Utilities Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

Otter Creek Solar LLC v. Public Utility Commission

2026-06-26T12:36:39-08:00

A company sought permission from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) to build and operate a solar facility. After the PUC denied this request, the company filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the decision had been made on grounds different from the proposal for decision, and later sought to serve interrogatories on the PUC Commissioners to determine if they had read the record as required by Vermont law. The PUC denied both motions, stating it had complied with statutory requirements, that Commissioners had sufficient opportunity to review the record, and that discovery from Commissioners acting in a quasi-judicial capacity was not permitted. After these denials, the company appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court regarding the underlying certificate denial and, separately, filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Chittenden Unit of the Superior Court under 3 V.S.A. § 809b, challenging the PUC's denial of discovery. The PUC moved to dismiss this complaint, asserting that § 809b did not cover orders denying discovery and that appeals of interlocutory PUC orders were governed by another, more specific statute. The Superior Court agreed, concluding it lacked jurisdiction, since § 809b only applies to orders compelling discovery, not those denying it, and that appeals from PUC orders must proceed directly to the Supreme Court under 30 V.S.A. § 12. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s dismissal de novo. It held that 3 V.S.A. § 809b does not authorize challenges to agency orders denying discovery and is limited to orders compelling action. Because the PUC’s order at issue denied, rather than compelled, discovery, the Superior Court was correct to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Otter Creek Solar LLC v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

In re Application of Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.

2026-06-25T05:04:42-08:00

Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) in 2021 for authority to increase its distribution rates, modify its tariffs, and adjust certain accounting methods. The utility also sought approval for an alternative-rate plan and to continue demand-side management (DSM) programs for commercial and residential customers. Following an investigation and objections from various parties, a joint stipulation was reached among Columbia, the commission staff, and several intervening parties. This agreement included a rate increase, a substantial increase in the fixed monthly charge for residential customers, and the elimination of DSM programs for non-low-income customers. Several groups, including the Environmental Law & Policy Center (ELPC) and the Citizens’ Utility Board of Ohio (CUB), opposed the stipulation. PUCO conducted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately approved the stipulation with certain modifications, finding it satisfied the three-part test for reasonableness of contested stipulations: it was the result of serious bargaining, benefitted ratepayers and the public interest, and did not violate important regulatory principles or practices. ELPC and CUB separately applied for rehearing, but the commission denied these applications by operation of law after a related Supreme Court of Ohio decision clarified the process for rehearing requests. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case on appeal. The appellants argued that the commission’s approval was unsupported by evidence, particularly criticizing the fixed charge increase and elimination of DSM programs for most customers. The court held that the commission did not err in approving the increased fixed monthly charge or in eliminating the DSM programs for non-low-income customers. It found sufficient support in the record for PUCO’s decision and concluded that the commission’s actions did not violate regulatory principles or prior precedent. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the commission’s orders. View "In re Application of Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

In re OVEC Generational Purchase Rider Audits Required by R.C. 4928.148

2026-06-25T05:04:41-08:00

Three Ohio electric-distribution utilities—Duke Energy Ohio, Dayton Power and Light (AES Ohio), and Ohio Power Company (AEP Ohio)—sought to recover from their retail customers the costs associated with their ownership interests in the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation (OVEC), a “legacy-generation resource” under Ohio law. Following the repeal of prior cost-recovery mechanisms, a new nonbypassable-rate mechanism called the Legacy Generation Resource (LGR) Rider was established pursuant to R.C. 4928.148, effective in 2019, to allow recovery of “prudently incurred” OVEC-related costs from 2020 onward. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) ordered an audit of the companies’ LGR Riders for the year 2020, as required by statute. After the audits, PUCO conducted a hearing and approved the audit findings, except for a recommended cap on capital expenditures. PUCO found that all costs and sales flowing through the LGR Riders for the audit period were prudent and reasonable, and it declined to disallow any costs. The Ohio Environmental Council (OEC) and the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association Energy Group (OMAEG) challenged these orders, arguing that the companies had recovered imprudent or unreasonable costs, that the Commission improperly excluded certain evidence, and that it did not apply the correct legal standards. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that the PUCO did not commit reversible error in approving the cost recovery. The court determined that PUCO provided sufficient record support and explanation for its decisions and did not violate statutory requirements. While the court found PUCO’s application of a presumption of prudence to be erroneous, it concluded that this did not result in reversible error, as the record showed the companies met their burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Commission’s orders. View "In re OVEC Generational Purchase Rider Audits Required by R.C. 4928.148" on Justia Law

Nguyen v. City of L.A.

2026-06-22T11:03:30-08:00

A utility company, Southern California Gas (SoCalGas), entered into a 2022 franchise agreement with the City of Los Angeles, allowing it to install, maintain, and operate its natural gas system under city streets. In exchange, SoCalGas agreed to pay the City a franchise fee equal to 5.5% of its gross receipts from natural gas sales within the City. Of this, 3.5% was passed to SoCalGas customers as a surcharge, which was later approved by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The franchise agreement was adopted after extensive, arm’s-length negotiations and CPUC review. A putative class action was filed by a customer, alleging that the surcharge component of the franchise fee constituted an unlawful tax under article XIII C of the California Constitution because it was not submitted for voter approval. The plaintiff argued the fee should have been apportioned between charges for physical use of city property and charges for the general business privilege, with the latter portion requiring voter approval. The Superior Court for Los Angeles County granted summary judgment for the City, finding the franchise fee, including the surcharge, exempt from voter approval as a charge for the use of local government property under section 1, subdivision (e)(4) of article XIII C. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the franchise fee, including the portion passed through as a surcharge, was not a tax within the meaning of article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(4), because it was compensation for the use of city property and not subject to voter approval. The Court further held that the fee did not need to be apportioned or shown to be reasonably related to the value of the franchise, but found that, even if such a requirement existed, the City met it through bona fide negotiations. View "Nguyen v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Zezula v. Brown

2026-06-17T05:00:03-08:00

In this case, a homeowner experienced property damage when sewage backed up into his residence after a sewer line was damaged during nearby excavation work. The excavation was initiated by a utility company, which hired an excavator to install a new underground electrical line following a neighbor’s complaint about electrical service. Before the excavation, the excavator notified MISS DIG Systems as required by law, which then informed local facility owners, including the township. The township responded that it did not have any facilities in the area and did not mark any sewer lines. The homeowner alleged that the township failed to comply with its duty under the MISS DIG Underground Facility Damage Prevention and Safety Act by not marking a township-owned sewer line, leading to his damages. The Oakland Circuit Court denied the township’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that governmental immunity did not shield the township from liability because the MISS DIG Act created an exception. The court also granted the homeowner leave to amend his complaint to assert a claim under the sewage disposal system event (SDSE) exception to governmental immunity, and set aside the notice issue for further briefing. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a governmental agency cannot be held civilly liable for monetary damages for a violation of the MISS DIG Act in circuit court, as the statute provides that the exclusive remedy is to file a complaint with the Public Service Commission. The Court also found that the trial court erred in granting the homeowner leave to amend his complaint to assert the SDSE exception before he demonstrated compliance with the statutory notice requirement. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts on these issues, vacated the grant of leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zezula v. Brown" on Justia Law

Midcontinent Independent System Operator Transmission Owners v. FERC

2026-06-05T07:33:21-08:00

A group of electric transmission companies operating within the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) region, along with the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC), challenged actions taken by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the rates charged to electricity customers. The dispute centered on the return-on-equity (Return) component of transmission rates, which compensates transmission owners for their investments. In 2013 and 2015, customers filed two complaints with FERC alleging that the Return was unlawfully high and violated the Federal Power Act's mandate for "just and reasonable" rates. FERC responded with a series of orders adjusting the Return and ordering limited refunds, but its methodology was challenged and ultimately vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, which remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, FERC issued new orders revising the Return, requiring Transmission Owners to provide refunds for the statutorily authorized 15-month period and, in light of the prior vacatur, ordering additional refunds from September 28, 2016 through October 17, 2024. FERC dismissed the second customer complaint after finding the revised Return was just and reasonable and declined to order additional refunds. Both Transmission Owners and LPSC sought rehearing, raising further objections to the refund periods and the methodology used to set the Return. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions. The court held that FERC acted within its authority in backdating refunds to align with the judicial vacatur, pursuant to FERC’s remedial powers under section 309 of the Federal Power Act. The court also found Transmission Owners lacked standing to challenge FERC’s consideration of the second complaint. LPSC’s objections to FERC’s methodology were rejected under the law-of-the-case doctrine and as lacking merit. The court denied in part and dismissed in part Transmission Owners’ petitions, and denied LPSC’s petitions for review. View "Midcontinent Independent System Operator Transmission Owners v. FERC" on Justia Law

Enterprise Products Operating, LLC v. Iowa Utilities Commission

2026-06-05T06:05:50-08:00

A company that supplies propane purchased a majority interest in another company’s pipeline and storage facilities in Iowa, believing all necessary permits were in place. However, it was later discovered that the company had operated for nearly twenty-one years without obtaining state permits required under Iowa law, though it complied with all federal safety permits. The confusion stemmed from earlier permits issued under a regulatory scheme that was later preempted by federal law and replaced by a new state permitting system. The company did not realize new permits were required after the changes in the statutory framework. After the Iowa Utilities Commission discovered the lack of permits, it ordered the company to show cause and eventually imposed a $1.8 million civil penalty. This amount was based on the Commission’s calculation that each of nine permits previously needed for different segments of the pipeline and storage facilities constituted a separate “related series of violations,” each warranting the statutory maximum penalty of $200,000. The company contested this, arguing that the statutory cap should apply to the entire set of violations collectively. The Iowa District Court for Polk County affirmed the Commission’s penalty, and the Iowa Court of Appeals also affirmed, finding that each missing permit was a distinct “related series” under the statute. The company sought further review. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the lower courts, holding that the statutory maximum civil penalty under Iowa Code section 479B.21(1) is $200,000 for any related series of violations, and that all violations arising from the company’s failure to obtain permits after acquiring the pipeline and facilities were a single related series. The Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation. View "Enterprise Products Operating, LLC v. Iowa Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.

2026-06-05T05:01:11-08:00

A public utility that provides natural gas service to approximately 450,000 customers in southwestern Ohio had long relied on propane caverns as a seasonal gas supply. After constructing a new pipeline, the utility retired the caverns and sought to recover the costs associated with their retirement—such as the remaining undepreciated value, decommissioning expenses, and the value of the remaining propane inventory—from customers through increased rates. The company had previously obtained approval to abandon the caverns and defer these costs as a regulatory asset, with the understanding that it would seek their recovery in its next base-rate case. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio reviewed the utility’s application to increase rates. After a hearing, the commission approved an agreement allowing the company to recover the full deferred amount, amortized over ten years as an operating expense. The commission determined that these costs were recoverable under Ohio Revised Code section 4909.15(A)(4) as a cost of rendering public-utility service, and not subject to the “used and useful” standard under section 4909.15(A)(1). The commission also found that, even if the latter standard applied, the costs would still be recoverable. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the commission’s order. The court held that the commission did not act unlawfully or unreasonably in permitting the utility to treat the deferred costs related to the retirement of the propane caverns as operating expenses recoverable under R.C. 4909.15(A)(4). The court further found that these costs were properly considered as current expenses necessary for the provision of utility service, distinguishing them from investment losses in facilities never placed into service. The court dismissed as moot arguments regarding alternative findings and rejected the request to make related rates subject to refund. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Citizens of the State of Florida v. Florida Public Service Commission

2026-06-04T07:03:28-08:00

A utility company serving multiple Florida counties sought approval from the Florida Public Service Commission for a four-year rate plan. As part of its petition, the company requested approval for two accounting measures: the Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism-Adjusted Depreciation Parameters (RSAM-ADP) and the Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism (RSAM). The RSAM-ADP would result in a reserve surplus, which the RSAM aimed to address. Additionally, the continued use of an acquisition adjustment related to a prior corporate purchase became an issue during the proceedings. The Public Service Commission received and considered various depreciation proposals from both the utility and the Office of Public Counsel (OPC), as well as testimony regarding the appropriateness and impact of the RSAM-ADP and RSAM. The Commission approved the RSAM-ADP, recognizing it would result in a reserve surplus, and then approved the RSAM as a corrective measure. The Commission also allowed the continued amortization of the acquisition adjustment until the utility’s next rate case. OPC filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed the Commission’s decisions to the Supreme Court of Florida. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed whether the Commission’s actions were consistent with its rules, policy, and prior practice, and whether its decisions were supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Court held that the Commission’s approval of the RSAM-ADP and RSAM was not inconsistent with the applicable depreciation rule, did not violate official policy or prior practice, and was supported by substantial evidence. The Court also found that the continuation of the acquisition adjustment was neither contrary to official policy nor lacking evidentiary support. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the Commission’s final and clarifying orders. View "Citizens of the State of Florida v. Florida Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Beckley Water Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia

2026-06-01T11:47:09-08:00

A privately owned water utility company provides water services to multiple customers in Raleigh and Fayette Counties, West Virginia. Near one of its service areas is an undeveloped tract of land known as the Appalachian Heights Site. The City of Mount Hope, a municipal water provider, received funding from the legislature, county commissions, and a developer to extend water service to this Site. After Mount Hope proposed annexing the Site, the utility company filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission (PSC), seeking to prevent Mount Hope from serving the Site, claiming exclusive rights to provide water there. Initially, the PSC’s chief administrative law judge found the Site to be within the utility company’s exclusive service territory, but no cease and desist order was issued. This recommended decision became final when no exceptions were filed. After Mount Hope annexed the Site, the utility company petitioned the PSC to reopen the case, seeking an order to enforce its exclusivity. The PSC reopened the matter, remanded for further proceedings, and eventually, after Mount Hope filed exceptions to a subsequent recommended decision re-affirming the utility’s exclusivity, the PSC found the Site to be in a “gray and overlapping” service area. This meant that future developers or customers at the Site could choose either provider. The utility company’s petition for reconsideration was denied. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed whether the PSC exceeded its statutory authority by reconsidering its prior decision and whether it properly found the Site to be in a gray and overlapping service territory. The court held that the PSC had authority to revisit its prior order and that, under applicable statutes and commission tests, the PSC’s finding that the Site was in a gray and overlapping service area was supported by the evidence. The court affirmed the PSC’s order. View "Beckley Water Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law

Dummer v. City and County of S.F.

