Products Liability - Justia Case Law Summaries

Quinn v. General Electric Co.

2026-06-01T13:56:42-08:00

A woman developed mesothelioma and lung cancer, allegedly due to exposure to asbestos dust brought home on her husband’s work clothing. Her husband, a professional insulator, installed asbestos-containing insulation on turbines manufactured by a defendant company at a Maryland power plant in the 1960s. Facilities for workers to shower or change at the worksite were not provided, so he regularly brought dusty work clothes home. The woman, who never visited the worksite, handled and laundered these clothes, potentially exposing herself to asbestos fibers. After her death, her estate continued the personal injury and wrongful death action against the manufacturer and others. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment to the defendant on all claims, including strict liability for design defect. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment concerning the design defect claim and remanded the case. Following further proceedings, the Superior Court again granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that as a bystander, the plaintiff could not recover on a strict liability theory. This led to a second appeal, after which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court of Maryland the question of whether, under Maryland law, a household member exposed to asbestos dust brought home by a worker must prove an additional element of duty in a strict liability design defect claim. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a household member in the plaintiff’s position is not required to prove the additional element of duty beyond the four elements of strict liability for design defect as set forth in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. The court clarified that, unlike failure to warn and negligence claims, duty is not a required element for strict liability design defect claims, whether for users, consumers, or household members exposed through no fault of their own. View "Quinn v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

Johnson v. SRM-Double L, LLC

2026-06-01T13:35:59-08:00

A workplace accident in 2020 resulted in the death of Colby Eldon Johnson, who was using a self-unloading bed manufactured by SRM-Double L, LLC (“SRM”) on his employer’s truck. Colby’s father, Harry Johnson, filed suit against SRM and others, alleging products liability and negligence. During pretrial proceedings, Johnson failed to submit timely responses to SRM’s discovery requests and did not file his opposition to SRM’s summary judgment motion by the court-ordered deadline. He later filed late motions and exhibits, citing scheduling conflicts and unresolved discovery issues. The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Gooding County, granted SRM’s motions to strike Johnson’s untimely filings, finding no valid justification for the delay. Consequently, the court treated SRM’s summary judgment motion as unopposed and granted summary judgment in SRM’s favor, finding Johnson’s claims barred by Idaho statutes. The court also awarded attorney fees and sanctions against Johnson and his counsel under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37, based on alleged misrepresentations and discovery delays. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to strike Johnson’s untimely filings, finding no abuse of discretion. However, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the lower court failed to analyze whether SRM had met its burden under Rule 56(a), which is required even if the motion is unopposed. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney fees under Rule 37 for discovery violations but reversed the sanctions under Rule 11 because the only support for the sanctions was inadmissible hearsay. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. Attorney fees on appeal were denied, as no party had yet prevailed. View "Johnson v. SRM-Double L, LLC" on Justia Law

Colwell v. Sig Sauer, Inc.

2026-05-28T07:00:03-08:00

A police sergeant suffered a gunshot injury to his leg when his department-issued Sig Sauer P320 pistol discharged while he was conducting a training exercise. He did not know what caused the trigger to move, but testified that the pistol was holstered and his hand was not on the gun at the time. Emergency responders’ documentation, however, suggested the gun discharged while he was still holstering it. The injured officer and his spouse brought strict products liability and negligence claims against the manufacturer, alleging that the P320 was defectively designed because it lacked an external safety, making it prone to accidental discharges. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York excluded the causation opinions of the plaintiffs’ experts, finding their analysis unreliable because they did not explain how the accident happened or how an external safety would have prevented it. The district court then granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, concluding New York law required expert testimony to establish proximate causation in a case involving the operation of a complex product like a firearm, and the plaintiffs could not meet that burden without admissible expert causation opinions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the experts’ causation opinions, as they were not sufficiently grounded in the facts of the accident. However, the Second Circuit ruled that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court held that, under New York law, expert testimony on causation is not always required if a jury can determine causation based on its own judgment, the characteristics of the product, and the evidence presented. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colwell v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

Beavan v. Allergan U.S.A., Inc.

2026-05-27T06:38:20-08:00

A plaintiff alleged that she suffered serious eye injuries, including blindness in one eye, after receiving an injection of a pharmaceutical product manufactured by the defendant. The specific unit used was from a lot later recalled due to the possible presence of silicone particulates. The plaintiff had a history of eye conditions and prior treatments but argued that her injuries followed the use of the recalled product. She presented two experts on causation: a retained ophthalmologist who provided a report and deposition, and her treating physician, who did not provide a written expert report. The Superior Court, Law Division, denied the defendant’s motions to bar the experts’ testimony and for summary judgment. The court did not conduct the “gatekeeping” inquiry regarding expert reliability required by New Jersey law. The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. It found the experts’ opinions to be inadmissible net opinions, lacking evidentiary support for the proposed theory of causation and methodology. The Appellate Division thus also reversed the denial of summary judgment, holding the plaintiff had not established causation. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that its decision in In re Accutane Litigation requires trial courts to resolve disputes about the reliability of expert testimony by undertaking a “rigorous” gatekeeping analysis, potentially including a hearing under N.J.R.E. 104. The Supreme Court found the record insufficient for this determination and ordered a remand so the trial court could conduct the proper reliability inquiry. The Court held the retained expert’s report was not a net opinion but left open whether the treating physician’s testimony could be admitted, depending on whether a proper expert report is served. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Beavan v. Allergan U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

OLSON V. FCA US, LLC

2026-05-21T08:01:11-08:00

Jeffrey Olson leased a Jeep Grand Cherokee from a car dealership under a lease agreement that included an arbitration provision and a delegation clause, which assigned questions about the scope of arbitration to an arbitrator. FCA US, LLC, the manufacturer of the Jeep, was not a signatory to the lease agreement. Olson later became the named plaintiff in a federal class-action lawsuit against FCA, alleging defects in the vehicle’s headrest system. FCA, not being a party to the lease, sought to compel Olson to arbitrate the dispute based on the arbitration agreement between Olson and the dealership. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration. The district court found that FCA, as a non-signatory to the lease agreement, could not enforce the arbitration provision or its delegation clause against Olson. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement applied only to Olson and the dealership (including its employees, agents, successors, or assigns), and FCA did not qualify under any of those categories. Additionally, the court rejected FCA’s argument that it could use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration, holding that none of Olson’s claims were sufficiently intertwined with the lease agreement to justify such an exception under California law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that FCA could not compel Olson to arbitrate because FCA was not a party to the arbitration agreement and no applicable exception—such as equitable estoppel—applied. The court clarified that, under both federal and California law, only parties to an arbitration agreement (or those qualifying under specific, limited exceptions) may enforce it. The court also rejected FCA’s reliance on Supreme Court precedent, finding it inapplicable to non-signatories in these circumstances. View "OLSON V. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

In re Whittaker, Clark & Daniels Inc

2026-05-19T09:00:14-08:00

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and three affiliates, with a history of manufacturing, storing, and distributing asbestos-containing talc, faced thousands of personal injury and environmental claims. After a $29 million verdict against Whittaker in South Carolina, a state court there appointed a receiver to administer Whittaker’s assets. Whittaker’s board, without consulting the receiver, authorized and filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. The Debtors’ estates were largely depleted by a 2004 asset sale to Brenntag, which expressly excluded liability for pre-sale asbestos and environmental claims. The Debtors, now essentially shells, sought to settle successor liability claims against Brenntag for $535 million, but some talc claimants had already asserted such claims against Brenntag in state courts. The South Carolina receiver and the Official Committee of Talc Claimants challenged the bankruptcy filing’s validity, arguing that only the receiver could authorize such a filing under the South Carolina court's order. The receiver’s motion to dismiss the bankruptcy petition as unauthorized was denied by the Bankruptcy Court, which found the South Carolina order did not divest Whittaker’s board of its authority. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed. In parallel, the Committee contested whether certain “product-line” successor liability claims belonged to the Debtors’ estates or to individual creditors. The Bankruptcy Court, referencing Third Circuit precedent, held that such claims were property of the bankruptcy estates. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed both lower court decisions. It held that Whittaker’s Chapter 11 filing was valid, as the South Carolina court’s receivership order did not displace the board’s authority under New Jersey law, which governs corporate internal affairs. The court further held that successor liability claims based on product-line theory, even if nominally assertable by creditors outside bankruptcy, are property of the bankruptcy estate when they address a general injury to the debtor that results in secondary harm to all creditors. Accordingly, the judgments below were affirmed. View "In re Whittaker, Clark & Daniels Inc" on Justia Law

Polinder v. Aecom Energy & Constr., Inc.

2026-04-30T07:13:05-08:00

A worker at the Cherry Point oil refinery in Washington was regularly exposed to asbestos-containing insulation during his employment, which began in 1971. The insulation at issue was chosen, supplied, and installed by a subcontractor as part of the refinery’s original construction in the early 1970s. Decades after his exposure, the worker developed mesothelioma and died from the disease. His estate brought claims against numerous defendants, including the subcontractor, based on alleged asbestos exposure at the refinery. The Whatcom County Superior Court first granted summary judgment for the subcontractor, relying on Maxwell v. Atlantic Richfield Co., which held that Washington’s six-year construction statute of repose barred such claims. However, the court reconsidered and denied summary judgment after the Washington Court of Appeals issued Welch v. Brand Insulations, Inc., which found there were factual questions about whether the subcontractor’s activities were covered by the statute of repose. Due to conflicting appellate decisions, the Supreme Court of Washington granted direct review. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that claims against the subcontractor arising from its construction activities—specifically, its installation of asbestos insulation as part of constructing an improvement on real property—are barred by the construction statute of repose. However, the court held that claims based on the subcontractor’s independent role as a product seller or supplier, separate from its construction activities, are not barred by the statute of repose. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine which claims, if any, survive under theories of product seller or supplier liability. The court declined to address the constitutionality of the statute of repose, as that issue was not timely raised. View "Polinder v. Aecom Energy & Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Quinn v. General Electric Co.

2026-04-27T12:17:06-08:00

A woman developed mesothelioma and lung cancer, allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos dust brought home on her husband’s work clothing. Her husband had applied asbestos-containing insulation to power generation turbines manufactured by a company at a Maryland power plant in the 1960s. The plaintiff did not work at the plant or use the product herself but routinely shook out and laundered her husband’s dusty clothes. After her death, her estate continued the lawsuit, asserting a strict liability design defect claim against the turbine manufacturer and others. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment for the manufacturer on all claims. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment as to the strict liability design defect claim and remanded the case. Following remand, the Superior Court again granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, concluding that, under Maryland law, the plaintiff could not recover as a bystander. The plaintiff appealed, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Supreme Court of Maryland, asking whether a household member claiming injury from asbestos dust must prove an additional element of “duty” beyond the four elements of strict liability under Maryland law. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a household member in the plaintiff’s position need not prove the additional element of duty to recover on a strict liability design defect claim in an asbestos case. The court emphasized that, unlike negligence or failure to warn claims, strict liability design defect actions require only the four elements identified in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. The court clarified that “duty” is not an additional element for such claims, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a “user,” “consumer,” or a household member exposed through no fault of their own. View "Quinn v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

In re: Whittaker Clark & Daniels

2026-04-27T09:00:10-08:00

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and three affiliates, historically involved in the manufacture and distribution of asbestos-containing talc, faced thousands of personal injury and environmental claims. Over the years, the companies divested their operating assets, notably selling them to Brenntag North America in 2004 while expressly excluding pre-sale asbestos and environmental liabilities. As liabilities mounted, one plaintiff obtained a large jury verdict in South Carolina and successfully moved to put Whittaker into receivership, with a receiver appointed to administer its assets. Following the South Carolina receivership, Whittaker's board authorized a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey without consulting the receiver. The receiver moved to dismiss the bankruptcy, arguing that under the receivership order, only he had authority to file such a petition. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding that the receivership order did not displace the board’s authority. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed this ruling. While bankruptcy proceedings moved forward, the Debtors negotiated a $535 million settlement with Brenntag to resolve successor liability claims. However, the Official Committee of Talc Claimants argued that certain product-line successor liability claims belonged exclusively to talc creditors and not to the bankruptcy estate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed two central issues. First, it held that the propriety of Whittaker’s bankruptcy petition did not affect the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction and that, under New Jersey law, the board retained authority to file for bankruptcy because the South Carolina receiver had not obtained recognition or ancillary receivership in New Jersey. Second, the court held that product-line successor liability claims, like other derivative claims based on injury to the debtor and available to all creditors, are property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ judgments. View "In re: Whittaker Clark & Daniels" on Justia Law

Berkley Regional Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc.

2026-04-27T07:30:50-08:00

An employee of a Minnesota company purchased a third-party replacement battery for her cellphone through an online marketplace. The battery, sold by a Chinese company and shipped via the marketplace’s fulfillment program, malfunctioned and caused a fire, resulting in significant property damage. The employer’s insurer covered the loss and then pursued recovery from the online marketplace, the battery’s seller, and the manufacturer. The insurer’s claims against all parties except the online marketplace were eventually dropped. After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the insurer sought to have the court certify to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of whether the online marketplace could be strictly liable for the defect under Minnesota law. The district court, however, declined to certify the question and instead made its own prediction (“Erie guess”) that Minnesota law would not hold the marketplace strictly liable for third-party goods it fulfills but does not sell. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the issue presented is novel, unsettled under Minnesota law, and implicates significant public policy concerns. The appellate court decided it was appropriate to certify the legal question to the Minnesota Supreme Court, rather than attempt its own prediction. The court certified the question of whether, under Minnesota law, an e-commerce company that allows an unrelated party to sell a defective product through its website and provides order-fulfillment services is strictly liable for harm caused by the defect. The Eighth Circuit stayed further proceedings pending the Minnesota Supreme Court’s response. The holding is that the court will certify this question to the Minnesota Supreme Court and not decide the merits of strict liability itself. View "Berkley Regional Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

2026-04-24T09:02:50-08:00

The case involves a decedent who developed and died from mesothelioma, a disease linked to asbestos exposure. The decedent encountered asbestos both during his employment with a state agency and the town of Manchester, as well as outside of work in various settings. After his death, his wife, acting as executrix of his estate, pursued and settled multiple product liability suits against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products. The settlement allocated a percentage of damages to the estate for personal injuries and death, and a portion to the spouse for loss of consortium. Subsequently, the plaintiff also sought and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, based on findings that occupational asbestos exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Before the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Commission, the administrative law judge determined that the decedent’s employers were entitled to a statutory lien under General Statutes § 31-293 (a) on the net settlement proceeds attributable to both occupational and nonoccupational asbestos exposure. The Compensation Review Board affirmed this decision. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the portion of the settlement related to nonoccupational exposure should not be subject to the employer’s lien because this exposure was not a work-related injury under the statute. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the lower board’s ruling. The court held that, because the decedent suffered a single occupational disease—mesothelioma—that was caused in substantial part by occupational exposure, the disease was fully compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, regardless of nonoccupational contributions. Thus, the employers’ lien under § 31-293 (a) extended to the net settlement proceeds from both occupational and nonoccupational exposures. The court also rejected the argument that a tortfeasor’s lack of an employment relationship with the decedent precluded application of the lien. View "Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

IN RE BELL HELICOPTER SERVICES INC.

