and sentence on that count and remanded for resentencing. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all other issues, including denial of a mistrial, exclusion of grand jury testimony, and the propriety of the additional jury instruction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-4362/24-4362-2026-02-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. McDonald" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An individual who served as Executive Director of a local economic development authority in Virginia was indicted on thirty-four counts stemming from multiple fraudulent schemes. These included wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering, and aggravated identity theft. The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant used forged documents and misrepresentations to divert public funds for personal gain. One scheme involved a $2 million wire transfer, where the defendant lied to both her employer and others, using another person’s identity to facilitate the movement of funds. The trial was repeatedly delayed due to health issues experienced by the defendant and her counsel, resulting in significant breaks and several motions for mistrial by the defense.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia presided over the trial, ultimately entering judgments of acquittal on four counts of bank fraud but allowing the remaining convictions to stand. The court denied the defendant’s motions for mistrial, a new trial, and to introduce certain grand jury testimony. After the jury returned guilty verdicts on the remaining counts, the defendant was sentenced accordingly. The defendant appealed, challenging the aggravated identity theft conviction, the handling of trial delays, evidentiary rulings, and a supplemental jury instruction given after closing arguments.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under Dubin v. United States, the aggravated identity theft conviction could not stand because the use of another’s identity was not at the “crux” of the predicate wire fraud offense. The court vacated the conviction and sentence on that count and remanded for resentencing. However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on all other issues, including denial of a mistrial, exclusion of grand jury testimony, and the propriety of the additional jury instruction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Roger Gregory</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-6021/24-6021-2026-02-04.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Wala</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-04T13:01:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-04T13:01:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-6021/24-6021-2026-02-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Over a five-year period, the defendant participated in a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute 16.1 million counterfeit alprazolam pills, which were sold via the dark web and other channels. The pills imitated the appearance and markings of legitimate FDA-approved alprazolam, but often contained benzodiazepine-class substances that were not scheduled as controlled substances at the time. The defendant marketed these pills as indistinguishable from legitimate products, and received payment in cryptocurrencies.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to conspiracy and counterfeiting charges. During sentencing, the court adopted the government’s proposed method for calculating loss under § 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, using the estimated street price of $2 per pill to determine a total loss amount of approximately $32 million. The court also applied enhancements for victim numerosity or mass-marketing and for conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury, resulting in a total offense level of 35. The defendant was sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment. Both parties objected to the loss calculation and enhancements, but the court overruled the objections after a joint evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence. The appellate court held that the district court properly interpreted and applied Application Note 3(E)(v) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which requires loss to include the amount paid by end-users for misrepresented goods. It found no clear error in using the street price to calculate loss, nor in applying the enhancements for ten or more victims and for conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury. The sentence was affirmed in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-6021/24-6021-2026-02-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Wala" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Over a five-year period, the defendant participated in a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute 16.1 million counterfeit alprazolam pills, which were sold via the dark web and other channels. The pills imitated the appearance and markings of legitimate FDA-approved alprazolam, but often contained benzodiazepine-class substances that were not scheduled as controlled substances at the time. The defendant marketed these pills as indistinguishable from legitimate products, and received payment in cryptocurrencies.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to conspiracy and counterfeiting charges. During sentencing, the court adopted the government’s proposed method for calculating loss under § 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, using the estimated street price of $2 per pill to determine a total loss amount of approximately $32 million. The court also applied enhancements for victim numerosity or mass-marketing and for conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury, resulting in a total offense level of 35. The defendant was sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment. Both parties objected to the loss calculation and enhancements, but the court overruled the objections after a joint evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence. The appellate court held that the district court properly interpreted and applied Application Note 3(E)(v) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which requires loss to include the amount paid by end-users for misrepresented goods. It found no clear error in using the street price to calculate loss, nor in applying the enhancements for ten or more victims and for conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury. The sentence was affirmed in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Julia Gibbons</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-191/24-191-2026-02-03.html</id>
        	<title>GEICO v. Patel</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-03T11:42:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-03T11:42:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-191/24-191-2026-02-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		GEICO and its subsidiaries brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Dr. Bhargav Patel and his medical practice, alleging that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud GEICO by manipulating New York’s no-fault automobile insurance system. GEICO claimed that from 2019 to 2023, defendants submitted approximately $3.4 million in reimbursement claims for treatments that were unnecessary, experimental, excessive, illusory, or not provided at all. These claims allegedly resulted from a fraudulent scheme involving kickbacks for patient referrals and the provision of services by unlicensed individuals or contractors.

After GEICO initiated its federal action, the defendants responded by filing over 600 collection actions in New York state courts and arbitration tribunals, seeking recovery for disputed or denied claims totaling more than $2 million. GEICO, facing the prospect of fragmented litigation and the risk of inconsistent judgments, sought a preliminary injunction from the district court to stay all pending state and arbitration proceedings and to prevent the defendants from filing new collection actions until the federal court resolved the RICO claims. The district court granted the injunction, finding that GEICO had demonstrated irreparable harm, serious questions going to the merits, and a balance of hardships tipping in GEICO’s favor. The court also determined it had authority under the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to enjoin the parallel proceedings.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and found none. The appellate court held that the preliminary injunction was justified by the real risk of irreparable harm to GEICO posed by inconsistent judgments and the inability to fully adjudicate the alleged fraudulent scheme in piecemeal state actions. The Second Circuit further held, consistent with its recent precedent in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Tri-Borough NY Medical Practice, P.C., that the injunction did not violate the Anti-Injunction Act because it was expressly authorized under RICO. The court affirmed the district court’s order. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-191/24-191-2026-02-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GEICO v. Patel" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                GEICO and its subsidiaries brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Dr. Bhargav Patel and his medical practice, alleging that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud GEICO by manipulating New York’s no-fault automobile insurance system. GEICO claimed that from 2019 to 2023, defendants submitted approximately $3.4 million in reimbursement claims for treatments that were unnecessary, experimental, excessive, illusory, or not provided at all. These claims allegedly resulted from a fraudulent scheme involving kickbacks for patient referrals and the provision of services by unlicensed individuals or contractors.

After GEICO initiated its federal action, the defendants responded by filing over 600 collection actions in New York state courts and arbitration tribunals, seeking recovery for disputed or denied claims totaling more than $2 million. GEICO, facing the prospect of fragmented litigation and the risk of inconsistent judgments, sought a preliminary injunction from the district court to stay all pending state and arbitration proceedings and to prevent the defendants from filing new collection actions until the federal court resolved the RICO claims. The district court granted the injunction, finding that GEICO had demonstrated irreparable harm, serious questions going to the merits, and a balance of hardships tipping in GEICO’s favor. The court also determined it had authority under the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to enjoin the parallel proceedings.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and found none. The appellate court held that the preliminary injunction was justified by the real risk of irreparable harm to GEICO posed by inconsistent judgments and the inability to fully adjudicate the alleged fraudulent scheme in piecemeal state actions. The Second Circuit further held, consistent with its recent precedent in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Tri-Borough NY Medical Practice, P.C., that the injunction did not violate the Anti-Injunction Act because it was expressly authorized under RICO. The court affirmed the district court’s order.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Susan L. Carney</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1998/24-1998-2026-01-30.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Abrams</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-30T10:00:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-30T10:00:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1998/24-1998-2026-01-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The appellant in this case was the sole owner and operator of a clean energy startup. In order to attract investment, he provided prospective investors with forged business agreements, altered financial statements, and other documents that misrepresented the company’s assets, operational history, and business relationships. He also fabricated the signatures of various business partners and used personal information of others without authorization. Investors provided nearly $1 million based on these representations. The appellant then diverted a substantial portion of the funds for personal use, including the purchase of a residence, and obscured these transactions through rapid transfers among several accounts. He continued to mislead investors about the use of their funds and the status of the business. When questioned by federal agents, he made a series of false statements regarding his activities.

A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania indicted the appellant on multiple counts, including wire fraud, mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, money laundering, unlawful monetary transactions, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. After a nine-day jury trial, the jury found him guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to 72 months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution of approximately $1.2 million, including attorneys’ fees incurred by victims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. On appeal, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, the constitutionality of the aggravated identity theft statute, denial of a good faith instruction, and the restitution order. The Court held that a general Rule 29 motion does not preserve all sufficiency arguments for appeal and found no plain error in the conviction. It also found the jury instructions and statute to be proper and the denial of the good faith instruction not to be an abuse of discretion. However, the Court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act does not authorize restitution for attorneys’ fees, vacated that portion of the restitution order, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. All other aspects of the conviction and sentence were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1998/24-1998-2026-01-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Abrams" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The appellant in this case was the sole owner and operator of a clean energy startup. In order to attract investment, he provided prospective investors with forged business agreements, altered financial statements, and other documents that misrepresented the company’s assets, operational history, and business relationships. He also fabricated the signatures of various business partners and used personal information of others without authorization. Investors provided nearly $1 million based on these representations. The appellant then diverted a substantial portion of the funds for personal use, including the purchase of a residence, and obscured these transactions through rapid transfers among several accounts. He continued to mislead investors about the use of their funds and the status of the business. When questioned by federal agents, he made a series of false statements regarding his activities.

