Professional Malpractice & Ethics - Justia Case Law Summaries

Doe 1 v. McGrath Kavinoky LLP

2026-06-29T11:32:46-08:00

Two individuals retained a law firm to represent them, alongside numerous other former patients, in claims against a doctor and UCLA for alleged sexual abuse. The law firm ultimately represented over 300 clients in separate but coordinated actions, which led to an aggregate settlement overseen by retired judges. The plaintiffs, longtime patients of the doctor, alleged that the law firm made promises about individual case handling and potential recoveries but pressured them into accepting the aggregate settlement and used a flawed allocation process. They further claimed the firm failed to disclose the potential conflict of interest inherent in representing multiple clients against the same defendant and failed to obtain informed written consent regarding those conflicts. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the law firm’s motion to compel arbitration, which was based on arbitration provisions in the engagement agreements. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the law firm’s failure to disclose and obtain informed written consent for the potential conflict, as required by Rule 1.7(b) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, rendered the agreements unenforceable. The trial court found that, given the large number of clients and the likelihood of a global settlement, the risk of conflict was high and the law firm’s failure to disclose this invalidated the agreements and the arbitration clauses. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that under the precedent established in Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc., a law firm’s violation of an ethical rule by failing to disclose a significant potential conflict and obtain informed written consent makes the entire engagement agreement, including its arbitration clause, unenforceable. The disposition was affirmed, and the plaintiffs were awarded costs. View "Doe 1 v. McGrath Kavinoky LLP" on Justia Law

IN RE: MMA LAW FIRM, PLLC

2026-06-29T08:36:37-08:00

After Hurricane Ida and other storms struck Louisiana, thousands of residents hired a Houston-based law firm under contingent fee contracts to pursue damage claims. Concerns emerged regarding the firm’s handling of these cases, leading to disciplinary and sanction actions by multiple courts. The Louisiana Supreme Court suspended the firm’s lead attorney’s license and stayed the firm’s cases in state courts. Subsequently, the firm withdrew or was discharged from virtually all remaining cases, and successor law firms resolved many claims. The firm filed for bankruptcy and asserted claims against successor law firms for attorney fees and costs from settlements, sparking disputes over the validity of its contracts in light of alleged misconduct. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, after a jury demand by a successor firm, withdrew the case from bankruptcy court and certified several questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The parties agreed that Louisiana substantive law governs the fee dispute. No factual findings were made about the misconduct allegations; the federal court and Louisiana Supreme Court addressed questions hypothetically. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a contingent fee contract formed as a result of unethical or illegal conduct by an attorney is absolutely null, and the attorney cannot recover fees or costs, even on a quasi-contract or quantum meruit basis. If an attorney engages in misconduct after a valid contract is formed, recovery of fees and costs is governed by the Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products, Inc. and O’Rourke v. Cairns framework, which allows for fee allocation based on the nature and gravity of the misconduct. The Court clarified that any person, including successor law firms, may assert absolute nullity of such contracts. The Court also declined to address procedural questions governed by federal law, such as whether a judge or jury should determine fee reductions in federal court. View "IN RE: MMA LAW FIRM, PLLC" on Justia Law

ALDACO v. WOOD

2026-06-26T06:22:18-08:00

After experiencing ongoing struggles with gender identity, a young adult sought a double mastectomy and was informed by the surgical clinic that a letter from a mental health practitioner was required to proceed. The petitioner requested this letter from her therapist, who had previously counseled her on unrelated matters. The therapist provided a letter recommending the surgery on February 22, 2021. Their therapeutic relationship ended on May 14, 2021. The petitioner underwent surgery on June 11, 2021, subsequently suffered medical complications, and later regretted the procedure. In 2023, she filed suit against the therapist and the therapist’s employer, alleging negligence and fraud in the issuance of the recommendation letter, and sought to hold the employer vicariously and directly liable. The case was first adjudicated in a Texas district court, where the respondents sought summary judgment, arguing that the petitioner’s claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations for health care liability claims under Section 74.251(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The district court granted summary judgment and severed the claims, making the decision final as to the therapist and her employer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date the recommendation letter was provided. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of the statute of limitations. The Court held that, under Section 74.251(a), a claim is timely if filed within two years of the completion of the relevant health care treatment or the occurrence of the tort. Here, treatment concluded on May 14, 2021, and the alleged injury occurred on June 11, 2021, when the surgery was performed. Because the petitioner gave notice of her claims within two years of these events, her suit was not time-barred. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "ALDACO v. WOOD" on Justia Law

CARDEN v. MINTON, BASSETT, FLORES & CARSEY, P.C.

2026-06-26T06:22:16-08:00

A man was charged with several serious crimes and, at trial, was represented by attorneys from a law firm. His mother paid $300,000 in legal fees to the firm, based on representations made by his defense counsel about the services to be provided. The man was convicted of some charges and sentenced to prison. After an unsuccessful appeal, he and his mother sued the defense attorneys and their firm for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. They claimed that the attorneys had provided ineffective representation, failed to deliver on promises related to legal services and use of retainer funds, overcharged, failed to account for fees, and did not return unearned funds. The trial court dismissed all claims with prejudice under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, finding that the mother had no standing to sue because she was not a client, and that the Peeler doctrine barred all of the son’s claims because he had not been exonerated. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, holding that the mother lacked standing and that the Peeler doctrine categorically barred all of the son’s claims, including those about excessive fees and failure to account. The Supreme Court of Texas clarified that Peeler v. Hughes & Luce bars a convicted criminal defendant from suing defense counsel for legal malpractice unless exonerated, but does not categorically bar contract or fraud claims unrelated to the conviction. The court held that the mother had standing to bring claims for her own direct economic losses, such as overpayment or failure to return unearned fees, but could not bring claims based on an attorney-client relationship. The court affirmed the dismissal of some claims, reversed as to others, and remanded to the court of appeals to consider additional issues, including whether some claims are really fractured malpractice claims and statute of limitations defenses. View "CARDEN v. MINTON, BASSETT, FLORES & CARSEY, P.C." on Justia Law

Munger Hortifrut North America v. Dan Drake Enterprises

2026-06-24T09:03:04-08:00

A company involved in ongoing litigation sought to disqualify opposing counsel’s law firm after an associate attorney who had participated in two depositions for the company switched firms and briefly joined the law firm representing the opposition. The associate had logged just over 21 hours on the case, but her new role at the opposing firm was in a different office and focused on unrelated areas of law. Upon learning of the potential conflict, the law firm promptly implemented measures to prevent any interaction or information exchange between the associate and the litigation team, and then terminated her within approximately ten days. The Superior Court of Kern County reviewed the motion to disqualify. It found there was no evidence that the associate had shared any confidential information with the new firm’s attorneys or that she had any substantive communication with the litigation team after joining. The court noted the immediate steps taken to isolate the associate, including an ethical screen, and concluded that no disclosure of confidential information had occurred. As a result, the Superior Court denied the disqualification motion. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. Applying the current California Rules of Professional Conduct, the appellate court held that after the associate was terminated, disqualification of the firm was only required if attorneys remaining at the firm possessed material, confidential information from the associate’s prior representation. The appellate court found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that no such information had been disclosed. Therefore, the appellate court concluded there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed the order denying disqualification. Costs were awarded to the respondents. View "Munger Hortifrut North America v. Dan Drake Enterprises" on Justia Law

Popa v. Simpson

2026-06-23T10:03:21-08:00

The case involves a civil dispute between two parties who had a previous romantic relationship. The plaintiff alleged various torts, including sexual battery, psychological abuse, and physical harm, against the defendant. During discovery, the plaintiff inadvertently produced a document containing descriptions of various categories of relevant evidence, along with access information for a Dropbox folder labeled with the plaintiff’s attorney’s name. The Dropbox folder contained numerous documents, including text messages and a handwritten note that contradicted some of the plaintiff’s allegations. The plaintiff’s attorney did not realize the inadvertent production until the defendant’s counsel referenced the documents during settlement discussions. After the defendant’s counsel referenced the documents, the plaintiff moved to disqualify the defendant’s law firm, Callahan & Blaine (C&B), arguing that privileged material had been accessed. The Superior Court of Orange County initially intended to deny the motion but ultimately granted it after a hearing, concluding that the Dropbox folder’s label placed C&B on notice of the privileged nature of the materials, thereby triggering ethical duties to refrain from reviewing them further. The court disqualified C&B, ordered destruction of the Dropbox documents, and sealed the related materials. The defendant appealed the disqualification order. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the order. The appellate court held that the inadvertently produced document was not clearly privileged, as it was ambiguous in its nature and not obviously addressed to an attorney or marked as confidential. The court also found that the Dropbox documents themselves were not privileged and were relevant and discoverable. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying C&B and ordering destruction of the Dropbox documents. The disqualification order was reversed except as it pertained to the separate “letter/memo,” which was not challenged on appeal. View "Popa v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing

2026-06-11T12:01:54-08:00

A law firm filed a class action complaint in San Francisco Superior Court on behalf of an employee and similarly situated individuals, alleging wage and hour violations against several beverage distribution companies. This followed the same firm’s earlier, nearly identical class action complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court, with overlapping claims and parties. The San Francisco action was amended to add claims under the Private Attorneys General Act. After the defense raised concerns about duplicative litigation, the defendants moved to stay the San Francisco case, arguing that the later-filed action was duplicative and should be stayed under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. The San Francisco Superior Court found substantial overlap between the two cases and granted the stay. In its tentative ruling, the court identified significant misconduct by the plaintiff’s attorneys, including fabricated legal citations and misrepresentations in their opposition to the motion to stay. The court issued an order to show cause regarding sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 and the attorneys’ ethical duties. The firm’s attorneys and a contract attorney responded, denying intentional misconduct and attributing errors to reliance on the contract attorney’s work and alleged citation-checking issues with legal research software. However, the court found their explanations lacking credibility, emphasized their responsibility as counsel of record, and imposed monetary sanctions jointly and severally against the firm and three attorneys, payable to both the defendants and the court. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the attorneys’ appeal of the sanctions order. The court held that the attorneys had forfeited their procedural challenges by not raising them in the trial court and found no abuse of discretion in imposing sanctions for filing a pleading with fabricated authority and failing to meet ethical and professional obligations. The appellate court affirmed the sanctions order. View "Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing" on Justia Law

Bellamah v. Lind

2026-06-09T13:10:24-08:00

A physician retained a law firm to represent him in his divorce proceedings. During those proceedings, both the client and his attorneys became aware of an ongoing federal investigation into the physician's medical practice for alleged violations of the False Claims Act. The parties negotiated a Marital Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) addressing, among other things, the use of a jointly held account to pay restitution or fines but not defense costs, and the calculation and modification of child support. The MPSA was adopted by the court. Subsequently, the physician settled with the federal government, agreeing to pay a substantial sum, part of which was labeled as restitution and part as a damage multiplier. Disputes arose over whether funds could be released from the joint account to cover the full settlement, particularly the portion classified as a damage multiplier. After the district court limited the release of funds, the physician’s attorneys filed a motion to reconsider rather than immediately appeal, but failed to advise their client about critical deadlines, ultimately missing the window to appeal. The physician then sued the law firm in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging professional negligence arising from multiple acts and omissions: failure to timely appeal, failure to advise on modifying child support, inadequate negotiation and drafting of the MPSA, and mishandling of post-judgment proceedings. The law firm moved for summary judgment, contending the malpractice claim was solely a “lost appeal” case and that, as a matter of law, their failure to appeal did not harm the plaintiff, since the underlying ruling would have been affirmed. The District Court granted summary judgment to the law firm, concluding the only claim was for lost appeal and finding no triable issues of fact. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed. It held that the malpractice claim encompassed a broader scope of pre-appeal negligent conduct, not just the failure to appeal, and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to these claims. Therefore, summary judgment was improper and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bellamah v. Lind" on Justia Law

Perez-Castillo v Blanche

2026-06-01T14:01:45-08:00

A Mexican national who had lived in the United States without legal status since infancy faced removal proceedings after being convicted of battery under Illinois law for a violent altercation involving his mother and siblings. He conceded his removability but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause his U.S. citizen wife exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The record showed his wife had health problems and relied on him financially, but she also had support from nearby family members. An Immigration Judge denied his application, finding him categorically ineligible for cancellation of removal because his battery conviction qualified as a “crime of domestic violence” and because his wife’s hardships, while significant, did not meet the statutory threshold. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the conviction rendered him ineligible and holding that he had waived any challenge to the hardship determination by failing to raise it. He petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for review. The Seventh Circuit applied a highly deferential “substantial evidence” standard to the agency’s factual findings and found no error. The court held that the petitioner’s challenge to the hardship finding was waived and, in any event, the record did not compel a contrary result. The court also held that his conviction for battery under Illinois law, with family members as victims, rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal as a matter of law. In addition to denying the petition for review, the Seventh Circuit imposed a $5,000 sanction on his counsel for submitting briefs containing numerous fabricated citations and factual misrepresentations produced by AI tools, and referred a second attorney involved to the Illinois disciplinary authorities for further investigation. View "Perez-Castillo v Blanche" on Justia Law

People v Flesch

2026-05-26T07:08:23-08:00

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree assault in Seneca County Court, resolving two indictments, in exchange for a sentence of five years’ probation and the possibility of participation in the Monroe County Mental Health Treatment Court if recommended. However, it later became apparent that such a sentence was unlawful for a class D felony, and the defendant was not eligible for the treatment court. At the initial sentencing, the newly elected District Attorney, who had previously worked on the defendant’s case as an Assistant Public Defender, objected to the agreed-upon probation sentence. The defendant then moved to disqualify the District Attorney due to a conflict of interest. The court granted this motion, appointed as special prosecutor the former Assistant District Attorney who had negotiated the plea, and proceeded with sentencing. After the special prosecutor was appointed, the court made clear it would not impose straight probation and would consider only a lawful sentence, such as shock probation. The special prosecutor stated he was “fine with” shock probation, an alternative the defendant also requested, arguing it would fulfill his expectations under the plea agreement. The court repeatedly offered the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea, but he declined. Ultimately, the court imposed a four-year determinate prison sentence and three years of post-release supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding the prosecution had not violated the plea agreement, as the court determined the sentence was not appropriate and allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that, under these unique circumstances—where the negotiated sentence was illegal, the District Attorney was disqualified, and the special prosecutor agreed to a lawful alternative that met the defendant’s expectations—vacatur and resentencing before a different judge were not required or warranted. View "People v Flesch" on Justia Law

Williams v. Noonan

2026-05-21T07:44:37-08:00

The case involves a legal malpractice claim related to the representation of a marina in a property tax dispute with a city. The marina, owned by a corporation for which John H. Williams is president and sole stockholder, retained Attorney Elizabeth McDonough Noonan and her law firm to handle ongoing tax matters in 2010. The attorney-client relationship ended no later than February 2017, when new counsel took over the representation and Attorney Noonan transferred all relevant files. Over three years later, in April 2020, the marina and Mr. Williams filed a complaint alleging negligent legal services and breach of contract related to the handling of the tax dispute. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment in the Kent County Superior Court, arguing that the claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice, that Mr. Williams lacked standing to sue individually, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide expert evidence on the standard of care. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court found that Mr. Williams was not a client in his individual capacity, the statute of limitations had expired, expert testimony was required and lacking, and there was no causation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the Superior Court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations began no later than February 15, 2017, when the attorney-client relationship ended, and the complaint filed in April 2020 was untimely. The Court found that the discovery rule exception did not apply because the plaintiffs were aware of the relevant facts during the representation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Williams v. Noonan" on Justia Law

MacLaurin v. Fischer Law, PLLC

2026-05-19T14:35:05-08:00

In this case, the plaintiff, Buck, alleged that his attorney’s legal advice led him to sever a joint tenancy and lose his right of survivorship in a property located in Sheridan, Montana. Originally, Buck, James, and Mary held the property as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Later, Buck and Wardwell conveyed a life estate to Mary, granting her exclusive use and possession of the property during her lifetime. In 2020, Buck, acting on his attorney’s advice, transferred his interest in the property to a living trust. After Mary’s death in 2022, her estate claimed a 50% ownership interest, and Buck sold his remaining share. The Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, reviewed Buck’s legal malpractice claim. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Buck did not plead a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court reasoned that the joint tenancy had already been severed in 1987 when Buck and Wardwell conveyed a life estate to Mary, as this act destroyed at least one of the four unities essential to a joint tenancy. Therefore, the attorney’s advice in 2020 did not cause the severance or extinguish Buck’s right of survivorship. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the conveyance of a life estate to Mary in 1987 severed the joint tenancy and extinguished Buck’s right of survivorship. Because the severance occurred decades before the attorney’s involvement, Buck could not plead a viable legal malpractice claim. The Court clarified that the four unities approach governs severance of joint tenancy in Montana and that the intent of the parties was not dispositive in this case. View "MacLaurin v. Fischer Law, PLLC" on Justia Law

D'Ambrosio v Meta Platforms, Inc.

