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	<title>Patents - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
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	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://patentsopinions.justia.com/"/>
	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/patents/</id>
	<updated>2026-07-08T21:53:37-08:00</updated>
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		<name>Justia Inc</name>
		<uri>https://www.justia.com/</uri>
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	<generator uri="https://law.justia.com/" version="3.0">Justia Law</generator>
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	<rights>Copyright 2026 Justia Inc</rights>
	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1102/24-1102-2026-07-02.html</id>
        	<title>TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC </title>
        	<updated>2026-07-02T06:01:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-02T06:01:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1102/24-1102-2026-07-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		TrackTime, LLC owned two patents claiming methods and systems for navigating within multimedia files on a mobile device using a time-correlated transcript. The patents described creating a synchronization index that allows users to tap on text to play corresponding multimedia segments and to annotate and share transcripts. TrackTime sued Amazon.com Services LLC and Audible, Inc. for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, asserting claims from both patents.

In the District of Delaware, the court ruled on two sets of claims. For the ’978 patent, the court construed certain limitations as means-plus-function terms under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and found the claims indefinite due to insufficient structural disclosure in the specification, leading to a holding of invalidity. For the ’638 patent, a jury trial was held focusing on claim 9. The jury found claim 9 not infringed and invalid for anticipation, as well as for other grounds. TrackTime’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied. Final judgment was entered accordingly.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. For the ’978 patent, the court found that further analysis was needed regarding whether the “executable program code” limitations should be considered means-plus-function terms under § 112(f), especially in light of intervening precedent from Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp. The court vacated the district court’s indefiniteness ruling and remanded for further proceedings. For the ’638 patent, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity for anticipation, holding there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find claim 9 anticipated by LiveNote and affirming the denial of post-trial motions. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1102/24-1102-2026-07-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "TRACKTIME, LLC v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                TrackTime, LLC owned two patents claiming methods and systems for navigating within multimedia files on a mobile device using a time-correlated transcript. The patents described creating a synchronization index that allows users to tap on text to play corresponding multimedia segments and to annotate and share transcripts. TrackTime sued Amazon.com Services LLC and Audible, Inc. for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, asserting claims from both patents.

In the District of Delaware, the court ruled on two sets of claims. For the ’978 patent, the court construed certain limitations as means-plus-function terms under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and found the claims indefinite due to insufficient structural disclosure in the specification, leading to a holding of invalidity. For the ’638 patent, a jury trial was held focusing on claim 9. The jury found claim 9 not infringed and invalid for anticipation, as well as for other grounds. TrackTime’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied. Final judgment was entered accordingly.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. For the ’978 patent, the court found that further analysis was needed regarding whether the “executable program code” limitations should be considered means-plus-function terms under § 112(f), especially in light of intervening precedent from Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp. The court vacated the district court’s indefiniteness ruling and remanded for further proceedings. For the ’638 patent, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity for anticipation, holding there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find claim 9 anticipated by LiveNote and affirming the denial of post-trial motions. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-2016/25-2016-2026-07-01.html</id>
        	<title>OTSUKA AMERICA PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. v. HETERO LABS LIMITED </title>
        	<updated>2026-07-01T06:32:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-01T06:32:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-2016/25-2016-2026-07-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Otsuka America Pharmaceutical and its subsidiary own a patent covering a method for treating pseudobulbar affect and emotional lability by administering dextromethorphan with quinidine. Their branded drug, Nuedexta, combines these substances in their salt forms. After the FDA approved Hetero Labs’ generic version, which uses identical salt forms and amounts, Hetero announced plans to launch its product. Otsuka responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to block Hetero’s market entry.

The District Court for the District of Delaware first issued a temporary restraining order, then granted a preliminary injunction, preventing Hetero from selling its generic drug. The court found Otsuka likely to succeed in proving patent infringement and determined that equitable factors favored the injunction. It also waived the requirement for Otsuka to post a bond pending appeal, citing strong equities in Otsuka’s favor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the patent claim terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” as including both the free base and salt forms administered to patients, rather than only the active moiety. This construction meant that Hetero’s generic product infringed the patent. The Federal Circuit also held that the district court acted within its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. However, it vacated the district court’s waiver of the Rule 65(c) bond requirement, finding that such waivers are extremely rare in cases involving commercial activity, and remanded the issue for reconsideration. Thus, the preliminary injunction was affirmed but the bond waiver was vacated and remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-2016/25-2016-2026-07-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "OTSUKA AMERICA PHARMACEUTICAL, INC. v. HETERO LABS LIMITED " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Otsuka America Pharmaceutical and its subsidiary own a patent covering a method for treating pseudobulbar affect and emotional lability by administering dextromethorphan with quinidine. Their branded drug, Nuedexta, combines these substances in their salt forms. After the FDA approved Hetero Labs’ generic version, which uses identical salt forms and amounts, Hetero announced plans to launch its product. Otsuka responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to block Hetero’s market entry.

The District Court for the District of Delaware first issued a temporary restraining order, then granted a preliminary injunction, preventing Hetero from selling its generic drug. The court found Otsuka likely to succeed in proving patent infringement and determined that equitable factors favored the injunction. It also waived the requirement for Otsuka to post a bond pending appeal, citing strong equities in Otsuka’s favor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the patent claim terms “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” as including both the free base and salt forms administered to patients, rather than only the active moiety. This construction meant that Hetero’s generic product infringed the patent. The Federal Circuit also held that the district court acted within its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. However, it vacated the district court’s waiver of the Rule 65(c) bond requirement, finding that such waivers are extremely rare in cases involving commercial activity, and remanded the issue for reconsideration. Thus, the preliminary injunction was affirmed but the bond waiver was vacated and remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Bryson</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5311/23-5311-2026-06-26.html</id>
        	<title>Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-26T07:01:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5311/23-5311-2026-06-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Norwich Pharmaceuticals sought to market a generic version of Xifaxan, a drug invented by Salix Pharmaceuticals for treating irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea and hepatic encephalopathy. Norwich submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA, identified as number 214369. Salix believed this ANDA infringed its patents and sued Norwich in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. That court found Norwich’s ANDA infringed Salix’s patents related to hepatic encephalopathy, while the patents for irritable bowel syndrome were invalid as obvious. The court’s final judgment barred FDA approval of Norwich’s ’369 ANDA until Salix’s hepatic encephalopathy patents expired in October 2029.

Following the judgment, Norwich amended its ’369 ANDA to remove the indication for hepatic encephalopathy and requested the Delaware District Court modify its judgment to allow immediate FDA approval of the amended ANDA. The court denied this motion, reasoning that Norwich could not change its ANDA after final judgment to circumvent the prior ruling. Norwich appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which agreed the judgment restricted approval of the entire ANDA, including non-infringing indications, until 2029, and affirmed the Delaware District Court’s decision.

After the FDA declined to grant final approval of Norwich’s amended ANDA, instead issuing only tentative approval, Norwich sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court granted summary judgment to the FDA and Salix. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Delaware District Court’s judgment applied to Norwich’s ANDA as amended, so the FDA correctly delayed final approval until October 2029. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-5311/23-5311-2026-06-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Norwich Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Kennedy" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Norwich Pharmaceuticals sought to market a generic version of Xifaxan, a drug invented by Salix Pharmaceuticals for treating irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea and hepatic encephalopathy. Norwich submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to the FDA, identified as number 214369. Salix believed this ANDA infringed its patents and sued Norwich in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. That court found Norwich’s ANDA infringed Salix’s patents related to hepatic encephalopathy, while the patents for irritable bowel syndrome were invalid as obvious. The court’s final judgment barred FDA approval of Norwich’s ’369 ANDA until Salix’s hepatic encephalopathy patents expired in October 2029.

Following the judgment, Norwich amended its ’369 ANDA to remove the indication for hepatic encephalopathy and requested the Delaware District Court modify its judgment to allow immediate FDA approval of the amended ANDA. The court denied this motion, reasoning that Norwich could not change its ANDA after final judgment to circumvent the prior ruling. Norwich appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which agreed the judgment restricted approval of the entire ANDA, including non-infringing indications, until 2029, and affirmed the Delaware District Court’s decision.

After the FDA declined to grant final approval of Norwich’s amended ANDA, instead issuing only tentative approval, Norwich sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court granted summary judgment to the FDA and Salix. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Delaware District Court’s judgment applied to Norwich’s ANDA as amended, so the FDA correctly delayed final approval until October 2029. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Justin Walker</case:judge>
													<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1427/25-1427-2026-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>ENANTA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. PFIZER INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-06-23T05:01:57-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-23T05:01:57-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1427/25-1427-2026-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Enanta Pharmaceuticals owned a patent directed to certain chemical compounds and methods for inhibiting coronavirus replication. The patent claimed priority to an earlier provisional application filed in July 2020. In the original provisional application, the relevant chemical group was described as containing two to twelve carbon atoms, while in the later patent, the range was changed to include one to twelve carbon atoms. Before the non-provisional patent was filed, Pfizer publicly disclosed a compound that fell within the scope of Enanta’s later patent claims.