2026-04-24T06:22:48-08:00

A helicopter manufactured in 1997 by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. was involved in a fatal crash in 2017 after an engine cowling came loose and struck the tail rotor. The pilot, working for a later owner, died in the accident. The pilot’s family brought suit against Bell, alleging that the flight manual was defective for failing to include an explicit warning about the dangers of flying with an unsecured engine cowling, even though the manual included a checklist item stating the cowling should be “Secured.” The physical cowling and its fasteners were original to the aircraft and had not been replaced or modified. Bell asserted that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an 18-year statute of repose, barred the suit. The plaintiffs responded that the repose period had been reset because Bell periodically revised the flight manual in the years before the crash. The 270th District Court of Harris County denied Bell’s summary judgment motion without explanation. Bell then sought mandamus relief from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which denied the petition without a substantive opinion. The Supreme Court of Texas held that GARA’s 18-year clock is only reset when a “new” part or component, including a substantive revision to the flight manual, is added or replaced and is alleged to have caused the accident. Because the engine-cowling instruction in the manual, which was the alleged defect, had not been revised since 1997, and no relevant “new” part was implicated, the rolling provision of GARA did not apply. The court conditionally granted Bell’s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the district court to grant summary judgment for Bell, holding that GARA bars the suit and that mandamus relief was appropriate to prevent litigation Congress has expressly foreclosed. View "IN RE BELL HELICOPTER SERVICES INC." on Justia Law

Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc.

2026-04-23T04:03:22-08:00

A Massachusetts resident, Barbara, began smoking Marlboro and Parliament cigarettes manufactured by Philip Morris as a teenager and continued for decades, becoming addicted and unable to quit despite many attempts. In 2015, after finally quitting, she was diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer and died two years later. Her husband and two children, individually and on behalf of her estate, sued Philip Morris for wrongful death, alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, negligent design and marketing, fraud, civil conspiracy, and deceptive trade practices. The Superior Court (trial court) dismissed claims against other defendants and tried the remaining claims against Philip Morris before a jury. The jury found for the plaintiffs on most claims, awarding $8.014 million in compensatory damages and $1 billion in punitive damages. The judge, after post-trial motions, reduced (remitted) the punitive damages to about $56 million—seven times the compensatory damages—finding the original award excessive. The judge also denied Philip Morris’s motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that the jury was not swayed by passion or prejudice and that the compensatory and punitive damages were supported by the evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying a new trial or further remittitur, and that the remitted punitive damages were constitutionally permissible in light of the egregious conduct by Philip Morris. The court also rejected Philip Morris’s arguments that the trial should have been bifurcated, that a higher burden of proof was required for punitive damages, that federal preemption barred certain claims, and that evidentiary rulings were improper. The judgment and denial of post-trial motions were affirmed. View "Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

2026-04-22T03:09:34-08:00

The case involves a decedent who developed and died from mesothelioma, a disease caused by exposure to asbestos both at his workplace and at home. His wife, acting as executrix of his estate, pursued and settled product liability claims against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products, with the majority of the settlement proceeds attributed to nonoccupational exposure. She also filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits, which were awarded based on findings that both occupational and nonoccupational exposures were significant factors in causing his disease. An administrative law judge for the Workers’ Compensation Commission found that, because the decedent’s work-related asbestos exposure was a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma, the disease constituted a compensable occupational disease under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The judge awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the estate and the surviving spouse. The judge further concluded that the decedent’s employers—the state and the town—were entitled under Connecticut General Statutes § 31-293(a) to a lien on the net amount of the tort settlement proceeds received by the estate, including those attributable to nonoccupational exposure. The Compensation Review Board affirmed this decision. The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the decisions below. It held that when a single occupational disease is caused in substantial part by both occupational and nonoccupational factors, and workers’ compensation benefits are awarded accordingly, the employer’s statutory lien on any third-party recovery extends to the entire net proceeds, including those attributable to nonoccupational causes. The court also held that the statute’s reference to a “person” liable for damages is not limited to parties with an employment relationship to the decedent. The decision of the Compensation Review Board was therefore affirmed. View "Dodge v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

MCAULIFFE V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY

2026-04-21T08:31:41-08:00

The case concerns a fatal helicopter crash during a sightseeing tour in Hawaii, resulting in the deaths of all aboard, including the plaintiffs’ daughter. The helicopter, manufactured by Robinson Helicopter Company in 2000, had its main rotor hub and blades replaced with new, identical parts from Robinson in December 2018, which was over eighteen years after the helicopter’s initial delivery. The plaintiffs alleged that defects in the replaced rotor hub and blades caused the crash, and brought claims for negligence, strict products liability, and failure to warn. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii heard the case first. Robinson invoked the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which generally bars actions against manufacturers eighteen years after delivery of the aircraft. The plaintiffs argued for exceptions under GARA’s “rolling provision”—which restarts the repose period for newly replaced parts—and the “fraud exception”—which removes the bar if the manufacturer concealed or misrepresented material information to the FAA. The district court granted summary judgment for Robinson, holding that the rolling provision did not apply because the replacement parts were not substantively altered from the originals, and that the plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with the necessary specificity. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to further amend their complaint. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in requiring a “substantive alteration” for the rolling provision to apply, as GARA only requires that a new part replaces an old one. The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in part and remanded for a new causation analysis regarding the replaced parts. However, the court affirmed the lower court’s determinations that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for the fraud exception and that denying leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. View "MCAULIFFE V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY" on Justia Law

Eichin v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, LLC

2026-04-17T10:30:33-08:00

The plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure involving multiple surgical staplers, one of which was used to create an anastomosis that subsequently leaked. In October 2021, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit against several manufacturers of surgical staplers. Over the course of pretrial proceedings, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina issued multiple scheduling orders, ultimately extending the plaintiff’s expert disclosure deadline to March 15, 2024. The plaintiff failed to disclose any experts by this deadline. Twenty days later, the plaintiff moved to extend the expert disclosure deadline, citing delays in obtaining discovery and the model number of the stapler at issue. The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the scheduling order, finding that he had not shown “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), and entered summary judgment for the defendants due to the absence of expert testimony needed to support the plaintiff’s claims. The court noted that the plaintiff had not acted diligently, as required by Rule 16(b)(4), and had not filed a motion to compel or otherwise timely challenged the adequacy of discovery responses. The district court also relied on the plaintiff’s own representations regarding when he learned the model number of the stapler. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to amend for abuse of discretion and the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the district court correctly applied Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard to the request to extend the expert disclosure deadline and did not abuse its discretion in finding a lack of diligence. Because the plaintiff failed to offer expert evidence, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings in full. View "Eichin v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, LLC" on Justia Law

Maldonado-Velasquez v. Ron J Peterson Construction

2026-04-16T09:22:01-08:00

A fatal collision occurred when a Volkswagen Jetta, driven by Raul Lopez with Emilio Martinez-Arroyo as a passenger, rear-ended a utility trailer owned by Ron J. Peterson Construction, Inc. (RJP) on a Utah highway. The trailer, which was transporting construction equipment and did not have underride protection, was traveling significantly below the speed limit with its emergency flashers on. Both occupants of the Jetta died instantly after their car slid under the trailer. Yesneiri Maldonado-Velasquez, the decedent’s wife, sued RJP alleging negligence both in operating the vehicle and in using a trailer that lacked safety features that could have mitigated the injuries. In the Third District Court, Summit County, RJP moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to upgrade the trailer beyond federal safety standards and that the crash was solely caused by Lopez. The district court found a general statutory duty to operate safe equipment but determined that there was no specific duty to alter the trailer, based on federal preemption and application of factors from B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West. As a result, the court excluded much of the plaintiff's expert testimony on enhanced injury and trailer design, allowing only claims related to negligent operation. The jury ultimately found RJP not at fault. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred by applying the Jeffs factors to narrow an already established broad statutory duty to operate safe vehicles. The Supreme Court clarified that federal regulations set a minimum standard, not a ceiling, and that state law may impose greater obligations unless direct conflict preemption applies. The court also held that the exclusion of expert testimony premised on the erroneous duty ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Maldonado-Velasquez v. Ron J Peterson Construction" on Justia Law

Estate of Lorbiecki v. Pabst Brewing Company

2026-04-15T05:48:22-08:00

Gerald Lorbiecki, a steamfitter, was diagnosed with and later died from mesothelioma, a disease caused by asbestos exposure. He alleged that part of his exposure occurred while working at Pabst Brewing Company’s brewery in the mid-1970s, where he was employed by an independent contractor. The facility contained extensive asbestos-insulated piping, and Lorbiecki and other workers removed and replaced this insulation using methods that generated airborne asbestos dust. Evidence showed that Pabst was aware of the presence and dangers of asbestos during this period but did not undertake abatement or enforce protective measures. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, after dismissing Lorbiecki’s common-law negligence claim, allowed his claim under Wisconsin’s safe-place statute to proceed. At trial, a jury found Pabst liable under the statute for failing to provide a safe workplace, awarded compensatory and punitive damages, and apportioned liability among Pabst and several non-party companies. The court entered judgment for Lorbiecki against Pabst, applying statutory caps to certain damages and including a portion of liability attributed to another company based on the non-delegable duty under the safe-place statute. On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Pabst could be liable under the safe-place statute to an employee of an independent contractor, as the statute imposes a heightened, non-delegable duty of care that supersedes common-law limitations. The Court also found sufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. However, it ruled that the statutory cap on punitive damages applies only to the compensatory damages recoverable from the sole remaining defendant, Pabst, and not to the total compensatory damages found by the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals. View "Estate of Lorbiecki v. Pabst Brewing Company" on Justia Law

BETTS V. TOYOTA

2026-04-14T08:16:45-08:00

Wayne and Kristin Betts brought a products liability lawsuit against Toyota after Wayne Betts was injured and paralyzed in a single-vehicle rollover accident while driving a 2002 Toyota Sequoia. The accident occurred in Oklahoma while Wayne was traveling for work, but both he and his wife were Texas residents. The vehicle had been designed in Japan, manufactured in Indiana, sold new in Georgia, resold to Wayne’s grandmother in Texas in 2015, and then retitled in Wayne’s name in Texas in 2016. At the time of the accident, the Sequoia was registered, titled, tagged, and garaged in Texas, and Wayne primarily lived and worked in Texas, though he traveled to Oklahoma for short-term work assignments. Toyota moved for summary judgment in the District Court, arguing that Texas’s 15-year statute of repose barred the Betts’ claims, as the vehicle had been originally sold more than 15 years before the accident. The Betts contended that Oklahoma law should apply because the accident and injury occurred there and Wayne had significant work contacts with Oklahoma. The District Court, using the “most significant relationship” test from Brickner v. Gooden, granted summary judgment to Toyota, holding that Texas law applied and barred the claim. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding that Oklahoma law should govern and the claim was not barred. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and held that Texas had the most significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence for purposes of applying the statute of repose. The Court concluded that Texas’s statute of repose barred the Betts’ products liability claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "BETTS V. TOYOTA" on Justia Law

Harcourt v. Tesla

2026-04-01T11:02:52-08:00

After purchasing a Tesla Model X, the plaintiff was injured when her two-and-a-half-year-old son, left unattended for a moment, entered the vehicle, started it by pressing the brake and manipulating the gear shifter, and inadvertently accelerated into her. The Model X did not require a traditional ignition or start/stop button; it powered on when the key fob was inside. The plaintiff had left the key fob in the vehicle, and her son managed to start and move the car, leading to significant injuries. The vehicle included safety features such as a PIN-to-Drive option, but the plaintiff had not activated or known about these features. The plaintiff initially filed multiple claims in the Santa Clara County Superior Court but ultimately amended her complaint to pursue only a strict product liability claim, based solely on the consumer expectations test. At trial, after the plaintiff rested her case, Tesla moved for nonsuit, arguing that she failed to establish that the consumer expectations test applied. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had not shown that ordinary consumers would have commonly accepted minimum safety assumptions regarding the car's performance under these circumstances, especially given the atypical facts and the vehicle’s complex safety features. The court entered judgment for Tesla and dismissed the action. The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the consumer expectations test did not apply because the incident involved misuse of the vehicle under unusual circumstances that were outside the common experience and safety expectations of ordinary consumers. As the plaintiff had not pursued an alternative theory of liability, judgment for Tesla was proper. The disposition was affirmed, with each party bearing its own costs on appeal. View "Harcourt v. Tesla" on Justia Law

LAOSD Asbestos Cases

2026-03-04T12:31:55-08:00

A woman began using talcum powder products from a cosmetics company as a child in the 1950s, continued through the late 1970s, and resumed use from 1995 to 2010. She was later diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease associated with asbestos exposure. She and her husband sued multiple companies, alleging that asbestos in cosmetic and automotive products caused her illness. By the time of trial, only the cosmetics company and one other defendant remained; the other defendant is not a party to this appeal. After her passing, her husband continued the suit as her successor. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over a lengthy trial. A jury found the cosmetics company liable on multiple grounds: strict liability for inadequate warnings, manufacturing and design defects, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. The jury further found the company had acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, justifying punitive damages. The jury awarded over $40 million in compensatory damages and $10.3 million in punitive damages, apportioning 90 percent of fault to the company. The company appealed, challenging several evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the cosmetics company had waived its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and most of its evidentiary objections. It found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the plaintiffs' expert testimony or excluding the company’s corporate witness due to lack of disclosure and personal knowledge. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, including all damages awards and findings of liability. View "LAOSD Asbestos Cases" on Justia Law

The City of Boston v. OptumRx, Inc.

2026-03-02T14:00:03-08:00

The City of Boston, along with its Public Health Commission and Housing Authority, brought suit against two pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), OptumRx and Express Scripts, alleging that the PBMs had worked with opioid manufacturers to misrepresent the risks of opioid drugs. The City claimed that this conduct violated Massachusetts public nuisance law and resulted in harm to the City. The PBMs removed the case to federal court and argued that the suit was untimely because it was brought after the three-year statute of limitations had expired. The City responded by asserting that its complaint sufficiently alleged a continuing nuisance and that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the PBMs’ fraudulent concealment of their wrongdoing. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the PBMs’ motion to dismiss, finding that the City either knew or should have known of its injuries and of the PBMs’ alleged role before 2021, based on public records and prior litigation, and thus failed to file suit within the statutory period. The district court further ruled that the City had not adequately pled a continuing nuisance, as it did not allege any specific, recent unlawful acts within the limitations period, and rejected the City’s claim of fraudulent concealment, determining that the City had the means to discover the facts needed for its claim. The district court also denied a motion by the PBMs to disqualify the City's law firm, Motley Rice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed both the dismissal of the City’s state law claim and the denial of the motion to disqualify Motley Rice. The court held that the action was time-barred and that the City had not met the requirements for tolling the statute of limitations or for pleading a continuing nuisance under Massachusetts law. View "The City of Boston v. OptumRx, Inc." on Justia Law

Ex parte Continental Roofing Company, LLC

2026-02-27T06:30:52-08:00

A homeowner alleged that he hired a roofing company in 2011 to install a specific type of roof on his residence. After installation, problems with roof materials became apparent, including issues with a protective layer that remained unresolved despite multiple repair attempts by both the roofing company and the manufacturer over more than a decade. The homeowner asserted that these defects persisted, and that communication from the roofing company ceased in early 2024. As a result, he filed a lawsuit in Etowah County, Alabama, alleging breach of express and implied warranties, as well as negligent or wanton installation and repair, and sought damages. The roofing company moved to dismiss the lawsuit for improper venue, arguing that a forum-selection clause in a “Service Agreement” required all disputes to be heard in Madison County, Alabama. The company attached an unsigned and undated sample agreement to its motion, but did not produce a copy signed by the homeowner or any evidence that the homeowner had agreed to such a clause. The homeowner responded that he had never signed, nor was he aware of, the agreement submitted by the company and also challenged the clause’s reasonableness. The Etowah Circuit Court denied the company’s motion to dismiss for improper venue. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the company’s petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to compel the lower court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Madison County. The Supreme Court held that the company failed to meet its burden of proving that the forum-selection clause applied, as it did not present evidence linking the blank agreement to the parties’ actual contract. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition, concluding that the circuit court did not clearly err in refusing to dismiss or transfer the case. View "Ex parte Continental Roofing Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Hanshaw v. Crown Equipment Corp.