2026-05-15T12:31:15-08:00

The case concerns a man who sued several parties after negative posts about him appeared in a large Chicago-based Facebook group where women share experiences about local men. The posts, made in late 2023, included a woman he briefly dated recounting her unpleasant experiences, attaching a screenshot of a profane text message he sent her after their breakup. Other posts by unidentified users included supportive comments and, in one instance, a link to a news article about a criminal case involving someone with a different name and appearance. The plaintiff alleged these posts caused him reputational, economic, and emotional harm. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendants—including the former date, her parents (for allegedly allowing use of their internet connection), the group’s administrators, and Meta Platforms—moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motions, finding the claims legally insufficient and dismissing the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed and voluntarily dismissed claims against unidentified “Jane Doe” defendants to preserve diversity jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to state plausible claims under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act because none of the defendants used his likeness for a commercial purpose. The court also found the “doxing” claim insufficient, as there were no plausible allegations of intent or recklessness regarding harm or stalking. Defamation and related claims failed because the allegedly defamatory material could be innocently interpreted or lacked special damages. The court also concluded that the appeal as to the woman and her parents was frivolous and ordered the plaintiff and his attorneys to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for bringing a meritless appeal and for submitting briefs containing fictitious quotations and misstatements of law. The court awarded costs to other appellees and referred attorney conduct to state disciplinary authorities. View "D'Ambrosio v Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources.

2026-05-15T10:02:31-08:00

A private company operating a hotel sought the renewal of a one-year, revocable state land permit for property fronting its hotel. A member of the public, who had long used the area for recreation, objected to the permit's renewal, particularly the practice of presetting hotel lounge chairs, which he argued deterred public use. He requested a formal contested case hearing on the permit renewal, asserting a property interest in the recreational and environmental quality of the public land. The Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) denied his request for such a hearing, instead allowing only written and oral testimony at a public meeting. The objector appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, which upheld the BLNR's denial, finding that he had been afforded due process through the public meeting process. On further appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that the appellant had a constitutionally protected interest in a clean and healthful environment and was entitled to a contested case hearing before the permit could be renewed. Because the permit had expired, the ICA remanded the case to the circuit court to determine what relief, if any, remained available. The ICA granted costs but denied the appellant’s request for attorney fees under the private attorney general (PAG) doctrine, reasoning that the requirements for such fees were unmet since the scope of relief was not yet determined. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i vacated the ICA’s denial of attorney fees. The court held that the PAG doctrine does not require the prevailing party to obtain final relief before becoming eligible for attorney fees. Determining that all three prongs of the PAG test were met, the court remanded the matter for the ICA to determine the reasonableness of the appellant’s attorney fees and whether the hotel company was liable for them. View "Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources." on Justia Law

Everest Stables, Inc. v. Porter, Wright LLP

2026-05-14T07:31:35-08:00

A Minnesota thoroughbred horse breeding and racing company and its CEO became dissatisfied with the legal work of three separate law firms in various matters, including business contract drafting and litigation. They hired an attorney employed by a national law firm to pursue legal malpractice claims against their prior counsel. Engagement letters for some of this representation included a provision selecting Ohio law to govern the attorney-client relationship. The malpractice actions against the original firms were unsuccessful, with adverse judgments in both federal and state courts. Following these outcomes, the company and CEO sued their new attorneys in federal court in Minnesota, alleging malpractice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The defendants counterclaimed for unpaid legal fees. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the malpractice, contract, and fiduciary duty claims related to two of the underlying matters (those involving Dorsey and Foley) as time-barred under Ohio’s one-year statute of limitations, which the court applied pursuant to the contractual choice-of-law provision. The court held that plaintiffs did not meet the rare standard for substituting Minnesota’s longer statute of limitations. For the remaining malpractice claim (involving Rambicure), the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants because plaintiffs failed to serve the expert disclosure affidavit required by Minnesota law within the deadline, and expert testimony was necessary to establish a prima facie case. The court also dismissed related fraud claims on the same grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It held that Ohio’s one-year statute of limitations barred the malpractice, contract, and fiduciary duty claims arising from the Dorsey and Foley matters. It also held that dismissal of the Rambicure-related claims and the fraud claims for failure to serve the required expert disclosure affidavit was proper, as expert testimony was necessary to support those claims. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. View "Everest Stables, Inc. v. Porter, Wright LLP" on Justia Law

Estate of Kalinski v. Murphy Law Office PLLC

2026-05-06T08:02:42-08:00

After the death of Laurel Kalinski in 2019, her estate consisted primarily of a house and a vehicle, with her daughter, Crystal, named as the personal representative. Crystal and her brother Nicholas, the sole heirs, initially agreed Crystal could keep the house by refinancing and paying Nicholas half the equity, using life insurance proceeds to pay estate debts and legal fees. They retained Murphy Law Office to represent the estate in the probate process. Disagreements emerged between the siblings regarding the value of the property and the amount Nicholas was to receive, leading Nicholas to hire separate counsel. Eventually, Crystal refinanced the house and transferred it to herself, prompting litigation between the siblings and later a settlement. The Estate, through Crystal, sued Murphy Law Office and its attorney, alleging negligence (legal malpractice), breach of contract, violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA), and unjust enrichment. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District granted summary judgment for Murphy on all claims, striking the Estate’s expert affidavit as untimely and lacking foundation, and finding no genuine dispute of material fact. The court ruled that the unjust enrichment and ICPA claims were not independent of the malpractice claim and that there was insufficient evidence of unfair or deceptive acts under the ICPA. The Estate appealed only the unjust enrichment and ICPA rulings. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that, under Idaho law, the Estate’s unjust enrichment claim could not proceed as an independent cause of action because it was based on the same allegations as the malpractice claim and did not establish any separate element. The Court also found the Estate failed to present evidence of any unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable conduct by the attorney sufficient to support a claim under the ICPA. Costs on appeal were awarded to Murphy, but attorney fees were denied. View "Estate of Kalinski v. Murphy Law Office PLLC" on Justia Law

Detrick v. Shimada

2026-04-28T12:08:31-08:00

The case involves an attorney who, after being voluntarily dismissed as a defendant in a legal malpractice and fraud lawsuit brought by his former client, later sued that client for malicious prosecution. The client, who speaks and reads only Japanese, had previously alleged that the attorney’s actions led her to accept an unfavorable settlement in an estate dispute. After receiving a letter from the attorney’s counsel asserting that the malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations and warning of potential malicious prosecution liability, the client dismissed her lawsuit with prejudice. When the attorney sued for malicious prosecution, the client moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. In support, she submitted a declaration stating her main motivation for dismissal was concern about the statute of limitations, and her counsel offered a similar declaration. The attorney objected, arguing that the client’s declaration was incompetent because she could not read or write English, and no interpreter’s attestation was provided. The Superior Court overruled this objection, finding no such attestation was required for written declarations, and granted summary judgment for the client on the basis that the dismissal was procedural and thus not a favorable termination for malicious prosecution. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the client’s declaration as competent evidence. The appellate court held that, since the client could not read or speak English, her declaration required a proper foundation, including an interpreter’s attestation regarding the translation’s accuracy and the interpreter’s qualifications. Without this foundation, the declaration could not establish the client’s reasons for dismissal, and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. The appellate court reversed the judgment and ordered the lower court to deny the summary judgment motion. View "Detrick v. Shimada" on Justia Law

State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities

2026-04-24T09:02:52-08:00

An attorney whose license to practice law in Connecticut was suspended for one year sought reinstatement and, after delays in the consideration of her application, filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. She alleged that the delay by the standing committee responsible for reviewing her reinstatement was racially discriminatory. When the standing committee sought guidance from the Superior Court regarding how to proceed given her discrimination complaints, the attorney filed a second complaint alleging retaliation. The Commission investigated this second complaint, found reasonable cause, and certified it for a public hearing. The Judicial Branch, named as a respondent in the administrative proceedings, moved to dismiss the retaliation complaint, arguing that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction, particularly because the underlying conduct implicated the core judicial function of regulating attorney admission. The Human Rights Referee denied the motion to dismiss, and the Judicial Branch appealed to the Superior Court under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. The Superior Court concluded that the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction over attorney reinstatement decisions violated the separation of powers doctrine, as such matters fall within the exclusive authority of the Judicial Branch, and ordered that the complaint be dismissed. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because the Judicial Branch had asserted a colorable claim of immunity from suit based on the separation of powers doctrine, which would be irretrievably lost absent immediate review. The Supreme Court further held that, under the circumstances, the Commission’s exercise of jurisdiction over complaints arising from attorney discipline or reinstatement proceedings would impermissibly interfere with the essential functions of the Judicial Branch, violating the separation of powers. The Court clarified, however, that its ruling does not shield the Judicial Branch from judicial review of discrimination claims arising from its regulation of the bar. View "State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities" on Justia Law

Ibach v. Stewart

2026-04-24T05:30:48-08:00

Two grandchildren of Edward and Betty Stewart brought suit against their uncle following the administration of two family trusts. The trusts, governed by Illinois law, were originally structured to provide for Edward and Betty’s children, including the grandchildren’s mother. After their mother’s death in 2017, Betty amended the trusts to designate her son Bruce as sole beneficiary. The grandchildren made repeated requests for information about the trusts, which were denied on the grounds that they were not beneficiaries. After Betty’s death in 2023, and confirmation that they had been excluded, the grandchildren sued Bruce, alleging undue influence, lack of capacity, breach of trust, and tortious interference with inheritance. The case was first heard by the Mobile Circuit Court. Bruce moved for summary judgment, asserting that the claims were time-barred and that certain claims were not recognized under Alabama law. The plaintiffs responded that Illinois law governed and that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to Bruce’s concealment of their removal as beneficiaries. After considering arguments from both parties, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Bruce, finding all claims time-barred, prompting the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that the plaintiffs’ attorney had filed appellate briefs rife with invalid, inaccurate, and non-existent legal citations, many generated by artificial intelligence. The Court determined these briefs were grossly deficient and failed to comply with the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal, denied the plaintiffs’ motion to file supplemental briefs, imposed sanctions on plaintiffs’ counsel, and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. The main holding is that an appeal supported by fabricated or grossly deficient legal authorities does not meet minimum procedural standards and will be dismissed. View "Ibach v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Paknad v. Super. Ct.

2026-04-17T18:10:24-08:00

An employee of a company made formal complaints of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation while she was still employed. The company retained an outside attorney to investigate these complaints, who conducted interviews, reviewed documents, and produced two reports summarizing her findings and conclusions. The employee was later terminated and filed suit against the company and her former supervisors, alleging various employment-related claims. As part of its defense, the company asserted that it had thoroughly investigated the employee’s allegations by hiring an independent investigator, emphasizing the scope and adequacy of the investigation. After the Santa Clara County Superior Court initially denied the employee’s motion to compel production of the investigator’s reports and related materials, the employee sought mandamus relief. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, previously issued a writ ordering the trial court to permit discovery of the reports and materials, subject to in camera review to determine if any protection for core attorney work product was warranted. Following this, the trial court allowed the company to redact certain portions of the reports, including all factual findings, on the basis that they constituted attorney work product and thus were not discoverable. Reviewing the case again, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the company had waived attorney-client privilege and attorney work product protection as to all factual findings and any information relevant to the scope or adequacy of the investigations, because it put these matters at issue in its defense. The court clarified that the waiver extended specifically to the investigator’s factual findings and materials relevant to the adequacy of the investigation, but not necessarily to unrelated legal advice. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its prior acceptance of the redactions, conduct further in camera review, and disclose all materials within the scope of the waiver. View "Paknad v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Culhane v. Thovson

2026-04-16T07:12:11-08:00

A South Dakota resident hired a South Dakota attorney after his wife's fatal car accident in North Dakota. The attorney brought in a North Dakota lawyer and they both signed agreements with the client, providing for a one-third contingent fee split between the two firms. The agreements allowed the attorneys to withdraw and assert a lien for their full contingent fee if the client refused a settlement offer they deemed reasonable. After the at-fault party’s insurer quickly offered policy limits totaling $500,000, the attorneys and client unsuccessfully pursued other sources of recovery. The attorneys advised settling, but the client declined, leading the attorneys to withdraw and file an attorney’s lien for their fee. Eighteen months later, the client accepted the settlement, prompting the attorneys to seek enforcement of their lien. The client counterclaimed, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and deceit, and sought rescission under North Dakota law. The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Codington County, granted summary judgment for the attorneys, enforcing their fee and dismissing the client’s counterclaims. The court found South Dakota law applied, not North Dakota law, and concluded that the fee agreements were enforceable and reasonable. The client appealed. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that South Dakota law governs the dispute and affirmed dismissal of the client’s counterclaims. However, it reversed the enforcement of the full contingent fee, finding that the contractual provision allowing withdrawal and a full fee upon the client’s refusal to settle unduly infringed on the client’s rights. The court held that, after withdrawal for good cause, the attorneys are entitled to recover reasonable fees based on quantum meruit, not the contingent fee, and remanded for determination of that amount. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Culhane v. Thovson" on Justia Law

True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS

2026-04-10T07:01:56-08:00

A nonprofit organization, after being represented by several law firms over multiple years in a lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service, was awarded attorneys’ fees by the district court under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The total fee award was almost $789,000. The various law firms that had represented the nonprofit at different times—specifically, a set of former attorneys and the Bopp Law Firm—disputed how much each was entitled to from the award. Both the former attorneys and Bopp asserted they had an equitable charging lien entitling them to direct payment from the fee award, rather than requiring payment first be made to the client. After the resolution of the underlying claims, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the former attorneys had a valid charging lien but denied Bopp’s motion to enforce its own lien. The district court reasoned, based on Indiana law (per a choice-of-law provision in Bopp's fee agreement), that Bopp had to show an agreement with the client that its compensation would come from the fund itself. The court concluded Bopp failed to establish such an agreement and thus did not have a valid lien. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard under Indiana law. Indiana law recognizes two independent ways an attorney may establish an equitable charging lien: either by securing the fund for the client or by an agreement with the client to be paid from the fund. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Bopp satisfied either prong and for potential resolution of lien priority and the calculation of amounts owed. View "True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

IN RE ZAIDI

2026-04-10T06:18:23-08:00

Several defendants in a long-running lawsuit hired an attorney whose legal assistant had previously worked for the plaintiffs’ original counsel and had participated in confidential discussions and work central to the litigation. Years after leaving the plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm, the legal assistant began performing secretarial work on the same case for the defendants’ new lawyers, without receiving any instruction not to work on matters she had previously handled or been exposed to during her prior employment. She worked intermittently on the case for several years, including filing documents that were electronically served on the plaintiffs’ current counsel. After discovering the legal assistant’s involvement, the plaintiffs’ representatives researched the issue and, within about two months, moved to disqualify opposing counsel and their firm, arguing that the required steps to protect client confidences were not taken. The trial court granted the motion to disqualify. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied relief to the defendants, who then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for mandamus, arguing that disqualification was improper because the legal assistant was not a “side-switcher” at the time of her hiring, her work was minimal and occurred years after her initial involvement, and the plaintiffs had waived their right to seek disqualification by delay. The Supreme Court of Texas held that a law firm must instruct a nonlawyer employee, at or before the time the employee begins work on a conflicted matter, not to work on any matter on which the nonlawyer worked during prior employment, even if the conflict arises years after hiring. The Court also held that the plaintiffs did not as a matter of law waive their right to seek disqualification. Because the required prophylactic measures were not taken, and waiver was not shown, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus. View "IN RE ZAIDI" on Justia Law

GOODMAN V. NEMES

2026-04-08T10:05:31-08:00

A sitting circuit court judge was the subject of an impeachment petition submitted to the Kentucky House of Representatives by a former legislator who was not a party to any of the cases he cited. The petition alleged that the judge abused her discretion in six cases; five of these cases were still pending in the judicial system at the time. The petition did not include an affidavit, as required by Kentucky statute. The House referred the matter to its Impeachment Committee, which held a hearing and ultimately issued articles of impeachment against the judge. The Kentucky Senate scheduled a trial on these articles. The judge sought a temporary injunction in Franklin Circuit Court to stop the impeachment proceedings. The Franklin Circuit Court denied the injunction. She then sought emergency relief and review from the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which also denied relief. The judge subsequently filed emergency motions and a petition for a supervisory writ with the Supreme Court of Kentucky, seeking a declaration that the impeachment articles and proceedings violated the separation of powers and her due process rights, and requesting that they be declared void from the outset. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted the petition for a supervisory writ. The Court held that the impeachment petition was invalid because it was not verified by affidavit, as required by statute. The Court further held that the allegations concerned discretionary judicial acts subject to correction through the appellate process or Judicial Conduct Commission proceedings, not impeachment, and that the Legislature’s actions violated the separation of powers. The Court also found that the impeachment process denied the judge due process, and that further proceedings would cause her irreparable harm. The Court enjoined the General Assembly from continuing the impeachment proceedings and ordered dismissal of the pending articles. View "GOODMAN V. NEMES" on Justia Law

Jones v. Jones

2026-04-03T01:16:20-08:00

A divorced couple with one child became embroiled in post-divorce litigation over visitation and the enforcement of prior court orders. After the divorce, the mother had primary physical custody, but the father was granted substantial visitation. In 2015, a chancellor found the mother had interfered with visitation and ordered her to pay the father for medical debt related to her other child. Years later, the father again sought to enforce visitation and recover the debt, leading to a series of contentious proceedings. The mother failed to comply with orders regarding visitation and payment. The court ultimately found her in contempt, incarcerated her, and awarded custody to the father. During these proceedings, allegations arose that the mother’s attorney had advised her not to follow the court’s orders. The case was heard in the Hinds County Chancery Court, where the new chancellor enforced the previous order for payment, found the mother in contempt, and sanctioned her attorney, Matthew Thompson, for his actions related to the case and his failure to appear at a show-cause hearing. The mother and her attorney appealed several orders, including the contempt finding against the attorney and the enforcement of the 2015 order. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeals. It held that the chancellor improperly sanctioned Thompson for constructive criminal contempt without affording him due process, specifically notice and a hearing before a different judge. The court vacated the sanction against Thompson, remanded for further proceedings before another chancellor, and ordered the return of the $1,500 fine. The court affirmed the enforcement of the 2015 order against the mother and denied her requests for permanent recusal of the chancellor and referral to the judicial commission. All other issues related to visitation and custody were deemed moot after the father relinquished his parental rights. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