Enanta filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting that Pfizer’s product infringed its patent. Pfizer countered that the patent was invalid because its public disclosure anticipated the patent claims, and argued that Enanta’s patent could not claim priority to the earlier provisional application since the specific chemical group was not adequately supported in the provisional filing. The district court granted summary judgment in Pfizer’s favor, concluding that the change from two to one carbon atoms was not a correctable typographical error, and that the patent could not claim the earlier priority date.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the provisional application did not provide written description support for the later patent’s claims, specifically the inclusion of the one-carbon group, and thus the patent was not entitled to the earlier priority date. As a result, Pfizer’s disclosure anticipated all claims of Enanta’s patent, rendering them invalid. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1427/25-1427-2026-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ENANTA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. PFIZER INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Enanta Pharmaceuticals owned a patent directed to certain chemical compounds and methods for inhibiting coronavirus replication. The patent claimed priority to an earlier provisional application filed in July 2020. In the original provisional application, the relevant chemical group was described as containing two to twelve carbon atoms, while in the later patent, the range was changed to include one to twelve carbon atoms. Before the non-provisional patent was filed, Pfizer publicly disclosed a compound that fell within the scope of Enanta’s later patent claims.

Enanta filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting that Pfizer’s product infringed its patent. Pfizer countered that the patent was invalid because its public disclosure anticipated the patent claims, and argued that Enanta’s patent could not claim priority to the earlier provisional application since the specific chemical group was not adequately supported in the provisional filing. The district court granted summary judgment in Pfizer’s favor, concluding that the change from two to one carbon atoms was not a correctable typographical error, and that the patent could not claim the earlier priority date.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the provisional application did not provide written description support for the later patent’s claims, specifically the inclusion of the one-carbon group, and thus the patent was not entitled to the earlier priority date. As a result, Pfizer’s disclosure anticipated all claims of Enanta’s patent, rendering them invalid. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2088/24-2088-2026-06-18.html</id>
        	<title>IRONBURG INVENTIONS LTD. v. VALVE CORPORATION </title>
        	<updated>2026-06-18T07:32:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-18T07:32:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2088/24-2088-2026-06-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Ironburg Inventions Ltd. owns a patent for a video game controller featuring additional, resilient controls on the back of the device. Ironburg alleged that Valve Corporation’s Steam Controller infringed several claims of this patent. Valve responded by filing an inter partes review (IPR) petition in 2016 challenging the patent, and later amended its invalidity contentions in district court proceedings to include new grounds based on prior art references that had been asserted by a third party, Collective Minds Gaming Co. Ltd., in a separate IPR.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted Ironburg’s motion for IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), barring Valve from asserting two invalidity grounds—one based on the Kotkin reference and another combining Willner, Koji, and Raymond—finding they could have been discovered by a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search. After a jury verdict for Ironburg and an initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the district court to place the burden on Ironburg and to evaluate whether the grounds were reasonably discoverable.

On remand, the district court again estopped Valve from raising both grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the evidence and found that the district court erred. Specifically, the district court relied on insufficient evidence to estop the Kotkin ground, as the search results from Valve’s agent included thousands of references without further narrowing. For the Willner-Koji-Raymond ground, the district court failed to properly account for hindsight bias in the evidence presented. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s estoppel rulings and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the district court to reconsider the invalidity of the patent in light of both grounds. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2088/24-2088-2026-06-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IRONBURG INVENTIONS LTD. v. VALVE CORPORATION " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Ironburg Inventions Ltd. owns a patent for a video game controller featuring additional, resilient controls on the back of the device. Ironburg alleged that Valve Corporation’s Steam Controller infringed several claims of this patent. Valve responded by filing an inter partes review (IPR) petition in 2016 challenging the patent, and later amended its invalidity contentions in district court proceedings to include new grounds based on prior art references that had been asserted by a third party, Collective Minds Gaming Co. Ltd., in a separate IPR.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted Ironburg’s motion for IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), barring Valve from asserting two invalidity grounds—one based on the Kotkin reference and another combining Willner, Koji, and Raymond—finding they could have been discovered by a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search. After a jury verdict for Ironburg and an initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the district court to place the burden on Ironburg and to evaluate whether the grounds were reasonably discoverable.

On remand, the district court again estopped Valve from raising both grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the evidence and found that the district court erred. Specifically, the district court relied on insufficient evidence to estop the Kotkin ground, as the search results from Valve’s agent included thousands of references without further narrowing. For the Willner-Koji-Raymond ground, the district court failed to properly account for hindsight bias in the evidence presented. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s estoppel rulings and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the district court to reconsider the invalidity of the patent in light of both grounds.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1600/24-1600-2026-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>HAFEMAN v. GOOGLE LLC </title>
        	<updated>2026-06-05T06:32:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-05T06:32:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1600/24-1600-2026-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on three patents owned by the appellant, which describe a method for displaying information to facilitate the return of lost or stolen computers. The patented method involves powering on a computer and automatically displaying a screen with return information, either before or alongside the lock screen, and includes the ability to remotely initiate or change the displayed information without assistance from a user with the computer. The appellant alleged that certain devices sold by LG Electronics, featuring Google or Microsoft’s “Find My Device” software, infringed these patents.

Following the appellant’s lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Google and Microsoft initiated six inter partes review (IPR) proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), contesting the validity of the patents based on prior art. The PTAB instituted review despite the appellant’s arguments referencing a parallel district court action and concerns about duplicative proceedings. LG, named as a real party in interest, filed a “Sotera stipulation,” agreeing not to pursue in district court any grounds raised in the IPRs, which the PTAB considered in its decision to institute review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s final written decisions, which found all challenged claims unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review challenges tied to the PTAB’s institution decision, specifically regarding the impact of LG’s violation of the Sotera stipulation. On the merits, the court affirmed the PTAB’s construction of the “without assistance” claim limitation, finding no error and concluding that the prior art disclosed the disputed method. The court also determined that the PTAB’s analysis of secondary considerations of non-obviousness was supported by substantial evidence. The court dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed in part, awarding costs against the appellant. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1600/24-1600-2026-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "HAFEMAN v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on three patents owned by the appellant, which describe a method for displaying information to facilitate the return of lost or stolen computers. The patented method involves powering on a computer and automatically displaying a screen with return information, either before or alongside the lock screen, and includes the ability to remotely initiate or change the displayed information without assistance from a user with the computer. The appellant alleged that certain devices sold by LG Electronics, featuring Google or Microsoft’s “Find My Device” software, infringed these patents.

Following the appellant’s lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Google and Microsoft initiated six inter partes review (IPR) proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), contesting the validity of the patents based on prior art. The PTAB instituted review despite the appellant’s arguments referencing a parallel district court action and concerns about duplicative proceedings. LG, named as a real party in interest, filed a “Sotera stipulation,” agreeing not to pursue in district court any grounds raised in the IPRs, which the PTAB considered in its decision to institute review.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s final written decisions, which found all challenged claims unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review challenges tied to the PTAB’s institution decision, specifically regarding the impact of LG’s violation of the Sotera stipulation. On the merits, the court affirmed the PTAB’s construction of the “without assistance” claim limitation, finding no error and concluding that the prior art disclosed the disputed method. The court also determined that the PTAB’s analysis of secondary considerations of non-obviousness was supported by substantial evidence. The court dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed in part, awarding costs against the appellant.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-889/</id>
        	<title>Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-04T06:45:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-04T06:45:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-889/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Amarin Pharma, Inc. developed and marketed Vascepa, a drug containing icosapent ethyl. Initially, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication). Later, the FDA approved a new use: reducing cardiovascular risk in certain patients (the CV indication), for which Amarin held two method-of-use patents. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., a generic manufacturer, sought to market a generic icosapent ethyl. After Amarin’s SH-indication patents were invalidated by a district court, Hikma pursued FDA approval for a “skinny label” generic, carving out the patented CV indication. The FDA approved Hikma’s application with the label limited to the SH indication.

Amarin sued Hikma in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that Hikma actively induced infringement of Amarin’s CV-indication patents. Amarin argued that various statements in Hikma’s skinny label, patient information leaflet, website, and press releases encouraged infringement. The District Court granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss, finding that the statements did not constitute active encouragement of infringement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding it plausible that a physician could read Hikma’s statements as instructions or encouragement to prescribe the drug for the patented use.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Amarin failed to state a claim for active inducement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b). The Court clarified that liability requires affirmative “active steps” to encourage infringement, not merely statements that could be read as encouragement. The Court found Hikma’s statements either reflected legal compliance or ordinary industry practice, or were too vague or passive to plausibly constitute active inducement. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/608/24-889/" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Amarin Pharma, Inc. developed and marketed Vascepa, a drug containing icosapent ethyl. Initially, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Vascepa for treating severe hypertriglyceridemia (the SH indication). Later, the FDA approved a new use: reducing cardiovascular risk in certain patients (the CV indication), for which Amarin held two method-of-use patents. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., a generic manufacturer, sought to market a generic icosapent ethyl. After Amarin’s SH-indication patents were invalidated by a district court, Hikma pursued FDA approval for a “skinny label” generic, carving out the patented CV indication. The FDA approved Hikma’s application with the label limited to the SH indication.