2026-05-29T11:03:02-08:00

A licensed California fisherman sought public access to fish at the Calaveras Reservoir, which is owned by the City and County of San Francisco and managed by the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission. The reservoir, a source of drinking water for millions, is governed by a watershed management plan that currently prohibits public access and fishing. After the City determined that, subject to environmental review and regulatory approval, shoreline fishing could potentially occur without compromising water quality, it began planning for a fishing program, which included infrastructure improvements and compliance with environmental laws. Previously, in a related proceeding, the Alameda County Superior Court ordered the City to determine whether fishing could occur without affecting water purity, but it did not require the City to immediately open the reservoir or apply for a permit. The City complied by starting the environmental review and planning process. Dissatisfied with the pace, the fisherman filed a new petition for a writ of mandate, seeking to compel the City to immediately apply for an amended water supply permit and open the reservoir for fishing. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding no ministerial duty requiring the City to proceed immediately and concluding that legal requirements, including environmental review and program planning, must be satisfied first. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff had not established a clear ministerial duty requiring the City to immediately apply for a permit or open the reservoir for fishing. The court found that the governing statutes and regulations allow for the exercise of discretion and require compliance with environmental and permitting processes before fishing access can be provided. The judgment was affirmed. View "Dummer v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Vistra Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

2026-05-27T04:02:09-08:00

Several electric suppliers, previously licensed to operate in Connecticut, entered into a settlement agreement with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) in 2022. This agreement resolved an investigation into the suppliers’ regulatory compliance. Under the agreement, the suppliers agreed to withdraw from the state market, make certain payments, and provide documentation demonstrating their compliance with the state’s renewable portfolio standards (RPS) for 2022. PURA approved the agreement, and the suppliers submitted the required documentation, after which PURA confirmed their compliance and returned their security deposits. Subsequently, PURA initiated its annual uncontested proceeding to review all suppliers’ compliance with the 2022 RPS, as mandated by statute. The plaintiffs resubmitted their compliance documents. However, PURA determined the suppliers had not fully satisfied their RPS obligations due to discrepancies in load data calculations and ordered additional payments exceeding $1 million. The suppliers then sought a declaratory ruling from PURA, arguing they had fulfilled their obligations under the settlement, but PURA declined, citing the ongoing RPS proceeding. After PURA issued its final decision in the uncontested proceeding, the suppliers filed suit in the Superior Court, seeking both an administrative appeal and a declaratory judgment. The Superior Court dismissed both claims: the administrative appeal for lack of a final agency decision, and the declaratory judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the administrative appeal, finding that PURA’s decision in an uncontested proceeding was not a “final decision” subject to judicial review under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. However, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim. It held that the suppliers had exhausted their administrative remedies by seeking a declaratory ruling and participating in the RPS proceeding, and that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider their request for a declaratory judgment regarding the applicability of the relevant statutes to their circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the declaratory judgment claim. View "Vistra Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II

2026-05-22T07:41:39-08:00

Two North Carolina electric utilities sought approval from the North Carolina Utilities Commission to implement performance-based regulation (PBR), an alternative to traditional ratemaking, and to increase rates through multiyear rate plans (MYRPs). The General Assembly had enacted legislation authorizing PBR in 2021, aiming to allow utilities to adjust rates over a three-year period based on projected capital investments and to incentivize carbon emissions reductions. The utilities, Duke Energy Progress and Duke Energy Carolinas, filed applications with supporting testimony and proposals, prompting intervention from stakeholders including the Attorney General, industrial customer groups, and electric membership corporations. The parties contested issues such as interclass subsidization, electric vehicle (EV) charging revenue treatment, approval of projected future capital projects, allocation of fuel and transmission costs, and the authorized return on equity (ROE) for the utilities’ shareholders. Following evidentiary hearings, the North Carolina Utilities Commission approved both utilities’ requests for modified MYRPs, allowed a 10% reduction in interclass subsidies (less than what some intervenors wanted), permitted the exclusion of estimated residential EV charging revenue from decoupling mechanisms, and authorized certain projected capital projects as “known and measurable” for rate recovery. The Commission also discontinued the “equal percentage” methodology for allocating fuel costs, approving voltage-differentiated rates instead, and adopted a stipulation shifting some transmission costs from one utility to the other to mitigate customer rate disparity. ROEs of 9.8% for Duke Energy Progress and 10.1% for Duke Energy Carolinas were set, with the latter reflecting a shift in Commission membership and risk assessment. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether the Commission’s orders violated law, misinterpreted the PBR statute, or lacked evidentiary support. The Court held that the Commission properly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes, made sufficient findings supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, and did not abuse its discretion regarding subsidy reductions, EV revenue exclusion, capital project approval, fuel cost allocation, or ROE determinations. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in full. View "State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates II" on Justia Law

State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates III

2026-05-22T07:41:37-08:00

Two affiliated electric utilities sought approval from the North Carolina Utilities Commission to increase rates and implement performance-based regulation (PBR) under recently enacted legislation. The utilities submitted general rate case applications that included multiyear rate plans (MYRPs), which would permit preapproved rate increases over three years. Numerous parties, including the Attorney General, business groups, and electric membership corporations, intervened to challenge various aspects of the applications, including how the utilities allocated costs among customer classes, how revenues from residential electric vehicle charging would be handled, proposed capital spending projects, and the utilities’ allowed return on equity. The North Carolina Utilities Commission held extensive evidentiary hearings, with intervenors offering expert testimony and raising objections about statutory interpretation and factual sufficiency. The Commission issued final orders approving the MYRPs for each utility, making modifications to proposed subsidy reductions, excluding certain revenues from decoupling mechanisms to promote electric vehicle adoption, approving projected capital investments, and adjusting how fuel costs would be allocated among customer classes. The Commission also set new rates of return on equity for the utilities, noting changes in economic conditions and balancing interests of customers and investors. The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the appeals as of right. It held that the Commission correctly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes, including the PBR statute’s requirements for minimizing interclass subsidies and for cost causation. The Court found the Commission’s factual findings and legal conclusions were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. The Court also determined that the Commission’s process and explanations met statutory and constitutional requirements. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders in all respects. View "State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Indus. Grp. for Fair Util. Rates III" on Justia Law

Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

2026-05-14T04:02:46-08:00

An electric utility company sought to recover capital costs it incurred repairing damage from five catastrophic storms that hit Connecticut after it had entered into a settlement agreement with the state’s utility regulator. The settlement agreement, approved in 2018, established new base rates for the company from 2018 through 2020 and created a mechanism—called the new capital tracker—allowing the company to recover certain infrastructure investments. During negotiations, the parties amended the agreement to address storm-related costs, allowing the utility to seek recovery of these costs either in a future rate case or a separate proceeding. The utility initiated a contested case to recover storm operation and maintenance costs but did not seek review or approval of related capital costs at that time, instead seeking to recover those capital costs during an annual rate adjustment in 2021. The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), in its decision on the 2021 rate adjustment, denied the company’s attempt to recover over $17 million in capital costs related to storm repairs in its current base rates, reasoning that the settlement agreement did not unambiguously provide for such recovery and that approval of those costs should occur in a future rate case. The utility appealed. The Superior Court upheld PURA’s decision, deferring to PURA’s rate-making discretion and finding substantial evidence to support its action, without interpreting the disputed sections of the settlement agreement. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the matter and held that the trial court erred by not first interpreting the settlement agreement to determine whether it was clear and unambiguous before deferring to PURA’s discretion. The Supreme Court found the agreement to be ambiguous regarding recovery of storm-related capital costs and concluded that neither the administrative record nor extrinsic evidence resolved this ambiguity. The case was remanded for further proceedings to resolve the contractual ambiguities. View "Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

Friedman v. Central Maine Power Company

2026-04-29T21:00:04-08:00

A Maine resident who suffers from a rare and incurable form of blood cancer was a long-time customer of an electric utility that uses smart meters emitting radiofrequency signals to track electricity usage. After the utility received regulatory approval, it allowed customers to keep analog meters for an additional fee, citing health and safety concerns that had been raised but not resolved by the state public utilities commission. The resident, concerned that radiofrequency radiation might worsen his cancer symptoms, requested a waiver of the opt-out fee, supported by a letter from his oncologist. The utility denied the waiver, and after the resident refused to pay the fee, his electric service was disconnected. The resident sued in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair Housing Act. He also claimed the fee constituted an unlawful surcharge under the ADA. The district court denied the utility’s initial motion to dismiss but, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of the utility. The district court limited the resident’s expert witnesses to general, not specific, causation testimony, and excluded the opinions of his treating physicians as untimely disclosed expert testimony. The court found a lack of admissible evidence connecting smart meter radiation to the resident’s health, and held the opt-out fee was not an unlawful surcharge. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. It held that, without timely, admissible expert evidence of specific causation linking the smart meter’s radiation to a non-speculative risk of harm to the resident’s health, the resident’s claims could not survive summary judgment. The court also held that the opt-out fee was not a discriminatory surcharge because waiver of the fee was not required under the ADA. View "Friedman v. Central Maine Power Company" on Justia Law

In re Rev. of the Power-Purchase-Agreement Rider of Ohio Power Co. for 2018 and 2019

2026-04-29T05:33:45-08:00

A public utility company implemented a power-purchase-agreement rider connected to its contractual share in two coal-fired plants operated by a regional power corporation. This rider could result in either surcharges or credits to retail customers, depending on whether the market revenues from selling the plants’ output exceeded their costs. For the years 2018 and 2019, an independent auditor was hired to review the prudency of all costs and sales associated with this rider and to determine if the company’s actions served the best interests of retail ratepayers. The audit found that while the plants cost customers more than the market price for energy, the company's processes were generally consistent with good utility practice. The audit noted that the “must-run” strategy for plant operation might not always be optimal but considered other factors, such as employment and fuel diversity. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio previously authorized the rider and allowed cost recovery, subject to annual prudency audits. After the independent audit, the Commission held hearings at which parties, including consumer advocacy groups, challenged the prudency of the must-run strategy and raised concerns about the independence of the audit process. They argued that commission staff improperly influenced the auditor and sought to subpoena a staff member for testimony. The Commission denied the subpoena, finding that testimony from other witnesses covered the relevant issues and that the auditor’s independence was not compromised. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Commission’s findings and procedures. The Court held that the Commission did not commit reversible error in crediting evidence supporting the must-run strategy’s prudency, nor did it violate due process or its own rules by denying the subpoena, since the parties had ample opportunity to cross-examine other key witnesses. The Court also found the Commission was not required to apply an appearance-of-impropriety standard to assess the auditor’s independence. The Commission’s orders were affirmed. View "In re Rev. of the Power-Purchase-Agreement Rider of Ohio Power Co. for 2018 and 2019" on Justia Law

Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

2026-04-29T03:08:51-08:00

After a motor vehicle accident in Norfolk, Connecticut, downed electrical wires from a utility pole owned by an electric supplier trapped the vehicle’s occupants. First responders waited about an hour before the utility’s specialist confirmed the wires were de-energized, delaying rescue. The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) investigated the supplier’s response, conducted a hearing in which the supplier participated, and ultimately found the response imprudent. PURA ordered the supplier to adopt a thirty-minute target response time for certain life-threatening situations, among other directives. The electric supplier appealed PURA’s decision to the Superior Court, arguing that the investigation and hearing constituted a “contested case” under Connecticut’s Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, which would entitle it to judicial review. The Superior Court rejected this argument, finding that the statutes and regulations cited by the supplier did not require PURA to hold a hearing in these circumstances, and therefore the proceeding did not qualify as a contested case. The court dismissed the supplier’s administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the proceeding was not a contested case because no state statute or regulation required PURA to determine the supplier’s legal rights, duties, or privileges after an opportunity for a hearing in this context. The Court explained that references to statutes requiring hearings in other circumstances did not convert the proceeding into a contested case when the relevant factual predicates were absent. The holding also clarified that PURA’s decision to hold a hearing voluntarily, or to follow contested case procedures, did not create contested case status where no such hearing was legally mandated. Thus, PURA’s determinations and orders in this investigation were not subject to judicial review under the contested case provisions. View "Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

USA v. Madigan

2026-04-27T21:03:47-08:00

A longtime Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives was prosecuted in federal court for engaging in extensive bribery schemes. The first involved a major utility company, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), which, facing financial difficulties, funneled more than $3 million to the defendant’s political associates through intermediaries and sham contracts in exchange for the defendant’s legislative support of ComEd’s agenda over several years. The government presented evidence that these payments resulted in concrete legislative actions by the defendant that benefitted ComEd, including support for specific bills and regulatory changes. The second scheme involved the defendant’s agreement to recommend a Chicago alderman for a state board appointment in exchange for business referrals and benefits to the defendant’s family. Following a lengthy trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the jury convicted the defendant on several counts, including conspiracy, federal-program bribery, honest-services wire fraud, and Travel Act violations. The jury acquitted him on some counts and was deadlocked on others. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, then imposed a sentence of imprisonment and a substantial fine. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported each conviction and found no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, including those related to the definition of “official act,” “corruptly,” and the intent elements of bribery. The court also concluded that any potential instructional error regarding state law bribery under the Travel Act was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

2026-04-24T09:02:52-08:00

An electric supplier was granted a license to operate in Connecticut in 2007. In 2014, the state’s utility authority began a proceeding to redesign the standard billing format for residential customers, ultimately deciding in 2023 to allocate the costs of this redesign among all licensed electric suppliers, including this supplier. Meanwhile, in 2021, the supplier entered into a settlement agreement with the authority’s enforcement office and other state entities, agreeing to leave the Connecticut market for six years in order to resolve various alleged violations. After the cost allocation decision was issued, the supplier moved to withdraw its license, asserting it had no further obligations to the state. The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) denied the motion to withdraw the license without prejudice, instructing the supplier to pay the allocated assessment before the license could be relinquished. The supplier appealed to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, arguing that the denial was a final agency decision in a contested case or a declaratory ruling subject to judicial review. The Superior Court granted PURA’s motion to dismiss the appeal, finding that the denial was not a final decision in a contested case and that no declaratory ruling had been issued. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The Court held that the supplier had waived its argument that PURA’s denial was a declaratory ruling, since it had argued the opposite in the Superior Court. The Supreme Court further held that PURA’s denial of the motion to withdraw was not a final decision in a contested case because no statute required PURA to hold a hearing on such a motion. The Court also found that the assessment was not a civil penalty, so statutes requiring hearings before penalties did not apply. Thus, the trial court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

In re Complaint of Ohio Power Co v. Nationwide Energy Partners, L.L.C.

2026-04-22T05:01:59-08:00

A company engaged in electric submetering entered into contracts with the landlords of several apartment complexes, granting it the exclusive right to supply electricity to tenants. These tenants had previously purchased electricity from a traditional utility provider. The submetering company purchased electricity, installed and maintained the necessary distribution and metering equipment, billed tenants directly, set the resale price, and could disconnect service for nonpayment. It profited from the difference between its purchase and resale rates. The landlords received payments from the submetering company but did not control its operations. The utility provider denied requests to convert the complexes to a system allowing the submetering arrangement and filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), alleging the submetering company was operating unlawfully as a public utility. The submetering company counterclaimed that the utility provider’s blanket policy of denying conversion requests was discriminatory. PUCO concluded that the submetering company was not a public utility, reasoning that the tenants were not “consumers” under the statute and that the company was merely acting as the landlords’ agent. Based on this, PUCO denied the utility provider’s claims but ordered the utility to file a new tariff imposing conditions on the submetering company’s activities. PUCO also found in favor of the submetering company on one counterclaim. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the submetering company is “engaged in the business of supplying electricity to consumers” and thus meets the statutory definition of an “electric light company” and a “public utility” under Ohio law. Accordingly, the court reversed PUCO’s orders, vacated its tariff directive and counterclaim finding, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its holding. View "In re Complaint of Ohio Power Co v. Nationwide Energy Partners, L.L.C." on Justia Law

GANN v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA.

2026-04-21T08:42:02-08:00

A ratepayer challenged a final order issued by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission that modified the rates charged by a public utility, the Public Service Company of Oklahoma. The utility had previously been authorized to add a charge to customer bills to pay ratepayer-backed bonds issued in response to high costs from a 2021 extreme weather event, pursuant to the February 2021 Regulated Utility Consumer Protection Act. During the rate proceeding, the utility and several other parties presented evidence and entered into a settlement agreement, which was approved by the Commission. The appellant, who did not participate in the Commission proceedings, sought reversal of the final order on the grounds that the utility did not provide sufficient evidence of a required audit, and that a Commissioner should have been disqualified. The appellant also attempted a collateral attack on orders from earlier proceedings related to the winter storm charges. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission reviewed and approved the proposed settlement and the stipulated rates after testimony and public comment. The appellant did not object at any stage of the Commission’s process, nor did he submit evidence or raise the issues he later brought on appeal. After the final order was entered, the appellant filed an appeal directly with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, as permitted by the state constitution. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that while the appellant had standing as a ratepayer to appeal, the issues raised were not exhausted before the Corporation Commission and could not be considered for the first time on appeal. The Court further held that the appellant’s collateral attack on prior Commission orders was both procedurally barred and statutorily prohibited. The Supreme Court affirmed the final order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. View "GANN v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA." on Justia Law

Office of the People's Counsel v. District of Columbia Public Service Commission

2026-04-17T08:38:56-08:00

This case involves a challenge to the District of Columbia Public Service Commission’s approval of Potomac Electric Power Company’s (Pepco) 2024–2026 multi-year electric rate plan. The petitioners, the Office of the People’s Counsel and the Apartment and Office Building Association, objected to the Commission’s decision to approve a $123.4 million rate increase following a “legislative-style” hearing that did not permit the presentation or cross-examination of witnesses. The petitioners argued that the process failed to address significant factual disputes, particularly concerning the Effective Rate Adjustment (ERA) and Bill Stabilization Adjustment (BSA), mechanisms affecting rates for large commercial customers. They maintained that an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve these factual disagreements. The Public Service Commission, after receiving written testimony and briefs, denied requests for an evidentiary hearing and approved Pepco’s rate plan with modifications. It concluded that there were no material factual disputes necessitating cross-examination or oral testimony, and thus a legislative-style hearing was sufficient. The Commission also rejected applications for reconsideration, reiterating its view that the contested issues were either legal or policy-based rather than factual. However, there were substantial discrepancies between the parties’ calculations regarding the BSA deferral balances and concerns about the ERA’s impact on certain customer classes. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and determined that this proceeding was a “contested case” under the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act and that the Commission was required to hold an evidentiary, trial-type hearing because there were genuine disputes over material facts. The court held that the Commission’s failure to provide such a hearing rendered its orders unsustainable. Accordingly, the court vacated the Commission’s orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Commission to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "Office of the People's Counsel v. District of Columbia Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