A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania indicted the appellant on multiple counts, including wire fraud, mail fraud, aggravated identity theft, money laundering, unlawful monetary transactions, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. After a nine-day jury trial, the jury found him guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced him to 72 months’ imprisonment and ordered restitution of approximately $1.2 million, including attorneys’ fees incurred by victims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. On appeal, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, the constitutionality of the aggravated identity theft statute, denial of a good faith instruction, and the restitution order. The Court held that a general Rule 29 motion does not preserve all sufficiency arguments for appeal and found no plain error in the conviction. It also found the jury instructions and statute to be proper and the denial of the good faith instruction not to be an abuse of discretion. However, the Court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act does not authorize restitution for attorneys’ fees, vacated that portion of the restitution order, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. All other aspects of the conviction and sentence were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Brooks Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2026/24-1166.html</id>
        	<title>State of Iowa  v. Hallock</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-30T07:05:57-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-30T07:05:57-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2026/24-1166.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant, a former employee of a tattoo studio, embezzled approximately $120,000 from her employer over a nine-month period. After being charged with first-degree theft, she pleaded guilty under a plea agreement in which both she and the State recommended a deferred judgment, with restitution payments as a condition of probation. Prior to sentencing, a presentence investigation report (PSI) was submitted, but it did not include any victim-impact statements. At the sentencing hearing, the business owner delivered an oral victim-impact statement detailing the emotional and financial harm caused by the theft. The district court declined to follow the parties’ joint recommendation and instead imposed the statutory maximum prison sentence of up to ten years.

The defendant appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing her to prison and by allegedly relying on improper factors contained in the victim-impact statement, which she claimed included unproven allegations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the defendant had not preserved error regarding the victim-impact statement because she failed to object at the sentencing hearing. The appellate court also found no indication that the district court had relied on improper factors.

Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court clarified that, with respect to previously unseen oral victim-impact statements delivered at sentencing, defendants are not required to object contemporaneously in order to raise claims on direct appeal about improper sentencing considerations. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the victim-impact statement in this case was largely appropriate and that the record did not indicate the district court relied on any improper factors. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2026/24-1166.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "State of Iowa  v. Hallock" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant, a former employee of a tattoo studio, embezzled approximately $120,000 from her employer over a nine-month period. After being charged with first-degree theft, she pleaded guilty under a plea agreement in which both she and the State recommended a deferred judgment, with restitution payments as a condition of probation. Prior to sentencing, a presentence investigation report (PSI) was submitted, but it did not include any victim-impact statements. At the sentencing hearing, the business owner delivered an oral victim-impact statement detailing the emotional and financial harm caused by the theft. The district court declined to follow the parties’ joint recommendation and instead imposed the statutory maximum prison sentence of up to ten years.

The defendant appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing her to prison and by allegedly relying on improper factors contained in the victim-impact statement, which she claimed included unproven allegations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the defendant had not preserved error regarding the victim-impact statement because she failed to object at the sentencing hearing. The appellate court also found no indication that the district court had relied on improper factors.

Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court clarified that, with respect to previously unseen oral victim-impact statements delivered at sentencing, defendants are not required to object contemporaneously in order to raise claims on direct appeal about improper sentencing considerations. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the victim-impact statement in this case was largely appropriate and that the record did not indicate the district court relied on any improper factors. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Iowa</case:state>
						<case:court>Iowa Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edward Mansfield</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="Iowa Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1831/24-1831-2026-01-29.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Abbas</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-29T14:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-29T14:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1831/24-1831-2026-01-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a defendant who, after losing his law license, became involved in schemes such as romance scams and business email compromises, which defrauded victims of millions of dollars. He opened bank accounts for shell companies, received funds from victims deceived by his co-conspirators, and transferred or withdrew the money for personal or further illicit purposes. Even after being confronted by bank investigators, he continued these activities.

Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts convicted him on charges including wire fraud and money-laundering conspiracy, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed only some of those convictions, vacated others, and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court imposed a new sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment—below the advisory guidelines range of 108 to 135 months—and reimposed more than $2 million in restitution. The defendant appealed again, challenging both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence and the amount and scope of restitution ordered.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed and rejected all of the defendant’s claims. The court held that the district judge correctly applied the sentencing guidelines, including the base offense level, loss amount calculation, and enhancements for money laundering and sophisticated means. The court also found that the district judge properly denied a reduction for zero-point offenders, reasonably found the sentence substantively appropriate given the facts, and correctly ordered restitution, including for losses suffered by a foreign victim through a domestic bank account. The First Circuit affirmed the new sentence and restitution order in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1831/24-1831-2026-01-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Abbas" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a defendant who, after losing his law license, became involved in schemes such as romance scams and business email compromises, which defrauded victims of millions of dollars. He opened bank accounts for shell companies, received funds from victims deceived by his co-conspirators, and transferred or withdrew the money for personal or further illicit purposes. Even after being confronted by bank investigators, he continued these activities.

Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts convicted him on charges including wire fraud and money-laundering conspiracy, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed only some of those convictions, vacated others, and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court imposed a new sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment—below the advisory guidelines range of 108 to 135 months—and reimposed more than $2 million in restitution. The defendant appealed again, challenging both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence and the amount and scope of restitution ordered.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed and rejected all of the defendant’s claims. The court held that the district judge correctly applied the sentencing guidelines, including the base offense level, loss amount calculation, and enhancements for money laundering and sophisticated means. The court also found that the district judge properly denied a reduction for zero-point offenders, reasonably found the sentence substantively appropriate given the facts, and correctly ordered restitution, including for losses suffered by a foreign victim through a domestic bank account. The First Circuit affirmed the new sentence and restitution order in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2026/2026-me-6.html</id>
        	<title>State of Maine v. Moulton</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-29T08:26:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-29T08:26:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2026/2026-me-6.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Between 2019 and 2022, a bookkeeper for a family-owned machine and fabrication business misappropriated approximately $500,000 from her employer. She forged the co-owner’s signature on checks made out to herself and later confessed to the theft in a video-recorded interview with law enforcement. The bookkeeper admitted to taking funds for personal use and acknowledged the significant amount taken. She was charged with theft by unauthorized taking or transfer and forgery, pleaded not guilty, and proceeded to a jury trial.

Prior to trial, the defendant sought access to the company’s QuickBooks password through a motion to compel discovery, which she later withdrew. She subsequently moved to suppress her confession as involuntary, but the Unified Criminal Docket (Piscataquis County, Roberts, J.) denied the motion after a hearing. Additional pretrial motions included a request for the trial judge’s recusal, based on his prior professional association with the prosecutor, and a motion to exclude financial evidence due to the State’s failure to produce the QuickBooks password. Both motions were denied. At trial, the prosecution presented testimonial, documentary, and video evidence, including the defendant’s confession. The jury found her guilty on both counts, and she was sentenced to concurrent prison terms, with part of the sentence suspended and probation imposed.

On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed claims of prosecutorial error, denial of recusal, and alleged discovery violations. The Court held that although some prosecutorial statements constituted error, these were harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant’s own confession. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in denying recusal or in rulings regarding discovery, concluding the State was not obligated to produce information it did not possess. The conviction was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2026/2026-me-6.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "State of Maine v. Moulton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Between 2019 and 2022, a bookkeeper for a family-owned machine and fabrication business misappropriated approximately $500,000 from her employer. She forged the co-owner’s signature on checks made out to herself and later confessed to the theft in a video-recorded interview with law enforcement. The bookkeeper admitted to taking funds for personal use and acknowledged the significant amount taken. She was charged with theft by unauthorized taking or transfer and forgery, pleaded not guilty, and proceeded to a jury trial.

Prior to trial, the defendant sought access to the company’s QuickBooks password through a motion to compel discovery, which she later withdrew. She subsequently moved to suppress her confession as involuntary, but the Unified Criminal Docket (Piscataquis County, Roberts, J.) denied the motion after a hearing. Additional pretrial motions included a request for the trial judge’s recusal, based on his prior professional association with the prosecutor, and a motion to exclude financial evidence due to the State’s failure to produce the QuickBooks password. Both motions were denied. At trial, the prosecution presented testimonial, documentary, and video evidence, including the defendant’s confession. The jury found her guilty on both counts, and she was sentenced to concurrent prison terms, with part of the sentence suspended and probation imposed.

On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed claims of prosecutorial error, denial of recusal, and alleged discovery violations. The Court held that although some prosecutorial statements constituted error, these were harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant’s own confession. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in denying recusal or in rulings regarding discovery, concluding the State was not obligated to produce information it did not possess. The conviction was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Maine</case:state>
						<case:court>Maine Supreme Judicial Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Rick E. Lawrence</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="Maine Supreme Judicial Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4076/24-4076-2026-01-21.html</id>
        	<title>Moxie Pest Control (Utah) v. Nielsen</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-21T14:31:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-21T14:31:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4076/24-4076-2026-01-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of affiliated pest-control companies discovered that employees of a competing firm, Aptive Environmental, LLC, had bribed members of their organization to obtain confidential sales data stored in a password-protected system. The misappropriated data was allegedly used by Aptive to recruit sales representatives for the competitive summer sales season, an activity crucial to both businesses’ revenue. Upon learning of these actions, the companies sued Aptive and several individual employees, asserting claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), and Utah’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).

The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the CFAA claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded the statutory loss requirement, specifically a loss from technological harm. The court denied motions to compel broad discovery into damages, limiting disclosures but allowing the possibility of further tailored discovery. On summary judgment, the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of causation linking Aptive’s alleged misappropriation to unjust enrichment, granting judgment for Aptive on the RICO, DTSA, and UTSA claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed these decisions. It held that the district court erred in dismissing the CFAA claim, clarifying that the statute does not require loss from technological harm and that investigative costs can qualify as statutory losses. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of broad discovery, finding no abuse of discretion. Regarding summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the outcome for the RICO claim due to lack of causation evidence but reversed in part for the DTSA and UTSA claims, holding that reasonable royalties and injunctive relief do not require the same proof of causation as unjust enrichment. The CFAA, DTSA, and UTSA claims were remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-4076/24-4076-2026-01-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Moxie Pest Control (Utah) v. Nielsen" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of affiliated pest-control companies discovered that employees of a competing firm, Aptive Environmental, LLC, had bribed members of their organization to obtain confidential sales data stored in a password-protected system. The misappropriated data was allegedly used by Aptive to recruit sales representatives for the competitive summer sales season, an activity crucial to both businesses’ revenue. Upon learning of these actions, the companies sued Aptive and several individual employees, asserting claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), and Utah’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).