Amarin sued Hikma in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that Hikma actively induced infringement of Amarin’s CV-indication patents. Amarin argued that various statements in Hikma’s skinny label, patient information leaflet, website, and press releases encouraged infringement. The District Court granted Hikma’s motion to dismiss, finding that the statements did not constitute active encouragement of infringement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding it plausible that a physician could read Hikma’s statements as instructions or encouragement to prescribe the drug for the patented use.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Amarin failed to state a claim for active inducement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b). The Court clarified that liability requires affirmative “active steps” to encourage infringement, not merely statements that could be read as encouragement. The Court found Hikma’s statements either reflected legal compliance or ordinary industry practice, or were too vague or passive to plausibly constitute active inducement. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The necessary inducement in a patent induced infringement claim must be clear to the relevant audience and affirmative.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ketanji Brown Jackson</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1045/25-1045-2026-06-04.html</id>
        	<title>OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. v. ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC </title>
        	<updated>2026-06-04T06:31:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-04T06:31:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1045/25-1045-2026-06-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A dispute arose between two companies over patents related to wireless communications for building automation systems. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s smart thermostat products infringed four patents, which addressed improvements in wireless network architecture, power and bandwidth usage, and data redundancy within building control systems. At trial, a jury found that the defendant had infringed at least one of the asserted patents (without specifying which), determined that the claims of one patent were not limited to well-understood or routine technology, found another patent’s claims invalid, and awarded the plaintiff lump sum damages.

In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the defendant moved to dismiss based on patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but the court denied these motions for the patents at issue, except for one where factual disputes precluded summary judgment. The court also denied the defendant’s post-trial motions, including challenges to the verdict form, jury instructions related to patent eligibility, and motions to exclude expert testimony. The plaintiff, in turn, appealed the district court’s limitation on prejudgment interest.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court’s verdict form, which combined all asserted patents into a single infringement question, violated the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict. The appellate court vacated both the infringement and damages judgments and remanded for a new trial on those issues. The court also vacated and remanded the § 101 eligibility determination for one patent, requiring further proceedings under the Alice framework. However, the court affirmed the district court’s findings that the asserted claims of two other patents were not directed to abstract ideas and that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement on one patent. Remaining evidentiary and interest issues were dismissed as moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1045/25-1045-2026-06-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "OLLNOVA TECHNOLOGIES LTD. v. ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A dispute arose between two companies over patents related to wireless communications for building automation systems. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s smart thermostat products infringed four patents, which addressed improvements in wireless network architecture, power and bandwidth usage, and data redundancy within building control systems. At trial, a jury found that the defendant had infringed at least one of the asserted patents (without specifying which), determined that the claims of one patent were not limited to well-understood or routine technology, found another patent’s claims invalid, and awarded the plaintiff lump sum damages.

In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the defendant moved to dismiss based on patent ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but the court denied these motions for the patents at issue, except for one where factual disputes precluded summary judgment. The court also denied the defendant’s post-trial motions, including challenges to the verdict form, jury instructions related to patent eligibility, and motions to exclude expert testimony. The plaintiff, in turn, appealed the district court’s limitation on prejudgment interest.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court’s verdict form, which combined all asserted patents into a single infringement question, violated the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict. The appellate court vacated both the infringement and damages judgments and remanded for a new trial on those issues. The court also vacated and remanded the § 101 eligibility determination for one patent, requiring further proceedings under the Alice framework. However, the court affirmed the district court’s findings that the asserted claims of two other patents were not directed to abstract ideas and that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict of infringement on one patent. Remaining evidentiary and interest issues were dismissed as moot.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1730/24-1730-2026-06-02.html</id>
        	<title>AGI SURETRACK LLC v. FARMERS EDGE INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-06-02T06:01:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-02T06:01:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1730/24-1730-2026-06-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		AGI SureTrack LLC brought suit against Farmers Edge Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging infringement of several patents relating to automated systems and methods for capturing, processing, and sharing farming data. The core patented technology involved using a relay device with generic computer components to collect real-time data from various farming equipment, process this information, and share it via an online exchange. The patent claims described a system using a microprocessor, bus connector, GPS receiver, and memory storage, together with software that records and interprets data from farming implements.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers Edge. The court found that the asserted patent claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, the court concluded that the claims merely used generic computer components to collect and process data and did not constitute an inventive concept. The district court also ruled that the case was not exceptional and denied Farmers Edge’s request for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed both AGI’s challenge to the finding of patent ineligibility and Farmers Edge’s cross-appeal regarding exceptionality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted patents were not patent-eligible, holding that the claims were directed to an abstract idea and lacked any inventive concept beyond conventional technology. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s summary determination that the case was not exceptional, finding the lower court failed to provide adequate reasoning or allow both parties to present argument on the issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings on exceptionality and attorney’s fees. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1730/24-1730-2026-06-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AGI SURETRACK LLC v. FARMERS EDGE INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                AGI SureTrack LLC brought suit against Farmers Edge Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging infringement of several patents relating to automated systems and methods for capturing, processing, and sharing farming data. The core patented technology involved using a relay device with generic computer components to collect real-time data from various farming equipment, process this information, and share it via an online exchange. The patent claims described a system using a microprocessor, bus connector, GPS receiver, and memory storage, together with software that records and interprets data from farming implements.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers Edge. The court found that the asserted patent claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, the court concluded that the claims merely used generic computer components to collect and process data and did not constitute an inventive concept. The district court also ruled that the case was not exceptional and denied Farmers Edge’s request for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed both AGI’s challenge to the finding of patent ineligibility and Farmers Edge’s cross-appeal regarding exceptionality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted patents were not patent-eligible, holding that the claims were directed to an abstract idea and lacked any inventive concept beyond conventional technology. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s summary determination that the case was not exceptional, finding the lower court failed to provide adequate reasoning or allow both parties to present argument on the issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings on exceptionality and attorney’s fees.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Haldane Mayer</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1317/25-1317-2026-05-19.html</id>
        	<title>A.L.M. HOLDING COMPANY v. ZYDEX INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LTD. </title>
        	<updated>2026-05-19T07:03:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-19T07:03:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1317/25-1317-2026-05-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two companies, both joint owners of several patents related to warm-mix asphalt paving, entered into a licensing agreement in 2008 granting an exclusive, worldwide, royalty-bearing license to another company (and, after a reorganization, its successor). The agreement allowed the licensee to manufacture, use, sell, and sublicense the patented products, but required that sublicensing terms be subject to the patent owners’ prior review and approval (not to be unreasonably withheld). The patent owners retained certain rights, including the right to sue for infringement (with shared or independent control depending on the circumstances), receive royalties, and veto sublicenses. The patent owners also kept limited rights to practice the invention for research and to use products purchased from the licensee.

In 2024, the patent owners sued two defendants, alleging infringement of the six patents. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware granted the motion, finding that the patent owners had transferred away all exclusionary rights through the license, and that their retained right to sue was not sufficient for constitutional standing. The district court relied on previous decisions holding that a bare right to sue, separated from other substantial patent rights, did not confer standing.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit held that the patent owners retained an exclusionary right sufficient for Article III standing, namely the right to sue for infringement that was not rendered illusory by the licensee’s rights. The court concluded that the combination of the right to sue, the right to veto sublicenses, and the continuing royalty interest demonstrated a concrete, non-illusory exclusionary interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1317/25-1317-2026-05-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "A.L.M. HOLDING COMPANY v. ZYDEX INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LTD. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two companies, both joint owners of several patents related to warm-mix asphalt paving, entered into a licensing agreement in 2008 granting an exclusive, worldwide, royalty-bearing license to another company (and, after a reorganization, its successor). The agreement allowed the licensee to manufacture, use, sell, and sublicense the patented products, but required that sublicensing terms be subject to the patent owners’ prior review and approval (not to be unreasonably withheld). The patent owners retained certain rights, including the right to sue for infringement (with shared or independent control depending on the circumstances), receive royalties, and veto sublicenses. The patent owners also kept limited rights to practice the invention for research and to use products purchased from the licensee.

In 2024, the patent owners sued two defendants, alleging infringement of the six patents. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware granted the motion, finding that the patent owners had transferred away all exclusionary rights through the license, and that their retained right to sue was not sufficient for constitutional standing. The district court relied on previous decisions holding that a bare right to sue, separated from other substantial patent rights, did not confer standing.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit held that the patent owners retained an exclusionary right sufficient for Article III standing, namely the right to sue for infringement that was not rendered illusory by the licensee’s rights. The court concluded that the combination of the right to sue, the right to veto sublicenses, and the continuing royalty interest demonstrated a concrete, non-illusory exclusionary interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2089/24-2089-2026-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>MCOM IP, LLC v. CITY NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA </title>
        	<updated>2026-05-15T06:03:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-15T06:03:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2089/24-2089-2026-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a patent dispute involving a company that owns a patent for a unified electronic banking system. After most of the patent’s claims were found unpatentable in an inter partes review (IPR) before the Patent and Trademark Office, only four claims remained. The company then sued a bank in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging infringement of these remaining claims. The allegations were supported by claim charts and references to the bank’s online services.