In re Petition of VT Real Estate Holdings 1 LLC

2026-04-17T07:43:46-08:00

A group of residents opposed the construction of energy and telecommunications projects in Vermont by seeking to intervene in proceedings before the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC). The PUC granted certificates of public good (CPG) for both projects—one for a solar project and the other for a telecommunications tower. After these decisions, the intervenors filed timely motions under PUC Rule 2.221 to alter or amend the PUC’s orders. The PUC denied both motions, finding that Rule 2.221 incorporated the language of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and that the intervenors had not met the necessary standard for relief. The intervenors then appealed the denials to the Vermont Supreme Court. The developers moved to dismiss the appeals, arguing that the notices of appeal were filed more than thirty days after the PUC’s final decisions and were therefore untimely. They contended that PUC Rule 2.221 motions did not toll the time to appeal under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), as those rules reference only motions filed in the superior court and not with the PUC. The Vermont Supreme Court held that a timely motion to alter or amend filed with the PUC under Rule 2.221 is substantively the same as a Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion. The Court explained that, under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(5), such motions toll the time for filing an appeal from a PUC decision. The Court distinguished prior cases involving appeals from municipal panels, where the rules did not allow for tolling. Because the intervenors’ motions were timely and tolled the appeal period, the Court denied the motions to dismiss, allowing the appeals to proceed. View "In re Petition of VT Real Estate Holdings 1 LLC" on Justia Law

Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

2026-04-15T04:02:01-08:00

A licensed electric supplier in Connecticut sought to withdraw its electric supplier license after previously entering into a settlement agreement with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) to resolve various regulatory allegations. This agreement required the supplier to voluntarily stop serving customers in Connecticut for six years but did not expressly require the withdrawal of the license itself. Around the same period, PURA completed a cost-allocation proceeding related to the redesign of residential billing formats, and ordered the supplier to pay an allocated assessment of approximately $179,000. The supplier then moved to withdraw its license, asserting it had no further obligations, but PURA denied the motion without prejudice and directed payment of the assessment before considering license relinquishment. The supplier filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Britain, challenging PURA’s denial of its withdrawal motion. The supplier argued that the ruling was an appealable final decision in a contested case, or in the alternative, a declaratory ruling. The Superior Court granted PURA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the denial was not a final decision in a contested case because no statute or regulation required PURA to provide a hearing on motions to withdraw a license. The court also declined to treat the supplier's complaint as a declaratory judgment action. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed whether the denial of the motion to withdraw was appealable as either a final decision in a contested case or a declaratory ruling. The court held that the supplier had waived its declaratory ruling argument by taking the opposite position in the trial court. The court further held that PURA was not statutorily required to provide a hearing on a motion to withdraw a license, so the matter was not a contested case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Clearview Electric, Inc. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

BREAUX VS. WORRELL

2026-04-10T10:05:35-08:00

After Hurricane Ida struck Louisiana in August 2021, Terrebonne Parish, which operates Houma’s electric system, requested help from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to restore power. LUS, in turn, sought assistance from the City of Wilson, North Carolina, leading to mutual aid agreements signed by Terrebonne Parish, LUS, and the City of Wilson. As a result, thirteen City of Wilson employees, including Kevin Ray Worrell, traveled to Louisiana to assist with power restoration. These workers stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily to Houma. On September 10, 2021, while driving a City of Wilson vehicle back to the hotel after work, Worrell was involved in an accident, injuring the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs initially filed tort actions in the St. Mary Parish district court, which were consolidated and removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Worrell was entitled to immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (LHSEADA). The district court agreed, finding that Worrell acted as a “representative” of Terrebonne Parish under the statute and thus was immune from liability. The district court also determined that commuting from the work site fell within emergency preparedness activities covered by the Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana regarding the definition of “representative” under the LHSEADA. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Worrell, as an employee of the City of Wilson, North Carolina, working pursuant to mutual aid agreements that explicitly preserved his status as a City of Wilson employee and independent contractor, was not a “representative” of the State of Louisiana or its subdivisions for purposes of LHSEADA immunity. Therefore, he was not entitled to statutory immunity. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the second certified question. View "BREAUX VS. WORRELL" on Justia Law

SPECTRUM GULF COAST, LLC v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO

2026-04-10T06:18:24-08:00

A municipally owned utility in San Antonio owns power poles used for distributing electricity. Since 1984, a telecommunications provider (and its predecessor) has attached its equipment to these poles under a written agreement. The contract set a per-pole attachment fee, allowed for annual rate increases, and included a clause requiring both parties to comply with all applicable laws affecting their rights and obligations under the agreement. Over time, the utility charged one telecommunications provider higher rates, while continuing to invoice another provider at the original rate, resulting in a disparity in charges. After amendments to the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) in 2005 prohibited discriminatory pole attachment rates and required uniform and federally capped rates, the provider paying the higher fee sued, seeking relief for breach of contract and statutory violations. The trial court, after abating proceedings while the Public Utility Commission (PUC) considered the matter, granted partial summary judgment for the utility on statutory and unjust enrichment claims, but for the provider on the breach-of-contract claim. The utility appealed. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement did not incorporate new statutes into its terms, and thus the provider could not base its contract claim on the utility’s alleged statutory violations. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the parties’ contract—by its express terms—incorporated post-1984 legal changes affecting their rights and obligations, including the 2005 PURA amendments. The Court concluded that the provider could pursue its contract claim based on the utility’s alleged failure to comply with current law, including prohibitions on discriminatory and excessive pole attachment rates. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SPECTRUM GULF COAST, LLC v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law

Megatel v. Mansfield

2026-03-26T10:02:41-08:00

Two development companies owned land in Johnson County, Texas, within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Mansfield but outside the city’s corporate boundaries. To develop this land, the companies needed access to retail water services, which, under state law, could be provided only by the Johnson County Special Utility District (“JCSUD”) because it held the exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) for the area. However, a contract between JCSUD and the City of Mansfield required JCSUD to secure Mansfield’s written consent, which could be withheld at the City’s discretion, before providing water services within the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The developers’ efforts to obtain water service were unsuccessful, as Mansfield demanded annexation and additional fees, ultimately refusing to formalize an agreement. After unsuccessful negotiations and attempts to compel service through the Texas Public Utility Commission, the developers sued the City of Mansfield in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They alleged violations of the Sherman Act and brought state-law claims. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the antitrust claims with prejudice, holding that Mansfield was entitled to state-action antitrust immunity under Texas law, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether Mansfield was entitled to state-action immunity. The Fifth Circuit held that, although Texas law authorizes monopolies for water utilities through CCNs, it does not clearly articulate or authorize the City of Mansfield to act anticompetitively concerning the area in question, since the CCN belonged to JCSUD. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of state-action immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Megatel v. Mansfield" on Justia Law

Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, v. FERC

2026-03-24T08:03:06-08:00

Several rural electricity distribution cooperatives entered into long-term, all-requirements contracts with a generation-and-transmission cooperative, requiring them to purchase nearly all of their electric service from the cooperative through 2050. Some of these distribution cooperatives later sought to terminate their memberships and contracts early. In response, the generation-and-transmission cooperative proposed a methodology for calculating an exit fee and submitted it to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for approval. FERC initiated hearing procedures to determine a just and reasonable exit-fee methodology. In those proceedings, both the cooperative and FERC’s Trial Staff presented different approaches: the cooperative advocated a lost-revenues approach, while Trial Staff proposed a balance-sheet approach. An administrative law judge found that the cooperative’s methodology was not just and reasonable, but that the balance-sheet approach, with modifications, was. The cooperative sought review from FERC, which agreed with the administrative law judge, rejecting the lost-revenues approach and directing the cooperative to adopt the modified balance-sheet methodology. The cooperative then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that FERC’s adopted methodology was arbitrary and capricious. The Tenth Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the lost-revenues approach, adopting the balance-sheet approach, implementing a transmission-crediting mechanism, or applying the methodology to certain members despite existing contracts. The Tenth Circuit concluded that FERC engaged in reasoned decisionmaking, supported by substantial evidence, and denied the petitions for review. View "Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, v. FERC" on Justia Law

In re RPA Energy, Inc.

2026-02-24T06:04:23-08:00

A company was certified by the state regulator to operate as both a competitive retail electric and natural gas service provider. After receiving multiple consumer complaints, including allegations of unauthorized enrollments, deceptive sales practices, and improper telemarketing and door-to-door solicitation during a pandemic, the regulator initiated a formal investigation. The investigation uncovered evidence that the company and its vendors engaged in misleading marketing, falsified call recordings, forged consumer signatures, spoofed caller identification to appear as a utility or other trusted source, and failed to maintain required records. The company also solicited customers in violation of specific pandemic-related commission orders. The company argued that it lacked responsibility for vendors’ actions and had relied on the advice of counsel, and it challenged procedural aspects of the investigation. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio conducted an evidentiary hearing and found the company had committed numerous violations of statutes and commission rules. It rescinded the company’s operating certificates, ordered it to cease operations in Ohio, imposed a $1.44 million forfeiture, and required the company to “rerate” affected consumers, providing restitution for the difference between the company’s rates and the utility’s default rates. The company’s application for rehearing was granted for further consideration but ultimately denied, and the company then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the rescission of the company’s operating certificates, holding that the commission provided adequate notice and opportunity for hearing and that the findings of statutory and rule violations were supported by the evidence. However, the court found the commission failed to sufficiently explain the basis for the forfeiture amount, violating statutory requirements for reasoned decision-making. The court also determined the rerating order was unclear as to which consumers were affected. The court reversed the forfeiture and rerating orders and remanded the matter for the commission to clarify and support its decisions. View "In re RPA Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Lansdowne Conservancy v. SCC

2026-02-19T06:20:34-08:00

Virginia Electric and Power Company sought certificates of public convenience and necessity to construct two high-voltage overhead transmission line projects in Loudoun County, including the Aspen-Golden and Apollo-Twin Creeks Projects. The Aspen-Golden Project involved approximately nine miles of transmission lines, some running beside Route 7 in the Lansdowne community. VEPCO evaluated several routes and preferred Route 1AA, asserting it minimized adverse impacts. The Apollo-Twin Creeks Project involved about 1.9 miles of transmission lines, some collocated with the Aspen-Golden lines, to serve data centers. VEPCO proposed overhead construction for both projects due to feasibility concerns with underground alternatives. The State Corporation Commission consolidated the applications for review. Loudoun County and Lansdowne Conservancy objected to overhead lines along Route 7, arguing for underground construction to protect scenic and historic assets, including Belmont Manor. They submitted an Updated Hybrid Proposal for partial underground construction, but VEPCO and Commission staff questioned its feasibility, cost, and engineering challenges. After public hearings and detailed testimony, the hearing examiner recommended approval of overhead construction along Route 1AA, finding underground options infeasible within required timelines and statutory criteria, and noting the proposal’s analytical deficiencies. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the Commission’s final orders, affirming the Commission’s approval of the CPCNs. The Court held that the Commission properly verified the need for the Aspen-Golden Project, reasonably rejected underground construction due to cost, engineering challenges, and timing, and gave due consideration to the local comprehensive plan and scenic easement. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decisions minimized adverse impacts to the extent reasonably practicable and found no abuse of discretion in declining to impose additional mitigation conditions or in approving the Apollo-Twin Creeks Project. The judgments were affirmed. View "Lansdowne Conservancy v. SCC" on Justia Law

Ellsworth ME Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Comission

2026-02-05T08:07:58-08:00

A solar energy developer sought to build a facility in Maine with an initial capacity of 4.98 megawatts, later reduced to 1.99 megawatts after changes to state law. The developer submitted an interconnection application to the local utility, obtained necessary permits, made payments, and began construction. During the project’s development, delays occurred in procuring key equipment, such as the meter and voltage regulator, resulting in a projected completion date after the statutory deadline of December 31, 2024. Despite the developer’s efforts, the facility was not operational by the required date. The developer petitioned the Maine Public Utilities Commission for a good cause exemption from the Commercial Operation Date deadline under Maine’s Net Energy Billing statute. After discovery and intervention by the Office of the Public Advocate, a Commission staff report recommended granting the exemption. However, the Commission ultimately denied the exemption, finding insufficient evidence that the developer ever received an initial construction schedule projecting completion within the 2024 deadline. The developer subsequently petitioned to reopen the record to submit additional evidence, but the Commission did not act on the petition within the required timeframe, resulting in a deemed denial. The developer appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Commission’s orders. The Court held that the Commission’s factual finding—that the developer failed to prove receipt of an initial schedule with a timely completion date—was supported by substantial evidence. The Court also found the Commission’s interpretation of the statute reasonable, its decision not arbitrary, and its refusal to reopen the record not an abuse of discretion. The judgment of the Commission was affirmed. View "Ellsworth ME Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Comission" on Justia Law

Public Service Company of Colorado v. Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC

2026-01-27T15:32:30-08:00

A landscaping company, owned by an individual, contracted with a homeowner to install Christmas lights on a tree located near a high voltage power line operated by a utility company. Neither the company nor its owner provided advance notice to the utility about the work, as required when working near high voltage lines. While performing the work, the owner came into contact with the electrified tree, fell, and suffered severe, permanent injuries. The owner sued the utility for negligence, claiming it failed to maintain the power lines and tree safely. The utility moved to dismiss the claim, relying on a tariff limiting its liability and arguing that statutory notice requirements had not been met. The utility also sought indemnity from the landscaping company for any liability it incurred due to the incident. The District Court for the City and County of Denver granted summary judgment to the utility, holding that the tariff barred the owner's claims, but denied summary judgment based on the statutory notice requirement, finding it only applied to the contracting party, not the individual employee. The court also found the landscaping company liable to indemnify the utility for any liability arising from the owner's claim, since it had failed to provide required notice under the High Voltage Safety Act (HVSA). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the tariff did not bar the owner's claim because it could not limit liability to non-customers, and upheld that the statutory notice requirement applied only to the contracting party. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed in part and vacated in part the appellate court’s judgment. The court held that the Public Utilities Commission lacked authority to approve a tariff limiting the utility’s liability to non-customers, that the owner was not subject to the HVSA’s notification requirement as he was not the contracting party, and that the HVSA’s indemnification provision did not require a separate causation analysis. View "Public Service Company of Colorado v. Outdoor Design Landscaping LLC" on Justia Law

Concerned Citizens & Property Owners v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n

2026-01-23T07:34:46-08:00

A company sought approval from the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) to construct and operate a high-voltage transmission line for renewable energy, running from Kansas through parts of Illinois to Indiana. The applicant, a special purpose entity owned by Invenergy, did not have existing utility assets in Illinois and planned to use a common energy industry “project finance” model—securing long-term contracts and commercial agreements after regulatory approval to finance construction through a combination of debt and equity. The applicant presented testimony regarding its management’s extensive experience with large-scale energy projects and relationships with major lenders, but did not submit traditional financial statements. The ICC reviewed the application, accepted evidence about the applicant’s financing strategy and experience, and imposed a condition that required the applicant to secure full financing for the entire project before beginning any construction on Illinois easement property. The ICC found that the applicant satisfied the statutory requirement to be “capable of financing the proposed construction without significant adverse financial consequences” for the utility or its customers, and issued the certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN). On direct administrative review, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, reversed the ICC’s grant of the CPCN. The appellate court concluded that the applicant failed to show it could currently finance the project at the time of the certificate’s issuance, and characterized the project finance method as speculative. It held that section 8-406.1(f)(3) of the Public Utilities Act required proof of present financing capability as a condition precedent to granting a CPCN. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the ICC’s decision. The court held that section 8-406.1(f)(3) does not require an applicant to prove current, present financing capability at the time of certificate issuance. Instead, it requires a showing of capacity to finance without significant adverse financial consequences, which may be established by substantial evidence of future financing ability and industry practices. The case was remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings on unaddressed issues. View "Concerned Citizens & Property Owners v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n" on Justia Law

In Re: Chester Water Authority Trust

2026-01-21T07:41:51-08:00

A water authority was originally created by a single municipality to serve local water needs but over time expanded its service area to include numerous communities in two counties. The authority’s board was initially appointed solely by the founding municipality. In response to changes in the demographics of its customer base, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a statutory amendment requiring equal board representation for the founding municipality and the two counties served. After the restructured board rejected a purchase offer from a private company, the authority attempted to transfer its assets into a trust. The founding municipality and the private bidder objected, asserting the municipality retained sole statutory power to convey the authority’s assets. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Division, denied motions by the municipality and the private bidder for judgment on the pleadings in both the trust and declaratory judgment actions. The court held that any conveyance of the authority’s assets under the Municipality Authorities Act required the unanimous consent of the governing bodies now represented on the authority’s board. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that the statutory change to board composition did not alter the founding municipality’s unilateral power to convey assets under the Act. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that the plain text of the relevant statute does not grant perpetual unilateral conveyance authority to the founding municipality, especially after legislative restructuring of the board. The court found that the right to effect a conveyance now rests collectively with the three municipalities represented on the board. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Chester Water Authority Trust" on Justia Law