The United States District Court for the District of Utah initially dismissed the CFAA claim, concluding that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded the statutory loss requirement, specifically a loss from technological harm. The court denied motions to compel broad discovery into damages, limiting disclosures but allowing the possibility of further tailored discovery. On summary judgment, the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of causation linking Aptive’s alleged misappropriation to unjust enrichment, granting judgment for Aptive on the RICO, DTSA, and UTSA claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed these decisions. It held that the district court erred in dismissing the CFAA claim, clarifying that the statute does not require loss from technological harm and that investigative costs can qualify as statutory losses. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of broad discovery, finding no abuse of discretion. Regarding summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the outcome for the RICO claim due to lack of causation evidence but reversed in part for the DTSA and UTSA claims, holding that reasonable royalties and injunctive relief do not require the same proof of causation as unjust enrichment. The CFAA, DTSA, and UTSA claims were remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nancy Moritz</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2962/24-2962-2026-01-16.html</id>
        	<title>Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-16T07:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-16T07:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2962/24-2962-2026-01-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A businessman from Kazakhstan alleged that he was wrongfully detained and psychologically coerced by the country’s National Security Committee into signing unfavorable business agreements, including waivers of legal claims and a forced transfer of valuable company shares. The business at issue, CAPEC, operated in Kazakhstan’s energy sector and held significant assets, some of which were allegedly misappropriated by fellow shareholders and transferred through U.S. financial institutions. The plaintiff claimed these actions harmed him economically, including the loss of potential U.S.-based legal claims.

Following unsuccessful litigation in Kazakhstan, the plaintiff initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to invalidate the coerced agreements and recover damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Alien Tort Statute, and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff, as a permanent resident alien, could not establish diversity jurisdiction against foreign defendants, that the alleged torts occurred outside the U.S., and that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury required for civil RICO claims. The court denied leave to amend, determining that any amendment would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the matter de novo, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that claims against the National Security Committee were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as its conduct was sovereign rather than commercial. For the individual defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, as the harm and racketeering activity occurred primarily in Kazakhstan. The court further concluded that amendment of the complaint would have been futile. The judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2962/24-2962-2026-01-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A businessman from Kazakhstan alleged that he was wrongfully detained and psychologically coerced by the country’s National Security Committee into signing unfavorable business agreements, including waivers of legal claims and a forced transfer of valuable company shares. The business at issue, CAPEC, operated in Kazakhstan’s energy sector and held significant assets, some of which were allegedly misappropriated by fellow shareholders and transferred through U.S. financial institutions. The plaintiff claimed these actions harmed him economically, including the loss of potential U.S.-based legal claims.

Following unsuccessful litigation in Kazakhstan, the plaintiff initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to invalidate the coerced agreements and recover damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Alien Tort Statute, and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff, as a permanent resident alien, could not establish diversity jurisdiction against foreign defendants, that the alleged torts occurred outside the U.S., and that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury required for civil RICO claims. The court denied leave to amend, determining that any amendment would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the matter de novo, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that claims against the National Security Committee were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as its conduct was sovereign rather than commercial. For the individual defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, as the harm and racketeering activity occurred primarily in Kazakhstan. The court further concluded that amendment of the complaint would have been futile. The judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Sullivan</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-3120/24-3120-2026-01-14.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Grusd</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-14T14:00:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-14T14:00:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-3120/24-3120-2026-01-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Sean Grusd fraudulently persuaded multiple victims over two years that he was a successful investor, convincing them to entrust him with significant sums of money, including life savings and funds intended for their children’s education. He substantiated his misrepresentations with forged documents and ultimately used the money for personal luxury purchases. Grusd pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and acknowledged in his plea agreement that he had defrauded his victims of approximately $23,155,000. He agreed that restitution would be ordered in that amount, minus any funds repaid prior to sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, oversaw Grusd’s sentencing. The Presentencing Investigative Report, consistent with the plea agreement, recommended restitution of $23,155,000. During sentencing, the prosecutor noted that approximately $1.6 million had already been recovered from third parties, a representation to which Grusd’s counsel acquiesced and clarified as voluntary returns connected with civil matters. The prosecutor then confirmed that the updated restitution figure was $21,557,739, which the district judge ordered, with credit for any further payments. Grusd did not object to this calculation or the restitution amount.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Grusd challenged the subtraction of the $1.6 million credit from the agreed-upon total, arguing that the district judge erred by not substantiating the amount. The Seventh Circuit held that Grusd had waived his right to challenge the restitution credit by acquiescing during sentencing and failing to object. The court further held that, even if the claim was merely forfeited, Grusd could not meet the requirements for plain-error review. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-3120/24-3120-2026-01-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Grusd" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Sean Grusd fraudulently persuaded multiple victims over two years that he was a successful investor, convincing them to entrust him with significant sums of money, including life savings and funds intended for their children’s education. He substantiated his misrepresentations with forged documents and ultimately used the money for personal luxury purchases. Grusd pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and acknowledged in his plea agreement that he had defrauded his victims of approximately $23,155,000. He agreed that restitution would be ordered in that amount, minus any funds repaid prior to sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, oversaw Grusd’s sentencing. The Presentencing Investigative Report, consistent with the plea agreement, recommended restitution of $23,155,000. During sentencing, the prosecutor noted that approximately $1.6 million had already been recovered from third parties, a representation to which Grusd’s counsel acquiesced and clarified as voluntary returns connected with civil matters. The prosecutor then confirmed that the updated restitution figure was $21,557,739, which the district judge ordered, with credit for any further payments. Grusd did not object to this calculation or the restitution amount.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Grusd challenged the subtraction of the $1.6 million credit from the agreed-upon total, arguing that the district judge erred by not substantiating the amount. The Seventh Circuit held that Grusd had waived his right to challenge the restitution credit by acquiescing during sentencing and failing to object. The court further held that, even if the claim was merely forfeited, Grusd could not meet the requirements for plain-error review. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Rebecca Taibleson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20020/25-20020-2026-01-14.html</id>
        	<title>Allstate Indemnity Co v. Bhagat</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-14T10:30:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-14T10:30:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20020/25-20020-2026-01-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several entities affiliated with Allstate sued a group of individuals and entities that own, manage, and operate Memorial Heights Emergency Center in Houston, Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that, starting in 2018, defendants entered into agreements with personal injury attorneys to refer clients to the Center under letters of protection, guaranteeing future payment from insurance settlements. Defendants billed these patients—primarily car accident victims—using emergency billing codes at rates far above standard charges, often conducting expensive diagnostic tests without documented medical necessity and discharging patients without additional treatment. The bills were then sent to attorneys, who submitted them to Allstate for inclusion in settlement demands. Between August 2018 and November 2022, Allstate settled with 635 claimants and subsequently alleged it discovered a fraudulent scheme, seeking to recover $4.7 million plus treble damages and attorney fees.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all claims with prejudice. The district court held that Allstate failed to sufficiently allege reliance on the fraudulent bills, undermining its RICO, common-law fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and money-had-and-received claims. The court also found Allstate had not adequately pleaded direct or proximate causation, concluded that Allstate was “complicit” in the alleged fraud due to its continued settlements after learning of the scheme, and determined that the complexity of the case made it unmanageable as a single lawsuit.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards to Allstate’s RICO claims by requiring reliance, which is not necessary for a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud. The appellate court further found that Allstate adequately pleaded proximate cause, damages, and the elements of its common-law and equitable claims. The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20020/25-20020-2026-01-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Allstate Indemnity Co v. Bhagat" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several entities affiliated with Allstate sued a group of individuals and entities that own, manage, and operate Memorial Heights Emergency Center in Houston, Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that, starting in 2018, defendants entered into agreements with personal injury attorneys to refer clients to the Center under letters of protection, guaranteeing future payment from insurance settlements. Defendants billed these patients—primarily car accident victims—using emergency billing codes at rates far above standard charges, often conducting expensive diagnostic tests without documented medical necessity and discharging patients without additional treatment. The bills were then sent to attorneys, who submitted them to Allstate for inclusion in settlement demands. Between August 2018 and November 2022, Allstate settled with 635 claimants and subsequently alleged it discovered a fraudulent scheme, seeking to recover $4.7 million plus treble damages and attorney fees.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all claims with prejudice. The district court held that Allstate failed to sufficiently allege reliance on the fraudulent bills, undermining its RICO, common-law fraud, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and money-had-and-received claims. The court also found Allstate had not adequately pleaded direct or proximate causation, concluded that Allstate was “complicit” in the alleged fraud due to its continued settlements after learning of the scheme, and determined that the complexity of the case made it unmanageable as a single lawsuit.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards to Allstate’s RICO claims by requiring reliance, which is not necessary for a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud. The appellate court further found that Allstate adequately pleaded proximate cause, damages, and the elements of its common-law and equitable claims. The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stuart Kyle Duncan</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2495/24-2495-2026-01-09.html</id>
        	<title>USA v Cui</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-09T10:30:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-09T10:30:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2495/24-2495-2026-01-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Charles Cui was charged with bribery and related offenses after he attempted to secure the assistance of Edward Burke, a powerful Chicago alderman, in reversing a permit denial by the Chicago Department of Buildings (CDOB) regarding a pole sign at his commercial property. Cui’s financial interests were jeopardized by the permit denial, which threatened both a lucrative lease with Binny’s Beverage Depot and tax increment financing from the City. To influence Burke, Cui offered to retain Burke’s law firm for property tax appeal work, explicitly seeking Burke’s intervention in the CDOB matter.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over a six-week trial in which a jury convicted Cui on all counts: bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), violations of the Travel Act, and making false statements to the government. The district court admitted evidence over Cui’s objections, including a photoshopped photograph sent to the CDOB, and denied Cui’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. The court sentenced Cui to 32 months’ imprisonment and applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement for failing to produce key emails in response to a grand jury subpoena.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Cui’s challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and sentencing. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, that the jury instructions correctly conveyed the law’s requirements—including the quid pro quo element and the definition of “corruptly”—and that the admission of the photoshopped photograph was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found that the sentencing enhancement and the disparity between Cui’s and Burke’s sentences were justified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2495/24-2495-2026-01-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v Cui" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Charles Cui was charged with bribery and related offenses after he attempted to secure the assistance of Edward Burke, a powerful Chicago alderman, in reversing a permit denial by the Chicago Department of Buildings (CDOB) regarding a pole sign at his commercial property. Cui’s financial interests were jeopardized by the permit denial, which threatened both a lucrative lease with Binny’s Beverage Depot and tax increment financing from the City. To influence Burke, Cui offered to retain Burke’s law firm for property tax appeal work, explicitly seeking Burke’s intervention in the CDOB matter.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over a six-week trial in which a jury convicted Cui on all counts: bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), violations of the Travel Act, and making false statements to the government. The district court admitted evidence over Cui’s objections, including a photoshopped photograph sent to the CDOB, and denied Cui’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. The court sentenced Cui to 32 months’ imprisonment and applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement for failing to produce key emails in response to a grand jury subpoena.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Cui’s challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and sentencing. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, that the jury instructions correctly conveyed the law’s requirements—including the quid pro quo element and the definition of “corruptly”—and that the admission of the photoshopped photograph was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found that the sentencing enhancement and the disparity between Cui’s and Burke’s sentences were justified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Amy St. Eve</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5544/24-5544-2026-01-08.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Goldy</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-08T13:00:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-08T13:00:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5544/24-5544-2026-01-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A former elected county prosecutor in Kentucky’s 21st Judicial Circuit was charged with Honest Services Wire Fraud, violations of the Travel Act, and Federal Program Bribery. The charges stemmed from an arrangement with a young woman, M.H., who repeatedly faced legal troubles. Evidence showed that the prosecutor agreed to help her with matters such as getting warrants withdrawn, charges reduced, and release from jail, in exchange for sexual acts and explicit images. The FBI discovered the scheme, leading to federal prosecution. At trial, the government presented incriminating text messages, testimony from M.H., and law enforcement, while the defendant claimed he did not solicit images and that M.H. was assisting in investigations—a claim disproved by evidence.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky oversaw the jury trial, which resulted in convictions on all counts. The court sentenced the defendant to 41 months in prison and imposed supervised release conditions, including refraining from excessive alcohol use. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant challenged the exclusion of certain testimony about Kentucky law, sufficiency of the evidence on several elements, the federal funding nexus for the bribery charge, the supervised release condition, and the sentencing court’s refusal to consider “collateral consequences.”