The district court first struck the original complaint as a “shotgun pleading” and allowed an amended complaint. The amended complaint was also challenged by the defendant, who argued that the remaining claims were invalid for obviousness and, alternatively, for claiming ineligible subject matter, and that the infringement allegations were inadequate. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding the asserted claims invalid for obviousness as they did not add anything patentably distinct from those already invalidated in the IPR, and also held that infringement was not adequately pleaded. The court denied leave to further amend the complaint and subsequently awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendant under 35 U.S.C. § 285, finding the case “exceptional,” and imposed sanctions on plaintiff’s counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for alleged bad faith litigation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, upholding the finding that the patent claims at issue were invalid for obviousness. However, the appellate court reversed the awards of attorneys’ fees and sanctions, holding that the record did not support a finding that the case was exceptional or that counsel acted in bad faith, as required by the respective statutes. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2089/24-2089-2026-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MCOM IP, LLC v. CITY NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a patent dispute involving a company that owns a patent for a unified electronic banking system. After most of the patent’s claims were found unpatentable in an inter partes review (IPR) before the Patent and Trademark Office, only four claims remained. The company then sued a bank in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging infringement of these remaining claims. The allegations were supported by claim charts and references to the bank’s online services.

The district court first struck the original complaint as a “shotgun pleading” and allowed an amended complaint. The amended complaint was also challenged by the defendant, who argued that the remaining claims were invalid for obviousness and, alternatively, for claiming ineligible subject matter, and that the infringement allegations were inadequate. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding the asserted claims invalid for obviousness as they did not add anything patentably distinct from those already invalidated in the IPR, and also held that infringement was not adequately pleaded. The court denied leave to further amend the complaint and subsequently awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendant under 35 U.S.C. § 285, finding the case “exceptional,” and imposed sanctions on plaintiff’s counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for alleged bad faith litigation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, upholding the finding that the patent claims at issue were invalid for obviousness. However, the appellate court reversed the awards of attorneys’ fees and sanctions, holding that the record did not support a finding that the case was exceptional or that counsel acted in bad faith, as required by the respective statutes. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1641/24-1641-2026-05-13.html</id>
        	<title>ACTELION PHARMACEUTICALS LTD v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-05-13T06:03:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-13T06:03:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1641/24-1641-2026-05-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd, holder of patents for pharmaceutical compositions involving epoprostenol, alleged that Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.’s proposed generic drug infringed its patents by manufacturing a bulk solution with a pH of 13 or higher, as claimed in the patents. The dispute centered on whether Mylan’s bulk solution met this pH threshold, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Actelion argued that pH should be measured at the solution’s actual (refrigerated) temperature, while Mylan maintained that its product’s pH, when measured at industry standard temperature, did not meet the claimed threshold.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia held a bench trial after remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which had previously vacated a judgment based on incorrect claim construction. On remand, the district court construed “a pH of 13 or higher” to mean a pH measurement of 12.98 or higher at standard temperature (25±2°C), relying on both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. The court found no literal infringement, as Mylan’s bulk solution did not meet this threshold at standard temperature. It also ruled that Actelion was barred from asserting infringement by an equivalent due to prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure-dedication rule, and that Actelion had not proven equivalence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction de novo and factual findings for clear error. The court affirmed the district court’s claim construction, finding that “a pH of 13 or higher” refers to standard-temperature measurement, supported by industry standards and patent evidence. It also upheld the district court’s application of prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure-dedication rule, barring Actelion’s equivalents argument. The judgment for Mylan was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1641/24-1641-2026-05-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ACTELION PHARMACEUTICALS LTD v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd, holder of patents for pharmaceutical compositions involving epoprostenol, alleged that Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.’s proposed generic drug infringed its patents by manufacturing a bulk solution with a pH of 13 or higher, as claimed in the patents. The dispute centered on whether Mylan’s bulk solution met this pH threshold, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Actelion argued that pH should be measured at the solution’s actual (refrigerated) temperature, while Mylan maintained that its product’s pH, when measured at industry standard temperature, did not meet the claimed threshold.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia held a bench trial after remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which had previously vacated a judgment based on incorrect claim construction. On remand, the district court construed “a pH of 13 or higher” to mean a pH measurement of 12.98 or higher at standard temperature (25±2°C), relying on both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. The court found no literal infringement, as Mylan’s bulk solution did not meet this threshold at standard temperature. It also ruled that Actelion was barred from asserting infringement by an equivalent due to prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure-dedication rule, and that Actelion had not proven equivalence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction de novo and factual findings for clear error. The court affirmed the district court’s claim construction, finding that “a pH of 13 or higher” refers to standard-temperature measurement, supported by industry standards and patent evidence. It also upheld the district court’s application of prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure-dedication rule, barring Actelion’s equivalents argument. The judgment for Mylan was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1509/24-1509-2026-05-11.html</id>
        	<title>BISSELL, INC. v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2026-05-11T06:34:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-11T06:34:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1509/24-1509-2026-05-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Bissell, Inc. and Bissell Homecare, Inc. accused Tineco Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. and related entities of importing and selling wet dry surface cleaning devices that allegedly infringed certain claims of two U.S. patents concerning surface cleaning apparatuses. After the complaint was filed with the United States International Trade Commission, Tineco introduced redesigned versions of the accused products, which were also evaluated for infringement. The key patent claims at issue involved limitations related to a battery charging circuit being disabled during a self-cleaning mode.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the International Trade Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ found that Tineco&#039;s original products infringed the asserted patent claims but that the redesigned products did not, as they did not meet the requirement that the battery charging circuit remain disabled during the automatic cleanout cycle. The ALJ also found that Bissell’s domestic industry products practiced the relevant claim limitations, and that all accused products met other disputed limitations. The Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings and issued a limited exclusion order barring importation of only the original infringing products.

On appeal, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Bissell challenged the finding of non-infringement for the redesigned products, while Tineco cross-appealed on domestic industry findings and certain infringement determinations. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s Final Determination, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Tineco’s redesigned products did not infringe the relevant patent claims, that Bissell’s domestic industry products met the asserted limitations, and that the accused products satisfied the “brushroll within the recovery pathway” and “suction nozzle” limitations. The court affirmed the exclusion order for the original products and denied relief on all appeals. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1509/24-1509-2026-05-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BISSELL, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Bissell, Inc. and Bissell Homecare, Inc. accused Tineco Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. and related entities of importing and selling wet dry surface cleaning devices that allegedly infringed certain claims of two U.S. patents concerning surface cleaning apparatuses. After the complaint was filed with the United States International Trade Commission, Tineco introduced redesigned versions of the accused products, which were also evaluated for infringement. The key patent claims at issue involved limitations related to a battery charging circuit being disabled during a self-cleaning mode.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the International Trade Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ found that Tineco&#039;s original products infringed the asserted patent claims but that the redesigned products did not, as they did not meet the requirement that the battery charging circuit remain disabled during the automatic cleanout cycle. The ALJ also found that Bissell’s domestic industry products practiced the relevant claim limitations, and that all accused products met other disputed limitations. The Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings and issued a limited exclusion order barring importation of only the original infringing products.

On appeal, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Bissell challenged the finding of non-infringement for the redesigned products, while Tineco cross-appealed on domestic industry findings and certain infringement determinations. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s Final Determination, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Tineco’s redesigned products did not infringe the relevant patent claims, that Bissell’s domestic industry products met the asserted limitations, and that the accused products satisfied the “brushroll within the recovery pathway” and “suction nozzle” limitations. The court affirmed the exclusion order for the original products and denied relief on all appeals.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2160/24-2160-2026-05-04.html</id>
        	<title>ENVIRO TECH CHEMICAL SERVICES, INC. v. SAFE FOODS CORP. </title>
        	<updated>2026-05-04T05:02:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-04T05:02:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2160/24-2160-2026-05-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Enviro Tech Chemical Services, Inc. held a patent covering methods for treating poultry during processing, specifically by using peracetic acid to increase the weight of the poultry. The method involved several steps, including adjusting the pH of peracetic acid-containing water to a range described as “about 7.6 to about 10” by adding an alkaline source. Enviro Tech alleged that Safe Foods Corp. infringed upon various claims of this patent.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reviewed the case and conducted claim construction. Safe Foods argued that the terms “about” and “an antimicrobial amount” in the patent were indefinite. The district court agreed, finding both terms indefinite and holding the asserted claims invalid. The court entered judgment accordingly.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined whether the district court was correct in finding the term “about,” as used to define the pH range, indefinite. The Federal Circuit analyzed the claim language, the patent’s specification, and the prosecution history. The court found that the intrinsic record did not provide reasonable certainty to those skilled in the art about the scope of “about,” especially since the specification and prosecution history showed inconsistent and conflicting guidance regarding permissible pH deviations. Because the term “about” was indefinite, the Federal Circuit concluded that all asserted claims were invalid. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of invalidity entered by the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2160/24-2160-2026-05-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ENVIRO TECH CHEMICAL SERVICES, INC. v. SAFE FOODS CORP. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Enviro Tech Chemical Services, Inc. held a patent covering methods for treating poultry during processing, specifically by using peracetic acid to increase the weight of the poultry. The method involved several steps, including adjusting the pH of peracetic acid-containing water to a range described as “about 7.6 to about 10” by adding an alkaline source. Enviro Tech alleged that Safe Foods Corp. infringed upon various claims of this patent.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas reviewed the case and conducted claim construction. Safe Foods argued that the terms “about” and “an antimicrobial amount” in the patent were indefinite. The district court agreed, finding both terms indefinite and holding the asserted claims invalid. The court entered judgment accordingly.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined whether the district court was correct in finding the term “about,” as used to define the pH range, indefinite. The Federal Circuit analyzed the claim language, the patent’s specification, and the prosecution history. The court found that the intrinsic record did not provide reasonable certainty to those skilled in the art about the scope of “about,” especially since the specification and prosecution history showed inconsistent and conflicting guidance regarding permissible pH deviations. Because the term “about” was indefinite, the Federal Circuit concluded that all asserted claims were invalid. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of invalidity entered by the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-05-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1236/24-1236-2026-04-29.html</id>
        	<title>FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-29T06:33:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-29T06:33:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1236/24-1236-2026-04-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A corporation owns a patent concerning systems and methods for providing access to shipment information using sensors, which can be attached to items for tracking and reporting data to a central location. The patent allows for customization and control over notifications about shipments, including limiting access to sensor information based on certain rules. Some claims of the patent specify restricting access by delaying when information is reported.