E. Ohio Gas Co v. Croce

2026-01-14T06:12:29-08:00

Three Ohio natural-gas producers filed a class-action lawsuit in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against East Ohio Gas Company (Dominion Energy Ohio). They alleged that Dominion Energy sold or used natural gas delivered into its pipeline system without properly compensating them, despite tariff provisions requiring reconciliation of delivered gas volumes. The plaintiffs claimed conversion, unjust enrichment, and violations of statutory provisions related to damages from criminal acts and theft. The class consisted of Ohio natural-gas producers participating in the Energy Choice Program whose wells were connected to Dominion Energy’s pipeline system. Judge Christine Croce partly granted Dominion Energy’s motion to dismiss by dismissing the conversion claim but allowed other claims to proceed. Dominion Energy appealed, but the Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding that Judge Croce’s order was not a final, appealable order. Subsequently, Dominion Energy sought a writ of prohibition in the Ninth District against Judge Croce, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the class-action claims. The natural-gas producers intervened in the prohibition action. The Ninth District Court of Appeals applied the test from Allstate Insurance Co. v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and concluded that PUCO has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because the resolution of the dispute depended on the interpretation and application of PUCO-approved tariffs and practices normally authorized by public utilities. The court granted summary judgment for Dominion Energy and issued a writ of prohibition ordering Judge Croce to cease jurisdiction over the class action and vacate her prior orders. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Ninth District’s judgment. The court held that PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the natural-gas producers, and the common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. View "E. Ohio Gas Co v. Croce" on Justia Law

Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC

2026-01-13T08:01:26-08:00

PJM Interconnection, LLC, which manages electricity transmission across several Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states, conducted its 2024/2025 capacity auction based on certain published parameters intended to ensure sufficient capacity for future electricity needs. After bidding closed, PJM discovered an error in the Locational Delivery Area Reliability Requirement for the Delmarva Power & Light Company South Zone, which would result in inflated auction prices and excess capacity charges for consumers. PJM sought to amend its tariff to correct this issue before finalizing the auction results, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PJM's request. Capacity suppliers challenged FERC’s approval in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the decision, finding that the amendment was retroactive and violated the filed-rate doctrine. FERC, complying with the Third Circuit’s mandate, directed PJM to proceed with the unamended tariff, resulting in higher costs for consumers. Following this, agencies, customers, and entities representing customers’ interests filed a complaint under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, seeking modification of the auction outcome. FERC denied the complaint, stating that the Third Circuit’s ruling foreclosed any relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders. The court held that FERC’s denial of the complaint was legally erroneous because the Third Circuit’s decision did not address whether FERC could use its section 206 authority to modify the auction result. The D.C. Circuit clarified that section 206(b) of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory exception to the general prohibition on retroactive rate changes. The court granted the petition for review, vacated FERC’s orders denying the complaint, and remanded the case to FERC for further proceedings. View "Maryland Office of People's Counsel v. FERC" on Justia Law

FirstEnergy v. PUC

2026-01-08T11:40:13-08:00

This case involves a dispute over the rates charged for leasing space on utility poles in Pennsylvania, specifically between an electric utility (FirstEnergy) and a telephone company (Verizon). Historically, the parties operated under Joint Use Agreements (JUAs), which set reciprocal rates for attachment to each other's poles. After regulatory changes at the federal level and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) decision to assume jurisdiction over pole attachments, Verizon challenged the rates charged by FirstEnergy under the JUAs, arguing they were unjust and unreasonable compared to the newer, lower rates (the New Telecom Rate) applied to other telecommunications providers. Following the initial complaint filed by Verizon, the matter was transferred from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to the PUC after Pennsylvania reverse preempted federal regulation. The PUC’s Administrative Law Judge found in favor of Verizon, determining that Verizon was entitled to the New Telecom Rate for its pole attachments and that FirstEnergy must refund the difference between the rates charged and the New Telecom Rate, for a period set by the PUC. FirstEnergy and Verizon each appealed aspects of this outcome to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the PUC’s decision. The Commonwealth Court majority determined that the PUC had properly applied its regulations and statutory authority, while the dissent argued the PUC’s actions conflicted with the Public Utility Code and longstanding principles of ratemaking. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the PUC lawfully shifted the burden of proof to FirstEnergy and adopted federal presumptions that were not supported by Pennsylvania law. The Court held that, under the Public Utility Code, the complainant (Verizon) bore the burden to prove that existing rates were unjust or unreasonable, and the PUC erred by adopting regulations that shifted this burden to the utility. The Supreme Court vacated the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FirstEnergy v. PUC" on Justia Law

Mendocino Railway v. Meyer

2026-01-07T10:01:36-08:00

Mendocino Railway, a California railroad corporation, sought to acquire a 20-acre parcel in Willits, California owned by John Meyer through eminent domain. The property is adjacent to Mendocino Railway’s tracks and was intended for the construction and maintenance of rail facilities supporting ongoing and future freight and passenger operations. The company argued that, as a common carrier public utility under relevant statutes, it had the authority to exercise eminent domain for public use. The evidence at trial included testimony about the history of rail service on the line, Mendocino Railway’s acquisition and operations, including passenger excursions and more limited commuter and freight services, and the necessity of the property for expanding its rail facilities. The Mendocino County Superior Court conducted a bench trial and found that Mendocino Railway failed to qualify as a public utility entitled to exercise eminent domain. The court reasoned that the railway’s primary activity was excursion service, which does not confer public utility status, and was unconvinced by the evidence of passenger and freight services. The court further concluded that, even if Mendocino Railway had public utility status, it did not meet the statutory requirements for eminent domain, finding the primary purpose of the proposed taking to be for private business activities rather than public use. The court also found insufficient evidence regarding the project’s impacts on neighboring residents and questioned the credibility and timing of Mendocino Railway’s site plans. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Mendocino Railway met its burden of proving it was a common carrier public utility under California law, and that it satisfied the statutory requirements for eminent domain: public interest and necessity, proper planning for public good and least private injury, and necessity of the property for the project. The court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding compensation to Meyer. View "Mendocino Railway v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Consum Adv v. PUC

2025-12-16T06:44:37-08:00

A private utility company entered into an agreement to purchase a township’s wastewater system, which served nearly 3,900 residents. The parties used a statutory procedure to determine the fair market value of the system’s assets, arriving at a purchase price of approximately $54.9 million. The utility, already certified to provide water and wastewater services in other areas, applied to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to acquire and operate the system. As part of the process, the utility agreed to maintain current rates for three years. An administrative law judge at the PUC recommended denying the utility’s application, finding that the township was already providing safe, reliable, and financially viable service, and that the acquisition would result in substantial rate increases for customers, outweighing any potential benefits. The PUC, however, rejected the judge’s recommendation and granted the CPC, finding that the utility’s expertise, financial resources, and the policy goal of consolidating systems provided substantial affirmative public benefits. The PUC also found that potential rate increases were not certain harms, as increases might occur regardless of the transaction and could be mitigated over a larger customer base. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the PUC’s decision, holding that benefits arising from the acquiring utility’s size and fitness were not sufficient to satisfy the statutory standard for public benefit, particularly when the existing service was adequate and the transaction would likely cause rate increases. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, holding that the PUC could consider benefits derived from the utility’s size and expertise in its affirmative public benefits analysis and that the lower court erred by reweighing the evidence and categorizing potential rate increases as “known harms.” The case was remanded for further proceedings on whether the PUC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "Consum Adv v. PUC" on Justia Law

In re Petition of Otter Creek Solar LLC

2025-12-12T08:15:56-08:00

An energy developer proposed to construct a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, near an existing solar facility that it had previously built. Both the new and existing facilities were located on adjacent parcels, shared similar ownership structures, and would use connected infrastructure to access the electric grid. The developer submitted bids for three projects; only the first was initially awarded a contract and then built. Later, the developer resubmitted bids for the other two projects, which were awarded contracts. When the developer sought a Certificate of Public Good (CPG) for the second facility, concerns were raised about whether this new facility and the existing one constituted a “single plant” under state law, which would make them ineligible for the state’s Standard Offer Program due to a cap on plant capacity. The Vermont Public Utility Commission reviewed the CPG application for the new facility. It held evidentiary hearings and ultimately concluded that, under the statutory definition, the two facilities were a single plant because they had common ownership, were developed in a contiguous timeframe, were physically proximate, and shared necessary grid infrastructure. This meant the combined facility exceeded the program’s capacity limit. The Commission denied the CPG and rejected the developer’s motion for reconsideration, prompting an appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Commission’s decision. It affirmed, holding that the Commission applied the correct two-prong “single plant” test as previously explained in its own precedents, properly considered all statutory factors, and acted within its discretion in finding the facilities to be a single plant. The Court rejected arguments about due process violations, claim and issue preclusion, and the application of alternative legal standards. The Supreme Court also found no error in the procedures followed by the Commission and did not grant a remand or new hearing. The decision of the Public Utility Commission was affirmed. View "In re Petition of Otter Creek Solar LLC" on Justia Law

Dreher v. City of Los Angeles

2025-12-08T11:01:58-08:00

In 2016, the City of Los Angeles established new tiered water rates for residential customers of its Department of Water and Power (LADWP). These rates included a charge that funded a low-income subsidy, which was paid by customers who did not qualify for the subsidy, and utilized progressively increasing charges based on water usage tiers. Stephen and Melinda Dreher, LADWP customers, challenged the constitutionality of two aspects of these rates under article XIII D, section 6 of the California Constitution: (1) the inclusion of a low-income subsidy charge in the rates of non-subsidized customers, and (2) the structure of the tiered rates themselves, arguing they exceeded the proportional cost of water service to each parcel. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the Drehers regarding the low-income subsidy charge, finding it unconstitutional and issuing a writ to prevent the City from including this charge in future rates. However, the court denied the Drehers’ request for a refund of previously paid charges, concluding that such a claim was barred because the Drehers had not paid under protest, as required by Health and Safety Code section 5472. The court also found that, aside from the invalid low-income subsidy, the City’s tiered rates complied with constitutional proportionality requirements. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the payment under protest requirement of Health and Safety Code section 5472 applies to claims seeking refunds of water delivery charges fixed by city ordinance, and that the Drehers’ failure to comply with this requirement barred their retrospective refund claim. The court further held that the City met its burden to demonstrate that its tiered water rates (excluding the invalid subsidy) did not exceed the proportional cost of service attributable to each parcel, as required by article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "Dreher v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In re Petition of Randolph Davis Solar LLC

2025-12-05T08:38:17-08:00

A company sought approval to construct a 500 kW solar-energy project in Randolph, Vermont. The proposed project required a certificate of public good (CPG) from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC). A portion of the project's infrastructure, such as its access road and interconnection line, would be located on land with slopes exceeding 25%. Local and regional planning commissions, as well as the Town of Randolph Selectboard, initially supported the project and jointly requested the site be designated as a “preferred site.” After neighbors raised concerns that some panels would be located on steep slopes in conflict with the Town Plan, the applicant agreed to revise the project so that no panels would be built on slopes over 25%. The Town conditioned its continued support on this revision and on receiving the final site plan. The PUC’s hearing officer initially recommended denying the CPG due to uncertainty about whether the Town’s conditions regarding slope measurement had been met. The PUC rejected this recommendation, refocusing on whether the Town itself was satisfied with the conditions. The applicant subsequently provided a letter from the Town confirming its support and satisfaction with the conditions. The PUC found the project's compliance with soil-erosion control measures sufficient, particularly in light of a stormwater permit issued by the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), and ruled that the project would not unduly interfere with the region’s orderly development. The PUC granted the CPG; the neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, giving deference to the PUC’s expertise and factual findings. The Court affirmed the PUC’s grant of the CPG, holding that the PUC correctly applied the legal standards under 30 V.S.A. § 248, properly considered the Town Plan’s land-conservation measures, reasonably relied on the Town’s assurances and ANR’s permit, and did not misapply its own rules regarding “preferred site” status. View "In re Petition of Randolph Davis Solar LLC" on Justia Law

Pacificorp v. IPUC

2025-11-19T09:03:55-08:00

PacifiCorp, a utility company operating a natural gas power plant in Chehalis, Washington, supplies electricity to customers in Idaho. Washington enacted the Climate Commitment Act (CCA), requiring greenhouse gas emitters to purchase emissions allowances. PacifiCorp sought to recover $2.3 million from Idaho customers, representing their share of the costs for these allowances needed to operate the Chehalis plant. The CCA provides “no-cost” allowances exclusively to Washington customers, shielding them from these costs, while PacifiCorp’s Idaho customers would bear the expense for electricity exported from Washington. The Idaho Public Utilities Commission reviewed PacifiCorp’s application under the Energy Cost Adjustment Mechanism (ECAM). The Commission approved recovery of over $60 million in other costs but denied the $2.3 million in CCA allowance costs. It reasoned that, under the 2020 PacifiCorp Inter-Jurisdictional Allocation Protocol, state-specific energy and climate policy costs should be borne by the state enacting them. The Commission also found that passing CCA costs to Idaho customers would violate Idaho Code section 61-502, which requires rates to be just, reasonable, and sufficient, and would create discriminatory customer classes. PacifiCorp’s petition for reconsideration was denied, with the Commission reaffirming its decision on both Protocol and statutory grounds. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho considered whether the Commission’s orders violated PacifiCorp’s constitutional rights, were unsupported by evidence, or were outside the regular pursuit of its authority. The Court held that the Commission acted within its statutory powers and that its decision to disallow recovery of CCA allowance costs from Idaho customers was supported by the record and consistent with its mandate under Idaho Code section 61-502. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders. View "Pacificorp v. IPUC" on Justia Law

Capital Power Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

2025-09-26T06:02:11-08:00

Several electricity generators challenged a change in how they are compensated for producing reactive power, a component of electricity necessary for grid stability but not directly consumed by end users. For many years, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) provided generators with cost-based compensation for reactive power, in addition to market-based payments for real power. In 2022, MISO amended its tariff to eliminate separate compensation for reactive power, meaning neither transmission owners nor independent generators would receive payment for producing it within a standard range. This change was approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and given immediate effect, despite objections from generators who argued they had made investments and entered contracts in reliance on the prior compensation structure. FERC approved MISO’s tariff amendment and denied requests for rehearing, concluding that the comparability standard justified the change and that generators’ reliance interests were either unsupported or outweighed by other considerations. FERC reasoned that generators should not have expected compensation for reactive power to continue indefinitely, especially since prior orders had made such compensation contingent on similar treatment for transmission owners. Generators petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that FERC failed to adequately consider their short-term financial reliance on the previous compensation scheme. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to adequately consider the generators’ short-term reliance interests before allowing the tariff change to take immediate effect. The court did not address the substantive validity of the tariff amendment itself but found that FERC’s explanation was insufficient regarding the abrupt elimination of compensation. The court granted the petitions for review, set aside FERC’s orders, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Capital Power Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Ventura

2025-09-25T13:32:24-08:00

Several utility companies operating in California, including in Ventura County, challenged the property tax rates applied to their state-assessed utility property. They argued that the method used to calculate the debt service component of their property tax rate resulted in a higher rate than that applied to locally assessed, nonutility property (referred to as “common property”). The utilities claimed this disparity violated section 19 of article XIII of the California Constitution, which states that utility property “shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.” The utilities filed suit in the Ventura County Superior Court against the County of Ventura and the California State Board of Equalization, seeking partial refunds for property taxes paid between 2018 and 2023. The County demurred, relying on recent appellate decisions that had rejected similar claims. The parties stipulated that the decision in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court was binding for purposes of this case, and the trial court sustained the demurrer, entering judgment in favor of the County and the Board. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that article XIII, section 19 does not require that utility property be taxed at the same or a comparable rate as nonutility property. Instead, the provision is an enabling clause that allows utility property to be subject to property taxation, but does not mandate rate equivalence. The court also found that the general uniformity requirement in article XIII, section 1 does not override the Legislature’s authority to implement reasonable distinctions in tax treatment for utility property. The judgment in favor of the County and the Board was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission

2025-09-25T05:43:30-08:00

Several companies that supply electricity generation services in Pennsylvania challenged a billing practice used by a regional electric distribution company (EDC), FirstEnergy. FirstEnergy, which is responsible for delivering electricity to customers, offered its own customers the option to pay for non-commodity goods and services—such as smart thermostats and surge protection—through their regular utility bills, a practice known as “on-bill billing.” However, FirstEnergy did not allow competing electric generation suppliers (EGSs) to use this billing method for their own non-commodity goods and services. The EGSs argued that this practice was unlawfully discriminatory under Section 1502 of the Public Utility Code and Section 2804(6) of the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act, which prohibit unreasonable preferences or advantages in utility service. An administrative law judge initially found in favor of the EGSs, concluding that FirstEnergy’s practice gave it a significant competitive advantage and violated the anti-discrimination provisions. However, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) reversed this decision, reasoning that discrimination only occurs if the EDC provides the billing service to third parties but not to EGSs, which was not the case here. The PUC also determined that the relevant statutes did not require EDCs to offer on-bill billing for non-commodity goods and services to EGSs. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the PUC’s decision, holding that the statutory provisions at issue did not obligate EDCs to provide on-bill billing for non-commodity goods and services to EGSs. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. The Court held that EDCs have no statutory duty to provide on-bill billing for non-commodity goods and services to EGSs, and that such billing does not constitute “service,” “electric services,” or “transmission and distribution service” under the relevant statutes. The Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Riverside

2025-09-24T08:31:00-08:00

Several public utility companies challenged the property tax rates imposed by a California county, arguing that the “debt service component” of the county’s property tax rate for utility property was higher than the average rate for non-utility (common) property. The utilities claimed this violated article XIII, section 19 of the California Constitution, which states that utility property “shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.” The utilities sought a partial refund of property taxes for several fiscal years, asserting that the constitutional provision required rate equality between utility and common property. The Superior Court of Riverside County allowed two local water districts to intervene, as they relied on property tax revenue for bond payments. The county demurred, relying on a recent decision from the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, which had rejected a similar claim by utilities in another county. The utilities conceded that this precedent was binding on the trial court but preserved their arguments for appeal. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the case. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It considered the text, structure, and legislative history of article XIII, section 19, as well as recent appellate decisions from other districts. The court held that the constitutional provision does not require that utility and common property be taxed at the same rates. Instead, it authorizes local ad valorem taxation of utility property, replacing the prior system of state-level in-lieu taxation, but does not impose a rate limitation. The court also found that prior California Supreme Court precedent did not mandate rate equality. The judgment dismissing the utilities’ lawsuit was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

OKLAHOMA ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION

2025-09-23T07:42:32-08:00

A dispute arose when Oklahoma Gas and Electric (OG&E) began providing retail electric service to a large cryogenic natural gas facility, the Chisolm Trail Plant, located in the certified territory of Oklahoma Electric Cooperative (OEC) in rural Grady County, Oklahoma. Under the Retail Energy Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA), OEC holds exclusive rights to serve customers in this area, unless an exception applies. OG&E relied on the "Large Load" exception, which allows another supplier to serve a facility with an initial load of 1,000 kilowatts or more. To serve the Plant, OG&E connected to a third-party transmission line owned by Public Service Company of Oklahoma, rather than extending its own distribution system. After OG&E began service in May 2018, OEC filed an application with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission in August 2019, seeking to enjoin OG&E from serving the Plant, arguing that OG&E’s conduct violated RESCTA. The Commission, however, denied OEC’s request for injunctive relief, not by analyzing the statutory exception, but by finding that OEC’s claim was barred by the equitable defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver, due to OEC’s delay in objecting and OG&E’s substantial investment in infrastructure. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and held that, under its recent decision in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm’n (People’s), RESCTA’s Large Load exception does not permit a supplier to connect with third-party transmission lines to extend service into another supplier’s certified territory. However, because the holding in People’s applies only prospectively and not to existing service arrangements, OG&E is permitted to continue serving the Plant. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s order allowing OG&E to continue providing retail electric service to the customer in OEC’s territory. View "OKLAHOMA ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA CORPORATION COMMISSION" on Justia Law

PacifiCorp v. Dept. of Rev.

2025-09-18T07:37:59-08:00

An electric utility company operating both within and outside Oregon was subject to central assessment for property tax purposes. For the 2020-21 tax year, the company and the Oregon Department of Revenue disagreed on the company’s overall value and the portion attributable to Oregon. The dispute centered on the methods used to determine real market value, specifically whether certain deductions and valuation models used by the company’s appraiser were consistent with the Department’s adopted standards. The Department relied on an administrative rule that incorporated the Western States Association of Tax Administrators (WSATA) Handbook, which prescribes valuation methods for centrally assessed properties. The Oregon Tax Court heard the case and considered expert testimony from both parties. The Department argued that the WSATA Handbook, as adopted by administrative rule, was binding and should control the valuation methods used. The company contended that the Tax Court, conducting a de novo review, was not bound by the Handbook. The Tax Court agreed with the company, holding that it was not required to defer to the Department’s rule and could determine real market value using other methods if it found them more accurate. The court ultimately adopted some of the company’s valuation approaches and set a value lower than the Department’s assessment. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case on appeal. It held that, absent a finding that the Department’s rule is invalid on its face or as applied, the rule has the force of law and must be given legal effect by the Tax Court. The Supreme Court found that the Tax Court erred by not treating the Department’s rule as binding unless its application would conflict with constitutional or statutory definitions of real market value. The Supreme Court reversed the Tax Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "PacifiCorp v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Capitol Park IV Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority

2025-09-18T04:34:04-08:00

A condominium association in Southwest Washington, D.C., which owns a large complex of over 200 townhomes, challenged the way the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (D.C. Water) calculates a stormwater runoff fee known as the Clean Rivers Impervious Area Charge (CRIAC). The association is classified as a multi-family customer because its water is supplied through several master-metered service lines, rather than each townhome having an individual meter. This classification results in the CRIAC being calculated based on the total impervious surface area of the property, rather than using a tiered system that applies to individually metered residential properties. The association argued that this method, which ties the fee calculation to how the property is metered, is arbitrary and capricious, as the metering method does not affect the amount of stormwater runoff. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to D.C. Water. The court found that D.C. Water’s classification and billing methodology were reasonable and consistent with industry standards, relying on declarations from D.C. Water officials and legislative history. The court also rejected the association’s constitutional and equal protection claims, which were not pursued on appeal. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on the constitutional claims, as those were not contested on appeal. However, the appellate court vacated the summary judgment on the claim that D.C. Water’s use of metering as a factor in CRIAC calculation was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that D.C. Water had not provided an adequate explanation for why metering should affect the fee, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "Capitol Park IV Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

Transource Pennsylvania LLC v. DeFrank

2025-09-05T09:00:10-08:00

A company sought approval to construct electricity transmission lines in Pennsylvania as part of a larger project selected through a federally supervised regional planning process. The project was designed to alleviate regional congestion on the electricity grid, which would lower wholesale electricity costs in certain states but increase costs for some Pennsylvania consumers. The regional transmission organization (PJM), acting under Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rules, selected the project using a benefit-cost methodology approved by FERC. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) reviewed the company’s applications for siting and eminent domain authority. After an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge recommended denial, finding that the project was no longer needed due to decreased congestion and that the benefit-cost analysis used by PJM was deficient under Pennsylvania law. The PUC adopted this recommendation, denied the applications, and rescinded the company’s provisional certificate of public convenience. The company appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the PUC’s decision. The company then pursued federal constitutional claims in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, reserving those issues in state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the PUC’s order was preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it posed an obstacle to federal objectives established by Congress and implemented by FERC—specifically, the regional planning and congestion-reduction process. The court found that the PUC’s independent “need” determination, which second-guessed PJM’s FERC-approved methodology, impermissibly conflicted with federal law. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment for the company and did not reach the dormant Commerce Clause issues. View "Transource Pennsylvania LLC v. DeFrank" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com.

2025-09-04T10:01:32-08:00

This case involves a challenge to a tariff adopted by the California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that significantly reduced the compensation utilities pay to customers who generate electricity through rooftop solar panels and export excess energy to the grid. Petitioners, including environmental organizations, argued that the Commission’s tariff was inconsistent with Public Utilities Code section 2827.1, which requires the Commission to ensure that compensation for customer-generators reflects the costs and benefits of renewable generation and supports sustainable growth, particularly among disadvantaged communities. The First Appellate District, Division Three, of the California Court of Appeal granted a writ of review and affirmed the Commission’s decision. In doing so, the Court of Appeal applied a highly deferential standard of review derived from the California Supreme Court’s decision in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com., asking only whether the Commission’s interpretation of the statute bore a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language. The court concluded that the Commission’s approach satisfied this standard and declined to engage in a more searching review of the statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine whether the deferential Greyhound standard remains appropriate following legislative amendments to the Public Utilities Code. The Supreme Court held that, for Commission decisions not pertaining solely to water corporations, the deferential Greyhound standard no longer applies. Instead, courts must independently review the Commission’s statutory interpretations under the standards set forth in Public Utilities Code sections 1757 and 1757.1, which parallel the review of other administrative agencies. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this less deferential standard. View "Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

Client Earth v. Washington Gas Light Company

2025-09-04T06:32:57-08:00

Three public interest organizations brought suit against a utility company that provides natural gas services in the District of Columbia, alleging that the company violated the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) by making false and misleading statements about the environmental effects of its natural gas. The organizations claimed these statements appeared in customer bills, on the company’s website, and in other public documents. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to address the alleged unfair and deceptive trade practices. The utility company responded by filing a special motion to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, followed by a motion to dismiss under Superior Court Civil Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The company argued that the CPPA does not create a right of action against entities regulated by the Public Service Commission (PSC), citing D.C. Code § 28-3903(c)(2)(B) and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decision in Gomez v. Independence Management of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2009). The public interest organizations countered that the statutory limitation only applied to the Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection, not to private actors like themselves, and that subsequent amendments to the CPPA had rendered Gomez obsolete. The Superior Court granted the utility’s motion to dismiss, finding that Gomez remained controlling and that the CPPA’s exemptions for PSC-regulated entities had not been altered by later amendments. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal. The court held that, although the plain text of the CPPA does not expressly bar private suits against PSC-regulated entities, binding precedent from Gomez requires that the limitations in D.C. Code § 28-3903(c)(2) apply to private actions as well. Therefore, public interest organizations may not sue entities regulated by the PSC under the CPPA. View "Client Earth v. Washington Gas Light Company" on Justia Law

Patz v. City of San Diego

2025-08-27T14:02:04-08:00

A group of single-family residential (SFR) water customers challenged the City of San Diego’s tiered water rate structure, which imposed higher rates for increased water usage, arguing that these rates exceeded the proportional cost of service attributable to their parcels as required by California Constitution article XIII D, section 6(b)(3) (enacted by Proposition 218). The City’s water system serves a large population and divides customers into several classes, but only SFR customers were subject to tiered rates; other classes paid uniform rates. The City’s rates were based on cost-of-service studies using industry-standard methodologies, including “base-extra capacity” and “peaking factors,” but the plaintiffs contended these methods did not accurately reflect the actual cost of providing water at higher usage tiers. The Superior Court of San Diego County certified the case as a class action and held a bifurcated trial. In the first phase, the court found that the City failed to demonstrate, with substantial evidence, that its tiered rates for SFR customers complied with section 6(b)(3), concluding the rates were not based on the actual cost of service at each tier but rather on usage budgets and conservation goals. The court also found the City lacked sufficient data to justify its allocation of costs to higher tiers and that the rate structure discriminated against SFR customers compared to other classes. In the second phase, the court awarded the class a refund for overcharges, offset by undercharges, and ordered the City to implement new, compliant rates. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s judgment with directions. The appellate court held that the City bore the burden of proving its rates did not exceed the proportional cost of service and that the applicable standard was not mere reasonableness but actual cost proportionality, subject to independent judicial review. The court found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the City’s tiered rates were not cost-based and thus violated section 6(b)(3). The court also upheld class certification and the method for calculating the refund, and directed the trial court to amend the judgment to comply with newly enacted Government Code section 53758.5, which affects the manner of refunding overcharges. View "Patz v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In re Application of Ohio Power Co.

2025-08-27T05:10:08-08:00

One Power Company challenged two orders issued by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regarding Ohio Power Company’s fifth electric-security plan. The first issue concerned a protective agreement governing access to confidential discovery materials. One Power argued that the agreement unreasonably prevented its chief executive officer and expert witness, an employee, from accessing all discovery, which allegedly disadvantaged its ability to litigate. The second issue involved the commission’s decision to continue a nonbypassable basic-transmission-cost rider, meaning all customers—including those who purchase generation service from competitive suppliers—must pay the charge. After AEP Ohio filed its application for the fifth electric-security plan, One Power intervened and sought broader access to confidential materials. The PUCO’s attorney examiner denied One Power’s motion for a more permissive protective agreement, finding the proposed limits reasonable. One Power’s interlocutory appeal was also denied. At the evidentiary hearing, One Power renewed its objections, but the commission affirmed the examiner’s rulings and later denied rehearing. Regarding the transmission rider, the commission maintained its nonbypassable status, citing the need for further study before making major changes and noting consistency with prior practice. One Power’s rehearing application on this issue was also denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the PUCO’s orders were unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that One Power failed to demonstrate particularized harm from the protective agreement and that the commission acted within its statutory and regulatory authority in continuing the nonbypassable rider. The court found no violation of state electric policy or commission precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the PUCO’s orders. View "In re Application of Ohio Power Co." on Justia Law

In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co.

2025-08-22T05:14:01-08:00

Dayton Power and Light Company (DP&L), operating as AES Ohio, sought approval from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) regarding whether its electric security plan (ESP) resulted in significantly excessive earnings for the years 2018 and 2019. The ESP is a mechanism for setting the standard generation rate for customers who do not choose a competitive supplier. During this period, DP&L also transitioned from its third ESP (ESP III) back to its first ESP (ESP I) after the commission invalidated a similar rider in another utility’s plan, following a decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. DP&L’s parent company, AES Corporation, made substantial capital contributions to support future investments in grid modernization. PUCO consolidated several related cases and found that DP&L’s ESP resulted in excessive earnings of $3.7 million in 2018 and $57.4 million in 2019. However, PUCO determined that DP&L could offset these excessive earnings with its commitment to future capital investments, and therefore, no refund to consumers was required. PUCO also found that DP&L’s ESP passed the required quadrennial review tests, including a prospective analysis of earnings and a comparison to market-rate offers. The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) appealed, challenging the refusal to order refunds and the continued collection of a rate-stabilization charge. DP&L filed a protective cross-appeal, asserting alternative grounds for affirmance. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that PUCO was not authorized under R.C. 4928.143(F) to allow DP&L to retain significantly excessive earnings based solely on its commitment to future investments. The court reversed PUCO’s orders and remanded the case for a new significantly excessive earnings test analysis. The court rejected OCC’s challenge to the rate-stabilization charge, finding its legality was not at issue in this appeal, and also rejected DP&L’s alternative grounds for affirmance. View "In re Application of Dayton Power & Light Co." on Justia Law

Louisville Gas and Electric Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

2025-08-08T07:01:04-08:00

Two electric utility companies merged in 1998, with federal approval conditioned on their participation in a regional grid operator to prevent customers from paying multiple, overlapping transmission fees (“pancaked” rates). Several years later, the merged company was allowed to leave the grid operator, but only if it continued to protect certain customers from redundant fees through a special rate schedule. In 2019, the company sought to end this obligation, arguing that continued protection was no longer necessary. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted this request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated that order, finding FERC had failed to consider the impact on customer rates. On remand, FERC issued a new order denying the company’s request to end the fee protection, concluding that removing the protection would adversely affect rates for certain customers and that the benefits of removal did not outweigh these harms. FERC also denied rehearing, maintaining that the company had not shown sufficient alternative protections for affected customers. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that FERC’s orders were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with law and precedent. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC did not violate its statutory mandate or precedent in its general approach. However, the court found that FERC failed to adequately consider whether alternative customer protections, such as transition agreements, could mitigate the adverse rate impacts. The court therefore granted the petitions for review, vacated FERC’s orders, and remanded the matter for further consideration of whether such protections would suffice to offset the adverse effects on rates. View "Louisville Gas and Electric Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com.