Dutton v. Shaffer

2026-04-01T13:00:37-08:00

A sitting district court judge in Kentucky faced potential discipline from the state Judicial Conduct Commission (JCC) after making statements to a newspaper during her reelection campaign. The statements concerned her prior suspension for inappropriate comments about an attorney accused of diverting funds from her husband’s law firm. The JCC claimed her remarks to the newspaper were false or misleading, implicated her opponent, and downplayed the seriousness of her misconduct. The Commission sent her a proposed agreed public reprimand order, which she refused to sign. Believing the JCC’s actions chilled her speech and threatened enforcement under three specific judicial conduct rules, the judge sued JCC officials, alleging violations of her First Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky partially granted and partially denied the judge’s claims. It granted her summary judgment and a permanent injunction on her as-applied challenge to Rule 4.1(A)(11), which prohibits judicial candidates from knowingly making false statements of material fact, finding the JCC’s enforcement against her statements unconstitutional. However, the district court denied her as-applied challenges to Rules 1.2 and 2.4(B), which address judicial independence and the influence of personal relationships, as well as her facial challenges to all three rules. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the judge had standing to sue and that the district court properly granted her an injunction under Rule 4.1(A)(11). However, the appellate court held that the district court erred in denying her as-applied challenges to Rules 1.2 and 2.4(B), as the JCC’s enforcement was not supported by evidence of false statements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunction as to Rule 4.1(A)(11), reversed as to Rules 1.2 and 2.4(B), and remanded for entry of a permanent injunction against enforcement of all three rules as applied to the judge’s statements. View "Dutton v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

Arthur C. v. Frame

2026-03-27T11:16:42-08:00

The petitioner was charged in Marshall County, West Virginia, with multiple counts of sexual abuse involving two victims, one of whom was a child. Before trial, the circuit court allowed the child victim to testify via live, closed-circuit television, as permitted by state statute. However, the petitioner elected to leave the courtroom during the child’s testimony, after which he was convicted on all counts. Following his conviction, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief, raising several claims including the constitutionality of the closed-circuit testimony procedure, the validity of his indictments, his absence from certain pretrial hearings, allegations of improper jury communications, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Circuit Court of Marshall County initially denied habeas relief without a hearing, but the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia remanded for an omnibus evidentiary hearing, particularly on ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing concerns. On remand, the circuit court granted relief only on the petitioner’s ex post facto sentencing claim, ordering resentencing on certain counts, and denied all other claims, finding that the petitioner either waived them by not raising them on direct appeal or failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The court held that because the petitioner did not raise his constitutional and procedural claims on direct appeal and failed to rebut the presumption of waiver, those claims could only be considered within the framework of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded the petitioner’s counsel was not deficient under the standards set by Strickland v. Washington and State v. Miller, and that none of the challenged actions or omissions prejudiced the outcome of the trial. The court also held that Crawford v. Washington did not overrule Maryland v. Craig, and the statutory closed-circuit testimony procedure remained constitutional. View "Arthur C. v. Frame" on Justia Law

McCarthy v. DEA

2026-03-27T10:00:55-08:00

An attorney representing a party before a federal appellate court submitted two briefs containing summaries of prior administrative agency decisions. These summaries were provided by a non-attorney, who had used artificial intelligence (AI) to generate them. The attorney made minor edits but did not verify the existence or accuracy of the cited authorities before filing the briefs. Seven of the eight cited authorities were inaccurately described, and one did not exist. The government identified these issues in its response, but even after reading the government’s brief and suspecting that AI had been used, the attorney did not check the citations or correct the record. He characterized the errors as immaterial in a reply brief, again without verification. Only after the court ordered him to provide copies of the cited decisions did the attorney confirm the inaccuracies and the nonexistence of one adjudication. Following the discovery of these misrepresentations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ordered the attorney to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. In response, the attorney admitted to his failures, demonstrated contrition, and described corrective actions taken. He requested and received a hearing regarding potential sanctions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the attorney violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, which requires competent representation, by failing to thoroughly verify citations and relying on unverified, AI-generated summaries. The court found that while the attorney’s conduct did not rise to a knowing violation of the duty of candor under Rule 3.3, his overall lack of diligence warranted discipline. The court imposed a public reprimand, with notice to other courts and disciplinary authorities, but did not impose monetary sanctions, citing mitigating factors including the novelty of AI issues and the attorney’s post-hearing candor. View "McCarthy v. DEA" on Justia Law

Guardian Storage Centers v. Simpson

2026-03-24T10:02:14-08:00

Several former executives and employees of a storage company were terminated or allegedly constructively terminated and subsequently brought claims against the company and its principals for wrongful termination, retaliation, harassment, and related causes of action. The company, in turn, sued two of the former executives, alleging breach of contract and misuse of confidential information, including forwarding company emails to personal accounts. The emails at issue contained communications from the company’s legal counsel and were allegedly attorney-client privileged. After their terminations, the former employees provided these emails to their attorney for use in their lawsuits against the company. The Superior Court of Orange County considered the company’s motions to disqualify the law firm representing the former employees, based on the firm’s possession and use of the disputed emails. The court found the emails were privileged and that the company held the privilege. However, it denied the motions, reasoning that the employees had been intended recipients of the emails, that privileged content would not be used to the company’s disadvantage, and that the emails were central to both parties’ claims. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court determined that the proper analytical framework for attorney disqualification, as set forth in State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., should apply not only to inadvertently disclosed privileged material but also to situations where an attorney receives material that was impermissibly taken from the privilege holder without authorization. The appellate court found the trial court erred in its legal analysis, failed to properly apply the relevant standard regarding future prejudice, and made unsupported findings. The court reversed the trial court’s orders and remanded for reconsideration of the disqualification motions under the correct legal standards. View "Guardian Storage Centers v. Simpson" on Justia Law

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 29 v. Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp

2026-03-23T10:00:38-08:00

Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation operated a power plant in Pennsylvania, where its employees were represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 29. After a 2021 dispute over health care benefit contributions, an arbitrator found that Energy Harbor had underpaid and ordered it to make additional contributions for 2021. Later, the parties entered into a new collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) on October 1, 2021, which included a broad arbitration clause and a merger clause voiding prior agreements not incorporated into the new CBA. When the union later alleged that Energy Harbor similarly underpaid contributions for 2022, it filed a grievance, contending that Energy Harbor failed to adjust 2022 contributions as required by the prior arbitration award. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the matter after the union sought to compel arbitration. The District Court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, held that the broad arbitration clause in the new CBA covered the dispute regarding the 2022 contributions. The court reasoned that because the grievance referenced the contribution-increase provision of the CBA, the dispute was subject to arbitration, and found no evidence that the parties intended to exclude such claims from arbitration. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Third Circuit held that, although the arbitration clause was broad, the union’s grievance regarding 2022 contributions did not arise under the new CBA but instead relied on the prior arbitration award, which was not incorporated into the new agreement. The court concluded that the dispute had “nothing to do with” the rights under the CBA because there was no evidence of a required increase in Energy Harbor’s health care plan costs from 2021 to 2022. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment for Energy Harbor. View "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 29 v. Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp" on Justia Law

State v. Houston

2026-03-20T10:06:55-08:00

The case arose from a criminal prosecution in which a defendant was charged with murdering his wife, claiming self-defense. During pretrial proceedings, the lead prosecutor, the Anne Arundel County State’s Attorney, conducted witness interviews alone, including one with a witness who relayed that the defendant stated his wife had previously threatened him with a knife—a fact potentially relevant to the defense. The State’s Attorney did not initially disclose this information to defense counsel, resulting in a discovery dispute. At a subsequent hearing, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found a discovery violation and concluded that the State’s Attorney had made herself a likely necessary witness in the case by interviewing witnesses alone. The court disqualified her from acting as prosecutor and imposed a firewall order mandating that she have no further involvement in the case except as a witness, with very limited exceptions. The State appealed these interlocutory orders to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the disqualification order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because determining whether the State’s Attorney was a necessary witness was not completely separate from the merits of the criminal case. The court did not separately address the firewall order. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether the disqualification and firewall orders were immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court held that the disqualification order was not immediately appealable because resolving whether the State’s Attorney was a necessary witness was not completely separate from the merits of the prosecution. However, the Supreme Court determined that the firewall order, which barred the State’s Attorney from participating in the case except as a witness, was immediately appealable as it raised important separation of powers concerns and was distinct from the merits. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the firewall order. View "State v. Houston" on Justia Law

People v Lewis

2026-03-19T10:08:53-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who, while on parole for a prior conviction, fired a gun into a vehicle in Rochester, injuring two people, and was later apprehended while in possession of a firearm after attempting to flee from officers. He was charged with several counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon—under both simple possession and possession with intent to use unlawfully—arising from the shooting and his arrest, as well as other related offenses. Before trial in Supreme Court, the defendant sought to have his retained counsel replaced, alleging ineffective assistance due to an alleged lack of discovery, but the court denied this request, determining it was a delay tactic. The defendant then repeatedly stated he had fired his attorney, refused to participate in a colloquy about his rights, declined to change out of his prison uniform, and ultimately chose to absent himself from the trial. The trial proceeded with defense counsel present but not participating, in line with the defendant’s instructions. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and the Supreme Court imposed consecutive sentences on the weapon possession counts. The Appellate Division affirmed, with a dissent arguing that the defendant had not waived his right to effective assistance of counsel. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant, by his repeated refusal to proceed with counsel and his explicit direction that his attorney not participate, waived his right to effective assistance of counsel by conduct. The court reasoned that the trial court’s persistent warnings and the defendant’s obstructive behavior supported this conclusion. Additionally, the Court of Appeals found that the consecutive sentences for simple possession and possession with intent to use a weapon were improper because the underlying act was the same, and ordered those sentences to run concurrently. The order of the Appellate Division was thus modified and, as modified, affirmed. View "People v Lewis" on Justia Law

In re Det. of M.E.

2026-03-19T07:19:50-08:00

Several individuals facing involuntary civil commitment under Washington’s Involuntary Treatment Act were entitled to appointed counsel. The King County Department of Public Defense (DPD) was responsible for providing this representation. During the spring and summer of 2024, DPD’s attorneys assigned to these cases reached their annual caseload limits, which are set by state standards. Despite having sufficient funding, DPD was unable to recruit additional attorneys and therefore notified the court when it could not assign counsel to new cases without exceeding the limits. When the court ordered DPD to provide counsel, DPD complied. The King County Executive was also ordered by the trial court to provide counsel, although in King County, only DPD has that authority. The King County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and subsequently issued orders requiring both DPD and the King County Executive to provide counsel to respondents. The court’s amended orders clarified that the decision of which attorney to appoint, and how to allocate caseloads, rested with DPD and the Executive, not with the court. Both DPD and the King County Executive sought review in the Washington Supreme Court. The Executive argued it should not be included in the orders due to the county’s charter, which provides DPD with exclusive authority and independence. DPD argued the orders effectively required it to violate mandatory caseload limits. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the caseload limits for public defenders in the Standards for Indigent Defense are mandatory and that courts lack authority to order attorneys or agencies to violate these limits. However, the court found that the trial court did not actually order DPD to violate the caseload limits, as it left the method of compliance to DPD. The court reversed the orders as they applied to the King County Executive but affirmed the orders requiring DPD to provide counsel. View "In re Det. of M.E." on Justia Law

JACKSON v. THE STATE

2026-03-17T05:02:26-08:00

In January 2012, the defendant shot and killed a man in a nightclub parking lot. He was indicted on several charges, including malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At his October 2015 jury trial, the defendant claimed self-defense, explaining that the victim had attacked him inside the club and later approached him outside while armed. Despite his assertions, the jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder plus a consecutive five-year term for the firearm offense. After his conviction, the defendant filed a pro se motion for new trial, which was not immediately addressed. Years of procedural developments followed, including a vacated order granting an out-of-time appeal and the trial court later recognizing his original motion as valid. With counsel, he amended his motion for new trial, alleging ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, specifically regarding advice about a plea offer from the State. The Superior Court of Fulton County held a hearing and ultimately denied the motion, finding the defendant’s claim that he would have accepted a plea if properly advised not credible, given his consistent assertions of innocence and desire to “tell the truth.” On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the ineffective assistance claim under the Strickland v. Washington standard. The Court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice, as required, because the trial court’s credibility determination—that he would not have accepted the plea—was not clearly erroneous. As a result, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the denial of the motion for new trial and upheld the convictions. View "JACKSON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

P. v. Riggs

2026-03-16T11:02:49-08:00

The case concerns a series of violent events involving the defendant and individuals with whom he had a personal relationship. On the day in question, the defendant, who had previously been romantically involved with the primary victim, arrived at her home while angry and looking for her. He encountered the victim and another man riding a motor bike near the residence. After an altercation, the defendant fired shots at the motor bike occupied by the victim and the man, physically assaulted the victim, threatened her family members with a firearm, and was subsequently apprehended by law enforcement. Forensic evidence linked the defendant to the firearm, and the victim suffered visible injuries. The victim’s testimony at trial was inconsistent with her initial statements to law enforcement, and she was uncooperative with the prosecution. Following these events, the Superior Court of Riverside County held a jury trial. The jury convicted the defendant of multiple offenses, including two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, assault with a deadly weapon, inflicting traumatic injury on a person with whom he had a dating relationship, making criminal threats, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a controlled substance. The jury also found firearm enhancement allegations to be true. The defendant was sentenced to 25 years and four months in prison. The defendant raised several claims on appeal, arguing insufficient evidence for the assault convictions, error in the denial of certain jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s temporary administrative suspension from the State Bar. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the assault convictions, the trial court did not err by refusing to give instructions on accident or mistake of law, and the temporary suspension of the defendant’s counsel for administrative reasons did not, by itself, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Riggs" on Justia Law

In re: Domestic Partnership of Campos & Munoz

2026-03-16T06:04:48-08:00

After the dissolution of a domestic partnership, a dispute arose between the former partners over shared custody and visitation of a pet dog, Kyra. The parties’ initial judgment did not address pet ownership. When one partner sought a court order for shared custody and visitation, the other, represented by her cousin acting as counsel, opposed the request and cited fictitious case authorities purporting to establish legal standards for pet custody based on the emotional well-being and stability of the parties. These fabricated authorities were also referenced in declarations and written submissions to the court. Both parties’ counsel failed to verify the authenticity of the cases cited. The Superior Court of San Diego County held a hearing, took live testimony from both parties, and ultimately denied the request for pet custody and visitation. The court’s written order, which was drafted and submitted by counsel for the party seeking custody, cited the same fictitious cases. No objection to the use of fake authorities was raised at that time. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court’s reliance on non-existent legal authority required reversal and sought clarification of the applicable standard under Family Code section 2605. The appellate record did not include a transcript or settled statement of the hearing. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the order. The court held that although it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely on fabricated legal authorities, the appellant forfeited this claim by drafting and submitting the challenged order and failing to alert the court to the error. The court further found that the appellant failed to provide an adequate appellate record to support his arguments regarding legal standards for pet custody. Additionally, the appellate court imposed $5,000 in sanctions on respondent’s counsel for knowingly and repeatedly submitting fictitious legal citations, and ordered reporting of this misconduct to the State Bar of California. View "In re: Domestic Partnership of Campos & Munoz" on Justia Law

Whiting v. City of Athens

2026-03-13T11:01:32-08:00

The case centers on a series of lawsuits initiated by an individual against the City of Athens, Tennessee, its officials, and employees, stemming from events related to the City’s annual fireworks show. In 2022, due to COVID-19 precautions, attendance at the show was restricted to City employees and their families. The plaintiff, objecting to the exclusion of the general public, attended the event in protest and began filming, which led to confrontations with City employees and ultimately police involvement. Subsequent disputes, including statements made by City officials regarding settlement negotiations and the cancellation of future fireworks shows, prompted the plaintiff to file multiple lawsuits alleging defamation and First Amendment retaliation. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee reviewed the plaintiff’s claims in several cases. It granted summary judgment or dismissed the actions for failure to state a claim, rejected motions to recuse the assigned judges, and, in each case, awarded sanctions and attorneys’ fees to the defendants. The plaintiff and his attorney appealed the sanctions and recusal orders, but not the merits of the underlying claims, which had already been dismissed or affirmed in previous appeals or were unreviewable due to procedural defects. Prior appellate proceedings, including one in which the appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute, precluded reconsideration of the underlying merits. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed only the sanctions and recusal orders. Applying abuse of discretion and de novo review where appropriate, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court properly denied recusal and correctly imposed sanctions. The appellate court found the plaintiff’s claims were frivolous, often barred by immunity or privilege, and part of a pattern of harassing litigation. The court affirmed the district court’s awards of attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-113, as well as the denial of the recusal motions. View "Whiting v. City of Athens" on Justia Law