Litigation began when the corporation sued another company for infringing this patent in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. While the litigation was pending, a third party, who was not a defendant in the district court case, filed petitions with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) challenging some claims of the patent as obvious. The patent owner argued that the PTAB should not consider the petitions because the third party failed to identify all real parties in interest, specifically the company being sued, as required by statute. The PTAB disagreed, instituted review, and later denied a motion to terminate the proceedings for failure to name all real parties in interest. The PTAB issued a final written decision finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked authority to review the PTAB’s refusal to determine whether all real parties in interest were named and its denial of the motion to terminate the proceedings, because such issues are barred from judicial review by statute. However, the appellate court found that the PTAB had erred in concluding that the patent owner had not contested one ground of obviousness and vacated the PTAB’s findings of obviousness for certain claims, remanding those issues for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1236/24-1236-2026-04-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A corporation owns a patent concerning systems and methods for providing access to shipment information using sensors, which can be attached to items for tracking and reporting data to a central location. The patent allows for customization and control over notifications about shipments, including limiting access to sensor information based on certain rules. Some claims of the patent specify restricting access by delaying when information is reported.

Litigation began when the corporation sued another company for infringing this patent in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. While the litigation was pending, a third party, who was not a defendant in the district court case, filed petitions with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) challenging some claims of the patent as obvious. The patent owner argued that the PTAB should not consider the petitions because the third party failed to identify all real parties in interest, specifically the company being sued, as required by statute. The PTAB disagreed, instituted review, and later denied a motion to terminate the proceedings for failure to name all real parties in interest. The PTAB issued a final written decision finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked authority to review the PTAB’s refusal to determine whether all real parties in interest were named and its denial of the motion to terminate the proceedings, because such issues are barred from judicial review by statute. However, the appellate court found that the PTAB had erred in concluding that the patent owner had not contested one ground of obviousness and vacated the PTAB’s findings of obviousness for certain claims, remanding those issues for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1822/24-1822-2026-04-28.html</id>
        	<title>CONSTELLATION DESIGNS, LLC v. LG ELECTRONICS INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-28T06:33:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-28T06:33:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1822/24-1822-2026-04-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Constellation Designs, LLC sued several branches of LG Electronics, alleging willful infringement of nine claims across four patents related to digital communication systems using non-uniform constellations optimized for greater capacity at a lower signal-to-noise ratio. The accused products were LG televisions compatible with the ATSC 3.0 broadcast standard, which includes specific protocols for signal transmission. The patents at issue fall into two groups: claims reciting a process for optimizing constellations for capacity using parallel decode (PD) capacity, and claims reciting specific non-uniform constellations.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment that all asserted claims were patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Following a jury trial, the jury found all asserted claims not invalid, found infringement, and awarded damages to Constellation, finding willful infringement. Post-trial motions by LG for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of non-infringement and no damages, and to exclude Constellation’s damages expert, were denied. The district court entered final judgment in favor of Constellation, including an ongoing royalty.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the summary judgment of eligibility for the claims that recite optimization for PD capacity, finding them ineligible as they are directed to the abstract idea of “optimizing” a constellation for capacity without sufficient limiting detail. The court affirmed summary judgment of eligibility for the claims reciting specific non-uniform constellations, finding these claims recite concrete technological improvements rather than abstract ideas. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s denial of JMOL of non-infringement and no damages, as well as its denial of LG’s motion to exclude the damages expert. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1822/24-1822-2026-04-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CONSTELLATION DESIGNS, LLC v. LG ELECTRONICS INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Constellation Designs, LLC sued several branches of LG Electronics, alleging willful infringement of nine claims across four patents related to digital communication systems using non-uniform constellations optimized for greater capacity at a lower signal-to-noise ratio. The accused products were LG televisions compatible with the ATSC 3.0 broadcast standard, which includes specific protocols for signal transmission. The patents at issue fall into two groups: claims reciting a process for optimizing constellations for capacity using parallel decode (PD) capacity, and claims reciting specific non-uniform constellations.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment that all asserted claims were patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Following a jury trial, the jury found all asserted claims not invalid, found infringement, and awarded damages to Constellation, finding willful infringement. Post-trial motions by LG for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of non-infringement and no damages, and to exclude Constellation’s damages expert, were denied. The district court entered final judgment in favor of Constellation, including an ongoing royalty.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the summary judgment of eligibility for the claims that recite optimization for PD capacity, finding them ineligible as they are directed to the abstract idea of “optimizing” a constellation for capacity without sufficient limiting detail. The court affirmed summary judgment of eligibility for the claims reciting specific non-uniform constellations, finding these claims recite concrete technological improvements rather than abstract ideas. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s denial of JMOL of non-infringement and no damages, as well as its denial of LG’s motion to exclude the damages expert. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1580/25-1580-2026-04-17.html</id>
        	<title>INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL DEVICES, INC. v. CORNELL </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-17T06:05:20-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-17T06:05:20-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1580/25-1580-2026-04-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A group of plaintiffs, including a medical device company and its founder, developed and sold a cosmetic penile implant. In 2018, a urologist who later became one of the defendants attended a training session hosted by the plaintiffs, where he signed a non-disclosure agreement and was introduced to certain ideas for improving the implant as well as a list of required surgical instruments. Plaintiffs claimed that these ideas and the instrument list were trade secrets. Soon after, the defendants began developing a competing implant, filed patent applications based on allegedly misappropriated information, and advertised using plaintiffs’ trademark.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California heard the case, which included claims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract under the nondisclosure agreement, trademark counterfeiting, and incorrect inventorship of two patents. The jury found for the plaintiffs on all major claims, including that the asserted trade secrets were protectable and misappropriated, and that there had been a breach of contract. The court awarded substantial damages, including a reasonable royalty, exemplary damages, and a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from using the trade secrets. The court also found for plaintiffs on their counterfeiting claim and invalidated the two patents for failure to name an alleged true inventor.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held there was not legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the asserted information qualified as trade secrets under California law, as the core concepts were either generally known or not subject to reasonable secrecy efforts. The court reversed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the trade secret and breach-of-contract claims, vacated the damages and injunction based on them, and reversed the invalidation of the patents. However, the court affirmed the verdict and damages for trademark counterfeiting. The result was an affirmance in part, reversal in part, and vacatur in part. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1580/25-1580-2026-04-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL DEVICES, INC. v. CORNELL " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A group of plaintiffs, including a medical device company and its founder, developed and sold a cosmetic penile implant. In 2018, a urologist who later became one of the defendants attended a training session hosted by the plaintiffs, where he signed a non-disclosure agreement and was introduced to certain ideas for improving the implant as well as a list of required surgical instruments. Plaintiffs claimed that these ideas and the instrument list were trade secrets. Soon after, the defendants began developing a competing implant, filed patent applications based on allegedly misappropriated information, and advertised using plaintiffs’ trademark.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California heard the case, which included claims for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract under the nondisclosure agreement, trademark counterfeiting, and incorrect inventorship of two patents. The jury found for the plaintiffs on all major claims, including that the asserted trade secrets were protectable and misappropriated, and that there had been a breach of contract. The court awarded substantial damages, including a reasonable royalty, exemplary damages, and a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from using the trade secrets. The court also found for plaintiffs on their counterfeiting claim and invalidated the two patents for failure to name an alleged true inventor.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held there was not legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the asserted information qualified as trade secrets under California law, as the core concepts were either generally known or not subject to reasonable secrecy efforts. The court reversed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the trade secret and breach-of-contract claims, vacated the damages and injunction based on them, and reversed the invalidation of the patents. However, the court affirmed the verdict and damages for trademark counterfeiting. The result was an affirmance in part, reversal in part, and vacatur in part.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1094/24-1094-2026-04-16.html</id>
        	<title>TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS INTERNATIONAL GMBH v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-16T06:02:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-16T06:02:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1094/24-1094-2026-04-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute arose when two pharmaceutical companies, one holding patents on methods of using humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies to treat headaches, accused a competitor of infringing these patents through the marketing of a competing medication. The relevant technology involves antibodies that inhibit the CGRP protein, which is linked to headache by promoting blood vessel dilation. The patents in question claim methods of treating headaches by administering humanized versions of these antibodies. The patent specifications referenced prior art disclosing murine (mouse) antibodies of this type, described methods for their humanization, and included one specific humanized antibody used in the patent holder’s product.