2025-08-07T09:01:33-08:00

This case involves a dispute over the compensation structure for utility customers who generate their own electricity, such as through rooftop solar panels, and export excess energy to the power grid. The California Legislature has required utilities to compensate these “customer-generators” since 1995, but concerns arose that the original compensation method overpaid such customers and shifted costs to those without solar systems. In 2013, the Legislature directed the Public Utilities Commission to reassess the compensation framework, resulting in a 2022 tariff that significantly reduced payments for customer-generated power. Environmental groups challenged the new tariff, arguing it failed to account for all societal benefits of renewable energy and did not adequately promote growth among disadvantaged communities. The First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the challenge after the petitioners sought a writ of review. The Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission’s decision, applying a highly deferential standard from Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com., which upheld Commission interpretations unless they lacked a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language. The appellate court concluded that the Commission’s approach met this deferential standard and declined to engage in further inquiry. The Supreme Court of California granted review to determine whether the deferential Greyhound standard remains appropriate following legislative amendments to the Public Utilities Code. The Supreme Court held that, due to statutory changes in the 1990s and 2000s, the Greyhound standard no longer applies to most Commission decisions, including those involving energy. Instead, courts must now independently review the Commission’s statutory interpretations, consistent with the approach outlined in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct standard of review. View "Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue

2025-07-24T07:47:41-08:00

The case involves Delta Air Lines, Inc. and PacifiCorp, both of which are centrally assessed businesses in Oregon. Under Oregon law, centrally assessed businesses are taxed on their intangible property, unlike locally assessed businesses. Delta and PacifiCorp challenged this tax, arguing it violated the state and federal constitutions by not being uniform and by violating equal protection and privileges clauses. The Oregon Tax Court addressed both cases in a single opinion, ruling in favor of Delta by finding the tax on intangible property unconstitutional for air transportation businesses. However, it ruled against PacifiCorp, upholding the tax for utilities. The Tax Court concluded that there were no genuine differences between the intangible property of centrally assessed air transportation businesses and locally assessed businesses, but found differences for utilities. The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the tax classifications were rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The court reversed the Tax Court's decision regarding Delta, holding that the tax on intangible property for centrally assessed businesses is constitutional. The court found that the legislature's decision to tax intangible property of centrally assessed businesses, but not locally assessed ones, was rationally related to legitimate purposes such as administrative efficiency, expertise in valuation, and balancing revenue against resources. The court also affirmed the Tax Court's decision regarding PacifiCorp in a separate opinion, maintaining the tax's constitutionality for utilities. The case was remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings. View "Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Florida Rising, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission

2025-07-17T07:02:46-08:00

Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) entered into a multi-party settlement agreement to establish base rates, which was approved by the Florida Public Service Commission (Commission). The settlement allowed FPL to increase rates annually for four years, generating significant additional revenue and permitting incremental rate increases for solar projects. It also included provisions for an equity-to-debt ratio, return on equity, and a minimum base bill for customers. The settlement aimed to support investments in power generation, transmission, distribution systems, and renewable energy programs. The Commission's initial approval of the settlement was challenged, leading to a remand by the Supreme Court of Florida in Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc. v. Clark (FAIR). The Court required the Commission to provide a more detailed explanation of its reasoning and to consider FPL's performance under the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (FEECA). On remand, the Commission denied a motion to reopen the evidentiary record and issued a Supplemental Final Order, reaffirming that the settlement was in the public interest. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case again. The Court upheld the Commission's approval of the settlement, finding that the Commission's factual findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence and that its policy decisions were within its discretion. The Court concluded that the Commission had adequately considered the mandatory and discretionary factors, including FPL's FEECA performance, and provided a reasoned explanation for its decision. The Court affirmed the Commission's Final and Supplemental Final Orders, determining that the settlement established fair, just, and reasonable rates. View "Florida Rising, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

2025-07-16T10:20:04-08:00

Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut (Aquarion) filed a rate application with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) in August 2022, seeking to increase its rates to cover approximately $700 million in capital improvements made since 2013. Aquarion also sought to recover $3 million in deferred water conservation expenses and $2.2 million for its employee incentive compensation program. PURA reviewed the application and allowed Aquarion to include $650 million in plant additions completed before August 31, 2022, in its rate base but excluded $48 million in post-application plant additions. PURA also denied Aquarion’s request for the full amount of deferred conservation expenses and employee incentive compensation, reducing the approved revenue requirement to $195 million and the return on equity (ROE) to 8.7%. The trial court dismissed Aquarion’s appeal, finding substantial evidence supporting PURA’s decisions. Aquarion then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing that PURA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its prudence determinations and that the rate order was confiscatory. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld PURA’s exclusion of the $42 million in post-application plant additions, finding a discernible difference in the quality of evidence submitted for pre- and post-application additions. The court also upheld the denial of $2.2 million for the employee incentive compensation program, agreeing that PURA did not use hindsight but rather assessed the program’s future efficacy based on historical data. However, the court found that PURA improperly used hindsight to evaluate the prudence of $1.5 million in deferred conservation expenses, focusing on after-the-fact economic savings rather than the prudence of the decision at the time the expenses were incurred. The court reversed this part of the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also rejected Aquarion’s claim that the rate order was confiscatory, affirming that the approved ROE of 8.7% was not effectively reduced by the disallowance of certain costs and was sufficient to maintain Aquarion’s financial integrity and ability to attract capital. View "Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

Snakeroot Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission

2025-07-15T07:33:35-08:00

Snakeroot Solar, LLC, sought a good-cause exemption from the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to extend the deadline for its photovoltaic generating facility in Pittsfield to reach commercial operation and participate in Maine’s net energy billing (NEB) program. The facility needed to be operational by December 31, 2024, but delays in the interconnection process and the time required for grid upgrades made this deadline unachievable. Snakeroot argued that these delays were outside its control and warranted an exemption. The PUC denied Snakeroot’s petition, finding that the delays were inherent to the interconnection process and not external. The PUC noted that the cluster study process, which took slightly longer than average, and the time required for grid upgrades were typical and did not constitute external delays. Snakeroot appealed, arguing that the PUC misinterpreted the statute and that the delays were indeed external and beyond its control. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld the PUC’s decision. The Court found that the PUC’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and aligned with the legislative intent to limit the number of projects eligible for the NEB program to control electricity rates. The Court also determined that the PUC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, including the typical duration of cluster studies and the standard lead times for equipment procurement. The Court concluded that the PUC did not abuse its discretion in denying the exemption, as the delays experienced by Snakeroot were part of the normal interconnection process and not extraordinary. View "Snakeroot Solar, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

McNair v. Johnson

2025-07-14T08:31:46-08:00

Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC plans to build an interstate pipeline through Iowa, passing through Shelby and Story Counties. Both counties enacted ordinances regulating pipelines, including setback, emergency response plan, and local permit requirements. Summit challenged these ordinances, claiming they were preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act (PSA) and Iowa law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit, permanently enjoining the ordinances. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and ruled in favor of Summit, finding that the PSA preempted the counties' ordinances. The court held that the ordinances imposed safety standards, which are under the exclusive regulatory authority of the federal government. The court also found that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa state law, which grants the Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC) the authority to regulate pipeline routes and safety standards. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the PSA preempts the Shelby and Story ordinances' setback, emergency response, and abandonment provisions. The court found that the ordinances' primary motivation was safety, which falls under the exclusive regulatory authority of the federal government. The court also held that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa state law, as they imposed additional requirements that could prohibit pipeline construction even if the IUC had granted a permit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in both cases, but vacated and remanded the judgment in the Story County case to the extent it addressed a repealed ordinance. View "McNair v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Napa

2025-07-08T15:00:54-08:00

The case involves Pacific Bell Telephone Company and other utilities suing the County of Napa and the state Board of Equalization for a refund of property taxes and declaratory relief. The utilities argue that from 2018 to 2023, the tax rates used to compute the debt-service component of their property taxes were higher than those applied to other properties, violating the California Constitution's requirement that public utility property be taxed in the same manner as other property. In the lower court, the trial court sustained the respondents' demurrer to the utilities' complaint without leave to amend, based on the precedent set by the Sixth District Court of Appeal in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the California Constitution does not mandate that public utility property be taxed at the same rate as other property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the respondents. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the reasoning in Santa Clara and another case, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced. The court concluded that the constitutional provision does not require the same or comparable debt-service tax rates for public utility and nonutility property. The court also rejected the utilities' claim that the tax rates violated the principle of taxation uniformity embodied in the California Constitution. The judgment in favor of the respondents was affirmed. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Napa" on Justia Law

Crystal Clear v. HK Baugh Ranch

2025-07-03T04:00:26-08:00

A real estate developer, HK Baugh Ranch, LLC, petitioned the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) to release its undeveloped land, River Bend Ranch, from the certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN) issued to Crystal Clear Special Utility District (Crystal Clear). Crystal Clear, a federally indebted utility district, sued the PUC’s Chair and Commissioners in federal court, alleging that Texas Water Code § 13.2541, which allows for decertification, was preempted by 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). This federal statute protects certain federally indebted utilities from curtailment of their service areas while their loans are outstanding. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction preventing the PUC from decertifying River Bend Ranch. The district court applied the “physical ability” test from Green Valley Special Utility District v. City of Schertz, determining that Crystal Clear likely made its service available to HK Baugh and was thus entitled to the protections of § 1926(b). The court concluded that § 1926(b) likely expressly preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541, resolving the remaining preliminary injunction factors in favor of Crystal Clear. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Crystal Clear would likely satisfy the “physical ability” test. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred in holding that § 1926(b) expressly preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether § 1926(b) otherwise preempts Texas Water Code § 13.2541 and to address all preliminary injunction factors as necessary. The preliminary injunction remains in place pending further proceedings. View "Crystal Clear v. HK Baugh Ranch" on Justia Law

IN RE ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY CO. LLC

2025-06-27T06:19:44-08:00

During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, extreme weather conditions in Texas led to record electricity demand and severe power shortages. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) declared a "Level 3 Emergency" and ordered transmission and distribution utilities (the "Utilities") to cut power to some customers, resulting in widespread outages. Plaintiffs alleged that the Utilities' actions during the storm, including failing to rotate blackouts and cutting power to critical infrastructure, worsened the crisis and violated common-law duties. The plaintiffs filed numerous lawsuits against various participants in the Texas electricity market, including the Utilities, asserting claims of negligence, gross negligence, and nuisance. The cases were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation pretrial court, which dismissed some claims but allowed the gross-negligence and intentional-nuisance claims against the Utilities to proceed. The Utilities sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals, which granted partial relief by dismissing some claims but allowing the gross-negligence and intentional-nuisance claims to continue. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs' pleadings did not sufficiently allege that the Utilities "created" or "maintained" a nuisance, leading to the dismissal of the intentional-nuisance claims with prejudice. The court also found that the pleadings were insufficient to support gross-negligence claims but allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to replead these claims in light of the court's guidance. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to vacate its previous order and dismiss the intentional-nuisance claims while permitting the plaintiffs to amend their gross-negligence claims. View "IN RE ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY CO. LLC" on Justia Law

In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.

2025-06-17T05:10:25-08:00

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. applied to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for an increase in natural gas distribution rates and approval of an alternative-rate plan. The Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) filed an application for rehearing, which PUCO initially extended through a tolling order. However, following a decision in a related case, In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., it was determined that PUCO lacked the authority to issue such tolling orders, meaning the OCC’s application for rehearing was denied by operation of law after 30 days. The OCC did not appeal the denial by operation of law but instead filed a second application for rehearing challenging PUCO’s tolling order practice. After the Moraine Wind decision, PUCO journalized an entry on September 4, 2024, acknowledging the denial by operation of law and closing the case. The OCC then filed a third application for rehearing, which PUCO denied on October 2, 2024. The OCC subsequently filed a notice of appeal on October 25, 2024. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and denied Duke Energy’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that under R.C. 4903.11, the OCC’s appeal was timely because it was filed within 60 days of PUCO’s journalized entry on September 4, 2024, which constituted an “entry upon the journal of the commission of the order denying an application for rehearing.” Thus, the OCC properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction, and the appeal was allowed to proceed. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

The Promenade D'Iberville, LLC v. Jacksonville Electric Authority

2025-06-13T01:28:29-08:00

Promenade D’Iberville, LLC, the owner and developer of a large retail shopping center in D’Iberville, Mississippi, discovered soil issues during construction in 2009. The problems were linked to the use of OPF42, a soil stabilizer containing bed ash from Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA), a Florida public utility. Promenade filed a lawsuit in 2010 in the Harrison County Circuit Court against several parties, including JEA, alleging damages from the defective product. The Harrison County Circuit Court granted JEA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity based on California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt (Hyatt III). The court also held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and comity principles required dismissal due to Florida’s presuit notice and venue requirements. Promenade appealed the decision. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Hyatt III does not apply to JEA, as it is not an arm of the State of Florida but an instrumentality of the City of Jacksonville. The court also determined that neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor comity principles mandated dismissal. The court held that Promenade should be allowed to proceed with its claims against JEA in Mississippi, seeking damages similar to those allowed under Mississippi’s constitution for property damage. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "The Promenade D'Iberville, LLC v. Jacksonville Electric Authority" on Justia Law

Couser v. Shelby County

2025-06-05T07:30:25-08:00

Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC plans to build an interstate pipeline through Iowa, passing through Shelby and Story Counties. Both counties enacted ordinances imposing various requirements on pipelines, including setback, emergency response plan, and local permit requirements. Summit challenged these ordinances, arguing they were preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act (PSA) and Iowa law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit, permanently enjoining the enforcement of the ordinances. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and ruled in favor of Summit, finding that the PSA and Iowa law preempted the counties' ordinances. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinances. The counties appealed the decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the PSA preempts the Shelby and Story County ordinances' setback, emergency response, and abandonment provisions. The court found that the ordinances were safety standards, which are preempted by the PSA. Additionally, the court held that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa law, as they imposed additional requirements that could prohibit pipeline construction even if the Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC) had granted a permit. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in both cases but vacated and remanded the judgment in the Story County case to the extent it addressed a repealed ordinance. View "Couser v. Shelby County" on Justia Law

Gluck v. City and County of San Francisco

2025-05-30T12:31:03-08:00

San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects and treats both wastewater and stormwater. In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 218, which added provisions to the California Constitution requiring voter approval for property-related charges, except for "sewer, water, and refuse collection services." Plaintiffs Robert Gluck and Adam Hertz filed a class action against the City and County of San Francisco, challenging the constitutionality of the City's sewer charges related to stormwater services. They argued that stormwater services funded by the City's sewer charges were not "sewer" services covered by the exception to Proposition 218's voter approval requirement and that the charges failed the proportionality requirement. The trial court sustained the City's demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services falling within the voter approval exception of article XIII D, section 6(c). The court also found that the plaintiffs' fourth cause of action failed because it was based on the premise that stormwater management is not a "sewer service." The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the first three causes of action, agreeing that the City's combined sewer system provides "sewer" services exempt from the voter approval requirement. However, the court reversed the judgment regarding the fourth and fifth causes of action, concluding that the City did not establish that the plaintiffs' allegations regarding the City's reliance on wastewater factors to support charges for stormwater services were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of the proportionality requirement of article XIII D, section 6(b)(3). The case was remanded for further proceedings on these claims. View "Gluck v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v. State

2025-05-30T06:05:21-08:00

A qualified nonresident transmission company challenged an Iowa statute that granted incumbent utilities a right of first refusal (ROFR) for electric transmission projects, arguing it was unconstitutionally enacted. The statute prevented the company from competing for projects. The Iowa District Court for Polk County declared the statute unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution's title and single-subject requirements and issued a permanent injunction against the statute's enforcement. The district court's decision was appealed by the State of Iowa, the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), and two incumbent utilities, MidAmerican Energy Company and ITC Midwest, LLC. They argued that the district court could not retroactively enjoin their participation in projects awarded under the ROFR while the case was pending. They also contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the nonresident company should have challenged the IUB's rule under Iowa Code chapter 17A. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment and permanent injunction. The court held that the ROFR statute was void ab initio due to its unconstitutional enactment. The court determined that the district court had the authority to enjoin the parties from participating in projects awarded under the ROFR, as the incumbents were on notice of the constitutional challenge and no physical construction had begun on the projects. The court also rejected the argument that the IUB's rule could only be challenged under chapter 17A, as the constitutional challenge to the statute inherently invalidated the rule. The court deferred any remaining federal law issues to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). View "LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer

2025-05-29T14:00:58-08:00

Utility companies operating in Placer County, California, filed a complaint against the County and the Board of Equalization, seeking a refund of taxes. They alleged that the tax rate imposed on their state-assessed property was unconstitutionally higher than the rate imposed on locally-assessed property. The tax rate for state-assessed property is calculated under Revenue and Taxation Code section 100, while locally-assessed property is taxed under a different formula. The utility companies argued that this discrepancy violated article XIII, section 19 of the California Constitution, which mandates that utility property be taxed to the same extent and in the same manner as other property. The Superior Court of Placer County sustained the County's demurrer, effectively dismissing the complaint. The trial court relied on the precedent set by the appellate court in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the tax rates imposed on utility property were constitutional. The utility companies acknowledged that the Santa Clara decision was binding on the trial court but maintained that they had a good faith basis for their claims on appeal. The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the utility companies had not established that the trial court erred. The appellate court found that the utility companies did not present a valid basis for defining comparability to state a valid claim. The court noted that while the utility companies argued for comparable tax rates, they failed to provide a clear standard or formula to determine what constitutes comparability. Consequently, the court held that the utility companies did not meet their burden of proving that the County's tax rates were unconstitutional. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer" on Justia Law