Jacobs v. Papez

2026-03-13T10:01:52-08:00

Two attorneys, each at different times, represented the same clients in a personal injury case, with both attorneys retained under written contingency fee agreements. After the clients achieved a settlement, both attorneys claimed attorney liens on the settlement proceeds, but could not agree on the amounts due to each under their respective agreements. The dispute centered on approximately $62,000 in withheld settlement funds, after a third law firm (not a party to this action) had been paid. After negotiations failed, one attorney filed a declaratory relief action in the Superior Court of El Dorado County against the other attorney and the clients, seeking a judicial determination of the parties’ rights to the withheld settlement proceeds. The opposing attorney responded by moving to dismiss on the theory that the validity and amount of his lien had to be adjudicated first in a separate action before any action could proceed on the other lien. The trial court agreed, finding that the first attorney’s lien was “senior,” and dismissed the claim as to the competing attorney, holding that the proper procedure required the first attorney to have his lien determined before the other attorney’s claim could be heard. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reversed the dismissal. The appellate court held that an attorney may bring a single declaratory relief action against both the clients and a competing attorney lien claimant to resolve the validity, amount, and priority of competing attorney liens on the same settlement proceeds. The court rejected the notion that one attorney’s claim must be resolved in a separate action before the other’s. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court’s judgment thus allows simultaneous adjudication of competing attorney liens in a single declaratory relief action. View "Jacobs v. Papez" on Justia Law

RED ROOF INNS, INC. V. DOE

2026-03-12T07:02:18-08:00

A parent, acting on behalf of a minor, filed a complaint in the Pulaski County Circuit Court alleging sex trafficking of the minor at a hotel in North Little Rock, Arkansas. After the complaint was amended, two national hotel franchisors were added as defendants. When these corporate defendants responded, their answer was signed only by their Arkansas attorney of record, but the pleading also listed three out-of-state attorneys, including two for whom a motion for pro hac vice admission was noted as forthcoming. The out-of-state attorneys did not sign the pleading. Subsequently, the corporate defendants filed petitions for pro hac vice admission for the two out-of-state attorneys, providing the required affidavits and fee payments. The Circuit Court denied the petitions, citing the inclusion of the out-of-state attorneys’ names on the earlier pleading as appearing before admission. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. The defendants appealed, arguing that the denial was an abuse of discretion and not supported by any rule. The appellees did not file a response. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a stay of circuit court proceedings pending the appeal. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that an order denying pro hac vice admission is immediately appealable since it deprives a party of counsel of choice, functionally equivalent to a disqualification. The court found that the Circuit Court abused its discretion by denying the petitions based solely on the listing of the out-of-state attorneys’ names with a clear indication of their pending pro hac vice status. The applicable rules did not prohibit such a listing, nor did it constitute an unauthorized appearance. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court’s orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "RED ROOF INNS, INC. V. DOE" on Justia Law

In re Domestic Partnership of Campos & Nunoz

2026-03-09T10:03:02-08:00

A dispute arose between two former domestic partners over the custody and visitation of a pet dog following the dissolution of their partnership. Initially, the judgment dissolving their partnership did not address the ownership or custody of pets. Two years later, one party sought shared custody and visitation of the dog, filing a formal request under California Family Code section 2605. The other party, represented by her cousin, opposed the request, citing purported legal precedents that supported considering the emotional well-being and stability of the parties in pet custody disputes. The Superior Court of San Diego County held a hearing and ultimately denied the request for shared custody and visitation. The written order, which cited the fictional cases provided by the parties, was drafted and submitted by the appellant’s own counsel and signed by the court. The order relied on these fake cases to justify denying the request, emphasizing the mental stability of the parties and the lack of a substantial relationship between the petitioner and the dog. The appellant did not object to the use of these fictitious authorities in the order at the trial court level. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the family court to rely on fictitious case authorities, but determined that the appellant had forfeited this claim by drafting and submitting the order with these citations and failing to object. The court also found that the appellant failed to provide an adequate appellate record for review of his proposed legal standard for pet custody under section 2605. The appellate court affirmed the order and imposed $5,000 in sanctions on respondent’s counsel for citing and persisting in reliance on fabricated legal authorities. View "In re Domestic Partnership of Campos & Nunoz" on Justia Law

SPEARS VS. HALL

2026-03-06T09:34:27-08:00

Two attorneys verbally agreed to jointly propose providing legal services to a public entity for Hurricane Katrina-related insurance claims on a contingency fee basis. After a meeting with the entity’s officials, they submitted several joint proposals, all based on a contingency fee arrangement. The entity, however, offered only an hourly fee contract, which one attorney accepted and the other declined to participate in. Subsequently, the accepting attorney was retained alone and performed all legal work. Over a year later, the entity entered a contingency fee agreement with the accepting attorney and another law firm. The attorney who had declined the hourly arrangement was not included in this contract and performed no work for the entity. The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans held a bench trial and found that a valid oral joint venture existed between the two attorneys when the contingency fee contract was executed. It concluded that the accepting attorney breached his fiduciary duty by failing to inform the other of the opportunity to participate, awarding damages equal to half the contingency fee. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the contract breach—not attorney fee rules—was controlling, and upheld the damages award. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and found clear legal errors in the lower courts’ analysis. The Court held that the initial joint venture terminated when the entity refused the proposed contingency fee arrangement, and no enforceable joint venture or other contractual relationship existed thereafter. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct govern such relationships and preclude fee-sharing without written client consent and meaningful legal services by all lawyers involved. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ judgments and entered judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any portion of the contingency fee. View "SPEARS VS. HALL" on Justia Law

Williams v. Gage

2026-03-05T08:15:08-08:00

The appellant, a former military service member, began suffering significant symptoms of multiple sclerosis shortly after receiving a second hepatitis A/B vaccine dose. Believing the vaccine caused or aggravated her condition, she sought compensation through the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. Dissatisfied with her first attorney’s handling of the case—specifically, the failure to include a claim for the earlier vaccine dose—she retained the appellee attorney in 2018 to address these concerns. The appellee refiled her petition, but ultimately did not include the earlier vaccine. While her compensation case was still pending, the appellant terminated the appellee’s representation and proceeded pro se. Afterward, the appellant sued the appellee and his law firm in the District Court of Laramie County for legal malpractice, alleging negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the emotional distress claim but allowed the malpractice claim to proceed. The court set a deadline for expert witness designation, which the appellant missed. She later moved to extend this and other deadlines, citing her brother’s injury and subsequent passing, as well as difficulties finding an expert while representing herself. The district court found she had not shown good cause or excusable neglect and denied her motions. The appellee then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the appellant’s failure to designate an expert was fatal to her malpractice claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Wyoming found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying deadline extensions, as the appellant failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect. The Court also held that expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care, breach, and causation in a legal malpractice case, and summary judgment was proper because the appellant did not produce such testimony. The Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Williams v. Gage" on Justia Law

Dissolution Of Healy Ranch, Inc.

2026-03-05T08:11:28-08:00

A family dispute over ownership of a South Dakota ranch led to extensive litigation between a corporation (HRI), a partnership (HRP), and individual family members, including Bret Healy. HRI, owned by three brothers in equal shares, petitioned for court-supervised dissolution after the board and a majority of shareholders voted in favor. Bret, representing HRP, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, asserting that HRP owned a majority of HRI’s stock and that the required shareholder approval for dissolution was lacking. This assertion contradicted prior factual findings in earlier related cases, which consistently determined that ownership claims advanced by Bret or HRP had been previously resolved against them. The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Brule County, South Dakota, issued an order to show cause regarding possible violations of SDCL 15-6-11(b) (the South Dakota rule analogous to Rule 11), focusing on whether Bret and his attorney, Volesky, submitted unsupported or false filings for improper purposes. After briefing and a hearing, the circuit court found that Bret violated SDCL 15-6-11(b)(1) by acting with improper purpose, and that Volesky violated multiple subsections. The court imposed monetary sanctions of $240,000 against Bret and $10,000 against Volesky, and reported Volesky to the disciplinary board. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the finding that Bret’s conduct was sanctionable under SDCL 15-6-11(c), concluding that his repeated litigation over ownership, despite numerous adverse rulings, was for improper purposes. However, the Supreme Court vacated the monetary sanction against Bret and remanded for a new hearing. The court held that, in determining sanctions, a trial court must consider the party’s ability to pay and whether non-monetary sanctions or a combination would be appropriate. The affirmation of sanctionable conduct was thus upheld, but the amount and type of sanction require further consideration. View "Dissolution Of Healy Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

NICHOLS v. SWINDOLL

2026-03-05T08:02:19-08:00

Rebecca Nichols was employed as a truck driver and was injured in an accident when her tractor-trailer overturned. She believed the crash was caused by improperly secured steel coils loaded into the trailer by other parties. Nichols retained attorneys to pursue a negligence claim against those responsible for loading and securing the cargo. The attorneys filed suit, but failed to timely identify and serve the proper defendants before the statute of limitations expired. Subsequent attempts to amend the complaint to add or substitute additional parties were unsuccessful, and Nichols’s underlying tort action was ultimately dismissed with prejudice. After the dismissal, Nichols filed a legal malpractice suit against her former attorneys in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Fifth Division. She alleged that their failure to timely investigate and properly name the responsible parties, as well as their failure to effect timely service, deprived her of the opportunity to recover damages for her injuries. The circuit court initially granted the attorneys’ motion to dismiss, finding the malpractice claim time-barred, but the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded, holding that Nichols had sufficiently pled fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations. On remand, after discovery and a series of evidentiary rulings excluding key evidence and testimony Nichols sought to introduce, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. It concluded that Nichols could not, as a matter of law, prove that the attorneys’ actions were the proximate cause of her loss, because she was unable to present admissible evidence to establish the identity of the alleged tortfeasors or to demonstrate that she would have prevailed in her underlying claim. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that Nichols failed to establish an essential element of her malpractice claim—proximate causation—as she did not demonstrate she could prove the merits of the underlying negligence action. The court also affirmed the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings and denial of Nichols’s recusal motion. View "NICHOLS v. SWINDOLL" on Justia Law

The City of Boston v. OptumRx, Inc.

2026-03-02T14:00:03-08:00

The City of Boston, along with its Public Health Commission and Housing Authority, brought suit against two pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), OptumRx and Express Scripts, alleging that the PBMs had worked with opioid manufacturers to misrepresent the risks of opioid drugs. The City claimed that this conduct violated Massachusetts public nuisance law and resulted in harm to the City. The PBMs removed the case to federal court and argued that the suit was untimely because it was brought after the three-year statute of limitations had expired. The City responded by asserting that its complaint sufficiently alleged a continuing nuisance and that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the PBMs’ fraudulent concealment of their wrongdoing. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the PBMs’ motion to dismiss, finding that the City either knew or should have known of its injuries and of the PBMs’ alleged role before 2021, based on public records and prior litigation, and thus failed to file suit within the statutory period. The district court further ruled that the City had not adequately pled a continuing nuisance, as it did not allege any specific, recent unlawful acts within the limitations period, and rejected the City’s claim of fraudulent concealment, determining that the City had the means to discover the facts needed for its claim. The district court also denied a motion by the PBMs to disqualify the City's law firm, Motley Rice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed both the dismissal of the City’s state law claim and the denial of the motion to disqualify Motley Rice. The court held that the action was time-barred and that the City had not met the requirements for tolling the statute of limitations or for pleading a continuing nuisance under Massachusetts law. View "The City of Boston v. OptumRx, Inc." on Justia Law

Ali v. BC Architects Engineers, PLC

2026-02-20T11:30:29-08:00

A woman of Syrian descent, who worked as a computer-assisted design drafter at an architecture and engineering firm, was terminated from her job and subsequently sued her former employer. She alleged discrimination based on race and national origin, hostile work environment, retaliation, breach of contract, and a Fair Labor Standards Act violation. The core of her complaint was that she was denied promotions and demoted due to her race, harassed by another employee due to her Arab background, and retaliated against after reporting discrimination, culminating in her termination. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially dismissed all of her claims. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of most claims but allowed a retaliatory termination claim to proceed. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the employer on that claim, finding insufficient evidence of pretext for retaliation. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Following this, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiff’s counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, reasoning that counsel should have known after discovery that the claim lacked a basis and unreasonably multiplied proceedings by opposing summary judgment and appealing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the imposition of sanctions. It held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the opposition to summary judgment was so baseless as to warrant sanctions. The appellate court concluded that counsel had at least two non-frivolous arguments for opposing summary judgment, including shifting reasons for termination and deviations from policy, making sanctions inappropriate under § 1927. The Fourth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s judgment imposing sanctions. View "Ali v. BC Architects Engineers, PLC" on Justia Law

Nygaard v. Volker

2026-02-19T12:06:20-08:00

Danielle Nygaard purchased a home in Fargo, North Dakota, with United Savings Credit Union as the mortgagee. Scott Volker recorded a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the property from Nygaard to himself and initiated eviction proceedings against Nygaard. Volker claimed this action was based on a loan agreement in which he personally guaranteed a loan from Joseph Svobodny to Nygaard, and that Nygaard failed to repay the loan. Nygaard denied executing the quitclaim deed or the loan agreement, asserting the $40,000 was a gift. She brought a quiet title action against Volker, later amending her complaint to include Svobodny and the Credit Union, and alleged fraud, slander of title, and abuse of process. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, presided by Judge Reid A. Brady, managed the case. Nygaard sought discovery of Volker’s electronic devices and accounts, suspecting document alteration. Volker resisted discovery and his attorney withdrew, citing ethical concerns after Volker instructed him not to disclose material subject to the court order. The court issued orders compelling discovery and warned of sanctions for noncompliance. Volker repeatedly failed to comply, leading the court to strike his and Svobodny’s pleadings. Nygaard moved for default judgment and was awarded title to the property, damages, and substantial attorney’s fees. The court also imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Volker for presenting pleadings lacking evidentiary support. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, Volker challenged the findings of forgery, the sanctions, and the default judgment. The Supreme Court held that Volker failed to timely respond or preserve his arguments regarding sanctions and forgery. Importantly, Volker did not move to vacate the default judgment under Rule 60(b), limiting appellate review to irregularities on the face of the judgment, none of which were found. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and all associated orders. View "Nygaard v. Volker" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo v. Myers

2026-02-19T08:12:51-08:00

Wells Fargo initiated a lawsuit to collect credit card debt from a woman identified as Mary Myers (Mary 1) based on a consumer agreement and supporting documentation that included her address, date of birth, and the last four digits of her social security number. The company provided directions for service to the Lawrence County Sheriff, but the deputy mistakenly served a different woman with the same name (Mary 2) at a different address. Mary 2, who was not the debtor, retained counsel and notified Wells Fargo’s attorney of the error, demanding dismissal and reimbursement of legal expenses. After receiving no response from Wells Fargo’s attorney, Mary 2’s counsel filed motions to dismiss and for sanctions under Rule 11 of the South Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells Fargo’s attorney explained that he had conducted due diligence before filing the complaint and, after reviewing further information, believed he had filed against the correct person. The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit found that Wells Fargo’s attorney violated Rule 11 by not communicating with Mary 2’s attorney after being informed of the mistaken service and by not rectifying the error. The court dismissed Mary 2 from the lawsuit and ordered Wells Fargo to pay her attorney’s fees as a sanction. The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the award of attorney’s fees. It held that Rule 11 sanctions apply only to the filing, signing, or advocacy of documents presented to the court, not to all attorney conduct within litigation. The court concluded that Wells Fargo’s complaint had evidentiary support against Mary 1, and the mistaken service on Mary 2 did not render the pleading sanctionable. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney’s fees, finding that the circuit court abused its discretion by misapplying Rule 11. View "Wells Fargo v. Myers" on Justia Law

SCHULKERS V. LAPE

2026-02-19T07:04:57-08:00

A vehicle driven by the defendant struck a pedestrian, causing serious injuries. The defendant was indicted for assault, wanton endangerment, and driving under the influence. A public defender, Amy Miller, was appointed as counsel. At a bond hearing, Miller made detailed statements about the defendant’s medical conditions and medications, suggesting the accident resulted from an acute medical emergency. Later, the Commonwealth argued Miller’s statements conflicted with disclosures by the defense’s medical expert, raising the possibility that Miller might be called as a witness at trial, thereby creating a conflict under Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130(3.7)(a). After extensive proceedings, the Kenton Circuit Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to disqualify Miller, reasoning that her statements would likely be introduced for impeachment and that she could become a necessary witness. The court found that continuing with Miller as counsel could prejudice the defendant and noted that substitute counsel lacked Miller’s familiarity with the case. The defendant petitioned the Kentucky Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the disqualification order, arguing she lacked an adequate remedy by appeal and would suffer irreparable injury. The Court of Appeals denied the writ, holding that an appeal after conviction would be an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that, under the circumstances, a later appeal would not be an adequate remedy and the defendant would suffer great and irreparable injury if deprived of her chosen counsel at such a late stage. The Court found the trial court’s disqualification order was speculative and unsupported by sufficient findings that Miller would be a necessary witness at trial. The Supreme Court ordered issuance of the requested writ of prohibition, barring enforcement of the disqualification order. View "SCHULKERS V. LAPE" on Justia Law

Fletcher v. Experian Info Solutions

2026-02-18T16:30:27-08:00

The case involves an attorney who represented a plaintiff in a Fair Credit Reporting Act lawsuit against two defendants. The plaintiff alleged that he was a victim of identity theft, resulting in a fraudulent automobile finance account opened in his name. However, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found that the attorney had not conducted even a minimal investigation before filing suit and sought damages barred by law or based on false factual allegations. The suit was also untimely against at least one defendant, as the plaintiff had discovered the alleged violations more than two years before filing. Initially, the district court sanctioned the attorney and his firm, ordering payment of approximately $33,000 in attorneys’ fees to the defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the sanctions, holding that the attorney needed a greater opportunity to defend his pre-suit investigation and that the conduct did not meet the requirements of § 1927, as it did not multiply proceedings. Despite the vacatur, another issue arose when the plaintiff’s appellate counsel submitted a reply brief containing numerous fabricated citations, quotations, and factual assertions, many of which appeared to be generated by artificial intelligence. After issuing a show-cause order and reviewing counsel’s responses, the Fifth Circuit found that the attorney used AI to draft substantial portions of the brief and failed to verify its accuracy. The court also determined that the attorney was not forthcoming in responding to the show-cause order. The Fifth Circuit held that such conduct is “unbecoming a member of the bar” and sanctioned the attorney $2,500 under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c) and the court’s inherent authority to discipline attorneys for misrepresentations and abuse of the judicial process. View "Fletcher v. Experian Info Solutions" on Justia Law