The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate constitutional rights in excluding expert legal opinion testimony and that the jury was properly instructed on the meaning of “official acts.” The court found overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict, including proof of a quid pro quo and an interstate nexus. The federal funding requirement was satisfied by evidence that the state received sufficient funds. The supervised release condition and sentencing decisions were not plainly erroneous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5544/24-5544-2026-01-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Goldy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A former elected county prosecutor in Kentucky’s 21st Judicial Circuit was charged with Honest Services Wire Fraud, violations of the Travel Act, and Federal Program Bribery. The charges stemmed from an arrangement with a young woman, M.H., who repeatedly faced legal troubles. Evidence showed that the prosecutor agreed to help her with matters such as getting warrants withdrawn, charges reduced, and release from jail, in exchange for sexual acts and explicit images. The FBI discovered the scheme, leading to federal prosecution. At trial, the government presented incriminating text messages, testimony from M.H., and law enforcement, while the defendant claimed he did not solicit images and that M.H. was assisting in investigations—a claim disproved by evidence.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky oversaw the jury trial, which resulted in convictions on all counts. The court sentenced the defendant to 41 months in prison and imposed supervised release conditions, including refraining from excessive alcohol use. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant challenged the exclusion of certain testimony about Kentucky law, sufficiency of the evidence on several elements, the federal funding nexus for the bribery charge, the supervised release condition, and the sentencing court’s refusal to consider “collateral consequences.”

The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate constitutional rights in excluding expert legal opinion testimony and that the jury was properly instructed on the meaning of “official acts.” The court found overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict, including proof of a quid pro quo and an interstate nexus. The federal funding requirement was satisfied by evidence that the state received sufficient funds. The supervised release condition and sentencing decisions were not plainly erroneous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alice Batchelder</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3314/24-3314-2026-01-08.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Texidor</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-08T10:00:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-08T10:00:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3314/24-3314-2026-01-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Christopher Texidor was charged alongside several codefendants for participating in a large-scale drug trafficking organization that conspired to ship nearly 3,000 kilograms of marijuana from California to Pennsylvania using the United States Postal Service. Texidor used his business, Fastlane Auto Sales, LLC, and his residence to facilitate these activities. He recruited various individuals, including family members, to receive shipments and organized GPS tracking for parcels after noticing thefts. When the group determined a postal employee was responsible for stealing their parcels, Texidor and others organized violent acts to intimidate him, including drive-by shootings and theft of the employee’s vehicle containing drugs and a firearm. During searches, law enforcement discovered drugs, tracking devices, firearms, and cash at Texidor’s properties. Texidor was also separately indicted for wire fraud involving false Paycheck Protection Program loan applications, which he committed while on pretrial release.

Following a six-day trial in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, a jury convicted Texidor on most drug and firearm counts, but acquitted him of the cocaine charge and a related firearm count. Texidor later pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, with other fraud charges dismissed. The District Court considered both cases at sentencing, calculated a Guidelines range of 292–365 months, and imposed concurrent sentences: 292 months for the drug/firearm offenses and 240 months for wire fraud. The District Court struck one reference to cocaine from the Presentence Investigation Report but overruled objections to other references and applied a four-level leadership enhancement.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that recent changes to the Sentencing Guidelines do not prevent consideration of acquitted conduct when determining an appropriate sentence outside of Guidelines calculations. The Court found no clear error in applying the leadership enhancement and concluded that the aggregate sentence was substantively reasonable. Further, under the concurrent sentence doctrine, the Court declined to review the substantive reasonableness of the wire fraud sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3314/24-3314-2026-01-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Texidor" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Christopher Texidor was charged alongside several codefendants for participating in a large-scale drug trafficking organization that conspired to ship nearly 3,000 kilograms of marijuana from California to Pennsylvania using the United States Postal Service. Texidor used his business, Fastlane Auto Sales, LLC, and his residence to facilitate these activities. He recruited various individuals, including family members, to receive shipments and organized GPS tracking for parcels after noticing thefts. When the group determined a postal employee was responsible for stealing their parcels, Texidor and others organized violent acts to intimidate him, including drive-by shootings and theft of the employee’s vehicle containing drugs and a firearm. During searches, law enforcement discovered drugs, tracking devices, firearms, and cash at Texidor’s properties. Texidor was also separately indicted for wire fraud involving false Paycheck Protection Program loan applications, which he committed while on pretrial release.

Following a six-day trial in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, a jury convicted Texidor on most drug and firearm counts, but acquitted him of the cocaine charge and a related firearm count. Texidor later pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, with other fraud charges dismissed. The District Court considered both cases at sentencing, calculated a Guidelines range of 292–365 months, and imposed concurrent sentences: 292 months for the drug/firearm offenses and 240 months for wire fraud. The District Court struck one reference to cocaine from the Presentence Investigation Report but overruled objections to other references and applied a four-level leadership enhancement.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings. It held that recent changes to the Sentencing Guidelines do not prevent consideration of acquitted conduct when determining an appropriate sentence outside of Guidelines calculations. The Court found no clear error in applying the leadership enhancement and concluded that the aggregate sentence was substantively reasonable. Further, under the concurrent sentence doctrine, the Court declined to review the substantive reasonableness of the wire fraud sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cindy Chung</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-12101/23-12101-2026-01-07.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Barry</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-07T08:31:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-07T08:31:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-12101/23-12101-2026-01-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of individuals, including the appellant, participated in a scheme involving the use of stolen credit cards and fraudulent memberships at a warehouse store to purchase large quantities of cigarettes. The appellant served as the primary account holder for two business membership accounts and was a secondary member on two others. The scheme resulted in over $2 million in cigarette purchases. Following an 85-count indictment, the appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit credit card fraud, several counts of credit card fraud, and aggravated identity theft. After his codefendants pleaded guilty, the appellant proceeded to trial. During the trial, the government presented testimony from victims whose credit cards were used without authorization. The district court granted the appellant’s motion for acquittal on certain counts due to insufficient evidence, and the jury acquitted him on others, but found him guilty of the remaining charges.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia sentenced the appellant, holding him accountable for the total loss amount charged by all members of the conspiracy using the shared credit cards. This figure was calculated in the presentence report and included losses attributable to the codefendants, except for those counts where the appellant was acquitted. The appellant objected, arguing that he should only be held responsible for transactions he personally conducted, but the district court overruled his objection and imposed restitution matching the total loss amount.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court committed legal error by failing to make individualized findings regarding the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the appellant, as required under the Sentencing Guidelines. The appellate court vacated the appellant’s sentence and restitution order, remanding for resentencing with instructions to determine the loss amount based on the appellant’s own conduct and correct a clerical error in the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-12101/23-12101-2026-01-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Barry" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of individuals, including the appellant, participated in a scheme involving the use of stolen credit cards and fraudulent memberships at a warehouse store to purchase large quantities of cigarettes. The appellant served as the primary account holder for two business membership accounts and was a secondary member on two others. The scheme resulted in over $2 million in cigarette purchases. Following an 85-count indictment, the appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit credit card fraud, several counts of credit card fraud, and aggravated identity theft. After his codefendants pleaded guilty, the appellant proceeded to trial. During the trial, the government presented testimony from victims whose credit cards were used without authorization. The district court granted the appellant’s motion for acquittal on certain counts due to insufficient evidence, and the jury acquitted him on others, but found him guilty of the remaining charges.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia sentenced the appellant, holding him accountable for the total loss amount charged by all members of the conspiracy using the shared credit cards. This figure was calculated in the presentence report and included losses attributable to the codefendants, except for those counts where the appellant was acquitted. The appellant objected, arguing that he should only be held responsible for transactions he personally conducted, but the district court overruled his objection and imposed restitution matching the total loss amount.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court committed legal error by failing to make individualized findings regarding the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the appellant, as required under the Sentencing Guidelines. The appellate court vacated the appellant’s sentence and restitution order, remanding for resentencing with instructions to determine the loss amount based on the appellant’s own conduct and correct a clerical error in the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Embry J. Kidd</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-1167/23-1167-2025-12-22.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Holmes</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-22T12:02:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-22T12:02:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-1167/23-1167-2025-12-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani founded Theranos, a company that claimed its technology could run fast, accurate, and affordable blood tests using just a drop of blood. Holmes served as CEO, and Balwani as President and COO. They raised significant investments by making representations about the capabilities of Theranos’s proprietary devices, financial health, and business relationships. However, investigations revealed that the technology was unreliable, Theranos often relied on third-party devices, and its partnerships and finances were misrepresented to investors. Both Holmes and Balwani were indicted for conspiracy and wire fraud relating to investors and patients; they were tried separately, and each was convicted of multiple counts of fraud.

