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	<title>Securities Law - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
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	<updated>2026-07-08T20:57:15-08:00</updated>
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	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-2728/25-2728-2026-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>20230930-DK-BUTTERFLY-1,INC. v. HBC Invs. LLC</title>
        	<updated>2026-07-07T07:00:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-07T07:00:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-2728/25-2728-2026-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company that had succeeded Bed Bath &amp; Beyond after bankruptcy sued two investment entities, asserting that they owed the company profits made from short-term trading of its stock. Before the bankruptcy, Bed Bath &amp; Beyond had sold derivative securities to the investment entities, giving them the right to acquire large amounts of its stock at a discount. However, the contracts for these derivatives included “blocker” provisions, which stated that the investment entities could not acquire more than 9.99% of the company’s stock at any time. The investment entities repeatedly exercised their rights under these contracts, buying and selling shares while maintaining their holdings below the 10% threshold.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case after the successor company filed suit, arguing that the contractual blockers were illusory and that, in substance, the investment entities effectively had the right to acquire more than 10% of the stock, triggering liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the blockers were valid and shielded the defendants from section 16(b) liability.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that effective and enforceable contractual blockers, which cap an investor&#039;s beneficial ownership below 10% and are not sham provisions, prevent section 16(b) liability for short-swing profits. The court found no plausible allegations that the blockers were illusory or that the investment entities ever exceeded the 10% threshold. The Court of Appeals also rejected arguments that the parties’ contractual arrangements were part of a scheme to evade regulatory obligations. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-2728/25-2728-2026-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "20230930-DK-BUTTERFLY-1,INC. v. HBC Invs. LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company that had succeeded Bed Bath &amp; Beyond after bankruptcy sued two investment entities, asserting that they owed the company profits made from short-term trading of its stock. Before the bankruptcy, Bed Bath &amp; Beyond had sold derivative securities to the investment entities, giving them the right to acquire large amounts of its stock at a discount. However, the contracts for these derivatives included “blocker” provisions, which stated that the investment entities could not acquire more than 9.99% of the company’s stock at any time. The investment entities repeatedly exercised their rights under these contracts, buying and selling shares while maintaining their holdings below the 10% threshold.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case after the successor company filed suit, arguing that the contractual blockers were illusory and that, in substance, the investment entities effectively had the right to acquire more than 10% of the stock, triggering liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the blockers were valid and shielded the defendants from section 16(b) liability.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that effective and enforceable contractual blockers, which cap an investor&#039;s beneficial ownership below 10% and are not sham provisions, prevent section 16(b) liability for short-swing profits. The court found no plausible allegations that the blockers were illusory or that the investment entities ever exceeded the 10% threshold. The Court of Appeals also rejected arguments that the parties’ contractual arrangements were part of a scheme to evade regulatory obligations. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Sullivan</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1752/25-1752-2026-06-26.html</id>
        	<title>Huey v. Anavex Life Sciences Corporation</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-26T06:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-26T06:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1752/25-1752-2026-06-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An investor in a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company filed a proposed class action against the company and its CEO, alleging securities fraud. The plaintiff claimed that the company misled investors by suggesting that the FDA had approved their methodology for measuring a drug’s efficacy in clinical trials. The alleged misrepresentation was made in a press release that communicated the FDA’s input on the study’s endpoints, but, according to the plaintiff, failed to disclose that the FDA found the methodology unacceptable. When the company later announced it would not use the disputed methodology, the share price initially increased. A decline in the share price occurred over the next two days, during which the stock moved in line with the general market.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead loss causation, an essential element of a securities fraud claim. The court noted that the share price rose on the day of the corrective disclosure and only declined later, in tandem with the broader market. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiff did not plausibly allege loss causation. It explained that when a stock price does not fall immediately after a corrective disclosure, and a later decline coincides with general market losses, a plaintiff must provide a plausible explanation linking the loss to the alleged fraud. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denial of leave to amend. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1752/25-1752-2026-06-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Huey v. Anavex Life Sciences Corporation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An investor in a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company filed a proposed class action against the company and its CEO, alleging securities fraud. The plaintiff claimed that the company misled investors by suggesting that the FDA had approved their methodology for measuring a drug’s efficacy in clinical trials. The alleged misrepresentation was made in a press release that communicated the FDA’s input on the study’s endpoints, but, according to the plaintiff, failed to disclose that the FDA found the methodology unacceptable. When the company later announced it would not use the disputed methodology, the share price initially increased. A decline in the share price occurred over the next two days, during which the stock moved in line with the general market.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead loss causation, an essential element of a securities fraud claim. The court noted that the share price rose on the day of the corrective disclosure and only declined later, in tandem with the broader market. The district court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiff did not plausibly allege loss causation. It explained that when a stock price does not fall immediately after a corrective disclosure, and a later decline coincides with general market losses, a plaintiff must provide a plausible explanation linking the loss to the alleged fraud. Because the plaintiff failed to do so, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denial of leave to amend.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Guido Calabresi</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2026/2024-1290.html</id>
        	<title>Bitounis v. Interactive Brokers, L.L.C.</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T05:01:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T05:01:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2026/2024-1290.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of investors lost money after purchasing interests in a hedge fund operated by Constantine Antonas between 2015 and 2021. Antonas was not a registered investment adviser and did not qualify for an exemption from registration. He solicited investments using a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) that identified a brokerage firm as the fund’s broker, which the investors claimed gave legitimacy to the scheme. After collecting approximately $25 million, Antonas lost nearly all the funds through speculative trades and died in 2021, leaving the investors without recourse against him.

The investors filed suit in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against the brokerage firm, alleging that it had participated in or aided Antonas&#039;s unlawful sale of securities in violation of Ohio law, specifically R.C. 1707.43(A). They argued that because the brokerage firm reviewed the PPM and performed routine account setup and compliance procedures before and after the fund’s account was opened, it should be liable for their losses. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. However, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the investors&#039; allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under R.C. 1707.43(A).

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that R.C. 1707.43(A) does not impose liability on a brokerage firm for routine business activities performed after an unlawful sale of securities has occurred. The Court found no nexus between the brokerage firm&#039;s conduct and the solicitation, negotiation, or execution of the specific securities sales to the investors. As a result, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the amended complaint. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/supreme-court-of-ohio/2026/2024-1290.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bitounis v. Interactive Brokers, L.L.C." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of investors lost money after purchasing interests in a hedge fund operated by Constantine Antonas between 2015 and 2021. Antonas was not a registered investment adviser and did not qualify for an exemption from registration. He solicited investments using a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) that identified a brokerage firm as the fund’s broker, which the investors claimed gave legitimacy to the scheme. After collecting approximately $25 million, Antonas lost nearly all the funds through speculative trades and died in 2021, leaving the investors without recourse against him.

The investors filed suit in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against the brokerage firm, alleging that it had participated in or aided Antonas&#039;s unlawful sale of securities in violation of Ohio law, specifically R.C. 1707.43(A). They argued that because the brokerage firm reviewed the PPM and performed routine account setup and compliance procedures before and after the fund’s account was opened, it should be liable for their losses. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. However, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the investors&#039; allegations were sufficient to state a claim for relief under R.C. 1707.43(A).

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that R.C. 1707.43(A) does not impose liability on a brokerage firm for routine business activities performed after an unlawful sale of securities has occurred. The Court found no nexus between the brokerage firm&#039;s conduct and the solicitation, negotiation, or execution of the specific securities sales to the investors. As a result, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the amended complaint.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Ohio</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Ohio</case:court>
							<case:judge>Megan Shanahan</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Ohio"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-961/24-961-2026-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>U.S. v. Bankman-Fried</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-12T14:00:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-12T14:00:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-961/24-961-2026-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns actions taken by the former CEO of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange and a related trading firm. The defendant, who exercised substantial control over both entities, was accused of misappropriating billions of dollars of customer funds. These funds, which customers believed would be safely held and used only for authorized transactions, were instead funneled to the trading firm and used for various unauthorized purposes, including investments, political contributions, and purchases of real estate. The collapse of cryptocurrency markets in 2022, followed by a rapid loss of customer confidence and mass withdrawals, ultimately led to the bankruptcy of both the exchange and the trading firm.

After the bankruptcy, the defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on several counts of fraud and conspiracy. The government’s case was supported by testimony from the defendant’s close associates, who described how the defendant orchestrated the transfer and misuse of customer funds, and by business records and communications. The defendant argued that he believed all customers would ultimately be repaid and that he acted in good faith. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 25 years in prison, imposed a three-year term of supervised release, and ordered a forfeiture of approximately $11 billion.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant challenged the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, discovery-related decisions, and the forfeiture order. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, instructions, or discovery decisions, and that the forfeiture was authorized and not constitutionally excessive. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-961/24-961-2026-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "U.S. v. Bankman-Fried" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns actions taken by the former CEO of a prominent cryptocurrency exchange and a related trading firm. The defendant, who exercised substantial control over both entities, was accused of misappropriating billions of dollars of customer funds. These funds, which customers believed would be safely held and used only for authorized transactions, were instead funneled to the trading firm and used for various unauthorized purposes, including investments, political contributions, and purchases of real estate. The collapse of cryptocurrency markets in 2022, followed by a rapid loss of customer confidence and mass withdrawals, ultimately led to the bankruptcy of both the exchange and the trading firm.

After the bankruptcy, the defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on several counts of fraud and conspiracy. The government’s case was supported by testimony from the defendant’s close associates, who described how the defendant orchestrated the transfer and misuse of customer funds, and by business records and communications. The defendant argued that he believed all customers would ultimately be repaid and that he acted in good faith. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 25 years in prison, imposed a three-year term of supervised release, and ordered a forfeiture of approximately $11 billion.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant challenged the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, discovery-related decisions, and the forfeiture order. The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, instructions, or discovery decisions, and that the forfeiture was authorized and not constitutionally excessive. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Barrington Parker, Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-345/</id>
        	<title>FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd.</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-11T06:45:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-11T06:45:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-345/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several investment companies managing closed-end mutual funds, incorporated in Maryland, adopted resolutions under the Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act (MCSAA) to limit the voting rights of shareholders who accumulate a large percentage of shares, such as activist investors. Saba Capital, an activist investor, sought to acquire significant stakes in these funds to influence their management. Saba challenged the funds’ resolutions, alleging they violated the Investment Company Act’s (ICA) requirement that every share of stock have equal voting rights. Saba based its legal claim on Section 47(b) of the ICA, which addresses rescission of contracts that violate the Act.

The United States District Court ruled in Saba’s favor, holding that Section 47(b) of the ICA creates an implied private right of action that allows private parties to sue for rescission of contracts allegedly violating the ICA. The District Court granted summary judgment to Saba on this basis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarily affirmed the District Court’s decision.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to resolve a circuit split regarding whether Section 47(b) of the ICA impliedly authorizes private parties to sue for rescission. The Court held that Section 47(b) does not confer an implied private right of action. The Court reasoned that the provision directs courts on how to exercise remedial authority in cases already before them but does not create a right for private parties to initiate such suits. The statutory text and structure, including the explicit enforcement roles given to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the existence of other express private rights of action in the ICA, further supported this conclusion. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-345/" target="_blank"&gt;View "FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several investment companies managing closed-end mutual funds, incorporated in Maryland, adopted resolutions under the Maryland Control Share Acquisition Act (MCSAA) to limit the voting rights of shareholders who accumulate a large percentage of shares, such as activist investors. Saba Capital, an activist investor, sought to acquire significant stakes in these funds to influence their management. Saba challenged the funds’ resolutions, alleging they violated the Investment Company Act’s (ICA) requirement that every share of stock have equal voting rights. Saba based its legal claim on Section 47(b) of the ICA, which addresses rescission of contracts that violate the Act.

The United States District Court ruled in Saba’s favor, holding that Section 47(b) of the ICA creates an implied private right of action that allows private parties to sue for rescission of contracts allegedly violating the ICA. The District Court granted summary judgment to Saba on this basis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarily affirmed the District Court’s decision.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to resolve a circuit split regarding whether Section 47(b) of the ICA impliedly authorizes private parties to sue for rescission. The Court held that Section 47(b) does not confer an implied private right of action. The Court reasoned that the provision directs courts on how to exercise remedial authority in cases already before them but does not create a right for private parties to initiate such suits. The statutory text and structure, including the explicit enforcement roles given to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the existence of other express private rights of action in the ICA, further supported this conclusion. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of any contract that allegedly violates the Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Amy Coney Barrett</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2026/2026-me-54.html</id>
        	<title>State of Maine v. Flynn</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-09T08:39:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-09T08:39:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2026/2026-me-54.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant created a company called Icy Gulch Resources, LLC, and solicited investments from five individuals through subscription agreements and short-term loans—both considered securities under Maine law. She misrepresented Icy Gulch’s involvement in several ventures, including falsely claiming a stake in the Sudanese gum arabic market, and asserted that wealthy individuals were participating in the deals. Contrary to these representations, Icy Gulch held no such interests, and there was no plan for financial benefit for the investors. The defendant also comingled investor funds with personal assets and spent substantial amounts on personal expenses without disclosure or permission. The total invested by the five individuals was $786,000, with $936,000 invested across all her projects, none of which was returned or yielded any profit.

In May 2019, the State charged the defendant in the Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket with theft by deception and securities fraud. Before trial, the court ruled that evidence of a 2012 indictment for similar conduct could be used only if the defendant claimed ignorance about the misuse of investor funds. The defendant waived her right to a jury trial on the securities fraud charge, which was tried by the judge, while the theft charge went to a jury. The jury convicted her of theft by deception; the judge found her guilty of securities fraud. The court denied her post-trial motions and imposed concurrent sentences, with partial suspension.

On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The Court held that sufficient evidence supported both convictions, as the record demonstrated deception, material misrepresentations, and misuse of funds. The Court found that arguments regarding hearsay were waived for lack of specific identification and that, regardless, the challenged evidence was properly admitted. It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the potential use of the prior indictment. The convictions and denial of post-trial motions were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2026/2026-me-54.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "State of Maine v. Flynn" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant created a company called Icy Gulch Resources, LLC, and solicited investments from five individuals through subscription agreements and short-term loans—both considered securities under Maine law. She misrepresented Icy Gulch’s involvement in several ventures, including falsely claiming a stake in the Sudanese gum arabic market, and asserted that wealthy individuals were participating in the deals. Contrary to these representations, Icy Gulch held no such interests, and there was no plan for financial benefit for the investors. The defendant also comingled investor funds with personal assets and spent substantial amounts on personal expenses without disclosure or permission. The total invested by the five individuals was $786,000, with $936,000 invested across all her projects, none of which was returned or yielded any profit.

In May 2019, the State charged the defendant in the Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket with theft by deception and securities fraud. Before trial, the court ruled that evidence of a 2012 indictment for similar conduct could be used only if the defendant claimed ignorance about the misuse of investor funds. The defendant waived her right to a jury trial on the securities fraud charge, which was tried by the judge, while the theft charge went to a jury. The jury convicted her of theft by deception; the judge found her guilty of securities fraud. The court denied her post-trial motions and imposed concurrent sentences, with partial suspension.

On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The Court held that sufficient evidence supported both convictions, as the record demonstrated deception, material misrepresentations, and misuse of funds. The Court found that arguments regarding hearsay were waived for lack of specific identification and that, regardless, the challenged evidence was properly admitted. It also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the potential use of the prior indictment. The convictions and denial of post-trial motions were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Maine</case:state>
						<case:court>Maine Supreme Judicial Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Catherine Connors</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Maine Supreme Judicial Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1192/25-1192-2026-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>Premca Extra Income Fund LP v. Angle</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-05T13:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-05T13:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1192/25-1192-2026-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A robotics company, whose primary product is a well-known robot vacuum, agreed in August 2022 to be acquired by a major online retailer. Over the next eighteen months, the companies sought approval for the merger from regulatory authorities in the United States and Europe. In January 2024, facing significant regulatory obstacles, the parties abandoned the merger. Following this, shareholders of the robotics company, led by an investment fund, brought a securities fraud class action against the company’s CEO and CFO. They alleged that during the merger’s review period, company statements misrepresented or omitted material information regarding the likelihood of regulatory approval, particularly concerning the company’s expectation of approval and the acquirer’s cooperation with regulators.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to identify any actionable material misrepresentation or omission and did not adequately allege scienter (the intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). During the appeal, the robotics company entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, resulting in its dismissal from the appeal, which continued as to the individual defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with the district court that the complaint failed to state a claim for most of the statements challenged by the plaintiffs, affirming dismissal as to those. However, the court found that the amended complaint plausibly alleged that an August 24, 2023, proxy statement expressed an opinion about expected regulatory approval while omitting important contrary information regarding European regulatory concerns and the acquirer’s refusal to cooperate. This omission, in the circumstances, was sufficient to state a claim as to that statement. The dismissal was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1192/25-1192-2026-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Premca Extra Income Fund LP v. Angle" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A robotics company, whose primary product is a well-known robot vacuum, agreed in August 2022 to be acquired by a major online retailer. Over the next eighteen months, the companies sought approval for the merger from regulatory authorities in the United States and Europe. In January 2024, facing significant regulatory obstacles, the parties abandoned the merger. Following this, shareholders of the robotics company, led by an investment fund, brought a securities fraud class action against the company’s CEO and CFO. They alleged that during the merger’s review period, company statements misrepresented or omitted material information regarding the likelihood of regulatory approval, particularly concerning the company’s expectation of approval and the acquirer’s cooperation with regulators.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to identify any actionable material misrepresentation or omission and did not adequately allege scienter (the intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). During the appeal, the robotics company entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, resulting in its dismissal from the appeal, which continued as to the individual defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with the district court that the complaint failed to state a claim for most of the statements challenged by the plaintiffs, affirming dismissal as to those. However, the court found that the amended complaint plausibly alleged that an August 24, 2023, proxy statement expressed an opinion about expected regulatory approval while omitting important contrary information regarding European regulatory concerns and the acquirer’s refusal to cooperate. This omission, in the circumstances, was sufficient to state a claim as to that statement. The dismissal was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Seth R. Aframe</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/25-1098/25-1098-2026-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>Kitchen v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-05T07:33:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-05T07:33:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/25-1098/25-1098-2026-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The appellant, an experienced foreign currency exchange (FX) trader, claimed he uncovered manipulation in the FX market after noticing a sharp drop in the values of several currencies relative to the Swiss franc in 2011. He believed this was due to collusion among market makers and shared his suspicions with various regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). His allegations focused on conduct by a retail trading platform, Oanda, and mentioned possible involvement by banks but did not name any specific institutions. Two years later, media reports surfaced about large banks rigging FX benchmark rates, prompting the CFTC to investigate and eventually reach settlements with several banks for manipulating benchmark rates.

The CFTC initially investigated the appellant’s allegations against Oanda but found no evidence of wrongdoing and closed the case without action. The CFTC’s later enforcement actions against major banks were initiated after media coverage revealed benchmark-rate manipulation schemes, not because of the appellant’s information. After the settlements were announced, the appellant applied for a whistleblower award, arguing his tips had led to these enforcement actions. The CFTC’s Whistleblower Office and Claims Review Staff recommended denial, finding his tips were not the original source of the information leading to the enforcement actions. The appellant sought reconsideration and, after a delay, petitioned for mandamus relief in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which was rendered moot when the Commission issued final orders denying his application.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC’s denial for arbitrariness or capriciousness. The court found that the appellant’s tips did not lead to or significantly contribute to the enforcement actions against the banks, nor was he the original or derivative source of the information used. The court affirmed the CFTC’s orders denying the whistleblower award. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/25-1098/25-1098-2026-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Kitchen v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The appellant, an experienced foreign currency exchange (FX) trader, claimed he uncovered manipulation in the FX market after noticing a sharp drop in the values of several currencies relative to the Swiss franc in 2011. He believed this was due to collusion among market makers and shared his suspicions with various regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). His allegations focused on conduct by a retail trading platform, Oanda, and mentioned possible involvement by banks but did not name any specific institutions. Two years later, media reports surfaced about large banks rigging FX benchmark rates, prompting the CFTC to investigate and eventually reach settlements with several banks for manipulating benchmark rates.

The CFTC initially investigated the appellant’s allegations against Oanda but found no evidence of wrongdoing and closed the case without action. The CFTC’s later enforcement actions against major banks were initiated after media coverage revealed benchmark-rate manipulation schemes, not because of the appellant’s information. After the settlements were announced, the appellant applied for a whistleblower award, arguing his tips had led to these enforcement actions. The CFTC’s Whistleblower Office and Claims Review Staff recommended denial, finding his tips were not the original source of the information leading to the enforcement actions. The appellant sought reconsideration and, after a delay, petitioned for mandamus relief in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which was rendered moot when the Commission issued final orders denying his application.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the CFTC’s denial for arbitrariness or capriciousness. The court found that the appellant’s tips did not lead to or significantly contribute to the enforcement actions against the banks, nor was he the original or derivative source of the information used. The court affirmed the CFTC’s orders denying the whistleblower award.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Karen Henderson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/25-466/</id>
        	<title>Sripetch v. SEC</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-04T08:45:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-04T08:45:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/25-466/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Ongkaruck Sripetch orchestrated several fraudulent schemes involving over 20 penny-stock companies. These schemes included classic “pump and dump” operations, where Sripetch and his associates would acquire shares, artificially inflate their value through promotion, and then sell at a profit. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) discovered these activities and filed a civil enforcement action, charging Sripetch with six counts of securities fraud and one count of selling unregistered securities. Sripetch consented to judgment and agreed that the court could order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California reviewed the SEC’s request for more than $4.1 million in disgorgement. Sripetch objected, arguing that the SEC had not demonstrated that investors suffered financial losses. The district court rejected this objection, finding that the SEC had made an adequate showing of pecuniary harm suffered by investors, but it did not decide whether such a showing was necessary. Sripetch appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that a finding of pecuniary harm is not required for a disgorgement order, relying on traditional equitable principles and relevant Restatements. The court’s decision deepened a split among the circuits.

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve whether the SEC must prove that investors suffered financial losses to obtain disgorgement. The Court held that a showing of pecuniary loss is not required before the SEC may secure a disgorgement award. The main holding is that, under traditional equitable principles and the relevant statutes, disgorgement may be ordered based on the defendant’s wrongful gain, regardless of whether the victims suffered financial losses. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/25-466/" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sripetch v. SEC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Ongkaruck Sripetch orchestrated several fraudulent schemes involving over 20 penny-stock companies. These schemes included classic “pump and dump” operations, where Sripetch and his associates would acquire shares, artificially inflate their value through promotion, and then sell at a profit. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) discovered these activities and filed a civil enforcement action, charging Sripetch with six counts of securities fraud and one count of selling unregistered securities. Sripetch consented to judgment and agreed that the court could order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California reviewed the SEC’s request for more than $4.1 million in disgorgement. Sripetch objected, arguing that the SEC had not demonstrated that investors suffered financial losses. The district court rejected this objection, finding that the SEC had made an adequate showing of pecuniary harm suffered by investors, but it did not decide whether such a showing was necessary. Sripetch appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that a finding of pecuniary harm is not required for a disgorgement order, relying on traditional equitable principles and relevant Restatements. The court’s decision deepened a split among the circuits.

The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve whether the SEC must prove that investors suffered financial losses to obtain disgorgement. The Court held that a showing of pecuniary loss is not required before the SEC may secure a disgorgement award. The main holding is that, under traditional equitable principles and the relevant statutes, disgorgement may be ordered based on the defendant’s wrongful gain, regardless of whether the victims suffered financial losses. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Securities and Exchange Commission does not need to show that an investor suffered a pecuniary loss before it may secure a disgorgement remedy under 15 U.S.C. §78u(d)(5) or §78u(d)(7).
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Neil Gorsuch</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/25-13631/25-13631-2026-05-29.html</id>
        	<title>Citadel Securities LLC v. Securities and Exchange Commission</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-29T10:01:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-29T10:01:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/25-13631/25-13631-2026-05-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case involves a challenge to the approval by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) of a new options trading exchange, IEX Options, proposed by Investors Exchange LLC (“IEX”). The dispute centers on IEX’s plan to introduce a 350-microsecond “speedbump” delay and a software mechanism called the Options Quote Indicator and Options Risk Parameter (“ORP”), designed to detect and mitigate “latency arbitrage.” Latency arbitrage occurs when high-frequency traders exploit tiny delays in the updating of quotes across exchanges, resulting in significant profits for these traders and increased costs for market makers and investors. IEX’s system aims to limit this practice by slowing the entry of incoming orders and repricing or canceling stale quotes when rapid price changes are detected, a model previously approved for equities trading.

After IEX submitted its proposal, the SEC solicited public comment and received input from market makers, institutional investors, and competitors. The SEC approved the proposal, finding that it was consistent with the Securities Exchange Act and did not unfairly discriminate or impose undue burdens on competition. The SEC also determined that quotes subject to IEX’s ORP qualified as “protected” quotations under the Options Order Protection and Locked/Crossed Market Plan. Citadel Securities LLC (“Citadel”), a major market maker and high-frequency trader, petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for review, arguing that the SEC’s approval was arbitrary and capricious and that the IEX system did not meet legal requirements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the SEC’s approval under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The court held that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s findings about the existence and harm of latency arbitrage in the options market and the effectiveness of IEX’s ORP. The court also concluded that IEX’s quotes were legally “protected,” the SEC’s approval was neither unfairly discriminatory nor unduly burdensome on competition, and denied Citadel’s petition. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/25-13631/25-13631-2026-05-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Citadel Securities LLC v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case involves a challenge to the approval by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) of a new options trading exchange, IEX Options, proposed by Investors Exchange LLC (“IEX”). The dispute centers on IEX’s plan to introduce a 350-microsecond “speedbump” delay and a software mechanism called the Options Quote Indicator and Options Risk Parameter (“ORP”), designed to detect and mitigate “latency arbitrage.” Latency arbitrage occurs when high-frequency traders exploit tiny delays in the updating of quotes across exchanges, resulting in significant profits for these traders and increased costs for market makers and investors. IEX’s system aims to limit this practice by slowing the entry of incoming orders and repricing or canceling stale quotes when rapid price changes are detected, a model previously approved for equities trading.

After IEX submitted its proposal, the SEC solicited public comment and received input from market makers, institutional investors, and competitors. The SEC approved the proposal, finding that it was consistent with the Securities Exchange Act and did not unfairly discriminate or impose undue burdens on competition. The SEC also determined that quotes subject to IEX’s ORP qualified as “protected” quotations under the Options Order Protection and Locked/Crossed Market Plan. Citadel Securities LLC (“Citadel”), a major market maker and high-frequency trader, petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for review, arguing that the SEC’s approval was arbitrary and capricious and that the IEX system did not meet legal requirements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the SEC’s approval under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The court held that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s findings about the existence and harm of latency arbitrage in the options market and the effectiveness of IEX’s ORP. The court also concluded that IEX’s quotes were legally “protected,” the SEC’s approval was neither unfairly discriminatory nor unduly burdensome on competition, and denied Citadel’s petition.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robin Rosenbaum</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1130/25-1130-2026-05-28.html</id>
        	<title>Smith v. The Gap, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-28T07:00:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-28T07:00:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1130/25-1130-2026-05-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Gap, a major clothing retailer, launched an initiative in August 2021 to expand plus-size clothing options in its Old Navy stores. The company overestimated customer demand for these larger sizes, resulting in excess inventory that had to be sold at discounts. By early 2022, Gap reduced its in-store plus-size offerings and eventually limited extended sizing to online sales. In May 2022, Gap disclosed that these missteps negatively affected its financial results for the first quarter of the year.

Investors who purchased Gap stock between November 24, 2021, and July 11, 2022, filed a putative securities class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. They alleged that Gap and two senior executives violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose problems with the initiative in various statements to investors. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that the plaintiffs did not identify any false or misleading statements or adequately plead that the defendants acted with scienter (intent or recklessness).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the challenged statements—including risk disclosures, earnings call remarks, and press releases—were not false or misleading in context and did not obligate Gap to disclose the problems with the initiative. The court found that the statements at issue were either generic industry risks, unactionable opinions or puffery, or did not give rise to a duty to disclose additional information. The appellate court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting a strong inference of scienter and, accordingly, their control-person liability claims under Section 20(a) were properly dismissed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/25-1130/25-1130-2026-05-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Smith v. The Gap, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Gap, a major clothing retailer, launched an initiative in August 2021 to expand plus-size clothing options in its Old Navy stores. The company overestimated customer demand for these larger sizes, resulting in excess inventory that had to be sold at discounts. By early 2022, Gap reduced its in-store plus-size offerings and eventually limited extended sizing to online sales. In May 2022, Gap disclosed that these missteps negatively affected its financial results for the first quarter of the year.

Investors who purchased Gap stock between November 24, 2021, and July 11, 2022, filed a putative securities class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. They alleged that Gap and two senior executives violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose problems with the initiative in various statements to investors. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that the plaintiffs did not identify any false or misleading statements or adequately plead that the defendants acted with scienter (intent or recklessness).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the challenged statements—including risk disclosures, earnings call remarks, and press releases—were not false or misleading in context and did not obligate Gap to disclose the problems with the initiative. The court found that the statements at issue were either generic industry risks, unactionable opinions or puffery, or did not give rise to a duty to disclose additional information. The appellate court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting a strong inference of scienter and, accordingly, their control-person liability claims under Section 20(a) were properly dismissed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael H. Park</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-5435/25-5435-2026-05-07.html</id>
        	<title>CRAIN WALNUT SHELLING, LP V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-07T09:04:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-07T09:04:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-5435/25-5435-2026-05-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns the process for selecting a lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class action brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). After investors filed federal securities claims against a company and its executives, several parties moved to be appointed as lead plaintiff, including Crain Walnut Shelling, LP. Crain Walnut reported the largest financial losses among the movants and made a prima facie showing of adequacy and typicality, initially making it the presumptive lead plaintiff. However, a competing movant, Universal, challenged Crain Walnut’s adequacy, raising concerns about inaccuracies in Crain Walnut’s filings and inconsistent representations about its ownership and organizational structure. During discovery, further issues arose when Crain Walnut’s representative gave problematic deposition testimony, indicating an unwillingness to comply with potential discovery obligations.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California evaluated these challenges. After initial proceedings and discovery, the district court concluded that the evidence raised doubts about Crain Walnut’s adequacy but initially applied a “genuine and serious doubt” standard. Ultimately, Universal was appointed as lead plaintiff after the district court found that Crain Walnut’s adequacy was rebutted based on the evidence.

Crain Walnut then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit clarified that the correct standard for rebutting the PSLRA’s presumption of adequacy is the preponderance of the evidence, not a lower standard. The appellate court held that, even under the correct standard, the district court did not commit clear error in finding Crain Walnut inadequate, and thus mandamus relief was not warranted. The court therefore denied the petition for writ of mandamus. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-5435/25-5435-2026-05-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CRAIN WALNUT SHELLING, LP V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns the process for selecting a lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class action brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). After investors filed federal securities claims against a company and its executives, several parties moved to be appointed as lead plaintiff, including Crain Walnut Shelling, LP. Crain Walnut reported the largest financial losses among the movants and made a prima facie showing of adequacy and typicality, initially making it the presumptive lead plaintiff. However, a competing movant, Universal, challenged Crain Walnut’s adequacy, raising concerns about inaccuracies in Crain Walnut’s filings and inconsistent representations about its ownership and organizational structure. During discovery, further issues arose when Crain Walnut’s representative gave problematic deposition testimony, indicating an unwillingness to comply with potential discovery obligations.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California evaluated these challenges. After initial proceedings and discovery, the district court concluded that the evidence raised doubts about Crain Walnut’s adequacy but initially applied a “genuine and serious doubt” standard. Ultimately, Universal was appointed as lead plaintiff after the district court found that Crain Walnut’s adequacy was rebutted based on the evidence.

Crain Walnut then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court’s orders. The Ninth Circuit clarified that the correct standard for rebutting the PSLRA’s presumption of adequacy is the preponderance of the evidence, not a lower standard. The appellate court held that, even under the correct standard, the district court did not commit clear error in finding Crain Walnut inadequate, and thus mandamus relief was not warranted. The court therefore denied the petition for writ of mandamus.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Randy Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1124/23-1124-2026-05-01.html</id>
        	<title>Doe v. SEC</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-01T07:02:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-01T07:02:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1124/23-1124-2026-05-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An individual disclosed information about significant misconduct at a large company to the news media. Following these disclosures, both Congress and staff from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contacted the individual for interviews and further information, which he provided. The SEC subsequently initiated an enforcement action against the company, relying on the information provided, resulting in substantial monetary sanctions. The individual then applied to the SEC for a whistleblower award under the Securities Exchange Act, which provides monetary awards to those who “voluntarily” provide “original information” leading to successful enforcement actions.