2026-02-24T13:30:26-08:00

The case involves an injury sustained by an individual while operating a forklift designed, manufactured, and distributed by a company. The injured party alleged that the forklift’s open operator compartment constituted a defective design, making the product unreasonably dangerous, and asserted that adding features such as a door or bumper would have prevented the accident. To support these claims, the injured party retained an expert witness to testify about the alleged defect and alternative, safer designs. In the Circuit Court of Jackson County, the defendant company filed motions both to exclude the plaintiff’s expert witness and for summary judgment. The court found that the expert’s testimony lacked reliability, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the expert’s opinions were based on reliable principles and methods, or that those methods had been properly applied to the facts. The court noted the absence of relevant testing, peer-reviewed support, or clear connection between the expert’s analysis and the incident. Consequently, the court excluded the expert’s testimony. Without admissible expert evidence to support the defective design claim, the circuit court then granted summary judgment for the company, as there was no genuine issue of material fact. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed only the grant of summary judgment. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert’s testimony under section 490.065, as the plaintiff failed to establish the reliability of the expert’s methods or their application to the case. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that without admissible expert testimony, summary judgment was proper, including as to the punitive damages claim, because the plaintiff could not prevail on the underlying product liability claim. View "Hanshaw v. Crown Equipment Corp." on Justia Law

Wells v. BNSF Railway Co.

2026-02-24T09:31:18-08:00

Two former residents of Libby, Montana developed mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos. The exposure was linked to asbestos-containing vermiculite transported by BNSF Railway Company from a nearby mine. Between 1922 and 1990, BNSF was required by federal law to ship this vermiculite to and from its Libby railyard. Evidence showed that asbestos dust escaped from sealed railcars during transit and switching operations, eventually accumulating in and around the railyard. Both plaintiffs resided or spent considerable time near the railyard during the relevant period. This litigation began when the personal representatives of the decedents’ estates brought negligence and strict liability claims against BNSF in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. BNSF moved for summary judgment on the strict liability claims, arguing that it was protected by the common carrier exception, but the district court denied the motion. After a jury trial, the jury found for BNSF on negligence but for the plaintiffs on strict liability, awarding compensatory damages. The district court subsequently denied BNSF’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the strict liability claims, prompting BNSF’s appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of Montana law de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying the common carrier exception too narrowly. The appellate court concluded that BNSF’s transportation of asbestos-containing vermiculite, including the resulting accumulation of asbestos dust, was conducted pursuant to its federally mandated duty as a common carrier. Montana law, including recent precedent from the Montana Supreme Court, supported applying the common carrier exception to shield BNSF from strict liability in these circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for BNSF. View "Wells v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist

2026-02-24T07:45:09-08:00

The parents of a young child in Texas purchased and fed him baby food manufactured by one company and sold by another. After the child began exhibiting serious developmental and physical disorders, doctors attributed his condition to heavy-metal poisoning. Years later, a congressional subcommittee released a report identifying elevated levels of toxic heavy metals in certain baby foods, including that manufactured by the company in question. The parents then sued both the manufacturer and the retailer in Texas state court, alleging various state-law product liability, negligence, and breach-of-warranty claims. The manufacturer, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, removed the case to federal court, arguing that the retailer—a Texas citizen like the plaintiffs—had been improperly joined and should be dismissed, thereby creating complete diversity. The United States District Court agreed, dismissed the retailer, denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, and proceeded to trial against the manufacturer alone. After trial, the District Court granted judgment as a matter of law to the manufacturer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s finding of improper joinder, reversed the dismissal of the retailer, and concluded that because the retailer was a proper party, complete diversity was lacking. The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case to state court. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of the nondiverse defendant did not cure the jurisdictional defect present at the time of removal. Because the jurisdictional defect was not cured and persisted through final judgment, the federal court’s judgment had to be vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist" on Justia Law

Scott v. Amazon.com, Inc.

2026-02-19T08:15:30-08:00

This case involves four individuals who died by suicide after ingesting high-purity sodium nitrite purchased through Amazon’s website. The families and estates of the decedents allege that Amazon sold sodium nitrite without age verification or adequate warnings, promoted related products that facilitated suicide, and continued selling the chemical despite knowing it was being used for suicide. Plaintiffs contend that Amazon’s actions enhanced the risk of harm and demonstrated knowledge of the product’s misuse, citing Amazon’s receipt of warnings from consumers, regulatory agencies, and the removal of the product in other jurisdictions. The Superior Court denied Amazon’s motions to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim for negligence under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA). On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed this decision. The appellate court concluded that, under Washington law, suicide is typically a superseding cause that breaks the chain of proximate causation for negligence, barring recovery unless the suicide was involuntary or due to an uncontrollable impulse. Relying on precedent, the appellate court held that plaintiffs could not state a WPLA claim because suicide was a superseding cause as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case de novo. It determined that common law principles of negligence and proximate cause, including those developed after the WPLA’s enactment, govern product seller liability claims. The court held that, at the motion to dismiss stage, it cannot be said as a matter of law that suicide is always a superseding cause precluding liability under the WPLA. The court concluded that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for product seller negligence, as questions of foreseeability and proximate cause are generally issues for the fact finder. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s denial of Amazon’s motions to dismiss. View "Scott v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC

2026-02-17T11:31:26-08:00

The plaintiff purchased a vehicle in 2017 and later alleged it was defective, suing the manufacturer in 2021. The parties eventually settled, with the plaintiff surrendering the vehicle and dismissing the suit, and the manufacturer agreeing to pay $100,000. The settlement specified the plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees, and the manufacturer would pay the amount determined by the trial court upon noticed motion. After the settlement was reported to the Superior Court of San Diego County, the court ordered dismissal within 45 days. When no dismissal was filed, the clerk issued notice that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023, unless a party showed good cause otherwise. No such cause was shown, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees. The motion for attorney fees was opposed by the manufacturer, arguing it was untimely under California Rules of Court, as it was not served within 180 days of the dismissal date. The plaintiff countered that the 180-day deadline did not apply, claiming the case had not been formally dismissed and no judgment had been entered. The Superior Court of San Diego County disagreed, finding the case had been dismissed on August 15, 2023, per the clerk’s notice and court rules, and denied the motion as untimely. The plaintiff appealed the denial, and a signed minute order dismissing the complaint was later entered, but the court maintained that the earlier date controlled. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the matter de novo. It held that a voluntary dismissal, even if not appealable, starts the clock for filing a motion for attorney fees when it concludes the litigation. The court found the case was dismissed on August 15, 2023, and the plaintiff failed to timely serve the fee motion. The order denying attorney fees was affirmed. View "Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

Alicea v. Cincinnati Incorporated

2026-02-06T14:30:03-08:00

A laser-cutting system operator died after being trapped between components of an industrial laser-cutting system when a steel beam descended into a gap, resulting in fatal injuries. The system, designed, sold, installed, and maintained by one company, consisted of several components, including a material handler, load frame, and main frame. On the day of the incident, the operator entered a narrow gap between the material handler and the load frame; when the system was activated, a steel beam pinned him, leading to his death. There were multiple possible routes into the gap, and prior incidents indicated the operator had previously entered the area. The estate of the deceased operator sued the designer and installer for negligent design, negligent installation, breach of warranty of merchantability (based on design and manufacturing defects), and negligent failure to maintain and warn of dangerous conditions. The case was initially filed in state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on all claims. The district court found that the system included a barrier fence at installation, making the system adequately protected and negating breach of warranty or negligent design claims. For the claims related to maintenance and failure to warn, the court found no triable issue on causation, as there was insufficient evidence that the operator had entered the gap through the unguarded wall-side opening. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the design-related claims, finding a genuine factual dispute as to whether a reasonable alternative design—such as additional safety devices—could have mitigated the system’s risks. However, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment on the installation, maintenance, and failure to warn claims, concluding there was insufficient evidence to establish causation for those theories. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the design claims. View "Alicea v. Cincinnati Incorporated" on Justia Law

Hillman v. Toro Company

2026-01-21T09:00:15-08:00

A woman suffered a below-the-knee amputation of her left leg after an accident involving a zero-radius-turn riding lawnmower manufactured by The Toro Company. The incident occurred when the mower, which could be disengaged from its hydrostatic braking system using "bypass pins," began rolling uncontrolled down a slope after the pins were not reset following an attempt to free the mower from a flower bed. The mower lacked an independent mechanical brake, a rollover protection system, and an ignition safety interlock that would have prevented operation with the bypass engaged. The injured woman, her spouse, and their minor child pursued damages for her injuries, claiming design defects and failure to warn. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. During pretrial proceedings, the district court excluded all of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony as unreliable or irrelevant and granted summary judgment to Toro on all remaining theories. The court found that, without expert evidence, the plaintiffs could not establish their strict products liability or negligent design claims. It also dismissed the failure-to-warn claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed most of the district court’s evidentiary rulings but found that the district court did not address one expert’s opinions regarding the need for an independent brake. The appellate court held those opinions to be reliable and relevant, thus presenting genuine disputes of material fact regarding the absence of an independent brake. Consequently, it reversed the summary judgment for Toro on the strict products liability and negligent design claims related to the independent brake theory, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for trial. View "Hillman v. Toro Company" on Justia Law

Franceschi v. LG Chem, LTD.

2025-12-18T09:07:07-08:00

A Nevada resident was injured when a lithium-ion battery exploded in his pocket, causing severe burns. He had purchased the battery individually from a local vape shop, with no warnings or instructions provided. The battery in question was manufactured by a South Korean company and its American subsidiary, which design and sell these batteries as industrial components intended for integration into products such as power tools, not for standalone consumer use. Despite efforts by the manufacturer to prevent individual sales and warn against improper use—including sending cease-and-desist letters and posting warnings online—third-party retailers in the United States, including Nevada, sold the batteries individually. After the injury, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit in Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court against the manufacturer and its subsidiary. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that they did not sell or market individual batteries for standalone use in Nevada. The district court agreed, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his injuries arose out of or were related to the manufacturer’s contacts with Nevada, and dismissed the case. The dismissal was certified as final, and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo. It held that, while the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of Nevada’s market by selling batteries as components for incorporation into end products, the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a standalone battery acquired through a different, unauthorized stream of commerce. Because there was no evidence that the manufacturer placed individual battery cells into the Nevada consumer market, the court found no sufficient connection between the company’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s injury. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Franceschi v. LG Chem, LTD." on Justia Law

Hunter v. Universal Precast Concrete, Inc.

2025-12-09T08:17:44-08:00

A minor child was injured in 2018 while playing on a piece of playground equipment called “Rocks and Ropes” at Meadowlark Elementary School in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The child’s parents, Scott and Heather Hunter, alleged that the equipment was defective and that the school failed in its supervision and medical care following the incident, as their daughter was diagnosed weeks later with a crushed vertebra. The Hunters sued Universal Precast Concrete, Miracle Recreation Equipment, Churchich Recreation Equipment, and Laramie County School District #1, alleging strict product liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and failure to warn. The case proceeded before the District Court of Laramie County. Due to extensive delays—including those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic—there were multiple changes to scheduling orders. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the business defendants after excluding several of the Hunters’ expert witnesses under the Daubert standard, finding their testimony unreliable or irrelevant. The court denied summary judgment to the School District. After a mistrial was declared due to repeated improper conduct by the Hunters’ counsel during voir dire and opening statements, the district court dismissed the remaining claims against the School District with prejudice as a sanction for counsel’s actions and various procedural violations. The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the Hunters’ experts and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the business defendants, holding that the lower court properly performed its gatekeeping function and the Hunters failed to offer admissible evidence of a defect. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice, concluding that, while counsel’s conduct warranted sanctions, the extreme sanction of dismissal was not justified without prior warning or full consideration of lesser sanctions. The case was remanded for imposition of a lesser sanction. View "Hunter v. Universal Precast Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

Dennis v. Monsanto Co.

2025-11-24T12:01:27-08:00

Mike Dennis developed mycosis fungoides, a subtype of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, after regularly applying Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, for approximately 20 years. Dennis claimed his cancer resulted from exposure to Roundup, which he alleged was sold and marketed without adequate warnings about its carcinogenic risks, despite Monsanto’s knowledge of the potential danger. He brought claims for design defect, failure to warn (under both negligence and strict liability), and negligence. At trial, the jury found that Monsanto was liable for failing to warn about the cancer risk, determining Monsanto knew or should have known of the risk, failed to provide adequate warnings, and acted with malice or oppression. The jury awarded Dennis $7 million in economic damages and $325 million in punitive damages. Following the verdict, Monsanto moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Monsanto’s requests to overturn the liability findings but reduced the punitive damages award from $325 million to $21 million, finding the original award disproportionate to the compensatory damages. Monsanto timely appealed, arguing that Dennis’s failure to warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and that the punitive damages were excessive and unconstitutional. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA does not preempt state law failure to warn claims that parallel federal misbranding requirements, in line with United States Supreme Court precedent and California decisions. The court also found that the punitive damages award, as reduced by the trial court, did not violate due process, as it was based on highly reprehensible conduct directly related to Dennis’s harm. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in full. View "Dennis v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

Pruchnik v. JCCP4621 Common Benefit Committee

2025-11-17T15:32:28-08:00

After a fatal car accident involving a 2008 Lexus ES350, the driver, whose wife died in the crash, sued Toyota, alleging the vehicle was defective due to unintended acceleration. His case was added to a coordinated group of California state court proceedings (JCCP) involving similar claims against Toyota. The coordinated proceedings had established a Common Benefit Fund, requiring all plaintiffs whose cases resolved after a certain date to pay an 8 percent assessment from their recoveries. This fund compensated lead counsel for work that benefited all plaintiffs, such as shared discovery and expert work. The plaintiff’s case was coordinated with the JCCP in 2018. After settling with Toyota, he moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to exempt his case from the 8 percent assessment, arguing he did not use or benefit from the shared work product and that his case was factually distinct. The Committee overseeing the fund opposed, submitting evidence that the plaintiff’s original attorney had relied on common benefit materials and that the issues in his case overlapped with those in the coordinated proceedings. The trial court found the plaintiff had not met his burden to show he was entitled to an exemption and denied his motion for relief from the assessment. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the order denying relief was appealable as a collateral order. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that neither he nor his counsel benefited from the common work product. The court found the assessment applied, as the plaintiff’s case fell within the scope of the coordination order and he did not prove entitlement to an exemption. The order requiring the 8 percent assessment was affirmed. View "Pruchnik v. JCCP4621 Common Benefit Committee" on Justia Law

DBMP LLC v. Delaware Claims Processing Facility, LLC

2025-11-14T14:36:21-08:00

A group of companies that are frequently sued in asbestos litigation brought an action against several settlement trusts and a claims processing facility. These trusts were established as part of bankruptcy reorganizations by former asbestos manufacturers to handle and pay out current and future asbestos-related claims. The plaintiffs rely on information held by these trusts—specifically, data about claimants’ other asbestos exposures—to defend themselves in ongoing and anticipated lawsuits. In January 2025, the trusts announced new document retention policies that would result in the destruction of most existing claims data after one year, which the plaintiffs argued would severely impair their ability to defend against asbestos claims and seek contribution or indemnification from the trusts. Previously, the trusts notified claimants of the impending data destruction, and the plaintiffs, upon learning of this, requested that the trusts not implement the new policies. When the trusts refused, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, seeking a declaratory judgment that the trusts have a duty to preserve the claims data and a permanent injunction to prevent the destruction of this information. The trusts moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and that the complaint failed to state a claim. The Court of Chancery denied the motions to dismiss. It held that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and because the case fit within the court’s traditional equitable powers, including the authority to grant a bill of discovery to preserve evidence for use in litigation. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, as they faced a concrete and imminent injury from the threatened destruction of data essential to their defense and contribution claims. The court also held that the complaint stated a claim for relief, allowing the case to proceed beyond the pleading stage. View "DBMP LLC v. Delaware Claims Processing Facility, LLC" on Justia Law

FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC.