Proceedings were held before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Holmes was convicted on four investor-related counts, while Balwani was convicted on all counts, including those related to patients and investors. At sentencing, both were found responsible for losses to multiple victims and given lengthy prison terms. The district court also ordered them to pay $452 million in restitution to fourteen victims, finding that the money invested constituted the lost property.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution order. The panel held that while some testimony by former Theranos employees should have been treated as expert opinion under Rule 702, any error was harmless. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting a regulatory report, limiting cross-examination, or excluding certain hearsay statements. It rejected arguments of constructive amendment and Napue violations. The panel clarified restitution calculations under the MVRA, holding that the victims’ actual losses equaled their total investments, affirming the district court’s order. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-1167/23-1167-2025-12-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Holmes" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani founded Theranos, a company that claimed its technology could run fast, accurate, and affordable blood tests using just a drop of blood. Holmes served as CEO, and Balwani as President and COO. They raised significant investments by making representations about the capabilities of Theranos’s proprietary devices, financial health, and business relationships. However, investigations revealed that the technology was unreliable, Theranos often relied on third-party devices, and its partnerships and finances were misrepresented to investors. Both Holmes and Balwani were indicted for conspiracy and wire fraud relating to investors and patients; they were tried separately, and each was convicted of multiple counts of fraud.

Proceedings were held before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Holmes was convicted on four investor-related counts, while Balwani was convicted on all counts, including those related to patients and investors. At sentencing, both were found responsible for losses to multiple victims and given lengthy prison terms. The district court also ordered them to pay $452 million in restitution to fourteen victims, finding that the money invested constituted the lost property.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution order. The panel held that while some testimony by former Theranos employees should have been treated as expert opinion under Rule 702, any error was harmless. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting a regulatory report, limiting cross-examination, or excluding certain hearsay statements. It rejected arguments of constructive amendment and Napue violations. The panel clarified restitution calculations under the MVRA, holding that the victims’ actual losses equaled their total investments, affirming the district court’s order.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jacqueline Nguyen</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1475/24-1475-2025-12-19.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Robertson</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-19T14:30:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-19T14:30:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1475/24-1475-2025-12-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two Massachusetts State Police officers, Lieutenant Daniel Griffin and Sergeant William Robertson, were implicated in a years-long scheme involving fraudulent overtime billing between 2015 and 2017. Both routinely claimed pay for hours they did not work, either by arriving late, leaving early, or “double-dipping” by billing overtime for tasks performed during regular hours. They also encouraged subordinates to engage in the same practices. The overtime funds in question were supplied through federal grants meant to support highway safety initiatives. In addition to the overtime fraud, Griffin separately engaged in wire fraud relating to private school financial aid and tax fraud connected to a private security business.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over a jury trial, which resulted in convictions for both defendants on all counts related to wire fraud, theft of federal funds, and conspiracy. Griffin pled guilty to additional charges of wire fraud and tax falsification before trial. Sentences were imposed: Griffin received 60 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, substantial restitution, and forfeiture; Robertson received 36 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, joint and several liability for restitution, and forfeiture.

Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court reviewed a broad array of challenges. The First Circuit largely affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution orders. It found no reversible error in the district court’s handling of the constitutional challenge, sufficiency of the evidence, guidelines calculations, sentencing disparities, and restitution. However, the Circuit Court vacated and remanded the forfeiture order against Griffin, holding that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the full amount of financial aid received was “traceable to” fraud, as required by statute. All other aspects of the district court’s judgment were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1475/24-1475-2025-12-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Robertson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two Massachusetts State Police officers, Lieutenant Daniel Griffin and Sergeant William Robertson, were implicated in a years-long scheme involving fraudulent overtime billing between 2015 and 2017. Both routinely claimed pay for hours they did not work, either by arriving late, leaving early, or “double-dipping” by billing overtime for tasks performed during regular hours. They also encouraged subordinates to engage in the same practices. The overtime funds in question were supplied through federal grants meant to support highway safety initiatives. In addition to the overtime fraud, Griffin separately engaged in wire fraud relating to private school financial aid and tax fraud connected to a private security business.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over a jury trial, which resulted in convictions for both defendants on all counts related to wire fraud, theft of federal funds, and conspiracy. Griffin pled guilty to additional charges of wire fraud and tax falsification before trial. Sentences were imposed: Griffin received 60 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, substantial restitution, and forfeiture; Robertson received 36 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, joint and several liability for restitution, and forfeiture.

Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court reviewed a broad array of challenges. The First Circuit largely affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution orders. It found no reversible error in the district court’s handling of the constitutional challenge, sufficiency of the evidence, guidelines calculations, sentencing disparities, and restitution. However, the Circuit Court vacated and remanded the forfeiture order against Griffin, holding that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the full amount of financial aid received was “traceable to” fraud, as required by statute. All other aspects of the district court’s judgment were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2244/24-2244-2025-12-19.html</id>
        	<title>USA v Owens</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-19T08:00:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-19T08:00:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2244/24-2244-2025-12-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		De’Andre Owens was the subject of a controlled drug buy operation in Centralia, Illinois, on March 15, 2022. Law enforcement provided a confidential informant, Charlie Anderson, with money and recording equipment to purchase methamphetamine from Owens. The exchange occurred under police surveillance, but the recording device did not capture the transaction clearly. After the sale, Anderson was followed by Owens, prompting coordinated surveillance by detectives until Anderson safely rejoined them and turned over methamphetamine. While awaiting trial in jail for this offense, Owens attempted to bribe Anderson not to testify, orchestrating a series of calls offering Anderson $10,000 for his silence.

In July 2023, Owens was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on counts of distributing methamphetamine and witness tampering. At trial, several law enforcement officers and experts testified regarding the procedures used in the controlled buy and the subsequent investigation. The jury found Owens guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, classifying him as a career offender based in part on a prior state drug conviction. Owens had initially objected to the career offender enhancement but withdrew that objection at sentencing.

Owens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing errors related to expert testimony, jury instructions, handling of dual-role witnesses, and the career offender enhancement. The Seventh Circuit held that Owens forfeited or waived each argument. The court found no plain error in the admission of expert testimony, the inclusion of a witness in a jury instruction, or the handling of dual-role testimony, and concluded Owens had waived his objection to the career offender enhancement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2244/24-2244-2025-12-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v Owens" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                De’Andre Owens was the subject of a controlled drug buy operation in Centralia, Illinois, on March 15, 2022. Law enforcement provided a confidential informant, Charlie Anderson, with money and recording equipment to purchase methamphetamine from Owens. The exchange occurred under police surveillance, but the recording device did not capture the transaction clearly. After the sale, Anderson was followed by Owens, prompting coordinated surveillance by detectives until Anderson safely rejoined them and turned over methamphetamine. While awaiting trial in jail for this offense, Owens attempted to bribe Anderson not to testify, orchestrating a series of calls offering Anderson $10,000 for his silence.

In July 2023, Owens was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on counts of distributing methamphetamine and witness tampering. At trial, several law enforcement officers and experts testified regarding the procedures used in the controlled buy and the subsequent investigation. The jury found Owens guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, classifying him as a career offender based in part on a prior state drug conviction. Owens had initially objected to the career offender enhancement but withdrew that objection at sentencing.