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. FERC

2025-05-27T06:32:15-08:00

Petitioners, who own New York’s electric-transmission grid, sought to finance upgrades required when new power sources connect to the grid. This would allow them to raise rates and earn a return on these investments. However, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denied their requests to change the rules prohibiting owner upgrade funding. The transmission owners filed two petitions with FERC on April 9, 2021, under Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act, requesting amendments to the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) to allow them to fund interconnection upgrades. On September 3, 2021, FERC rejected the Section 205 filing, stating that the owners’ agreement with the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) limited their Section 205 rights. FERC also dismissed the Section 206 complaint, concluding that the owners failed to demonstrate that the existing funding mechanism was unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential. The owners’ requests for rehearing were deemed denied by operation of law on November 4, 2021, and FERC issued a new order on March 24, 2022, modifying its original orders. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC’s decisions. The court found that FERC acted reasonably in dismissing the Section 205 filing, as the owners had relinquished their rights to file for changes to the OATT without NYISO’s approval. The court also agreed with FERC’s dismissal of the Section 206 complaint, noting that the owners failed to provide sufficient evidence that the current rates were unjust or unreasonable. The court concluded that FERC’s orders were not arbitrary or capricious and denied the owners’ petitions for review. View "Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. FERC" on Justia Law

Huntington Sanitary Board v. Public Service Commission

2025-05-23T11:17:19-08:00

The case involves the Huntington Sanitary Board (HSB) challenging an order by the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (PSC) that designated HSB as the most suitable capable proximate utility (CPU) to acquire and operate the failing sewer system of the Hubbard Heights subdivision in Wayne County. The sewer system, originally servicing 27 customers, had fallen into disrepair and ceased operations, posing health and environmental risks. The PSC's order was issued under the Distressed and Failing Utilities Act, which aims to remediate struggling utilities. The PSC initiated proceedings after a petition was filed by a former president of the Hubbard Heights Homeowners Association (HOA). The PSC found that the sewer system met the statutory definition of a failing utility and considered various alternatives to acquisition, ultimately determining that acquisition by a CPU was necessary. HSB, along with other utilities, was identified as a potential CPU. The PSC held public and evidentiary hearings, during which no utility expressed willingness to acquire Hubbard Heights. The PSC designated HSB as the most suitable CPU based on its size, financial capacity, and proximity. HSB appealed, arguing that the PSC lacked jurisdiction because the customer count had fallen below the statutory threshold of 25 and that the PSC failed to consider alternatives to acquisition adequately. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case, affirming the PSC's order. The court held that the PSC had continuing jurisdiction over Hubbard Heights despite the reduced customer count, as the utility had not sought to be divested of its status, and the PSC had not relinquished jurisdiction. The court also found that the PSC had considered alternatives and provided a reasoned analysis in designating HSB as the most suitable CPU, complying with the statutory requirements. View "Huntington Sanitary Board v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Gauley River Public Service District v. Public Service Commission

2025-05-22T11:43:25-08:00

Gauley River Public Service District (Gauley River) experienced multiple interruptions in water service to the Mount Olive Correctional Complex (Mt. Olive) over a three-month period. This led the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (Commission) to investigate whether Gauley River was a distressed or failing utility under the Distressed and Failing Utilities Improvement Act. The Commission found Gauley River to be a distressed utility due to its prolonged lack of adequate management and operational deficiencies. The Commission ordered Gauley River to negotiate an operation and maintenance agreement with West Virginia-American Water Company (WVAWC) to provide oversight and managerial control. Gauley River and WVAWC submitted a proposed agreement, but the Commission rejected it, finding it did not meet the required terms. The Commission then ordered the parties to execute a standard operation and maintenance agreement structured by the Commission. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory authority under West Virginia Code § 24-2H-7(b) in ordering Gauley River and WVAWC to implement an alternative to acquisition. The court found that the ordered agreement did not amount to an acquisition of Gauley River by WVAWC but was designed to remediate the utility's deficiencies. The court affirmed the Commission's order, concluding that the terms of the agreement were lawful and necessary to address Gauley River's operational issues. View "Gauley River Public Service District v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. SCC

2025-05-22T04:25:12-08:00

Norfolk Southern Railway Company challenged the constitutionality of Code § 56-16.3, which allows broadband service providers to install fiber optic cables across railroad property. The statute, enacted in 2023, aims to promote broadband expansion in Virginia. Cox Communications filed applications to install fiber optic cables under Norfolk Southern’s tracks, which Norfolk Southern did not initially oppose. However, a dispute arose over the license fees, leading Cox to proceed without a licensing agreement, prompting Norfolk Southern to seek relief from the State Corporation Commission (the “Commission”). The Commission rejected Norfolk Southern’s arguments without a hearing, finding the claims insufficient to establish undue hardship. Norfolk Southern appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which stayed the Commission’s judgment during the appeal. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Code § 56-16.3 violated Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. The court emphasized that eminent domain statutes must be strictly construed and that the burden of proving public use lies with the condemnor. The court found that Code § 56-16.3 did not reference public use and allowed a private company to take property for financial gain, which is not a public use under the Virginia Constitution. The court held that the application of Code § 56-16.3 in this case constituted a taking of Norfolk Southern’s property for a nonpublic use, violating the Virginia Constitution. Consequently, the court reversed the Commission’s judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. SCC" on Justia Law

Edwards v. IPUC

2025-04-24T07:22:13-08:00

Samuel and Peggy Edwards, residents of Rexburg, Idaho, refused to allow PacifiCorp, doing business as Rocky Mountain Power Company, to install a smart electrical meter on their property due to health concerns. Rocky Mountain considered this refusal a violation of its terms of service, which required access to electrical meter bases. After negotiations failed, Rocky Mountain informed the Edwards that their electrical service would be terminated unless they allowed the installation. The Edwards filed a formal complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (PUC), arguing they had not denied access and should be allowed to opt-out of the smart meter installation. The PUC consolidated the Edwards' complaint with similar complaints from other customers and granted Rocky Mountain's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Edwards had not provided evidence that smart meters presented a legitimate safety concern and that Rocky Mountain had the authority to access and replace meters. The Edwards' motion for reconsideration was also dismissed by the PUC, leading them to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed whether the PUC properly determined that Rocky Mountain had the authority to access the Edwards' property to replace the existing meter with a smart meter. The Court affirmed the PUC's decision, concluding that the tariff provisions allowed Rocky Mountain to access and replace meters. The Court also found that the Edwards' constitutional arguments were waived due to insufficient support and authority. The PUC's orders dismissing the Edwards' complaint and denying reconsideration were affirmed. View "Edwards v. IPUC" on Justia Law

DONGKUK S&C CO., LTD. v. US

2025-04-21T07:00:49-08:00

Dongkuk S&C Co., Ltd., a Korean producer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the United States Department of Commerce's final determination that its wind towers were being sold in the United States at less than fair value, resulting in an antidumping duty order. Commerce's investigation covered sales from July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019, and found that Dongkuk's sales were below normal value, leading to the imposition of antidumping duties. The Court of International Trade (CIT) initially remanded Commerce's decision to adjust Dongkuk's steel plate costs, questioning the analytical support for Commerce's determination. Commerce provided additional analysis on remand, demonstrating that the cost variations were due to the timing of steel plate purchases rather than the physical characteristics of the wind towers. The CIT subsequently sustained Commerce's remand redetermination and upheld the choice of surrogate financial data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT's decision. The court held that Commerce's determination to adjust Dongkuk's steel plate costs was supported by substantial evidence, as the cost variations were unrelated to the physical characteristics of the wind towers. Additionally, the court upheld Commerce's use of SeAH Steel Holdings Corporation's consolidated financial statement as a reasonable source of surrogate data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses, despite Dongkuk's preference for SeAH Steel Corporation's standalone financial data. The court found that Commerce's decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. View "DONGKUK S&C CO., LTD. v. US" on Justia Law

Mississippi v. JXN Water

2025-04-10T16:30:15-08:00

The case involves the City of Jackson, Mississippi's water-related utilities, which faced significant failures. The United States and the State of Mississippi brought enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) against the City for violations, including allowing raw sewage to be discharged into waterways and failing to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) orders. The district court appointed a federal receiver, Edward Henefin, as interim third-party manager (ITPM) to manage the City's water and sewer systems. Henefin, operating through JXN Water, Inc., developed new utility rates, including a discount for residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi ruled that the ITPM's rate-setting activities constituted a federal assistance program under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (FNA), thereby allowing access to SNAP recipient data. The United States and Mississippi opposed this, arguing that such disclosure violated the FNA's privacy protections for SNAP recipients. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ITPM's rate-setting activities did not qualify as a federal assistance program under the FNA. The court emphasized that the term "federal assistance program" implies administration by a federal entity, and the ITPM's authority derived from municipal law, not federal law. The court also noted that the statutory history and context supported a narrow interpretation of "federal assistance program." Consequently, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi v. JXN Water" on Justia Law

Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC v. Sorrells

2025-04-04T06:34:03-08:00

Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. (SPU) provides water and sewer services to commercial properties in Bonneville County, Idaho. Donald Sorrells, the owner of a lot in the Sunnyside Industrial & Professional Park, received a "Will Serve" letter from SPU in 2018, agreeing to provide water and sewer services based on his representation that he would install only two restrooms. However, Sorrells installed additional unauthorized water and sewer connections, leading to repeated excessive discharges into SPU's septic system. Despite multiple notices and requests for remediation from SPU, Sorrells failed to address the issues adequately, resulting in SPU seeking a declaratory judgment against him. The District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho found that Sorrells was a persistent violator of SPU's Sewer Rules and Regulations but determined that the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) retained original jurisdiction over SPU's water system. The court denied SPU's requests for costs and attorney fees, leading to appeals from both parties. The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in granting a declaratory judgment to SPU regarding Sorrells' violations of the sewer rules. However, it also upheld the district court's determination that the IPUC initially had jurisdiction over SPU's water system, as SPU had not established its nonprofit status at the time of filing. The court further affirmed the denial of attorney fees and costs to SPU, concluding that the Rules and Regulations did not expressly provide for such fees. On appeal, the Supreme Court declined to consider the merits of Sorrells' arguments due to his failure to comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules. The court also denied SPU's request for attorney fees and costs on appeal, as SPU did not prevail on its cross-appeal. View "Sunnyside Park Utilities, LLC v. Sorrells" on Justia Law

Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist.

2025-04-01T09:03:06-08:00

Great Oaks Water Company, a private water retailer, sued the Santa Clara Valley Water District, alleging that the district’s groundwater pumping charges were unlawful taxes levied without voter approval, violating Proposition 26. Great Oaks argued that the charges exceeded the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and were unfairly allocated, benefiting other water users to which Great Oaks had no access. Additionally, Great Oaks contended that the district’s use of ad valorem property taxes to subsidize agricultural groundwater pumping charges was unconstitutional. The trial court ruled in favor of the water district, finding that the groundwater charges did not exceed the costs of the district’s overall water management program. The court held that it was reasonable to use these charges to pay for the program because non-agricultural groundwater pumpers, like Great Oaks, received significant benefits from it. The charges were deemed reasonably allocated on a volumetric basis, and the agricultural discount was found constitutionally valid as it was funded by ad valorem property taxes, not by non-agricultural pumpers. The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court concluded that the groundwater charges were not “taxes” under Proposition 26 because they fell under exceptions for specific benefits conferred or government services provided directly to the payor. The court found that the water district proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges were no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity and that the costs were fairly allocated to Great Oaks. The court also upheld the use of ad valorem taxes to fund the agricultural discount, finding no violation of the California Constitution or the Water Code. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Various Insurers, Reinsurers and Retrocessionaires v. General Electric International, Inc.

2025-03-18T05:30:54-08:00

A catastrophic turbine failure occurred at the Hadjret En Nouss Power Plant in Tipaza, Algeria. The plant is owned by Shariket Kahraba Hadjret En Nouss (SKH), which is jointly owned by the Algerian government and Algerian Utilities International Ltd. SNC-Lavalin Contructeurs International Inc. (SNC) operated the plant on behalf of SKH. SNC entered into multiple contracts with various General Electric entities, including a Services Contract with General Electric International, which contained an arbitration clause. The insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessionaires (collectively the "Insurers") initiated litigation as subrogees of SKH against General Electric International, General Electric Company, GE Power, and GE Power Services Engineering (collectively the "GE Entities") in Georgia's state-wide business court. The GE Entities removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the Services Contract. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the motion, concluding that SKH was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SKH, as the plant's owner, was a third-party beneficiary of the Services Contract. Consequently, the Insurers, as subrogees of SKH, were bound by the arbitration clause. The court also affirmed that any questions regarding the arbitrability of specific claims should be resolved by the arbitrator, as the Services Contract incorporated the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which delegate such decisions to the arbitrator. View "Various Insurers, Reinsurers and Retrocessionaires v. General Electric International, Inc." on Justia Law

Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced

2025-03-17T15:01:32-08:00

The case involves five public utilities operating in California, including Pacific Bell Telephone Company and AT&T Mobility LLC, which challenged the property tax rates imposed by Merced County for the fiscal years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. The utilities argued that the tax rates applied to their properties exceeded the permissible rates under Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution, which they interpreted as requiring utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property. In the Superior Court of Merced County, the utilities sought partial refunds of the property taxes paid, claiming that the tax rates levied on them were higher than the average tax rates in the county. The County demurred, relying on the precedent set by the Sixth District in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that Section 19 does not mandate the same tax rate for utility property as for locally assessed property. The utilities conceded that Santa Clara was binding but sought to challenge its holding on appeal. The Superior Court dismissed the case, and the utilities filed a timely notice of appeal. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that Section 19 of Article XIII of the California Constitution does not require utility property to be taxed at the same rate as non-utility property. Instead, the court interpreted the relevant language as an enabling clause, allowing utility property to be subject to taxation, rather than a limiting clause mandating equal tax rates. The court found that the historical context, language, and structure of Section 19 supported this interpretation, and thus, Merced County's application of the tax rates did not violate the constitutional provision. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Merced" on Justia Law

Cole v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission

2025-03-14T09:35:13-08:00

Sherry Cole filed a formal complaint against Rocky Mountain Power (RMP) alleging she had been overbilled due to her power meter being cross-connected with her neighbor’s. Initially, an RMP employee confirmed the cross-connection and credited her account with $1,256.45. However, subsequent tests revealed no cross-connection, leading RMP to remove the credit and instead apply a $450 credit for the inconvenience. Cole then filed a formal complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, which dismissed her complaint due to lack of evidence of overcharging. Cole's motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Idaho Public Utilities Commission reviewed Cole’s complaint and RMP’s response, which included calculations of her energy usage and an affidavit from an investigator who found no cross-connection. The Commission dismissed Cole’s complaint, finding no evidence of overcharging, and denied her petition for reconsideration, stating she failed to demonstrate the dismissal was unreasonable or unlawful. Cole appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, asserting multiple errors. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the Commission’s decisions. The Court found that the Commission’s findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence, including the investigator’s analysis and the results of two breaker tests. The Court also held that Cole’s constitutional arguments were waived as they were raised for the first time on appeal and were not supported by sufficient legal authority. Additionally, the Court ruled that pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney fees, and since Cole appeared pro se and did not prevail, she was not awarded attorney fees. View "Cole v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Volcano Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission

2025-03-13T13:31:43-08:00

Volcano Telephone Company, a rural telephone service provider, receives subsidies from the California High-Cost Fund-A (A-Fund) administered by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Volcano Vision, Inc., an affiliate, uses Volcano Telephone’s broadband-capable facilities, subsidized by the A-Fund, to deliver broadband services without contributing to the underlying costs. The PUC considered Volcano Vision’s net revenues in setting Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and future rates. The PUC also required Volcano Telephone to submit broadband service quality metrics related to Volcano Vision’s services. The PUC issued Decision No. 23-02-008, calculating Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and approving rates for 2023. Volcano Telephone and Volcano Vision challenged this decision, arguing that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation constituted an unconstitutional taking and conflicted with federal law. They also contended that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was outside the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The PUC denied rehearing and modified the decision to clarify the reporting requirements. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected the petitioners’ claims, affirming Decision Nos. 23-02-008 and 23-08-051. The court held that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking, as the A-Fund program is voluntary, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the rate of return was confiscatory. The court also found that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was within the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The court concluded that the PUC’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence and did not violate any constitutional rights. View "Volcano Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc.