City of Dickinson v. Helgeson

2026-02-12T08:36:14-08:00

A driver was cited for failing to display license plates on his vehicle, an infraction under a municipal ordinance. The matter was transferred from municipal court to the District Court of Stark County for a jury trial. Before trial, the defendant filed multiple motions, including to disqualify both the prosecutor and judge, to continue or stay the proceedings, and to dismiss the case, most of which were denied. Ultimately, a jury found that the defendant had committed the violation. Following these proceedings, the district court designated the defendant as a vexatious litigant, citing his numerous and largely meritless filings. After the jury’s verdict, the defendant appealed the vexatious litigant order to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because he claimed the underlying proceeding was criminal, not civil, and further contending that the vexatious litigant designation violated his constitutional rights. He also challenged the district court’s findings, asserting abuse of discretion. The City of Dickinson responded by seeking sanctions, alleging the defendant’s appellate brief cited fictitious cases. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the underlying proceeding was a noncriminal infraction under state law, so the district court had jurisdiction to issue a vexatious litigant order under the applicable administrative rule. The Court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in designating the defendant a vexatious litigant, finding ample evidence of frivolous and burdensome litigation tactics. The constitutional challenges were rejected, as the vexatious litigant rule provided sufficient procedural safeguards. Additionally, the Court found that the defendant’s use of fictitious case citations warranted sanctions and ordered him to pay $500 to the City. The district court’s vexatious litigant order was affirmed. View "City of Dickinson v. Helgeson" on Justia Law

Semaan v. Mosier

2026-02-06T12:02:27-08:00

Several plaintiffs brought suit against a court-appointed receiver and his company, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The underlying facts involve a criminal prosecution against one of the plaintiffs, Simon Semaan, for insurance fraud. In connection with the prosecution, the criminal court issued a temporary restraining order that froze certain assets and appointed the receiver to manage them. Later, the court ordered the receiver to liquidate specific stock holdings “as soon as practicable.” The receiver did not immediately liquidate the assets, citing ongoing settlement negotiations and concerns about account closure requirements. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the receiver’s delay, the value of the investment accounts declined, causing them over $1.1 million in damages. After the receiver was replaced, the plaintiffs filed a civil lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty in the Superior Court of Orange County. The defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the claims arose from protected activity and that quasi-judicial immunity applied. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. The court found that the receiver’s conduct occurred within the scope of his appointment, that the litigation privilege applied, and that the receiver was protected by quasi-judicial immunity. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order. It held that a court-appointed receiver is protected by quasi-judicial immunity for discretionary acts and decisions performed in the course of carrying out court orders. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the receiver’s discretionary decisions as receiver, which are constitutionally protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. Because of this immunity, the plaintiffs failed to show that their claims had the minimal merit necessary to survive an anti-SLAPP motion. The court thus affirmed the order striking the complaint. View "Semaan v. Mosier" on Justia Law

Geraci v. Hamilton

2026-02-05T08:04:55-08:00

A licensed clinical social worker, designated as a mandatory reporter under District of Columbia law, reported suspected sexual abuse of a minor patient to the Child and Family Services Agency. The child’s father, who was the subject of the report, subsequently filed suit against the reporter and her employer, alleging professional malpractice and emotional distress. The claims arose from both the initial report and the reporter’s testimony in related proceedings. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which invoked statutory immunity granted to mandatory reporters for reports made in good faith. The court granted summary judgment on some counts but denied it on others, including the immunity claim. The court reasoned that there was evidence suggesting the reporter’s actions could have been motivated by bias or malice, and thus the question of good faith should be decided by a jury. The defendants appealed the denial of summary judgment on the immunity issue before final judgment. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered whether it had interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the Superior Court’s denial of statutory immunity. The appellate court held that the statute provides immunity from liability, not from suit, and such immunity is effectively reviewable after final judgment rather than through an interlocutory appeal. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court, without reaching the merits of the immunity claim. View "Geraci v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

FLAKES v. THE STATE

2026-02-03T05:34:20-08:00

Two men were convicted of malice murder and armed robbery following the shooting death of an individual in Muscogee County, Georgia. The crime occurred in August 2018, and both were indicted in November 2020. During their joint trial in October 2022, evidence included surveillance footage, cell phone records showing extensive communication between the defendants around the time of the murder, and testimony connecting one defendant to the murder weapon through a prior uncharged shooting. Witnesses also identified one defendant by his distinctive walk in the video footage, and another admitted to being present at the scene but denied involvement in the killing. Both defendants received life sentences, with one eligible for parole and the other not, while the felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law. After sentencing, both defendants moved for new trials in the Superior Court of Muscogee County. One motion was denied following an evidentiary hearing, and the defendant appealed his conviction, raising issues including the admissibility of surveillance identification, evidence from a prior shooting, alleged prosecutorial conflict of interest, and the admission of in-life photos and victim-impact testimony. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The other defendant’s motion for new trial was granted solely on the ground that the prosecutor had previously represented him as a public defender in an unrelated case, which the trial court found to be a conflict of interest warranting disqualification. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed both appeals. It affirmed the convictions and sentences of the first defendant, finding no reversible error or ineffective assistance of counsel. For the second defendant, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of a new trial, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the initial motion to disqualify the prosecutor, as the prior representation was not “substantially related” to the current case under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a). The case was remanded for further proceedings on any remaining claims raised in the motion for new trial. View "FLAKES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

BlueRadios, Inc. v. Hamilton, Brook, Smith & Reynolds, P.C.

2026-02-02T14:30:03-08:00

A Colorado-based technology company specializing in wireless communications collaborated with a Massachusetts micro-display company to develop a headset, formalizing their respective rights in a contract. The contract established joint intellectual property ownership for the project and designated the Massachusetts company to select counsel and prosecute patents. The selected law firm worked with both companies during patent prosecution, opening billing files and receiving powers of attorney from the Colorado company’s employees. Over time, disputes arose regarding patent applications, including amendments that allegedly benefited the Massachusetts company at the expense of the Colorado company, abandonment of applications, and filing disclaimers—often without informing the Colorado company. After the business relationship ended in 2009, the Colorado company only discovered alleged misconduct by the law firm years later when investigating its patent portfolio in response to a potential acquisition. Subsequent litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado led to the law firm’s disqualification due to a found attorney-client relationship, and discovery revealed possible concealment and conflicts of interest. The Colorado company then sued the law firm and individual attorneys in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging legal malpractice and related claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the law firm, concluding all claims were untimely under the statute of limitations, not saved by equitable tolling, and that no attorney-client relationship existed. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that whether the malpractice claims were timely is a factual question suitable for a jury, not summary judgment, and that an attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of law for the relevant period. The appellate court reversed the district court’s timeliness and relationship rulings on the legal malpractice claim, vacated determinations regarding other claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "BlueRadios, Inc. v. Hamilton, Brook, Smith & Reynolds, P.C." on Justia Law

Koponen v. Romanov

2026-02-01T09:03:53-08:00

The dispute centers on an attorney’s contingency fee agreement concerning legal representation for heirs of an Alaska Native allotment. After the attorney successfully represented the heirs in a federal lawsuit against the government for mismanagement of oil and gas leases, a fee dispute arose. The attorney sued one heir in federal court, claiming unpaid fees under the agreement. That heir moved to compel arbitration of the fee dispute pursuant to Alaska Bar Rules, and the federal court stayed the litigation pending arbitration. An Alaska Bar Association arbitration panel was convened. Bar Counsel advised the panel to limit its review to whether the amount of the attorney’s fee was reasonable, excluding issues of enforceability of the agreement, such as claims of duress or illegality under federal Indian law. The panel accepted this narrowed scope and ultimately found the attorney’s fee reasonable, declining to address other challenges. The panel also chose not to refer any ethical concerns to Bar Counsel for disciplinary review. The heir petitioned the Alaska Superior Court (Second Judicial District, Utqiaġvik) to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the panel exceeded its authority, was not impartial, and that the fee agreement was unenforceable. The superior court confirmed the arbitration panel’s decision, finding the panel’s scope limitation a reasonably possible interpretation of its authority under the Bar Rules. The court also awarded the attorney enhanced attorney’s fees for costs incurred in the post-arbitration proceedings, citing Alaska Civil Rule 82. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that a fee arbitration panel’s decision to narrow its review to the reasonableness of a fee is proper if it is a reasonably possible interpretation of the panel’s authority. Additionally, it held that attorney’s fees may be awarded under Civil Rule 82 for post-arbitration proceedings governed by the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. View "Koponen v. Romanov" on Justia Law

State Public Defender v. Iowa District Court For Scott County

2026-01-30T07:05:58-08:00

Six unrelated criminal defendants in Scott County, Iowa, were each charged with serious misdemeanors in late 2024 and requested court-appointed counsel due to indigency. The Iowa District Court for Scott County initially appointed the Davenport local public defender’s office to represent each defendant. Shortly after these appointments, the Davenport Public Defender, citing a temporary overload of cases as specified in Iowa Code section 13B.9(4)(a), filed motions to withdraw from representing these defendants. The office asserted it was ethically unable to handle the additional cases after considering all relevant factors, including attorney staffing and caseloads. The district associate judge denied these withdrawal motions, stating the Davenport office was fully staffed and that insufficient information had been provided about its workload. The court also noted the lack of available contract or noncontract attorneys to appoint in place of the public defender. Despite repeated filings by the Davenport PD asserting the overload, the district court continued to deny withdrawal, eventually ordering the chief public defender to appear in each case. The State Public Defender then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Iowa Supreme Court, challenging the district court’s refusal to allow the Davenport PD to withdraw. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that while district courts have a limited role in ensuring the statutory precondition of a temporary overload is met, they must be highly deferential to a local public defender’s professional representation regarding such overload. The court concluded that the Davenport PD’s representations satisfied its burden to establish a temporary overload. The district court exceeded its authority by refusing to accept these representations and denying withdrawal. The Supreme Court sustained the writ of certiorari and vacated the district court’s orders attaching the Davenport PD to the six cases. View "State Public Defender v. Iowa District Court For Scott County" on Justia Law

Oenga v. Givens

2026-01-23T10:01:06-08:00

A dispute arose from a contingency fee agreement between the heirs of an Alaska Native allotment and an attorney who helped them recover substantial compensation from the federal government for mismanagement of oil and gas leases on their land. After a settlement was reached, years later, one of the heirs was sued by the attorney in federal court for allegedly failing to make required payments under the fee agreement. The heir then invoked mandatory fee arbitration under Alaska Bar Association rules, which prompted the federal court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration. The arbitration was conducted before an Alaska Bar Association panel, which, following guidance from Bar Counsel, limited its review to whether the amount of the attorney’s fee was reasonable, and declined to address broader challenges to the enforceability of the fee agreement, including claims of duress and illegality under federal Indian law. The panel ultimately found the fee amount reasonable. Dissatisfied, the heir petitioned the Alaska Superior Court to vacate the panel’s decision, arguing that the panel exceeded its authority by not deciding enforceability issues and raising other statutory grounds under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA). The Superior Court denied the petition, confirmed the arbitration award, and granted enhanced attorney’s fees to the attorney for post-arbitration litigation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the Superior Court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court held that a fee arbitration panel’s decision to narrow the scope of review is subject to a “reasonably possible” standard and that the panel did not exceed its authority in this case. The court also held that awards of attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82 are permissible in post-arbitration proceedings governed by the RUAA and found no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s award. View "Oenga v. Givens" on Justia Law

Blanchard v. 480 King Street, LLC

2026-01-21T07:42:39-08:00

480 King Street, LLC hired Glick/Boehm & Associates, Inc. (GBA), an architectural firm, to design and administer construction of a stair tower. 480 King alleged that GBA negligently designed elements of the project, including the elevator, electrical, HVAC, windows, and stairs, and also failed to properly administer construction, resulting in code violations and additional costs. As the statute of limitations was approaching, 480 King filed its complaint without the expert affidavit required by the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, later submitting an affidavit from Louis Hackney, a professional engineer, attesting to deviations from the standard of care in both design and contract administration. The Circuit Court of Charleston County, after allowing time for the affidavit, ultimately dismissed all claims against GBA, finding Hackney was not qualified to opine on the standard of care for architects. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of negligent design claims but reversed as to claims for negligent construction administration, finding Hackney qualified under statutory standards for expert witnesses. The appellate court also reversed dismissal of breach of contract and warranty claims, remanding them for further proceedings. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the expert witness affidavit requirement under section 15-36-100 does not mandate the affiant be from the same profession as the defendant, provided the statutory qualifications are met. Hackney’s affidavit was sufficient for the negligent construction administration claim, but not for negligent architectural design, as he declined to opine on the latter. Claims for negligent supervision were subsumed under construction administration. The breach of contract claim may proceed only as to construction administration, while breach of warranty and negligent design claims were properly dismissed. The disposition was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Blanchard v. 480 King Street, LLC" on Justia Law

N.D. v. Superior Ct.

2026-01-20T13:32:00-08:00

An attorney filed a petition for a writ of mandate on behalf of a client, seeking to have the trial court refer a statement of disqualification to a different judge. The petition included only the trial court’s order striking the statement of disqualification and did not provide the statement itself or any supporting evidence for the serious accusations made against the trial judge, such as alleged retaliation, discrimination, collusion with opposing counsel, and forgery of court orders. The attorney asserted that these claims were based on his and his client’s “earnest belief,” but failed to present any evidence from the court record to support them. The Superior Court of Orange County had previously struck the statement of disqualification, and the attorney’s petition to the appellate court was denied due to lack of supporting evidence. Following this denial, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, issued an order to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed for filing a frivolous writ petition and for failing to support factual contentions with citations to the record. The attorney responded but continued to provide no substantive evidence, instead relying on personal beliefs and documents not included in the trial record. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, found that the petition was frivolous and that the attorney had unreasonably violated procedural rules by making unsupported assertions, particularly serious accusations against the trial judge. The main holding is that an attorney may not make factual assertions or accusations against a judge without evidentiary support and must adhere to procedural requirements for appellate filings. The court imposed monetary sanctions of $25,000 against the attorney and ordered that notice be given to the State Bar. View "N.D. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Akhlaghpour v. Orantes

2026-01-20T09:30:26-08:00

A debtor filed for bankruptcy in 2017 and retained an attorney to serve as counsel in the Chapter 11 proceedings. The bankruptcy court appointed the attorney as counsel for the estate. In early 2018, a trustee was appointed due to concerns about liens on the debtor’s properties, and the trustee began liquidating assets. Following these events, the debtor sued her former bankruptcy attorney and his law firm in California state court for legal malpractice related to the bankruptcy representation. In state court, the attorney moved to dismiss the malpractice suit, arguing that the Barton doctrine, res judicata, and lack of standing barred the action. The Los Angeles County Superior Court dismissed the suit solely based on the Barton doctrine, which requires leave from the bankruptcy court before suing court-appointed officers in another forum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that the Barton doctrine applied to claims arising from the attorney’s actions while serving as debtor-in-possession counsel but not to actions taken after the trustee’s appointment. The appellate court allowed leave to amend for certain post-trustee claims if standing was established. The debtor then moved in bankruptcy court for leave to continue her malpractice suit under the Barton doctrine. The bankruptcy court granted leave for certain time periods but did not precisely tailor its order to the state appellate decision. The attorney appealed to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which vacated the bankruptcy court’s order, holding it violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by modifying state court judgments. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that granting Barton leave does not violate Rooker-Feldman, and the bankruptcy court may cure a jurisdictional defect after state court proceedings have begun. However, the Ninth Circuit found the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by not aligning its order with the state appellate decision and by granting Barton approval for claims not subject to the doctrine. The Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions for the bankruptcy court to issue a tailored order consistent with the California appellate decision. View "Akhlaghpour v. Orantes" on Justia Law

Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System v. Sanford

2026-01-16T12:33:54-08:00

A cloud-based real estate services company faced persistent and grave allegations that two top agents, along with several others, drugged and sexually assaulted company agents at events. Reports began surfacing in 2020, including a viral social media post and a memo sent to company executives detailing numerous incidents. Despite these warnings, the board initially terminated one perpetrator but continued paying him, and allowed others implicated to continue working. A whistleblower director raised these issues repeatedly at board meetings and with outside counsel, but the board’s responses were limited to internal investigations led by insiders and did not result in meaningful change. The company only took further action after survivors filed federal anti-trafficking lawsuits in 2023 and the story became public. Prior to the current litigation, federal courts sustained anti-trafficking claims against the company and its leadership, finding sufficient allegations that the leadership benefited from retaining perpetrators due to the company’s revenue-sharing structure. The defendants in this derivative action are not accused of direct misconduct, but of harming the company by allowing and covering up systemic sexual abuse. The plaintiff, a shareholder, alleges the board and certain officers actively covered up abuse and breached their fiduciary duties, and that some board members failed their oversight obligations in the face of numerous red flags. The Delaware Court of Chancery reviewed the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It held that workplace sexual misconduct can constitute a corporate trauma supporting a breach of fiduciary duty claim under Delaware law. The court denied dismissal as to claims against the officer alleged to have benefited from covering up abuse, and against the directors for failing to respond in good faith to clear red flags. However, it granted dismissal of a novel claim seeking to extend oversight duties to a control group of shareholders, declining to make new law in that area. View "Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System v. Sanford" on Justia Law

Weigel v. Albertson

2026-01-15T08:11:17-08:00

This case concerns a business dispute between two individuals, Alan Weigel and Jason Albertson, regarding Veritas Crane LLC, a company providing crane and hoist services. Albertson founded Veritas in 2018, and Weigel joined the business in 2019, with both claiming at least 50% ownership. Their relationship deteriorated, leading Albertson to request the company’s bank to restrict access to its accounts due to allegations of fraudulent activity. In response, Weigel limited Albertson’s access to company facilities. Weigel then filed a complaint, naming himself and Veritas as plaintiffs, asserting both derivative claims on behalf of Veritas and direct claims against Albertson. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the matter after Albertson moved to disqualify Weigel’s attorney, Joel Fremstad. The court found that Fremstad had a lawyer-client relationship with both Weigel and Veritas, relying on evidence such as Fremstad’s signing of pleadings for both plaintiffs and communications indicating he advised Weigel in his role as CEO of Veritas. The court concluded that this concurrent representation violated North Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), which prohibits representation of adverse clients, and ordered Fremstad’s disqualification. The Supreme Court of North Dakota addressed Weigel’s appeal and his petition for a supervisory writ. It determined the disqualification order was not immediately appealable under statutory law or the collateral order doctrine and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Exercising its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s order for abuse of discretion and clear error. Although it noted a harmless legal error in the district court’s reasoning regarding derivative suits, the Supreme Court held that the underlying factual findings were supported by the record. The Court denied the petition for a supervisory writ, upholding the disqualification of Fremstad. View "Weigel v. Albertson" on Justia Law

Vining v. Plunkett Cooney, P.C.