Owens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing errors related to expert testimony, jury instructions, handling of dual-role witnesses, and the career offender enhancement. The Seventh Circuit held that Owens forfeited or waived each argument. The court found no plain error in the admission of expert testimony, the inclusion of a witness in a jury instruction, or the handling of dual-role testimony, and concluded Owens had waived his objection to the career offender enhancement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Amy St. Eve</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2310/24-2310-2025-12-15.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Smith</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-15T16:00:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-15T16:00:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2310/24-2310-2025-12-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two individuals who held leadership positions at a local public housing authority in South Bend, Indiana, orchestrated a scheme in which they collaborated with several contractors to submit false invoices for maintenance work that was never performed. The contractors cashed checks issued by the housing authority for these fictitious services and shared the proceeds with the two employees. This fraudulent activity came to light after a casino employee observed the pair gambling large amounts of cash and reported the suspicious behavior to law enforcement. Following an investigation, both individuals were indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, several counts of bank fraud, wire fraud, and federal program theft.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana presided over their trial. After the government presented its case, both defendants moved for judgments of acquittal on the wire fraud charges; the court reserved ruling, and the jury ultimately convicted both individuals on the majority of counts, although one was acquitted on a wire fraud count. The district court denied the motions for acquittal, imposed prison sentences, and ordered substantial restitution. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the appeals. It held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the bank fraud convictions because the government failed to prove that any false statement was made to a bank, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), and therefore reversed those convictions. However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the wire fraud convictions, finding that a rational jury could conclude the fraudulent scheme furthered the transmission of funds via interstate wire. The court also affirmed one defendant’s sentence enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, finding no clear error or harmless error. The case was remanded solely to correct a clerical error in the restitution order. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2310/24-2310-2025-12-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two individuals who held leadership positions at a local public housing authority in South Bend, Indiana, orchestrated a scheme in which they collaborated with several contractors to submit false invoices for maintenance work that was never performed. The contractors cashed checks issued by the housing authority for these fictitious services and shared the proceeds with the two employees. This fraudulent activity came to light after a casino employee observed the pair gambling large amounts of cash and reported the suspicious behavior to law enforcement. Following an investigation, both individuals were indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, several counts of bank fraud, wire fraud, and federal program theft.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana presided over their trial. After the government presented its case, both defendants moved for judgments of acquittal on the wire fraud charges; the court reserved ruling, and the jury ultimately convicted both individuals on the majority of counts, although one was acquitted on a wire fraud count. The district court denied the motions for acquittal, imposed prison sentences, and ordered substantial restitution. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the appeals. It held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the bank fraud convictions because the government failed to prove that any false statement was made to a bank, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), and therefore reversed those convictions. However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the wire fraud convictions, finding that a rational jury could conclude the fraudulent scheme furthered the transmission of funds via interstate wire. The court also affirmed one defendant’s sentence enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, finding no clear error or harmless error. The case was remanded solely to correct a clerical error in the restitution order.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael Scudder</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-40621/23-40621-2025-12-10.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Page</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-10T13:31:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-10T13:31:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-40621/23-40621-2025-12-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two brothers sought multimillion-dollar loans from a bank to fund oil and gas investments. Because the bank required collateral, one brother arranged for a third party to create fraudulent documents making it appear that a securities account was worth millions. The brothers paid the third party for these fake statements, and, over several years, borrowed millions from the bank. They used some of the loan proceeds for improper purposes, including personal expenses and paying for the fake account statements. The bank eventually discovered the fraud after questioning the third party, who confessed and cooperated with the government, leading to indictments for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering.

Prior to trial, the case was assigned to a district judge who had previously represented the victim bank in unrelated civil matters. One brother pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud before trial, while the other, Phillip, went to trial. The district court denied motions to dismiss the indictment, sever the defendants, and for the judge’s recusal. It also admitted certain evidence and denied several of Phillip’s proposed jury instructions. After a jury found Phillip guilty on all counts, he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and supervised release. He appealed, raising issues related to the judge’s recusal, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial delay, instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district judge was not required to recuse himself due to his prior, unrelated representation of the bank. The court found no reversible error in the handling of co-conspirators’ pleas or other evidentiary rulings, found no grounds for dismissal due to prosecutorial delay, and held that the jury instructions were adequate. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions and rejected the cumulative error argument. The convictions were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-40621/23-40621-2025-12-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Page" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two brothers sought multimillion-dollar loans from a bank to fund oil and gas investments. Because the bank required collateral, one brother arranged for a third party to create fraudulent documents making it appear that a securities account was worth millions. The brothers paid the third party for these fake statements, and, over several years, borrowed millions from the bank. They used some of the loan proceeds for improper purposes, including personal expenses and paying for the fake account statements. The bank eventually discovered the fraud after questioning the third party, who confessed and cooperated with the government, leading to indictments for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and money laundering.

Prior to trial, the case was assigned to a district judge who had previously represented the victim bank in unrelated civil matters. One brother pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud before trial, while the other, Phillip, went to trial. The district court denied motions to dismiss the indictment, sever the defendants, and for the judge’s recusal. It also admitted certain evidence and denied several of Phillip’s proposed jury instructions. After a jury found Phillip guilty on all counts, he was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and supervised release. He appealed, raising issues related to the judge’s recusal, evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial delay, instructions, and sufficiency of the evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district judge was not required to recuse himself due to his prior, unrelated representation of the bank. The court found no reversible error in the handling of co-conspirators’ pleas or other evidentiary rulings, found no grounds for dismissal due to prosecutorial delay, and held that the jury instructions were adequate. The court also found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions and rejected the cumulative error argument. The convictions were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leslie Southwick</case:judge>
													<category term="Banking"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3216/23-3216-2025-12-10.html</id>
        	<title>USA v Sabaini</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-10T08:00:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-10T08:00:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3216/23-3216-2025-12-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A special agent with Homeland Security Investigations was discovered to have stolen money from criminal targets, embezzled agency funds, and entered into a cash-for-protection arrangement with a confidential source. The agent’s conduct came to light after the confidential source was arrested by the DEA, and text messages between the two were uncovered. Investigators found that the agent deleted incriminating messages, misappropriated cash from drug dealers and agency sources, manipulated controlled buys for personal gain, and protected his source from law enforcement scrutiny. The agent was also shown to have structured cash deposits to evade bank reporting requirements and failed to report significant taxable income.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, conducted a thirteen-day jury trial in 2023. The jury found the agent guilty on all counts, including filing false tax returns, structuring cash transactions, and concealing material facts from the government. The district court denied the agent’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial, then imposed sentence. The agent appealed, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict on all counts. The evidence included direct and indirect proof of unreported income, clear indications of structuring to evade reporting requirements, and material omissions on government forms. The court found no grounds to disturb the jury’s credibility determinations or the district court’s denial of post-trial motions. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3216/23-3216-2025-12-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v Sabaini" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A special agent with Homeland Security Investigations was discovered to have stolen money from criminal targets, embezzled agency funds, and entered into a cash-for-protection arrangement with a confidential source. The agent’s conduct came to light after the confidential source was arrested by the DEA, and text messages between the two were uncovered. Investigators found that the agent deleted incriminating messages, misappropriated cash from drug dealers and agency sources, manipulated controlled buys for personal gain, and protected his source from law enforcement scrutiny. The agent was also shown to have structured cash deposits to evade bank reporting requirements and failed to report significant taxable income.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, conducted a thirteen-day jury trial in 2023. The jury found the agent guilty on all counts, including filing false tax returns, structuring cash transactions, and concealing material facts from the government. The district court denied the agent’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial, then imposed sentence. The agent appealed, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict on all counts. The evidence included direct and indirect proof of unreported income, clear indications of structuring to evade reporting requirements, and material omissions on government forms. The court found no grounds to disturb the jury’s credibility determinations or the district court’s denial of post-trial motions. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joshua Kolar</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-3017/23-3017-2025-12-09.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Eddings</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-09T10:00:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-09T10:00:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-3017/23-3017-2025-12-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An employee was hired by a nonprofit organization to help organize a fundraiser and was given access to a board member’s email account for work purposes. After a dispute about the nature of her employment, the employee resigned and requested payment for her services, but the organization stopped communicating with her and did not pay. The former employee, still having technical access to the email account, began accessing it, downloaded internal documents, and sent them to a friend. The friend subsequently threatened the organization with releasing these documents unless both were paid substantial sums. The organization eventually revoked the employee’s access and reported the matter to the authorities.

A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted both individuals on several counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which prohibits intentionally accessing a computer “without authorization.” At trial, the prosecution’s theory was that the employee’s resignation automatically ended her authorization to access the email account, making her subsequent access a crime. The district court denied defense motions for acquittal and a new trial, the latter of which challenged both the jury instructions on authorization and the prosecutor’s remarks about extortion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, in the absence of any evidence the organization took affirmative steps to revoke the employee’s authorization—or any contract linking authorization to employment—the mere act of resignation did not terminate authorization under the CFAA. The court found the jury instruction on authorization erroneous and determined there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and ordered a judgment of acquittal. The court also found that any improper remarks by the prosecutor were harmless given the curative instructions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-3017/23-3017-2025-12-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Eddings" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An employee was hired by a nonprofit organization to help organize a fundraiser and was given access to a board member’s email account for work purposes. After a dispute about the nature of her employment, the employee resigned and requested payment for her services, but the organization stopped communicating with her and did not pay. The former employee, still having technical access to the email account, began accessing it, downloaded internal documents, and sent them to a friend. The friend subsequently threatened the organization with releasing these documents unless both were paid substantial sums. The organization eventually revoked the employee’s access and reported the matter to the authorities.