Earlier, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over a jury trial. The jury found that the competitor had willfully infringed the asserted patent claims and rejected arguments that the patents were invalid for lack of written description or enablement. Despite the jury’s verdict, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the competitor, ruling that the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failing both the written description and enablement requirements. The district court reasoned that the patents did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed genus of humanized antibodies.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s invalidity judgment. The appellate court held that, in the context of these method claims, the specification and background knowledge in the field were sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the written description and enablement requirements were met. The court emphasized that the invention concerned the use of a well-known genus of antibodies for a specific purpose, and the specification indicated that all members of the genus would function as claimed. The holding reinstated the jury’s verdict, reversing the district court’s judgment of invalidity, and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1094/24-1094-2026-04-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS INTERNATIONAL GMBH v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute arose when two pharmaceutical companies, one holding patents on methods of using humanized anti-CGRP antagonist antibodies to treat headaches, accused a competitor of infringing these patents through the marketing of a competing medication. The relevant technology involves antibodies that inhibit the CGRP protein, which is linked to headache by promoting blood vessel dilation. The patents in question claim methods of treating headaches by administering humanized versions of these antibodies. The patent specifications referenced prior art disclosing murine (mouse) antibodies of this type, described methods for their humanization, and included one specific humanized antibody used in the patent holder’s product.

Earlier, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over a jury trial. The jury found that the competitor had willfully infringed the asserted patent claims and rejected arguments that the patents were invalid for lack of written description or enablement. Despite the jury’s verdict, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the competitor, ruling that the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failing both the written description and enablement requirements. The district court reasoned that the patents did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed genus of humanized antibodies.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s invalidity judgment. The appellate court held that, in the context of these method claims, the specification and background knowledge in the field were sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the written description and enablement requirements were met. The court emphasized that the invention concerned the use of a well-known genus of antibodies for a specific purpose, and the specification indicated that all members of the genus would function as claimed. The holding reinstated the jury’s verdict, reversing the district court’s judgment of invalidity, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sharon Prost</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1772/24-1772-2026-04-14.html</id>
        	<title>VLSI TECHNOLOGY LLC v. INTEL CORPORATION </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-14T06:04:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-14T06:04:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1772/24-1772-2026-04-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		VLSI Technology LLC brought a lawsuit against Intel Corporation, alleging infringement of multiple patents, including U.S. Patent No. 8,566,836. The patent concerns methods and apparatuses for selecting processor cores in multicore systems to execute tasks based on performance parameters, such as processing speed. VLSI asserted several claims from the patent, including both method and apparatus claims, and introduced expert damages theories to support its case.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California addressed several pretrial issues. It struck certain damages theories from VLSI’s expert Dr. Sullivan, concluding that VLSI had not adequately disclosed these theories in its damages contentions as required under local patent rules. The district court also granted Intel summary judgment of noninfringement on two grounds: first, that the alleged infringing acts occurred outside the United States (extraterritoriality), and second, by rejecting VLSI’s doctrine of equivalents (DOE) theory. The district court’s construction of claim terms, particularly importing an “upon identifying” limitation into an apparatus claim, was central to its resolution of the DOE issue.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement on extraterritoriality grounds, finding that a pretrial stipulation between the parties established a U.S. nexus for infringement, and that the district court erred in its analysis of the apparatus claims’ capability to perform the patented functions. The Federal Circuit also reversed the summary judgment for noninfringement under the DOE theory for certain apparatus claims, holding that the district court improperly construed the claims based on prosecution disclaimer. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to strike Dr. Sullivan’s NPV and VPU damages theories, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1772/24-1772-2026-04-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "VLSI TECHNOLOGY LLC v. INTEL CORPORATION " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                VLSI Technology LLC brought a lawsuit against Intel Corporation, alleging infringement of multiple patents, including U.S. Patent No. 8,566,836. The patent concerns methods and apparatuses for selecting processor cores in multicore systems to execute tasks based on performance parameters, such as processing speed. VLSI asserted several claims from the patent, including both method and apparatus claims, and introduced expert damages theories to support its case.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California addressed several pretrial issues. It struck certain damages theories from VLSI’s expert Dr. Sullivan, concluding that VLSI had not adequately disclosed these theories in its damages contentions as required under local patent rules. The district court also granted Intel summary judgment of noninfringement on two grounds: first, that the alleged infringing acts occurred outside the United States (extraterritoriality), and second, by rejecting VLSI’s doctrine of equivalents (DOE) theory. The district court’s construction of claim terms, particularly importing an “upon identifying” limitation into an apparatus claim, was central to its resolution of the DOE issue.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s orders. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment of noninfringement on extraterritoriality grounds, finding that a pretrial stipulation between the parties established a U.S. nexus for infringement, and that the district court erred in its analysis of the apparatus claims’ capability to perform the patented functions. The Federal Circuit also reversed the summary judgment for noninfringement under the DOE theory for certain apparatus claims, holding that the district court improperly construed the claims based on prosecution disclaimer. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to strike Dr. Sullivan’s NPV and VPU damages theories, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1761/24-1761-2026-04-14.html</id>
        	<title>DEFINITIVE HOLDINGS v. POWERTEQ </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-14T06:04:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-14T06:04:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1761/24-1761-2026-04-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute concerns patented methods and apparatuses for upgrading software in engine controllers by connecting an external device that can replace and restore software without losing the original version. The patent, with a priority date of March 30, 2001, was asserted by the patent owner against a competitor. The accused infringer responded by alleging that a non-party, Hypertech, had sold a device called the Power Programmer III (PP3) well before the patent’s critical date. The PP3 was alleged to have all features described in the asserted patent claims, based on contemporaneous sales records and analysis of its source code.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah reviewed the case. The district court granted summary judgment of invalidity under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), finding that the PP3 was on sale more than one year before the patent’s critical date and that it embodied every claim limitation of the asserted patent. In reaching this decision, the district court admitted deposition testimony from Hypertech’s CEO regarding sales records and the device’s code, holding that, at summary judgment, corporate representatives may testify beyond their personal knowledge. The court also found that the source code itself was not hearsay and, even if it were, could be admitted as a business record.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the evidence at summary judgment. The court further clarified that the on-sale bar under pre-AIA § 102(b) does not require a sale to publicly disclose the inner workings of the device; it is sufficient that the sale of a device embodying the patented invention occurred before the critical date. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of all asserted patent claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1761/24-1761-2026-04-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "DEFINITIVE HOLDINGS v. POWERTEQ " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute concerns patented methods and apparatuses for upgrading software in engine controllers by connecting an external device that can replace and restore software without losing the original version. The patent, with a priority date of March 30, 2001, was asserted by the patent owner against a competitor. The accused infringer responded by alleging that a non-party, Hypertech, had sold a device called the Power Programmer III (PP3) well before the patent’s critical date. The PP3 was alleged to have all features described in the asserted patent claims, based on contemporaneous sales records and analysis of its source code.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah reviewed the case. The district court granted summary judgment of invalidity under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), finding that the PP3 was on sale more than one year before the patent’s critical date and that it embodied every claim limitation of the asserted patent. In reaching this decision, the district court admitted deposition testimony from Hypertech’s CEO regarding sales records and the device’s code, holding that, at summary judgment, corporate representatives may testify beyond their personal knowledge. The court also found that the source code itself was not hearsay and, even if it were, could be admitted as a business record.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the evidence at summary judgment. The court further clarified that the on-sale bar under pre-AIA § 102(b) does not require a sale to publicly disclose the inner workings of the device; it is sufficient that the sale of a device embodying the patented invention occurred before the critical date. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of all asserted patent claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Tiffany Cunningham</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1831/24-1831-2026-04-07.html</id>
        	<title>IRONSOURCE LTD. v. DIGITAL TURBINE, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-07T05:32:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-07T05:32:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1831/24-1831-2026-04-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company owned a patent involving technology that allows mobile device applications to be downloaded and installed in the background, without requiring users to visit an application store. Another company, which had previously developed and marketed a product with similar features, initiated a post-grant review proceeding before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board, challenging the validity of the patent&#039;s original claims. During the proceeding, the patent owner sought to amend the claims by proposing substitute claims, which included additional limitations. The challenger argued that the substitute claims were also unpatentable.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board granted the patent owner’s revised motion to amend, finding that the challenger had not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the substitute claims were unpatentable or patent ineligible. The Board also determined that the original claims were unpatentable based on a prior decision invalidating claims of a related parent patent. The challenger appealed the Board’s decision regarding the substitute claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the challenger had Article III standing to appeal. The court found that the challenger failed to demonstrate an injury in fact because it did not provide evidence showing concrete plans to engage in activities that would potentially infringe the substitute claims, nor did it sufficiently link its previous product features to the limitations in the new claims. As a result, the court held that the challenger lacked standing and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court awarded costs to the patent owner. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1831/24-1831-2026-04-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IRONSOURCE LTD. v. DIGITAL TURBINE, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company owned a patent involving technology that allows mobile device applications to be downloaded and installed in the background, without requiring users to visit an application store. Another company, which had previously developed and marketed a product with similar features, initiated a post-grant review proceeding before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board, challenging the validity of the patent&#039;s original claims. During the proceeding, the patent owner sought to amend the claims by proposing substitute claims, which included additional limitations. The challenger argued that the substitute claims were also unpatentable.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board granted the patent owner’s revised motion to amend, finding that the challenger had not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the substitute claims were unpatentable or patent ineligible. The Board also determined that the original claims were unpatentable based on a prior decision invalidating claims of a related parent patent. The challenger appealed the Board’s decision regarding the substitute claims to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the challenger had Article III standing to appeal. The court found that the challenger failed to demonstrate an injury in fact because it did not provide evidence showing concrete plans to engage in activities that would potentially infringe the substitute claims, nor did it sufficiently link its previous product features to the limitations in the new claims. As a result, the court held that the challenger lacked standing and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court awarded costs to the patent owner.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2313/24-2313-2026-04-02.html</id>
        	<title>FORTRESS IRON, LP v. DIGGER SPECIALTIES, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-02T05:32:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-02T05:32:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2313/24-2313-2026-04-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Fortress Iron, LP developed a pre-assembled vertical cable railing system for outdoor spaces, collaborating with two Chinese companies for its manufacture and quality control. Fortress&#039;s owner originated the idea, and an employee prepared initial sketches. Employees of the quality control company, HuaPing Huang and Alfonso Lin, contributed critical refinements to the design. After incorporating these suggestions, Fortress filed for and obtained two patents, listing only its owner and employee as inventors, omitting Lin and Huang. Huang later left his company and could not be located.