The SEC denied the whistleblower award application, finding that the individual’s submission was not “voluntary” because it occurred only after the SEC and other authorities had contacted him. Additionally, the SEC found his submission was untimely and summarily denied his request for exemptions from these requirements. The individual challenged these determinations, arguing that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” conflicted with the statute&#039;s purpose and plain meaning, that his submission was timely, and that the denial of his request for exemptions was insufficiently explained and inconsistent with SEC precedent. He also raised First Amendment concerns, suggesting the SEC’s approach penalized whistleblowers for speaking to the press.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the SEC’s order. The court held that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” was reasonable and consistent with statutory text and purpose, and rejected the First Amendment argument, finding it was based on a mistaken premise. However, the court found that the SEC abused its discretion by inadequately explaining its denial of the request for an exemption from the voluntariness requirement. The court thus denied the petition in part, granted it in part, vacated the denial of the exemption request, and remanded to the SEC for further consideration. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-1124/23-1124-2026-05-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Doe v. SEC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An individual disclosed information about significant misconduct at a large company to the news media. Following these disclosures, both Congress and staff from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contacted the individual for interviews and further information, which he provided. The SEC subsequently initiated an enforcement action against the company, relying on the information provided, resulting in substantial monetary sanctions. The individual then applied to the SEC for a whistleblower award under the Securities Exchange Act, which provides monetary awards to those who “voluntarily” provide “original information” leading to successful enforcement actions.

The SEC denied the whistleblower award application, finding that the individual’s submission was not “voluntary” because it occurred only after the SEC and other authorities had contacted him. Additionally, the SEC found his submission was untimely and summarily denied his request for exemptions from these requirements. The individual challenged these determinations, arguing that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” conflicted with the statute&#039;s purpose and plain meaning, that his submission was timely, and that the denial of his request for exemptions was insufficiently explained and inconsistent with SEC precedent. He also raised First Amendment concerns, suggesting the SEC’s approach penalized whistleblowers for speaking to the press.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the SEC’s order. The court held that the SEC’s interpretation of “voluntarily” was reasonable and consistent with statutory text and purpose, and rejected the First Amendment argument, finding it was based on a mistaken premise. However, the court found that the SEC abused its discretion by inadequately explaining its denial of the request for an exemption from the voluntariness requirement. The court thus denied the petition in part, granted it in part, vacated the denial of the exemption request, and remanded to the SEC for further consideration.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Judith Rogers</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-355/25-355-2026-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>USA V. BOLANDIAN</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-21T08:31:43-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-21T08:31:43-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-355/25-355-2026-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Shahriyar Bolandian was convicted of insider trading based on allegations that he traded on nonpublic information regarding the mergers of two companies, information allegedly obtained from a friend, Ashish Aggarwal, who worked at J.P. Morgan. Bolandian executed trades in the stocks of PLX Technologies and ExactTarget before their respective acquisitions, ultimately earning substantial profits. These trades occurred while Aggarwal, though not assigned to the deals, worked in the relevant banking group. The case revolved around whether Aggarwal had improperly shared confidential information, and whether Bolandian knowingly traded on it.

Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California severed Aggarwal’s trial from that of Bolandian and another co-defendant, Sadigh, due to the risk of antagonistic defenses. Aggarwal was ultimately acquitted by a jury. Afterward, a superseding indictment charged only Bolandian and Sadigh, and eventually Bolandian alone proceeded to trial. During Bolandian’s trial, a juror (Juror No. 6) expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial due to a family connection to J.P. Morgan. The district court questioned Juror No. 6 briefly, but allowed him to remain on the jury after both parties did not object.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Bolandian’s conviction and focused on the issue of juror bias. The court held that the district court failed in its independent duty to investigate credible allegations of juror bias after Juror No. 6 expressed doubt about his impartiality. The panel concluded that defense counsel’s agreement to keep Juror No. 6 did not waive Bolandian’s right to challenge for bias, as a proper investigation is a prerequisite to waiver. The Ninth Circuit found plain error, vacated Bolandian’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/25-355/25-355-2026-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA V. BOLANDIAN" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Shahriyar Bolandian was convicted of insider trading based on allegations that he traded on nonpublic information regarding the mergers of two companies, information allegedly obtained from a friend, Ashish Aggarwal, who worked at J.P. Morgan. Bolandian executed trades in the stocks of PLX Technologies and ExactTarget before their respective acquisitions, ultimately earning substantial profits. These trades occurred while Aggarwal, though not assigned to the deals, worked in the relevant banking group. The case revolved around whether Aggarwal had improperly shared confidential information, and whether Bolandian knowingly traded on it.

Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California severed Aggarwal’s trial from that of Bolandian and another co-defendant, Sadigh, due to the risk of antagonistic defenses. Aggarwal was ultimately acquitted by a jury. Afterward, a superseding indictment charged only Bolandian and Sadigh, and eventually Bolandian alone proceeded to trial. During Bolandian’s trial, a juror (Juror No. 6) expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial due to a family connection to J.P. Morgan. The district court questioned Juror No. 6 briefly, but allowed him to remain on the jury after both parties did not object.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Bolandian’s conviction and focused on the issue of juror bias. The court held that the district court failed in its independent duty to investigate credible allegations of juror bias after Juror No. 6 expressed doubt about his impartiality. The panel concluded that defense counsel’s agreement to keep Juror No. 6 did not waive Bolandian’s right to challenge for bias, as a proper investigation is a prerequisite to waiver. The Ninth Circuit found plain error, vacated Bolandian’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kim McLane Wardlaw</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2026/24sc644.html</id>
        	<title>CenturyLink, Inc. v. Houser</title>
        	<updated>2026-04-07T06:35:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-07T06:35:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2026/24sc644.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of shareholders brought a class action against a telecommunications company and its executives, alleging violations of securities laws related to the company’s merger with another entity. The plaintiffs claimed that the registration statement and prospectus for the merger contained false statements and omitted material facts about illegal billing practices known as “cramming,” which they argued were widespread, known to senior management, and impacted the company’s financial performance. The amended complaint incorporated allegations and statements made by confidential witnesses and public filings from related lawsuits, as well as affidavits from other cases, all supporting the claim of pervasive cramming practices.

Initially, the Boulder County District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead material misrepresentations or omissions with particularity and denied leave to amend. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the denial of leave to amend the omissions claim based on the cramming theory, instructing that any borrowed allegations must be pleaded as facts after reasonable inquiry as required by C.R.C.P. 11. After the plaintiff amended the complaint, the district court dismissed it again, concluding that the plaintiff’s counsel had not satisfied the requirement to conduct a reasonable inquiry, as the complaint relied on allegations from other lawsuits without direct verification from the original sources or witnesses.

The Colorado Supreme Court, en banc, reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal. The Supreme Court held that under C.R.C.P. 11(a), counsel must conduct a sufficient investigation to support allegations, at least on information and belief, but the extent of the required investigation is fact-dependent. Copying allegations from related complaints does not alone violate Rule 11 provided counsel’s inquiry is objectively reasonable in context. The Court found that the plaintiff’s counsel had met this standard and affirmed the judgment below. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2026/24sc644.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CenturyLink, Inc. v. Houser" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of shareholders brought a class action against a telecommunications company and its executives, alleging violations of securities laws related to the company’s merger with another entity. The plaintiffs claimed that the registration statement and prospectus for the merger contained false statements and omitted material facts about illegal billing practices known as “cramming,” which they argued were widespread, known to senior management, and impacted the company’s financial performance. The amended complaint incorporated allegations and statements made by confidential witnesses and public filings from related lawsuits, as well as affidavits from other cases, all supporting the claim of pervasive cramming practices.

Initially, the Boulder County District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead material misrepresentations or omissions with particularity and denied leave to amend. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the denial of leave to amend the omissions claim based on the cramming theory, instructing that any borrowed allegations must be pleaded as facts after reasonable inquiry as required by C.R.C.P. 11. After the plaintiff amended the complaint, the district court dismissed it again, concluding that the plaintiff’s counsel had not satisfied the requirement to conduct a reasonable inquiry, as the complaint relied on allegations from other lawsuits without direct verification from the original sources or witnesses.

The Colorado Supreme Court, en banc, reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal. The Supreme Court held that under C.R.C.P. 11(a), counsel must conduct a sufficient investigation to support allegations, at least on information and belief, but the extent of the required investigation is fact-dependent. Copying allegations from related complaints does not alone violate Rule 11 provided counsel’s inquiry is objectively reasonable in context. The Court found that the plaintiff’s counsel had met this standard and affirmed the judgment below.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Colorado</case:state>
						<case:court>Colorado Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gabriel</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Colorado Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-3907/24-3907-2026-03-27.html</id>
        	<title>Smith v. Securities and Exchange Commission</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-27T11:31:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-27T11:31:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-3907/24-3907-2026-03-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Eric Smith was the majority owner, chairman, and CEO of Consulting Services Support Corporation (CSSC), which wholly owned CSSC Brokerage Services, Inc. (CSSC-BD), a registered FINRA broker-dealer. Although CSSC-BD was registered, Smith did not personally register with FINRA, claiming an exemption so long as he was not involved in managing the securities business. However, between 2010 and 2015, Smith actively managed CSSC-BD, including overseeing debt offerings, preparing offering documents with false statements, and soliciting investments totaling $130,000 from four investors. A FINRA examination and investor complaints uncovered these activities.

Following an investigation, FINRA’s Department of Enforcement filed a complaint against Smith for violations of federal securities laws and FINRA rules. After a disciplinary proceeding, FINRA found against Smith and imposed sanctions, including $130,000 in restitution and a bar from associating with any FINRA member. Smith appealed to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which affirmed FINRA’s findings and sanctions. Smith then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that FINRA lacked jurisdiction over him and that the proceedings violated his rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that FINRA had statutory authority to discipline Smith because, despite not registering, he controlled a FINRA member firm and was therefore a “person associated with a member” under the relevant statute. The court found Smith’s constitutional claims barred because he failed to raise them before the SEC as required by statute, and none of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement applied. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-3907/24-3907-2026-03-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Smith v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Eric Smith was the majority owner, chairman, and CEO of Consulting Services Support Corporation (CSSC), which wholly owned CSSC Brokerage Services, Inc. (CSSC-BD), a registered FINRA broker-dealer. Although CSSC-BD was registered, Smith did not personally register with FINRA, claiming an exemption so long as he was not involved in managing the securities business. However, between 2010 and 2015, Smith actively managed CSSC-BD, including overseeing debt offerings, preparing offering documents with false statements, and soliciting investments totaling $130,000 from four investors. A FINRA examination and investor complaints uncovered these activities.

Following an investigation, FINRA’s Department of Enforcement filed a complaint against Smith for violations of federal securities laws and FINRA rules. After a disciplinary proceeding, FINRA found against Smith and imposed sanctions, including $130,000 in restitution and a bar from associating with any FINRA member. Smith appealed to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which affirmed FINRA’s findings and sanctions. Smith then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that FINRA lacked jurisdiction over him and that the proceedings violated his rights under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that FINRA had statutory authority to discipline Smith because, despite not registering, he controlled a FINRA member firm and was therefore a “person associated with a member” under the relevant statute. The court found Smith’s constitutional claims barred because he failed to raise them before the SEC as required by statute, and none of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement applied. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Chad Readler</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10788/24-10788-2026-03-25.html</id>
        	<title>Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-25T15:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-25T15:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10788/24-10788-2026-03-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated an enforcement action against Timothy Barton and related entities, alleging violations of federal securities laws. The district court subsequently appointed a receiver to manage properties allegedly acquired with funds from Barton’s fraudulent activities. Certain properties and entities, including TC Hall, LLC (owner of the Hall Street property), Goldmark Hospitality LLC (owner of Amerigold Suites), BM318, LLC, and JMJ Development, LLC, were placed within the receivership because they had received or benefitted from assets traceable to the alleged misconduct.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the receivership and issued several orders approving property sales and settlements. Barton previously appealed the appointment of the receivership and its scope. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an earlier decision (SEC v. Barton, 79 F.4th 573 (5th Cir. 2023)), vacated and remanded for reconsideration; on remand, the district court narrowed and reappointed the receivership. The Fifth Circuit later affirmed the new receivership order in SEC v. Barton, 135 F.4th 206 (5th Cir. 2025). While appeals were pending, the district court issued orders related to the sale of Amerigold Suites, settlements involving JMJ and BM318, and the sale of the Hall Street property.

In the current appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the cancelled Amerigold Suites sale and the two settlement agreements, dismissing those portions of the appeal. The court found jurisdiction to review the approval of the Hall Street property sale and affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the sale, which complied with statutory requirements and was in the best interest of the receivership estate. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10788/24-10788-2026-03-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated an enforcement action against Timothy Barton and related entities, alleging violations of federal securities laws. The district court subsequently appointed a receiver to manage properties allegedly acquired with funds from Barton’s fraudulent activities. Certain properties and entities, including TC Hall, LLC (owner of the Hall Street property), Goldmark Hospitality LLC (owner of Amerigold Suites), BM318, LLC, and JMJ Development, LLC, were placed within the receivership because they had received or benefitted from assets traceable to the alleged misconduct.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the receivership and issued several orders approving property sales and settlements. Barton previously appealed the appointment of the receivership and its scope. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an earlier decision (SEC v. Barton, 79 F.4th 573 (5th Cir. 2023)), vacated and remanded for reconsideration; on remand, the district court narrowed and reappointed the receivership. The Fifth Circuit later affirmed the new receivership order in SEC v. Barton, 135 F.4th 206 (5th Cir. 2025). While appeals were pending, the district court issued orders related to the sale of Amerigold Suites, settlements involving JMJ and BM318, and the sale of the Hall Street property.

In the current appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the cancelled Amerigold Suites sale and the two settlement agreements, dismissing those portions of the appeal. The court found jurisdiction to review the approval of the Hall Street property sale and affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the sale, which complied with statutory requirements and was in the best interest of the receivership estate.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Carl Stewart</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1304/25-1304-2026-03-24.html</id>
        	<title>Manzo v. Wohlstadter</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-24T12:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-24T12:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1304/25-1304-2026-03-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiffs, who were long-time friends of the defendants, invested significant sums in a biopharmaceutical company controlled by the defendants. The defendants did not disclose that the company was in serious financial distress, under a substantial obligation to a lender, and prohibited from incurring additional debt. The investment was structured through promissory notes, which included false warranties regarding the company’s financial status and claimed the formation of a new entity that never materialized. Instead of funding a new venture, the defendants used the investment to pay off existing company debt. Less than two years later, the company declared bankruptcy, making the notes essentially worthless.

The plaintiffs brought claims under federal and Massachusetts securities laws, the Massachusetts consumer protection statute, and for common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The defendants moved to dismiss the action, relying on a forum selection clause in the promissory notes requiring litigation in Delaware courts. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice, concluding that the clause applied to the plaintiffs’ claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The plaintiffs argued that their claims did not “arise out of” the notes and that the forum selection clause was unenforceable as contrary to Massachusetts public policy. The First Circuit rejected both arguments, holding that the claims arose from the notes and that the plaintiffs did not meet the heavy burden required to invalidate the clause on public policy grounds. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal without prejudice, leaving the plaintiffs free to pursue their claims in the contractually designated Delaware courts. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1304/25-1304-2026-03-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Manzo v. Wohlstadter" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiffs, who were long-time friends of the defendants, invested significant sums in a biopharmaceutical company controlled by the defendants. The defendants did not disclose that the company was in serious financial distress, under a substantial obligation to a lender, and prohibited from incurring additional debt. The investment was structured through promissory notes, which included false warranties regarding the company’s financial status and claimed the formation of a new entity that never materialized. Instead of funding a new venture, the defendants used the investment to pay off existing company debt. Less than two years later, the company declared bankruptcy, making the notes essentially worthless.

The plaintiffs brought claims under federal and Massachusetts securities laws, the Massachusetts consumer protection statute, and for common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The defendants moved to dismiss the action, relying on a forum selection clause in the promissory notes requiring litigation in Delaware courts. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice, concluding that the clause applied to the plaintiffs’ claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The plaintiffs argued that their claims did not “arise out of” the notes and that the forum selection clause was unenforceable as contrary to Massachusetts public policy. The First Circuit rejected both arguments, holding that the claims arose from the notes and that the plaintiffs did not meet the heavy burden required to invalidate the clause on public policy grounds. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal without prejudice, leaving the plaintiffs free to pursue their claims in the contractually designated Delaware courts.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Kayatta</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1595/25-1595-2026-03-06.html</id>
        	<title>HPIL Holding, Inc. v. Zhang</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-06T13:30:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-06T13:30:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1595/25-1595-2026-03-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		HPIL Holding, a Wyoming corporation, was the subject of a state court receivership proceeding initiated by minority shareholders who alleged mismanagement. The state court appointed a receiver after HPIL failed to respond to the complaint, which was served at its old Nevada address rather than its new Wyoming address. The appointed receiver and one of the petitioning shareholders allegedly diluted the corporation’s stock and sold a controlling interest to a third party. Later, minority shareholders intervened, leading the state court to set aside the default judgment and dismiss the receivership complaint for improper service, but it declined to vacate the receiver&#039;s actions. Subsequent derivative claims by minority shareholders were dismissed for failing to comply with Wyoming corporate law requirements.

Following these state court actions, HPIL Holding, authorized by a minority shareholder, sued those involved in federal court, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, torts, RICO violations, and civil conspiracy related to misconduct during and after the receivership. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because HPIL’s federal claims alleged injuries caused by independent misconduct, not by the state court judgment itself, and did not seek appellate review or rejection of the state court’s rulings. The court emphasized that only direct appeals of state court judgments fall under § 1257(a)’s jurisdictional bar, and that ordinary principles of issue and claim preclusion—not Rooker-Feldman—should govern the effect of prior state court decisions. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1595/25-1595-2026-03-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "HPIL Holding, Inc. v. Zhang" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                HPIL Holding, a Wyoming corporation, was the subject of a state court receivership proceeding initiated by minority shareholders who alleged mismanagement. The state court appointed a receiver after HPIL failed to respond to the complaint, which was served at its old Nevada address rather than its new Wyoming address. The appointed receiver and one of the petitioning shareholders allegedly diluted the corporation’s stock and sold a controlling interest to a third party. Later, minority shareholders intervened, leading the state court to set aside the default judgment and dismiss the receivership complaint for improper service, but it declined to vacate the receiver&#039;s actions. Subsequent derivative claims by minority shareholders were dismissed for failing to comply with Wyoming corporate law requirements.

Following these state court actions, HPIL Holding, authorized by a minority shareholder, sued those involved in federal court, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, torts, RICO violations, and civil conspiracy related to misconduct during and after the receivership. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because HPIL’s federal claims alleged injuries caused by independent misconduct, not by the state court judgment itself, and did not seek appellate review or rejection of the state court’s rulings. The court emphasized that only direct appeals of state court judgments fall under § 1257(a)’s jurisdictional bar, and that ordinary principles of issue and claim preclusion—not Rooker-Feldman—should govern the effect of prior state court decisions. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jeffrey Sutton</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1770/24-1770-2026-02-19.html</id>
        	<title>Securities and Exchange Commission v. Gasarch</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-19T14:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-19T14:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1770/24-1770-2026-02-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of individuals participated in a complex securities fraud scheme over nearly a decade, orchestrated by a central figure, with each playing specialized roles. The operation involved acquiring large volumes of penny stocks, artificially inflating their value through paid promotions, and then selling these stocks at inflated prices (“pump and dump” schemes). The participants concealed their ownership through nominee companies and offshore accounts, and maintained records in an encrypted internal system. The scheme generated over $1 billion in gross proceeds, and its participants went to great lengths to avoid detection and regulatory scrutiny.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against various defendants, including those currently appealing. Some defendants went to jury trial, while others conceded liability and proceeded to remedies. The district court admitted evidence from the internal accounting system, found the jury’s verdicts supported by sufficient evidence, and denied motions to dismiss. For those who conceded liability, the court assessed appropriate remedies, including disgorgement and civil penalties.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and remedies imposed. The Court held that the district court properly admitted the internal accounting evidence and that the jury instructions correctly stated the law. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. The Court affirmed the district court’s use of joint and several liability for disgorgement due to the appellants’ concerted wrongdoing, and held that the SEC’s calculations were a reasonable approximation of unjust gains. The First Circuit also upheld the application of the extended statute of limitations under the National Defense Authorization Act. The Court affirmed all remedies except one aspect of an injunction, which it vacated and remanded for clarification. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1770/24-1770-2026-02-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Gasarch" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of individuals participated in a complex securities fraud scheme over nearly a decade, orchestrated by a central figure, with each playing specialized roles. The operation involved acquiring large volumes of penny stocks, artificially inflating their value through paid promotions, and then selling these stocks at inflated prices (“pump and dump” schemes). The participants concealed their ownership through nominee companies and offshore accounts, and maintained records in an encrypted internal system. The scheme generated over $1 billion in gross proceeds, and its participants went to great lengths to avoid detection and regulatory scrutiny.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against various defendants, including those currently appealing. Some defendants went to jury trial, while others conceded liability and proceeded to remedies. The district court admitted evidence from the internal accounting system, found the jury’s verdicts supported by sufficient evidence, and denied motions to dismiss. For those who conceded liability, the court assessed appropriate remedies, including disgorgement and civil penalties.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and remedies imposed. The Court held that the district court properly admitted the internal accounting evidence and that the jury instructions correctly stated the law. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts. The Court affirmed the district court’s use of joint and several liability for disgorgement due to the appellants’ concerted wrongdoing, and held that the SEC’s calculations were a reasonable approximation of unjust gains. The First Circuit also upheld the application of the extended statute of limitations under the National Defense Authorization Act. The Court affirmed all remedies except one aspect of an injunction, which it vacated and remanded for clarification.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1188/25-1188-2026-02-17.html</id>
        	<title>City of Southfield General Employees&#039; Retirement v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-17T11:30:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-17T11:30:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1188/25-1188-2026-02-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Advance Auto Parts, Inc., a publicly traded company, announced ambitious financial goals for 2023, which increased its stock price. However, the company subsequently lowered its guidance and identified a series of accounting errors, resulting in significant declines in its stock price. The City of Southfield General Employees’ Retirement System, representing investors who purchased stock during the period between November 2022 and November 2023, filed a class action lawsuit against Advance Auto and several former executives. The plaintiffs alleged violations of SEC Rule 10b-5 and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, asserting that the defendants intentionally or recklessly misrepresented the company’s financial results and forecasts.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina consolidated several investor suits and designated Southfield as lead plaintiff. The court found that Southfield adequately alleged material misstatements or omissions and satisfied the basic requirements for a securities fraud claim, except for scienter—the requirement that defendants acted with wrongful intent or recklessness. The court concluded that the more plausible inference was that the defendants acted in good faith and corrected errors as they became known, dismissing the complaint for failure to sufficiently plead scienter.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit examined the allegations individually and holistically, finding that none supported a strong inference of scienter as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The court held that the facts, even when considered collectively, only plausibly suggested wrongful intent but did not meet the heightened standard for a strong inference. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the securities fraud claims and the related vicarious liability claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1188/25-1188-2026-02-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "City of Southfield General Employees&#039; Retirement v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Advance Auto Parts, Inc., a publicly traded company, announced ambitious financial goals for 2023, which increased its stock price. However, the company subsequently lowered its guidance and identified a series of accounting errors, resulting in significant declines in its stock price. The City of Southfield General Employees’ Retirement System, representing investors who purchased stock during the period between November 2022 and November 2023, filed a class action lawsuit against Advance Auto and several former executives. The plaintiffs alleged violations of SEC Rule 10b-5 and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, asserting that the defendants intentionally or recklessly misrepresented the company’s financial results and forecasts.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina consolidated several investor suits and designated Southfield as lead plaintiff. The court found that Southfield adequately alleged material misstatements or omissions and satisfied the basic requirements for a securities fraud claim, except for scienter—the requirement that defendants acted with wrongful intent or recklessness. The court concluded that the more plausible inference was that the defendants acted in good faith and corrected errors as they became known, dismissing the complaint for failure to sufficiently plead scienter.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit examined the allegations individually and holistically, finding that none supported a strong inference of scienter as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The court held that the facts, even when considered collectively, only plausibly suggested wrongful intent but did not meet the heightened standard for a strong inference. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the securities fraud claims and the related vicarious liability claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Albert Diaz</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1157/25-1157-2026-02-17.html</id>
        	<title>Lingam v. Dish Network Corporation</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-17T08:32:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-17T08:32:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1157/25-1157-2026-02-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two plaintiffs who purchased stock in a publicly traded corporation brought a securities class action against the corporation and several of its executives. Their complaint alleged the company embarked on an unusually risky plan to develop a nationwide 5G wireless network using unproven technologies and made materially false or misleading statements concerning the progress and capabilities of the network, anticipated enterprise customer relationships, projected revenue growth, and market demand. The plaintiffs asserted violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming the defendants acted with fraudulent intent or recklessness, leading the plaintiffs and other investors to acquire stock at artificially inflated prices.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing the complaint did not allege any actionable misstatements, facts supporting a strong inference of scienter, or loss causation. The district court agreed, finding that the alleged statements were not false when made and that the complaint lacked particularized facts showing the defendants acted with the required scienter under the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for the defendants.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the PSLRA’s requirements to plead with particularity both falsity and scienter for each alleged misstatement. The court also affirmed dismissal of the Section 20(a) claim, as it is derivative of the Section 10(b) claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1157/25-1157-2026-02-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lingam v. Dish Network Corporation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two plaintiffs who purchased stock in a publicly traded corporation brought a securities class action against the corporation and several of its executives. Their complaint alleged the company embarked on an unusually risky plan to develop a nationwide 5G wireless network using unproven technologies and made materially false or misleading statements concerning the progress and capabilities of the network, anticipated enterprise customer relationships, projected revenue growth, and market demand. The plaintiffs asserted violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming the defendants acted with fraudulent intent or recklessness, leading the plaintiffs and other investors to acquire stock at artificially inflated prices.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing the complaint did not allege any actionable misstatements, facts supporting a strong inference of scienter, or loss causation. The district court agreed, finding that the alleged statements were not false when made and that the complaint lacked particularized facts showing the defendants acted with the required scienter under the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for the defendants.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the PSLRA’s requirements to plead with particularity both falsity and scienter for each alleged misstatement. The court also affirmed dismissal of the Section 20(a) claim, as it is derivative of the Section 10(b) claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Scott Matheson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-4909/24-4909-2026-02-04.html</id>
        	<title>Construction Laborers Pension Trust of Greater St. Louis v. Funko, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-04T10:07:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-04T10:07:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-4909/24-4909-2026-02-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Funko, Inc., a company specializing in pop culture collectibles, experienced a significant decline in its share price after writing off millions of dollars in unsellable inventory. Shareholders who purchased Funko stock during the relevant period alleged that Funko and its key officers misled investors about the progress of relocating to a new warehouse, the quality and management of inventory, the status of its information technology upgrades, and its distribution capabilities. The plaintiffs claimed that these misrepresentations led them to buy stock at artificially inflated prices. The period in question was marked by Funko&#039;s transition to a larger distribution center and a planned upgrade of its enterprise resource planning software, both of which encountered serious operational difficulties that impacted inventory management and order fulfillment.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege falsity and scienter—a necessary intent to mislead investors or recklessness to the risk of doing so. The district court found that most of the challenged statements were either not objectively false, constituted non-actionable puffery, or were protected as forward-looking statements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s safe harbor.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that while Funko’s affirmative statements about the distribution center operations, inventory quality, and distribution capabilities were not demonstrably false or actionable, certain risk disclosures in Funko’s SEC filings regarding inventory management and its use of existing information technology systems were misleading. The court found that these risk disclosures implied the risks were merely hypothetical when, in fact, they had already materialized. The court also found sufficient allegations of scienter, concluding that senior officers likely knew their statements were misleading. The court reversed the dismissal of claims related to those disclosures and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-4909/24-4909-2026-02-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Construction Laborers Pension Trust of Greater St. Louis v. Funko, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Funko, Inc., a company specializing in pop culture collectibles, experienced a significant decline in its share price after writing off millions of dollars in unsellable inventory. Shareholders who purchased Funko stock during the relevant period alleged that Funko and its key officers misled investors about the progress of relocating to a new warehouse, the quality and management of inventory, the status of its information technology upgrades, and its distribution capabilities. The plaintiffs claimed that these misrepresentations led them to buy stock at artificially inflated prices. The period in question was marked by Funko&#039;s transition to a larger distribution center and a planned upgrade of its enterprise resource planning software, both of which encountered serious operational difficulties that impacted inventory management and order fulfillment.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege falsity and scienter—a necessary intent to mislead investors or recklessness to the risk of doing so. The district court found that most of the challenged statements were either not objectively false, constituted non-actionable puffery, or were protected as forward-looking statements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s safe harbor.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that while Funko’s affirmative statements about the distribution center operations, inventory quality, and distribution capabilities were not demonstrably false or actionable, certain risk disclosures in Funko’s SEC filings regarding inventory management and its use of existing information technology systems were misleading. The court found that these risk disclosures implied the risks were merely hypothetical when, in fact, they had already materialized. The court also found sufficient allegations of scienter, concluding that senior officers likely knew their statements were misleading. The court reversed the dismissal of claims related to those disclosures and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sal Mendoza Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3156/24-3156-2026-02-03.html</id>
        	<title>Abramowski v. Nuvei Corp</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-03T11:48:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-03T11:48:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3156/24-3156-2026-02-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several shareholders of Paya Holdings, Inc.—who were originally sponsors of a special purpose acquisition company that merged with Paya—held “Earnout Shares” subject to contractual transfer restrictions. Under the Sponsor Support Agreement (“SSA”), these shares could not be transferred until October 2025 unless a “Change in Control” occurred and the price per share exceeded $15.00. If the price was below $15.00, the Earnout Shares would be automatically forfeited prior to consummation of the change. In January 2023, Nuvei Corporation agreed to purchase all Paya shares for $9.75 per share in a tender offer. The offer required that tendered shares be freely transferable. The appellants attempted to tender their Earnout Shares, but Nuvei rejected them, citing the SSA’s restrictions.

The shareholders sued Nuvei in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that Nuvei violated the SEC’s Best Price Rule, which requires the highest consideration paid to any shareholder in a tender offer to be paid to all shareholders of that class. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, reasoning that no consideration was actually paid to the appellants because their shares were not validly tendered due to the transfer restrictions.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Third Circuit held that the Best Price Rule does not require a tender offeror to purchase shares that are subject to self-imposed transfer restrictions. The Rule mandates equal payment only for shares “taken up and paid for” pursuant to a tender offer, and it is silent regarding whether offerors must accept all tendered shares. Therefore, Nuvei was not required to purchase the appellants’ restricted shares, and dismissal of their claim was proper. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-3156/24-3156-2026-02-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Abramowski v. Nuvei Corp" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several shareholders of Paya Holdings, Inc.—who were originally sponsors of a special purpose acquisition company that merged with Paya—held “Earnout Shares” subject to contractual transfer restrictions. Under the Sponsor Support Agreement (“SSA”), these shares could not be transferred until October 2025 unless a “Change in Control” occurred and the price per share exceeded $15.00. If the price was below $15.00, the Earnout Shares would be automatically forfeited prior to consummation of the change. In January 2023, Nuvei Corporation agreed to purchase all Paya shares for $9.75 per share in a tender offer. The offer required that tendered shares be freely transferable. The appellants attempted to tender their Earnout Shares, but Nuvei rejected them, citing the SSA’s restrictions.

The shareholders sued Nuvei in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that Nuvei violated the SEC’s Best Price Rule, which requires the highest consideration paid to any shareholder in a tender offer to be paid to all shareholders of that class. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, reasoning that no consideration was actually paid to the appellants because their shares were not validly tendered due to the transfer restrictions.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Third Circuit held that the Best Price Rule does not require a tender offeror to purchase shares that are subject to self-imposed transfer restrictions. The Rule mandates equal payment only for shares “taken up and paid for” pursuant to a tender offer, and it is silent regarding whether offerors must accept all tendered shares. Therefore, Nuvei was not required to purchase the appellants’ restricted shares, and dismissal of their claim was proper.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Porter</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2026/47-2025.html</id>
        	<title>Illinois National Insurance Company and Federal Insurance Company v. Harman International Industries, Incorporated</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-27T09:03:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-27T09:03:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2026/47-2025.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Harman International Industries was acquired by Samsung Electronics in a reverse triangular merger, after which a class of former Harman shareholders filed a federal securities lawsuit alleging that disclosures made in connection with the transaction were misleading and violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. The shareholders claimed they were deprived of a fully informed vote and the full value of their shares, seeking damages equal to the difference between the merger price and Harman’s true value. The parties settled the suit for $28 million, which was distributed to a class defined as shareholders who held Harman stock at any time during the relevant period, including some who did not receive merger consideration.