2025-11-14T09:01:10-08:00

David and Bonnie Faulk, residents of Alaska, purchased over one hundred windows from Spenard Builders Supply for their custom-built home and alleged that the windows, manufactured by JELD-WEN, were defective in breach of an oral warranty. They filed a class action in Alaska state court against Spenard Builders Supply, an Alaska corporation, and JELD-WEN, a Delaware corporation, asserting state-law claims. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows federal jurisdiction based on minimal diversity in class actions. After removal, the Faulks amended their complaint to remove all class action allegations and sought to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska denied their motion to remand, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent that held federal jurisdiction under CAFA is determined at the time of removal and is not affected by post-removal amendments. The district court allowed the amendment to eliminate class allegations but ultimately dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice, finding most claims time-barred and one insufficiently pled. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, which held that federal jurisdiction depends on the operative complaint, including post-removal amendments. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, after the Faulks removed their class action allegations, the sole basis for federal jurisdiction under CAFA was eliminated, and complete diversity was lacking. The court vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint and remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court unless another basis for federal jurisdiction is established. View "FAULK V. JELD-WEN, INC." on Justia Law

Hardy v. 3M Company

2025-11-07T12:18:14-08:00

A group of former coal miners brought products liability lawsuits against several manufacturers and distributors of respirators, alleging that the devices failed to protect them from dust exposure and caused them to develop occupational lung diseases. Each plaintiff had used specific respirators during their mining careers and claimed that the products were defective. The cases were consolidated for discovery due to common factual and legal issues. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The Circuit Court of McDowell County granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that each plaintiff knew or should have known of their injury and its possible connection to the respirators more than two years before filing suit. The court used certain “triggering” dates—such as the date of medical diagnosis, receipt of disability benefits, or application for federal black lung benefits—to determine when the statute of limitations began to run. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly resolved factual disputes and applied an incorrect standard for latent disease cases. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of the claims. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower courts’ rulings. The Court held that, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations in products liability cases begins when a plaintiff knows or should know of their injury, the identity of the product’s maker, and the product’s causal relation to the injury. The Court found no genuine dispute of material fact as to when each plaintiff was on notice of their injury and its possible cause, and rejected arguments for tolling based on fraudulent concealment. The summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Hardy v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Nissan North America, Inc. v. Henderson-Brundidge

2025-10-31T05:30:02-08:00

A young woman was seriously injured when the passenger airbag in a 1998 Infiniti QX4 deployed during a low-speed collision, causing permanent vision loss in one eye. She was wearing her seatbelt at the time. The accident occurred when another vehicle exited a parking lot and collided with the Infiniti. The injured party, initially represented by her mother as next friend, sued the vehicle’s manufacturer, alleging that the airbag system was defectively designed and that safer alternative designs were available at the time of manufacture. The case was tried in the Mobile Circuit Court. During voir dire, two jurors failed to disclose their prior involvement as defendants in civil lawsuits, despite being directly asked. After a jury awarded $8.5 million in compensatory damages to the plaintiff on her Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) claim, Nissan discovered the nondisclosures and moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur. The trial court denied all motions, finding that substantial evidence supported the verdict and, although it believed probable prejudice resulted from the jurors’ nondisclosures, it felt bound by Alabama Supreme Court precedent to deny a new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the denial of Nissan’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the plaintiff presented substantial evidence of a safer, practical, alternative airbag design. However, the Court reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in believing it lacked discretion due to prior case law. The Supreme Court clarified that the trial court retained discretion to determine whether the jurors’ nondisclosures resulted in probable prejudice and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise that discretion. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Henderson-Brundidge" on Justia Law

Erickson v. Pharmacia LLC

2025-10-30T07:20:22-08:00

Three public school teachers in Washington developed health problems after working in an older school building that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) manufactured by Monsanto. The teachers sued Pharmacia, Monsanto’s successor-in-interest, alleging injuries from PCB exposure and brought claims under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) for design defect, construction defect, and failures to warn, while also seeking punitive damages under Missouri law. After a seven-week trial, the jury found for the teachers on all claims, awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages. The Snohomish County Superior Court, where the case was tried, ruled that Missouri law governed the issues of repose and punitive damages, while Washington law governed the substantive elements of liability. The court also admitted expert testimony estimating historic PCB exposure levels. Pharmacia challenged the verdict, but the trial court denied its post-trial motions. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Washington’s statute of repose applied, limiting the plaintiffs’ claims, and that the verdict form was insufficient for punitive damages because it did not specify which theory of liability supported the award. The Court of Appeals also found error in the admission of certain expert testimony. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and partially reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under Washington’s established choice of law principles, Missouri law governs both the issues of repose and punitive damages because Missouri has the most significant relationship to those issues. The Court also held that the jury instructions and special verdict form were sufficient to sustain the punitive damages award under Missouri law, and that the challenged expert testimony was admissible under the Frye standard and ER 702. The Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s verdict and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Erickson v. Pharmacia LLC" on Justia Law

PELLECER VS. WERNER CO.

2025-10-24T07:05:48-08:00

Carlos Pellecer died after falling from a Werner brand aluminum extension ladder while working as a handyman in New Orleans. His family sued Werner Co., a Delaware corporation, and New Werner Holding Co., Inc., alleging that the ladder was unreasonably dangerous under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) and that the defendants failed to warn about a 2018 recall. The ladder in question was manufactured in 1991 by Werner Co., a Pennsylvania corporation (later renamed Old Ladder), which filed for bankruptcy in 2006. The defendants had purchased certain assets, including the Werner name and trademark, from Old Ladder in 2007, but did not manufacture or sell the specific ladder model involved in the accident. The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on a verdict finding the defendants to be manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The jury awarded over $5 million in damages, apportioning fault equally between the defendants and Old Ladder. The defendants’ post-trial motions were denied. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the jury could reasonably find the defendants to be manufacturers under the LPLA’s apparent manufacturer doctrine. The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari and held that the defendants were not manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The court found no evidence that the defendants labeled the ladder as their own, held themselves out as its manufacturer, or exercised control over its design, construction, or quality. The court concluded that merely acquiring the Werner name and trademark did not make the defendants manufacturers of the subject ladder. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the trial court’s judgment, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "PELLECER VS. WERNER CO." on Justia Law

Gilbert v Lands' End, Inc.

2025-10-23T07:00:19-08:00

Delta Airlines contracted with Lands’ End to supply new uniforms for its employees, which were manufactured overseas and distributed to approximately 64,000 workers. After the uniforms were issued, many employees reported that the garments transferred dye onto other surfaces and caused a range of health symptoms, including skin irritation and respiratory issues. Two groups of Delta employees filed lawsuits: one group sought damages for property damage and breach of express warranty as intended beneficiaries of the contract between Delta and Lands’ End, while the other group pursued personal injury claims, alleging the uniforms were defectively manufactured or designed and that Lands’ End failed to warn of these defects. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin consolidated the actions and, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of Lands’ End on all claims. For the personal injury claims, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony on defect and causation, finding the opinions unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that the uniforms were defective or that any defect caused their injuries. On the breach of warranty claim, the court determined that Lands’ End had not breached the contract’s satisfaction guarantee because plaintiffs had not returned their uniforms as required by the contract’s terms. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, as the experts failed to reliably establish defect or causation. The court also held that summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim was proper because the contract’s return requirement was reasonable and not an unlawful limitation on the express warranty. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. View "Gilbert v Lands' End, Inc." on Justia Law

BRAUN V. BEARMAN INDUSTRIES, LLC

2025-10-23T06:06:53-08:00

A Kentucky resident purchased a firearm from a local pawn shop and, shortly after, suffered severe injuries when the gun allegedly discharged unexpectedly while the safety was engaged. The gun had been manufactured by a Utah-based company, which sold it to a Texas distributor. The distributor then sold the firearm to a Kentucky merchant, and it eventually reached the plaintiff through a Kentucky pawn shop. The injured party filed a products liability lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court against both the manufacturer and the pawn shop, alleging the manufacturer’s product caused his injuries. The Fayette Circuit Court initially held the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in abeyance to allow for limited discovery. However, the manufacturer failed to timely respond to discovery requests, only providing responses after being compelled by court order and after significant delay. Despite this, the trial court granted the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss, finding that the manufacturer had not purposefully availed itself of doing business in Kentucky and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that due process would be offended, though it found the manufacturer fell within the state’s long-arm statute due to deriving substantial revenue from Kentucky sales. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to show the manufacturer derived substantial revenue from sales in Kentucky and that the plaintiff’s claims arose from those sales, thus satisfying the long-arm statute. However, the Court determined that the manufacturer’s failure to comply with discovery obligations deprived the plaintiff of an adequate opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The Court reversed the dismissal in part and remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court, instructing it to allow the plaintiff ample opportunity to complete jurisdictional discovery before ruling on personal jurisdiction. View "BRAUN V. BEARMAN INDUSTRIES, LLC" on Justia Law

BURROUGHS v. STRENGTH OF NATURE GLOBAL, LLC

2025-10-15T04:10:14-08:00

The plaintiff in this case alleged that she developed uterine fibroids as a result of using chemical hair relaxer products manufactured by two companies over a period spanning from 1995 to 2014. She purchased and used different products from each manufacturer at various times, applying them every six to eight weeks, with a brief pause between 2001 and 2002. She was diagnosed with uterine fibroids in 2018 and filed suit in 2022, claiming that the products contained harmful chemicals that caused her injury. The Superior Court denied the manufacturers’ motions to dismiss her strict products liability claims, which were based on Georgia’s ten-year statute of repose for such actions. The manufacturers argued that the statute of repose began running from the date the plaintiff first purchased any product from each manufacturer, which would bar her claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that the statute of repose for all units sold by each manufacturer to the plaintiff began with the earliest sale to her, and thus her claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine how the statute of repose under OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) applies when a plaintiff alleges injury from multiple consumable products sold over time. The Court held that the statute of repose applies on a per-unit basis, meaning the ten-year period begins with the sale of each individual unit as new to the end user. Therefore, claims are not barred for units sold within ten years of the lawsuit, even if earlier units were sold outside that period. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision in part and remanded the case, allowing the strict liability claims to proceed for units sold within the statutory period. View "BURROUGHS v. STRENGTH OF NATURE GLOBAL, LLC" on Justia Law

Thelen v. Somatics, LLC

2025-09-29T06:33:04-08:00

A patient with a long history of severe depression and multiple suicide attempts underwent 95 electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) treatments at a Nebraska hospital between 2014 and 2016. The ECT was administered using a device manufactured by Somatics, LLC. After the treatments, the patient experienced significant memory loss and was diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder. In 2020, he filed suit against Somatics in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging negligence, strict product liability, breach of warranties, violation of Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act, and fraudulent misrepresentation, primarily claiming that Somatics failed to adequately warn of the risks associated with ECT. The district court dismissed the claims under Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act and for fraudulent misrepresentation, merged the strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims, and granted summary judgment to Somatics on the design defect, manufacturing defect, and breach of express warranty claims. The remaining claims for negligence and strict liability, both based on failure to warn, were merged for trial. The jury found that while Somatics failed to provide adequate warnings, this failure was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and awarded no damages. The district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motions, including for a new trial. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo for summary judgment and for abuse of discretion on evidentiary and procedural rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the design defect claim, correctly merged the negligence and strict liability claims, gave an appropriate jury instruction on proximate cause, and did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and expert testimony. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Thelen v. Somatics, LLC" on Justia Law

United States v. Fishman

2025-09-22T06:30:08-08:00

A licensed veterinarian developed and manufactured undetectable performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) for use in professional horse racing, selling them to trainers who administered them to horses to gain a competitive edge. His salesperson assisted in these activities, operating a company that distributed the drugs without prescriptions or FDA approval. The drugs were misbranded or adulterated, and the operation involved deceptive practices such as misleading labeling and falsified customs forms. The PEDs were credited by trainers for their horses’ successes, and evidence showed the drugs could be harmful if misused. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over two separate trials, resulting in convictions for both the veterinarian and his salesperson for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute misbranded or adulterated drugs with intent to defraud or mislead, in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The district court denied motions to dismiss the indictment, admitted evidence from a prior state investigation, and imposed sentences including imprisonment, restitution, and forfeiture. The court calculated loss for sentencing based on the veterinarian’s gains and ordered restitution to racetracks based on winnings by a coconspirator’s doped horses. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the statute’s “intent to defraud or mislead” element is not limited to particular categories of victims; it is sufficient if the intent relates to the underlying violation. The court found no error in the admission of evidence from the 2011 investigation or in the use of gain as a proxy for loss in sentencing. However, it vacated the restitution order to racetracks, finding no evidence they suffered pecuniary loss, and vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the relevant statute is not a civil forfeiture statute subject to criminal forfeiture procedures. The convictions and sentence were otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Fishman" on Justia Law

Moshi v. Kia Motors Am., Inc.

2025-09-16T12:30:19-08:00

Kia and Hyundai manufactured millions of vehicles between 2011 and 2021 that lacked engine immobilizers, a standard anti-theft device, and had ignition assemblies that were easily compromised. These design features made the cars especially vulnerable to theft, leading to a surge in thefts nationwide, particularly after a viral social media trend demonstrated how to steal these vehicles. In two separate incidents, teenagers stole such cars and, while driving them, caused accidents that resulted in severe injury to Donald Strench and the death of Matthew Moshi. Strench and Moshi’s estate brought suit against Hyundai and Kia, respectively, alleging that the companies were liable under the Ohio Product Liability Act (OPLA) for design defects that made the cars susceptible to theft and, consequently, to the resulting injuries. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the claims, holding that the plaintiffs could not establish proximate causation as a matter of Ohio law. The district court relied on Ohio precedents that generally absolve car owners of liability for injuries caused by thieves who steal their cars, applying the same reasoning to the manufacturers. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio cases concerning car owners’ liability do not control product liability claims against manufacturers. The Sixth Circuit found that, under OPLA and Ohio common law, foreseeability must be assessed from the perspective of a manufacturer, who is expected to have specialized knowledge of risks, including those arising from third-party theft. The court concluded that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the manufacturers should have foreseen the risk of theft-related accidents. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the design defect and inadequate warning claims, but affirmed the dismissal of the manufacturing defect and nonconformance to representation claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the surviving claims. View "Moshi v. Kia Motors Am., Inc." on Justia Law

In re Whittaker Clark & Daniels Inc.

2025-09-10T12:00:09-08:00

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and its affiliates, former processors and distributors of industrial chemicals including talc, faced thousands of asbestos-related tort claims after selling their operating assets in 2004. In 2023, following a $29 million jury verdict in South Carolina for a plaintiff diagnosed with mesothelioma, the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas appointed a receiver to manage Whittaker’s assets. The receiver was granted broad authority to administer Whittaker’s assets and protect its interests, but the order did not explicitly remove the board’s authority over corporate affairs. Whittaker’s board, without consulting the receiver, authorized a bankruptcy filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. The receiver moved to dismiss the bankruptcy, arguing that only he had authority to file. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, finding the board retained authority under New Jersey law, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed. Meanwhile, the Official Committee of Talc Claimants intervened in an adversary proceeding, contesting whether certain successor liability claims against a nondebtor (Brenntag) were property of the bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the debtors, holding that these claims belonged to the estate, and certified the decision for direct appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed both lower courts. It held that an improperly filed bankruptcy petition is not a jurisdictional defect but may be grounds for dismissal. The court determined that under New Jersey law, the board retained authority to file for bankruptcy because the South Carolina receiver had not been recognized by a New Jersey court. The court also held that successor liability claims based on a “product line” theory are general claims belonging to the bankruptcy estate, not to individual creditors, following its precedent in In re Emoral. View "In re Whittaker Clark & Daniels Inc." on Justia Law

Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

2025-09-10T04:11:09-08:00

A woman was injured when a heat lamp manufactured by a company made contact with her foot during an acupuncture session performed by a physician. She initially sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice. The physician then filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer, alleging product liability. The injured woman subsequently filed a direct product liability claim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer raised special defenses, asserting that both the woman and the physician bore comparative responsibility for her injuries and that, if found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from the physician. Before trial concluded, the physician withdrew his third-party complaint. The jury found the manufacturer 80 percent responsible and the physician 20 percent responsible for the woman’s damages. After judgment was rendered, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the medical malpractice claim against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but affirmed the product liability judgment, including the jury’s allocation of comparative responsibility. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the manufacturer’s petition for certification to appeal, and the woman withdrew her appeals after receiving payment in satisfaction of the judgment. The manufacturer and its insurer then filed a contribution action against the physician, seeking to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to the injured woman. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer. On appeal, the physician argued that he was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and that the contribution action was untimely. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether they are product sellers, are subject to comparative responsibility under the statute. The Court also held that a contribution action is timely if brought within one year after all appellate proceedings in the underlying action are final. The judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer was affirmed. View "Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang" on Justia Law

United States Fire Insurance Company v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc.