A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted both individuals on several counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which prohibits intentionally accessing a computer “without authorization.” At trial, the prosecution’s theory was that the employee’s resignation automatically ended her authorization to access the email account, making her subsequent access a crime. The district court denied defense motions for acquittal and a new trial, the latter of which challenged both the jury instructions on authorization and the prosecutor’s remarks about extortion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, in the absence of any evidence the organization took affirmative steps to revoke the employee’s authorization—or any contract linking authorization to employment—the mere act of resignation did not terminate authorization under the CFAA. The court found the jury instruction on authorization erroneous and determined there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and ordered a judgment of acquittal. The court also found that any improper remarks by the prosecutor were harmless given the curative instructions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Thomas Ambro</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10644/24-10644-2025-12-08.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Kirchner</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-08T16:30:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-08T16:30:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10644/24-10644-2025-12-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Christopher Kirchner, the founder and CEO of a Dallas-based logistics software startup, raised substantial funds from investors over several rounds of stock offerings. While some of these funds were used for legitimate business expenses, Kirchner misappropriated millions for personal use, including luxury purchases such as private jet charters and stadium suites. To secure additional investments and conceal his misuse of earlier funds, Kirchner made false statements about the company’s financial health and fabricated documents. When the company began missing payroll, he launched another unauthorized funding round and continued his pattern of deception. Eventually, internal scrutiny and investor complaints led to his suspension and termination, and the company was forced to liquidate.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas presided over Kirchner’s trial, where a jury convicted him on four counts of wire fraud and seven counts of money laundering. The district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison and issued a Presentence Report applying the money-laundering Guideline with an abuse-of-trust enhancement, resulting in a higher offense level. Kirchner appealed, arguing that the district court’s questioning of witnesses showed judicial bias, that there was insufficient evidence to support two wire fraud convictions, and that there were errors in the sentencing calculations, including the application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement and the calculation of loss amounts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court’s questioning did not amount to plain error or violate due process, as its interventions were limited and the jury received proper instructions. The evidence was sufficient to support all convictions, including the challenged wire fraud counts. The court also affirmed the sentencing approach, concluding that the abuse-of-trust enhancement properly applied and that the loss calculation was reasonable. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Kirchner’s conviction and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10644/24-10644-2025-12-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Kirchner" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Christopher Kirchner, the founder and CEO of a Dallas-based logistics software startup, raised substantial funds from investors over several rounds of stock offerings. While some of these funds were used for legitimate business expenses, Kirchner misappropriated millions for personal use, including luxury purchases such as private jet charters and stadium suites. To secure additional investments and conceal his misuse of earlier funds, Kirchner made false statements about the company’s financial health and fabricated documents. When the company began missing payroll, he launched another unauthorized funding round and continued his pattern of deception. Eventually, internal scrutiny and investor complaints led to his suspension and termination, and the company was forced to liquidate.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas presided over Kirchner’s trial, where a jury convicted him on four counts of wire fraud and seven counts of money laundering. The district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison and issued a Presentence Report applying the money-laundering Guideline with an abuse-of-trust enhancement, resulting in a higher offense level. Kirchner appealed, arguing that the district court’s questioning of witnesses showed judicial bias, that there was insufficient evidence to support two wire fraud convictions, and that there were errors in the sentencing calculations, including the application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement and the calculation of loss amounts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court’s questioning did not amount to plain error or violate due process, as its interventions were limited and the jury received proper instructions. The evidence was sufficient to support all convictions, including the challenged wire fraud counts. The court also affirmed the sentencing approach, concluding that the abuse-of-trust enhancement properly applied and that the loss calculation was reasonable. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Kirchner’s conviction and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6333/23-6333-2025-12-05.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. NG CHONG HWA</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-05T07:30:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-05T07:30:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6333/23-6333-2025-12-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Malaysian national who worked as a managing director for Goldman Sachs in Malaysia was prosecuted for his role in a large-scale financial scheme involving 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a Malaysian state-owned investment fund. The government presented evidence showing that, along with other conspirators, he participated in three major bond offerings raising $6.5 billion, from which more than $2.5 billion was diverted for bribes and kickbacks to officials and participants, including himself. The funds were laundered through shell companies, and the defendant received $35.1 million that was deposited in an account controlled by his family members. The defendant’s wife asserted at trial that these funds were legitimate investment returns, not criminal proceeds.

Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied several motions by the defendant. The court rejected his arguments that the indictment should be dismissed for lack of venue, concluding that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy passed through the Eastern District of New York. The court also found that the government did not breach an agreement regarding his extradition from Malaysia, since the superseding indictments did not charge new offenses. The district court excluded a video recording offered by the defense as inadmissible hearsay, and ultimately, a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $35.1 million.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued improper venue, breach of extradition agreement, erroneous exclusion of evidence, and that the forfeiture was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the district court had not erred in any respect. Venue was proper, the extradition agreement was not breached, the evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion, and the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the offense. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and forfeiture order were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6333/23-6333-2025-12-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. NG CHONG HWA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Malaysian national who worked as a managing director for Goldman Sachs in Malaysia was prosecuted for his role in a large-scale financial scheme involving 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a Malaysian state-owned investment fund. The government presented evidence showing that, along with other conspirators, he participated in three major bond offerings raising $6.5 billion, from which more than $2.5 billion was diverted for bribes and kickbacks to officials and participants, including himself. The funds were laundered through shell companies, and the defendant received $35.1 million that was deposited in an account controlled by his family members. The defendant’s wife asserted at trial that these funds were legitimate investment returns, not criminal proceeds.

Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied several motions by the defendant. The court rejected his arguments that the indictment should be dismissed for lack of venue, concluding that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy passed through the Eastern District of New York. The court also found that the government did not breach an agreement regarding his extradition from Malaysia, since the superseding indictments did not charge new offenses. The district court excluded a video recording offered by the defense as inadmissible hearsay, and ultimately, a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $35.1 million.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued improper venue, breach of extradition agreement, erroneous exclusion of evidence, and that the forfeiture was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the district court had not erred in any respect. Venue was proper, the extradition agreement was not breached, the evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion, and the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the offense. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and forfeiture order were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Amalya Kearse</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1421/24-1421-2025-12-04.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Ross</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-04T07:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-04T07:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1421/24-1421-2025-12-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In October 2021, a Florida attorney, Ross, held a trust account at Regions Bank that received a $29.6 million wire transfer, the result of a business email compromise fraud perpetrated on a company called Phoenix. Most of the funds were rapidly transferred out of the account, with some recalled by the bank. Federal authorities seized approximately $4.9 million remaining or recovered from the account and initiated a civil forfeiture action, alleging the funds were proceeds of fraud or involved in money laundering.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York oversaw the initial proceedings. Ross filed a verified claim to $1.21 million of the seized funds, asserting they were legitimate client funds or proceeds from his home sale, but made no claim to the remaining $3.69 million. Another claimant, Phoenix, also asserted interest in the $1.21 million. The district court entered default judgment forfeiting the unclaimed $3.69 million to the government, dismissed without prejudice the forfeiture proceedings as to the $1.21 million, and issued a certificate of reasonable cause for the seizure. It denied Ross’s subsequent motion for attorney fees, costs, and interest under CAFRA, finding he did not “substantially prevail,” and denied reconsideration.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Ross lacked standing to contest the forfeiture of the $3.69 million because he had not filed a claim as to those funds. The court rejected Ross’s due process challenge to the stay of proceedings, finding the delay reasonable, and upheld the denial of attorney fees, costs, and interest, concluding that dismissal without prejudice did not make Ross a prevailing party under CAFRA. The court also found no abuse of discretion in dismissing the forfeiture action without prejudice. However, the Second Circuit vacated the issuance of a certificate of reasonable cause, as no judgment for Ross had been entered. All other aspects of the district court’s judgments were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1421/24-1421-2025-12-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Ross" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In October 2021, a Florida attorney, Ross, held a trust account at Regions Bank that received a $29.6 million wire transfer, the result of a business email compromise fraud perpetrated on a company called Phoenix. Most of the funds were rapidly transferred out of the account, with some recalled by the bank. Federal authorities seized approximately $4.9 million remaining or recovered from the account and initiated a civil forfeiture action, alleging the funds were proceeds of fraud or involved in money laundering.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York oversaw the initial proceedings. Ross filed a verified claim to $1.21 million of the seized funds, asserting they were legitimate client funds or proceeds from his home sale, but made no claim to the remaining $3.69 million. Another claimant, Phoenix, also asserted interest in the $1.21 million. The district court entered default judgment forfeiting the unclaimed $3.69 million to the government, dismissed without prejudice the forfeiture proceedings as to the $1.21 million, and issued a certificate of reasonable cause for the seizure. It denied Ross’s subsequent motion for attorney fees, costs, and interest under CAFRA, finding he did not “substantially prevail,” and denied reconsideration.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Ross lacked standing to contest the forfeiture of the $3.69 million because he had not filed a claim as to those funds. The court rejected Ross’s due process challenge to the stay of proceedings, finding the delay reasonable, and upheld the denial of attorney fees, costs, and interest, concluding that dismissal without prejudice did not make Ross a prevailing party under CAFRA. The court also found no abuse of discretion in dismissing the forfeiture action without prejudice. However, the Second Circuit vacated the issuance of a certificate of reasonable cause, as no judgment for Ross had been entered. All other aspects of the district court’s judgments were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Reena Raggi</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-30068/22-30068-2025-11-28.html</id>
        	<title>USA V. DENCKLAU</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-28T09:00:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-28T09:00:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-30068/22-30068-2025-11-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two members of the Gypsy Joker Motorcycle Club were prosecuted for their roles in the kidnapping and murder of a former club member. The victim had previously been expelled from the club for theft, severely beaten, and later participated in a robbery at one defendant’s home. In retaliation, the defendants and other associates tracked down the victim, forcibly abducted him, and transported him to a remote location where he was tortured and killed. His body was subsequently found in a field. Both defendants held significant roles in the club, with one serving as chapter president and the other as a full member.