Harman sought coverage for the $28 million settlement under its Directors and Officers (D&amp;O) insurance policies with Illinois National Insurance Company, Federal Insurance Company, and Berkley Insurance Company. The insurers denied coverage, invoking a “Bump-Up Provision” that excluded settlements representing an effective increase in deal consideration for claims alleging inadequate consideration in an acquisition. Harman sued the insurers for breach of contract in the Delaware Superior Court. After initial motions were denied due to insufficient facts, both sides moved for summary judgment on the applicability of the Bump-Up Provision.

The Delaware Superior Court held that the Bump-Up Provision did not exclude coverage because the underlying complaint did not allege inadequate consideration as a viable remedy, and the settlement amount did not represent an effective increase in deal consideration. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding that although the complaint did allege inadequate consideration, the insurers failed to prove the settlement amount effectively increased the deal consideration. Thus, the $28 million settlement was covered under Harman’s policies. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2026/47-2025.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Illinois National Insurance Company and Federal Insurance Company v. Harman International Industries, Incorporated" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Harman International Industries was acquired by Samsung Electronics in a reverse triangular merger, after which a class of former Harman shareholders filed a federal securities lawsuit alleging that disclosures made in connection with the transaction were misleading and violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. The shareholders claimed they were deprived of a fully informed vote and the full value of their shares, seeking damages equal to the difference between the merger price and Harman’s true value. The parties settled the suit for $28 million, which was distributed to a class defined as shareholders who held Harman stock at any time during the relevant period, including some who did not receive merger consideration.

Harman sought coverage for the $28 million settlement under its Directors and Officers (D&amp;O) insurance policies with Illinois National Insurance Company, Federal Insurance Company, and Berkley Insurance Company. The insurers denied coverage, invoking a “Bump-Up Provision” that excluded settlements representing an effective increase in deal consideration for claims alleging inadequate consideration in an acquisition. Harman sued the insurers for breach of contract in the Delaware Superior Court. After initial motions were denied due to insufficient facts, both sides moved for summary judgment on the applicability of the Bump-Up Provision.

The Delaware Superior Court held that the Bump-Up Provision did not exclude coverage because the underlying complaint did not allege inadequate consideration as a viable remedy, and the settlement amount did not represent an effective increase in deal consideration. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding that although the complaint did allege inadequate consideration, the insurers failed to prove the settlement amount effectively increased the deal consideration. Thus, the $28 million settlement was covered under Harman’s policies.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Karen L. Valihura</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-3313/25-3313-2026-01-21.html</id>
        	<title>Newtyn Partners, LP v. Alliance Data Systems Corp.</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-21T13:30:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-21T13:30:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-3313/25-3313-2026-01-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Alliance Data Systems, a company based in Columbus, Ohio, faced mounting debt and responded by selling off side businesses, including spinning off its LoyaltyOne division into a standalone company called Loyalty Ventures Inc. Prior to and during the spinoff, executives publicly described LoyaltyOne’s Canadian AIR MILES program as having strong, long-term sponsor relationships. However, in the period leading up to and following the spinoff, AIR MILES lost several major sponsors, including its second largest, Sobeys, which announced its intention to exit the program shortly before the sponsor’s contract allowed. Loyalty’s financial condition deteriorated, leading to its bankruptcy about a year and a half after the spinoff.

Investors, specifically two funds managed by Newtyn Management, brought a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. They alleged that Alliance Data Systems and individual executives committed securities fraud by making misleading statements or omissions about AIR MILES’s sponsor relationships and LoyaltyOne’s financial health, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Newtyn had not adequately alleged any actionable misrepresentation or omission, nor had it sufficiently pled that the defendants acted with scienter (intent to defraud).

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the statements cited by Newtyn were either immaterial puffery, accurate historical statements, or accompanied by sufficient cautionary language such that no reasonable investor would have been misled. The court also determined that Newtyn failed to plead a strong inference of scienter and that its related scheme liability and control person claims could not survive absent a primary violation. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-3313/25-3313-2026-01-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Newtyn Partners, LP v. Alliance Data Systems Corp." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Alliance Data Systems, a company based in Columbus, Ohio, faced mounting debt and responded by selling off side businesses, including spinning off its LoyaltyOne division into a standalone company called Loyalty Ventures Inc. Prior to and during the spinoff, executives publicly described LoyaltyOne’s Canadian AIR MILES program as having strong, long-term sponsor relationships. However, in the period leading up to and following the spinoff, AIR MILES lost several major sponsors, including its second largest, Sobeys, which announced its intention to exit the program shortly before the sponsor’s contract allowed. Loyalty’s financial condition deteriorated, leading to its bankruptcy about a year and a half after the spinoff.

Investors, specifically two funds managed by Newtyn Management, brought a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. They alleged that Alliance Data Systems and individual executives committed securities fraud by making misleading statements or omissions about AIR MILES’s sponsor relationships and LoyaltyOne’s financial health, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Newtyn had not adequately alleged any actionable misrepresentation or omission, nor had it sufficiently pled that the defendants acted with scienter (intent to defraud).

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the statements cited by Newtyn were either immaterial puffery, accurate historical statements, or accompanied by sufficient cautionary language such that no reasonable investor would have been misled. The court also determined that Newtyn failed to plead a strong inference of scienter and that its related scheme liability and control person claims could not survive absent a primary violation. The judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Chad Readler</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1068/25-1068-2026-01-20.html</id>
        	<title>Navigators Insurance Co. v. Under Armour, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-20T13:00:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-20T13:00:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1068/25-1068-2026-01-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Under Armour, a publicly traded sports apparel company, faced significant legal claims and government investigations over its financial forecasts and accounting practices following the bankruptcy of a major customer, Sports Authority, in 2016. Shareholders alleged that Under Armour made misleading public statements about its financial prospects and that company insiders sold stock at inflated prices. These allegations led to a federal securities class action, derivative demands, and eventually an SEC investigation into whether Under Armour manipulated its accounting by pulling forward revenue to maintain the appearance of strong growth.

In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Under Armour’s insurers sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that the securities litigation, derivative actions, and government investigations constituted a single claim under the terms of Under Armour’s directors and officers insurance policies and therefore were subject only to the coverage limit of the earlier policy period. Under Armour countered that the government investigations were a separate claim, entitling it to an additional $100 million in coverage under a subsequent policy. The district court sided with Under Armour, finding that the government investigations and the earlier shareholder claims were not sufficiently related to constitute a single claim under the policy’s language.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the plain meaning of the 2017–2018 insurance policy’s “single claims” provision, the claims related to Under Armour’s public financial statements and its accounting practices were “logically or causally related” and thus constituted a single claim. As a result, only the coverage limits from the earlier, 2016–2017 policy period applied. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Under Armour. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1068/25-1068-2026-01-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Navigators Insurance Co. v. Under Armour, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Under Armour, a publicly traded sports apparel company, faced significant legal claims and government investigations over its financial forecasts and accounting practices following the bankruptcy of a major customer, Sports Authority, in 2016. Shareholders alleged that Under Armour made misleading public statements about its financial prospects and that company insiders sold stock at inflated prices. These allegations led to a federal securities class action, derivative demands, and eventually an SEC investigation into whether Under Armour manipulated its accounting by pulling forward revenue to maintain the appearance of strong growth.

In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Under Armour’s insurers sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that the securities litigation, derivative actions, and government investigations constituted a single claim under the terms of Under Armour’s directors and officers insurance policies and therefore were subject only to the coverage limit of the earlier policy period. Under Armour countered that the government investigations were a separate claim, entitling it to an additional $100 million in coverage under a subsequent policy. The district court sided with Under Armour, finding that the government investigations and the earlier shareholder claims were not sufficiently related to constitute a single claim under the policy’s language.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the plain meaning of the 2017–2018 insurance policy’s “single claims” provision, the claims related to Under Armour’s public financial statements and its accounting practices were “logically or causally related” and thus constituted a single claim. As a result, only the coverage limits from the earlier, 2016–2017 policy period applied. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Under Armour.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>A. Marvin Quattlebaum Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13129/22-13129-2026-01-16.html</id>
        	<title>Securities and Exchange Commission v. Spartan Securities Group, LTD</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-16T14:01:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-16T14:01:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13129/22-13129-2026-01-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several individuals orchestrated microcap securities fraud schemes by creating nineteen shell companies with no genuine business operations or assets, selling their securities at inflated prices once publicly tradable. Two firms, operated by Carl Dilley and Micah Eldred—Spartan Securities Group, Ltd. (a broker-dealer) and Island Capital Management (a transfer agent)—facilitated this process. Spartan submitted Form 211 applications to FINRA for each shell company, enabling public trading, while Island managed applications for Depository Trust Company (DTC) eligibility. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an enforcement action against Dilley, Eldred, Spartan, and Island, alleging, among other claims, that they made false statements to obtain FINRA clearance and DTC eligibility, violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5(b).

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the defendants’ pretrial motions to exclude the SEC’s expert witness and for special jury interrogatories, and allowed the case to proceed to trial. The jury found all defendants liable on the count concerning false statements or omissions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b. The district court subsequently denied the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, and imposed remedies including injunctions against future violations, penny stock bars, civil penalties, and ordered Island to disgorge profits to the U.S. Treasury.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants challenged the admission of expert testimony, denial of judgment as a matter of law, and the remedies imposed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of material misrepresentations made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The court further held that the SEC was authorized to seek disgorgement to the Treasury and that the remedies, including civil penalties, were timely and equitable. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13129/22-13129-2026-01-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Spartan Securities Group, LTD" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several individuals orchestrated microcap securities fraud schemes by creating nineteen shell companies with no genuine business operations or assets, selling their securities at inflated prices once publicly tradable. Two firms, operated by Carl Dilley and Micah Eldred—Spartan Securities Group, Ltd. (a broker-dealer) and Island Capital Management (a transfer agent)—facilitated this process. Spartan submitted Form 211 applications to FINRA for each shell company, enabling public trading, while Island managed applications for Depository Trust Company (DTC) eligibility. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an enforcement action against Dilley, Eldred, Spartan, and Island, alleging, among other claims, that they made false statements to obtain FINRA clearance and DTC eligibility, violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5(b).

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the defendants’ pretrial motions to exclude the SEC’s expert witness and for special jury interrogatories, and allowed the case to proceed to trial. The jury found all defendants liable on the count concerning false statements or omissions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b. The district court subsequently denied the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, and imposed remedies including injunctions against future violations, penny stock bars, civil penalties, and ordered Island to disgorge profits to the U.S. Treasury.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants challenged the admission of expert testimony, denial of judgment as a matter of law, and the remedies imposed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of material misrepresentations made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The court further held that the SEC was authorized to seek disgorgement to the Treasury and that the remedies, including civil penalties, were timely and equitable.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2962/24-2962-2026-01-16.html</id>
        	<title>Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-16T07:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-16T07:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2962/24-2962-2026-01-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A businessman from Kazakhstan alleged that he was wrongfully detained and psychologically coerced by the country’s National Security Committee into signing unfavorable business agreements, including waivers of legal claims and a forced transfer of valuable company shares. The business at issue, CAPEC, operated in Kazakhstan’s energy sector and held significant assets, some of which were allegedly misappropriated by fellow shareholders and transferred through U.S. financial institutions. The plaintiff claimed these actions harmed him economically, including the loss of potential U.S.-based legal claims.

Following unsuccessful litigation in Kazakhstan, the plaintiff initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to invalidate the coerced agreements and recover damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Alien Tort Statute, and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff, as a permanent resident alien, could not establish diversity jurisdiction against foreign defendants, that the alleged torts occurred outside the U.S., and that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury required for civil RICO claims. The court denied leave to amend, determining that any amendment would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the matter de novo, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that claims against the National Security Committee were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as its conduct was sovereign rather than commercial. For the individual defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, as the harm and racketeering activity occurred primarily in Kazakhstan. The court further concluded that amendment of the complaint would have been futile. The judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2962/24-2962-2026-01-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A businessman from Kazakhstan alleged that he was wrongfully detained and psychologically coerced by the country’s National Security Committee into signing unfavorable business agreements, including waivers of legal claims and a forced transfer of valuable company shares. The business at issue, CAPEC, operated in Kazakhstan’s energy sector and held significant assets, some of which were allegedly misappropriated by fellow shareholders and transferred through U.S. financial institutions. The plaintiff claimed these actions harmed him economically, including the loss of potential U.S.-based legal claims.

Following unsuccessful litigation in Kazakhstan, the plaintiff initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to invalidate the coerced agreements and recover damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Alien Tort Statute, and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff, as a permanent resident alien, could not establish diversity jurisdiction against foreign defendants, that the alleged torts occurred outside the U.S., and that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury required for civil RICO claims. The court denied leave to amend, determining that any amendment would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the matter de novo, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that claims against the National Security Committee were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as its conduct was sovereign rather than commercial. For the individual defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, as the harm and racketeering activity occurred primarily in Kazakhstan. The court further concluded that amendment of the complaint would have been futile. The judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Sullivan</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3109/23-3109-2026-01-15.html</id>
        	<title>LJM Partners, Ltd. v. Barclays Capital, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-15T14:30:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-15T14:30:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3109/23-3109-2026-01-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		LJM Partners, Ltd. and Two Roads Shared Trust, both involved in options trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, experienced catastrophic losses on February 5 and 6, 2018, when volatility in the S&amp;P 500 surged unexpectedly; LJM lost approximately 86.5% of its managed assets and the Preservation Fund (managed by Two Roads) lost around 80%. The plaintiffs alleged that eight defendant firms, acting as market makers, manipulated the VIX index by submitting inflated bid-ask quotes for certain SPX Options, which artificially raised volatility and resulted in inflated prices on the plaintiffs&#039; trades, causing over one billion dollars in combined losses.

After initially filing complaints against unnamed &quot;John Doe&quot; defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs pursued extensive discovery to identify the responsible parties. The cases were swept into a multidistrict litigation proceeding (VIX MDL), which delayed discovery. Eventually, after several rounds of amended complaints, the plaintiffs identified and named eight defendant firms. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that LJM lacked Article III standing because it failed to allege an injury in fact, as the losses belonged to its clients, not LJM itself. For Two Roads, the district court held that its claims were time-barred under the Commodity Exchange Act’s two-year statute of limitations, and equitable tolling was denied due to lack of diligence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that LJM’s complaint failed to establish Article III standing, as it did not allege that LJM itself—not just its clients—suffered actual losses. The court further held that Two Roads’s complaint was untimely and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing equitable tolling. Both dismissals were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3109/23-3109-2026-01-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "LJM Partners, Ltd. v. Barclays Capital, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                LJM Partners, Ltd. and Two Roads Shared Trust, both involved in options trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, experienced catastrophic losses on February 5 and 6, 2018, when volatility in the S&amp;P 500 surged unexpectedly; LJM lost approximately 86.5% of its managed assets and the Preservation Fund (managed by Two Roads) lost around 80%. The plaintiffs alleged that eight defendant firms, acting as market makers, manipulated the VIX index by submitting inflated bid-ask quotes for certain SPX Options, which artificially raised volatility and resulted in inflated prices on the plaintiffs&#039; trades, causing over one billion dollars in combined losses.

After initially filing complaints against unnamed &quot;John Doe&quot; defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs pursued extensive discovery to identify the responsible parties. The cases were swept into a multidistrict litigation proceeding (VIX MDL), which delayed discovery. Eventually, after several rounds of amended complaints, the plaintiffs identified and named eight defendant firms. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that LJM lacked Article III standing because it failed to allege an injury in fact, as the losses belonged to its clients, not LJM itself. For Two Roads, the district court held that its claims were time-barred under the Commodity Exchange Act’s two-year statute of limitations, and equitable tolling was denied due to lack of diligence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that LJM’s complaint failed to establish Article III standing, as it did not allege that LJM itself—not just its clients—suffered actual losses. The court further held that Two Roads’s complaint was untimely and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing equitable tolling. Both dismissals were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>John Z. Lee</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3138/23-3138-2026-01-15.html</id>
        	<title>Two Roads Shared Trust v. Barclays Capital Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-15T14:30:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-15T14:30:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3138/23-3138-2026-01-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		On February 5, 2018, an abrupt spike in market volatility led to a sharp decline in the S&amp;P 500 and a rapid increase in the VIX index. LJM Partners, Ltd. and Two Roads Shared Trust pursued trading strategies on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that assumed low volatility and suffered catastrophic losses when volatility soared. They alleged that several market makers manipulated the VIX by quoting inflated bid-ask prices for certain options, which artificially increased volatility and caused losses exceeding one billion dollars in managed assets over two days.

Both LJM and Two Roads filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, initially naming “John Doe” defendants. The cases were coordinated into multidistrict litigation, and the plaintiffs sought expedited discovery to identify the defendants. After extensive litigation, they amended their complaints to name eight firms as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that LJM lacked Article III standing, as its complaint only alleged injuries suffered by its clients, not by LJM itself. The court denied LJM’s request for leave to substitute the real party in interest and dismissed its complaint without prejudice. For Two Roads, the court found that its claims were barred by the Commodity Exchange Act’s two-year statute of limitations, declined to apply equitable tolling, and also dismissed for failure to state a claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that LJM did not allege a concrete injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing, as its complaint failed to distinguish between its own losses and those of its clients. The court also held that Two Roads’s complaint was untimely and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable tolling. The court declined to reach the merits of the underlying Commodity Exchange Act claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3138/23-3138-2026-01-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Two Roads Shared Trust v. Barclays Capital Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                On February 5, 2018, an abrupt spike in market volatility led to a sharp decline in the S&amp;P 500 and a rapid increase in the VIX index. LJM Partners, Ltd. and Two Roads Shared Trust pursued trading strategies on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that assumed low volatility and suffered catastrophic losses when volatility soared. They alleged that several market makers manipulated the VIX by quoting inflated bid-ask prices for certain options, which artificially increased volatility and caused losses exceeding one billion dollars in managed assets over two days.

Both LJM and Two Roads filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, initially naming “John Doe” defendants. The cases were coordinated into multidistrict litigation, and the plaintiffs sought expedited discovery to identify the defendants. After extensive litigation, they amended their complaints to name eight firms as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that LJM lacked Article III standing, as its complaint only alleged injuries suffered by its clients, not by LJM itself. The court denied LJM’s request for leave to substitute the real party in interest and dismissed its complaint without prejudice. For Two Roads, the court found that its claims were barred by the Commodity Exchange Act’s two-year statute of limitations, declined to apply equitable tolling, and also dismissed for failure to state a claim.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that LJM did not allege a concrete injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing, as its complaint failed to distinguish between its own losses and those of its clients. The court also held that Two Roads’s complaint was untimely and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable tolling. The court declined to reach the merits of the underlying Commodity Exchange Act claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>John Z. Lee</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1001/25-1001-2026-01-15.html</id>
        	<title>Boyd v. Northern Biomedical Research Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-15T14:00:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-15T14:00:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1001/25-1001-2026-01-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An individual who founded a Michigan biomedical research company sold a majority stake in 2019 to four defendants but retained a minority interest, later becoming dissatisfied with the company’s management and moving out of state. The new owners aimed to expand the company but withheld information from the plaintiff about their efforts to secure financing, including discussions with Avista Capital Partners, a venture capital firm that ultimately made a large investment. The plaintiff sold his shares in December 2020 for a price based on an annual valuation, prior to Avista’s capital infusion that significantly increased the company’s value. The plaintiff later sued, alleging violations of federal and state securities laws, breach of fiduciary duty under Michigan law, and various fraud and contract claims based on the defendants’ failure to disclose material facts about the company’s pursuit of equity financing and Avista’s interest.

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. That court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss but, following discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. The court concluded that the omissions were not material under federal securities law and, applying Delaware law and a federal standard, also found no materiality for the breach of fiduciary duty claim under Michigan law.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment as to the federal securities law claims, the Michigan Uniform Securities Act claim, and the contract-based claims, holding that the omissions were not material under the applicable federal standards. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the summary judgment for the Michigan common-law fiduciary duty and fraud claims, finding the district court had applied an incorrect legal standard and that genuine disputes of material fact remained. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the fiduciary duty and fraud counts. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1001/25-1001-2026-01-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Boyd v. Northern Biomedical Research Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An individual who founded a Michigan biomedical research company sold a majority stake in 2019 to four defendants but retained a minority interest, later becoming dissatisfied with the company’s management and moving out of state. The new owners aimed to expand the company but withheld information from the plaintiff about their efforts to secure financing, including discussions with Avista Capital Partners, a venture capital firm that ultimately made a large investment. The plaintiff sold his shares in December 2020 for a price based on an annual valuation, prior to Avista’s capital infusion that significantly increased the company’s value. The plaintiff later sued, alleging violations of federal and state securities laws, breach of fiduciary duty under Michigan law, and various fraud and contract claims based on the defendants’ failure to disclose material facts about the company’s pursuit of equity financing and Avista’s interest.

The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. That court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss but, following discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. The court concluded that the omissions were not material under federal securities law and, applying Delaware law and a federal standard, also found no materiality for the breach of fiduciary duty claim under Michigan law.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment as to the federal securities law claims, the Michigan Uniform Securities Act claim, and the contract-based claims, holding that the omissions were not material under the applicable federal standards. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the summary judgment for the Michigan common-law fiduciary duty and fraud claims, finding the district court had applied an incorrect legal standard and that genuine disputes of material fact remained. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the fiduciary duty and fraud counts.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Karen Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7876/23-7876-2026-01-15.html</id>
        	<title>Alta Partners, LLC v. Getty Images Holdings, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-15T07:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-15T07:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7876/23-7876-2026-01-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Getty Images Holdings, Inc. became a publicly traded company after merging with CC Neuberger Principal Holdings II, a special purpose acquisition company. Alta Partners, LLC and CRCM Institutional Master Fund (BVI) Ltd., along with CRCM SPAC Opportunity Fund LP, acquired warrants to purchase Getty stock. The warrants’ exercise was governed by a warrant agreement requiring both an effective registration statement and a current prospectus for the underlying shares. After the merger, Getty filed two relevant registration statements: a Form S-4 and a Form S-1. Alta and CRCM attempted to exercise their warrants in August 2022, when Getty’s stock price was significantly higher than the warrant strike price, but Getty refused, claiming the contractual conditions for exercise were unmet.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed breach of contract claims brought by Alta and CRCM. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding as a matter of law that the conditions of the warrant agreement had been satisfied. Specifically, it held the Form S-4 was an effective registration statement for the warrant shares and the accompanying prospectus was current at the time the plaintiffs attempted to exercise their warrants. The court awarded damages based on the stock price at the time of the breach but limited Alta’s recovery, denying damages for warrants purchased after Getty’s refusal to honor the redemption.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that Getty breached the warrant agreement because the required registration statement and prospectus conditions were met on the relevant dates. The court concluded that damages should be calculated using the market price of the shares at the time of breach and upheld the limitation on Alta’s damages for post-breach warrant purchases. The affirmance applies to all aspects of the district court’s rulings challenged on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7876/23-7876-2026-01-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Alta Partners, LLC v. Getty Images Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Getty Images Holdings, Inc. became a publicly traded company after merging with CC Neuberger Principal Holdings II, a special purpose acquisition company. Alta Partners, LLC and CRCM Institutional Master Fund (BVI) Ltd., along with CRCM SPAC Opportunity Fund LP, acquired warrants to purchase Getty stock. The warrants’ exercise was governed by a warrant agreement requiring both an effective registration statement and a current prospectus for the underlying shares. After the merger, Getty filed two relevant registration statements: a Form S-4 and a Form S-1. Alta and CRCM attempted to exercise their warrants in August 2022, when Getty’s stock price was significantly higher than the warrant strike price, but Getty refused, claiming the contractual conditions for exercise were unmet.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed breach of contract claims brought by Alta and CRCM. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding as a matter of law that the conditions of the warrant agreement had been satisfied. Specifically, it held the Form S-4 was an effective registration statement for the warrant shares and the accompanying prospectus was current at the time the plaintiffs attempted to exercise their warrants. The court awarded damages based on the stock price at the time of the breach but limited Alta’s recovery, denying damages for warrants purchased after Getty’s refusal to honor the redemption.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that Getty breached the warrant agreement because the required registration statement and prospectus conditions were met on the relevant dates. The court concluded that damages should be calculated using the market price of the shares at the time of breach and upheld the limitation on Alta’s damages for post-breach warrant purchases. The affirmance applies to all aspects of the district court’s rulings challenged on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Denny Chin</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6333/23-6333-2025-12-05.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. NG CHONG HWA</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-05T07:30:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-05T07:30:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6333/23-6333-2025-12-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Malaysian national who worked as a managing director for Goldman Sachs in Malaysia was prosecuted for his role in a large-scale financial scheme involving 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a Malaysian state-owned investment fund. The government presented evidence showing that, along with other conspirators, he participated in three major bond offerings raising $6.5 billion, from which more than $2.5 billion was diverted for bribes and kickbacks to officials and participants, including himself. The funds were laundered through shell companies, and the defendant received $35.1 million that was deposited in an account controlled by his family members. The defendant’s wife asserted at trial that these funds were legitimate investment returns, not criminal proceeds.

Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied several motions by the defendant. The court rejected his arguments that the indictment should be dismissed for lack of venue, concluding that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy passed through the Eastern District of New York. The court also found that the government did not breach an agreement regarding his extradition from Malaysia, since the superseding indictments did not charge new offenses. The district court excluded a video recording offered by the defense as inadmissible hearsay, and ultimately, a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $35.1 million.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued improper venue, breach of extradition agreement, erroneous exclusion of evidence, and that the forfeiture was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the district court had not erred in any respect. Venue was proper, the extradition agreement was not breached, the evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion, and the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the offense. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and forfeiture order were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6333/23-6333-2025-12-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. NG CHONG HWA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Malaysian national who worked as a managing director for Goldman Sachs in Malaysia was prosecuted for his role in a large-scale financial scheme involving 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a Malaysian state-owned investment fund. The government presented evidence showing that, along with other conspirators, he participated in three major bond offerings raising $6.5 billion, from which more than $2.5 billion was diverted for bribes and kickbacks to officials and participants, including himself. The funds were laundered through shell companies, and the defendant received $35.1 million that was deposited in an account controlled by his family members. The defendant’s wife asserted at trial that these funds were legitimate investment returns, not criminal proceeds.

Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied several motions by the defendant. The court rejected his arguments that the indictment should be dismissed for lack of venue, concluding that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy passed through the Eastern District of New York. The court also found that the government did not breach an agreement regarding his extradition from Malaysia, since the superseding indictments did not charge new offenses. The district court excluded a video recording offered by the defense as inadmissible hearsay, and ultimately, a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and ordered to forfeit $35.1 million.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the defendant argued improper venue, breach of extradition agreement, erroneous exclusion of evidence, and that the forfeiture was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The Second Circuit held that the district court had not erred in any respect. Venue was proper, the extradition agreement was not breached, the evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion, and the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the offense. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and forfeiture order were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Amalya Kearse</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2254/24-2254-2025-12-04.html</id>
        	<title>Securities and Exchange Commission v. Duff</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-04T14:04:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-04T14:04:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2254/24-2254-2025-12-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Jerome and Shaun Cohen operated a Ponzi scheme through their companies, EquityBuild, Inc. and EquityBuild Finance, LLC, from 2010 to 2018. They solicited funds from individual investors and institutional lenders, promising high returns secured by real estate, primarily in Chicago. In reality, the Cohens used new investors’ funds to pay earlier investors and overvalued properties to retain excess capital. By 2018, the scheme collapsed, leaving over $75 million in unpaid obligations. The Securities and Exchange Commission intervened, obtaining a temporary restraining order and having a receiver appointed to liquidate assets and distribute proceeds to victims.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois oversaw the receivership and determined how proceeds from the sale of two properties—7749 South Yates and 5450 South Indiana—should be distributed. Both a group of individual investors and Shatar Capital Partners claimed priority to the proceeds, with Shatar arguing its mortgages were recorded before those of the individual investors. The district court found that Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ preexisting interests and thus not entitled to priority, limiting all claimants’ recoveries to their contributed principal, minus any amounts previously received.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s distribution order. The appellate court affirmed, holding that under Illinois law, Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ interests in both properties at the time it invested, given multiple red flags about the properties’ financing and EquityBuild’s business model. As a result, the individual investors were entitled to priority in the distribution of proceeds. The court also found Shatar’s challenge to the distribution plan moot, as there were insufficient funds to benefit Shatar after satisfying the investors’ claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2254/24-2254-2025-12-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Duff" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Jerome and Shaun Cohen operated a Ponzi scheme through their companies, EquityBuild, Inc. and EquityBuild Finance, LLC, from 2010 to 2018. They solicited funds from individual investors and institutional lenders, promising high returns secured by real estate, primarily in Chicago. In reality, the Cohens used new investors’ funds to pay earlier investors and overvalued properties to retain excess capital. By 2018, the scheme collapsed, leaving over $75 million in unpaid obligations. The Securities and Exchange Commission intervened, obtaining a temporary restraining order and having a receiver appointed to liquidate assets and distribute proceeds to victims.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois oversaw the receivership and determined how proceeds from the sale of two properties—7749 South Yates and 5450 South Indiana—should be distributed. Both a group of individual investors and Shatar Capital Partners claimed priority to the proceeds, with Shatar arguing its mortgages were recorded before those of the individual investors. The district court found that Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ preexisting interests and thus not entitled to priority, limiting all claimants’ recoveries to their contributed principal, minus any amounts previously received.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s distribution order. The appellate court affirmed, holding that under Illinois law, Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ interests in both properties at the time it invested, given multiple red flags about the properties’ financing and EquityBuild’s business model. As a result, the individual investors were entitled to priority in the distribution of proceeds. The court also found Shatar’s challenge to the distribution plan moot, as there were insufficient funds to benefit Shatar after satisfying the investors’ claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joshua Kolar</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-13372/24-13372-2025-11-26.html</id>
        	<title>City of Hollywood Police Officers Retirement Syst v. NextEra Energy, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-26T11:01:20-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-26T11:01:20-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-13372/24-13372-2025-11-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Investors in a major energy company alleged that the company and several executives misled them about involvement in a Florida election-interference scheme. The alleged scheme included tactics such as supporting “ghost” candidates in state and local elections, bribery, covert payments, and manipulating media outlets. These actions were reportedly orchestrated by the company’s main subsidiary and its CEO, with assistance from a political consulting firm. When reports of the scheme began to surface, the company and its executives publicly denied any involvement or wrongdoing, including direct statements to the press and investors. However, after further scrutiny and media coverage, the company’s leadership changed course, abruptly terminating the subsidiary’s CEO and filing updated risk disclosures with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that acknowledged potential legal and reputational risks associated with the allegations. On the same day as these disclosures, the company’s stock price fell sharply, resulting in significant losses for investors.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the investors’ complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead loss causation—a necessary element of securities fraud. The District Court found that the investors did not identify a sufficient corrective disclosure linking the alleged fraud to the stock price decline.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the District Court. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged loss causation by identifying corrective disclosures—namely, the company’s risk disclosures, the CEO’s abrupt departure, and a unique compensation claw-back provision—that collectively revealed enough truth to the market to undermine prior denials. The court found the alleged sequence of disclosures, price drop, and market analyst reactions sufficient at the pleading stage. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-13372/24-13372-2025-11-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "City of Hollywood Police Officers Retirement Syst v. NextEra Energy, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Investors in a major energy company alleged that the company and several executives misled them about involvement in a Florida election-interference scheme. The alleged scheme included tactics such as supporting “ghost” candidates in state and local elections, bribery, covert payments, and manipulating media outlets. These actions were reportedly orchestrated by the company’s main subsidiary and its CEO, with assistance from a political consulting firm. When reports of the scheme began to surface, the company and its executives publicly denied any involvement or wrongdoing, including direct statements to the press and investors. However, after further scrutiny and media coverage, the company’s leadership changed course, abruptly terminating the subsidiary’s CEO and filing updated risk disclosures with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that acknowledged potential legal and reputational risks associated with the allegations. On the same day as these disclosures, the company’s stock price fell sharply, resulting in significant losses for investors.

Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the investors’ complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead loss causation—a necessary element of securities fraud. The District Court found that the investors did not identify a sufficient corrective disclosure linking the alleged fraud to the stock price decline.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the District Court. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged loss causation by identifying corrective disclosures—namely, the company’s risk disclosures, the CEO’s abrupt departure, and a unique compensation claw-back provision—that collectively revealed enough truth to the market to undermine prior denials. The court found the alleged sequence of disclosures, price drop, and market analyst reactions sufficient at the pleading stage. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gerald Tjoflat</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1750/24-1750-2025-11-18.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Medoff</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-18T14:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-18T14:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1750/24-1750-2025-11-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Craig Medoff, after a history of violating federal securities laws and failing to comply with prior court orders and penalties, was subject to a 2016 consent judgment in the District of Massachusetts that barred him and any entity he controlled from participating in the issuance, offer, or sale of any security for ten years. Despite this, Medoff continued to control Nova Capital International LLC and engaged in securities-related activities, using an alias and receiving substantial fees in violation of the judgment. The SEC initiated civil contempt proceedings, but the district court, concerned about the futility of further civil sanctions given Medoff’s history and financial situation, instead initiated criminal contempt proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a).