2025-09-09T13:30:04-08:00

Peterson’s Oil Service, Inc. supplied heating fuel to customers in Massachusetts between 2012 and 2019. The fuel contained higher-than-standard levels of biodiesel, averaging 35% between 2015 and 2018, exceeding the 5% industry standard for ordinary heating oil. Customers alleged that this biodiesel-blended fuel was incompatible with conventional heating systems, caused repeated heat loss, and resulted in permanent damage to their equipment. They brought a class action in Massachusetts state court against Peterson’s and its officers, asserting claims for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence, including allegations that Peterson’s continued supplying the fuel despite customer complaints and only later disclosed the high biodiesel content. United States Fire Insurance Company and The North River Insurance Company had issued Peterson’s a series of commercial general liability and umbrella policies. The insurers initially defended Peterson’s in the class action under a reservation of rights, then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking a declaration that they owed no duty to defend or indemnify Peterson’s. The insurers moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims did not arise from a covered “occurrence” and that policy provisions limiting or excluding coverage for failure to supply applied. The district court denied summary judgment, finding a genuine dispute as to whether Peterson’s actions were accidental and holding that the failure-to-supply provisions were ambiguous and did not apply. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The court held that the underlying complaint alleged a potentially covered “occurrence” because it was possible Peterson’s did not intend or expect the property damage alleged. The court also held that the failure-to-supply provisions were ambiguous and, under Massachusetts law, must be construed in favor of coverage. The district court’s summary judgment rulings were affirmed. View "United States Fire Insurance Company v. Peterson's Oil Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Sunshine Mills, Inc. v. Nutra-Blend, LLC

2025-09-05T01:19:34-08:00

A pet food manufacturer, Sunshine Mills, had a longstanding business relationship with Nutra-Blend, a supplier of animal nutrient products. For years, Sunshine Mills ordered a specific concentration of Vitamin D3 (Vitamin D3 7500) from Nutra-Blend for use in its dog food. In 2017, due to a miscommunication, Nutra-Blend shipped a different, much more concentrated product (Vitamin D3 500) instead. Sunshine Mills, unaware of the difference and believing Nutra-Blend only sold one type of Vitamin D3, accepted and used the product, resulting in several dogs developing Vitamin D toxicity, with some becoming ill or dying. After the incident, Sunshine Mills sued Nutra-Blend in the Lee County Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, a claim under the Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA), and common-law negligence. Nutra-Blend moved for summary judgment, arguing that all claims were subsumed by the MPLA and failed on other grounds. Sunshine Mills abandoned its tort-based claims, leaving only the contract-based claims. The Lee County Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Nutra-Blend on all claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and held that the MPLA does not govern Sunshine Mills’ remaining claims because they do not allege damages caused by a defective product, but rather by breach of contract and implied warranty. The court clarified that the MPLA applies only to claims for damages caused by defective products, not to contract-based claims between commercial entities. The court also found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding both the breach of contract and implied warranty claims, precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sunshine Mills, Inc. v. Nutra-Blend, LLC" on Justia Law

Needham v. Merck & Company Inc.

2025-09-04T10:00:19-08:00

Three plaintiffs alleged they suffered injuries after receiving the Gardasil vaccine, which is designed to prevent certain strains of human papillomavirus. Each plaintiff experienced adverse symptoms following their Gardasil injections, but the onset of these symptoms occurred more than three years before they filed petitions for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The plaintiffs acknowledged to the special master that their petitions were untimely and sought equitable tolling of the Vaccine Act’s limitations period. The special master in the United States Court of Federal Claims found the petitions untimely and denied equitable tolling, resulting in dismissal of the claims. The plaintiffs then filed suit against Merck & Co. and Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, which was handling multi-district litigation related to Gardasil. Merck moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to timely pursue their remedies under the Vaccine Act. The district court dismissed the complaints, holding that the proper forum for challenging the special master’s timeliness rulings was the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, not the district court. The court also rejected a constitutional challenge to the process by which Gardasil was added to the Vaccine Injury Table. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Fourth Circuit held that the addition of Gardasil to the Vaccine Injury Table did not violate the Constitution. It further held that timely participation in the Vaccine Act compensation program is a prerequisite to bringing a tort suit, and that courts hearing vaccine-related tort suits may not reconsider the timeliness of a Vaccine Act petition once the special master has made a finding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaints. View "Needham v. Merck & Company Inc." on Justia Law

Messerli v. AW Distributing

2025-09-03T08:02:06-08:00

Kyle Messerli died from acute intoxication after repeatedly inhaling Difluoroethane gas contained in computer duster cans, a practice known as “huffing.” He became addicted to the substance, using multiple cans daily, and ultimately overdosed. His father, Robbin Messerli, acting individually and as representative of Kyle’s estate, sued several manufacturers and distributors of the computer duster products. The lawsuit alleged that the companies knew their products were being abused but failed to take adequate steps to reduce harm, including ineffective warnings and product design changes. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas reviewed the case. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Kansas law bars tort recovery when the plaintiff’s injuries result from their own illegal acts. The district court agreed, finding that the illegality defense—where a plaintiff’s illegal conduct proximately causes their injury—remains valid under Kansas law and was not abrogated by the state’s adoption of comparative fault principles. The court dismissed Messerli’s claims and denied his subsequent motion to certify the question to the Kansas Supreme Court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the illegality defense applies to products liability actions under Kansas law. The court held that the defense is still available, as neither the Kansas Legislature nor the Kansas Supreme Court has abrogated it. The court further determined that Kansas’s comparative fault regime does not implicitly eliminate the illegality defense, which is grounded in public policy against allowing recovery for injuries caused by one’s own illegal acts. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Messerli’s claims. View "Messerli v. AW Distributing" on Justia Law

Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co.

2025-08-25T11:31:03-08:00

After being diagnosed with lung cancer, Kirt Bjoin and his wife brought a lawsuit against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM) and others, alleging that Bjoin’s cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos dust generated when he cut JMM’s asbestos cement pipe with a power saw during the 1980s. Bjoin worked for his father’s company and later co-owned a pipe-laying business, during which time he frequently cut asbestos cement pipe without respiratory protection and claimed he was never warned of the associated risks. He argued that JMM should have provided warnings about the dangers of cutting the pipe with a power saw and the need for protective equipment. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over a jury trial in which JMM asserted affirmative defenses, including that Bjoin was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the product’s dangers, and that using a power saw to cut the pipe was an unforeseeable misuse. The jury found in favor of JMM on these defenses and on the general negligence claim, concluding that Bjoin was a sophisticated user and that his method of cutting the pipe was not a reasonably foreseeable use. The trial court also granted JMM’s motion for nonsuit on the fraudulent concealment claim. Bjoin’s post-trial motion for a new trial was denied. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that Bjoin failed to meet the high burden required to overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, particularly because he did not adequately address evidence supporting JMM’s defenses. The court also found that Bjoin waived his claims regarding the admission of Cal-OSHA regulations and the product misuse instruction by failing to provide proper legal argument and standards. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of JMM, upholding the jury’s findings and the trial court’s rulings. View "Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC

2025-08-22T19:42:00-08:00

A general contractor was hired to oversee the construction of a hotel in Vermont and subcontracted with a firm to install metal siding panels manufactured by a third party. The subcontractor relied on installation instructions available on the manufacturer’s website, which did not specify the use of a splice plate to connect the panels. The panels were installed without splice plates, and after construction, the panels began to detach from the building, causing some to fall and damage nearby property. The contractor later discovered that the manufacturer had created an instruction sheet in 2006 recommending splice plates, but this information was not publicly available at the time of installation. The contractor initially sued the installer for breach of contract, warranty, and negligence in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division. The complaint was later amended to add a product liability claim against the manufacturer. After further discovery, the contractor sought to amend the complaint a third time to add new claims against the manufacturer, arguing that new evidence justified the amendment. The trial court denied this motion, citing undue delay and prejudice to the manufacturer, and granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the product liability claim and on a crossclaim for implied indemnity brought by the installer, finding both barred by the economic-loss rule. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the third motion to amend due to undue delay and prejudice. It also held that the economic-loss rule barred the contractor’s product liability claim, as neither the “other-property” nor “special-relationship” exceptions applied. Finally, the Court found the contractor lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment on the installer’s implied indemnity claim. View "PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

ENGILIS V. MONSANTO COMPANY

2025-08-12T08:30:44-08:00

Peter Engilis, Jr. regularly used Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, at his homes in Florida from 1990 to 2015. In 2014, he was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia, a type of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Engilis and his wife filed a lawsuit against Monsanto, alleging that his cancer was caused by exposure to Roundup. To support their claim, they relied on the expert opinion of Dr. Andrew Schneider, who conducted a differential etiology to determine the cause of Engilis’s cancer. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California as part of multidistrict litigation involving similar claims against Monsanto. Monsanto moved to exclude Dr. Schneider’s specific causation opinion, arguing it was unreliable. The district court initially granted the motion without a hearing, but later vacated that order in part and held a Daubert hearing. During the hearing, Dr. Schneider was unable to reliably rule out obesity as a potential cause of Engilis’s cancer, conceding he could not determine whether Engilis was obese and failing to provide a reasoned basis for dismissing obesity as a risk factor. The district court found that Dr. Schneider’s methodology did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and excluded his testimony. With no admissible evidence of specific causation, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Monsanto. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion and its summary judgment order de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Schneider’s opinion because it was not based on sufficient facts or data, as required by Rule 702. The court also clarified that there is no presumption in favor of admitting expert testimony under Rule 702. The summary judgment in favor of Monsanto was affirmed. View "ENGILIS V. MONSANTO COMPANY" on Justia Law

Howard v. Hormel Foods Corporation

2025-08-08T07:30:25-08:00

A 93-year-old woman with dysphagia was discharged from the hospital with a recommendation to consume puree-based meals and liquid additives produced by a food company. For about a month, her caretakers provided her with six of these meals and four servings of the additive daily. The product labels disclosed their sodium content. The woman suffered multiple cardiac arrests and was diagnosed with hypernatremia before passing away. Her estate, represented by her daughter, alleged that the company’s products caused her death and brought claims including strict products liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and wrongful death. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas excluded one of the estate’s expert reports for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), finding it lacked an opinion and was merely a recitation of facts. The court denied the estate’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the company on all claims, concluding that the estate failed to provide sufficient evidence or expert testimony to support its claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of the expert report for abuse of discretion and its grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert report, as the estate failed to comply with disclosure requirements and did not show the failure was justified or harmless. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the company, finding the estate did not present evidence that the products were defective or unreasonably dangerous, nor did it provide necessary expert testimony for its claims. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Howard v. Hormel Foods Corporation" on Justia Law

Dibble v. Torax Medical, Inc.

2025-08-07T07:30:23-08:00

A citizen of the United Kingdom, who currently resides in Japan, underwent surgery in the United Kingdom to have a medical device implanted. The device was manufactured by a Minnesota-based company, which is a subsidiary of a New Jersey-based parent company. After the device allegedly failed, the plaintiff traveled to Colorado for removal and replacement of the device, but continued to experience problems. He later received additional medical care in Thailand. Dissatisfied with the device’s performance, he filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, asserting negligence and strict liability claims against both the manufacturer and its parent company. The defendants did not contest jurisdiction or venue in Minnesota, but moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing that the United Kingdom was a more appropriate forum. The district court agreed, reasoning that most relevant events and evidence were outside Minnesota, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint to add more facts connecting the case to Minnesota, concluding that such an amendment would be futile. The plaintiff’s subsequent request to file a motion for reconsideration was also denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the district court failed to properly hold the defendants to their burden of persuasion on all elements of the forum non conveniens analysis and erred by automatically weighing all contacts outside Minnesota in favor of the United Kingdom, rather than considering contacts with the entire United States. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for a new forum non conveniens analysis, instructing the district court to apply the correct legal standards and properly weigh the relevant factors. View "Dibble v. Torax Medical, Inc." on Justia Law

Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp.

2025-08-06T11:01:02-08:00

Several individuals from five different states purchased ovens with front-mounted burner knobs manufactured by a major appliance company. They allege that these ovens have a defect causing the stovetop burners to turn on unintentionally, sometimes resulting in gas leaks. The plaintiffs claim they were unaware of this defect at the time of purchase, but that the manufacturer had prior knowledge of the issue through consumer complaints sent to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and reviews posted on the company’s website. The plaintiffs assert that, had they known about the defect, they would have paid less for the ovens or not purchased them at all. The plaintiffs filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging violations of federal warranty law, fraud by omission, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violations of state consumer protection statutes. The district court found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, as they alleged a concrete injury, but dismissed all claims for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their state common law fraud and statutory consumer protection claims, while the manufacturer argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they plausibly alleged economic injury from overpaying for a defective product. The court further held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged the manufacturer’s knowledge of the defect and its safety risks, particularly because the CPSC had sent incident reports directly to the manufacturer. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of most state law fraud and consumer protection claims, except for the Illinois common law fraud claim, which failed for lack of a duty to disclose under Illinois law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Carroll v. Brunswick Corporation

2025-08-04T07:30:25-08:00

In May 2020, a fire started in the engine of a recreational power boat on the Lake of the Ozarks, causing an explosion that injured Lauren Wilken and killed Shawn Carroll. The Carroll family and Wilken sued the boat's designer, manufacturer, and seller (collectively "Brunswick") for defective design, failure to warn, negligence, and wrongful death. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Brunswick. The plaintiffs appealed, asserting four errors by the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. They claimed the district court erred in denying their Batson challenge, excluding evidence of other similar incidents, striking expert testimony, and not allowing them to introduce evidence of other explosions during closing arguments. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no clear error in the district court's denial of the Batson challenge, as Brunswick's reason for striking Juror No. 13 was deemed reasonable and based on accepted trial strategy. The court also upheld the exclusion of evidence related to the Schroeder explosion, as the plaintiffs failed to show that the conditions of the boats were sufficiently similar. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to strike the expert's testimony about the Schroeder explosion as a sanction for violating its order. Lastly, the court determined that the district court's curative instruction to the jury regarding Brunswick's counsel's comment during closing arguments was sufficient to mitigate any potential prejudice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Brunswick. View "Carroll v. Brunswick Corporation" on Justia Law

Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc.

2025-08-01T09:00:10-08:00

A federal immigration agent, Keith Slatowski, was injured when his Sig Sauer P320 pistol fired a bullet into his hip and out his thigh during a training session. Slatowski claimed he did not touch the trigger, only the grip, and argued that the gun's design, which lacks an external safety, made it prone to accidental discharge. He sued Sig Sauer, alleging that the gun was defectively designed and that a different safety design, such as a tabbed trigger, would have prevented the accident. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania excluded the causation testimony of Slatowski's two experts, Dr. James Tertin and Dr. William Vigilante, because their conclusions were based on speculation rather than reliable testing. The court allowed their testimony on the gun's design defects but granted summary judgment for Sig Sauer, reasoning that without expert testimony on causation, the jury could not determine what caused the gun to fire. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's exclusion of the expert testimony on causation, agreeing that the experts' conclusions were speculative. However, the Third Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the jury could still determine causation based on the admissible evidence and lay testimony. The court found that the jury, with the help of expert explanations of the gun's design, could understand the remaining causation question without further expert testimony. The case was remanded for trial. View "Slatowski v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

DOE 1 V. TWITTER, INC.