2026-01-14T14:30:14-08:00

MTG, Inc., a company specializing in tooling for the auto industry, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1995, which was later converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding in 1996. Charles Taunt was appointed as the Chapter 7 trustee and, during his tenure, entered into a fee agreement with Comerica Bank, MTG's largest secured creditor. Taunt failed to disclose this agreement to the bankruptcy court, despite rules requiring disclosure of such connections. Several orders were issued during this time that benefited Comerica, including allowance of its claim, relief from stay, and settlement of pre-petition lender liability claims. After Taunt's undisclosed conflict of interest was revealed, litigation ensued over whether the resulting orders should be set aside and whether Taunt, his law firms, and Comerica were liable for fraud, conversion, and unauthorized transfers. Following discovery of Taunt's conflict, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan vacated the orders benefitting Comerica and found Taunt and his law firm had committed fraud on the court. Taunt was disqualified as trustee, his firm was denied fees, and Guy Vining was appointed as successor trustee. Vining initiated an adversary proceeding with multiple claims, primarily post-petition claims alleging fraud on the court, avoidable transfers, and conversion. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for defendants on most claims, awarding only limited attorney’s fees for exposing the fraud. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan affirmed these rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held Comerica was not directly or vicariously liable for fraud on the court, as it was not an officer of the court and did not control Taunt. The court also ruled that the challenged post-petition transfers were authorized by valid court orders and thus not avoidable under bankruptcy law. Finally, the court found Taunt’s actions as trustee were authorized, rejecting the conversion claim. The limited attorney’s fees award and denial of punitive damages were upheld as within the bankruptcy court’s discretion. View "Vining v. Plunkett Cooney, P.C." on Justia Law

Cales v. Theisen Brock LPA

2026-01-14T14:30:14-08:00

Plaintiff Stacy Cales, a nurse practitioner, owned Road to Recovery, LLC, a substance abuse treatment business in West Virginia. In 2020, Cales engaged attorney Kristopher Justice, from the Ohio firm Theisen Brock, LPA, to assist in selling her business. Justice drafted sales documents, including a Promissory Note that defined payment terms and specified a liquidated damages amount in the event of default. Cales expressed concern to Justice about the damages provision, fearing it would limit her recovery if the buyer defaulted. Justice reassured her that the contract’s implied covenant of good faith would prevent the buyer from exploiting the provision. After the buyer ceased payments, litigation ensued in West Virginia, where the buyer asserted that damages should be limited to the liquidated amount. Dissatisfied with her representation and the contract, Cales hired a new attorney, who later advised her that she was entitled only to liquidated damages, prompting her to settle. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a legal malpractice claim and a vicarious liability claim in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that the Ohio one-year statute of limitations barred plaintiffs' claims. The court reasoned that the statute began running when Cales terminated her prior attorney in March 2022, as that constituted a “cognizable event.” On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the statute of limitations began on April 13, 2023, when Cales was advised by her new attorney about the consequence of the liquidated damages provision. Since the complaint was filed within one year of that date, the claims were timely. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cales v. Theisen Brock LPA" on Justia Law

NONDOC MEDIA v. STATE Ex Rel. BOARD OF REGENTS of the UNIV. of OKLAHOMA

2026-01-13T09:41:29-08:00

NonDoc Media and William W. Savage III submitted open records requests to the University of Oklahoma seeking two reports prepared by the law firm Jones Day. The reports resulted from investigations into allegations of misreporting alumni donor data and possible sexual misconduct involving high-ranking University officials. Jones Day was retained under an attorney-client relationship, and the reports included confidential interviews and legal analysis. Portions of the reports were provided to law enforcement under joint-interest agreements and excerpts of the sexual misconduct report were shared with the parties involved pursuant to Title IX protocols. The District Court of Cleveland County conducted an in camera review of both reports. It granted summary judgment in favor of the University, finding the documents protected by attorney-client privilege. The court also found that the reports were exempt under the Open Records Act’s personnel record exemption, and that the sexual misconduct report was further protected by work-product and informer privileges. The court did not find that the University had waived any of these protections, and rejected NonDoc’s arguments to the contrary. NonDoc appealed, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma retained the case. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege protects the reports from disclosure, and clarified that the privilege does not expire when the underlying investigation or action concludes. The court also found that the University did not waive the privilege by sharing the reports with law enforcement under joint-interest agreements or by limited disclosure required by law. Summary judgment for the University was affirmed. View "NONDOC MEDIA v. STATE Ex Rel. BOARD OF REGENTS of the UNIV. of OKLAHOMA" on Justia Law

In re Knudsen

2025-12-31T14:18:49-08:00

Austin Knudsen, the Montana Attorney General, was charged with 41 counts of attorney misconduct by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) for actions taken while representing the Montana State Legislature in litigation before the Montana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. The underlying events involved Knudsen and his office’s response to subpoenas issued by the Legislature seeking judicial branch emails, and subsequent orders by the Montana Supreme Court to return those materials. During the litigation, Knudsen and his subordinates made critical statements about the Court and delayed compliance with a direct order to return subpoenaed documents. The Commission on Practice of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held a contested hearing, ultimately finding that Knudsen violated five provisions of the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct and recommending a 90-day suspension from the practice of law. Knudsen objected, raising separation of powers arguments and claiming multiple due process violations during the disciplinary proceedings. The Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were brief, lacking detailed explanation for each alleged rule violation. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana, exercising de novo review, found that Knudsen violated Rule 3.4(c) by knowingly failing to seek a stay or otherwise comply with the Court’s order to return subpoenaed materials, and Rule 5.1(c) by failing to ensure that his subordinates also complied. However, the Court determined that the Commission failed to prove violations of Rules 8.2(a), 8.4(d), and 8.4(a), finding that Knudsen’s critical statements about the Court were either opinions or facts not proven false, and that no prejudice to a specific proceeding was demonstrated. Due to significant due process violations in the Commission proceedings, the Supreme Court dismissed the case without imposing discipline. View "In re Knudsen" on Justia Law

Monson v. Monson

2025-12-23T14:03:46-08:00

Two siblings, Ryan and Nancy, disputed the administration of their father Hal’s estate and the status of his ownership interest in Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (TPS), an Idaho storage facility business. Hal, who suffered from progressive dementia before his death, was TPS’s sole voting member and manager, with Nancy assisting in legal and management matters. Several amendments to TPS’s operating agreement changed ownership and management, culminating—after Hal’s death—in Nancy executing further amendments that retroactively transferred Hal’s economic interest to herself and changed accounting records. Nancy, an attorney, served as both Hal’s lawyer and later as personal representative of his estate. Ryan questioned whether Hal’s interest in TPS remained an estate asset and sought access to business records, which Nancy resisted. The siblings litigated issues in two related cases in Bonneville County: a probate case in the Magistrate Court regarding Hal’s estate, and a separate TEDRA (Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act) civil action in District Court initiated by Ryan. Both courts and parties at times treated the cases as consolidated. Ryan’s TEDRA complaint sought judicial determination of estate assets, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and appointment of a receiver, naming Nancy in both her individual and representative capacities and TPS as defendants. The magistrate court dismissed Ryan’s claims and removed Nancy and TPS as parties, finding that estate matters should be decided exclusively in probate. The district court affirmed, denying Ryan’s motions and dismissing his amended complaint, reasoning that Ryan’s claims were matters for probate only. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho vacated both lower courts’ judgments. It held that Ryan’s claims for judicial determination of estate assets and breach of fiduciary duty fall within TEDRA’s definition of “matters” and may be raised in a separate civil action, not only in probate. The Court reversed the orders dismissing claims and parties, remanded the case for further proceedings, and awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees to Ryan against Nancy personally. View "Monson v. Monson" on Justia Law

HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit

2025-12-22T13:00:15-08:00

HRT Enterprises pursued a takings claim against the City of Detroit after losing a jury verdict in state court in 2005. Subsequently, HRT filed suit in federal court in 2008, alleging a post-2005 violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the federal action, citing the requirement from Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), to exhaust state remedies first. HRT then returned to state court, where its claim was dismissed on claim preclusion grounds, a decision affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. After the state court denied compensation, HRT initiated a federal § 1983 action in 2012. The case was stayed when the City filed for bankruptcy, prompting HRT to participate in bankruptcy proceedings to protect its compensation rights. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court excepted HRT’s takings claim from discharge, allowing the federal case to proceed. After two jury trials, the district court entered judgment for HRT in September 2023. Following its success, HRT moved for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, presenting billing records that included work from related state and bankruptcy proceedings. The district court applied a 33% discount to the claimed hours due to commingled and poorly described entries, set an average hourly rate, and awarded $720,486.25, which included expert witness fees. Both parties appealed aspects of the fee award to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred by concluding it had no discretion to award fees for work performed in the related state-court and bankruptcy proceedings, as such fees are recoverable when the work is necessary to advance the federal litigation. The court also found the district court erred in awarding expert witness fees under § 1988(c) in a § 1983 action, as the statute does not authorize such fees for § 1983 claims. The appellate court vacated the fee award and remanded for recalculation consistent with its opinion. View "HRT Enterprises v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Moore-Reed v. Griffin

2025-12-18T08:42:38-08:00

The plaintiff shot and killed her uncle outside her grandmother’s house, claiming ongoing abuse and financial exploitation. She recorded the incident on her cellphone, which was seized and later returned by police, who did not review the video. After being charged with manslaughter and released on bail, the trial court appointed the defendant as her new criminal defense attorney. The plaintiff informed the defendant about the video and gave him her cellphone. Without her consent, the defendant sent the video to the district attorney, who then presented it to a grand jury, resulting in an amended indictment for murder. Her bail was revoked due to the murder charge, leading to 20 months of pretrial incarceration. The defendant subsequently withdrew from the case; the murder charge was later dismissed, and the plaintiff pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter. In Jackson County Circuit Court, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing under Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or 221 (1993), that the plaintiff had not suffered “legally cognizable harm” because she had not been exonerated of her crime. The circuit court granted the motion, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that exoneration was a necessary element for a legal malpractice claim following a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and reversed both lower courts. It held that Stevens applies only when the alleged harm is the conviction itself or flows from the conviction. Here, the plaintiff alleged harms unrelated to her conviction, such as reputational damage, emotional distress, and economic losses from being charged with murder and pretrial incarceration. The court concluded that a legal malpractice plaintiff need not always allege exoneration to state a claim when the alleged attorney negligence caused harm independent of the conviction. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Moore-Reed v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Garner v. Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell

2025-12-09T12:13:43-08:00

Alan Cartwright was the beneficiary of a family trust managed by his sister, Alice Garner, and her husband, Alan Garner. Over more than a decade, Cartwright, represented by attorneys Jerry Mitchell and later his son Justin Mitchell, brought six lawsuits against the Garners challenging their administration of the trust. All of these lawsuits were ultimately resolved in favor of the Garners. After the trust litigation concluded, Cartwright, dissatisfied with his legal representation, sued the Mitchells for legal malpractice and fraudulent concealment. The Garners also sued the Mitchells and their law firms under the tort-of-another doctrine, seeking to recover attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred during the trust litigation. In the Circuit Court for Shelby County, the Mitchells moved to dismiss the Garners’ suit under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), arguing that the claims were filed in response to their exercise of the right to petition. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the TPPA did not protect attorneys alleged to have acted inconsistently with their client’s interests. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Mitchells had met their initial burden under the TPPA by showing the Garners’ suit related to the underlying trust lawsuits. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that, under the TPPA, an attorney filing a lawsuit on behalf of a client does not personally exercise the right to petition; rather, the attorney facilitates the client’s exercise of that right. Therefore, the Mitchells failed to demonstrate that the Garners’ suit was filed in response to the Mitchells’ own exercise of the right to petition. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, denying the Mitchells’ petition for dismissal under the TPPA. View "Garner v. Thomason, Hendrix, Harvey, Johnson & Mitchell" on Justia Law

Cartwright v. Thomason Hendrix, P.C.

2025-12-09T12:13:42-08:00

A beneficiary of a family trust, dissatisfied with the outcome of multiple lawsuits against his sister and her husband concerning trust administration, brought claims for legal malpractice and fraudulent concealment against the lawyers who had represented him in those actions. He alleged that the lawyers filed nonmeritorious lawsuits primarily to obtain a contingency fee and failed to keep him informed, ultimately leaving him responsible for attorney’s fees when the cases were resolved against him. The lawyers and their associated law firms responded by seeking dismissal under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), arguing that the malpractice suit was filed in response to their “exercise of the right to petition”—specifically, the act of filing lawsuits on the beneficiary’s behalf. The Circuit Court for Shelby County denied this petition, holding that an attorney sued by a former client for malpractice cannot establish that the suit was in response to the attorney’s own exercise of the right to petition. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that legal malpractice claims are not categorically excluded from the TPPA and that, in this instance, the lawyers had made a prima facie showing that the complaint related to their exercise of the right to petition. The Supreme Court of Tennessee granted permission to appeal and held that, even assuming filing a lawsuit is an “exercise of the right to petition” under the TPPA, an attorney who files suit on behalf of a client does not personally exercise that right—the attorney merely facilitates the client’s exercise of it. Thus, the lawyers could not show that the malpractice and concealment suit was brought in response to their own exercise of the right to petition. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals, denied the lawyers’ TPPA petition, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cartwright v. Thomason Hendrix, P.C." on Justia Law

Blake v USA

2025-12-09T08:30:18-08:00

The petitioner was convicted following a jury trial for filing a fraudulent tax return and theft of government funds, after he submitted a tax form claiming a large refund based on a mistaken belief about a government “trust” linked to Social Security. He received and spent the refund, then requested another, which was denied. The IRS investigated, and he later filed a document stating he was deceased. His defense at trial centered on his claim that he misunderstood tax law due to information from an online forum and advice from an IRS agent. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana oversaw the criminal trial, where the petitioner was represented by attorney John Davis. During trial, Davis pursued motions under Brady v. Maryland, seeking exculpatory evidence, but the motions were denied. After conviction, Davis was removed from the Seventh Circuit Bar for misconduct in an unrelated case. The petitioner then moved for a new trial and, later, for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on Davis’s disciplinary history and alleged trial errors. The district court denied both motions, finding Davis’s performance did not prejudice the petitioner’s defense and that his disciplinary issues in other cases did not establish ineffectiveness in the present case. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of collateral relief de novo for legal issues and for clear error regarding factual findings. The court held that there is no per se rule that concurrent or subsequent attorney discipline renders counsel ineffective; instead, a petitioner must show specific deficient performance and resulting prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel’s alleged errors affected the outcome of the trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion. View "Blake v USA" on Justia Law

City of Davenport v. Office of the Auditor of the State of Iowa

2025-12-05T07:04:46-08:00

The case centers on a dispute involving the Iowa Auditor of State’s authority to subpoena records from the City of Davenport, including documents claimed to be protected by the attorney–client privilege, in connection with a reaudit of city settlement payments. The city provided some documents but refused to produce others, asserting privilege. The Auditor sought enforcement of the subpoena, while the city moved to modify it. The controversy escalated due to public interest in the timing and propriety of the city’s settlements and the Auditor’s investigation into their legality. The Iowa District Court for Scott County ruled in favor of the Auditor, holding that Iowa law gave the Auditor broad access to city records, including attorney–client privileged materials, except for attorney work product, and ordered an in camera review of the contested documents. The city appealed, arguing the Auditor did not have authority to access attorney–client communications. During the appeal, the Auditor and the Iowa Attorney General disagreed fundamentally about the scope of the Auditor’s subpoena power and whether to defend the district court’s ruling. The Attorney General declined to make arguments supporting the Auditor’s position, citing broader state interests and a perceived conflict of interest. The Supreme Court of Iowa determined that, due to this conflict of interest, the Auditor may be represented by his own general counsel, rather than the Attorney General. The court reasoned that the Attorney General’s duties are materially limited by her responsibilities to other state agencies, constituting a conflict under Iowa’s professional conduct rules. The court further held that the Auditor does not need executive council approval to be represented by in-house counsel, as statutory provisions requiring such approval apply only to hiring outside counsel at state expense. The Attorney General was permitted to participate as amicus curiae. View "City of Davenport v. Office of the Auditor of the State of Iowa" on Justia Law