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts appointed the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the criminal contempt case. Medoff’s counsel moved for the judge’s recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), arguing that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned due to his comments and conduct during the proceedings. The district court denied the recusal motion, finding no reasonable basis for doubting its impartiality, and proceeded with the criminal case. Medoff ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal contempt and was sentenced to twenty months in prison, a variance above the guideline range, and thirty-six months of supervised release, along with a fine.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Medoff challenged the denial of the recusal motion and the reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal, as the judge’s actions did not display deep-seated antagonism or favoritism. The court also found the sentence both procedurally and substantively reasonable, affirming the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1750/24-1750-2025-11-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Medoff" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Craig Medoff, after a history of violating federal securities laws and failing to comply with prior court orders and penalties, was subject to a 2016 consent judgment in the District of Massachusetts that barred him and any entity he controlled from participating in the issuance, offer, or sale of any security for ten years. Despite this, Medoff continued to control Nova Capital International LLC and engaged in securities-related activities, using an alias and receiving substantial fees in violation of the judgment. The SEC initiated civil contempt proceedings, but the district court, concerned about the futility of further civil sanctions given Medoff’s history and financial situation, instead initiated criminal contempt proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a).

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts appointed the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the criminal contempt case. Medoff’s counsel moved for the judge’s recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), arguing that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned due to his comments and conduct during the proceedings. The district court denied the recusal motion, finding no reasonable basis for doubting its impartiality, and proceeded with the criminal case. Medoff ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal contempt and was sentenced to twenty months in prison, a variance above the guideline range, and thirty-six months of supervised release, along with a fine.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Medoff challenged the denial of the recusal motion and the reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal, as the judge’s actions did not display deep-seated antagonism or favoritism. The court also found the sentence both procedurally and substantively reasonable, affirming the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Seth R. Aframe</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1735/22-1735-2025-11-14.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Maldonado-Vargas</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-14T13:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-14T13:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1735/22-1735-2025-11-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendant formed a company in 2005 that solicited funds from clients through financial agreements promising fixed returns, with the stated purpose of developing various businesses. Clients entered into these agreements, called &quot;Productive Development Contracts,&quot; by making monetary contributions in exchange for promised earnings. The company failed to fulfill its obligations, and the government alleged that the defendant operated a Ponzi scheme, using funds from later clients to pay earlier ones, without generating legitimate profits. The indictment listed specific transactions involving eight clients, and at trial, both these and additional clients testified about their experiences and losses.

The case was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The government presented evidence including client testimony, bank records, and summary exhibits prepared by a forensic accountant. The defendant objected to the admission of certain summary exhibits under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, arguing they contained hearsay and improper conclusions. The district court overruled these objections, and the jury convicted the defendant on all counts. At sentencing, the court calculated loss and restitution amounts based on both testifying and non-testifying victims, resulting in a sentence of 135 months’ imprisonment and a restitution order exceeding $2.1 million. The defendant appealed, challenging the evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of the evidence, sentencing calculations, and restitution order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the securities fraud conviction, sentence, and restitution order, but vacated the bank fraud convictions at the government’s request. The court held that any error in admitting the summary exhibits was harmless given the overwhelming unchallenged evidence. It found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the contracts were securities under the law. The court also upheld the district court’s loss and restitution calculations, concluding they were supported by reliable evidence and not plainly erroneous. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/22-1735/22-1735-2025-11-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Maldonado-Vargas" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendant formed a company in 2005 that solicited funds from clients through financial agreements promising fixed returns, with the stated purpose of developing various businesses. Clients entered into these agreements, called &quot;Productive Development Contracts,&quot; by making monetary contributions in exchange for promised earnings. The company failed to fulfill its obligations, and the government alleged that the defendant operated a Ponzi scheme, using funds from later clients to pay earlier ones, without generating legitimate profits. The indictment listed specific transactions involving eight clients, and at trial, both these and additional clients testified about their experiences and losses.

The case was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The government presented evidence including client testimony, bank records, and summary exhibits prepared by a forensic accountant. The defendant objected to the admission of certain summary exhibits under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, arguing they contained hearsay and improper conclusions. The district court overruled these objections, and the jury convicted the defendant on all counts. At sentencing, the court calculated loss and restitution amounts based on both testifying and non-testifying victims, resulting in a sentence of 135 months’ imprisonment and a restitution order exceeding $2.1 million. The defendant appealed, challenging the evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of the evidence, sentencing calculations, and restitution order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the securities fraud conviction, sentence, and restitution order, but vacated the bank fraud convictions at the government’s request. The court held that any error in admitting the summary exhibits was harmless given the overwhelming unchallenged evidence. It found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the contracts were securities under the law. The court also upheld the district court’s loss and restitution calculations, concluding they were supported by reliable evidence and not plainly erroneous.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Julie Rikelman</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3568/24-3568-2025-11-10.html</id>
        	<title>HUNT V. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-10T09:31:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-10T09:31:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3568/24-3568-2025-11-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Bloom Energy, a company specializing in fuel-cell servers, entered into Managed Services Agreements (MSAs), which are sale-leaseback arrangements involving banks and customers. The company initially classified these MSAs as operating leases, based on its assessment that the lease terms were less than 75% of the servers’ estimated useful lives and that the servers were not “integral equipment.” This classification affected how Bloom Energy reported revenue and liabilities in its financial statements. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) was engaged to audit Bloom Energy’s 2016 and 2017 financial statements, which were prepared by Bloom Energy’s management, and PwC issued an audit opinion stating that the financial statements were fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.

After Bloom Energy went public in 2018, it later restated its financial statements, reclassifying certain MSAs as capital leases following a review prompted by PwC’s identification of an accounting issue. This restatement led to a significant drop in Bloom Energy’s stock price. Plaintiffs, consisting of shareholders, filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Bloom Energy, its officers, directors, underwriters, and later added PwC as a defendant. They alleged violations of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, claiming that PwC was liable for material misstatements in the registration statement due to its audit opinion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against PwC. The Ninth Circuit held that under § 11, an independent accountant is not strictly liable for information in a registration statement or financial statements merely because it certified them. PwC’s audit opinion was a statement of subjective judgment, protected as an opinion under Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, and did not contain actionable misstatements or omissions. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against PwC. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3568/24-3568-2025-11-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "HUNT V. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Bloom Energy, a company specializing in fuel-cell servers, entered into Managed Services Agreements (MSAs), which are sale-leaseback arrangements involving banks and customers. The company initially classified these MSAs as operating leases, based on its assessment that the lease terms were less than 75% of the servers’ estimated useful lives and that the servers were not “integral equipment.” This classification affected how Bloom Energy reported revenue and liabilities in its financial statements. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) was engaged to audit Bloom Energy’s 2016 and 2017 financial statements, which were prepared by Bloom Energy’s management, and PwC issued an audit opinion stating that the financial statements were fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.

After Bloom Energy went public in 2018, it later restated its financial statements, reclassifying certain MSAs as capital leases following a review prompted by PwC’s identification of an accounting issue. This restatement led to a significant drop in Bloom Energy’s stock price. Plaintiffs, consisting of shareholders, filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Bloom Energy, its officers, directors, underwriters, and later added PwC as a defendant. They alleged violations of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, claiming that PwC was liable for material misstatements in the registration statement due to its audit opinion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against PwC. The Ninth Circuit held that under § 11, an independent accountant is not strictly liable for information in a registration statement or financial statements merely because it certified them. PwC’s audit opinion was a statement of subjective judgment, protected as an opinion under Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, and did not contain actionable misstatements or omissions. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against PwC.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Randy Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7566/23-7566-2025-10-27.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Cole</title>
        	<updated>2025-10-27T06:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-27T06:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7566/23-7566-2025-10-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a former CEO of a brand-management company who was prosecuted for allegedly orchestrating a scheme to inflate company revenues through secret “overpayments-for-givebacks” deals with a business partner. The government alleged that the CEO arranged for the partner to pay inflated prices for joint ventures, with a secret understanding that the excess would be returned later, thereby allowing the company to report higher revenues to investors. The CEO was also accused of making false filings with the SEC and improperly influencing audits. The central factual dispute was whether the CEO actually made these undisclosed agreements.

In 2021, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a jury trial. The jury acquitted the CEO of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, make false SEC filings, and interfere with audits, but could not reach a verdict on the substantive charges, resulting in a mistrial on those counts. The government retried the CEO in 2022 on the substantive counts, and the second jury convicted him on all charges. The CEO moved to bar the retrial, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded it because the first jury’s acquittal necessarily decided factual issues essential to the government’s case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the first jury’s acquittal on the conspiracy charge necessarily decided that the CEO did not make the alleged secret agreements, which was a factual issue essential to the substantive charges. Because the government’s case at the second trial depended on proving those same secret agreements, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s issue-preclusion doctrine barred the retrial. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the CEO’s convictions, and ordered dismissal of the indictment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7566/23-7566-2025-10-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a former CEO of a brand-management company who was prosecuted for allegedly orchestrating a scheme to inflate company revenues through secret “overpayments-for-givebacks” deals with a business partner. The government alleged that the CEO arranged for the partner to pay inflated prices for joint ventures, with a secret understanding that the excess would be returned later, thereby allowing the company to report higher revenues to investors. The CEO was also accused of making false filings with the SEC and improperly influencing audits. The central factual dispute was whether the CEO actually made these undisclosed agreements.

In 2021, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a jury trial. The jury acquitted the CEO of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, make false SEC filings, and interfere with audits, but could not reach a verdict on the substantive charges, resulting in a mistrial on those counts. The government retried the CEO in 2022 on the substantive counts, and the second jury convicted him on all charges. The CEO moved to bar the retrial, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded it because the first jury’s acquittal necessarily decided factual issues essential to the government’s case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the first jury’s acquittal on the conspiracy charge necessarily decided that the CEO did not make the alleged secret agreements, which was a factual issue essential to the substantive charges. Because the government’s case at the second trial depended on proving those same secret agreements, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s issue-preclusion doctrine barred the retrial. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the CEO’s convictions, and ordered dismissal of the indictment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Susan L. Carney</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2829/24-2829-2025-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>Handal v. Innovative Industrial Properties Inc</title>
        	<updated>2025-10-15T09:00:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-15T09:00:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2829/24-2829-2025-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A real estate investment trust that specializes in purchasing and leasing properties to cannabis companies was defrauded by one of its tenants, Kings Garden, which submitted fraudulent reimbursement requests for capital improvements. The trust paid out over $48 million based on these requests before discovering irregularities, such as forged documentation and payments for work that was not performed. After uncovering the fraud, the trust sued Kings Garden and disclosed the situation to the market, which led to a decline in its stock price.

Following these events, several shareholders filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The shareholders claimed that the trust and its executives made false or misleading statements about their due diligence, tenant monitoring, and the nature of reimbursements, and that these misstatements caused their losses when the fraud was revealed. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that while some statements could be misleading, the plaintiffs failed to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Third Circuit held that most of the challenged statements were either non-actionable opinions, not false or misleading, or not sufficiently specific. For the one statement plausibly alleged to be false or misleading, the court found that the facts did not support a strong inference that the statement’s maker acted with scienter. The court also rejected the application of corporate scienter and found no basis for control-person liability under Section 20(a) in the absence of a primary violation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2829/24-2829-2025-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Handal v. Innovative Industrial Properties Inc" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A real estate investment trust that specializes in purchasing and leasing properties to cannabis companies was defrauded by one of its tenants, Kings Garden, which submitted fraudulent reimbursement requests for capital improvements. The trust paid out over $48 million based on these requests before discovering irregularities, such as forged documentation and payments for work that was not performed. After uncovering the fraud, the trust sued Kings Garden and disclosed the situation to the market, which led to a decline in its stock price.

Following these events, several shareholders filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The shareholders claimed that the trust and its executives made false or misleading statements about their due diligence, tenant monitoring, and the nature of reimbursements, and that these misstatements caused their losses when the fraud was revealed. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that while some statements could be misleading, the plaintiffs failed to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Third Circuit held that most of the challenged statements were either non-actionable opinions, not false or misleading, or not sufficiently specific. For the one statement plausibly alleged to be false or misleading, the court found that the facts did not support a strong inference that the statement’s maker acted with scienter. The court also rejected the application of corporate scienter and found no basis for control-person liability under Section 20(a) in the absence of a primary violation.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Tamika Montgomery-Reeves</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1350/24-1350-2025-10-14.html</id>
        	<title>Cboe Global Markets, Inc. v. SEC</title>
        	<updated>2025-10-14T06:03:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-14T06:03:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1350/24-1350-2025-10-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several national securities exchanges challenged a 2024 rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that lowered the cap on fees exchanges may charge investors for executing orders. The SEC had previously set a cap of 30 mils ($0.003) per share for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.3% of the quotation price for stocks below $1. In 2024, after gathering new data and considering market developments, the SEC reduced these caps to 10 mils for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.1% for stocks below $1. The SEC explained that the changes were necessary to address market distortions and to align fee caps with reduced minimum tick sizes, thereby promoting price transparency and market efficiency.

After the SEC adopted the new rule, several exchanges petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The SEC agreed to stay the amendment pending judicial review. The exchanges contended that the SEC lacked authority to impose an industry-wide fee cap and that, if it had such authority, it was required to proceed on an exchange-by-exchange basis. They also argued that the SEC’s decision-making was arbitrary, particularly in its assessment of market effects and its choice of the 10-mil cap.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the SEC acted within its statutory authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which grants the SEC broad discretion to regulate the national market system, including the power to set universal access-fee caps. The court further found that the SEC’s rulemaking was not arbitrary or capricious, as the agency reasonably considered relevant issues, explained its decision, and relied on both economic theory and empirical data. The petition for review was denied. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-1350/24-1350-2025-10-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cboe Global Markets, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several national securities exchanges challenged a 2024 rule adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that lowered the cap on fees exchanges may charge investors for executing orders. The SEC had previously set a cap of 30 mils ($0.003) per share for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.3% of the quotation price for stocks below $1. In 2024, after gathering new data and considering market developments, the SEC reduced these caps to 10 mils for stocks priced at or above $1, and 0.1% for stocks below $1. The SEC explained that the changes were necessary to address market distortions and to align fee caps with reduced minimum tick sizes, thereby promoting price transparency and market efficiency.

After the SEC adopted the new rule, several exchanges petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, arguing that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The SEC agreed to stay the amendment pending judicial review. The exchanges contended that the SEC lacked authority to impose an industry-wide fee cap and that, if it had such authority, it was required to proceed on an exchange-by-exchange basis. They also argued that the SEC’s decision-making was arbitrary, particularly in its assessment of market effects and its choice of the 10-mil cap.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the SEC acted within its statutory authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which grants the SEC broad discretion to regulate the national market system, including the power to set universal access-fee caps. The court further found that the SEC’s rulemaking was not arbitrary or capricious, as the agency reasonably considered relevant issues, explained its decision, and relied on both economic theory and empirical data. The petition for review was denied.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bradley Garcia</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-2438/22-2438-2025-10-06.html</id>
        	<title>Sherman v. Abengoa, S.A.</title>
        	<updated>2025-10-06T08:00:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-06T08:00:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-2438/22-2438-2025-10-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of investors who purchased American Depository Shares in a Spanish engineering and construction company alleged that the company manipulated its financial records to conceal a liquidity crisis, which ultimately led to its bankruptcy. The investors claimed that the company’s registration statement for its U.S. offering contained false statements about its accounting practices, specifically regarding the use of the percentage-of-completion method for recognizing revenue. They also alleged that company executives and underwriters were involved in or responsible for these misrepresentations. The complaint relied on information from confidential witnesses and findings from Spanish criminal proceedings and regulatory investigations, which described widespread accounting fraud and the deliberate inflation of project revenues.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the investors’ claims under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court found the Securities Act claims untimely under the one-year statute of limitations and concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim under either statute. The court also denied leave to amend the Exchange Act claims against the company’s former CEO, finding that such amendment would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Securities Act claims were timely because the relevant “storm warning” triggering the statute of limitations occurred later than the district court had found. The appellate court also held that the complaint adequately stated claims under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act against the company, crediting the detailed allegations from confidential witnesses and Spanish proceedings. However, the court affirmed the denial of leave to amend the Exchange Act claims against the former CEO, finding insufficient allegations of scienter. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-2438/22-2438-2025-10-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sherman v. Abengoa, S.A." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of investors who purchased American Depository Shares in a Spanish engineering and construction company alleged that the company manipulated its financial records to conceal a liquidity crisis, which ultimately led to its bankruptcy. The investors claimed that the company’s registration statement for its U.S. offering contained false statements about its accounting practices, specifically regarding the use of the percentage-of-completion method for recognizing revenue. They also alleged that company executives and underwriters were involved in or responsible for these misrepresentations. The complaint relied on information from confidential witnesses and findings from Spanish criminal proceedings and regulatory investigations, which described widespread accounting fraud and the deliberate inflation of project revenues.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the investors’ claims under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court found the Securities Act claims untimely under the one-year statute of limitations and concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim under either statute. The court also denied leave to amend the Exchange Act claims against the company’s former CEO, finding that such amendment would be futile.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the Securities Act claims were timely because the relevant “storm warning” triggering the statute of limitations occurred later than the district court had found. The appellate court also held that the complaint adequately stated claims under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act against the company, crediting the detailed allegations from confidential witnesses and Spanish proceedings. However, the court affirmed the denial of leave to amend the Exchange Act claims against the former CEO, finding insufficient allegations of scienter. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Sullivan</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20143/24-20143-2025-10-02.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Constantinescu</title>
        	<updated>2025-10-03T07:30:55-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-03T07:30:55-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20143/24-20143-2025-10-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of individuals with large social media followings was charged with securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The government alleged that these individuals engaged in a “pump and dump” scheme: they would purchase securities, then use their social media platforms to post false or misleading information about those securities to induce their followers to buy, thereby artificially inflating the price. After the price increased, the defendants would sell their holdings for a profit. The indictment claimed that the defendants collectively profited $114 million from this scheme.

After indictment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, one defendant pleaded guilty while the others moved to dismiss the indictment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the indictment failed to allege a scheme to deprive victims of a traditional property interest, instead only alleging deprivation of valuable economic information. The district court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ciminelli v. United States, which held that deprivation of economic information alone does not constitute fraud under federal law.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the indictment adequately alleged both a scheme to defraud and an intent to defraud, as required by the securities fraud statute. The court distinguished the case from Ciminelli, finding that the indictment alleged a fraudulent-inducement theory—whereby the defendants used misrepresentations to induce followers to part with money by purchasing securities—not merely a deprivation of information. The court also held that the fraud statutes do not require proof that the defendants intended to cause economic harm, only that they intended to obtain money or property by deceit. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20143/24-20143-2025-10-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Constantinescu" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of individuals with large social media followings was charged with securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The government alleged that these individuals engaged in a “pump and dump” scheme: they would purchase securities, then use their social media platforms to post false or misleading information about those securities to induce their followers to buy, thereby artificially inflating the price. After the price increased, the defendants would sell their holdings for a profit. The indictment claimed that the defendants collectively profited $114 million from this scheme.

After indictment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, one defendant pleaded guilty while the others moved to dismiss the indictment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the indictment failed to allege a scheme to deprive victims of a traditional property interest, instead only alleging deprivation of valuable economic information. The district court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ciminelli v. United States, which held that deprivation of economic information alone does not constitute fraud under federal law.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the indictment adequately alleged both a scheme to defraud and an intent to defraud, as required by the securities fraud statute. The court distinguished the case from Ciminelli, finding that the indictment alleged a fraudulent-inducement theory—whereby the defendants used misrepresentations to induce followers to part with money by purchasing securities—not merely a deprivation of information. The court also held that the fraud statutes do not require proof that the defendants intended to cause economic harm, only that they intended to obtain money or property by deceit. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kurt Engelhardt</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7612/23-7612-2025-09-29.html</id>
        	<title>Gimpel v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-29T06:30:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-29T06:30:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7612/23-7612-2025-09-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns allegations by investors against a company that markets and sells organic and natural products, as well as several of its current and former executives. The investors claim that, during a specified period, the company engaged in “channel stuffing”—offering distributors significant incentives to purchase more product than they could sell, in order to meet financial projections. The investors allege that these practices were not adequately disclosed to the public or properly accounted for, and that the company made misleading statements about its financial health, internal controls, and compliance with accounting standards. The company later restated its financial results, admitted to deficiencies in its internal controls, and settled with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which did not bring charges but found violations of recordkeeping and internal control requirements.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially dismissed the investors’ complaint, finding that they had not sufficiently alleged that the defendants acted with scienter, or wrongful intent. After a prior appeal resulted in a remand for further consideration, the district court again dismissed the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead scienter and actionable misstatements or omissions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the defendants made actionable misstatements and omissions regarding the company’s financial results, internal controls, and the use of channel stuffing. The court also found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged scienter, loss causation, and control-person liability under the relevant securities laws. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and that the case should proceed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-7612/23-7612-2025-09-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Gimpel v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns allegations by investors against a company that markets and sells organic and natural products, as well as several of its current and former executives. The investors claim that, during a specified period, the company engaged in “channel stuffing”—offering distributors significant incentives to purchase more product than they could sell, in order to meet financial projections. The investors allege that these practices were not adequately disclosed to the public or properly accounted for, and that the company made misleading statements about its financial health, internal controls, and compliance with accounting standards. The company later restated its financial results, admitted to deficiencies in its internal controls, and settled with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which did not bring charges but found violations of recordkeeping and internal control requirements.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially dismissed the investors’ complaint, finding that they had not sufficiently alleged that the defendants acted with scienter, or wrongful intent. After a prior appeal resulted in a remand for further consideration, the district court again dismissed the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead scienter and actionable misstatements or omissions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the defendants made actionable misstatements and omissions regarding the company’s financial results, internal controls, and the use of channel stuffing. The court also found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged scienter, loss causation, and control-person liability under the relevant securities laws. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and that the case should proceed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Sack</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1162/24-1162-2025-09-16.html</id>
        	<title>In Re: Archegos 20A Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-16T06:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-16T06:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1162/24-1162-2025-09-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of shareholders in seven small-to-mid cap companies brought coordinated class actions against two major financial institutions, alleging that these institutions enabled Archegos Capital Management to amass large, nonpublic, and highly leveraged positions in the companies’ stocks through total return swaps and margin lending. When the value of these stocks declined and Archegos was unable to meet margin calls, the financial institutions quickly sold off their related positions before the public became aware of Archegos’ impending collapse. The shareholders claimed that this conduct constituted insider trading, arguing that the institutions used confidential information to avoid losses at the expense of ordinary investors.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York first dismissed the shareholders’ complaints, finding insufficient factual allegations to support claims under both the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading. The court allowed the shareholders to amend their complaint, but after a second amended complaint was filed, the court again dismissed the claims with prejudice. The district court concluded that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Archegos was a corporate insider or that the financial institutions owed a fiduciary duty to Archegos. It also found the allegations of tipping preferred clients to be unsupported by sufficient facts. The court dismissed the related claims under Sections 20A and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act for lack of an underlying securities violation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the shareholders failed to plausibly allege that the financial institutions engaged in insider trading under either the classical or misappropriation theories. The court found no fiduciary or similar duty owed by Archegos to the issuers or by the financial institutions to Archegos, and determined that the complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to support a tipping theory. The court also affirmed dismissal of the Section 20A and 20(a) claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-1162/24-1162-2025-09-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re: Archegos 20A Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of shareholders in seven small-to-mid cap companies brought coordinated class actions against two major financial institutions, alleging that these institutions enabled Archegos Capital Management to amass large, nonpublic, and highly leveraged positions in the companies’ stocks through total return swaps and margin lending. When the value of these stocks declined and Archegos was unable to meet margin calls, the financial institutions quickly sold off their related positions before the public became aware of Archegos’ impending collapse. The shareholders claimed that this conduct constituted insider trading, arguing that the institutions used confidential information to avoid losses at the expense of ordinary investors.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York first dismissed the shareholders’ complaints, finding insufficient factual allegations to support claims under both the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading. The court allowed the shareholders to amend their complaint, but after a second amended complaint was filed, the court again dismissed the claims with prejudice. The district court concluded that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Archegos was a corporate insider or that the financial institutions owed a fiduciary duty to Archegos. It also found the allegations of tipping preferred clients to be unsupported by sufficient facts. The court dismissed the related claims under Sections 20A and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act for lack of an underlying securities violation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that the shareholders failed to plausibly allege that the financial institutions engaged in insider trading under either the classical or misappropriation theories. The court found no fiduciary or similar duty owed by Archegos to the issuers or by the financial institutions to Archegos, and determined that the complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to support a tipping theory. The court also affirmed dismissal of the Section 20A and 20(a) claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Maria Araujo Kahn</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2282/23-2282-2025-09-05.html</id>
        	<title>USA V. JESENIK</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-05T08:30:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-05T08:30:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2282/23-2282-2025-09-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of former executives from an investment management company were prosecuted after the company collapsed and was placed in receivership. The company, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors, primarily through promissory notes and other investment vehicles, experienced severe financial distress following the default of a major asset. Despite this, the executives continued to solicit investments, representing to investors that their funds would be used to purchase secure receivables and that the company was financially healthy. In reality, most new investor funds were used to pay prior investors and cover operating expenses. The executives were accused of making material misrepresentations and misleading half-truths about the use of investor funds, the security of investments, and the company’s financial health.

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and multiple counts of wire fraud; one defendant was also convicted of making a false statement on a loan application. The defendants argued that they were improperly convicted on an omissions theory of fraud and that they were prevented from presenting a complete defense based on disclosures in offering documents and financial statements. They also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the materiality of their statements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government’s theory at trial was based on affirmative misrepresentations and misleading half-truths, not mere omissions, and that the jury instructions fairly stated the law. The court found that evidence of what was not disclosed was relevant to materiality, and that disclaimers in offering documents did not render other representations immaterial in a criminal fraud prosecution. The convictions were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2282/23-2282-2025-09-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA V. JESENIK" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of former executives from an investment management company were prosecuted after the company collapsed and was placed in receivership. The company, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors, primarily through promissory notes and other investment vehicles, experienced severe financial distress following the default of a major asset. Despite this, the executives continued to solicit investments, representing to investors that their funds would be used to purchase secure receivables and that the company was financially healthy. In reality, most new investor funds were used to pay prior investors and cover operating expenses. The executives were accused of making material misrepresentations and misleading half-truths about the use of investor funds, the security of investments, and the company’s financial health.

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and multiple counts of wire fraud; one defendant was also convicted of making a false statement on a loan application. The defendants argued that they were improperly convicted on an omissions theory of fraud and that they were prevented from presenting a complete defense based on disclosures in offering documents and financial statements. They also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the materiality of their statements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government’s theory at trial was based on affirmative misrepresentations and misleading half-truths, not mere omissions, and that the jury instructions fairly stated the law. The court found that evidence of what was not disclosed was relevant to materiality, and that disclaimers in offering documents did not render other representations immaterial in a criminal fraud prosecution. The convictions were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Hurwitz</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3830/24-3830-2025-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. SRIPETCH</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-03T08:01:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-03T08:01:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3830/24-3830-2025-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action against Ongkaruck Sripetch and several other defendants, alleging that they engaged in fraudulent schemes involving at least 20 penny stock companies. The SEC claimed that the defendants obtained over $6 million in illicit proceeds through violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including securities fraud and the sale of unregistered securities. The SEC sought various remedies, including an order requiring the defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over the case. Sripetch consented to the entry of judgment, agreeing that the court could order disgorgement and prejudgment interest, and that the complaint’s allegations would be accepted as true for the purposes of the SEC’s motion. The district court ordered Sripetch to disgorge $2,251,923.16 in net profits, plus prejudgment interest. Sripetch appealed, arguing that disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) requires a showing of pecuniary harm to investors, which he claimed the SEC had not demonstrated.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s disgorgement order for abuse of discretion. The Ninth Circuit held that the SEC is not required to show that investors suffered pecuniary harm as a precondition to a disgorgement award under § 78u(d)(5) or (d)(7). The court reasoned that disgorgement is a profits-based remedy focused on depriving wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains, not compensating victims for losses. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3830/24-3830-2025-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. SRIPETCH" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action against Ongkaruck Sripetch and several other defendants, alleging that they engaged in fraudulent schemes involving at least 20 penny stock companies. The SEC claimed that the defendants obtained over $6 million in illicit proceeds through violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including securities fraud and the sale of unregistered securities. The SEC sought various remedies, including an order requiring the defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over the case. Sripetch consented to the entry of judgment, agreeing that the court could order disgorgement and prejudgment interest, and that the complaint’s allegations would be accepted as true for the purposes of the SEC’s motion. The district court ordered Sripetch to disgorge $2,251,923.16 in net profits, plus prejudgment interest. Sripetch appealed, arguing that disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) requires a showing of pecuniary harm to investors, which he claimed the SEC had not demonstrated.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s disgorgement order for abuse of discretion. The Ninth Circuit held that the SEC is not required to show that investors suffered pecuniary harm as a precondition to a disgorgement award under § 78u(d)(5) or (d)(7). The court reasoned that disgorgement is a profits-based remedy focused on depriving wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains, not compensating victims for losses. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Holly Thomas</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1818/24-1818-2025-08-29.html</id>
        	<title>In re Walmart Inc. Securities Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-29T09:00:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-29T09:00:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1818/24-1818-2025-08-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Walmart, a national pharmacy operator, was investigated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas from 2016 to 2018 regarding its opioid dispensing practices. The investigation included raids, subpoenas, and meetings where prosecutors indicated a possible indictment, but ultimately, the Department of Justice declined to prosecute criminally, though a civil investigation continued. In 2020, a news article revealed the investigation, causing Walmart’s stock price to drop. Later that year, the DOJ filed a civil lawsuit against Walmart for alleged violations of the Controlled Substances Act.

Investors who owned Walmart stock during the relevant period filed a putative securities fraud class action in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. They alleged that Walmart’s public filings failed to adequately disclose the government investigation, violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, and that Walmart’s statements about its “reasonably possible” liabilities and compliance with accounting rules (ASC 450) were misleading. The District Court granted Walmart’s motion to dismiss, finding no actionable misrepresentation or omission, and denied plaintiffs’ request to further amend their complaint.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Walmart’s omission of the investigation from its disclosures before June 4, 2018, was not misleading because the investigation did not constitute a “reasonably possible” material liability at that stage. After June 4, 2018, Walmart’s disclosures sufficiently informed investors about the existence and potential impact of government investigations. The court also found no violation of ASC 450 and affirmed the District Court’s denial of leave to amend, concluding that further amendment would be futile. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1818/24-1818-2025-08-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Walmart Inc. Securities Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Walmart, a national pharmacy operator, was investigated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas from 2016 to 2018 regarding its opioid dispensing practices. The investigation included raids, subpoenas, and meetings where prosecutors indicated a possible indictment, but ultimately, the Department of Justice declined to prosecute criminally, though a civil investigation continued. In 2020, a news article revealed the investigation, causing Walmart’s stock price to drop. Later that year, the DOJ filed a civil lawsuit against Walmart for alleged violations of the Controlled Substances Act.