2025-08-01T08:01:31-08:00

Two minor boys, referred to as John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, were coerced by a trafficker into producing pornographic content, which was later posted on Twitter. Despite reporting the content to Twitter, the platform did not immediately remove it, leading to significant views and retweets. The boys and their mother made multiple attempts to have the content removed, but Twitter only acted after being prompted by the Department of Homeland Security. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, primarily based on the immunity provided under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The court found that Twitter was immune from liability for most of the claims, including those under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and California product-defect claims, as these claims treated Twitter as a publisher of third-party content. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Twitter is immune from liability under § 230 for the TVPRA claim and the California product-defect claim related to the failure to remove posts and the creation of search features that amplify child-pornography posts. However, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims for negligence per se and their product-liability theory based on defective reporting-infrastructure design are not barred by § 230 immunity, as these claims do not arise from Twitter's role as a publisher. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPRA and certain product-defect claims, reversed the dismissal of the negligence per se and defective reporting-infrastructure design claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DOE 1 V. TWITTER, INC." on Justia Law

Murray v. Motorola, Inc.

2025-07-17T06:32:12-08:00

In this case, Michael Patrick Murray and other plaintiffs, who either suffer from brain tumors or represent estates of decedents who died from brain cancer, sued Motorola, Inc. and other telecommunications companies. They alleged that long-term exposure to cell phone radiation caused their health issues. The litigation began in 2001 and has been through multiple appeals. In a previous decision, the court allowed the litigation to proceed, and in another, it changed the evidentiary standard for admitting expert testimony from the "general acceptance" test to the "reliability" test. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, post-remand, denied the plaintiffs' motions for additional discovery and to add new experts, struck portions of their supplemental expert reports, excluded all of their expert testimony under Rule 702, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial judges ruled that the plaintiffs failed to provide admissible expert testimony on general causation, which was necessary to proceed with the case. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judges' rulings on discovery and expert testimony. The court held that the trial judges correctly applied the legal principles and managed the discovery process appropriately. The appellate court also agreed that the plaintiffs failed to meet the standards set out in Rule 702 for their expert testimony, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. View "Murray v. Motorola, Inc." on Justia Law

Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Stradis Healthcare, LLC

2025-07-16T10:30:23-08:00

KeraLink International, Inc. operates a network of eyebanks and purchased surgical packs containing eyewash from Stradis Healthcare, LLC. The eyewash, supplied by Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals Corporation, was contaminated, rendering corneal tissue unusable. KeraLink sued Stradis and Geri-Care for strict products liability, and both were held jointly and severally liable for $606,415.49 plus prejudgment interest. Stradis sought indemnification from Geri-Care, claiming Geri-Care's primary culpability as the apparent manufacturer of the eyewash. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland awarded summary judgment to KeraLink on its strict products liability claim against both Stradis and Geri-Care. The court rejected the sealed container defense asserted by both defendants. Stradis then sought implied indemnification from Geri-Care, arguing that its liability was secondary. The district court agreed, granting Stradis summary judgment for indemnification but denied Stradis' request for attorneys' fees incurred in defending against KeraLink's suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in awarding Stradis implied indemnification against Geri-Care. The court found that Geri-Care's conduct as the apparent manufacturer of the contaminated eyewash was primarily culpable, while Stradis' conduct was secondary. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Stradis' request for attorneys' fees, citing the American Rule, which generally precludes the recovery of attorneys' fees as compensatory damages unless authorized by statute, rule, or contract. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects. View "Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Stradis Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Johnson v. Mazie

2025-07-11T09:00:10-08:00

In 2015, product liability cases involving the blood-pressure medication Olmesartan were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Adam Slater and his law firm, Mazie Slater Katz & Freeman, LLC, represented over 200 plaintiffs, and the case settled for over $300 million. Subsequently, Anthony Martino, a plaintiff in the MDL, filed a class action in New Jersey state court against his former lawyers, alleging they received contingent fees in violation of New Jersey court rules. The case was removed to federal court and dismissed, with the dismissal affirmed on appeal. Following this, twenty-one individuals represented by the same defendants in the MDL filed a similar action in New Jersey state court, alleging breach of contract, legal malpractice, conversion, and unjust enrichment. Defendants removed the case to the District Court, citing diversity and federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, asserting ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, and granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying issue preclusion. The court also dismissed the parties' motions for sanctions as moot. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that ancillary enforcement jurisdiction does not confer original jurisdiction sufficient for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The court also found that the plaintiffs' state-law claims did not necessarily raise a federal issue to establish federal-question jurisdiction. The court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case to determine if the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 for diversity jurisdiction. Additionally, the court vacated the order dismissing the motions for sanctions as moot, instructing the District Court to consider the merits of each motion. View "Johnson v. Mazie" on Justia Law

Mehner v. Furniture Design Studios, Inc.

2025-07-11T07:30:24-08:00

In April 2017, Mark Mehner was injured when a chair he was sitting on at a Panera café in Omaha collapsed. Mehner sued Panera and the chair manufacturer, Furniture Design Studios (FDS), for negligence, spoliation, and strict liability. He claimed permanent injuries, including spinal fractures. Panera's general manager filled out an incident report but discarded the broken chair and the handwritten report. Mehner alleged that he had requested the preservation of the chair and surveillance video, which Panera denied. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment to both FDS and Panera. The court found that Mehner failed to provide evidence of a specific defect in the chair or causation, particularly since the chair had been out of FDS's possession for nearly eight years. The court also denied Mehner's motion for spoliation sanctions, finding no intentional destruction of evidence by Panera. Additionally, the court rejected Mehner's motion for relief from judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of FDS, agreeing that Mehner did not present sufficient evidence of a defect or causation. The court also upheld the summary judgment for Panera, determining that Mehner failed to establish that Panera created or had notice of the chair's condition. The court rejected Mehner's res ipsa loquitur argument, noting that he did not show the chair was under Panera's exclusive control or that the incident would not have occurred without negligence. The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the district court's discovery rulings, including the denial of Mehner's motion to defer, the denial of his motion to extend progression, and the issuance of a protective order to Panera. The court found no abuse of discretion in these rulings. Finally, the court upheld the denial of spoliation sanctions and the denial of Mehner's motion to revise, alter, or amend the judgment. View "Mehner v. Furniture Design Studios, Inc." on Justia Law

Berzanskis v. FCA US, LLC

2025-07-10T11:30:19-08:00

Plaintiffs in this multi-district products liability suit allege that they purchased defective Chrysler Pacifica minivans from FCA, which were recalled due to a risk of battery explosions. After the recall, plaintiffs filed seven putative class action suits, which were consolidated in the Eastern District of Michigan. During discovery, FCA discovered that some plaintiffs had agreed to arbitration clauses when purchasing their minivans and moved to compel arbitration for those plaintiffs. The district court denied FCA’s motion, finding that FCA had waived its right to arbitrate by moving to dismiss the entire complaint. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that FCA had waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with that right, specifically by moving to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. The district court made this finding sua sponte, without the plaintiffs raising the issue of waiver. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that a party cannot waive its right to arbitration without knowledge of that right. The court found that FCA did not know about the arbitration clauses until it obtained the relevant purchase agreements through discovery. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court erred by raising the issue of waiver on its own, violating the principle of party presentation. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision was clearly erroneous and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Berzanskis v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Litigation

2025-07-10T10:32:10-08:00

The case involves nearly 75,000 plaintiffs who filed personal injury claims in the Delaware Superior Court, alleging that their ingestion of ranitidine, marketed under the brand name Zantac, caused them to develop various types of cancer. The plaintiffs claim that ranitidine contains or degrades into N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), a likely carcinogen. The defendants in the case include GlaxoSmithKline LLC, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Sanofi US Services Inc., Pfizer Inc., and Patheon Manufacturing Services, LLC. The Superior Court of Delaware denied the defendants' motions to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony, which supported the claim that ranitidine causes cancer. The court concluded that the general causation question could focus on NDMA rather than ranitidine itself and that Delaware law does not require a "threshold dose" for general causation. The court also applied a "liberal thrust" favoring the admissibility of expert testimony, viewing challenges to the experts' methodologies as questions for the jury. The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court erred in interpreting Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 by applying a "liberal thrust" favoring admissibility and by concluding that Delaware's standard for admissibility is distinct from the federal standard. The Supreme Court emphasized that the proponent of expert testimony must establish its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court must act as a gatekeeper to ensure the reliability and sufficiency of the expert's methodology and application. The Supreme Court also found that the Superior Court erred in defining the general causation question as focusing on NDMA rather than the product at issue, ranitidine. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' experts did not reliably link the NDMA studies to the exposure caused by ranitidine, failing to establish the necessary scientific connection between the product and the alleged harm. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Litigation" on Justia Law

Ortiz v. Daimler Truck North America LLC

2025-06-27T10:30:47-08:00

Plaintiffs' mother was killed when a commercial truck rear-ended her car at a red light. The plaintiffs sued the truck manufacturer, Daimler Trucks North America LLC, alleging design defect and negligent design claims. They argued that Daimler Trucks should be held liable for their mother's death because it failed to equip the truck with a collision avoidance system, Detroit Assurance 4.0, which could have prevented the accident. This system warns drivers of collision risks and can autonomously stop the truck if the driver fails to act. Daimler Trucks included this system in some, but not all, of its trucks. The Superior Court of Butte County granted summary judgment in favor of Daimler Trucks, concluding that the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. The court found that the truck driver, not the truck's design, was the proximate cause of the accident and that Daimler Trucks owed no duty to install the collision avoidance system. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that proximate cause should be a question for the jury, as a single injury can have multiple proximate causes. The court also determined that manufacturers have a general duty to install reasonable safety devices and that this duty extends to collision avoidance systems. The court rejected the trial court's conclusion that Daimler Trucks owed no duty of care and found that the plaintiffs' evidence supported the claim that the truck's design was a proximate cause of the accident. The appellate court held that Daimler Trucks must exercise due care when choosing whether to install collision avoidance systems and that the issue of whether Daimler Trucks breached that duty was outside the scope of the appeal. The court reversed the trial court's judgment against the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ortiz v. Daimler Truck North America LLC" on Justia Law

The Promenade D'Iberville, LLC v. Jacksonville Electric Authority

2025-06-13T01:28:29-08:00

Promenade D’Iberville, LLC, the owner and developer of a large retail shopping center in D’Iberville, Mississippi, discovered soil issues during construction in 2009. The problems were linked to the use of OPF42, a soil stabilizer containing bed ash from Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA), a Florida public utility. Promenade filed a lawsuit in 2010 in the Harrison County Circuit Court against several parties, including JEA, alleging damages from the defective product. The Harrison County Circuit Court granted JEA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity based on California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt (Hyatt III). The court also held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and comity principles required dismissal due to Florida’s presuit notice and venue requirements. Promenade appealed the decision. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that Hyatt III does not apply to JEA, as it is not an arm of the State of Florida but an instrumentality of the City of Jacksonville. The court also determined that neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor comity principles mandated dismissal. The court held that Promenade should be allowed to proceed with its claims against JEA in Mississippi, seeking damages similar to those allowed under Mississippi’s constitution for property damage. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "The Promenade D'Iberville, LLC v. Jacksonville Electric Authority" on Justia Law

Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. v. Sayre

2025-06-06T06:15:44-08:00

In April 2022, six-year-old Emory Sayre was killed by her school bus in Parker County, Texas. The bus was manufactured by Blue Bird Body Company and sold by Rush Truck Centers of Texas to Brock Independent School District. Emory's parents, Sean and Tori Sayre, filed a lawsuit in Dallas County against Rush Truck and Blue Bird, asserting various claims including strict liability and negligence. They argued that venue was proper in Dallas County due to several activities related to the bus sale occurring there. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to transfer venue to Parker or Comal County. Rush Truck and Blue Bird filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Dallas County. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and focused on whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the interlocutory appeal. The Court held that Section 15.003(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits interlocutory appeals only in cases where a plaintiff’s independent claim to venue is at issue. Since the Sayres asserted identical claims based on identical facts with identical venue grounds, the trial court did not need to determine whether each plaintiff independently established proper venue. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in taking jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. v. Sayre" on Justia Law

Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos

2025-06-05T10:35:07-08:00

The Government of Mexico filed a lawsuit against seven American gun manufacturers, alleging that the companies aided and abetted unlawful gun sales that routed firearms to Mexican drug cartels. Mexico claimed that the manufacturers failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent trafficking of their guns into Mexico, resulting in harm from the weapons' misuse. The complaint included allegations that the manufacturers knowingly supplied firearms to retail dealers who sold them illegally to Mexican traffickers, failed to impose controls on their distribution networks, and made design and marketing decisions to stimulate demand among cartel members. The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the decision. The First Circuit found that Mexico had plausibly alleged that the defendants aided and abetted illegal firearms sales, thus satisfying the predicate exception under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Mexico's complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers' unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers. The Court concluded that the allegations did not meet the requirements for aiding and abetting liability, as they did not show that the manufacturers took affirmative acts to facilitate the illegal sales or intended to promote the criminal activities. Consequently, PLCAA barred the lawsuit, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos" on Justia Law

Sprafka v. Medical Device Bus. Services

2025-06-04T07:31:13-08:00

Julie Sprafka underwent knee replacement surgery in August 2016 using the ATTUNE knee replacement system designed by DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Four years later, she required revision surgery due to the debonding of the tibial baseplate. Sprafka filed a lawsuit against DePuy, claiming strict liability, negligent products liability, and breach of warranties. She later withdrew the warranty claims and proceeded with the products liability claims, alleging defective design and failure to warn. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case. DePuy moved to exclude the opinions of Sprafka’s design defect expert, Dr. Mari S. Truman, and for summary judgment. The district court granted DePuy’s motions, excluding Dr. Truman’s opinions for failing to meet the requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert standards. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of DePuy, as Sprafka could not prove her design defect claim without expert testimony. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Dr. Truman’s opinions were unreliable and speculative. The appellate court noted that Dr. Truman’s opinions were not based on independent research and lacked scientific scrutiny. The court also found that Sprafka did not preserve the argument that Dr. Kristoffer Breien’s expert opinion alone could support her design defect claim. Additionally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment, as Sprafka failed to provide sufficient expert testimony to support her claims. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Sprafka v. Medical Device Bus. Services" on Justia Law

Fire-Dex, LLC v. Admiral Insurance Co.