Fortress sued Digger Specialties, Inc. for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. During litigation, it emerged that Lin and Huang were coinventors. Fortress successfully added Lin to the patents under 35 U.S.C. § 256(a), but was unable to add Huang due to his unavailability. Fortress then moved for partial summary judgment to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256(b), while Digger Specialties moved for summary judgment asserting patent invalidity due to incorrect inventorship. The district court denied Fortress’s motion to correct inventorship, holding that notice and an opportunity for hearing must be given to all parties concerned—including Huang—before correction could be ordered. The court granted summary judgment to Digger Specialties, holding the patents invalid for omission of an inventor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Federal Circuit held that an omitted coinventor is a “party concerned” under 35 U.S.C. § 256(b) and must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before inventorship can be corrected. As Fortress could not satisfy this statutory requirement, correction was unavailable and the patents were invalid. The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment of invalidity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2313/24-2313-2026-04-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FORTRESS IRON, LP v. DIGGER SPECIALTIES, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Fortress Iron, LP developed a pre-assembled vertical cable railing system for outdoor spaces, collaborating with two Chinese companies for its manufacture and quality control. Fortress&#039;s owner originated the idea, and an employee prepared initial sketches. Employees of the quality control company, HuaPing Huang and Alfonso Lin, contributed critical refinements to the design. After incorporating these suggestions, Fortress filed for and obtained two patents, listing only its owner and employee as inventors, omitting Lin and Huang. Huang later left his company and could not be located.

Fortress sued Digger Specialties, Inc. for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. During litigation, it emerged that Lin and Huang were coinventors. Fortress successfully added Lin to the patents under 35 U.S.C. § 256(a), but was unable to add Huang due to his unavailability. Fortress then moved for partial summary judgment to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256(b), while Digger Specialties moved for summary judgment asserting patent invalidity due to incorrect inventorship. The district court denied Fortress’s motion to correct inventorship, holding that notice and an opportunity for hearing must be given to all parties concerned—including Huang—before correction could be ordered. The court granted summary judgment to Digger Specialties, holding the patents invalid for omission of an inventor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Federal Circuit held that an omitted coinventor is a “party concerned” under 35 U.S.C. § 256(b) and must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before inventorship can be corrected. As Fortress could not satisfy this statutory requirement, correction was unavailable and the patents were invalid. The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment of invalidity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/26-1026/26-1026-2026-03-26.html</id>
        	<title>ASCENDIS PHARMA A/S v. BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-03-26T05:33:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-26T05:33:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/26-1026/26-1026-2026-03-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two pharmaceutical companies developing treatments for achondroplasia, a genetic disorder, became involved in litigation after one company (Ascendis) filed a New Drug Application (NDA) for its product. The other company (BioMarin), holding a relevant patent, filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Ascendis’s product. Shortly afterward, Ascendis filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking a judgment of non-infringement and arguing that its activities were protected under the statutory “safe harbor” for regulatory approval.

More than thirty days after filing its district court complaint, Ascendis moved for an expedited hearing. BioMarin responded by seeking to dismiss or stay the district court action pending the ITC’s investigation. Ascendis voluntarily dismissed its complaint without prejudice and promptly refiled a nearly identical complaint, this time moving for a mandatory stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a)(2), which requires a district court to stay its proceedings if requested within thirty days of the action’s filing or of being named as a respondent in the ITC. BioMarin opposed, contending Ascendis’s request was untimely, and sought a discretionary stay instead.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted BioMarin’s motion for a discretionary stay and denied Ascendis’s motion for a mandatory stay as moot. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that § 1659(a)(2) does not permit a litigant to restart the thirty-day period for a mandatory stay by voluntarily dismissing and refiling a substantially identical action. The court reasoned that the statutory deadline applies to the original action and that allowing refiling would circumvent the statute’s purpose. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/26-1026/26-1026-2026-03-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ASCENDIS PHARMA A/S v. BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two pharmaceutical companies developing treatments for achondroplasia, a genetic disorder, became involved in litigation after one company (Ascendis) filed a New Drug Application (NDA) for its product. The other company (BioMarin), holding a relevant patent, filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging patent infringement by Ascendis’s product. Shortly afterward, Ascendis filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking a judgment of non-infringement and arguing that its activities were protected under the statutory “safe harbor” for regulatory approval.

More than thirty days after filing its district court complaint, Ascendis moved for an expedited hearing. BioMarin responded by seeking to dismiss or stay the district court action pending the ITC’s investigation. Ascendis voluntarily dismissed its complaint without prejudice and promptly refiled a nearly identical complaint, this time moving for a mandatory stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a)(2), which requires a district court to stay its proceedings if requested within thirty days of the action’s filing or of being named as a respondent in the ITC. BioMarin opposed, contending Ascendis’s request was untimely, and sought a discretionary stay instead.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted BioMarin’s motion for a discretionary stay and denied Ascendis’s motion for a mandatory stay as moot. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that § 1659(a)(2) does not permit a litigant to restart the thirty-day period for a mandatory stay by voluntarily dismissing and refiling a substantially identical action. The court reasoned that the statutory deadline applies to the original action and that allowing refiling would circumvent the statute’s purpose. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1285/24-1285-2026-03-19.html</id>
        	<title>APPLE INC. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-19T10:11:16-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-19T10:11:16-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1285/24-1285-2026-03-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Apple Inc. launched the Apple Watch Series 6, featuring technology to estimate the wearer’s blood oxygenation level. Masimo Corporation and Cercacor Laboratories, Inc. alleged that Apple’s importation and sale of the device infringed on several Masimo patents related to wearable blood oxygen measurement technology. Masimo filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission, asserting that Apple’s actions violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits importation of infringing articles if a related domestic industry exists. The patents at issue, called the Poeze Patents, cover user-worn devices utilizing optical emitters and photodetectors for physiological measurements.

Following an investigation, an administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and concluded that Masimo had established a domestic industry, Apple’s devices infringed some asserted claims, and several claims were not proven invalid. The ALJ found Masimo was not barred from enforcement by prosecution history laches. The ALJ’s decision led to a limited exclusion order barring importation of infringing Apple Watches. Both Apple and Masimo sought review by the Commission. The Commission affirmed the finding of infringement and the existence of a domestic industry, as to certain claims, and maintained the exclusion order.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Commission’s determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act, affirming its findings as reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit held that Masimo satisfied both the technical and economic prongs of the domestic industry requirement, that the Apple Watch infringed valid claims of the asserted patents, and that Apple failed to prove invalidity or prosecution laches. The Commission’s judgment and the exclusion order were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1285/24-1285-2026-03-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "APPLE INC. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Apple Inc. launched the Apple Watch Series 6, featuring technology to estimate the wearer’s blood oxygenation level. Masimo Corporation and Cercacor Laboratories, Inc. alleged that Apple’s importation and sale of the device infringed on several Masimo patents related to wearable blood oxygen measurement technology. Masimo filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission, asserting that Apple’s actions violated § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibits importation of infringing articles if a related domestic industry exists. The patents at issue, called the Poeze Patents, cover user-worn devices utilizing optical emitters and photodetectors for physiological measurements.