Investors who owned Walmart stock during the relevant period filed a putative securities fraud class action in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. They alleged that Walmart’s public filings failed to adequately disclose the government investigation, violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, and that Walmart’s statements about its “reasonably possible” liabilities and compliance with accounting rules (ASC 450) were misleading. The District Court granted Walmart’s motion to dismiss, finding no actionable misrepresentation or omission, and denied plaintiffs’ request to further amend their complaint.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Walmart’s omission of the investigation from its disclosures before June 4, 2018, was not misleading because the investigation did not constitute a “reasonably possible” material liability at that stage. After June 4, 2018, Walmart’s disclosures sufficiently informed investors about the existence and potential impact of government investigations. The court also found no violation of ASC 450 and affirmed the District Court’s denial of leave to amend, concluding that further amendment would be futile. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Anthony Scirica</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-1036/24-1036-2025-08-29.html</id>
        	<title>Sodha v. Golubowski</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-29T08:02:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-29T08:02:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-1036/24-1036-2025-08-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Robinhood Markets, Inc., an online brokerage firm, experienced a surge in business during early 2021 due to increased trading in “meme stocks” and Dogecoin. This activity declined sharply in the second quarter of 2021, leading to significant drops in key financial metrics and performance indicators. In July 2021, Robinhood conducted an initial public offering (IPO) and issued a registration statement that included limited information about its second-quarter performance. After the IPO, Robinhood released its full second-quarter results, which revealed substantial declines and led to a drop in its stock price. Plaintiffs, representing a class of investors, alleged that Robinhood’s registration statement omitted material information about these declines, violating Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The district court found that Robinhood and its co-defendants were not liable under the Securities Act for failing to disclose the pre-IPO declines in key performance indicators and certain revenue sources. The court also held that there was no actionable omission regarding the increased percentage of Robinhood’s revenue attributable to speculative trading.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court applied incorrect legal standards to the plaintiffs’ theories under Section 11’s “misleading” prong and Item 303 of Regulation S-K. The appellate court clarified that, in this context, Sections 11 and 12 require disclosure of all material information, and rejected the “extreme departure” test used by the district court. The court vacated the dismissal as to these theories and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claim based on Item 105 of Regulation S-K, finding no duty to provide a breakdown of revenue sources for the relevant period. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-1036/24-1036-2025-08-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sodha v. Golubowski" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Robinhood Markets, Inc., an online brokerage firm, experienced a surge in business during early 2021 due to increased trading in “meme stocks” and Dogecoin. This activity declined sharply in the second quarter of 2021, leading to significant drops in key financial metrics and performance indicators. In July 2021, Robinhood conducted an initial public offering (IPO) and issued a registration statement that included limited information about its second-quarter performance. After the IPO, Robinhood released its full second-quarter results, which revealed substantial declines and led to a drop in its stock price. Plaintiffs, representing a class of investors, alleged that Robinhood’s registration statement omitted material information about these declines, violating Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The district court found that Robinhood and its co-defendants were not liable under the Securities Act for failing to disclose the pre-IPO declines in key performance indicators and certain revenue sources. The court also held that there was no actionable omission regarding the increased percentage of Robinhood’s revenue attributable to speculative trading.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court applied incorrect legal standards to the plaintiffs’ theories under Section 11’s “misleading” prong and Item 303 of Regulation S-K. The appellate court clarified that, in this context, Sections 11 and 12 require disclosure of all material information, and rejected the “extreme departure” test used by the district court. The court vacated the dismissal as to these theories and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claim based on Item 105 of Regulation S-K, finding no duty to provide a breakdown of revenue sources for the relevant period.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Milan Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-950/24-950-2025-08-28.html</id>
        	<title>Roth v. Armistice Capital, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-28T06:00:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-28T06:00:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-950/24-950-2025-08-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Armistice Capital, LLC and its client fund held warrants to purchase shares in Vaxart, Inc., a biotech company developing an oral COVID-19 vaccine. Stephen J. Boyd, Armistice’s Chief Investment Officer, served on Vaxart’s board. The warrants included “blocker provisions” limiting Armistice’s ownership to 4.99% and 9.99% of Vaxart’s shares. Boyd requested that Vaxart’s board amend these provisions to allow Armistice to own up to 19.99%. The board, with full knowledge that Boyd and another director were Armistice representatives, unanimously approved the amendment. Shortly after Vaxart announced its vaccine’s selection for a federal study, Armistice exercised the warrants and sold its shares, allegedly realizing an $87 million profit.

Andrew E. Roth, a Vaxart shareholder, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that Armistice and Boyd, as statutory insiders, violated Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act by engaging in a prohibited short-swing transaction. Roth sought disgorgement of the profits to Vaxart. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that even if a short-swing transaction occurred, they were exempt from liability under SEC Rule 16b-3(d) because the Vaxart board had approved the transaction with knowledge of all material facts. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the exemption applied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. The Second Circuit held that the exemption under SEC Rule 16b-3(d) applied because the transaction involved the acquisition of issuer equity securities by insiders, those insiders were directors at the time, and the transaction was approved in advance by the issuer’s board with full knowledge of the relevant relationships. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, holding that the defendants were exempt from Section 16(b) liability under Rule 16b-3(d). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-950/24-950-2025-08-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Roth v. Armistice Capital, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Armistice Capital, LLC and its client fund held warrants to purchase shares in Vaxart, Inc., a biotech company developing an oral COVID-19 vaccine. Stephen J. Boyd, Armistice’s Chief Investment Officer, served on Vaxart’s board. The warrants included “blocker provisions” limiting Armistice’s ownership to 4.99% and 9.99% of Vaxart’s shares. Boyd requested that Vaxart’s board amend these provisions to allow Armistice to own up to 19.99%. The board, with full knowledge that Boyd and another director were Armistice representatives, unanimously approved the amendment. Shortly after Vaxart announced its vaccine’s selection for a federal study, Armistice exercised the warrants and sold its shares, allegedly realizing an $87 million profit.

Andrew E. Roth, a Vaxart shareholder, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that Armistice and Boyd, as statutory insiders, violated Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act by engaging in a prohibited short-swing transaction. Roth sought disgorgement of the profits to Vaxart. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that even if a short-swing transaction occurred, they were exempt from liability under SEC Rule 16b-3(d) because the Vaxart board had approved the transaction with knowledge of all material facts. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the exemption applied.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. The Second Circuit held that the exemption under SEC Rule 16b-3(d) applied because the transaction involved the acquisition of issuer equity securities by insiders, those insiders were directors at the time, and the transaction was approved in advance by the issuer’s board with full knowledge of the relevant relationships. The court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, holding that the defendants were exempt from Section 16(b) liability under Rule 16b-3(d).
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Barrington Parker, Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3324/23-3324-2025-08-27.html</id>
        	<title>USA v Miller</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-27T06:30:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-27T06:30:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3324/23-3324-2025-08-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Earl Miller, who owned and operated several real estate investment companies under the 5 Star name, was responsible for soliciting funds from investors, primarily in the Amish community, with promises that their money would be used exclusively for real estate ventures. After becoming sole owner in 2014, Miller diverted substantial investor funds for personal use, unauthorized business ventures, and payments to friends’ companies, all in violation of the investment agreements. He also misled investors about the nature and use of their funds, including issuing false statements about new business activities. The scheme continued even as the business faltered, and Miller ultimately filed for bankruptcy.

A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Indiana indicted Miller on multiple counts, including wire fraud and securities fraud. At trial, the government presented evidence, including testimony from an FBI forensic accountant, showing that Miller misappropriated approximately $4.5 million. The jury convicted Miller on one count of securities fraud and five counts of wire fraud, acquitting him on one wire fraud count and a bankruptcy-related charge. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana sentenced Miller to 97 months’ imprisonment, applying an 18-level sentencing enhancement based on a $4.5 million intended loss, and ordered $2.3 million in restitution to victims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Miller’s appeal, in which he challenged the district court’s loss and restitution calculations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court reasonably estimated the intended loss at $4.5 million, as this amount reflected the funds Miller placed at risk through his fraudulent scheme, regardless of when the investments were made. The court also upheld the restitution award, finding it properly included all victims harmed by the overall scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-3324/23-3324-2025-08-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v Miller" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Earl Miller, who owned and operated several real estate investment companies under the 5 Star name, was responsible for soliciting funds from investors, primarily in the Amish community, with promises that their money would be used exclusively for real estate ventures. After becoming sole owner in 2014, Miller diverted substantial investor funds for personal use, unauthorized business ventures, and payments to friends’ companies, all in violation of the investment agreements. He also misled investors about the nature and use of their funds, including issuing false statements about new business activities. The scheme continued even as the business faltered, and Miller ultimately filed for bankruptcy.

A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Indiana indicted Miller on multiple counts, including wire fraud and securities fraud. At trial, the government presented evidence, including testimony from an FBI forensic accountant, showing that Miller misappropriated approximately $4.5 million. The jury convicted Miller on one count of securities fraud and five counts of wire fraud, acquitting him on one wire fraud count and a bankruptcy-related charge. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana sentenced Miller to 97 months’ imprisonment, applying an 18-level sentencing enhancement based on a $4.5 million intended loss, and ordered $2.3 million in restitution to victims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Miller’s appeal, in which he challenged the district court’s loss and restitution calculations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court reasonably estimated the intended loss at $4.5 million, as this amount reflected the funds Miller placed at risk through his fraudulent scheme, regardless of when the investments were made. The court also upheld the restitution award, finding it properly included all victims harmed by the overall scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Nancy Maldonado</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2803/24-2803-2025-08-27.html</id>
        	<title>City of Hialeah Employees&#039; Retirement System v. Peloton Interactive, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-27T06:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-27T06:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2803/24-2803-2025-08-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Investors who purchased shares of a fitness equipment company between February 2021 and January 2022 alleged that the company and several executives misled the public about the ongoing demand for its products and the state of its inventory following the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, demand for the company’s products surged, but plaintiffs claimed that by early 2021, demand had declined as gyms reopened. Plaintiffs asserted that the company concealed this decline and continued to assure investors that demand remained strong and that supply chain investments were necessary. Their allegations were supported by statements from numerous former employees who described declining sales, missed quotas, and growing excess inventory.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege any actionable material misstatements or omissions. The court determined that most statements were either protected forward-looking statements, non-actionable puffery, or consistent with the company’s actual financial results. The court also found that the confidential witness accounts were anecdotal and did not reflect the company’s overall performance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that most of the challenged statements were not actionable, either because they were not materially false or misleading, or because they constituted non-actionable puffery. However, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged actionable misstatements or omissions regarding the company’s characterization of a price reduction as “absolutely offensive” and its risk disclosures about excess inventory in certain SEC filings, which may have been misleading because the risks had already materialized. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal as to these statements and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the dismissal of claims based on other statements. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2803/24-2803-2025-08-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "City of Hialeah Employees&#039; Retirement System v. Peloton Interactive, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Investors who purchased shares of a fitness equipment company between February 2021 and January 2022 alleged that the company and several executives misled the public about the ongoing demand for its products and the state of its inventory following the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, demand for the company’s products surged, but plaintiffs claimed that by early 2021, demand had declined as gyms reopened. Plaintiffs asserted that the company concealed this decline and continued to assure investors that demand remained strong and that supply chain investments were necessary. Their allegations were supported by statements from numerous former employees who described declining sales, missed quotas, and growing excess inventory.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York reviewed the case after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege any actionable material misstatements or omissions. The court determined that most statements were either protected forward-looking statements, non-actionable puffery, or consistent with the company’s actual financial results. The court also found that the confidential witness accounts were anecdotal and did not reflect the company’s overall performance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that most of the challenged statements were not actionable, either because they were not materially false or misleading, or because they constituted non-actionable puffery. However, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged actionable misstatements or omissions regarding the company’s characterization of a price reduction as “absolutely offensive” and its risk disclosures about excess inventory in certain SEC filings, which may have been misleading because the risks had already materialized. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal as to these statements and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the dismissal of claims based on other statements.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Menashi</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60626/23-60626-2025-08-25.html</id>
        	<title>Natl Assoc Priv Fund Mgr v. SEC</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-26T04:01:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-26T04:01:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60626/23-60626-2025-08-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted two rules intended to increase transparency in the securities lending and short sale markets. Securities lending involves temporarily transferring securities from a lender to a borrower for a fee, and is closely tied to short selling, where investors sell securities they do not own, hoping to profit from a price decline. The SEC found both markets to be opaque, making regulatory oversight difficult. To address this, the SEC, under authority from the Dodd-Frank Act, promulgated the Securities Lending Rule (requiring prompt reporting of securities loans) and the Short Sale Rule (mandating monthly aggregate reporting of short sale positions by institutional investment managers).

The petitioners, associations representing institutional investment managers, challenged both rules before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued that the rules were arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the SEC’s statutory authority, conflicted with each other, and that the SEC failed to consider their cumulative economic impact. They also raised procedural objections, including inadequate opportunity for public comment and concerns about the extraterritorial application of the Short Sale Rule. The SEC defended its process and statutory authority, maintaining that the rules addressed distinct regulatory gaps and that its economic analysis was sufficient.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the SEC acted within its statutory authority in adopting both rules and provided adequate opportunity for public comment. The court also found that the SEC reasonably explained its choices regarding reporting systems and that the Short Sale Rule did not have impermissible extraterritorial reach. However, the court concluded that the SEC failed to consider and quantify the cumulative economic impact of the two interrelated rules, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Exchange Act. The court granted the petition for review in part and remanded both rules to the SEC for further proceedings on this issue, while denying the remainder of the petition. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60626/23-60626-2025-08-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Natl Assoc Priv Fund Mgr v. SEC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted two rules intended to increase transparency in the securities lending and short sale markets. Securities lending involves temporarily transferring securities from a lender to a borrower for a fee, and is closely tied to short selling, where investors sell securities they do not own, hoping to profit from a price decline. The SEC found both markets to be opaque, making regulatory oversight difficult. To address this, the SEC, under authority from the Dodd-Frank Act, promulgated the Securities Lending Rule (requiring prompt reporting of securities loans) and the Short Sale Rule (mandating monthly aggregate reporting of short sale positions by institutional investment managers).

The petitioners, associations representing institutional investment managers, challenged both rules before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. They argued that the rules were arbitrary and capricious, exceeded the SEC’s statutory authority, conflicted with each other, and that the SEC failed to consider their cumulative economic impact. They also raised procedural objections, including inadequate opportunity for public comment and concerns about the extraterritorial application of the Short Sale Rule. The SEC defended its process and statutory authority, maintaining that the rules addressed distinct regulatory gaps and that its economic analysis was sufficient.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the SEC acted within its statutory authority in adopting both rules and provided adequate opportunity for public comment. The court also found that the SEC reasonably explained its choices regarding reporting systems and that the Short Sale Rule did not have impermissible extraterritorial reach. However, the court concluded that the SEC failed to consider and quantify the cumulative economic impact of the two interrelated rules, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Exchange Act. The court granted the petition for review in part and remanded both rules to the SEC for further proceedings on this issue, while denying the remainder of the petition.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cory Wilson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-2330/24-2330-2025-08-22.html</id>
        	<title>Pederson v. U.S. Securities Exch. Comm.</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-22T07:30:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-22T07:30:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-2330/24-2330-2025-08-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action against several individuals, alleging they orchestrated profitable “pump-and-dump” schemes to artificially inflate stock prices and then sell shares at a profit, harming investors. The SEC ultimately obtained final judgments and recovered over $11 million in sanctions. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is required to pay whistleblower awards to individuals who voluntarily provide original information leading to successful enforcement actions. After posting a Notice of Covered Action, five claimants submitted applications for whistleblower awards related to this enforcement action.

The SEC’s Claims Review Staff awarded 30 percent of the monetary sanctions to Daniel Fisher, a former executive at a company central to the investigation, finding that Fisher provided new, helpful information that substantially advanced the investigation. The staff denied the other applications, including those from Lee Michael Pederson, John Amster, and Robert Heath, concluding that their information was either duplicative, based on publicly available sources, or not used by enforcement staff. Pederson and Fisher were found not to have acted jointly as whistleblowers, and Amster and Heath’s information was not relied upon in the investigation. The SEC affirmed these determinations in its final order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s final order, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo. The court held that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s determinations: Pederson and Fisher did not act jointly, Pederson’s individual tips were not original or helpful, and Amster and Heath’s information did not lead to the enforcement action. The court also rejected Pederson’s due process and procedural arguments and denied his motion to compel. The petitions for review were denied, and the SEC’s order was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/24-2330/24-2330-2025-08-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Pederson v. U.S. Securities Exch. Comm." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action against several individuals, alleging they orchestrated profitable “pump-and-dump” schemes to artificially inflate stock prices and then sell shares at a profit, harming investors. The SEC ultimately obtained final judgments and recovered over $11 million in sanctions. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is required to pay whistleblower awards to individuals who voluntarily provide original information leading to successful enforcement actions. After posting a Notice of Covered Action, five claimants submitted applications for whistleblower awards related to this enforcement action.

The SEC’s Claims Review Staff awarded 30 percent of the monetary sanctions to Daniel Fisher, a former executive at a company central to the investigation, finding that Fisher provided new, helpful information that substantially advanced the investigation. The staff denied the other applications, including those from Lee Michael Pederson, John Amster, and Robert Heath, concluding that their information was either duplicative, based on publicly available sources, or not used by enforcement staff. Pederson and Fisher were found not to have acted jointly as whistleblowers, and Amster and Heath’s information was not relied upon in the investigation. The SEC affirmed these determinations in its final order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s final order, applying a deferential standard to the agency’s factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo. The court held that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s determinations: Pederson and Fisher did not act jointly, Pederson’s individual tips were not original or helpful, and Amster and Heath’s information did not lead to the enforcement action. The court also rejected Pederson’s due process and procedural arguments and denied his motion to compel. The petitions for review were denied, and the SEC’s order was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lavenski Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/19-1769/19-1769-2025-08-22.html</id>
        	<title>Sullivan v. UBS AG</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-22T06:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-22T06:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/19-1769/19-1769-2025-08-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of plaintiffs, including an individual, a retirement fund, and several investment funds, traded derivatives based on the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor). They alleged that a group of banks and brokers conspired to manipulate Euribor, which affected the pricing of various over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, such as FX forwards, interest-rate swaps, and forward rate agreements. The alleged conduct included coordinated false submissions to set Euribor at artificial levels, collusion among banks and brokers, and structural changes within banks to facilitate manipulation. Plaintiffs claimed this manipulation harmed them by distorting the prices of their Euribor-based derivative transactions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Sherman Act, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and state common law, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court also found that the RICO claims were based on extraterritorial conduct and did not meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). It declined to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed that conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction was not established but held that two plaintiffs—Frontpoint Australian Opportunities Trust and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System—had established specific personal jurisdiction over UBS AG and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC for Sherman Act and RICO claims related to OTC Euribor derivative transactions in the United States. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claims for lack of particularity, but held that the Sherman Act claims were sufficiently pleaded. It vacated the district court’s refusal to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/19-1769/19-1769-2025-08-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sullivan v. UBS AG" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of plaintiffs, including an individual, a retirement fund, and several investment funds, traded derivatives based on the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor). They alleged that a group of banks and brokers conspired to manipulate Euribor, which affected the pricing of various over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, such as FX forwards, interest-rate swaps, and forward rate agreements. The alleged conduct included coordinated false submissions to set Euribor at artificial levels, collusion among banks and brokers, and structural changes within banks to facilitate manipulation. Plaintiffs claimed this manipulation harmed them by distorting the prices of their Euribor-based derivative transactions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Sherman Act, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and state common law, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over all defendants. The district court also found that the RICO claims were based on extraterritorial conduct and did not meet the particularity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). It declined to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed that conspiracy-based personal jurisdiction was not established but held that two plaintiffs—Frontpoint Australian Opportunities Trust and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System—had established specific personal jurisdiction over UBS AG and The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC for Sherman Act and RICO claims related to OTC Euribor derivative transactions in the United States. The court affirmed dismissal of the RICO claims for lack of particularity, but held that the Sherman Act claims were sufficiently pleaded. It vacated the district court’s refusal to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Sullivan</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1118/24-1118-2025-08-20.html</id>
        	<title>Boilermaker Blacksmith National Pension Trust v. Maiden Holdings Ltd</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-20T09:00:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-20T09:00:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1118/24-1118-2025-08-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A publicly traded reinsurance company experienced significant financial losses over a two-year period due to adverse developments with its largest client, which led to higher-than-expected claim payouts and a dramatic drop in its stock price. Investors, represented by a pension trust and a bank, alleged that the company committed securities fraud by making misleading statements about the adequacy of its reserve funds. Specifically, they claimed the company failed to disclose historical data indicating that its reserves were insufficient, even though it knew of this adverse information.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied the company’s motion to dismiss, allowing limited discovery focused on whether the company intentionally omitted the historical loss ratio information. The Magistrate Judge restricted discovery to a narrow scope, declining to require production of all underlying data, and the District Court affirmed this limitation. After this limited discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment for the company, holding that the reserve statements were not misleading as a matter of law because the company had considered the historical data and the omitted information did not “totally eclipse” other factors in the reserve calculations.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court erred in its application of the materiality standard and in denying further discovery. The Third Circuit found that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the omission of adverse historical data was material to investors, given the company’s dependence on its largest client and the significance of historical trends in its reserve-setting process. The court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for full discovery and further proceedings, clarifying that materiality is a context-specific inquiry and that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to proceed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-1118/24-1118-2025-08-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Boilermaker Blacksmith National Pension Trust v. Maiden Holdings Ltd" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A publicly traded reinsurance company experienced significant financial losses over a two-year period due to adverse developments with its largest client, which led to higher-than-expected claim payouts and a dramatic drop in its stock price. Investors, represented by a pension trust and a bank, alleged that the company committed securities fraud by making misleading statements about the adequacy of its reserve funds. Specifically, they claimed the company failed to disclose historical data indicating that its reserves were insufficient, even though it knew of this adverse information.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially denied the company’s motion to dismiss, allowing limited discovery focused on whether the company intentionally omitted the historical loss ratio information. The Magistrate Judge restricted discovery to a narrow scope, declining to require production of all underlying data, and the District Court affirmed this limitation. After this limited discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment for the company, holding that the reserve statements were not misleading as a matter of law because the company had considered the historical data and the omitted information did not “totally eclipse” other factors in the reserve calculations.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court erred in its application of the materiality standard and in denying further discovery. The Third Circuit found that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the omission of adverse historical data was material to investors, given the company’s dependence on its largest client and the significance of historical trends in its reserve-setting process. The court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for full discovery and further proceedings, clarifying that materiality is a context-specific inquiry and that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to proceed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michael Chagares</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3560/24-3560-2025-08-20.html</id>
        	<title>Sneed v. Talphera, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-20T08:30:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-20T08:30:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3560/24-3560-2025-08-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A pharmaceutical company developed a sublingual opioid painkiller, DSUVIA, which could only be administered in medically supervised settings due to safety concerns and was subject to a strict FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS). The company marketed DSUVIA with the slogan “Tongue and Done” at investor conferences, accompanied by additional disclosures about the drug’s limitations and REMS requirements. After the FDA issued a warning letter objecting to the slogan as potentially misleading under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, several shareholders filed suit, alleging that the slogan misled investors about the complexity of administering DSUVIA and the drug’s limited market potential.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the shareholders’ complaint, finding that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead facts supporting a strong inference of scienter, but did not rule on whether the statements were false or misleading. The plaintiffs were given two opportunities to amend their complaint, but the court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead falsity because a reasonable investor would not interpret the “Tongue and Done” slogan in isolation, but would consider the context provided by accompanying disclosures and other available information. The court also held that the FDA’s warning letter did not establish falsity under securities law, as the standards and intended audiences differ. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs did not plead a strong inference of scienter, as the facts suggested the company’s officers acted in good faith. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3560/24-3560-2025-08-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sneed v. Talphera, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A pharmaceutical company developed a sublingual opioid painkiller, DSUVIA, which could only be administered in medically supervised settings due to safety concerns and was subject to a strict FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS). The company marketed DSUVIA with the slogan “Tongue and Done” at investor conferences, accompanied by additional disclosures about the drug’s limitations and REMS requirements. After the FDA issued a warning letter objecting to the slogan as potentially misleading under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, several shareholders filed suit, alleging that the slogan misled investors about the complexity of administering DSUVIA and the drug’s limited market potential.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the shareholders’ complaint, finding that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead facts supporting a strong inference of scienter, but did not rule on whether the statements were false or misleading. The plaintiffs were given two opportunities to amend their complaint, but the court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead falsity because a reasonable investor would not interpret the “Tongue and Done” slogan in isolation, but would consider the context provided by accompanying disclosures and other available information. The court also held that the FDA’s warning letter did not establish falsity under securities law, as the standards and intended audiences differ. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs did not plead a strong inference of scienter, as the facts suggested the company’s officers acted in good faith. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kenneth Kiyul Lee</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2849/23-2849-2025-08-20.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Smith</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-20T07:30:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-20T07:30:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2849/23-2849-2025-08-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three individuals who worked as precious metals futures traders at major financial institutions were prosecuted for engaging in a market manipulation scheme known as spoofing. This practice involved placing large orders on commodities exchanges with the intent to cancel them before execution, thereby creating a false impression of market supply or demand to benefit their genuine trades. The traders’ conduct was in violation of both exchange rules and their employers’ policies, and the government charged them with various offenses, including wire fraud, commodities fraud, attempted price manipulation, and violating the anti-spoofing provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over separate trials for the defendants. In the first trial, two defendants were convicted by a jury on all substantive counts except conspiracy, after the court denied their motions for acquittal and a new trial. The third defendant, tried separately, admitted to spoofing but argued he lacked the requisite criminal intent; he was convicted of wire fraud, and his post-trial motions were also denied. The district court made several evidentiary rulings, including admitting lay and investigator testimony, and excluded certain defense exhibits and instructions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the convictions and the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that spoofing constitutes a scheme to defraud under the federal wire and commodities fraud statutes, and that the anti-spoofing statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The court found sufficient evidence supported all convictions, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary or jury instruction decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and the district court’s denial of post-trial motions for all three defendants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2849/23-2849-2025-08-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three individuals who worked as precious metals futures traders at major financial institutions were prosecuted for engaging in a market manipulation scheme known as spoofing. This practice involved placing large orders on commodities exchanges with the intent to cancel them before execution, thereby creating a false impression of market supply or demand to benefit their genuine trades. The traders’ conduct was in violation of both exchange rules and their employers’ policies, and the government charged them with various offenses, including wire fraud, commodities fraud, attempted price manipulation, and violating the anti-spoofing provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, presided over separate trials for the defendants. In the first trial, two defendants were convicted by a jury on all substantive counts except conspiracy, after the court denied their motions for acquittal and a new trial. The third defendant, tried separately, admitted to spoofing but argued he lacked the requisite criminal intent; he was convicted of wire fraud, and his post-trial motions were also denied. The district court made several evidentiary rulings, including admitting lay and investigator testimony, and excluded certain defense exhibits and instructions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the convictions and the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that spoofing constitutes a scheme to defraud under the federal wire and commodities fraud statutes, and that the anti-spoofing statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The court found sufficient evidence supported all convictions, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary or jury instruction decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and the district court’s denial of post-trial motions for all three defendants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Thomas L. Kirsch II</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1705/24-1705-2025-08-15.html</id>
        	<title>State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio v. Charles River Laboratories International, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-15T13:00:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-15T13:00:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1705/24-1705-2025-08-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Investors in a major drug-development company alleged that the company and two of its officers misled them about the integrity of the company’s overseas supply chain for long-tailed macaques, which are essential for its business. After China halted exports of these monkeys due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the company shifted to suppliers in Cambodia and Vietnam, some of which were later implicated in a federal investigation into illegal wildlife trafficking. Despite public signs of the investigation and seizures of shipments, the company’s CEO assured investors that its supply chain was unaffected by the federal indictment of certain suppliers, and that the indicted supplier was not one of its own. However, evidence suggested that the company was, in fact, sourcing macaques from entities targeted by the investigation, either directly or through intermediaries.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the investors’ class action complaint, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege any false or misleading statements or scienter (intent or recklessness), and therefore did not reach the issue of loss causation. The court also dismissed the derivative claim against the individual officers.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the investors plausibly alleged that the company and its CEO knowingly or recklessly misled investors in November 2022 by assuring them that the company’s supply chain was not implicated in the federal investigation, when in fact it was. The court found these statements actionable, but agreed with the lower court that other statements about “non-preferred vendors” were not independently misleading. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal as to the November 2022 statements and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of loss causation. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1705/24-1705-2025-08-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio v. Charles River Laboratories International, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Investors in a major drug-development company alleged that the company and two of its officers misled them about the integrity of the company’s overseas supply chain for long-tailed macaques, which are essential for its business. After China halted exports of these monkeys due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the company shifted to suppliers in Cambodia and Vietnam, some of which were later implicated in a federal investigation into illegal wildlife trafficking. Despite public signs of the investigation and seizures of shipments, the company’s CEO assured investors that its supply chain was unaffected by the federal indictment of certain suppliers, and that the indicted supplier was not one of its own. However, evidence suggested that the company was, in fact, sourcing macaques from entities targeted by the investigation, either directly or through intermediaries.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the investors’ class action complaint, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege any false or misleading statements or scienter (intent or recklessness), and therefore did not reach the issue of loss causation. The court also dismissed the derivative claim against the individual officers.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the investors plausibly alleged that the company and its CEO knowingly or recklessly misled investors in November 2022 by assuring them that the company’s supply chain was not implicated in the federal investigation, when in fact it was. The court found these statements actionable, but agreed with the lower court that other statements about “non-preferred vendors” were not independently misleading. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal as to the November 2022 statements and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of loss causation. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Kayatta</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3940/23-3940-2025-08-13.html</id>
        	<title>Owens v. FirstEnergy Corp.</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-13T12:30:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-13T12:30:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3940/23-3940-2025-08-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Between 2017 and 2020, a major energy company and its senior executives allegedly orchestrated a large-scale bribery scheme, funneling approximately $60 million to key Ohio political figures and regulators through a network of shell companies and political action committees. In exchange, the company secured favorable legislation (Ohio House Bill 6), which provided substantial financial benefits, including a $2 billion bailout for its nuclear power plants. The scheme was concealed from shareholders and the public, with the company issuing public statements and regulatory filings that failed to disclose the true nature and risks of its political activities. When the bribery was exposed in 2020, the company’s stock and debt securities plummeted, resulting in significant losses for investors.

After the scheme was revealed, investors filed multiple class actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which were consolidated. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, specifically section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming that the company and its executives made material misstatements and omissions that artificially inflated the value of its securities. The district court denied motions to dismiss and later certified a class of investors, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, and that their damages methodology satisfied the predominance requirement for class certification.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the class certification order. The court held that the district court erred in applying the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance because the case was primarily based on misrepresentations, not omissions. The Sixth Circuit established a framework for distinguishing between omission- and misrepresentation-based cases and clarified that the Affiliated Ute presumption applies only if a case is primarily based on omissions. The court also found that the district court failed to conduct the required “rigorous analysis” of the plaintiffs’ damages methodology under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The Sixth Circuit vacated the class certification order to the extent it relied on the Affiliated Ute presumption and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/23-3940/23-3940-2025-08-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Owens v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Between 2017 and 2020, a major energy company and its senior executives allegedly orchestrated a large-scale bribery scheme, funneling approximately $60 million to key Ohio political figures and regulators through a network of shell companies and political action committees. In exchange, the company secured favorable legislation (Ohio House Bill 6), which provided substantial financial benefits, including a $2 billion bailout for its nuclear power plants. The scheme was concealed from shareholders and the public, with the company issuing public statements and regulatory filings that failed to disclose the true nature and risks of its political activities. When the bribery was exposed in 2020, the company’s stock and debt securities plummeted, resulting in significant losses for investors.

After the scheme was revealed, investors filed multiple class actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which were consolidated. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, specifically section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming that the company and its executives made material misstatements and omissions that artificially inflated the value of its securities. The district court denied motions to dismiss and later certified a class of investors, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, and that their damages methodology satisfied the predominance requirement for class certification.

On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the class certification order. The court held that the district court erred in applying the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance because the case was primarily based on misrepresentations, not omissions. The Sixth Circuit established a framework for distinguishing between omission- and misrepresentation-based cases and clarified that the Affiliated Ute presumption applies only if a case is primarily based on omissions. The court also found that the district court failed to conduct the required “rigorous analysis” of the plaintiffs’ damages methodology under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The Sixth Circuit vacated the class certification order to the extent it relied on the Affiliated Ute presumption and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Danny Boggs</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1167/24-1167-2025-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>FISHER v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-08-13T05:01:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-13T05:01:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1167/24-1167-2025-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, acting derivatively on behalf of these entities, challenged the federal government’s actions following the 2008 financial crisis. After the housing market collapse, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), creating the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorizing it to act as conservator for the Enterprises. The FHFA placed both entities into conservatorship, and the U.S. Treasury entered into agreements to provide financial support in exchange for senior preferred stock and other rights. In 2012, a “net worth sweep” was implemented, redirecting nearly all profits from the Enterprises to the Treasury, effectively eliminating dividends for other shareholders. The plaintiffs, as preferred shareholders, alleged that this arrangement constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.