2025-06-02T11:30:16-08:00

Fire-Dex, a manufacturer of personal protective equipment for firefighters, faced lawsuits from firefighters and their spouses alleging exposure to carcinogens from Fire-Dex's products. These lawsuits were consolidated in multidistrict litigation in South Carolina. Fire-Dex had general commercial liability insurance policies with Admiral Insurance Company and requested Admiral to defend and indemnify it against the lawsuits. Admiral refused, leading to a declaratory judgment action in federal court in Ohio, where the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially had diversity jurisdiction over Admiral's declaratory judgment action but chose to abstain from exercising it, a decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Subsequently, Fire-Dex filed a lawsuit in Ohio state court seeking a declaration that Admiral must defend and indemnify it, along with compensatory and punitive damages for breach of contract and bad faith. Admiral removed the case to federal court and filed counterclaims for declaratory judgment. Fire-Dex moved to remand the case to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision to remand the declaratory claims and stay the damages claims. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred in abstaining from the declaratory claims under Thibodaux abstention, as the case did not involve unsettled questions of state law intimately involved with state sovereignty. The court also found that abstaining from the declaratory claims was an abuse of discretion because the declaratory and damages claims were closely intertwined, and no traditional abstention doctrine applied to the damages claims. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fire-Dex, LLC v. Admiral Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA

2025-05-23T07:30:24-08:00

An egg farm owned by Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. experienced a collapse of its poultry cage system in 2020, resulting in significant damage and the death of a farm worker. Rembrandt had contracted with Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA in 2006 to design and manufacture the cage system, which included a provision for Tecno to supervise its installation. The installation was completed in 2007. Rembrandt sued Tecno in 2021, alleging strict products liability, breach of implied warranties, and negligence. The district court allowed the negligence claim to proceed to trial, where a jury found that Tecno did not breach its duty to supervise the installation. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa granted summary judgment for Tecno on the strict products liability and breach of implied warranties claims. At trial, the jury heard conflicting expert testimony regarding the cause of the collapse. Rembrandt's expert attributed the collapse to missing screws and misplaced bolts, while Tecno's experts blamed improper manure disposal by Rembrandt. The jury ultimately sided with Tecno, and the district court entered judgment in favor of Tecno. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Rembrandt argued that the district court erred in denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law and in excluding a screenshot of Tecno's website. The appellate court held that Rembrandt failed to preserve its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by not renewing its motion under Rule 50(b) after the jury verdict. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the website screenshot, as it was not relevant to the 2006 contract. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc. v. Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA" on Justia Law

Ethridge v. Samsung SDI

2025-05-14T15:30:16-08:00

James Ethridge, a Texas resident, purchased a Samsung 18650 lithium-ion battery from a Wyoming-based seller on Amazon in October 2018. The battery exploded in his pocket in November 2019, causing severe burns and other injuries. Ethridge filed a personal injury lawsuit in Texas state court in 2021 against Samsung SDI Company, Firehouse Vapors LLC, and two Amazon entities. He later added Macromall LLC as a defendant. After dismissing Firehouse Vapors, the remaining defendants removed the case to federal court. Ethridge then dismissed Macromall, leaving Samsung and the Amazon entities as defendants. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Amazon defendants and dismissed Samsung for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ethridge appealed the dismissal of Samsung to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, voluntarily dismissing his appeal against Amazon. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo and reversed the dismissal. The court held that Samsung had purposefully availed itself of the Texas market by shipping 18650 batteries to companies like Black & Decker, HP, and Dell in Texas. The court found that Ethridge's claims were related to Samsung's contacts with Texas, as the same type of battery that injured Ethridge was sold in Texas. The court concluded that exercising personal jurisdiction over Samsung in Texas was fair and reasonable, given the state's interest in providing a forum for its injured residents and Samsung's ability to litigate in Texas. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ethridge v. Samsung SDI" on Justia Law

Daughtry v. Silver Fern Chemical

2025-05-12T15:30:16-08:00

The plaintiffs, a group of individuals and entities associated with the Daughtry family, sued Silver Fern Chemical, Inc. and its employee, Gilda Franco. Silver Fern supplied the plaintiffs with a chemical called 1,4 butanediol (BDO), which can be used as a date-rape drug. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigated the distribution of BDO for illicit use and subpoenaed Silver Fern for emails related to BDO purchases. Franco altered these emails to include a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) that was not originally attached, and the plaintiffs allege this was done to aid the government in prosecuting them. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed the claims against Franco for lack of personal jurisdiction and against Silver Fern for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that Silver Fern intended for them to rely on the altered emails, nor did they show reliance on these emails to their detriment. The court also dismissed the products-liability claims, stating that the plaintiffs were not the end users of the chemical and did not suffer physical harm. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the fraud claims, agreeing that the plaintiffs failed to show that Silver Fern intended for them to rely on the altered emails. The court also upheld the dismissal of the civil conspiracy to commit fraud claim, as it was dependent on the underlying fraud claim. Additionally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the products-liability claims, noting that the plaintiffs did not suffer physical harm and were not the end users of the chemical. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's judgment of dismissal was correct and affirmed the decision. View "Daughtry v. Silver Fern Chemical" on Justia Law

HERNANDEZ VS. THE HOME DEPOT, INC.

2025-05-01T08:06:07-08:00

Oscar Hernandez allegedly sustained injuries from a RIDGID-branded nail gun purchased from Home Depot. The nail gun, designed and manufactured by other companies, was marketed and sold by Home Depot under a trademark license agreement with Ridge Tool Company. Hernandez filed a complaint against Ridge Tool Company and Home Depot, asserting claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ridge Tool Company should not be held strictly liable as it only licensed the RIDGID trademark and did not participate in the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of the nail gun. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment on all claims except the strict liability claim, noting the lack of controlling precedent in Nevada on whether a trademark licensor can be held strictly liable under such circumstances. The court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Nevada. The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that Nevada does not impose strict products liability on an entity whose only involvement with a defective product is licensing its trademark for marketing purposes. The court adopted the rule set forth in section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which states that a trademark licensor is not subject to strict liability unless it substantially participates in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the product. The court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that a trademark licensor cannot be held strictly liable for damages caused by a defective product if its role is limited to licensing its trademark. View "HERNANDEZ VS. THE HOME DEPOT, INC." on Justia Law

Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc.

2025-04-29T12:12:12-08:00

William D. Lunn, individually and as the representative of the estates of his three deceased children, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) in October 2009, alleging a design defect caused an airplane crash that killed his children. In September 2012, CMI made an unapportioned offer of judgment for $300,000, which Lunn rejected. After a lengthy litigation process, a jury found in favor of CMI. Lunn moved for a new trial, which the district court granted in February 2021. CMI appealed, arguing the claims were barred by the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the district court's decision. CMI then sought attorney's fees, claiming entitlement under the offer of judgment statute since the judgment was less than their offer. The district court denied the motion, ruling the unapportioned offer invalid. CMI appealed this decision. COCA affirmed the district court's ruling, referencing prior cases that required offers of judgment to be apportioned among plaintiffs to be valid. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case to address whether an offer of judgment under 12 O.S.2021, § 1101.1(A) must be apportioned among multiple plaintiffs. The court held that such offers must indeed be apportioned to allow each plaintiff to independently evaluate the settlement offer. The court emphasized that unapportioned offers create confusion and hinder the plaintiffs' ability to assess the offer's value relative to their claims. Consequently, the court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling CMI's unapportioned offer invalid. View "Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Johnson v. Bass Pro Outdoor World

2025-04-25T08:33:22-08:00

Marquise Johnson was injured when his friend, André Lewis, accidentally shot him while attempting to disassemble a handgun in a car. Lewis believed the gun could not fire without the magazine, but it discharged, hitting Johnson in the legs. Johnson sued the gun's manufacturer, importer, and seller, alleging the gun was defective for lacking certain safety features. The Lyon District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, citing the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which provides immunity to firearm manufacturers and sellers from lawsuits when their products are misused criminally. The court found that Lewis' act of pulling the trigger was volitional and constituted a criminal offense under Kansas law, specifically the strict-liability crime of discharging a firearm on a public road. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, interpreting the PLCAA to require an intentional discharge for immunity to apply. The majority held that because Lewis did not intend to fire the gun, the PLCAA did not bar Johnson's lawsuit. A dissenting judge argued that the PLCAA should apply because Lewis' act of pulling the trigger was volitional. The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the PLCAA bars product-liability actions if a volitional act causes the gun to discharge and the shooting constitutes a criminal offense. The court found that Lewis' deliberate trigger pull was a volitional act and that discharging a firearm on a public road is a strict-liability crime under Kansas law. Therefore, the PLCAA provided immunity to the defendants, and the district court's summary judgment was affirmed. The case was remanded to the district court. View "Johnson v. Bass Pro Outdoor World " on Justia Law

Allied World National v. Nisus

2025-04-21T04:00:39-08:00

In 2018, a $200 million mixed-use development project at Louisiana State University experienced issues with its fire-protection sprinkler systems, which began to crack and leak. Allied World National Assurance Company, which paid over $10 million for system replacements, sued Nisus Corporation in 2021, alleging that Nisus falsely represented its product's compatibility with the pipe material, leading to the damage. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of Nisus, concluding that Allied's claims were time-barred under Louisiana law. The court found that while Provident, the insured party, did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the cause of the damage, RISE Residential, Provident's agent, had constructive knowledge of the cause by November 2019. This knowledge was imputed to Provident, starting the prescription period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that RISE Residential's constructive knowledge of the sprinkler system issues, which was imputed to Provident, triggered the running of the prescription period well before July 23, 2020. The court also found that Nisus did not prevent Allied from timely availing itself of its causes of action, as a reasonable inquiry by RISE Residential would have uncovered the necessary information. Therefore, Allied's claims were prescribed, and the summary judgment in favor of Nisus was affirmed. View "Allied World National v. Nisus" on Justia Law

Diaz v. FCA US LLC

2025-04-15T09:00:10-08:00

Plaintiffs alleged that an automobile manufacturer designed, manufactured, and sold defective vehicles, specifically Dodge "muscle" cars with defective rear differentials. They filed a complaint asserting state and federal causes of action based on fraud and breach of warranty. The District Court dismissed the fraud counts and some warranty counts, allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint. After amending, the District Court dismissed the fraud counts again and some warranty counts, but allowed two warranty counts to proceed. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially dismissed the complaint without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to amend it. After the plaintiffs amended their complaint, the District Court dismissed the fraud counts and some warranty counts with prejudice, but allowed two warranty counts to proceed. The plaintiffs then moved to certify the dismissal of their fraud counts for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or for final judgment under Rule 54(b). The District Court denied the request for certification under § 1292(b) but granted the request for final judgment under Rule 54(b) for the fraud counts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the District Court's Rule 54(b) judgment was not final. The Court of Appeals held that the fraud and warranty counts constituted a single claim for purposes of Rule 54(b) because they were alternative theories of recovery based on the same factual situation. As a result, the judgment did not dispose of all the rights or liabilities of one or more of the parties. Consequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and instructed the District Court to vacate its order directing the entry of a partial final judgment. View "Diaz v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc.

2025-04-08T10:40:01-08:00

Charter Oak Production Co., LLC paid to settle a property damage claim after a pipeline installed on its easement ruptured, causing a saltwater spill on the property of Jason and Melissa Mills. Charter Oak sought indemnity from JM Eagle, Inc., the manufacturer, and Rainmaker Sales, Inc., the distributor, alleging the pipe was defective. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JM Eagle and Rainmaker, finding that Charter Oak lacked the necessary legal relationship to assert an indemnity claim and that the claim was barred by the economic loss rule. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, reversed the district court's decision. It found that Charter Oak's non-delegable duty to the Millses created the legal relationship necessary to support an indemnity claim against JM Eagle and Rainmaker. Additionally, it held that Charter Oak's claim was not barred by the economic loss rule. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case. It held that Charter Oak's non-delegable duty as the dominant tenant of the easement established the legal relationship necessary to seek indemnity from JM Eagle and Rainmaker. The court also held that the economic loss rule did not bar Charter Oak's indemnity claim, as it sought reimbursement for damage to property other than the defective product itself. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, reversed the district court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Hairston v. Lku

2025-04-05T05:00:03-08:00

Darnell Hairston was seriously injured while operating machinery at Zeeland Farm Soya, Inc. He sued Zeeland Farm Services, Inc. (ZFS) and an employee, later adding Specialty Industries, Inc. as a defendant for negligence and products liability. ZFS settled, but the case against Specialty Industries proceeded to trial, resulting in a jury awarding Hairston over $13 million. Specialty Industries had insurance policies with Burlington Insurance Company and Evanston Insurance Company, which paid their policy limits, leaving a significant portion of the judgment unpaid. The Ottawa Circuit Court denied Hairston and Specialty Industries' motion for supplemental proceedings to pursue a bad-faith refusal to settle claim against the insurers, suggesting they file a separate lawsuit. Hairston then served writs of garnishment on the insurers, which the trial court quashed, stating there was no judgment of bad faith. The trial court also imposed sanctions on Hairston for filing the writs. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to quash the writs, relying on the precedent set in Rutter v King, which allowed bad-faith refusal to settle claims to be litigated through garnishment. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the sanctions against Hairston. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that unresolved claims of bad-faith refusal to settle are not subject to garnishment under MCR 3.101(G)(1) because they are not sufficiently liquidated. The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on Rutter, which was decided before the current court rules were adopted. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hairston v. Lku" on Justia Law

Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc.

2025-03-31T11:09:52-08:00

In March 2016, thirteen-year-old J.R. Gustafson was accidentally shot and killed by his fourteen-year-old friend at a residence in Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania. J.R.'s parents, Mark and Leah Gustafson, filed a lawsuit against Springfield Armory, the manufacturer of the firearm, and Saloom Department Store, the retailer that sold the firearm. They alleged defective design, negligent design and sale, and negligent warnings and marketing. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, citing the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which bars certain civil actions against firearms manufacturers and sellers. The Gustafsons appealed, and the Superior Court reversed the trial court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Superior Court's en banc panel issued a per curiam order, with no single rationale garnering majority support. Some judges found the PLCAA barred the claims but was unconstitutional, while others found the PLCAA did not bar the claims or was constitutional. The Superior Court's order was challenged, leading to the current appeal. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the PLCAA barred the Gustafsons' action. The court found that the action constituted a "qualified civil liability action" under the PLCAA, as it was a civil action against a manufacturer and seller of a qualified product for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a firearm. The court also concluded that the product liability exception did not apply because the discharge of the firearm was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense. The court further held that the PLCAA was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority and did not violate the Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court's dismissal of the Gustafsons' complaint. View "Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc." on Justia Law

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.

2025-03-17T13:30:03-08:00

Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and Series PMPI filed a lawsuit in September 2018 against Fresenius Medical Care Holdings and related entities, alleging negligence, product liability, and design defect claims related to the GranuFlo product used in hemodialysis treatments. The claims arose from a 2012 public memorandum by Fresenius that GranuFlo could lead to cardiopulmonary arrest. The plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by a putative class action filed in 2013 (the Berzas action) in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was later transferred to the District of Massachusetts as part of multidistrict litigation (MDL). The District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, concluding that the Berzas action ceased to be a class action by June 2014 when the named plaintiffs filed Short Form Complaints or stipulations of dismissal, which did not include class allegations. The court also noted that the Berzas plaintiffs did not pursue class certification actively, and the case was administratively closed in April 2019. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The First Circuit held that the Berzas action lost its class action status by June 2014, and any tolling under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah ended at that time. The court reasoned that allowing indefinite tolling based on an inactive class certification request would contravene the principles of efficiency and economy in litigation. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 2018 complaint was untimely, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

2025-03-10T08:31:10-08:00

Plaintiffs, who were allegedly sexually assaulted or harassed by Uber drivers, filed individual lawsuits against Uber Technologies, Inc. across various districts. They claimed Uber failed to take reasonable measures to prevent such misconduct, asserting negligence, misrepresentation, products liability, and vicarious liability. Plaintiffs argued that Uber was aware of the issue since at least 2014 but did not implement adequate safety measures, such as proper background checks, emergency notifications, and effective responses to complaints. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) centralized these cases in the Northern District of California for coordinated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Uber opposed the centralization, arguing that their terms of use included a collective action waiver that precluded such a transfer and that the cases did not share sufficient common factual questions to warrant centralization. The JPML found that the cases did involve common factual questions and that centralization would eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve resources. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Uber's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the JPML's order. The court held that Uber had not demonstrated that the JPML committed a clear error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. The court found that the JPML acted within its broad discretion in determining that the cases presented common questions of fact and that centralization would promote the just and efficient conduct of the actions. The court also rejected Uber's argument regarding the collective action waiver, stating that Section 1407 grants the JPML the authority to centralize cases regardless of private agreements to the contrary. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Uber's petition for a writ of mandamus. View "UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION" on Justia Law

Cearley v. Bobst Group North America Inc.