2025-03-13T09:01:37-08:00

Plaintiffs, LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC, and affiliates, sought to build and operate interstate electricity transmission lines in Indiana. An Indiana statute granted incumbent electric companies the right of first refusal to build and operate new interstate transmission facilities connecting to their existing facilities. Plaintiffs argued that this statute violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) Commissioners from enforcing the statute. The IURC Commissioners and several intervening defendants appealed the injunction. They argued that the IURC did not enforce the rights of first refusal and that the injunction would not redress plaintiffs' injuries. The district court had found that plaintiffs had standing because it believed the IURC enforced the rights of first refusal and that an injunction would prevent MISO from recognizing the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the IURC had no relevant responsibilities for enforcing the challenged statute and that any genuine redress would have to operate against MISO, a non-governmental entity not party to the lawsuit. The court noted that MISO had made clear it would not respond to the preliminary injunction as plaintiffs and the district court expected. The court also rejected a dissenting opinion's novel theory of standing, which was not presented by plaintiffs or adopted by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law

OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE

2025-03-04T09:38:55-08:00

In the spring of 2018, People's Electric Cooperative and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) submitted competing bids to provide retail electric service to the Tall Oak Woodford Cryo Plant in Coal County, Oklahoma. The Plant is located in People's certified territory, which grants them exclusive rights to provide electricity under the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA). OG&E's proposal relied on the Large Load exception to RESCTA, which allows a supplier to extend its service into another supplier's territory for large-load customers. OG&E used third-party transmission facilities to provide service to the Plant without extending its own distribution lines. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission enjoined OG&E from serving the Plant, finding that OG&E was not "extending its service" as authorized by RESCTA. The Commission determined that a retail electric supplier may not use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory under the Large Load exception. OG&E appealed the decision. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and upheld the Commission's determination. The Court held that Article 9, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution requires a limited review of the Commission's order. The Court affirmed the Commission's interpretation that the Large Load exception does not permit a supplier to use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory. The Court's decision applies prospectively only and does not affect existing retail electric services and facilities established under the Large Load exception. View "OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE" on Justia Law

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist.

2025-01-31T10:01:33-08:00

The Coachella Valley Water District (Water District) appealed a judgment finding that the rates it charged for Coachella Canal water violated Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The Water District argued that the rates were lawful and that no refund remedy was authorized. The court rejected both arguments, finding the rates unlawful and that a refund remedy was constitutionally mandated. In the lower court, the Superior Court of Riverside County ruled that the Water District's Canal Water rates and the Irrigation Water Availability Assessment (IWAA) violated Proposition 218. The court found that the Water District's historical priority argument was not persuasive and that the Water District had made no attempt to show that the rates complied with the California Constitution. The court deferred ruling on remedies and later awarded Class 2 customers approximately $17.5 million in refunds and interest for invalid charges from March 2018 through June 2022. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) had standing to challenge the Class 2 rates because domestic customers paid the rates indirectly. The court found that the Class 2 rates were taxes under Article XIII C and did not fall under any exceptions. The court rejected the Water District's arguments that the rates were justified based on historical priority and that they were expenditures of funds. The court also found that the IWAA was an assessment under Proposition 218 and that the Water District failed to show it was proportional to the benefits conferred on the properties. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling on liability and the amount of refund relief awarded. However, the court found that the injunction in the judgment was overbroad and modified the judgment to strike the paragraph enjoining the Water District from imposing any future Canal Water rates and charges that did not comply with Proposition 218. As modified, the judgment was affirmed, and Howard Jarvis was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue

2025-01-31T09:30:53-08:00

San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) owns an interstate electric transmission line running from Arizona to California. The Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) is responsible for valuing SDG&E's property in Arizona for tax purposes. In 2020, SDG&E reported a net "original plant in service" valuation of $48,817,396 and a net "related accumulated provision for depreciation" amount of $51,446,397, resulting in a negative valuation of $2,629,001. ADOR disagreed with this calculation and determined a different accumulated depreciation amount, resulting in a positive valuation. The Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of SDG&E, finding that their valuation correctly followed the statutory requirements. ADOR appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision, holding that the statute did not permit a negative valuation for a plant in service and that accumulated depreciation could not reduce the full cash value to a negative number. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the calculation prescribed by the statute for determining a reduced plant in service cost does not preclude a negative valuation. The Court found that the statutory language did not limit the reduction of the original plant in service cost by accumulated depreciation to a non-negative number. Additionally, the Court clarified that a negative valuation for one component, when summed with other component valuations, reduces the overall full cash value but does not "offset" the valuation of other components. The Supreme Court vacated the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the Tax Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of SDG&E. View "San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

WALTON ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

2025-01-28T06:02:07-08:00

In 2019, Nestle Purina Petcare Company sought to switch its electric supplier for its facility in Hartwell, Georgia, from Georgia Power Company to Walton Electric Membership Corporation. Georgia Power objected, citing the Territorial Electric Service Act, arguing that the premises were not new and did not meet the requirements to switch suppliers. Georgia Power contended that the premises had long been a manufacturing and warehousing facility and that the changes made by Nestle did not amount to the premises being "destroyed or dismantled" as required by the Act. The Georgia Public Service Commission (the "Commission") ruled in favor of Nestle, concluding that the premises were "destroyed or dismantled" and not "reconstructed in substantial kind," allowing Nestle to switch to Walton EMC. The superior court reversed this decision, finding that the premises were not "destroyed or dismantled" and that the modifications did not meet the statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion. The Court determined that the Commission's decision should have been upheld. The Court held that "destroyed or dismantled" does not require complete destruction but can include substantial dismantling or stripping away of significant components. The Court also found that the premises were not "reconstructed in substantial kind" due to the significant differences in structure and function between the old and new facilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing Nestle to switch its electric supplier to Walton EMC. View "WALTON ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY" on Justia Law

City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission

2025-01-14T11:31:16-08:00

The City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority challenged a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to issue a phase I driverless autonomous vehicle (AV) deployment permit to Waymo, LLC for fared passenger service in San Francisco and parts of San Mateo County. The petitioners argued that the PUC failed to follow the law and disregarded significant public safety issues. However, the record showed that the PUC considered and responded to the safety concerns raised by the petitioners, noting that few incidents involved Waymo driverless AVs, each was minor, and none involved injuries. The PUC had previously issued a decision establishing a pilot program for the regulation of AV passenger carriers, which included both drivered and driverless AVs. The petitioners participated in these proceedings but did not challenge the decision at that time. Waymo submitted an advice letter in December 2022 seeking a phase I driverless AV deployment permit, which was protested by the San Francisco entities. The PUC's Consumer Protection and Enforcement Division circulated a draft resolution authorizing Waymo's permit, and after considering comments and holding meetings, the PUC issued a final resolution in August 2023, authorizing Waymo to provide fared driverless AV service. The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that the PUC acted within its authority and did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the PUC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including data showing that Waymo driverless AVs had not been involved in any collisions resulting in injuries. The court also upheld the PUC's use of the advice letter process, as it was authorized by the PUC's prior decision. The court denied the relief requested by the petitioners, affirming the PUC's decision to issue the phase I driverless AV deployment permit to Waymo. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Holcim U.S. Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n

2025-01-14T06:10:54-08:00

During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, Black Hills Colorado Electric LLC incurred extraordinary natural gas costs to ensure continuous electric service to its customers. Holcim U.S. Inc., a large retail electric customer, argued that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) set an unjust and unreasonable charge for electricity over a five-day period, disproportionately allocating utility costs to Holcim. Holcim also claimed that the PUC's charge constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court for the City and County of Denver upheld the PUC's decision, finding that the rate was just and reasonable and did not violate Holcim's constitutional rights. The court noted that the PUC's rate structure was based on total customer usage forecasts and was applied uniformly to all customers. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the PUC's rate was just and reasonable, as it accurately reflected the cost of service, distributed costs among customers fairly, and maintained the utility's financial integrity. The court also found that Holcim's actual electricity usage during the storm did not impact the costs incurred by Black Hills, which were based on forecasted needs. Additionally, the court rejected Holcim's constitutional claims. It concluded that Holcim did not adequately develop its takings claim and that the PUC's decision did not violate Holcim's due process rights, as the PUC provided a fair hearing, considered competent evidence, and made its determination based on evidence rather than arbitrarily. View "Holcim U.S. Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

City of Gridley v. Superior Ct.

2025-01-01T09:14:25-08:00

The City of Gridley operates an electric utility that provides electricity to local residents. In September 2020, the city council approved a reduction in electric rates for residential users. Plaintiffs, who are residential ratepayers, challenged these rates, alleging they constituted a tax because the charges exceeded the reasonable cost of providing electric service, violating article XIII C of the California Constitution. They also claimed the rates violated the state and federal takings clauses under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate and class action complaint, alleging the City set rates higher than necessary and transferred excess revenues to its general fund. The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact regarding whether the rates resulted in excessive charges and whether the transfers to the general fund were financed by rate revenues. The court also found that plaintiffs could challenge the rate changes under article XIII C, even though the City’s action decreased rates. For the takings claim, the court found triable issues of fact regarding plaintiffs' property interest in continued electric service. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that article XIII C was inapplicable because the City did not impose, extend, or increase any tax when it approved reduced rates. The court also found the unconstitutional conditions doctrine inapplicable, as it applies only in the land-use permitting context, not to user fees like the electric rates in question. The court directed the trial court to set aside its order denying the City’s motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion. The City was entitled to recover its costs. View "City of Gridley v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Burton v. Campbell

2025-01-01T09:13:27-08:00

In 2021, the San Diego City Council approved new franchise agreements granting San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) the exclusive right to provide gas and electric services in San Diego. Kathryn Burton, a San Diego resident, filed a lawsuit against the City and the Council members, alleging a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Burton claimed that the Council members had discussed and agreed on their votes in a "secret serial meeting" using the mayor as an intermediary before approving the agreements. The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed SDG&E to intervene as a defendant. SDG&E, along with the City defendants, moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, concluding that Burton failed to comply with the Brown Act's requirement to make a prelitigation demand to the legislative body to cure or correct the alleged violation. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. Burton argued that she had satisfied the demand requirement through letters sent by her later-hired attorney, Maria Severson. However, the court found that Severson's letters did not mention Burton and were not sent on her behalf. The court held that Burton did not comply with the statutory requirement to make a demand before filing the lawsuit, as required by section 54960.1 of the Government Code. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that Burton's appeal lacked merit due to her failure to comply with the demand requirement. The court also found that Burton's challenge to the order allowing SDG&E to intervene was moot, as the summary judgment was properly granted regardless of SDG&E's participation. View "Burton v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Cole v. IPUC

2024-12-20T08:35:31-08:00

Sherry Cole filed a formal complaint against Rocky Mountain Power (RMP) alleging she had been overbilled due to her power meter being cross-connected with her neighbor’s. Initially, an RMP employee confirmed the cross-connection and credited her account with $1,256.45. However, subsequent tests revealed no cross-connection, leading RMP to remove the credit and instead apply a $450 credit for the inconvenience. Cole then filed a complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, which dismissed her complaint due to lack of evidence of overcharging. Cole's motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Commission. Cole appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Commission had reviewed Cole’s complaint, RMP’s billing calculations, and an analysis by Jon Kruck, an investigator, which concluded that Cole’s energy usage was consistent and did not indicate a cross-connection. The Commission found no substantial evidence supporting Cole’s claims and dismissed her complaint. Cole’s petition for reconsideration was denied as she failed to present new evidence or demonstrate that the dismissal was unreasonable or unlawful. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, finding that the Commission’s factual findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Court noted that Cole relied on anecdotal evidence and did not provide sufficient proof to counter the Commission’s findings. Additionally, the Court held that Cole’s constitutional arguments were waived as they were raised for the first time on appeal and were not supported by sufficient legal authority. The Court also denied Cole’s request for attorney fees, as pro se litigants are not entitled to such fees. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission dismissing Cole’s complaint and denying her petition for reconsideration. View "Cole v. IPUC" on Justia Law

Aenergy, S.A. v. Republic of Angola

2024-12-20T08:01:11-08:00

Aenergy, S.A. (Aenergy) sought damages from the Republic of Angola for unpaid work related to power turbines to be installed in Angola. Aenergy had previously entered into contracts with Angolan utility subsidiaries to construct, supply, and maintain power plants and water infrastructure. The contracts involved General Electric (GE) turbines and were financed by a credit line from GE Capital. Aenergy alleged that a GE accounting error led to forged contract amendments, resulting in the Angolan government terminating the contracts and seizing turbines. Aenergy initially filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), which dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. The court found that Angola was an adequate alternative forum for the dispute. The Second Circuit affirmed this decision, emphasizing that Aenergy could bring similar claims in Angola, even if the breach-of-contract claim was time-barred. Aenergy's requests for rehearing and certiorari were denied. Aenergy then filed a new lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, focusing on breach of contract for unpaid work. The district court dismissed the case, citing issue preclusion based on the prior SDNY and Second Circuit rulings. The court also conducted a fresh forum non conveniens analysis, concluding that Angola remained the appropriate forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that issue preclusion applied because the adequacy of Angola as an alternative forum had already been determined in the previous litigation. The court found that Aenergy's trimmed-down complaint did not change the forum non conveniens analysis, and the Supreme Court of Angola's subsequent dismissal of Aenergy's administrative action did not alter the adequacy of Angola as a forum. View "Aenergy, S.A. v. Republic of Angola" on Justia Law

Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Duke Energy Indiana, LLC

2024-12-19T11:32:45-08:00

The case involves the regulatory approval of Duke Energy Indiana, LLC's proposed infrastructure improvements under the TDSIC statute, which allows utilities to recoup costs of approved improvements as they are completed. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approved Duke's TDSIC plan, finding it reasonable. The key issue on appeal was the interpretation of the statute's cost-justification section: whether each improvement must be cost-justified individually or whether all improvements combined must be cost-justified. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approved Duke's plan, interpreting the statute to mean that the overall plan must be cost-justified. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, applying a deferential standard of review to the Commission's interpretation. The appellants, including the Indiana Office of Utility Consumer Counselor and other groups, argued that the statute requires each individual improvement to be cost-justified. The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the scope of the Commission's authority to approve a TDSIC plan is a question of law, requiring plenary review rather than deference to the Commission's interpretation. The Court concluded that the Commission must determine whether each individual improvement within a TDSIC plan is cost-justified. However, the Court found that the Commission had made the required determination in this case, as it considered the benefits of individual projects, including those with a benefit-to-cost ratio below 1.0, and concluded that the overall plan was reasonable. Therefore, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order approving Duke's TDSIC plan. View "Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Duke Energy Indiana, LLC" on Justia Law

Hollis v. City of LaGrange

2024-12-10T05:32:17-08:00

Plaintiffs Lonnie Hollis and Mason’s World Bar & Grill, LLC, filed a putative class action against the City of LaGrange, alleging that the City imposed excessive mandatory charges for utilities services, which they argued constituted an unauthorized tax under the Georgia Constitution. The plaintiffs claimed that the charges generated profits exceeding the actual cost of providing the services and were used to raise general revenues for the City, effectively making them illegal taxes. They sought a refund of these alleged illegal taxes, a declaration that the charges were illegal, and an injunction to prevent the City from continuing to impose such charges. The trial court granted the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the Georgia Constitution prohibited the court from regulating the utilities charges. The court concluded that because the Georgia Constitution prevents the General Assembly from regulating or fixing charges of public utilities owned or operated by municipalities, the court similarly lacked the authority to review the plaintiffs’ claims. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision in question, which restricts the General Assembly from regulating or fixing municipal utility charges, does not apply to the judicial branch. The plaintiffs’ claims required the court to exercise its judicial authority to determine whether the charges constituted illegal taxes, not to regulate or fix the charges. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court must address the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without misinterpreting the constitutional limitations on its authority. View "Hollis v. City of LaGrange" on Justia Law

Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. Webb

2024-12-04T08:30:21-08:00

Entergy Arkansas, LLC, a public utility company, challenged an order by the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC) regarding the allocation of costs from a refund mandated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Entergy Arkansas made short-term opportunity sales to third-party wholesale customers, which led to a complaint by the Louisiana Public Service Commission. FERC ruled that Entergy Arkansas violated the System operating agreement, resulting in a net refund of approximately $135 million to other System members. Entergy Arkansas sought to recover these costs from its retail customers, but the APSC denied the request and ordered Entergy Arkansas to refund a portion to its retail customers. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld the APSC's order after a bench trial, finding that it did not violate Arkansas law, the filed rate doctrine, or the dormant Commerce Clause. Entergy Arkansas appealed, arguing that the APSC's order violated the filed rate doctrine by trapping costs and improperly allocating the bandwidth adjustment. They also contended that the order violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce and imposing excessive burdens. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the filed rate doctrine did not apply because FERC did not preemptively decide the cost allocation of the refund. FERC explicitly left the allocation of costs to state commissions. Additionally, the court found that the APSC's order did not discriminate against interstate commerce or impose excessive burdens, as it was not driven by economic protectionism and any negative effects were speculative. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the APSC's order. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. Webb" on Justia Law