Following initial arrests on state charges, federal prosecutors obtained an indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The indictment charged both men with murder and kidnapping offenses under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, kidnapping resulting in death, conspiracy to commit kidnapping resulting in death, and for one defendant, racketeering conspiracy under RICO. Some co-defendants pleaded guilty, but the two appellants proceeded to trial. A jury convicted both on all counts except the racketeering conspiracy charge for one defendant. The district court sentenced each to concurrent life sentences.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that a VICAR indictment is sufficient if it tracks the statutory language, even without enumerating elements of the predicate state offense. The panel found no error in various evidentiary rulings, including exclusions of certain character evidence and expert testimony, as well as the admission of evidence regarding the club’s nature and culture. The court also upheld the jury instructions on VICAR purpose and consideration of punishment, and rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to mandatory life sentences, citing binding precedent. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-30068/22-30068-2025-11-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA V. DENCKLAU" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two members of the Gypsy Joker Motorcycle Club were prosecuted for their roles in the kidnapping and murder of a former club member. The victim had previously been expelled from the club for theft, severely beaten, and later participated in a robbery at one defendant’s home. In retaliation, the defendants and other associates tracked down the victim, forcibly abducted him, and transported him to a remote location where he was tortured and killed. His body was subsequently found in a field. Both defendants held significant roles in the club, with one serving as chapter president and the other as a full member.

Following initial arrests on state charges, federal prosecutors obtained an indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The indictment charged both men with murder and kidnapping offenses under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, kidnapping resulting in death, conspiracy to commit kidnapping resulting in death, and for one defendant, racketeering conspiracy under RICO. Some co-defendants pleaded guilty, but the two appellants proceeded to trial. A jury convicted both on all counts except the racketeering conspiracy charge for one defendant. The district court sentenced each to concurrent life sentences.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that a VICAR indictment is sufficient if it tracks the statutory language, even without enumerating elements of the predicate state offense. The panel found no error in various evidentiary rulings, including exclusions of certain character evidence and expert testimony, as well as the admission of evidence regarding the club’s nature and culture. The court also upheld the jury instructions on VICAR purpose and consideration of punishment, and rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to mandatory life sentences, citing binding precedent.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Milan Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1251/25-1251-2025-11-26.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. SpineFrontier, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-26T12:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-26T12:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1251/25-1251-2025-11-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A medical device company that manufactures spinal devices was indicted, along with its CEO and CFO, for allegedly paying bribes to surgeons through a sham consulting program in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The indictment claimed the surgeons did not provide bona fide consulting services, but were paid to use and order the company’s devices in surgeries covered by federal health care programs. The company’s CFO, who is not a shareholder but is one of only two officers, allegedly calculated these payments based on the volume and value of surgeries performed with the company’s devices. During the development of the consulting program, the company retained outside counsel to provide legal opinions on the agreements’ compliance with health care law, and those opinions were distributed to the surgeons.

After the grand jury returned the indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed whether the CFO’s plan to argue at trial that the involvement of outside counsel negated his criminal intent would effect an implied waiver of the company’s attorney-client privilege. The district court initially found that if the CFO or CEO invoked an “involvement-of-counsel” defense, it would waive the corporation’s privilege over communications with counsel. Following dismissal of charges against the company, the district court focused on whether the officers collectively could waive the privilege, concluded they could, and ruled that the CFO’s planned defense would constitute an implied waiver, allowing disclosure of certain privileged communications to the government. The district court stayed its order pending appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s waiver order and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that (1) the record was insufficient to determine whether the CFO alone had authority to waive the company’s privilege, and (2) not every involvement-of-counsel defense necessitates a waiver. The appellate court directed the district court to reassess the issue in light of changed circumstances and to consider less intrusive remedies before finding an implied waiver. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1251/25-1251-2025-11-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. SpineFrontier, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A medical device company that manufactures spinal devices was indicted, along with its CEO and CFO, for allegedly paying bribes to surgeons through a sham consulting program in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The indictment claimed the surgeons did not provide bona fide consulting services, but were paid to use and order the company’s devices in surgeries covered by federal health care programs. The company’s CFO, who is not a shareholder but is one of only two officers, allegedly calculated these payments based on the volume and value of surgeries performed with the company’s devices. During the development of the consulting program, the company retained outside counsel to provide legal opinions on the agreements’ compliance with health care law, and those opinions were distributed to the surgeons.

After the grand jury returned the indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed whether the CFO’s plan to argue at trial that the involvement of outside counsel negated his criminal intent would effect an implied waiver of the company’s attorney-client privilege. The district court initially found that if the CFO or CEO invoked an “involvement-of-counsel” defense, it would waive the corporation’s privilege over communications with counsel. Following dismissal of charges against the company, the district court focused on whether the officers collectively could waive the privilege, concluded they could, and ruled that the CFO’s planned defense would constitute an implied waiver, allowing disclosure of certain privileged communications to the government. The district court stayed its order pending appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s waiver order and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that (1) the record was insufficient to determine whether the CFO alone had authority to waive the company’s privilege, and (2) not every involvement-of-counsel defense necessitates a waiver. The appellate court directed the district court to reassess the issue in light of changed circumstances and to consider less intrusive remedies before finding an implied waiver.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Julie Rikelman</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1345/24-1345-2025-11-26.html</id>
        	<title>Al-Sabah v. World Business Lenders, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-26T11:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-26T11:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1345/24-1345-2025-11-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A member of the Kuwaiti royal family was defrauded by a Baltimore restaurateur, who convinced her to send nearly $7.8 million under the guise of investing in real estate and restaurant ventures in the United States. The restaurateur used the funds to acquire multiple properties, including a condominium in New York City and a home in Pikesville, Maryland, but secretly held ownership in his own name and for his personal use. After the fraud was uncovered, the investor sued the restaurateur for fraud and sought to impose a constructive trust over the properties purchased with her funds. Around the same time, she attempted to file a notice of lis pendens to protect her interest in the Pikesville property, but the notice was recorded against the wrong property and was thus ineffective.

During discovery, the investor learned that World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) had issued three loans to the restaurateur, each secured by properties acquired with her funds. She then filed suit against WBL in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that WBL aided and abetted the restaurateur’s fraud by encumbering the properties with liens, thereby hindering her ability to recover on any judgment. Following a bench trial, the district court found for WBL on two of the loans, but found WBL liable for aiding and abetting fraud in relation to the loan secured by the Pikesville home, awarding compensatory and punitive damages.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment for WBL on the first two loans but reversed as to the Pikesville loan. The Fourth Circuit held that WBL was not willfully blind to the restaurateur’s fraud in any of the loans as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for WBL on all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1345/24-1345-2025-11-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Al-Sabah v. World Business Lenders, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A member of the Kuwaiti royal family was defrauded by a Baltimore restaurateur, who convinced her to send nearly $7.8 million under the guise of investing in real estate and restaurant ventures in the United States. The restaurateur used the funds to acquire multiple properties, including a condominium in New York City and a home in Pikesville, Maryland, but secretly held ownership in his own name and for his personal use. After the fraud was uncovered, the investor sued the restaurateur for fraud and sought to impose a constructive trust over the properties purchased with her funds. Around the same time, she attempted to file a notice of lis pendens to protect her interest in the Pikesville property, but the notice was recorded against the wrong property and was thus ineffective.

During discovery, the investor learned that World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) had issued three loans to the restaurateur, each secured by properties acquired with her funds. She then filed suit against WBL in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that WBL aided and abetted the restaurateur’s fraud by encumbering the properties with liens, thereby hindering her ability to recover on any judgment. Following a bench trial, the district court found for WBL on two of the loans, but found WBL liable for aiding and abetting fraud in relation to the loan secured by the Pikesville home, awarding compensatory and punitive damages.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment for WBL on the first two loans but reversed as to the Pikesville loan. The Fourth Circuit held that WBL was not willfully blind to the restaurateur’s fraud in any of the loans as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for WBL on all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Agee</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13410/22-13410-2025-11-26.html</id>
        	<title>Trump v. Clinton</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-26T06:31:43-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-26T06:31:43-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13410/22-13410-2025-11-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Donald J. Trump filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against dozens of defendants, including Hillary Clinton, the Democratic National Committee, several law firms, and individuals, alleging that they conspired to spread false claims of his collusion with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump asserted multiple claims, including two under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and three under Florida law, such as injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution. He alleged that these actions caused him substantial financial harm and loss of business opportunities.

After extensive pleadings, the district court dismissed Trump’s amended complaint with prejudice, holding that his federal racketeering claims were untimely and legally insufficient, and that his state law claims either failed to state a claim or were also untimely. The court found the complaint to be a “shotgun pleading” and cited numerous factual inaccuracies and implausible legal theories. The court also dismissed claims against certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, but did so with prejudice. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on Trump and his attorneys for filing frivolous claims and pleadings, based both on its inherent authority and Rule 11, and denied Trump’s motions for reconsideration and to disqualify the judge.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that Trump’s racketeering claims were untimely and meritless, and that his state law claims failed for both procedural and substantive reasons. However, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over one defendant, Orbis, and therefore vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis, remanding with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. The sanctions orders and other rulings were affirmed, and requests for appellate sanctions were denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13410/22-13410-2025-11-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Trump v. Clinton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Donald J. Trump filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against dozens of defendants, including Hillary Clinton, the Democratic National Committee, several law firms, and individuals, alleging that they conspired to spread false claims of his collusion with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump asserted multiple claims, including two under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and three under Florida law, such as injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution. He alleged that these actions caused him substantial financial harm and loss of business opportunities.

After extensive pleadings, the district court dismissed Trump’s amended complaint with prejudice, holding that his federal racketeering claims were untimely and legally insufficient, and that his state law claims either failed to state a claim or were also untimely. The court found the complaint to be a “shotgun pleading” and cited numerous factual inaccuracies and implausible legal theories. The court also dismissed claims against certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, but did so with prejudice. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on Trump and his attorneys for filing frivolous claims and pleadings, based both on its inherent authority and Rule 11, and denied Trump’s motions for reconsideration and to disqualify the judge.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that Trump’s racketeering claims were untimely and meritless, and that his state law claims failed for both procedural and substantive reasons. However, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over one defendant, Orbis, and therefore vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis, remanding with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. The sanctions orders and other rulings were affirmed, and requests for appellate sanctions were denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Pryor</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
    </feed>