2025-02-21T08:30:38-08:00

Vernon Holland was fatally injured by a rewinder machine at his workplace. Robert Cearley, Jr., representing Holland’s estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Bobst Group North America, Inc. (Bobst NA), the company responsible for delivering and installing the rewinder. The lawsuit sought damages based on several tort claims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Bobst NA. The court ruled that Arkansas’s statute of repose, which limits the time frame for bringing claims related to construction or design defects, barred Cearley’s claims. Cearley appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether Bobst NA was protected under Arkansas Code § 16-56-112(b)(1), which is a statute of repose for claims arising from personal injury or wrongful death caused by construction defects. The court concluded that Bobst NA’s involvement in the delivery, installation, integration, and commissioning of the rewinder constituted the construction of an improvement to real property. The court also determined that the rewinder was an improvement to real property because it was affixed to the plant, furthered the purpose of the realty, and was designed for long-term use. As the lawsuit was filed more than four years after the installation of the rewinder, the court held that the claims were barred by the statute of repose. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Bobst NA. View "Cearley v. Bobst Group North America Inc." on Justia Law

Wilson v. Hearos, LLC

2025-02-18T12:01:39-08:00

James Wilson III used earplugs manufactured by Hearos, LLC at a shooting range and subsequently suffered significant hearing loss. He filed a lawsuit against Hearos in state court, alleging various tort claims. Protective Industrial Products, Inc. (PIP), a non-party, removed the case to federal court. The district court noted the unusual removal by a non-party but proceeded as neither Wilson nor Hearos objected to the court's jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Wilson's claims as time-barred under Georgia law. The district court for the Southern District of Georgia found that Wilson filed his complaint three days before the statute of limitations expired but did not serve Hearos until 117 days after the limitations period ended. The court concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate the required diligence in serving Hearos, leading to the dismissal of his claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that removal by a non-party is a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one, and must be objected to within 30 days under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Since Wilson did not object within this period, he waived his right to challenge the removal. The court also affirmed that Georgia's service-and-diligence rule, rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), applied to determine if Wilson's claims were time-barred. The court concluded that Wilson did not act with the required diligence to serve Hearos, affirming the district court's dismissal of his claims. View "Wilson v. Hearos, LLC" on Justia Law

DOE V. GRINDR INC.

2025-02-18T09:30:27-08:00

An underage user of the Grindr application, John Doe, filed a lawsuit against Grindr Inc. and Grindr LLC, alleging that the app facilitated his sexual exploitation by adult men. Doe claimed that Grindr's design and operation allowed him to be matched with adults despite being a minor, leading to his rape by four men, three of whom were later convicted. Doe's lawsuit included state law claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a federal claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Doe's claims, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provided Grindr with immunity from liability for the state law claims. The court also found that Doe failed to state a plausible claim under the TVPRA, as he did not sufficiently allege that Grindr knowingly participated in or benefitted from sex trafficking. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 barred Doe's state law claims because they implicated Grindr's role as a publisher of third-party content. The court also agreed that Doe failed to state a plausible TVPRA claim, as he did not allege that Grindr had actual knowledge of or actively participated in sex trafficking. Consequently, Doe could not invoke the statutory exception to Section 230 immunity under the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2018. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Doe's claims in their entirety. View "DOE V. GRINDR INC." on Justia Law

L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc.

2025-02-13T05:11:17-08:00

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged violations of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA) after their minor child, L.L., was severely injured. The injury occurred when a Graco car seat, placed on a kitchen counter next to an electric range stove, caught fire. The plaintiffs claimed that the car seat and stove were defectively designed or manufactured. As a result of the fire, L.L. suffered severe burns and injuries. The plaintiffs, including L.L.'s parents, also sought damages for loss of filial consortium, alleging that they lost the society, care, and companionship of their daughter due to her injuries. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed the case and certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court, asking whether Connecticut law recognizes a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium when a minor child suffers severe but nonfatal injuries due to a defendant's tortious conduct. The District Court had previously denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claims without prejudice. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. The court reasoned that the justifications for recognizing loss of spousal and parental consortium claims, which are based on mutual dependence and reliance, do not apply to the parent-child relationship in the same way. The court emphasized that the emotional distress experienced by a parent due to a child's severe injury is distinct from the relational loss addressed by loss of consortium claims. The court found the reasoning of jurisdictions that distinguish between parental and filial consortium more persuasive and declined to expand the scope of liability to include loss of filial consortium. View "L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

Eastern Maine Medical Center v. Walgreen Co.

2025-02-06T08:09:08-08:00

The case involves Eastern Maine Medical Center and eight other Maine hospitals (the Hospitals) who filed a 509-page complaint against various businesses and individuals (the Opioid Sellers) involved in the marketing and distribution of prescription opioids. The Hospitals alleged that the Opioid Sellers created illegitimate demand for opioids and unlawfully increased supply, leading to an opioid epidemic that caused the Hospitals to incur high costs for treating patients with opioid misuse, addiction, and dependency, with only partial reimbursement from insurance. The Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) dismissed the Hospitals' complaint. The court found that the complaint did not comply with the requirement for a "short and plain statement" of the claim but chose to dismiss it based on the legal insufficiency of the claims. The court concluded that the Hospitals could not recover under any of their legal theories, including negligence, public nuisance, unjust enrichment, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy. The court also denied the Hospitals' request for leave to amend their complaint. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The court held that the Hospitals' claims were legally insufficient. Specifically, the court found that the Hospitals did not have a direct negligence claim, as they did not suffer harm directly caused by the Opioid Sellers. The fraud and misrepresentation claims failed due to lack of reliance by the Hospitals on the Opioid Sellers' misrepresentations. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed because the Hospitals did not confer a benefit on the Opioid Sellers. The public nuisance claim failed as the Hospitals did not suffer a special injury different in kind from the public. Lastly, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed as it required an underlying tort, which was not present. The court concluded that the deficiencies in the complaint could not be remedied by amendment. View "Eastern Maine Medical Center v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

M.P. v. Meta Platforms Inc.

2025-02-04T11:30:35-08:00

In June 2015, Dylann Roof shot and killed nine people at Mother Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, including M.P.'s father, Reverend Clementa Pinckney. M.P., a minor, filed a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.) and its subsidiaries, alleging that Facebook's algorithm recommended harmful content that radicalized Roof, leading to the murders. M.P. asserted claims of strict products liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under South Carolina law, as well as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed M.P.'s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act barred her state law tort claims. The court also found that M.P. failed to plausibly allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that M.P.'s state law tort claims were barred by Section 230 because they sought to hold Facebook liable as a publisher of third-party content. The court also determined that M.P. failed to plausibly allege proximate causation under South Carolina law, as her complaint did not provide sufficient factual foundation linking Roof's Facebook use to his crimes. Additionally, the court found that M.P. forfeited her challenge to the dismissal of her Section 1985 claim by not adequately addressing it in her appellate brief. The court also concluded that any potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting Facebook's motion to dismiss. View "M.P. v. Meta Platforms Inc." on Justia Law

Davis v. Sig Sauer, Inc.

2025-01-27T12:30:16-08:00

Timothy Davis accidentally shot himself in the leg with his Sig Sauer P320 X-Carry pistol while getting out of his truck. Davis claimed the gun was fully holstered and that he did not pull the trigger. He alleged that the P320 was defectively designed, making it prone to accidental discharge, and that alternative designs could have prevented his injury. Davis filed a products-liability lawsuit against Sig Sauer under Kentucky law, citing strict liability and negligence. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Sig Sauer’s motions to exclude Davis’s expert witnesses and for summary judgment. The court found that Davis’s experts, James Tertin and Dr. William J. Vigilante, Jr., did not investigate the exact circumstances of the shooting and thus could not opine on causation. Without expert testimony, the court held that Davis could not pursue his products-liability claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the experts’ opinions on causation but reversed the exclusion of their testimonies on design defects and reasonable alternative designs. The appellate court found that the experts’ opinions were admissible to prove that the P320 was defectively designed and that reasonable alternative designs existed. The court held that Davis had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the P320 was defectively designed and caused his injury. Consequently, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

L.W. v. Audi AG

2025-01-15T15:01:08-08:00

A minor, L.W., suffered severe injuries when an Audi Q7, allegedly defective, surged forward and crushed him against a garage wall. L.W., his mother, and two siblings filed a products liability suit against Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (VWGoA), claiming the vehicle lacked necessary safety features. Audi AG, a German company, manufactures vehicles sold in the U.S. through VWGoA, which markets and sells them to authorized dealerships, including in California. The Superior Court of Placer County granted Audi's motion to quash service of summons, finding no personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Audi's purposeful availment of California's market or a substantial connection between Audi's activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable or consistent with fair play and substantial justice. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Audi, through VWGoA, deliberately served the U.S. market, including California, and thus could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in California. The court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating Audi's purposeful availment and the relatedness of the controversy to Audi's contacts with California. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction over Audi would be fair and reasonable, given California's significant interest in providing a forum for its residents and enforcing safety regulations. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to quash and remanded the case with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "L.W. v. Audi AG" on Justia Law

Watts v. Pneumo Abex

2025-01-01T09:13:43-08:00

In 2019, Steven Watts, an automotive repair shop owner, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure. He and his wife, Cindy Watts, filed a lawsuit against 28 defendants, later adding eight more. By the time of trial, only one defendant, Pneumo Abex, LLC (Abex), a brake linings manufacturer, remained. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2,943,653 in economic damages, $6.75 million in noneconomic damages, and $1 million for loss of consortium, attributing 60% fault to Abex, 25% to other brake manufacturers, and 15% to Watts. The trial court directed a verdict against Abex on its sophisticated user defense and made several rulings on the allocation of fault. Abex appealed, arguing for a new trial on all issues, particularly challenging the directed verdict on the sophisticated user defense and the allocation of fault. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against Abex on the sophisticated user defense, as there was substantial evidence that Watts, as a trained mechanic and business owner, should have known about the dangers of asbestos. The court also found errors in the trial court's rulings on the allocation of fault, including the exclusion of joint compound manufacturers from the verdict form and the preclusion of Watts's interrogatory responses. The appellate court concluded that these errors warranted a new trial. The court reversed the September 15, 2022 judgment, the November 28, 2022 order, and the March 20, 2023 amended judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. Abex was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Watts v. Pneumo Abex" on Justia Law

In re Natl. Prescription Opiate Litigation

2024-12-10T06:08:35-08:00

A group of city and county governments, Indian tribes, and other entities filed actions against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies, alleging they misled medical professionals and the public, leading to widespread addiction. Two Ohio counties, Trumbull and Lake, claimed that national pharmaceutical chains, including Walgreens, CVS, and Walmart, contributed to the opioid epidemic by filling prescriptions without proper controls. They filed a common-law absolute public-nuisance claim seeking equitable relief. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the pharmacies' motion to dismiss, which argued that the Ohio Product Liability Act (OPLA) abrogated the public-nuisance claims. The court based its decision on a prior ruling in a related case, concluding that the OPLA did not abrogate public-nuisance claims seeking non-compensatory damages. After a jury verdict in favor of the counties, the pharmacies' motion for judgment as a matter of law was also denied. The pharmacies appealed, and the Sixth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Ohio regarding the OPLA's scope. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the OPLA abrogates all common-law public-nuisance claims arising from the sale of a product, including those seeking equitable relief. The court determined that the statutory definition of "product liability claim" includes public-nuisance claims related to the design, manufacture, supply, marketing, distribution, promotion, advertising, labeling, or sale of a product. The court rejected the argument that the OPLA only abrogates claims seeking compensatory damages or involving defective products. The court concluded that the counties' claims, based on the pharmacies' dispensing of opioids, fall within the scope of the OPLA and are therefore abrogated. View "In re Natl. Prescription Opiate Litigation" on Justia Law

Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Rogers Manufacturing Corporation

2024-11-27T08:30:20-08:00

Following heavy snowfall in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the roofs of several chicken houses at ten poultry farms collapsed. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which insured the farms, sued Rogers Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the roof trusses used in the chicken houses, claiming strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranties. Rogers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Norfolk’s claims were barred by the Arkansas statute of repose. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas agreed with Rogers and dismissed the complaint. Norfolk appealed the dismissal, arguing that the statute of repose did not apply to Rogers because the roof trusses were standardized goods, not custom-designed for the farms. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Norfolk’s favor. The court found that Norfolk’s complaint plausibly supported an inference that the roof trusses were standardized goods, which would not be covered by the Arkansas statute of repose. The court emphasized that at this early stage, the complaint should not be dismissed if it allows for a reasonable inference of liability. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the facts and legal arguments could be further developed as the case progresses. View "Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Rogers Manufacturing Corporation" on Justia Law

Mazzocchio v. Cotter Corporation

2024-10-30T07:30:24-08:00

Sisters Nikki Mazzocchio and Angela Kraus filed a federal "public liability action" under the Price-Anderson Act (PAA) against several defendants, alleging that exposure to radioactive waste caused them to develop cancer. The waste had been handled by various entities over the years, including Mallinckrodt, Cotter Corporation, and Commonwealth Edison Company. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, and civil conspiracy. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law preempted the state-law claims because federal nuclear dosage regulations provide the exclusive standard of care in a public liability action. The district court denied the motions to dismiss, and the defendants appealed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs' state-law claims were not preempted by federal law. The court found that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded their case under state tort law standards. The defendants then sought and were granted permission to appeal the decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that state tort law standards of care are not preempted by federal nuclear dosage regulations in a public liability action under the PAA. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., which established that state tort law applies in cases involving nuclear incidents, despite the federal government's exclusive control over nuclear safety regulation. The court also noted that Congress, through the PAA's 1988 amendments, did not repudiate the role of state tort law in such cases. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, allowing the plaintiffs' state-law claims to proceed. View "Mazzocchio v. Cotter Corporation" on Justia Law

Watts v. Pneumo Abex

2024-10-29T19:09:04-08:00

Steven Watts, an automotive repair shop owner, was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2019, a disease linked to asbestos exposure. He and his wife, Cindy Watts, filed a lawsuit against 28 defendants, later adding eight more. By the time of trial, only one defendant, Pneumo Abex, LLC (Abex), remained. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2,943,653 in economic damages, $6.75 million in noneconomic damages, and $1 million for loss of consortium, attributing 60% fault to Abex, 25% to other brake manufacturers, and 15% to Watts. The trial court had granted a directed verdict against Abex on its sophisticated user defense, which argued that Watts, as a trained mechanic and business owner, should have known about the dangers of asbestos. The court also made several rulings affecting the allocation of fault, including refusing to include joint compound manufacturers on the verdict form and precluding Abex from using Watts’s interrogatory responses. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in directing the verdict against Abex on the sophisticated user defense, as there was substantial evidence that Watts should have known about the asbestos risks. The court also found errors in the trial court’s rulings on the allocation of fault, including the exclusion of joint compound manufacturers from the verdict form and the preclusion of Watts’s interrogatory responses. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing Abex to present its sophisticated user defense and addressing the allocation of fault issues. The court also upheld the trial court’s discretion in allocating pretrial settlements but found that the overall handling of the case warranted a new trial. View "Watts v. Pneumo Abex" on Justia Law

CHAVEZ VS. METSO MINERALS INDUSTRIES, INC.

2024-10-25T09:09:24-08:00

The petitioner, Rafael Antonio Mena Chavez, filed a lawsuit under the false name "Sergio Balboa" after sustaining injuries while working for Southern Recycling, LLC. Chavez used the alias to obtain employment and continued using it when seeking medical attention and workers' compensation benefits. He later filed a lawsuit against Metso Minerals Industries, Inc., alleging product liability and negligence. Southern Recycling and other intervenors joined the suit, claiming they had paid substantial workers' compensation benefits to "Sergio Balboa." The Orleans Civil District Court denied Metso's motion to dismiss the case, despite Metso's argument that Chavez's use of a false identity undermined the judicial process. The court found no fraud or willful deception at that stage and allowed the case to proceed. Metso's subsequent writ to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, was also denied. Metso then sought relief from the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that courts have inherent authority to dismiss an action with prejudice when a petitioner’s conduct undermines the integrity of the judicial process. The court found that Chavez's prolonged use of a false identity was a calculated deception that harmed the judicial system and the defendants. The court dismissed Chavez's petition with prejudice and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the intervenors' petition survives the dismissal of Chavez's petition. View "CHAVEZ VS. METSO MINERALS INDUSTRIES, INC." on Justia Law