Benton v. Babcock

2025-12-02T14:36:52-08:00

After being arrested for violating probation related to a past conviction and facing a new charge for failing to register as a sex offender, the plaintiff was indicted in federal court for possession of a firearm as a prohibited person. Initially represented by the defendant, a federal public defender, the plaintiff entered a guilty plea. Before sentencing, the attorney withdrew due to communication breakdown, and a new counsel was appointed. The plaintiff was ultimately sentenced to prison and supervised release. He later filed a motion in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawful searches, fabricated evidence, and coercion regarding his plea. The federal court rejected these claims, finding no supporting evidence and that the searches and arrest had been lawful. Subsequently, the plaintiff brought a civil action in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, alleging professional negligence by his former attorney based on similar allegations already raised in the federal proceeding. The district court noted the plaintiff’s failure to timely and properly disclose expert witnesses but primarily analyzed whether his claims were barred by collateral estoppel. It found that the issues had already been litigated and decided in the federal court, and thus granted summary judgment for the defendant, dismissing all claims. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that all four elements of collateral estoppel were satisfied: the issues were identical to those litigated in federal court, there was a final judgment on the merits, the parties were the same, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims previously. Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of the claims, holding they were barred by collateral estoppel. View "Benton v. Babcock" on Justia Law

Butler v. Motiva Performance Engineering, LLC

2025-12-01T11:03:12-08:00

The case concerns a dispute that arose after a company, Motiva Performance Engineering, failed to deliver on an agreement to upgrade a vehicle for the plaintiff, resulting in a jury verdict against Motiva for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violation of the Unfair Practices Act. The company’s managing member, who was also its attorney, transferred Motiva’s Ferrari to another company he controlled shortly after the verdict and subsequently used the car as collateral for a loan without disclosing this to the court. Additional questionable conduct included failing to disclose or potentially backdating a promissory note and depositing insurance proceeds into his personal account. These acts occurred while the court was overseeing asset proceedings to satisfy the judgment against Motiva. Following these actions, the district court held a hearing and issued a sanctions order against the managing member and his associated entities for what it termed remedial contempt, requiring payment of the underlying judgment and a $50,000 donation to charity. The sanctions order also referenced Rule 1-011 NMRA (Rule 11) violations due to misstatements in court filings. The managing member moved for reconsideration, arguing the evidence did not support remedial contempt, but appealed the order before the motion was decided. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the sanctions on both inherent powers and Rule 11 grounds, though a dissent questioned the breadth of conduct relied upon under Rule 11. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the district court erred by imposing punitive contempt sanctions without affording criminal-level due process protections and that such sanctions could not be justified under the court’s inherent powers without those protections. However, the court upheld the sanctions under Rule 11, as the due process requirements for Rule 11 are not equivalent to those for contempt. The holding was limited to willful misstatements made in documents filed with the court. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Butler v. Motiva Performance Engineering, LLC" on Justia Law

United States v. SpineFrontier, Inc.

2025-11-26T12:30:04-08:00

A medical device company that manufactures spinal devices was indicted, along with its CEO and CFO, for allegedly paying bribes to surgeons through a sham consulting program in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The indictment claimed the surgeons did not provide bona fide consulting services, but were paid to use and order the company’s devices in surgeries covered by federal health care programs. The company’s CFO, who is not a shareholder but is one of only two officers, allegedly calculated these payments based on the volume and value of surgeries performed with the company’s devices. During the development of the consulting program, the company retained outside counsel to provide legal opinions on the agreements’ compliance with health care law, and those opinions were distributed to the surgeons. After the grand jury returned the indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed whether the CFO’s plan to argue at trial that the involvement of outside counsel negated his criminal intent would effect an implied waiver of the company’s attorney-client privilege. The district court initially found that if the CFO or CEO invoked an “involvement-of-counsel” defense, it would waive the corporation’s privilege over communications with counsel. Following dismissal of charges against the company, the district court focused on whether the officers collectively could waive the privilege, concluded they could, and ruled that the CFO’s planned defense would constitute an implied waiver, allowing disclosure of certain privileged communications to the government. The district court stayed its order pending appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s waiver order and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that (1) the record was insufficient to determine whether the CFO alone had authority to waive the company’s privilege, and (2) not every involvement-of-counsel defense necessitates a waiver. The appellate court directed the district court to reassess the issue in light of changed circumstances and to consider less intrusive remedies before finding an implied waiver. View "United States v. SpineFrontier, Inc." on Justia Law

Trump v. Clinton

2025-11-26T06:31:43-08:00

Donald J. Trump filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against dozens of defendants, including Hillary Clinton, the Democratic National Committee, several law firms, and individuals, alleging that they conspired to spread false claims of his collusion with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump asserted multiple claims, including two under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and three under Florida law, such as injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution. He alleged that these actions caused him substantial financial harm and loss of business opportunities. After extensive pleadings, the district court dismissed Trump’s amended complaint with prejudice, holding that his federal racketeering claims were untimely and legally insufficient, and that his state law claims either failed to state a claim or were also untimely. The court found the complaint to be a “shotgun pleading” and cited numerous factual inaccuracies and implausible legal theories. The court also dismissed claims against certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, but did so with prejudice. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on Trump and his attorneys for filing frivolous claims and pleadings, based both on its inherent authority and Rule 11, and denied Trump’s motions for reconsideration and to disqualify the judge. Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that Trump’s racketeering claims were untimely and meritless, and that his state law claims failed for both procedural and substantive reasons. However, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over one defendant, Orbis, and therefore vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis, remanding with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. The sanctions orders and other rulings were affirmed, and requests for appellate sanctions were denied. View "Trump v. Clinton" on Justia Law

Acorn Investments, LLC v. Elsaesser

2025-11-19T09:03:56-08:00

Lewis Patrick and Michele Sivertson owned and managed Laughing Dog Brewing, Inc. (LDB), which faced financial difficulties in 2017. To address these issues, they, along with affiliated entities AHR, LLC and Fetchingly Good, LLC, engaged attorney Ford Elsaesser to restructure their debt. Elsaesser drafted a promissory note and facilitated the transfer of LDB’s assets to AHR and Fetchingly Good, allegedly without disclosing conflicts of interest or legal risks. After the asset transfer, Fetchingly Good assumed LDB’s operations, and LDB filed for bankruptcy. Acorn Investments, LLC, a creditor with a judgment against LDB, sued the Original Plaintiffs under various theories, including the Idaho Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and racketeering statutes. The litigation between Acorn and the Original Plaintiffs was resolved through a settlement agreement. The Original Plaintiffs stipulated to a judgment in favor of Acorn, but Acorn agreed not to execute on the judgment. Instead, Acorn received an assignment of the Original Plaintiffs’ claims against Elsaesser, including legal malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. Acorn substituted as plaintiff in the malpractice case. Elsaesser moved for summary judgment, arguing that the malpractice claim was not assignable. The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, agreed and dismissed the case without prejudice, finding the assignment did not meet the exception for assignability established in St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Luciani. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that the assignment of the legal malpractice claim to Acorn did not fall within the Luciani exception, which allows assignment only when such claims are transferred as part of a larger commercial transaction involving other business assets and liabilities. Here, only the claims were assigned, not any business assets or obligations. The Court also declined to award attorney fees to either party, but awarded costs to Elsaesser. View "Acorn Investments, LLC v. Elsaesser" on Justia Law

Schlichter v. Kennedy

2025-11-17T11:34:05-08:00

In this matter, an attorney representing the appellant in a civil case filed a petition for writ of supersedeas and an opening appellate brief that included citations to several cases that do not exist. The cited case names, reporter volumes, and page numbers either led to unrelated cases or to no cases at all, and the legal propositions attributed to these citations were unsupported by any actual authority. The attorney later provided copies of real cases with similar names but different citations, which also failed to support the propositions for which the fabricated citations were used. The attorney claimed these errors were clerical and not the result of intentional fabrication or reliance on artificial intelligence (AI), although he admitted to using AI in preparing at least one of the briefs. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two, issued an order to show cause regarding the fabricated citations and held a hearing. The attorney responded in writing and at the hearing, accepting responsibility for the citation errors but maintaining they were not willful and resulted from a breakdown in his citation-verification process. He asserted that the errors were clerical and not the product of AI hallucinations, although he acknowledged using AI in preparing the appellate brief and possibly the writ. The court found his explanations lacking in credibility, noting that the errors were not consistent with mere clerical mistakes and that the attorney’s claims about his verification process were contradicted by his own admissions. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two, held that the attorney unreasonably violated California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), by failing to support each point in his briefs with citations to real legal authority. The court imposed a sanction of $1,750, to be paid to the court, and directed the clerk to notify the State Bar of California of the sanction. View "Schlichter v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Baer v. Tedder

2025-11-10T12:01:26-08:00

The case involves a long-running dispute between two parties, Baer and Tedder, stemming from Baer's lawsuit against Tedder for malicious prosecution. During the course of this litigation, Baer filed a motion to compel production of documents and requested sanctions against Tedder and his counsel, Kent, for misuse of the discovery process. The trial court found that Tedder and Kent had engaged in evasive and unjustified conduct during discovery, which hindered Baer's ability to prepare his case. As a result, the court imposed $10,475 in monetary sanctions against both Tedder and Kent, jointly and severally. Tedder and Kent appealed the sanctions order to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three. In a prior opinion, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s sanctions order, finding that Tedder and Kent’s actions were not substantially justified and that their arguments on appeal were largely frivolous. Following the remittitur, Baer moved in the trial court to recover attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal, arguing that the relevant discovery statutes authorized such an award. The trial court agreed, awarding Baer $113,532.50 in appellate attorney’s fees, but imposed liability only on Tedder. On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) authorize a trial court to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to a party who successfully defends an order imposing monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The appellate court found the amount of fees reasonable with one reduction and concluded that both Tedder and Kent should be held jointly and severally liable for the full amount. The order was modified to reduce the fee award to $101,805 and to impose joint and several liability on both Tedder and Kent, and as modified, the order was affirmed and remanded for entry of the revised order. View "Baer v. Tedder" on Justia Law

State ex rel. Condon v. Braaten

2025-10-24T05:36:48-08:00

A county attorney in Nebraska sought to challenge the appointment of a special prosecutor in a juvenile court case. The issue arose because the county attorney’s adult daughter, who works as a caseworker for the Department of Health and Human Services, was assigned to the same juvenile case and could potentially be called as a witness. The daughter testified that she did not discuss her work with her father and that her father’s position would not affect her testimony. The deputy county attorney assigned to the case also testified to his independence in handling the matter. The Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster County, on its own initiative, raised concerns about a possible conflict of interest due to the familial relationship. The court found that the lack of disclosure of the relationship, combined with the organizational structure of the county attorney’s office, created a conflict of interest. Relying on Nebraska ethics advisory opinions and a prior appellate decision, the court concluded that the entire county attorney’s office should be disqualified and appointed a special prosecutor under Nebraska Revised Statute § 23-1205. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the matter as an original action in quo warranto. The court held that the existence of a conflict of interest must be determined on a case-by-case basis and is personal to the attorney involved. It found no evidence that the county attorney’s professional judgment or the deputy county attorney’s independence was compromised by the daughter’s involvement. The court concluded that the appointment of a special prosecutor was unwarranted under the facts presented and ordered the ouster of the special prosecutor, reinstating the county attorney’s office to the case. View "State ex rel. Condon v. Braaten" on Justia Law

Marcus & Cinelli, LLP v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co.

2025-10-23T07:30:08-08:00

A law firm sought defense and indemnification from its professional liability insurer after being sued in New York state court by a judgment creditor of its client. The creditor alleged that the firm facilitated the sale of the client’s diamond ring and received a portion of the proceeds to satisfy past fees and as a retainer for future services, despite a restraining notice prohibiting the client from transferring assets due to an unpaid judgment. The state court complaint accused the firm of fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with judgment collection, and contempt of court. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the law firm’s claims for defense and indemnification and denied its motion for partial summary judgment regarding the insurer’s duty to defend. The district court found that the policy’s misappropriation exclusion applied, concluding that the firm’s handling of the sale proceeds was unauthorized in light of the restraining notice, regardless of the client’s consent. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. Applying New York law, the Second Circuit held that the allegations in the underlying complaint involved the provision of professional services by the law firm and did not constitute “misappropriation” as commonly understood, since there was no allegation that the firm acted without its client’s authorization. The court found the term “misappropriation” ambiguous and construed it in favor of the insured. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal, reversed the denial of partial summary judgment on the duty to defend, and remanded with instructions to enter partial summary judgment for the law firm on the insurer’s duty to defend. The court did not address other policy exclusions or the insurer’s ultimate duty to indemnify. View "Marcus & Cinelli, LLP v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

CENTRIPETAL NETWORKS, LLC v. PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC.

2025-10-22T07:02:21-08:00

Centripetal Networks LLC owns a patent related to rule-based network threat detection for encrypted communications. In November 2021, Palo Alto Networks petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of certain claims of Centripetal’s patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted the IPR with a panel of three administrative patent judges (APJs). Subsequently, Cisco Systems and Keysight Technologies filed similar petitions and sought to join the proceedings. During the process, Centripetal discovered that one APJ, McNamara, owned Cisco stock and moved for the recusal of the panel and vacatur of the institution decision, arguing a conflict of interest. After rehearing requests and additional disclosures, APJ McNamara and another APJ withdrew from the panel, but the Board denied Centripetal’s recusal motion as untimely and found no violation of ethics rules or due process. The PTAB, in its final written decision, held claims 1, 24, and 25 of Centripetal’s patent unpatentable as obvious. Centripetal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging both the merits of the Board’s obviousness determination and the handling of the recusal issue. The Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s recusal analysis for abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions de novo, finding that Centripetal’s recusal motion was untimely and that the APJ’s stock ownership did not violate applicable ethics regulations. The court also determined that Centripetal’s due process rights were not infringed and that the Board’s actions did not warrant vacatur based on recusal concerns. However, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB failed to adequately consider evidence of copying presented by Centripetal as part of the obviousness analysis. The court vacated the Board’s final written decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Board to properly address the evidence of copying. The disposition by the Federal Circuit was “vacated and remanded.” View "CENTRIPETAL NETWORKS, LLC v. PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC. " on Justia Law

People v. Wagstaff

2025-10-16T10:31:45-08:00

A Black man was charged with multiple offenses, including felony false imprisonment, after a domestic violence incident in which his girlfriend alleged he struck her and prevented her from leaving his car. Witnesses observed the girlfriend attempting to exit the moving vehicle and heard shouting. The girlfriend initially told police that the defendant hit her and threatened her if she tried to leave, but later recanted, claiming she fabricated the story out of anger. The prosecution introduced both her initial statements and her recantation at trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of felony false imprisonment and other related charges, but acquitted him of attempted robbery. He admitted a prior conviction, and the trial court imposed a total sentence of nine years and four months, including time for an unrelated prior case. During trial, the defendant’s counsel raised concerns under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) regarding the racial composition of the jury venire and the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of a Black prospective juror. The Santa Clara County Superior Court denied these motions, finding no evidence of bias or violation of the RJA. At sentencing, the court made comments referencing the defendant’s race and background, but defense counsel did not object to these statements under the RJA. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant forfeited his RJA claims on appeal by failing to object to the trial court’s statements at the appropriate time. The court also found no merit in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was a conceivable tactical reason for not objecting. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on misdemeanor false imprisonment, as there was no substantial evidence to support that lesser offense. The judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed. View "People v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law

English v. Crochet

2025-10-08T15:30:16-08:00

An attorney who represented a client in a high-profile employment discrimination case against Louisiana State University (LSU) officials later brought suit against two attorneys and their law firm who had served as outside counsel to LSU. The plaintiff alleged that these attorneys engaged in misconduct during a Title IX investigation and, during subsequent state court litigation, made defamatory statements about him, including accusations of fabricating evidence. The state court had previously imposed significant monetary sanctions against the plaintiff and his client, citing, among other things, the plaintiff’s alleged fabrication of evidence and abusive litigation tactics. After the state court proceedings, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, asserting claims for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy under Louisiana law. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. It found the defamation claim barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which limits federal review of state court judgments, and determined that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was inadequately pleaded. The court also dismissed the conspiracy claim for lack of an underlying tort and denied leave to amend the complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not bar the defamation claim because the plaintiff’s alleged injury arose from the defendants’ conduct, not from the state court judgment itself. The court vacated the dismissal of the defamation and conspiracy claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding the alleged conduct did not meet the required legal standard. The court also vacated the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "English v. Crochet" on Justia Law