The United States Court of Federal Claims previously reviewed the case and granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The Claims Court relied on the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, which held that, under HERA, the Enterprises lost any cognizable property interest necessary to support a takings claim because the FHFA, as conservator, had broad authority over the Enterprises’ assets. The Claims Court found the plaintiffs’ claims indistinguishable from those in Fairholme and dismissed them accordingly.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the Claims Court’s decision, holding that claim preclusion barred the plaintiffs’ derivative takings claims because the issues had already been litigated in Fairholme. The court rejected arguments that the prior representation was inadequate or that the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County fundamentally changed takings law. The Federal Circuit concluded that Fairholme remained binding precedent and affirmed the dismissal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1167/24-1167-2025-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FISHER v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, acting derivatively on behalf of these entities, challenged the federal government’s actions following the 2008 financial crisis. After the housing market collapse, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), creating the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and authorizing it to act as conservator for the Enterprises. The FHFA placed both entities into conservatorship, and the U.S. Treasury entered into agreements to provide financial support in exchange for senior preferred stock and other rights. In 2012, a “net worth sweep” was implemented, redirecting nearly all profits from the Enterprises to the Treasury, effectively eliminating dividends for other shareholders. The plaintiffs, as preferred shareholders, alleged that this arrangement constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.

The United States Court of Federal Claims previously reviewed the case and granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The Claims Court relied on the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, which held that, under HERA, the Enterprises lost any cognizable property interest necessary to support a takings claim because the FHFA, as conservator, had broad authority over the Enterprises’ assets. The Claims Court found the plaintiffs’ claims indistinguishable from those in Fairholme and dismissed them accordingly.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the Claims Court’s decision, holding that claim preclusion barred the plaintiffs’ derivative takings claims because the issues had already been litigated in Fairholme. The court rejected arguments that the prior representation was inadequate or that the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County fundamentally changed takings law. The Federal Circuit concluded that Fairholme remained binding precedent and affirmed the dismissal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2861/24-2861-2025-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>Perrigo Institutional Investor Group v. Papa</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-12T09:00:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-12T09:00:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2861/24-2861-2025-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of institutional investors brought a class action lawsuit against a pharmaceutical company and several of its officers, alleging violations of federal securities laws after the company’s share price dropped significantly following the rejection of a takeover bid and subsequent negative financial disclosures. One large investor, Sculptor, intended to pursue its own individual lawsuit rather than participate in the class action. The District Court certified the class and issued a notice specifying the procedure and deadline for class members to opt out. Although Sculptor intended to opt out, its counsel failed to submit the required exclusion request by the deadline. Both Sculptor and the company proceeded for years as if Sculptor had opted out, litigating the individual action and treating Sculptor as an opt-out plaintiff.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey later approved a class settlement, which prompted the discovery that Sculptor had never formally opted out. Sculptor then sought to be excluded from the class after the deadline, arguing that its conduct showed a reasonable intent to opt out, that its failure was due to excusable neglect, and that the class notice was inadequate. The District Court rejected these arguments, finding that only compliance with the court’s specified opt-out procedure sufficed, that Sculptor’s neglect was not excusable under the relevant legal standard, and that the notice met due process requirements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that a class member must follow the opt-out procedures established by the district court under Rule 23; a mere “reasonable indication” of intent to opt out is insufficient. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Sculptor’s late opt-out request and concluded that the class notice satisfied due process. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2861/24-2861-2025-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Perrigo Institutional Investor Group v. Papa" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of institutional investors brought a class action lawsuit against a pharmaceutical company and several of its officers, alleging violations of federal securities laws after the company’s share price dropped significantly following the rejection of a takeover bid and subsequent negative financial disclosures. One large investor, Sculptor, intended to pursue its own individual lawsuit rather than participate in the class action. The District Court certified the class and issued a notice specifying the procedure and deadline for class members to opt out. Although Sculptor intended to opt out, its counsel failed to submit the required exclusion request by the deadline. Both Sculptor and the company proceeded for years as if Sculptor had opted out, litigating the individual action and treating Sculptor as an opt-out plaintiff.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey later approved a class settlement, which prompted the discovery that Sculptor had never formally opted out. Sculptor then sought to be excluded from the class after the deadline, arguing that its conduct showed a reasonable intent to opt out, that its failure was due to excusable neglect, and that the class notice was inadequate. The District Court rejected these arguments, finding that only compliance with the court’s specified opt-out procedure sufficed, that Sculptor’s neglect was not excusable under the relevant legal standard, and that the notice met due process requirements.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that a class member must follow the opt-out procedures established by the district court under Rule 23; a mere “reasonable indication” of intent to opt out is insufficient. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Sculptor’s late opt-out request and concluded that the class notice satisfied due process.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cheryl Ann Krause</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2699/23-2699-2025-08-11.html</id>
        	<title>UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. BARRY</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-11T08:00:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-11T08:00:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2699/23-2699-2025-08-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Three individuals served as sales agents for a California company that marketed and sold fractional interests in life settlements, which are transactions where investors purchase life insurance policies from insured individuals, pay the ongoing premiums, and receive the death benefit when the insured passes away. The company selected which policies to purchase, determined the purchase price, and managed a complex premium reserve system to fund ongoing premium payments. Investors relied on the company’s expertise in selecting policies and managing the reserve system, and their interests in each policy were fractionalized among multiple investors. When the reserve system failed due to insureds living longer than projected, the company made additional premium calls to investors, and some investors lost their investments if they did not pay.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the three sales agents. The court found that the fractional interests in life settlements were securities under the Securities Act of 1933, that no exemption from registration applied, and that the sales agents had not registered as broker-dealers. The court ordered disgorgement of a portion of the agents’ commissions, imposed civil penalties, and enjoined one agent from future violations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the fractional interests in life settlements were investment contracts and thus securities, because investors’ profits depended on the company’s selection of policies, management of the premium reserve system, and the structure of the fractionalized interests. The court also held that the offerings were not exempt from registration as intrastate offerings, as they were integrated and included at least one out-of-state investor. The court affirmed the remedies, finding that investors suffered pecuniary harm through the loss of the time value of their money. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2699/23-2699-2025-08-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. BARRY" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Three individuals served as sales agents for a California company that marketed and sold fractional interests in life settlements, which are transactions where investors purchase life insurance policies from insured individuals, pay the ongoing premiums, and receive the death benefit when the insured passes away. The company selected which policies to purchase, determined the purchase price, and managed a complex premium reserve system to fund ongoing premium payments. Investors relied on the company’s expertise in selecting policies and managing the reserve system, and their interests in each policy were fractionalized among multiple investors. When the reserve system failed due to insureds living longer than projected, the company made additional premium calls to investors, and some investors lost their investments if they did not pay.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the three sales agents. The court found that the fractional interests in life settlements were securities under the Securities Act of 1933, that no exemption from registration applied, and that the sales agents had not registered as broker-dealers. The court ordered disgorgement of a portion of the agents’ commissions, imposed civil penalties, and enjoined one agent from future violations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the fractional interests in life settlements were investment contracts and thus securities, because investors’ profits depended on the company’s selection of policies, management of the premium reserve system, and the structure of the fractionalized interests. The court also held that the offerings were not exempt from registration as intrastate offerings, as they were integrated and included at least one out-of-state investor. The court affirmed the remedies, finding that investors suffered pecuniary harm through the loss of the time value of their money.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Clifton</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-1899/24-1899-2025-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>POWELL V. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-06T08:31:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-06T08:31:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-1899/24-1899-2025-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of individuals and organizations challenged a longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), codified as Rule 202.5(e), which requires defendants in civil enforcement actions to agree not to publicly deny the allegations against them as a condition of settlement. This “no-deny” provision has been in place since 1972 and is incorporated into settlement agreements, with the SEC’s remedy for a breach being the ability to ask the court to reopen the case. The petitioners argued that this rule violates the First Amendment and was improperly adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Previously, the New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) petitioned the SEC to amend Rule 202.5(e) to remove the no-deny requirement, citing constitutional concerns. The SEC denied the petition, explaining that defendants can voluntarily waive constitutional rights in settlements and that the rule preserves the agency’s ability to litigate if a defendant later denies the allegations. After the denial, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, asserting both First Amendment and APA violations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s denial. Applying the Supreme Court’s framework from Town of Newton v. Rumery, the court held that voluntary waivers of constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are generally permissible if knowing and voluntary. The court concluded that Rule 202.5(e) is not facially invalid under the First Amendment, as it is a limited restriction tied to the settlement context and does not preclude all speech. The court also found that the SEC had statutory authority for the rule, was not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, and provided a rational explanation for its decision. The petition for review was denied, but the court left open the possibility of future as-applied challenges. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-1899/24-1899-2025-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "POWELL V. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of individuals and organizations challenged a longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), codified as Rule 202.5(e), which requires defendants in civil enforcement actions to agree not to publicly deny the allegations against them as a condition of settlement. This “no-deny” provision has been in place since 1972 and is incorporated into settlement agreements, with the SEC’s remedy for a breach being the ability to ask the court to reopen the case. The petitioners argued that this rule violates the First Amendment and was improperly adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

Previously, the New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) petitioned the SEC to amend Rule 202.5(e) to remove the no-deny requirement, citing constitutional concerns. The SEC denied the petition, explaining that defendants can voluntarily waive constitutional rights in settlements and that the rule preserves the agency’s ability to litigate if a defendant later denies the allegations. After the denial, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, asserting both First Amendment and APA violations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s denial. Applying the Supreme Court’s framework from Town of Newton v. Rumery, the court held that voluntary waivers of constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are generally permissible if knowing and voluntary. The court concluded that Rule 202.5(e) is not facially invalid under the First Amendment, as it is a limited restriction tied to the settlement context and does not preclude all speech. The court also found that the SEC had statutory authority for the rule, was not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, and provided a rational explanation for its decision. The petition for review was denied, but the court left open the possibility of future as-applied challenges.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Daniel Bress</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-2101/22-2101-2025-08-05.html</id>
        	<title>In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-05T06:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-05T06:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-2101/22-2101-2025-08-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several investment funds based in the British Virgin Islands invested heavily in Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities and were forced into liquidation after the Madoff Ponzi scheme was exposed in 2008. Liquidators were appointed in the BVI insolvency proceedings. Before the collapse, certain investors redeemed their shares in the funds for cash, receiving over $6 billion in payments. The liquidators, seeking to recover these redemption payments for equitable distribution among all investors, initiated approximately 300 actions in the United States, alleging that the payments were inflated due to fictitious Net Asset Value (NAV) calculations based on Madoff’s fraudulent statements.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the actions after recognizing the BVI proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court dismissed most claims, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over some defendants, that the liquidators were bound by the NAV calculations, and that the safe harbor for securities transactions under § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code barred the claims. However, it allowed constructive trust claims to proceed against certain defendants alleged to have known the NAVs were inflated. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment, leaving only the constructive trust claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that all of the liquidators’ claims, including the constructive trust claims, should have been dismissed under the safe harbor provision of § 546(e), which applies extraterritorially via § 561(d) in Chapter 15 cases. The court concluded that the safe harbor bars both statutory and common-law claims seeking to avoid covered securities transactions, regardless of the legal theory or proof required. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment allowing the constructive trust claims and otherwise affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/22-2101/22-2101-2025-08-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several investment funds based in the British Virgin Islands invested heavily in Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities and were forced into liquidation after the Madoff Ponzi scheme was exposed in 2008. Liquidators were appointed in the BVI insolvency proceedings. Before the collapse, certain investors redeemed their shares in the funds for cash, receiving over $6 billion in payments. The liquidators, seeking to recover these redemption payments for equitable distribution among all investors, initiated approximately 300 actions in the United States, alleging that the payments were inflated due to fictitious Net Asset Value (NAV) calculations based on Madoff’s fraudulent statements.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the actions after recognizing the BVI proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court dismissed most claims, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over some defendants, that the liquidators were bound by the NAV calculations, and that the safe harbor for securities transactions under § 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code barred the claims. However, it allowed constructive trust claims to proceed against certain defendants alleged to have known the NAVs were inflated. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment, leaving only the constructive trust claims.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that all of the liquidators’ claims, including the constructive trust claims, should have been dismissed under the safe harbor provision of § 546(e), which applies extraterritorially via § 561(d) in Chapter 15 cases. The court concluded that the safe harbor bars both statutory and common-law claims seeking to avoid covered securities transactions, regardless of the legal theory or proof required. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment allowing the constructive trust claims and otherwise affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Menashi</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1439/24-1439-2025-07-30.html</id>
        	<title>Black v. Mantei &amp; Associates, Ltd.</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-30T11:00:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-30T11:00:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1439/24-1439-2025-07-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in state court against Defendants, alleging violations of state securities laws. Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), arguing that the case involved covered securities. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to exclude any claims related to covered securities, leading the district court to remand the case to state court. After three years of state court litigation, Defendants removed the case again, citing an expert report that allegedly identified covered securities. The district court remanded the case again and awarded Plaintiffs $63,007.50 in attorneys&#039; fees.

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina initially denied Plaintiffs&#039; motion to remand but later granted it after Plaintiffs amended their complaint. The court found that the amended complaint excluded any claims related to covered securities, thus SLUSA did not apply, and no federal question remained. After Defendants removed the case a second time, the district court remanded it again and awarded attorneys&#039; fees, finding the second removal lacked a reasonable basis.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s award of attorneys&#039; fees. The court held that the second removal was improper because the amended complaint explicitly excluded claims related to covered securities, and thus SLUSA did not apply. Additionally, the court found that the removal was objectively unreasonable, as the district court had already addressed the issues in its first remand order. The Fourth Circuit also denied Plaintiffs&#039; request for additional attorneys&#039; fees for defending the appeal, stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) does not authorize fee awards on appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1439/24-1439-2025-07-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Black v. Mantei &amp; Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in state court against Defendants, alleging violations of state securities laws. Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), arguing that the case involved covered securities. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to exclude any claims related to covered securities, leading the district court to remand the case to state court. After three years of state court litigation, Defendants removed the case again, citing an expert report that allegedly identified covered securities. The district court remanded the case again and awarded Plaintiffs $63,007.50 in attorneys&#039; fees.

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina initially denied Plaintiffs&#039; motion to remand but later granted it after Plaintiffs amended their complaint. The court found that the amended complaint excluded any claims related to covered securities, thus SLUSA did not apply, and no federal question remained. After Defendants removed the case a second time, the district court remanded it again and awarded attorneys&#039; fees, finding the second removal lacked a reasonable basis.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s award of attorneys&#039; fees. The court held that the second removal was improper because the amended complaint explicitly excluded claims related to covered securities, and thus SLUSA did not apply. Additionally, the court found that the removal was objectively unreasonable, as the district court had already addressed the issues in its first remand order. The Fourth Circuit also denied Plaintiffs&#039; request for additional attorneys&#039; fees for defending the appeal, stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) does not authorize fee awards on appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Julius Richardson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6136/23-6136-2025-07-30.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Hild</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-30T06:30:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-30T06:30:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6136/23-6136-2025-07-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Michael Hild, the Defendant-Appellant, was convicted by a jury in 2021 of securities fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy. Hild, as the CEO of Live Well Financial, Inc., engaged in a scheme to inflate the value of a bond portfolio used as collateral for loans. This scheme allowed Live Well to grow its bond portfolio significantly from 2014 to 2016. Hild appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that a new trial was warranted due to a Supreme Court decision invalidating one of the fraud theories used in his jury instructions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Hild&#039;s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. Hild then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions.

The Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that sufficient evidence supported Hild&#039;s conviction. The court noted that Hild misrepresented the value of the bonds to secure loans and acted with fraudulent intent. The court also addressed Hild&#039;s argument regarding the jury instructions, acknowledging that the instructions included an invalid right-to-control theory of fraud as per the Supreme Court&#039;s decision in Ciminelli v. United States. However, the court concluded that this error did not affect Hild&#039;s substantial rights because the jury would have convicted him based on a valid theory of fraud.

Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Hild&#039;s conviction on all counts. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-6136/23-6136-2025-07-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Hild" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Michael Hild, the Defendant-Appellant, was convicted by a jury in 2021 of securities fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy. Hild, as the CEO of Live Well Financial, Inc., engaged in a scheme to inflate the value of a bond portfolio used as collateral for loans. This scheme allowed Live Well to grow its bond portfolio significantly from 2014 to 2016. Hild appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that a new trial was warranted due to a Supreme Court decision invalidating one of the fraud theories used in his jury instructions.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Hild&#039;s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial. Hild then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions.

The Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that sufficient evidence supported Hild&#039;s conviction. The court noted that Hild misrepresented the value of the bonds to secure loans and acted with fraudulent intent. The court also addressed Hild&#039;s argument regarding the jury instructions, acknowledging that the instructions included an invalid right-to-control theory of fraud as per the Supreme Court&#039;s decision in Ciminelli v. United States. However, the court concluded that this error did not affect Hild&#039;s substantial rights because the jury would have convicted him based on a valid theory of fraud.

Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding Hild&#039;s conviction on all counts.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alison J. Nathan</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1839/23-1839-2025-07-29.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Freeman</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-29T11:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-29T11:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1839/23-1839-2025-07-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the defendant, a radio talk show host and church founder, began selling bitcoin in 2014. The government investigated his bitcoin sales and charged him with conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and tax evasion. After a jury convicted him on all counts, the district court acquitted him of the substantive money laundering count due to insufficient evidence but upheld the other convictions.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court should not have allowed the money-transmitting-business charges to proceed to trial, citing the &quot;major questions doctrine&quot; which he claimed should exempt virtual currencies like bitcoin from regulatory statutes. He also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his tax evasion conviction and that he should be granted a new trial on the money laundering conspiracy count due to prejudicial evidentiary spillover. Additionally, he argued that his 96-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected the defendant&#039;s major questions doctrine argument, holding that the statutory definition of &quot;money transmitting business&quot; under 31 U.S.C. § 5330 includes businesses dealing in virtual currencies like bitcoin. The court found that the plain meaning of &quot;funds&quot; encompasses virtual currencies and that the legislative history and subsequent congressional actions supported this interpretation.

The court also found sufficient evidence to support the tax evasion conviction, noting that the defendant had substantial unreported income and engaged in conduct suggesting willful evasion of taxes. The court rejected the claim of prejudicial spillover, concluding that the evidence related to the money laundering conspiracy was admissible and relevant.

Finally, the court upheld the 96-month sentence, finding it substantively reasonable given the defendant&#039;s conduct and the factors considered by the district court. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s rulings and the defendant&#039;s convictions and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/23-1839/23-1839-2025-07-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the defendant, a radio talk show host and church founder, began selling bitcoin in 2014. The government investigated his bitcoin sales and charged him with conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and tax evasion. After a jury convicted him on all counts, the district court acquitted him of the substantive money laundering count due to insufficient evidence but upheld the other convictions.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court should not have allowed the money-transmitting-business charges to proceed to trial, citing the &quot;major questions doctrine&quot; which he claimed should exempt virtual currencies like bitcoin from regulatory statutes. He also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his tax evasion conviction and that he should be granted a new trial on the money laundering conspiracy count due to prejudicial evidentiary spillover. Additionally, he argued that his 96-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected the defendant&#039;s major questions doctrine argument, holding that the statutory definition of &quot;money transmitting business&quot; under 31 U.S.C. § 5330 includes businesses dealing in virtual currencies like bitcoin. The court found that the plain meaning of &quot;funds&quot; encompasses virtual currencies and that the legislative history and subsequent congressional actions supported this interpretation.

The court also found sufficient evidence to support the tax evasion conviction, noting that the defendant had substantial unreported income and engaged in conduct suggesting willful evasion of taxes. The court rejected the claim of prejudicial spillover, concluding that the evidence related to the money laundering conspiracy was admissible and relevant.

Finally, the court upheld the 96-month sentence, finding it substantively reasonable given the defendant&#039;s conduct and the factors considered by the district court. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s rulings and the defendant&#039;s convictions and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13396/23-13396-2025-07-25.html</id>
        	<title>American Securities Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-25T11:32:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-25T11:32:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13396/23-13396-2025-07-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a challenge to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission&#039;s (SEC) 2023 Funding Order, which amended the funding structure for the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT). The CAT was established to create a single electronic system for gathering and maintaining data on stock trades. Initially, the SEC estimated the cost of building and operating the CAT to be significantly lower than the actual costs incurred. The 2023 Funding Order allowed self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to pass all CAT costs to their broker-dealer members, a shift from the original plan that required both SROs and broker-dealers to share the costs.

The American Securities Association and Citadel Securities, LLC challenged the 2023 Funding Order, arguing that it was arbitrary and capricious. They contended that the SEC failed to justify the decision to allow SROs to pass all CAT costs to broker-dealers and did not update its economic analysis to reflect the actual costs of the CAT, which had significantly increased since the original estimates.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the SEC&#039;s 2023 Funding Order was internally inconsistent and represented an unexplained policy change from previous rules that required both SROs and broker-dealers to share CAT costs. The court also determined that the SEC failed to consider the effects of allowing SROs to pass all CAT costs to broker-dealers, creating a potential free-rider problem. Additionally, the court held that the SEC&#039;s reliance on outdated economic analysis was unreasonable given the significant increase in CAT costs.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the 2023 Funding Order, stayed its decision for sixty days to allow the SEC to address the issues, and remanded the matter to the SEC for further proceedings consistent with the court&#039;s opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13396/23-13396-2025-07-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "American Securities Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a challenge to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission&#039;s (SEC) 2023 Funding Order, which amended the funding structure for the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT). The CAT was established to create a single electronic system for gathering and maintaining data on stock trades. Initially, the SEC estimated the cost of building and operating the CAT to be significantly lower than the actual costs incurred. The 2023 Funding Order allowed self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to pass all CAT costs to their broker-dealer members, a shift from the original plan that required both SROs and broker-dealers to share the costs.

The American Securities Association and Citadel Securities, LLC challenged the 2023 Funding Order, arguing that it was arbitrary and capricious. They contended that the SEC failed to justify the decision to allow SROs to pass all CAT costs to broker-dealers and did not update its economic analysis to reflect the actual costs of the CAT, which had significantly increased since the original estimates.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the SEC&#039;s 2023 Funding Order was internally inconsistent and represented an unexplained policy change from previous rules that required both SROs and broker-dealers to share CAT costs. The court also determined that the SEC failed to consider the effects of allowing SROs to pass all CAT costs to broker-dealers, creating a potential free-rider problem. Additionally, the court held that the SEC&#039;s reliance on outdated economic analysis was unreasonable given the significant increase in CAT costs.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the 2023 Funding Order, stayed its decision for sixty days to allow the SEC to address the issues, and remanded the matter to the SEC for further proceedings consistent with the court&#039;s opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew Brasher</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3044/24-3044-2025-07-25.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Berman</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-25T07:01:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-25T07:01:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3044/24-3044-2025-07-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Keith Berman, the appellant, pleaded guilty to securities fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of proceedings related to a scheme to fraudulently increase the share price of his company, Decision Diagnostics Corp. (DECN). Berman issued false press releases claiming DECN had developed a blood test for coronavirus, which led to a significant increase in the company&#039;s stock price. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated and suspended trading of DECN&#039;s stock, revealing that Berman&#039;s claims were false. Despite this, Berman continued to issue misleading statements and used aliases to discredit the SEC&#039;s investigation.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Berman to 84 months&#039; imprisonment. The court calculated the loss caused by Berman&#039;s fraud using the modified rescissory method, determining a loss amount of $27.8 million. This calculation was based on the difference in DECN&#039;s stock price before and after the fraud was disclosed, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. The court also applied enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship to five or more individuals, resulting in a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months, but ultimately imposed a downward variance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. Berman challenged the district court&#039;s calculation of the loss amount, arguing that the fraud was disclosed earlier and that the loss was not solely attributable to his fraudulent statements. The appellate court found that the district court did not commit clear error in determining the disclosure date or in its loss causation analysis. The court also upheld the enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship, finding sufficient evidence to support these determinations. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-3044/24-3044-2025-07-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Berman" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Keith Berman, the appellant, pleaded guilty to securities fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of proceedings related to a scheme to fraudulently increase the share price of his company, Decision Diagnostics Corp. (DECN). Berman issued false press releases claiming DECN had developed a blood test for coronavirus, which led to a significant increase in the company&#039;s stock price. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated and suspended trading of DECN&#039;s stock, revealing that Berman&#039;s claims were false. Despite this, Berman continued to issue misleading statements and used aliases to discredit the SEC&#039;s investigation.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Berman to 84 months&#039; imprisonment. The court calculated the loss caused by Berman&#039;s fraud using the modified rescissory method, determining a loss amount of $27.8 million. This calculation was based on the difference in DECN&#039;s stock price before and after the fraud was disclosed, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. The court also applied enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship to five or more individuals, resulting in a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months, but ultimately imposed a downward variance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. Berman challenged the district court&#039;s calculation of the loss amount, arguing that the fraud was disclosed earlier and that the loss was not solely attributable to his fraudulent statements. The appellate court found that the district court did not commit clear error in determining the disclosure date or in its loss causation analysis. The court also upheld the enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship, finding sufficient evidence to support these determinations. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bradley Garcia</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-696/24-696-2025-07-14.html</id>
        	<title>Doyle v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-14T07:00:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-14T07:00:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-696/24-696-2025-07-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves plaintiffs-appellees, trustees of the Peter and Elizabeth C. Tower Foundation, who brought claims against UBS Financial Services, Inc. and Jay S. Blair (collectively, the &quot;UBS Defendants&quot;) under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and New York state law. The plaintiffs allege that the UBS Defendants breached their fiduciary duties in managing the Foundation&#039;s investment advisory accounts. Specifically, they claim that John N. Blair, the father of Jay Blair, improperly used his position to place the Foundation’s assets with his son&#039;s investment firm, which later became affiliated with UBS.

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied the UBS Defendants&#039; motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to question the validity of the arbitration agreement, warranting a trial on that issue. The UBS Defendants had previously moved to stay or dismiss the action under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, which was also denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the Supreme Court&#039;s 2022 decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., which held that courts may not impose a prejudice requirement when evaluating whether a party has waived enforcement of an arbitration agreement. The Second Circuit concluded that the UBS Defendants waived their right to compel arbitration by seeking a resolution of their dispute in the District Court first, thus acting inconsistently with the right to arbitrate. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the UBS Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the alternative ground of waiver. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-696/24-696-2025-07-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Doyle v. UBS Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves plaintiffs-appellees, trustees of the Peter and Elizabeth C. Tower Foundation, who brought claims against UBS Financial Services, Inc. and Jay S. Blair (collectively, the &quot;UBS Defendants&quot;) under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and New York state law. The plaintiffs allege that the UBS Defendants breached their fiduciary duties in managing the Foundation&#039;s investment advisory accounts. Specifically, they claim that John N. Blair, the father of Jay Blair, improperly used his position to place the Foundation’s assets with his son&#039;s investment firm, which later became affiliated with UBS.

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied the UBS Defendants&#039; motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to question the validity of the arbitration agreement, warranting a trial on that issue. The UBS Defendants had previously moved to stay or dismiss the action under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, which was also denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the Supreme Court&#039;s 2022 decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., which held that courts may not impose a prejudice requirement when evaluating whether a party has waived enforcement of an arbitration agreement. The Second Circuit concluded that the UBS Defendants waived their right to compel arbitration by seeking a resolution of their dispute in the District Court first, thus acting inconsistently with the right to arbitrate. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the UBS Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the alternative ground of waiver.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sarah Ann Leilani Merriam</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Trusts &amp; Estates"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2989/23-2989-2025-07-11.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Schena</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-11T08:00:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-11T08:00:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2989/23-2989-2025-07-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Mark Schena operated Arrayit, a medical testing laboratory in Northern California, which focused on blood tests for allergies. Schena marketed these tests as superior to skin tests, despite their limitations, and billed insurance providers up to $10,000 per test. To maintain a steady flow of patient samples, Schena paid marketers a percentage of the revenue they generated by pitching Arrayit’s services to medical professionals, often misleading them about the tests&#039; efficacy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Schena transitioned to COVID testing, using similar deceptive marketing practices to bundle allergy tests with COVID tests.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Schena’s motion to dismiss the EKRA counts, arguing that his conduct did not violate the statute as a matter of law. The jury convicted Schena on all counts, including conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, healthcare fraud, conspiracy to violate EKRA, EKRA violations, and securities fraud. The district court sentenced Schena to 96 months in prison and ordered him to pay over $24 million in restitution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Schena’s convictions. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 220(a)(2)(A) of EKRA covers payments to marketing intermediaries who interface with those who do the referrals, and there is no requirement that the payments be made to a person who interfaces directly with patients. The court also concluded that a percentage-based compensation structure for marketing agents does not violate EKRA per se, but the evidence showed wrongful inducement when Schena paid marketers to unduly influence doctors’ referrals through false or fraudulent representations. The court affirmed Schena’s EKRA and other convictions, vacated in part the restitution order, and remanded in part. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-2989/23-2989-2025-07-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Schena" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Mark Schena operated Arrayit, a medical testing laboratory in Northern California, which focused on blood tests for allergies. Schena marketed these tests as superior to skin tests, despite their limitations, and billed insurance providers up to $10,000 per test. To maintain a steady flow of patient samples, Schena paid marketers a percentage of the revenue they generated by pitching Arrayit’s services to medical professionals, often misleading them about the tests&#039; efficacy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Schena transitioned to COVID testing, using similar deceptive marketing practices to bundle allergy tests with COVID tests.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Schena’s motion to dismiss the EKRA counts, arguing that his conduct did not violate the statute as a matter of law. The jury convicted Schena on all counts, including conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, healthcare fraud, conspiracy to violate EKRA, EKRA violations, and securities fraud. The district court sentenced Schena to 96 months in prison and ordered him to pay over $24 million in restitution.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Schena’s convictions. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 220(a)(2)(A) of EKRA covers payments to marketing intermediaries who interface with those who do the referrals, and there is no requirement that the payments be made to a person who interfaces directly with patients. The court also concluded that a percentage-based compensation structure for marketing agents does not violate EKRA per se, but the evidence showed wrongful inducement when Schena paid marketers to unduly influence doctors’ referrals through false or fraudulent representations. The court affirmed Schena’s EKRA and other convictions, vacated in part the restitution order, and remanded in part.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Daniel Bress</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-11024/24-11024-2025-07-09.html</id>
        	<title>AST &amp; Science LLC v. Delclaux Partners SA</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-09T12:31:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-09T12:31:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-11024/24-11024-2025-07-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		AST &amp; Science LLC, a company in the satellite technology and communications business, hired Delclaux Partners SA to introduce it to registered broker-dealers for investment purposes. Delclaux introduced AST to LionTree Advisors LLC, which handled AST&#039;s Series A financing. Two contracts were involved: a Finder’s Fee Agreement between AST and Delclaux, and a separate agreement between AST and LionTree. After the Series B financing, Delclaux claimed it was owed fees from four transactions, which AST refused to pay, leading to AST suing Delclaux for breach of contract, alleging Delclaux acted as an unregistered broker-dealer.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied summary judgment on AST’s complaint and granted summary judgment to AST on Delclaux’s counterclaim. Delclaux appealed, but the appeal was voluntarily dismissed due to jurisdictional questions. The district court later held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction but claimed federal-question jurisdiction, asserting that the case involved a federal issue regarding the Securities Exchange Act.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s assertion of federal-question jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the breach-of-contract claim was governed by state law and did not meet the criteria for federal-question jurisdiction under the Grable &amp; Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &amp; Manufacturing test. The court found that the federal issue was not substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/24-11024/24-11024-2025-07-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AST &amp; Science LLC v. Delclaux Partners SA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                AST &amp; Science LLC, a company in the satellite technology and communications business, hired Delclaux Partners SA to introduce it to registered broker-dealers for investment purposes. Delclaux introduced AST to LionTree Advisors LLC, which handled AST&#039;s Series A financing. Two contracts were involved: a Finder’s Fee Agreement between AST and Delclaux, and a separate agreement between AST and LionTree. After the Series B financing, Delclaux claimed it was owed fees from four transactions, which AST refused to pay, leading to AST suing Delclaux for breach of contract, alleging Delclaux acted as an unregistered broker-dealer.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied summary judgment on AST’s complaint and granted summary judgment to AST on Delclaux’s counterclaim. Delclaux appealed, but the appeal was voluntarily dismissed due to jurisdictional questions. The district court later held that it lacked diversity jurisdiction but claimed federal-question jurisdiction, asserting that the case involved a federal issue regarding the Securities Exchange Act.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s assertion of federal-question jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the breach-of-contract claim was governed by state law and did not meet the criteria for federal-question jurisdiction under the Grable &amp; Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &amp; Manufacturing test. The court found that the federal issue was not substantial enough to warrant federal jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kevin C. Newsom</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-5105/24-5105-2025-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. v. SEC</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-01T06:41:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-01T06:41:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-5105/24-5105-2025-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) interpretation of the term “solicit” under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC had begun regulating proxy advisory firms by treating their voting recommendations as “solicitations” of proxy votes. ISS argued that its recommendations did not constitute “solicitation” under the Act.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with ISS and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that the SEC’s interpretation of “solicit” was overly broad and not supported by the statutory text. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an intervenor supporting the SEC’s position, appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the ordinary meaning of “solicit” does not include providing proxy voting recommendations upon request. The court concluded that “solicit” refers to actively seeking to obtain proxy authority or votes, not merely influencing them through advice. The SEC’s definition, which included proxy advisory firms’ recommendations as solicitations, was found to be contrary to the statutory text of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-5105/24-5105-2025-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) interpretation of the term “solicit” under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC had begun regulating proxy advisory firms by treating their voting recommendations as “solicitations” of proxy votes. ISS argued that its recommendations did not constitute “solicitation” under the Act.