De Meo v. Cooley LLP

2025-10-08T14:01:53-08:00

Giovanni De Meo, a co-founder of ReTech Labs, Inc., was involved in two business transactions in 2017 and 2021 concerning Rebotics, LLC, a company in which he held a minority interest. Cooley LLP served as outside counsel for ReTech and later for Rebotics, but De Meo was never a direct client of Cooley. In both transactions, Cooley prepared documents at the direction of its client, but did not communicate or negotiate directly with De Meo regarding the terms. During the 2021 transaction, De Meo retained his own counsel and negotiated separately with the buyer, Symphony AI, ultimately securing more favorable terms for himself without Cooley’s involvement. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment in favor of Cooley LLP, finding no attorney-client relationship between De Meo and Cooley during either transaction. The court determined that Cooley had complied with its professional obligations, including those under California State Bar Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(f), and that De Meo’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment were unsupported by the facts. The court also excluded certain evidence submitted by De Meo, including portions of his declaration and an expert’s declaration, on evidentiary grounds. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that no express or implied attorney-client relationship existed between De Meo and Cooley, and that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not create a fiduciary duty to nonclients actionable in tort. The court also found that De Meo’s fraudulent concealment theory was not properly pled and could not be considered. The judgment in favor of Cooley LLP was affirmed. View "De Meo v. Cooley LLP" on Justia Law

Weiss v. President and Fellows of Harvard College

2025-10-07T04:13:41-08:00

A staff member at a university medical school morgue, Cedric Lodge, engaged in a scheme over several years in which he dissected, stole, and sold body parts from cadavers that had been donated for research and education. After Lodge’s federal indictment became public, forty-seven relatives of individuals whose remains were potentially mishandled sued the university, the managing director of the anatomical gift program (Cicchetti), and the program manager (Fay). The plaintiffs alleged that the university and its staff failed to ensure the dignified treatment and disposition of donated remains, pointing to inadequate security and oversight, and referenced a similar prior scandal at another institution. The cases were consolidated in the Massachusetts Superior Court, where the defendants moved to dismiss all claims, arguing they were protected by the “good faith” immunity provision of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). The Superior Court judge granted the motion, finding that the complaints did not plausibly suggest the defendants failed to act in good faith or were legally responsible for Lodge’s actions. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the UAGA’s good faith immunity applies to the entire anatomical donation process, including the final disposition of remains. The court further held that the plaintiffs’ allegations against the university and Cicchetti, if true, could support a finding of “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” with the act, sufficient to infer a lack of good faith and defeat the motion to dismiss at this stage. However, the court found the allegations against Fay insufficient to overcome the good faith defense. The court reversed the dismissal as to the university and Cicchetti (except for respondeat superior claims), affirmed dismissal as to Fay, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Weiss v. President and Fellows of Harvard College" on Justia Law

Walgreen v. Jensen

2025-10-02T06:20:24-08:00

A man with severe chronic pain had long been prescribed oxycodone. When he visited his doctor for an unrelated issue, he was also prescribed clonazepam, a benzodiazepine. The combination of these two drugs carries a significant risk of respiratory depression and death, a fact underscored by an FDA-mandated black box warning. The man and his wife expressed concern about the new prescription, but his doctor reassured them. When the prescription for clonazepam was filled at a pharmacy, the pharmacist’s computer system flagged a warning about the dangerous interaction with oxycodone. The pharmacist overrode the warning and dispensed the medication. The man died the next day from toxicity due to both drugs. The man’s family and estate sued the pharmacy, alleging negligence, including a failure to warn about the drug interaction. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, denied the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on the “learned intermediary rule.” This rule generally exempts pharmacists from warning patients about the general risks of FDA-approved drugs, on the assumption that the prescribing physician is best positioned to provide such warnings. The district court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the pharmacist knew of a patient-specific risk and whether the learned intermediary rule applied. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the learned intermediary rule does not shield a pharmacist from liability when the pharmacist is aware of a patient-specific risk, as opposed to general risks associated with a drug. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, clarifying that pharmacists retain a duty to act as a reasonably prudent pharmacist would when aware of such risks. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walgreen v. Jensen" on Justia Law

State v. Maestas

2025-10-01T10:21:25-08:00

Attorney Alan Maestas was found guilty of direct punitive contempt for refusing to proceed to trial despite the district court’s orders and warnings. As a sanction, the district court imposed a ten-day jail sentence, suspended in full, and ordered Maestas to pay a $1,000 fine to the New Mexico State Bar Foundation. The contempt finding and sanction arose from Maestas’s conduct in the presence of the court, which the court determined warranted punitive measures. The New Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s contempt finding and affirmed it, but found that the initial sanction imposed was an abuse of discretion. On remand, the district court imposed the revised sanction described above. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court of New Mexico the question of whether a contempt fine ordered payable to a third party is permitted by statute and the New Mexico Constitution. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that a fine payable to a third party is permitted under the judiciary’s inherent and broad contempt power and is constitutional. The Court clarified that only fees collected by the judicial department, not fines merely imposed, are subject to the limitations of Article VI, Section 30 of the New Mexico Constitution. The Court distinguished between “fees” and “fines,” finding that the constitutional provision applies only to fees collected, not to punitive contempt fines directed to third parties. The Court also found no relevant legislative constraint on the type of fine imposed in this case. The matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of other issues raised on appeal. View "State v. Maestas" on Justia Law

Bjorkman v. Noble

2025-09-30T08:44:23-08:00

Several homeowners initiated a lawsuit against an individual, alleging conversion, trespass, outrage, reformation of restrictive covenants, quiet title, and seeking injunctive relief to prevent interference with their use of common areas in a real estate development. The defendant retained counsel and filed a timely answer. However, when the homeowners moved for summary judgment, the defendant’s attorney failed to respond or inform his client about the motion. The district court granted summary judgment for the homeowners, awarding substantial actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees, far exceeding the amount requested in the motion. After more than 30 days had passed since judgment, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment in the District Court of Cherokee County, Oklahoma, arguing that unavoidable casualty or misfortune, fraud, and irregularity had prevented him from defending the action. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to vacate. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that the defendant had not properly pled a valid defense and that his attorney’s negligence was imputed to him. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the attorney’s abandonment of the case without the client’s knowledge, combined with a breakdown in office procedures and lack of communication, constituted unavoidable casualty or misfortune under Oklahoma law. The court further found that the district court’s award of damages and attorney’s fees without a hearing or proper evidentiary support violated the defendant’s due process rights. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. It also vacated the appellate attorney fee award previously granted to the homeowners. View "Bjorkman v. Noble" on Justia Law

Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P.

2025-09-12T12:31:11-08:00

Sylvia Noland was hired by the defendants to work as a leasing agent and sales representative for two properties in Los Angeles. She was promised compensation for administrative work, commissions for securing tenants and booking events, and a monthly draw against earnings. Noland alleged that defendants failed to pay her the agreed amounts, including a substantial commission, minimum wage, overtime, and proper wage statements. She also claimed she was constructively terminated after refusing to participate in leasing activities she believed were unlawful. Her complaint included 25 causes of action, ranging from wage and hour violations to breach of contract and emotional distress. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first denied defendants’ initial motion for summary judgment on procedural grounds. After a trial continuance due to defense counsel’s medical issues, defendants refiled their summary judgment motion. The trial court overruled plaintiff’s objections to the successive motion, finding it permissible since the prior denial was not on the merits. After considering the parties’ arguments, the court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Noland was an independent contractor, not entitled to wage protections, and not owed the claimed commission. The court also denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and her requests to reopen discovery, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural error. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the court had discretion to consider the renewed summary judgment motion and that plaintiff’s substantive arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also imposed a $10,000 sanction on plaintiff’s counsel for filing briefs containing fabricated legal citations generated by AI, directed counsel to serve the opinion on his client, and ordered the clerk to notify the State Bar. Respondents were awarded appellate costs. View "Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P." on Justia Law

Upsolve, Inc. v. James

2025-09-09T06:30:11-08:00

A nonprofit organization sought to provide free legal advice to low-income New Yorkers facing debt-collection lawsuits by training nonlawyer “Justice Advocates” to help individuals complete a state-issued check-the-box answer form. The organization and a prospective Justice Advocate argued that many defendants in such cases default due to lack of understanding, leading to severe consequences. However, New York law prohibits nonlawyers from providing individualized legal advice, and all parties agreed that the proposed activities would violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes. The plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that applying the UPL statutes to their activities would violate their First Amendment rights. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing and were likely to succeed on the merits, holding that the UPL statutes, as applied, were a content-based regulation of speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. The court granted a preliminary injunction, barring the Attorney General from enforcing the UPL statutes against the plaintiffs and participants in their program. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the UPL statutes, as applied, regulate speech. However, the Second Circuit held that the regulation is content neutral, not content based, and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Because the district court applied the wrong standard, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. The court did not reach a final decision on whether the statutes, as applied, ultimately violate the First Amendment, leaving that determination for the district court on remand. View "Upsolve, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

Neal v USA

2025-09-05T09:02:03-08:00

Tyree M. Neal, Jr. was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine under federal law. After evading arrest in a high-speed chase and carjacking, he was eventually apprehended. The government sought a sentencing enhancement based on Neal’s prior Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine, which, if applied, increased his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years. Neal pleaded guilty, represented by several attorneys during plea negotiations and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found the enhancement applicable and imposed the 30-year maximum. Neal appealed, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and lacked a factual basis, but did not challenge the enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. Subsequently, Neal filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his appellate, sentencing, and plea counsel were deficient for failing to raise the argument that his Illinois cocaine conviction could not support the federal enhancement, an argument that later succeeded in United States v. Ruth. The district court denied relief, finding that counsel were not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in law, and held an evidentiary hearing regarding appellate counsel’s performance. The court concluded appellate counsel was not ineffective, as the unraised argument was not “obvious nor clearly stronger” than those presented. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, although later precedent established the categorical approach to such enhancements, counsel’s failure to raise the argument did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that none of Neal’s attorneys performed below an objective standard of reasonableness given the law at the time, and thus denied collateral relief. View "Neal v USA" on Justia Law

Morales v. City of San Francisco

2025-09-04T12:30:54-08:00

The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the City and County of San Francisco, seeking $5,000,000 in damages for injuries sustained after falling from a scooter that struck a pothole. During discovery, the City sought information about the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of the incident. The plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide timely and complete responses to certain form interrogatories related to requests for admission about intoxication, despite repeated requests and meet and confer efforts by the City. Additionally, during an independent medical examination, observers chosen by the plaintiff’s attorney interfered with the process, preventing the examining doctor from completing the evaluation. The Superior Court of San Francisco City and County addressed two discovery disputes. First, it granted the City’s motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and imposed a $6,500 sanction against the plaintiff’s counsel for failing to provide timely, code-compliant responses. Second, it imposed a $1,500 sanction after finding that the plaintiff’s observers had improperly interfered with the medical examination. The parties settled the underlying action, but the plaintiff appealed the sanctions. The City moved to dismiss portions of the appeal, arguing that some orders were not appealable and that the sanctions for the medical exam were below the statutory threshold for appeal. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, granted the City’s motion to partially dismiss the appeal, finding that the orders regarding the protective order and the $1,500 sanction were not appealable. The court affirmed the $6,500 sanction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing it, as the plaintiff’s counsel lacked substantial justification for opposing the motion to compel. The appellate court also imposed $30,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and referred the matter to the State Bar. View "Morales v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

P. v. Cardenas

2025-09-04T09:01:26-08:00

The case involved a defendant who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder, all arising from a gang-related shooting in Visalia, California. The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was a member of the North Side Visalia gang and that he shot individuals he believed to be rival gang members, resulting in one death and serious injury to another. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on expert testimony to establish the defendant’s gang membership and the gang-related nature of the crimes, as well as evidence of prior offenses by the defendant and other gang members. The defense argued that the shooting was not premeditated or gang-motivated, but rather stemmed from a personal dispute, and presented evidence that the defendant had renounced gang affiliation. The Tulare County Superior Court denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to recuse the entire District Attorney’s Office after his former defense attorney joined that office, finding that an effective ethical wall had been established. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, found true the gang enhancements and the gang-murder special circumstance, and returned a death verdict. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. On automatic appeal, the Supreme Court of California reviewed the case. The court held that, due to subsequent legal developments—specifically, its decision in People v. Sanchez and legislative amendments to Penal Code section 186.22 by Assembly Bill 333—the evidence was insufficient to support the gang enhancements and the gang-murder special circumstance. As a result, the court reversed the gang-related findings and the death judgment. The court also ordered a limited remand to allow the defendant to further develop his claim that his trial counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right of autonomy over the defense, as articulated in McCoy v. Louisiana. The convictions and death judgment were reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "P. v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

Moore v. United States

2025-09-04T06:05:08-08:00

The appellant was represented by an attorney in a criminal contempt proceeding after allegedly violating a civil protective order. During the course of representation, the appellant twice made statements to his attorney threatening to kill the Assistant Attorney General prosecuting his case, including specific language and gestures indicating an intent to cause harm. The attorney, disturbed by these threats, initially sought to withdraw from representation and later disclosed the threats to the court after being ordered to do so. The attorney subsequently testified before a grand jury and at trial regarding the threats, which led to the appellant being charged and convicted by a jury of threatening a public official and obstruction of justice. Following conviction in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the appellant challenged the admissibility of his attorney’s testimony, arguing that the statements were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that the threats were not made for the purpose of seeking legal advice and thus were not privileged. On appeal, a division of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals initially vacated the convictions, holding that the statements were privileged and their admission was not harmless error. The United States successfully petitioned for en banc review, and the full court vacated the division’s decision, limiting the scope of review to the attorney-client privilege issue. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the attorney-client privilege does not protect communications that themselves constitute criminal threats to cause death or serious bodily harm. The court reasoned that such threats are an abuse of the attorney-client relationship and fall outside the privilege, regardless of whether the technical elements of the privilege are otherwise met. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s admission of the attorney’s testimony and remanded the case for consideration of the appellant’s remaining arguments. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law

De'Andrea v. City of Montgomery

2025-08-29T05:30:07-08:00

Jessica De'Andrea, a patrol officer with the Montgomery Police Department, was involved in a motor vehicle collision while on duty. The driver of the other vehicle, Clint Walters, later sued De'Andrea individually for negligence, resulting in a $550,000 judgment against her after a jury trial. De'Andrea alleged that the City of Montgomery, which had procured liability insurance and acted as a self-insurer for its employees, failed to properly defend her, did not communicate settlement or appeal options, and refused to satisfy the judgment. She claimed these failures led to her bankruptcy and brought multiple claims against the City, including breach of contract, bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violations of the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act. The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the City's motions to dismiss, finding it was not apparent beyond doubt that De'Andrea could prove no set of circumstances entitling her to relief. The City then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus, seeking dismissal of all claims on the basis of statutory immunity and other defenses. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed only the City's immunity defense as to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, because the City had not preserved immunity arguments for the other claims in the lower court. The Court held that municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, does not automatically bar all fraudulent misrepresentation claims, as such claims can be based on innocent or mistaken misrepresentations, not just intentional torts. The Court denied the City's petition for a writ of mandamus, allowing De'Andrea's claims to proceed. The City may raise its other defenses on appeal if necessary. View "De'Andrea v. City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

USA V. HUNT

2025-08-27T08:00:42-08:00

In this case, the defendant was shot five times in his apartment parking lot and, in the chaos, dropped his black iPhone and a satchel. His girlfriend took the satchel but left the phone, which was later recovered by police near some shrubs. The police also seized a different (white) iPhone from the defendant at the hospital. The black iPhone remained in police evidence for over two years, until it became relevant in a separate federal drug investigation. The government ultimately used data from the black iPhone, along with other evidence, to charge the defendant with drug trafficking, firearm offenses, and money laundering. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the black iPhone, arguing that he retained a privacy interest in the device and its data, and also sought recusal of the district judge due to her prior service as U.S. Attorney when he was prosecuted for unrelated charges over fifteen years earlier. The district court denied both motions, finding that the defendant had abandoned the black iPhone and thus lacked standing to challenge its search, and that recusal was not warranted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that the defendant had abandoned his privacy interest in the black iPhone, holding that the circumstances—dropping the phone while fleeing after being shot—did not show intent to abandon the device or its data. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the suppression motion because federal agents obtained a warrant and searched the phone within a reasonable period. The court also affirmed the denial of the recusal motion, concluding that a reasonable person would not question the judge’s impartiality under these facts. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. HUNT" on Justia Law

Devalle v. Sheriffs’ Education & Training Standards Commission

2025-08-22T13:08:58-08:00

Maurice Devalle, a former North Carolina State Highway Patrol sergeant, was terminated in April 2017 after an internal investigation revealed he had falsified his home address to meet residency requirements, submitted false time sheets, and was untruthful about his work activities. Shortly after his termination, Devalle accepted a position as a deputy sheriff and school resource officer in Columbus County and applied for justice officer certification from the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Education and Training Standards Commission. Over the following year and a half, Devalle received strong character endorsements from his new supervisors and colleagues, who testified to his rehabilitation and positive impact in his new role. After reviewing Devalle’s application, the Commission’s Probable Cause Committee determined he lacked good moral character based on his prior misconduct and did not conduct a new investigation into his recent conduct. Devalle challenged the denial in a contested case before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who found his supporting witnesses credible but noted Devalle’s own testimony was evasive and lacked candor. The Commission ultimately denied certification, citing Devalle’s lack of truthfulness during the hearing. Devalle sought judicial review in Superior Court, Columbus County, which reversed the Commission’s decision, finding insufficient evidence to support the denial and ordering retroactive certification. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious compared to its handling of a prior, similar case. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the whole record test and found substantial evidence supported the Commission’s conclusion that Devalle lacked the requisite candor and truthfulness. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the Commission’s indefinite denial of certification. View "Devalle v. Sheriffs’ Education & Training Standards Commission" on Justia Law