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with ISS and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that the SEC’s interpretation of “solicit” was overly broad and not supported by the statutory text. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an intervenor supporting the SEC’s position, appealed the decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the ordinary meaning of “solicit” does not include providing proxy voting recommendations upon request. The court concluded that “solicit” refers to actively seeking to obtain proxy authority or votes, not merely influencing them through advice. The SEC’s definition, which included proxy advisory firms’ recommendations as solicitations, was found to be contrary to the statutory text of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Karen Henderson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-6114/22-6114-2025-06-26.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Maike</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-26T11:00:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-26T11:00:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-6114/22-6114-2025-06-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The defendants, Richard Maike, Doyce Barnes, and Faraday Hosseinipour, were involved in a company called Infinity 2 Global (I2G), which the FBI determined to be a pyramid scheme. The company collected approximately $34 million from investors, most of whom lost money. After a 25-day trial, a jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The defendants appealed their convictions, presenting numerous arguments for reversal.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky initially handled the case, where the jury found the defendants guilty on both counts. The defendants were sentenced to varying prison terms: Maike received 120 months, Barnes 48 months, and Hosseinipour 30 months. The defendants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions, among other issues.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and rejected all the defendants&#039; arguments. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury&#039;s verdicts on both counts. The court also determined that the jury instructions were appropriate and did not mislead the jury. The court affirmed the criminal judgments of Maike and Barnes. For Hosseinipour, the court affirmed her criminal judgment but vacated the district court&#039;s denial of her Rule 33 motion for a new trial, remanding her case for reconsideration of that motion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/22-6114/22-6114-2025-06-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Maike" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The defendants, Richard Maike, Doyce Barnes, and Faraday Hosseinipour, were involved in a company called Infinity 2 Global (I2G), which the FBI determined to be a pyramid scheme. The company collected approximately $34 million from investors, most of whom lost money. After a 25-day trial, a jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. The defendants appealed their convictions, presenting numerous arguments for reversal.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky initially handled the case, where the jury found the defendants guilty on both counts. The defendants were sentenced to varying prison terms: Maike received 120 months, Barnes 48 months, and Hosseinipour 30 months. The defendants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions, among other issues.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and rejected all the defendants&#039; arguments. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury&#039;s verdicts on both counts. The court also determined that the jury instructions were appropriate and did not mislead the jury. The court affirmed the criminal judgments of Maike and Barnes. For Hosseinipour, the court affirmed her criminal judgment but vacated the district court&#039;s denial of her Rule 33 motion for a new trial, remanding her case for reconsideration of that motion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Kethledge</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-682/24-682-2025-06-25.html</id>
        	<title>Xeriant, Inc. v. Auctus Fund LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-25T07:00:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-25T07:00:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-682/24-682-2025-06-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2021, Xeriant, Inc., an aerospace company, sought financing for a joint venture and connected with Auctus Fund LLC, a hedge fund. Auctus agreed to lend approximately $5 million through a convertible promissory note, allowing Auctus to convert the debt into shares of Xeriant&#039;s common stock if the loan was not repaid in cash. When Xeriant failed to repay the loan, Auctus attempted to convert the debt into stock, but Xeriant rejected the request and filed a lawsuit seeking to void the contract under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, claiming Auctus was not a registered securities dealer.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Xeriant&#039;s complaint, holding that the contract did not obligate Auctus to act as a dealer, and thus, the agreement was not void under Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. The court found that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), not private parties, enforces the registration requirement under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The appellate court agreed that Xeriant failed to allege a sufficient claim for rescission under Section 29(b) because the contract did not require Auctus to engage in unlawful dealer activity. The court concluded that the contract could be performed lawfully and was not inherently illegal. Therefore, the contract could not be rescinded under Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. The court also held that Xeriant&#039;s claim was timely filed, as the facts underlying Auctus&#039;s alleged status as an unregistered dealer were not appreciable until the SEC filed its complaint in June 2023. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-682/24-682-2025-06-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Xeriant, Inc. v. Auctus Fund LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2021, Xeriant, Inc., an aerospace company, sought financing for a joint venture and connected with Auctus Fund LLC, a hedge fund. Auctus agreed to lend approximately $5 million through a convertible promissory note, allowing Auctus to convert the debt into shares of Xeriant&#039;s common stock if the loan was not repaid in cash. When Xeriant failed to repay the loan, Auctus attempted to convert the debt into stock, but Xeriant rejected the request and filed a lawsuit seeking to void the contract under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, claiming Auctus was not a registered securities dealer.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Xeriant&#039;s complaint, holding that the contract did not obligate Auctus to act as a dealer, and thus, the agreement was not void under Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. The court found that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), not private parties, enforces the registration requirement under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The appellate court agreed that Xeriant failed to allege a sufficient claim for rescission under Section 29(b) because the contract did not require Auctus to engage in unlawful dealer activity. The court concluded that the contract could be performed lawfully and was not inherently illegal. Therefore, the contract could not be rescinded under Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act. The court also held that Xeriant&#039;s claim was timely filed, as the facts underlying Auctus&#039;s alleged status as an unregistered dealer were not appreciable until the SEC filed its complaint in June 2023.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Denny Chin</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2025/23sc776.html</id>
        	<title>People v. Schnorenberg</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-24T09:02:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-24T09:02:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2025/23sc776.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2008, Kelly James Schnorenberg formed KJS Marketing, Inc. to secure funding and recruit agents for insurance companies. Between 2009 and 2015, KJS solicited over $15 million from approximately 250 investors, promising a 12% annual return. Schnorenberg failed to disclose to investors his past legal and financial troubles, including a lawsuit by the Colorado Division of Securities, a permanent injunction from selling securities in Colorado, a bankruptcy filing, and unpaid civil judgments.

Schnorenberg was charged with twenty-five counts of securities fraud under section 11-51-501, with twenty-four counts based on materially false statements or omissions and one count based on a fraudulent course of business. He planned to defend himself by arguing that he acted in good faith reliance on the advice of his securities lawyer, Hank Schlueter. However, the trial court denied his motions for a continuance to secure Schlueter&#039;s testimony and excluded Schnorenberg&#039;s testimony about the specific advice he received, ruling it as hearsay.

The Colorado Court of Appeals vacated seven of Schnorenberg&#039;s convictions as time-barred, reversed the remaining convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Schnorenberg&#039;s testimony about his lawyer&#039;s advice and in not instructing the jury that good faith reliance on the advice of counsel could negate the mens rea element of the securities fraud charges.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the mens rea of &quot;willfully,&quot; synonymous with &quot;knowingly,&quot; applies to each element of securities fraud under subsections 11-51-501(1)(b) and (c). The court concluded that Schnorenberg&#039;s testimony about his lawyer&#039;s advice was relevant to whether he had the requisite mens rea and that the trial court erred in excluding this testimony. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2025/23sc776.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "People v. Schnorenberg" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2008, Kelly James Schnorenberg formed KJS Marketing, Inc. to secure funding and recruit agents for insurance companies. Between 2009 and 2015, KJS solicited over $15 million from approximately 250 investors, promising a 12% annual return. Schnorenberg failed to disclose to investors his past legal and financial troubles, including a lawsuit by the Colorado Division of Securities, a permanent injunction from selling securities in Colorado, a bankruptcy filing, and unpaid civil judgments.

Schnorenberg was charged with twenty-five counts of securities fraud under section 11-51-501, with twenty-four counts based on materially false statements or omissions and one count based on a fraudulent course of business. He planned to defend himself by arguing that he acted in good faith reliance on the advice of his securities lawyer, Hank Schlueter. However, the trial court denied his motions for a continuance to secure Schlueter&#039;s testimony and excluded Schnorenberg&#039;s testimony about the specific advice he received, ruling it as hearsay.

The Colorado Court of Appeals vacated seven of Schnorenberg&#039;s convictions as time-barred, reversed the remaining convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding Schnorenberg&#039;s testimony about his lawyer&#039;s advice and in not instructing the jury that good faith reliance on the advice of counsel could negate the mens rea element of the securities fraud charges.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that the mens rea of &quot;willfully,&quot; synonymous with &quot;knowingly,&quot; applies to each element of securities fraud under subsections 11-51-501(1)(b) and (c). The court concluded that Schnorenberg&#039;s testimony about his lawyer&#039;s advice was relevant to whether he had the requisite mens rea and that the trial court erred in excluding this testimony. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Colorado</case:state>
						<case:court>Colorado Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gabriel</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Colorado Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3512/23-3512-2025-06-10.html</id>
        	<title>PINO V. CARDONE CAPITAL, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-10T08:31:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-10T08:31:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3512/23-3512-2025-06-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a putative class action filed by Christine Pino on behalf of herself and others against Grant Cardone and his associated entities, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933. Pino claims that Cardone made misleading statements and omissions on social media about the internal rate of return (IRR) and distribution projections for real estate investment funds, and misstated material facts regarding the funds&#039; debt obligations.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Cardone and his entities were not &quot;sellers&quot; under § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and that the statements in question were not actionable. Pino appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Cardone and his entities could be considered statutory sellers and that some of the statements were actionable. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Upon remand, Pino filed a second amended complaint, and the district court again dismissed the claims without leave to amend, holding that Pino had waived subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and failed to plausibly allege subjective and objective falsity. The court also found that the omission of the SEC letter did not support a claim and that the debt obligation statement was not material.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court&#039;s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Pino did not waive subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and sufficiently alleged that Cardone subjectively disbelieved his IRR and distribution projections, which were also objectively untrue. The court also held that Pino stated a material omission claim under § 12(a)(2) by alleging that Cardone failed to disclose the SEC letter. Additionally, the court found that Pino sufficiently alleged that Cardone misstated material facts regarding the funds&#039; debt obligations, which could be considered material to a reasonable investor. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court&#039;s dismissal and allowed the claims to proceed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3512/23-3512-2025-06-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "PINO V. CARDONE CAPITAL, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a putative class action filed by Christine Pino on behalf of herself and others against Grant Cardone and his associated entities, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933. Pino claims that Cardone made misleading statements and omissions on social media about the internal rate of return (IRR) and distribution projections for real estate investment funds, and misstated material facts regarding the funds&#039; debt obligations.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Cardone and his entities were not &quot;sellers&quot; under § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and that the statements in question were not actionable. Pino appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Cardone and his entities could be considered statutory sellers and that some of the statements were actionable. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Upon remand, Pino filed a second amended complaint, and the district court again dismissed the claims without leave to amend, holding that Pino had waived subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and failed to plausibly allege subjective and objective falsity. The court also found that the omission of the SEC letter did not support a claim and that the debt obligation statement was not material.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court&#039;s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Pino did not waive subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and sufficiently alleged that Cardone subjectively disbelieved his IRR and distribution projections, which were also objectively untrue. The court also held that Pino stated a material omission claim under § 12(a)(2) by alleging that Cardone failed to disclose the SEC letter. Additionally, the court found that Pino sufficiently alleged that Cardone misstated material facts regarding the funds&#039; debt obligations, which could be considered material to a reasonable investor. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court&#039;s dismissal and allowed the claims to proceed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Margaret McKeown</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/374-2024.html</id>
        	<title>Erste Asset Management GmbH v. Hees</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-09T08:03:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-09T08:03:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/374-2024.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In early 2020, Erste Asset Management GmbH filed a derivative action against Kraft Heinz Company’s fiduciaries, arising from an August 2018 stock sale by 3G Capital, Inc., a significant minority stockholder. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint under Rule 23.1, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that six of Kraft Heinz’s eleven directors were disinterested or lacked independence. One of those directors, John Cahill, was alleged to have ended his consulting relationship with Kraft Heinz before the derivative action was filed. However, it was later revealed that Cahill continued to serve as a consultant after July 2019, contrary to Kraft Heinz’s public disclosures.

The Court of Chancery dismissed the derivative action, relying on the false representation that Cahill’s consulting agreement had terminated. Erste later discovered the ongoing consultancy and filed a new action seeking relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) for fraud and newly discovered evidence. The Court of Chancery dismissed this new action, holding that the fraud must be extrinsic and that the new information was not newly discovered evidence because Erste could have learned it with reasonable diligence.

The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision, holding that Rule 60(b)(3) applies to both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and that Erste had pleaded a claim that Kraft Heinz’s misrepresentations prevented it from fairly presenting its case. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including Rule 23.1 motion practice to reassess demand futility in light of the new evidence. The court also remanded Erste’s breach of fiduciary duty claim for further consideration. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/374-2024.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Erste Asset Management GmbH v. Hees" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In early 2020, Erste Asset Management GmbH filed a derivative action against Kraft Heinz Company’s fiduciaries, arising from an August 2018 stock sale by 3G Capital, Inc., a significant minority stockholder. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint under Rule 23.1, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to plead particularized facts creating a reasonable doubt that six of Kraft Heinz’s eleven directors were disinterested or lacked independence. One of those directors, John Cahill, was alleged to have ended his consulting relationship with Kraft Heinz before the derivative action was filed. However, it was later revealed that Cahill continued to serve as a consultant after July 2019, contrary to Kraft Heinz’s public disclosures.

The Court of Chancery dismissed the derivative action, relying on the false representation that Cahill’s consulting agreement had terminated. Erste later discovered the ongoing consultancy and filed a new action seeking relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) for fraud and newly discovered evidence. The Court of Chancery dismissed this new action, holding that the fraud must be extrinsic and that the new information was not newly discovered evidence because Erste could have learned it with reasonable diligence.

The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision, holding that Rule 60(b)(3) applies to both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and that Erste had pleaded a claim that Kraft Heinz’s misrepresentations prevented it from fairly presenting its case. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including Rule 23.1 motion practice to reassess demand futility in light of the new evidence. The court also remanded Erste’s breach of fiduciary duty claim for further consideration.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Abigail LeGrow</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10308/24-10308-2025-06-03.html</id>
        	<title>Vuoncino v. Forterra</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-03T15:30:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-03T15:30:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10308/24-10308-2025-06-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Raymond Vuoncino, a corporate-finance professional, worked for U.S. Pipe Fabrication, LLC (Fabrication). After Fabrication implemented new accounting practices for inter-company sales, Vuoncino objected to these practices as potentially fraudulent. Subsequently, he was fired by an executive of Fabrication’s parent company, Forterra, Inc. Vuoncino sued Fabrication, Forterra, and two Forterra executives, alleging violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s anti-retaliation provision.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Vuoncino’s first amended complaint for failure to state a claim, denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint, and denied reconsideration of those orders. Vuoncino appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Vuoncino’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, finding the proposed amendments were time-barred and did not relate back to the original complaint. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of reconsideration, noting that Vuoncino’s motion rehashed previously rejected arguments and did not present newly discovered evidence.

However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act claim against Fabrication, concluding that Vuoncino’s first amended complaint plausibly alleged that Fabrication employed him. The court found that Vuoncino’s allegations, taken as true, were sufficient to raise a plausible inference that he was a Fabrication employee. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act claims against Forterra, Bradley, and Kerfin, as Vuoncino failed to sufficiently plead that these defendants were his employer’s alter ego or that he could sue Forterra directly without establishing an employment relationship.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10308/24-10308-2025-06-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Vuoncino v. Forterra" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Raymond Vuoncino, a corporate-finance professional, worked for U.S. Pipe Fabrication, LLC (Fabrication). After Fabrication implemented new accounting practices for inter-company sales, Vuoncino objected to these practices as potentially fraudulent. Subsequently, he was fired by an executive of Fabrication’s parent company, Forterra, Inc. Vuoncino sued Fabrication, Forterra, and two Forterra executives, alleging violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s anti-retaliation provision.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Vuoncino’s first amended complaint for failure to state a claim, denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint, and denied reconsideration of those orders. Vuoncino appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Vuoncino’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, finding the proposed amendments were time-barred and did not relate back to the original complaint. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of reconsideration, noting that Vuoncino’s motion rehashed previously rejected arguments and did not present newly discovered evidence.

However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act claim against Fabrication, concluding that Vuoncino’s first amended complaint plausibly alleged that Fabrication employed him. The court found that Vuoncino’s allegations, taken as true, were sufficient to raise a plausible inference that he was a Fabrication employee. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act claims against Forterra, Bradley, and Kerfin, as Vuoncino failed to sufficiently plead that these defendants were his employer’s alter ego or that he could sue Forterra directly without establishing an employment relationship.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1754/24-1754-2025-05-27.html</id>
        	<title>Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lemelson</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-27T13:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-27T13:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1754/24-1754-2025-05-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves an enforcement action by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Gregory Lemelson and Lemelson Capital Management, LLC. The SEC alleged that Lemelson made false statements of material fact, engaged in a fraudulent scheme, and violated securities laws, resulting in approximately $1.3 million in illegal profits. The SEC sought disgorgement of these profits, a permanent injunction, and civil monetary penalties. Lemelson moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court dismissed one of the challenged statements. The SEC filed an amended complaint, and the jury ultimately found Lemelson liable for three statements but rejected other claims.

The District Court for the District of Massachusetts held Lemelson in contempt for violating a protective order and threatening a priest who provided information to the SEC. After the jury verdict, the district court issued a final judgment, including a five-year injunction against Lemelson and a $160,000 civil penalty. Lemelson appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. Lemelson then moved for attorneys&#039; fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), arguing that the SEC&#039;s demands were excessive compared to the final judgment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s denial of Lemelson&#039;s motion for fees and costs. The appellate court found that the district court incorrectly compared the SEC&#039;s demand to the scope of the initial claims rather than the final judgment obtained. The appellate court vacated the denial of fees and costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the SEC&#039;s demands were excessive and unreasonable compared to the final judgment. The appellate court also noted that the district court should consider whether Lemelson acted in bad faith or if special circumstances make an award unjust. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1754/24-1754-2025-05-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Lemelson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves an enforcement action by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Gregory Lemelson and Lemelson Capital Management, LLC. The SEC alleged that Lemelson made false statements of material fact, engaged in a fraudulent scheme, and violated securities laws, resulting in approximately $1.3 million in illegal profits. The SEC sought disgorgement of these profits, a permanent injunction, and civil monetary penalties. Lemelson moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court dismissed one of the challenged statements. The SEC filed an amended complaint, and the jury ultimately found Lemelson liable for three statements but rejected other claims.

The District Court for the District of Massachusetts held Lemelson in contempt for violating a protective order and threatening a priest who provided information to the SEC. After the jury verdict, the district court issued a final judgment, including a five-year injunction against Lemelson and a $160,000 civil penalty. Lemelson appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. Lemelson then moved for attorneys&#039; fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), arguing that the SEC&#039;s demands were excessive compared to the final judgment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s denial of Lemelson&#039;s motion for fees and costs. The appellate court found that the district court incorrectly compared the SEC&#039;s demand to the scope of the initial claims rather than the final judgment obtained. The appellate court vacated the denial of fees and costs and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the SEC&#039;s demands were excessive and unreasonable compared to the final judgment. The appellate court also noted that the district court should consider whether Lemelson acted in bad faith or if special circumstances make an award unjust.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sandra Lea Lynch</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2464/24-2464-2025-05-23.html</id>
        	<title>Roth v. LAL Family Corp.</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-23T07:00:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-23T07:00:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2464/24-2464-2025-05-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff Andrew Roth, a shareholder of Estée Lauder Companies Inc. and Altice USA, Inc., filed suits alleging that controlling shareholders of these companies engaged in transactions that violated Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. Roth claimed that the controlling shareholders sold shares of the companies while the companies repurchased their own shares, and sought to pair these transactions to impose liability for short-swing profits.

In the Southern District of New York, Roth&#039;s complaint against LAL Family Corporation and LAL Family Partners L.P. was dismissed. The court held that issuer repurchases cannot be paired with insiders&#039; sales of outstanding shares to create Section 16(b) liability. Similarly, in the Eastern District of New York, Roth&#039;s complaint against Patrick Drahi and other defendants was dismissed. The court relied in part on the analysis from the Southern District of New York, concluding that Roth&#039;s legal theory was invalid.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the cases and affirmed the judgments of dismissal. The court held that Section 16(b) does not impose liability for pairing sales by controlling shareholders with share repurchases by corporations they control. The court reasoned that under applicable state law, repurchased shares are transformed into treasury shares, which are different in kind from outstanding shares and cannot be paired. Therefore, Roth&#039;s theory of liability was rejected, and the judgments dismissing his complaints were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-2464/24-2464-2025-05-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Roth v. LAL Family Corp." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff Andrew Roth, a shareholder of Estée Lauder Companies Inc. and Altice USA, Inc., filed suits alleging that controlling shareholders of these companies engaged in transactions that violated Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. Roth claimed that the controlling shareholders sold shares of the companies while the companies repurchased their own shares, and sought to pair these transactions to impose liability for short-swing profits.

In the Southern District of New York, Roth&#039;s complaint against LAL Family Corporation and LAL Family Partners L.P. was dismissed. The court held that issuer repurchases cannot be paired with insiders&#039; sales of outstanding shares to create Section 16(b) liability. Similarly, in the Eastern District of New York, Roth&#039;s complaint against Patrick Drahi and other defendants was dismissed. The court relied in part on the analysis from the Southern District of New York, concluding that Roth&#039;s legal theory was invalid.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the cases and affirmed the judgments of dismissal. The court held that Section 16(b) does not impose liability for pairing sales by controlling shareholders with share repurchases by corporations they control. The court reasoned that under applicable state law, repurchased shares are transformed into treasury shares, which are different in kind from outstanding shares and cannot be paired. Therefore, Roth&#039;s theory of liability was rejected, and the judgments dismissing his complaints were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Dennis Jacobs</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-4108/23-4108-2025-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>USA V. YAFA</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-15T08:30:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-15T08:30:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-4108/23-4108-2025-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves codefendant brothers Joshua and Jamie Yafa, who were convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud for their involvement in a &quot;pump-and-dump&quot; stock manipulation scheme. They promoted the stock of Global Wholehealth Products Corporation (GWHP) through various means, including a &quot;phone room&quot; and social media, to inflate its price. Once the stock price rose significantly, they sold their shares, earning over $1 million. Following the sale, the stock price plummeted, causing significant losses to individual investors. A grand jury indicted the Yafas, along with their associates Charles Strongo and Brian Volmer, who pled guilty and testified against the Yafas at trial.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced the Yafas, applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2B1.1. The court used Application Note 3(B) from the commentary to § 2B1.1, which allows courts to use the gain from the offense as an alternative measure for calculating loss when the actual loss cannot be reasonably determined. The district court found it difficult to calculate the full amount of investor losses and thus relied on the gain as a proxy. This resulted in a fourteen-level increase in the offense level for both brothers, leading to sentences of thirty-two months for Joshua and seventeen months for Jamie.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the term &quot;loss&quot; in § 2B1.1 is genuinely ambiguous and that Application Note 3(B)&#039;s instruction to use gain as an alternative measure is a reasonable interpretation. The court concluded that the district court did not err in using the gain from the Yafas&#039;s offenses to calculate the loss and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-4108/23-4108-2025-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA V. YAFA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves codefendant brothers Joshua and Jamie Yafa, who were convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud for their involvement in a &quot;pump-and-dump&quot; stock manipulation scheme. They promoted the stock of Global Wholehealth Products Corporation (GWHP) through various means, including a &quot;phone room&quot; and social media, to inflate its price. Once the stock price rose significantly, they sold their shares, earning over $1 million. Following the sale, the stock price plummeted, causing significant losses to individual investors. A grand jury indicted the Yafas, along with their associates Charles Strongo and Brian Volmer, who pled guilty and testified against the Yafas at trial.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced the Yafas, applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2B1.1. The court used Application Note 3(B) from the commentary to § 2B1.1, which allows courts to use the gain from the offense as an alternative measure for calculating loss when the actual loss cannot be reasonably determined. The district court found it difficult to calculate the full amount of investor losses and thus relied on the gain as a proxy. This resulted in a fourteen-level increase in the offense level for both brothers, leading to sentences of thirty-two months for Joshua and seventeen months for Jamie.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the term &quot;loss&quot; in § 2B1.1 is genuinely ambiguous and that Application Note 3(B)&#039;s instruction to use gain as an alternative measure is a reasonable interpretation. The court concluded that the district court did not err in using the gain from the Yafas&#039;s offenses to calculate the loss and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20050/24-20050-2025-05-13.html</id>
        	<title>Ezell v. Dinges</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-13T15:30:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-13T15:30:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20050/24-20050-2025-05-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2006, Cabot Oil &amp; Gas Company began fracking in Dimock Township, Pennsylvania. By 2009, their operations caused a residential water well explosion, leading to methane gas contamination in local water supplies. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) found Cabot in violation of environmental laws, resulting in the 2009 Consent Order, which mandated corrective actions and a $120,000 penalty. Cabot violated this order by 2010, leading to another consent order and additional fines. Over the next decade, Cabot received numerous violation notices and faced lawsuits, including a 2020 grand jury finding of long-term indifference to remediation efforts, resulting in criminal charges and a nolo contendere plea.

Shareholders filed a derivative suit against Cabot’s directors, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties, including failure to oversee operations, issuing misleading statements, and insider trading. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims, finding no serious oversight failure or bad faith by the directors, and insufficient particularized allegations to support claims of material misrepresentation or insider trading.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that the directors had implemented and monitored compliance systems, and that the shareholders failed to demonstrate bad faith or conscious disregard of duties. The court also found that the statements in Cabot’s disclosures were not materially misleading and that the shareholders did not adequately plead demand futility regarding the insider trading claim. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims with prejudice. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-20050/24-20050-2025-05-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ezell v. Dinges" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2006, Cabot Oil &amp; Gas Company began fracking in Dimock Township, Pennsylvania. By 2009, their operations caused a residential water well explosion, leading to methane gas contamination in local water supplies. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) found Cabot in violation of environmental laws, resulting in the 2009 Consent Order, which mandated corrective actions and a $120,000 penalty. Cabot violated this order by 2010, leading to another consent order and additional fines. Over the next decade, Cabot received numerous violation notices and faced lawsuits, including a 2020 grand jury finding of long-term indifference to remediation efforts, resulting in criminal charges and a nolo contendere plea.

Shareholders filed a derivative suit against Cabot’s directors, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties, including failure to oversee operations, issuing misleading statements, and insider trading. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims, finding no serious oversight failure or bad faith by the directors, and insufficient particularized allegations to support claims of material misrepresentation or insider trading.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal, agreeing that the directors had implemented and monitored compliance systems, and that the shareholders failed to demonstrate bad faith or conscious disregard of duties. The court also found that the statements in Cabot’s disclosures were not materially misleading and that the shareholders did not adequately plead demand futility regarding the insider trading claim. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims with prejudice.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>James Graves</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Environmental Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1654/24-1654-2025-05-12.html</id>
        	<title>Tax-Free Fixed Income Fund for Puerto Rico Residents, Inc. v. Ocean Capital LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-12T13:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-12T13:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1654/24-1654-2025-05-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiffs, representing nine closed-end mutual funds, sued Ocean Capital LLC and several individuals and firms for allegedly committing securities violations. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants misled their shareholders by failing to make complete and accurate disclosures, violating Sections 13(d), 14(a), and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and other applicable SEC rules. The district court granted the defendants&#039; motions for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss, leading the plaintiffs to appeal.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. U.S. Magistrate Judge Giselle Lépez-Soler recommended dismissing the plaintiffs&#039; complaint on grounds of failure to state a claim and mootness. The district court adopted this recommendation, dismissing the plaintiffs&#039; claims but retaining jurisdiction over the defendants&#039; counterclaims. The plaintiffs then moved for a stay of the proceedings on the counterclaims, which was denied. The district court granted the defendants&#039; requested relief on their counterclaims, ordering the plaintiffs to seat the defendants&#039; nominees for the board of directors of three funds. The plaintiffs timely appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of the plaintiffs&#039; Sections 13(d), 14(a), and 20(a) claims. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a Section 13(d) claim for the non-PRRTFF IV funds and did not demonstrate irreparable harm for PRRTFF IV. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs&#039; Section 14(a) claims were insufficient, as the statements in question were not materially misleading. Consequently, the court upheld the district court&#039;s judgment on the defendants&#039; counterclaims, ordering the plaintiffs to seat the defendants&#039; nominees. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1654/24-1654-2025-05-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Tax-Free Fixed Income Fund for Puerto Rico Residents, Inc. v. Ocean Capital LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiffs, representing nine closed-end mutual funds, sued Ocean Capital LLC and several individuals and firms for allegedly committing securities violations. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants misled their shareholders by failing to make complete and accurate disclosures, violating Sections 13(d), 14(a), and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and other applicable SEC rules. The district court granted the defendants&#039; motions for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss, leading the plaintiffs to appeal.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. U.S. Magistrate Judge Giselle Lépez-Soler recommended dismissing the plaintiffs&#039; complaint on grounds of failure to state a claim and mootness. The district court adopted this recommendation, dismissing the plaintiffs&#039; claims but retaining jurisdiction over the defendants&#039; counterclaims. The plaintiffs then moved for a stay of the proceedings on the counterclaims, which was denied. The district court granted the defendants&#039; requested relief on their counterclaims, ordering the plaintiffs to seat the defendants&#039; nominees for the board of directors of three funds. The plaintiffs timely appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of the plaintiffs&#039; Sections 13(d), 14(a), and 20(a) claims. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a Section 13(d) claim for the non-PRRTFF IV funds and did not demonstrate irreparable harm for PRRTFF IV. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs&#039; Section 14(a) claims were insufficient, as the statements in question were not materially misleading. Consequently, the court upheld the district court&#039;s judgment on the defendants&#039; counterclaims, ordering the plaintiffs to seat the defendants&#039; nominees.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gustavo Gelpí</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-7025/24-7025-2025-05-06.html</id>
        	<title>Goodrich v. Bank of America N.A.</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-06T06:31:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-06T06:31:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-7025/24-7025-2025-05-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In early 2020, Robert Goodrich liquidated his stock portfolio due to concerns about the financial market&#039;s reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in significant financial losses. Goodrich had an investment account with U.S. Trust Bank of America Private Wealth Management, managed by Matthew Lettinga. Despite advice from Lettinga to avoid liquidation, Goodrich insisted on selling his portfolio. Goodrich later sued Lettinga and Bank of America, claiming gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, arguing that he was not adequately informed of the risks involved in liquidating his portfolio.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Goodrich&#039;s claims of gross negligence and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, finding them implausibly pleaded. The court allowed the breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed but later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Goodrich had explicitly instructed the sale of his portfolio, which precluded liability under the terms of the investment agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court&#039;s decisions. The appellate court held that the investment agreement&#039;s exculpatory clauses were enforceable and that Goodrich&#039;s explicit instruction to liquidate his portfolio shielded the defendants from liability. The court also agreed that Goodrich failed to plausibly allege scienter, a necessary element for his claims under the D.C. Securities Act, and found no abuse of discretion in the District Court&#039;s limitation of discovery to the dispositive issue of whether Goodrich instructed the sale. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/24-7025/24-7025-2025-05-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Goodrich v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In early 2020, Robert Goodrich liquidated his stock portfolio due to concerns about the financial market&#039;s reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in significant financial losses. Goodrich had an investment account with U.S. Trust Bank of America Private Wealth Management, managed by Matthew Lettinga. Despite advice from Lettinga to avoid liquidation, Goodrich insisted on selling his portfolio. Goodrich later sued Lettinga and Bank of America, claiming gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, arguing that he was not adequately informed of the risks involved in liquidating his portfolio.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Goodrich&#039;s claims of gross negligence and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, finding them implausibly pleaded. The court allowed the breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed but later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Goodrich had explicitly instructed the sale of his portfolio, which precluded liability under the terms of the investment agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court&#039;s decisions. The appellate court held that the investment agreement&#039;s exculpatory clauses were enforceable and that Goodrich&#039;s explicit instruction to liquidate his portfolio shielded the defendants from liability. The court also agreed that Goodrich failed to plausibly allege scienter, a necessary element for his claims under the D.C. Securities Act, and found no abuse of discretion in the District Court&#039;s limitation of discovery to the dispositive issue of whether Goodrich instructed the sale.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Robert Leon Wilkins</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2379/24-2379-2025-04-24.html</id>
        	<title>OPPENHEIMER &amp; CO. INC. V. MITCHELL</title>
        	<updated>2025-04-24T08:30:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-24T08:30:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2379/24-2379-2025-04-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Defendants, alleged victims of a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by John Woods, sought to bring claims against Woods&#039;s employer, Oppenheimer &amp; Co. Inc., in a FINRA arbitration forum. Defendants claimed they were customers of Oppenheimer because they transacted with Woods, an associated person of Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer filed a federal action seeking a declaration that Defendants were not its customers and a permanent injunction to prevent arbitration.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of Oppenheimer, concluding that Defendants were not customers of Oppenheimer or Woods. The court found that Defendants had no direct relationship with Oppenheimer and that their investments were facilitated by Michael Mooney, not Woods. The court also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from arbitrating their claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that a &quot;customer&quot; under FINRA Rule 12200 includes any non-broker and non-dealer who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member or its associated person. However, the court agreed with the district court that Defendants did not transact with Woods, as their investments were facilitated by Mooney. The court also rejected Defendants&#039; &quot;alter ego&quot; theory, which suggested that their investments in an entity controlled by Woods made them Woods&#039;s customers.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Defendants were not entitled to arbitrate their claims against Oppenheimer under FINRA Rule 12200 and upheld the permanent injunction. The court found no errors in the district court&#039;s analysis or factual findings and affirmed the decision in full. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-2379/24-2379-2025-04-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "OPPENHEIMER &amp; CO. INC. V. MITCHELL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Defendants, alleged victims of a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by John Woods, sought to bring claims against Woods&#039;s employer, Oppenheimer &amp; Co. Inc., in a FINRA arbitration forum. Defendants claimed they were customers of Oppenheimer because they transacted with Woods, an associated person of Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer filed a federal action seeking a declaration that Defendants were not its customers and a permanent injunction to prevent arbitration.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of Oppenheimer, concluding that Defendants were not customers of Oppenheimer or Woods. The court found that Defendants had no direct relationship with Oppenheimer and that their investments were facilitated by Michael Mooney, not Woods. The court also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from arbitrating their claims.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that a &quot;customer&quot; under FINRA Rule 12200 includes any non-broker and non-dealer who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member or its associated person. However, the court agreed with the district court that Defendants did not transact with Woods, as their investments were facilitated by Mooney. The court also rejected Defendants&#039; &quot;alter ego&quot; theory, which suggested that their investments in an entity controlled by Woods made them Woods&#039;s customers.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Defendants were not entitled to arbitrate their claims against Oppenheimer under FINRA Rule 12200 and upheld the permanent injunction. The court found no errors in the district court&#039;s analysis or factual findings and affirmed the decision in full.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Milan Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10004/24-10004-2025-04-17.html</id>
        	<title>Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton</title>
        	<updated>2025-04-17T15:30:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-17T15:30:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10004/24-10004-2025-04-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Timothy Barton was involved in a scheme to develop underutilized land with loans from Chinese nationals. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice initiated parallel civil and criminal proceedings against Barton and his associates, alleging violations of antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The SEC sought a receivership to preserve lenders&#039; assets, leading to various district court orders imposing and administering a receivership and freezing Barton’s assets. Barton appealed these orders and requested reassignment of the case on remand.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially imposed a receivership, which Barton appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the receivership order, finding that the district court used the wrong standard and that the receivership&#039;s scope was too broad. On remand, the district court applied the correct standard from Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron and reimposed a receivership, including entities that received or benefited from assets traceable to Barton’s alleged fraudulent activities. Barton again appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction, the decision to appoint the receiver, the scope of the receivership, the administration of the receivership, and the preliminary injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition and scope of the receivership and the grant of a preliminary injunction. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s actions and dismissed Barton’s appeal of certain orders administering the receivership for lack of jurisdiction. The court also denied Barton’s request to reassign the case to another district-court judge, finding no basis for reassignment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-10004/24-10004-2025-04-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barton" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Timothy Barton was involved in a scheme to develop underutilized land with loans from Chinese nationals. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice initiated parallel civil and criminal proceedings against Barton and his associates, alleging violations of antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The SEC sought a receivership to preserve lenders&#039; assets, leading to various district court orders imposing and administering a receivership and freezing Barton’s assets. Barton appealed these orders and requested reassignment of the case on remand.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas initially imposed a receivership, which Barton appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the receivership order, finding that the district court used the wrong standard and that the receivership&#039;s scope was too broad. On remand, the district court applied the correct standard from Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron and reimposed a receivership, including entities that received or benefited from assets traceable to Barton’s alleged fraudulent activities. Barton again appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction, the decision to appoint the receiver, the scope of the receivership, the administration of the receivership, and the preliminary injunction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition and scope of the receivership and the grant of a preliminary injunction. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s actions and dismissed Barton’s appeal of certain orders administering the receivership for lack of jurisdiction. The court also denied Barton’s request to reassign the case to another district-court judge, finding no basis for reassignment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Don Willett</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5839/24-5839-2025-04-17.html</id>
        	<title>Grae v. Corrections Corp. of Am.</title>
        	<updated>2025-04-17T09:01:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-17T09:01:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5839/24-5839-2025-04-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A publicly traded company, CoreCivic, which operates private prisons, faced scrutiny after the Bureau of Prisons raised safety and security concerns about its facilities. Following a report by the Department of Justice&#039;s Inspector General highlighting higher rates of violence and other issues in CoreCivic&#039;s prisons compared to federal ones, the Deputy Attorney General recommended reducing the use of private prisons. This led to a significant drop in CoreCivic&#039;s stock price and a subsequent shareholder class action lawsuit.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, early in the litigation, issued a protective order allowing parties to designate discovery materials as &quot;confidential.&quot; This led to many documents being filed under seal. The Nashville Banner intervened, seeking to unseal these documents, but the district court largely maintained the seals, including on 24 deposition transcripts, without providing specific reasons for the nondisclosure.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court emphasized the strong presumption of public access to judicial records and the requirement for compelling reasons to justify sealing them. The court found that the district court had not provided specific findings to support the seals and had not narrowly tailored the seals to serve any compelling reasons. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s order regarding the deposition transcripts and remanded the case for a prompt decision in accordance with its precedents, requiring the district court to determine if any parts of the transcripts meet the requirements for a seal within 60 days. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/24-5839/24-5839-2025-04-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Grae v. Corrections Corp. of Am." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A publicly traded company, CoreCivic, which operates private prisons, faced scrutiny after the Bureau of Prisons raised safety and security concerns about its facilities. Following a report by the Department of Justice&#039;s Inspector General highlighting higher rates of violence and other issues in CoreCivic&#039;s prisons compared to federal ones, the Deputy Attorney General recommended reducing the use of private prisons. This led to a significant drop in CoreCivic&#039;s stock price and a subsequent shareholder class action lawsuit.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, early in the litigation, issued a protective order allowing parties to designate discovery materials as &quot;confidential.&quot; This led to many documents being filed under seal. The Nashville Banner intervened, seeking to unseal these documents, but the district court largely maintained the seals, including on 24 deposition transcripts, without providing specific reasons for the nondisclosure.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court emphasized the strong presumption of public access to judicial records and the requirement for compelling reasons to justify sealing them. The court found that the district court had not provided specific findings to support the seals and had not narrowly tailored the seals to serve any compelling reasons. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s order regarding the deposition transcripts and remanded the case for a prompt decision in accordance with its precedents, requiring the district court to determine if any parts of the transcripts meet the requirements for a seal within 60 days.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Kethledge</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1709/24-1709-2025-04-08.html</id>
        	<title>Defeo v. IonQ, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-04-08T10:30:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-08T10:30:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1709/24-1709-2025-04-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		IonQ, Inc., a public company developing quantum computers, experienced a significant drop in its stock price from $7.86 on May 2, 2022, to $4.34 on May 12, 2022. A group of investors claimed this decline was due to the Scorpion Report, published on May 3, 2022, which alleged that IonQ had been committing widespread fraud regarding the value of its company. The investors filed a securities fraud lawsuit against IonQ, asserting that the report revealed the truth about IonQ&#039;s misrepresentations, causing their financial losses.

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the investors&#039; first amended complaint for failing to state a claim, particularly for not adequately pleading loss causation. The court found that the Scorpion Report, authored by a short-seller with financial incentives, was not a reliable source of information. The court also noted that the investors failed to show that the report or IonQ&#039;s response revealed any new, truthful information to the market. The investors then sought reconsideration and leave to file a second amended complaint, which the district court denied, again citing the failure to plead loss causation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The appellate court agreed that the Scorpion Report, given its disclaimers and the financial motivations of its authors, could not plausibly be seen as revealing the truth about IonQ&#039;s alleged fraud. Additionally, IonQ&#039;s response to the report did not concede any truth to the allegations but rather dismissed them as inaccurate. Therefore, the investors failed to establish the necessary element of loss causation, making their proposed amendments futile. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1709/24-1709-2025-04-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Defeo v. IonQ, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                IonQ, Inc., a public company developing quantum computers, experienced a significant drop in its stock price from $7.86 on May 2, 2022, to $4.34 on May 12, 2022. A group of investors claimed this decline was due to the Scorpion Report, published on May 3, 2022, which alleged that IonQ had been committing widespread fraud regarding the value of its company. The investors filed a securities fraud lawsuit against IonQ, asserting that the report revealed the truth about IonQ&#039;s misrepresentations, causing their financial losses.

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the investors&#039; first amended complaint for failing to state a claim, particularly for not adequately pleading loss causation. The court found that the Scorpion Report, authored by a short-seller with financial incentives, was not a reliable source of information. The court also noted that the investors failed to show that the report or IonQ&#039;s response revealed any new, truthful information to the market. The investors then sought reconsideration and leave to file a second amended complaint, which the district court denied, again citing the failure to plead loss causation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decision. The appellate court agreed that the Scorpion Report, given its disclaimers and the financial motivations of its authors, could not plausibly be seen as revealing the truth about IonQ&#039;s alleged fraud. Additionally, IonQ&#039;s response to the report did not concede any truth to the allegations but rather dismissed them as inaccurate. Therefore, the investors failed to establish the necessary element of loss causation, making their proposed amendments futile. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven Agee</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1427/24-1427-2025-04-01.html</id>
        	<title>Securities and Exchange Commission v. Commonwealth Equity Services, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-04-01T12:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-01T12:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1427/24-1427-2025-04-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action against Commonwealth Equity Services, LLC, alleging that from 2014 to 2018, Commonwealth failed to adequately disclose potential conflicts of interest related to its revenue-sharing agreement with National Financial Services, LLC (NFS). The SEC claimed this omission violated Sections 206(2) and (4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and SEC Rule 206(4)-7. Commonwealth&#039;s representatives, who provided investment advice to clients, were unaware of the revenue-sharing arrangement, which the SEC argued created a conflict of interest by incentivizing Commonwealth to direct clients to higher-cost mutual fund share classes that generated revenue-sharing income.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the SEC&#039;s motion for summary judgment on liability, finding that Commonwealth&#039;s disclosures were inadequate as a matter of law and that the firm acted negligently. The court also denied Commonwealth&#039;s cross-motion for summary judgment and its motion to reconsider. Subsequently, the district court entered final judgment against Commonwealth, ordering disgorgement of $65,588,906 in revenue-sharing income, $21,185,162 in prejudgment interest, and a civil penalty of $6,500,000. The court struck Commonwealth&#039;s expert declaration proposing an alternative disgorgement calculation and adopted the SEC&#039;s proposed amount.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment and the disgorgement order, remanding for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the issue of materiality should have been decided by a jury, as reasonable minds could differ on whether the additional disclosures would have significantly altered the total mix of information available to investors. The court also found that the SEC had not adequately shown a reasonable approximation or causal connection between Commonwealth&#039;s profits and the alleged violations, and that the district court must consider whether Commonwealth is entitled to deduct its expenses from any disgorgement awarded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1427/24-1427-2025-04-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Commonwealth Equity Services, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action against Commonwealth Equity Services, LLC, alleging that from 2014 to 2018, Commonwealth failed to adequately disclose potential conflicts of interest related to its revenue-sharing agreement with National Financial Services, LLC (NFS). The SEC claimed this omission violated Sections 206(2) and (4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and SEC Rule 206(4)-7. Commonwealth&#039;s representatives, who provided investment advice to clients, were unaware of the revenue-sharing arrangement, which the SEC argued created a conflict of interest by incentivizing Commonwealth to direct clients to higher-cost mutual fund share classes that generated revenue-sharing income.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the SEC&#039;s motion for summary judgment on liability, finding that Commonwealth&#039;s disclosures were inadequate as a matter of law and that the firm acted negligently. The court also denied Commonwealth&#039;s cross-motion for summary judgment and its motion to reconsider. Subsequently, the district court entered final judgment against Commonwealth, ordering disgorgement of $65,588,906 in revenue-sharing income, $21,185,162 in prejudgment interest, and a civil penalty of $6,500,000. The court struck Commonwealth&#039;s expert declaration proposing an alternative disgorgement calculation and adopted the SEC&#039;s proposed amount.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s grant of summary judgment and the disgorgement order, remanding for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the issue of materiality should have been decided by a jury, as reasonable minds could differ on whether the additional disclosures would have significantly altered the total mix of information available to investors. The court also found that the SEC had not adequately shown a reasonable approximation or causal connection between Commonwealth&#039;s profits and the alleged violations, and that the district court must consider whether Commonwealth is entitled to deduct its expenses from any disgorgement awarded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sandra Lea Lynch</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2025/g063109.html</id>
        	<title>Harding v. Lifetime Financial, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-03-14T12:31:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-03-14T12:31:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2025/g063109.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An imposter posing as investment advisor Daniel Corey Payne of Lifetime Financial, Inc. stole over $300,000 from Mark Frank Harding. Prior to this, Lifetime had received several inquiries about a potential imposter posing as Payne but did not post a warning or take significant action. Harding sued Lifetime and others for negligence, arguing that as registered investment advisors, they had a duty to post a warning about the imposter on their website and report the complaints to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Harding claimed that had they done so, he would not have transferred funds to the imposter.

The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they owed no duty to Harding. The court noted that Harding was not a client of the defendants and that there was no fiduciary relationship between them. The court also found that there was no statutory or case authority imposing a duty on the defendants to warn nonclients about an imposter.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court&#039;s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding to report the imposter on their website or to FINRA. The court found that FINRA Rule 4530 did not apply because the defendants were not the subject of any written customer complaint involving allegations of theft or misappropriation of funds. The court also found that FINRA Rule 2210 did not impose an affirmative duty to warn the general public about a third-party impersonator. The court concluded that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding and affirmed the summary judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2025/g063109.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Harding v. Lifetime Financial, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An imposter posing as investment advisor Daniel Corey Payne of Lifetime Financial, Inc. stole over $300,000 from Mark Frank Harding. Prior to this, Lifetime had received several inquiries about a potential imposter posing as Payne but did not post a warning or take significant action. Harding sued Lifetime and others for negligence, arguing that as registered investment advisors, they had a duty to post a warning about the imposter on their website and report the complaints to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Harding claimed that had they done so, he would not have transferred funds to the imposter.

The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they owed no duty to Harding. The court noted that Harding was not a client of the defendants and that there was no fiduciary relationship between them. The court also found that there was no statutory or case authority imposing a duty on the defendants to warn nonclients about an imposter.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court&#039;s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding to report the imposter on their website or to FINRA. The court found that FINRA Rule 4530 did not apply because the defendants were not the subject of any written customer complaint involving allegations of theft or misappropriation of funds. The court also found that FINRA Rule 2210 did not impose an affirmative duty to warn the general public about a third-party impersonator. The court concluded that the defendants did not owe a duty to Harding and affirmed the summary judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-03-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>Thomas M. Goethals</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1047/24-1047-2025-03-04.html</id>
        	<title>Fiorisce, LLC v. Colorado Technical University</title>
        	<updated>2025-03-04T10:04:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-03-04T10:04:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1047/24-1047-2025-03-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Fiorisce, LLC, a limited liability company, filed a qui tam lawsuit against Colorado Technical University (CTU) under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that CTU misrepresented compliance with federal credit hour requirements to fraudulently obtain federal student aid funds. Fiorisce claimed that CTU&#039;s online learning platform, Intellipath, provided insufficient educational content and falsified learning hour calculations to meet federal standards. Fiorisce&#039;s principal, a former CTU faculty member, created the company to protect their identity while exposing the alleged fraud.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. CTU moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded the suit because the allegations were substantially similar to previously disclosed information. The district court denied CTU’s motion, finding that Fiorisce’s specific claims about misrepresentation of credit hours and the use of Intellipath were not substantially the same as prior disclosures. The court also suggested that Fiorisce might qualify as an original source of the information.

CTU appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, seeking interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply, as the public disclosure bar did not confer a right to avoid trial and could be effectively reviewed after final judgment. The court emphasized that expanding the collateral order doctrine to include such denials would undermine the final judgment rule and dismissed CTU’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/24-1047/24-1047-2025-03-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Fiorisce, LLC v. Colorado Technical University" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Fiorisce, LLC, a limited liability company, filed a qui tam lawsuit against Colorado Technical University (CTU) under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that CTU misrepresented compliance with federal credit hour requirements to fraudulently obtain federal student aid funds. Fiorisce claimed that CTU&#039;s online learning platform, Intellipath, provided insufficient educational content and falsified learning hour calculations to meet federal standards. Fiorisce&#039;s principal, a former CTU faculty member, created the company to protect their identity while exposing the alleged fraud.

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. CTU moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded the suit because the allegations were substantially similar to previously disclosed information. The district court denied CTU’s motion, finding that Fiorisce’s specific claims about misrepresentation of credit hours and the use of Intellipath were not substantially the same as prior disclosures. The court also suggested that Fiorisce might qualify as an original source of the information.

CTU appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, seeking interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply, as the public disclosure bar did not confer a right to avoid trial and could be effectively reviewed after final judgment. The court emphasized that expanding the collateral order doctrine to include such denials would undermine the final judgment rule and dismissed CTU’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-03-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Scott Matheson</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Education Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2025/23sc511.html</id>
        	<title>Snedeker v. People</title>
        	<updated>2025-03-04T07:02:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-03-04T07:02:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2025/23sc511.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Bradford Wayne Snedeker was convicted of various fraud and theft charges in two separate Boulder County District Court cases. In the first case, he was sentenced to four years in prison for securities fraud and a consecutive one-year term of work release plus twenty years of probation for theft. In the second case, he was sentenced to fifteen years of probation for theft, to run concurrently with the first case&#039;s sentence. After serving the prison term, Snedeker argued that his sentences were illegal under the ruling in Allman v. People, which held that a court cannot impose both imprisonment and probation for different offenses in the same case. The district court agreed that the first case&#039;s sentence was illegal and ordered resentencing but found the second case&#039;s sentence legal.

The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the Fraud Case and affirmed the district court&#039;s resentencing decision. Snedeker then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for review, arguing that reimposing the original probationary sentence after serving the prison term still violated Allman and that imposing concurrent prison and probation sentences in separate cases also violated Allman.

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that when a sentence is illegal under Allman and the defendant has already served the prison portion, the court can reimpose a probationary term because probation remains a legal sentencing option. The court also held that it does not violate Allman to sentence a defendant to imprisonment in one case and probation in a separate case. Thus, the court affirmed the court of appeals&#039; judgment in the Fraud Case and the district court&#039;s resentencing in the Theft Case. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2025/23sc511.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Snedeker v. People" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Bradford Wayne Snedeker was convicted of various fraud and theft charges in two separate Boulder County District Court cases. In the first case, he was sentenced to four years in prison for securities fraud and a consecutive one-year term of work release plus twenty years of probation for theft. In the second case, he was sentenced to fifteen years of probation for theft, to run concurrently with the first case&#039;s sentence. After serving the prison term, Snedeker argued that his sentences were illegal under the ruling in Allman v. People, which held that a court cannot impose both imprisonment and probation for different offenses in the same case. The district court agreed that the first case&#039;s sentence was illegal and ordered resentencing but found the second case&#039;s sentence legal.

The Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the Fraud Case and affirmed the district court&#039;s resentencing decision. Snedeker then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for review, arguing that reimposing the original probationary sentence after serving the prison term still violated Allman and that imposing concurrent prison and probation sentences in separate cases also violated Allman.

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that when a sentence is illegal under Allman and the defendant has already served the prison portion, the court can reimpose a probationary term because probation remains a legal sentencing option. The court also held that it does not violate Allman to sentence a defendant to imprisonment in one case and probation in a separate case. Thus, the court affirmed the court of appeals&#039; judgment in the Fraud Case and the district court&#039;s resentencing in the Theft Case.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-03-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Colorado</case:state>
						<case:court>Colorado Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Brian Boatright</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Colorado Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13327/22-13327-2025-02-24.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Horn</title>
        	<updated>2025-02-24T10:02:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-24T10:02:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13327/22-13327-2025-02-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Jeffrey Horn, a former registered stockbroker, was convicted by a jury in April 2022 of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and securities fraud. The district court sentenced him to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of $1,469,702. Horn appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging cumulative error. He also raised objections regarding the calculation of his loss, restitution, and offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. The jury found Horn guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him accordingly. Horn&#039;s co-defendant, Omar Leon Plummer, was also convicted and sentenced. Horn&#039;s appeal followed, raising several issues related to the trial and sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support Horn&#039;s convictions. The court held that Horn acted with the requisite intent to defraud, as evidenced by his distribution of materially false information to investors and his role in the fraudulent scheme. The court also rejected Horn&#039;s arguments regarding cumulative error, finding no merit in his claims.

Regarding sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court&#039;s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found no clear error in the district court&#039;s determination that Horn was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity, justifying a four-level enhancement. The court also affirmed the use of intended loss rather than actual loss for sentencing purposes, consistent with the Guidelines and relevant case law. The court concluded that the district court&#039;s loss calculation and restitution order were supported by reliable and specific evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-13327/22-13327-2025-02-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Horn" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Jeffrey Horn, a former registered stockbroker, was convicted by a jury in April 2022 of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and securities fraud. The district court sentenced him to 100 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of $1,469,702. Horn appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging cumulative error. He also raised objections regarding the calculation of his loss, restitution, and offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. The jury found Horn guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him accordingly. Horn&#039;s co-defendant, Omar Leon Plummer, was also convicted and sentenced. Horn&#039;s appeal followed, raising several issues related to the trial and sentencing.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support Horn&#039;s convictions. The court held that Horn acted with the requisite intent to defraud, as evidenced by his distribution of materially false information to investors and his role in the fraudulent scheme. The court also rejected Horn&#039;s arguments regarding cumulative error, finding no merit in his claims.

Regarding sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court&#039;s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found no clear error in the district court&#039;s determination that Horn was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity, justifying a four-level enhancement. The court also affirmed the use of intended loss rather than actual loss for sentencing purposes, consistent with the Guidelines and relevant case law. The court concluded that the district court&#039;s loss calculation and restitution order were supported by reliable and specific evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stanley Marcus</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-2110/23-2110-2025-02-24.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Cammarata</title>
        	<updated>2025-02-24T10:00:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-24T10:00:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-2110/23-2110-2025-02-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Joseph Cammarata and his associates, Eric Cohen and David Punturieri, created Alpha Plus Recovery, LLC, a claims aggregator that submitted fraudulent claims to securities class action settlement funds. They falsely represented that three entities, Nimello, Quartis, and Invergasa, had traded in securities involved in class action settlements, obtaining over $40 million. The fraudulent claims included falsified trade data and fabricated reports. The scheme unraveled when a claims administrator, KCC, discovered the fraud, leading to the rejection of the claims and subsequent legal action.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering. Cohen and Punturieri pled guilty, while Cammarata proceeded to trial and was found guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced Cammarata to 120 months in prison, ordered restitution, and forfeiture of certain property.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld most of the District Court&#039;s rulings but found issues with the restitution order and the forfeiture of Cammarata&#039;s vacation home. The court held that the restitution order did not fully compensate the victims, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), and remanded for reconsideration. The court also found procedural error in the forfeiture process, as Cammarata was deprived of his right to a jury determination on the forfeitability of his property. The court vacated the forfeiture order in part and remanded for the Government to amend the order to reflect that the property is forfeitable as a substitute asset under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/23-2110/23-2110-2025-02-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Cammarata" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Joseph Cammarata and his associates, Eric Cohen and David Punturieri, created Alpha Plus Recovery, LLC, a claims aggregator that submitted fraudulent claims to securities class action settlement funds. They falsely represented that three entities, Nimello, Quartis, and Invergasa, had traded in securities involved in class action settlements, obtaining over $40 million. The fraudulent claims included falsified trade data and fabricated reports. The scheme unraveled when a claims administrator, KCC, discovered the fraud, leading to the rejection of the claims and subsequent legal action.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering. Cohen and Punturieri pled guilty, while Cammarata proceeded to trial and was found guilty on all counts. The District Court sentenced Cammarata to 120 months in prison, ordered restitution, and forfeiture of certain property.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld most of the District Court&#039;s rulings but found issues with the restitution order and the forfeiture of Cammarata&#039;s vacation home. The court held that the restitution order did not fully compensate the victims, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), and remanded for reconsideration. The court also found procedural error in the forfeiture process, as Cammarata was deprived of his right to a jury determination on the forfeitability of his property. The court vacated the forfeiture order in part and remanded for the Government to amend the order to reflect that the property is forfeitable as a substitute asset under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Brooks Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/604/23-1127/</id>
        	<title>Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath</title>
        	<updated>2025-02-21T08:35:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-21T08:35:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/604/23-1127/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The E-Rate program, established under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, subsidizes internet and telecommunications services for schools and libraries. The program is funded by contributions from telecommunications carriers, managed by the Universal Service Administrative Company, and regulated by the FCC. The &quot;lowest corresponding price&quot; rule ensures that schools and libraries are not charged more than similarly situated non-residential customers. Todd Heath, an auditor, alleged that Wisconsin Bell overcharged schools, violating this rule and leading to inflated reimbursement requests from the E-Rate program.

Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss Heath&#039;s suit, arguing that E-Rate reimbursement requests do not qualify as &quot;claims&quot; under the False Claims Act (FCA) because the funds come from private carriers and are managed by a private corporation, not the government. The District Court and the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit held that the government &quot;provided&quot; E-Rate funding through its regulatory role and by depositing over $100 million from the U.S. Treasury into the Fund.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that E-Rate reimbursement requests are &quot;claims&quot; under the FCA because the government provided a portion of the money by transferring over $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund. This transfer included delinquent contributions collected by the FCC and Treasury, as well as settlements and restitution payments from the Justice Department. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/604/23-1127/" target="_blank"&gt;View "Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The E-Rate program, established under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, subsidizes internet and telecommunications services for schools and libraries. The program is funded by contributions from telecommunications carriers, managed by the Universal Service Administrative Company, and regulated by the FCC. The &quot;lowest corresponding price&quot; rule ensures that schools and libraries are not charged more than similarly situated non-residential customers. Todd Heath, an auditor, alleged that Wisconsin Bell overcharged schools, violating this rule and leading to inflated reimbursement requests from the E-Rate program.

Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss Heath&#039;s suit, arguing that E-Rate reimbursement requests do not qualify as &quot;claims&quot; under the False Claims Act (FCA) because the funds come from private carriers and are managed by a private corporation, not the government. The District Court and the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit held that the government &quot;provided&quot; E-Rate funding through its regulatory role and by depositing over $100 million from the U.S. Treasury into the Fund.

The Supreme Court of the United States held that E-Rate reimbursement requests are &quot;claims&quot; under the FCA because the government provided a portion of the money by transferring over $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund. This transfer included delinquent contributions collected by the FCC and Treasury, as well as settlements and restitution payments from the Justice Department. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Education-Rate reimbursement requests qualified as &quot;claims&quot; under the False Claims Act when the U.S. Treasury deposited money into the Universal Service Fund in the years when the requests were made for disbursement to those entitled to E-Rate subsidies.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Elena Kagan</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Communications Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-56206/22-56206-2025-02-20.html</id>
        	<title>USSEC V. CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY</title>
        	<updated>2025-02-20T09:00:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-20T09:00:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-56206/22-56206-2025-02-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Gina Champion-Cain operated a Ponzi scheme through her company ANI Development, LLC, defrauding over 400 investors of approximately $389 million. The SEC initiated a civil enforcement action, freezing Cain’s and ANI’s assets, appointing a receiver for ANI, and temporarily staying litigation against ANI. Defrauded investors then sued third parties, including Chicago Title Company and the Nossaman law firm, alleging their involvement in the scheme.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California approved a global settlement between the Receiver and Chicago Title, which included a bar order preventing further litigation against Chicago Title and Nossaman related to the Ponzi scheme. Kim Peterson and Ovation Fund Management II, LLC, whose state-court claims against Chicago Title and Nossaman were extinguished by the bar orders, challenged these orders.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court had the authority to enter the bar orders because the claims by Peterson and Ovation substantially overlapped with the Receiver’s claims, seeking recovery for the same losses stemming from the Ponzi scheme. The bar orders were deemed necessary to protect the ANI receivership estate, as allowing the claims to proceed would interfere with the Receiver’s efforts and deplete the receivership’s assets.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not preclude the bar orders, as they were necessary in aid of the district court’s jurisdiction over the receivership estate. The court rejected Peterson’s argument that the bar order was inequitable, noting that Peterson had the opportunity to file claims through the receivership estate but was determined to be a net winner from the Ponzi scheme. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s bar orders. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-56206/22-56206-2025-02-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USSEC V. CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Gina Champion-Cain operated a Ponzi scheme through her company ANI Development, LLC, defrauding over 400 investors of approximately $389 million. The SEC initiated a civil enforcement action, freezing Cain’s and ANI’s assets, appointing a receiver for ANI, and temporarily staying litigation against ANI. Defrauded investors then sued third parties, including Chicago Title Company and the Nossaman law firm, alleging their involvement in the scheme.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California approved a global settlement between the Receiver and Chicago Title, which included a bar order preventing further litigation against Chicago Title and Nossaman related to the Ponzi scheme. Kim Peterson and Ovation Fund Management II, LLC, whose state-court claims against Chicago Title and Nossaman were extinguished by the bar orders, challenged these orders.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court had the authority to enter the bar orders because the claims by Peterson and Ovation substantially overlapped with the Receiver’s claims, seeking recovery for the same losses stemming from the Ponzi scheme. The bar orders were deemed necessary to protect the ANI receivership estate, as allowing the claims to proceed would interfere with the Receiver’s efforts and deplete the receivership’s assets.

The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not preclude the bar orders, as they were necessary in aid of the district court’s jurisdiction over the receivership estate. The court rejected Peterson’s argument that the bar order was inequitable, noting that Peterson had the opportunity to file claims through the receivership estate but was determined to be a net winner from the Ponzi scheme. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s bar orders.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David Ebel</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2723/23-2723-2025-02-19.html</id>
        	<title>Hussam Al-Nahhas v 777 Partners LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-02-19T15:30:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-19T15:30:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2723/23-2723-2025-02-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Eido Hussam Al-Nahhas, an Illinois resident, took out four loans from Rosebud Lending LZO, operating as ZocaLoans, with interest rates up to nearly 700%, far exceeding Illinois law limits. Al-Nahhas alleged that ZocaLoans was a front for two private equity firms, 777 Partners, LLC, and Tactical Marketing Partners, LLC, to evade state usury laws by claiming tribal sovereign immunity through the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. He sued ZocaLoans and the firms for violating Illinois usury statutes and the federal Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act.

The defendants participated in litigation for fourteen months, including filing an answer, engaging in discovery, and attending status conferences. They later sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in the loan agreements. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the motion, finding that the defendants had waived their right to compel arbitration by participating in litigation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decision, holding that the defendants waived their right to arbitrate through their litigation conduct. The court also found that the case was not moot despite the settlement between Al-Nahhas and ZocaLoans, as punitive damages were still at issue. The court granted the parties&#039; motions to file documents under seal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/23-2723/23-2723-2025-02-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hussam Al-Nahhas v 777 Partners LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Eido Hussam Al-Nahhas, an Illinois resident, took out four loans from Rosebud Lending LZO, operating as ZocaLoans, with interest rates up to nearly 700%, far exceeding Illinois law limits. Al-Nahhas alleged that ZocaLoans was a front for two private equity firms, 777 Partners, LLC, and Tactical Marketing Partners, LLC, to evade state usury laws by claiming tribal sovereign immunity through the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. He sued ZocaLoans and the firms for violating Illinois usury statutes and the federal Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act.

The defendants participated in litigation for fourteen months, including filing an answer, engaging in discovery, and attending status conferences. They later sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in the loan agreements. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the motion, finding that the defendants had waived their right to compel arbitration by participating in litigation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court&#039;s decision, holding that the defendants waived their right to arbitrate through their litigation conduct. The court also found that the case was not moot despite the settlement between Al-Nahhas and ZocaLoans, as punitive damages were still at issue. The court granted the parties&#039; motions to file documents under seal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Candace Jackson-Akiwumi</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Consumer Law"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
    </feed>