Following an investigation, an administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and concluded that Masimo had established a domestic industry, Apple’s devices infringed some asserted claims, and several claims were not proven invalid. The ALJ found Masimo was not barred from enforcement by prosecution history laches. The ALJ’s decision led to a limited exclusion order barring importation of infringing Apple Watches. Both Apple and Masimo sought review by the Commission. The Commission affirmed the finding of infringement and the existence of a domestic industry, as to certain claims, and maintained the exclusion order.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Commission’s determinations under the Administrative Procedure Act, affirming its findings as reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit held that Masimo satisfied both the technical and economic prongs of the domestic industry requirement, that the Apple Watch infringed valid claims of the asserted patents, and that Apple failed to prove invalidity or prosecution laches. The Commission’s judgment and the exclusion order were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1243/24-1243-2026-03-11.html</id>
        	<title>TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY v. GEN DIGITAL INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-03-11T06:02:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-11T06:02:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1243/24-1243-2026-03-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Columbia University sued Gen Digital Inc., which markets Norton antivirus software, alleging infringement of certain claims in two patents related to methods for detecting anomalous program executions. These patents described techniques using an emulator to execute portions of software and compare function calls against models created from multiple computers, aiming to detect malicious activity. Columbia also sought to correct inventorship on a third patent owned by Norton. Norton’s products, including the SONAR/BASH feature, were sold both domestically and internationally. Columbia claimed that these products infringed the asserted patent claims by utilizing the patented detection methods.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia construed disputed claim terms largely in Columbia’s favor and denied Norton’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under 35 U.S.C. § 101, ruling that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea at Alice step one. Prior to trial, the district court struck Norton’s § 101 defense. At trial, the jury found willful infringement of four claims and awarded substantial damages, including damages based on Norton’s foreign sales. The district court denied Norton’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law regarding infringement, willfulness, and foreign sales damages. It also awarded enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees, partly relying on a contempt finding against Norton’s counsel.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims are abstract at Alice step one and remanded for the district court to address step two. The court found no error in claim construction or in the denial of judgment as a matter of law for infringement and willfulness, but concluded that damages for foreign sales were improperly awarded. The contempt finding having been reversed in a companion case, the enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees awards must also be reconsidered. The disposition was reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1243/24-1243-2026-03-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY v. GEN DIGITAL INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Columbia University sued Gen Digital Inc., which markets Norton antivirus software, alleging infringement of certain claims in two patents related to methods for detecting anomalous program executions. These patents described techniques using an emulator to execute portions of software and compare function calls against models created from multiple computers, aiming to detect malicious activity. Columbia also sought to correct inventorship on a third patent owned by Norton. Norton’s products, including the SONAR/BASH feature, were sold both domestically and internationally. Columbia claimed that these products infringed the asserted patent claims by utilizing the patented detection methods.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia construed disputed claim terms largely in Columbia’s favor and denied Norton’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under 35 U.S.C. § 101, ruling that the claims were not directed to an abstract idea at Alice step one. Prior to trial, the district court struck Norton’s § 101 defense. At trial, the jury found willful infringement of four claims and awarded substantial damages, including damages based on Norton’s foreign sales. The district court denied Norton’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law regarding infringement, willfulness, and foreign sales damages. It also awarded enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees, partly relying on a contempt finding against Norton’s counsel.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims are abstract at Alice step one and remanded for the district court to address step two. The court found no error in claim construction or in the denial of judgment as a matter of law for infringement and willfulness, but concluded that damages for foreign sales were improperly awarded. The contempt finding having been reversed in a companion case, the enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees awards must also be reconsidered. The disposition was reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1598/24-1598-2026-03-11.html</id>
        	<title>GRAMM v. DEERE &amp; COMPANY</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-11T05:33:43-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-11T05:33:43-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1598/24-1598-2026-03-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		An inventor and his exclusive licensee filed a lawsuit alleging patent infringement against a manufacturer, asserting claims of a patent related to an apparatus for maintaining a crop harvester’s header at a designated height above the soil. The patent described a device using a controller interface, head controller, and hydraulic control system. The parties agreed that the “control means” term in the patent invoked means-plus-function claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and further agreed on the basic claimed function and the corresponding structures described in the specification. However, they disagreed over whether the specification sufficiently disclosed the structure for “control means,” particularly regarding whether the disclosure required an algorithm for microprocessor-based controllers.

After the case was transferred from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the district court concluded that the patent’s “control means” limitation was indefinite. The district court found that the only sufficiently disclosed controllers were microprocessor-based versions, which would require a disclosed algorithm that the patent did not provide. The court excluded an earlier version of the controller that used logic circuitry, not a microprocessor, from the corresponding structure. Based on this, the district court held the asserted claims invalid as indefinite and entered judgment for the defendant.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the district court erred by excluding the non-microprocessor-based controller from the corresponding structure, as it performed the claimed function and did not trigger the algorithm disclosure requirement. The Federal Circuit clarified that a means-plus-function limitation need only be supported by one embodiment of corresponding structure. Therefore, the judgment of indefiniteness and invalidity was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Costs were assessed against the manufacturer. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1598/24-1598-2026-03-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GRAMM v. DEERE &amp; COMPANY" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                An inventor and his exclusive licensee filed a lawsuit alleging patent infringement against a manufacturer, asserting claims of a patent related to an apparatus for maintaining a crop harvester’s header at a designated height above the soil. The patent described a device using a controller interface, head controller, and hydraulic control system. The parties agreed that the “control means” term in the patent invoked means-plus-function claiming under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and further agreed on the basic claimed function and the corresponding structures described in the specification. However, they disagreed over whether the specification sufficiently disclosed the structure for “control means,” particularly regarding whether the disclosure required an algorithm for microprocessor-based controllers.

After the case was transferred from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, the district court concluded that the patent’s “control means” limitation was indefinite. The district court found that the only sufficiently disclosed controllers were microprocessor-based versions, which would require a disclosed algorithm that the patent did not provide. The court excluded an earlier version of the controller that used logic circuitry, not a microprocessor, from the corresponding structure. Based on this, the district court held the asserted claims invalid as indefinite and entered judgment for the defendant.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the district court erred by excluding the non-microprocessor-based controller from the corresponding structure, as it performed the claimed function and did not trigger the algorithm disclosure requirement. The Federal Circuit clarified that a means-plus-function limitation need only be supported by one embodiment of corresponding structure. Therefore, the judgment of indefiniteness and invalidity was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Costs were assessed against the manufacturer.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1173/20-1173-2026-03-09.html</id>
        	<title>IMPLICIT, LLC v. SONOS, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-03-09T06:34:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-09T06:34:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1173/20-1173-2026-03-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Implicit, LLC owned two patents that named Edward Balassanian and Scott Bradley as the only inventors. Both men worked for BeComm Corporation, Implicit’s predecessor. Sonos, Inc. filed petitions for inter partes review (IPR) with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, arguing that the claims in both patents were unpatentable due to prior art, specifically referencing a patent by Janevski. Implicit responded that the inventions were conceived and reduced to practice before the Janevski filing date, involving work by engineer Guy Carpenter. The Board found Implicit’s evidence insufficient to establish Carpenter’s role or that any reduction to practice benefited the named inventors, and determined the challenged claims were unpatentable.

After the Board’s final written decisions in 2019, Implicit appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, raising Appointments Clause challenges based on Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith &amp; Nephew, Inc. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with Arthrex. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., the case was again remanded to allow for Director Review, which was denied. During this period, Implicit sought and obtained certificates of correction to add Carpenter as an inventor. The case was remanded to the Board to consider whether these corrections affected the prior IPR decisions. The Board held that judicial estoppel, waiver, and forfeiture barred Implicit from relying on the corrections to revisit the prior decisions.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that forfeiture can apply even when inventorship is corrected under 35 U.S.C. § 256. The court found no abuse of discretion by the Board in determining that Implicit forfeited its new inventorship arguments by waiting until after final decisions to seek correction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decisions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1173/20-1173-2026-03-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IMPLICIT, LLC v. SONOS, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Implicit, LLC owned two patents that named Edward Balassanian and Scott Bradley as the only inventors. Both men worked for BeComm Corporation, Implicit’s predecessor. Sonos, Inc. filed petitions for inter partes review (IPR) with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, arguing that the claims in both patents were unpatentable due to prior art, specifically referencing a patent by Janevski. Implicit responded that the inventions were conceived and reduced to practice before the Janevski filing date, involving work by engineer Guy Carpenter. The Board found Implicit’s evidence insufficient to establish Carpenter’s role or that any reduction to practice benefited the named inventors, and determined the challenged claims were unpatentable.

After the Board’s final written decisions in 2019, Implicit appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, raising Appointments Clause challenges based on Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith &amp; Nephew, Inc. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with Arthrex. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., the case was again remanded to allow for Director Review, which was denied. During this period, Implicit sought and obtained certificates of correction to add Carpenter as an inventor. The case was remanded to the Board to consider whether these corrections affected the prior IPR decisions. The Board held that judicial estoppel, waiver, and forfeiture barred Implicit from relying on the corrections to revisit the prior decisions.

Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that forfeiture can apply even when inventorship is corrected under 35 U.S.C. § 256. The court found no abuse of discretion by the Board in determining that Implicit forfeited its new inventorship arguments by waiting until after final decisions to seek correction. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decisions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Tiffany Cunningham</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2296/24-2296-2026-03-06.html</id>
        	<title>EXAFER LTD v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION </title>
        	<updated>2026-03-06T07:34:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-06T07:34:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2296/24-2296-2026-03-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Exafer Ltd. owns two patents related to optimizing communication paths in virtual network environments. Exafer brought suit against Microsoft, alleging that Microsoft’s Azure Platform, specifically its Smart Network Interface Cards and Virtual Filtering Platform Fastpath technology, infringed these patents. To support its damages claim, Exafer submitted expert reports quantifying the technical and financial benefits Microsoft allegedly obtained through the accused features. The damages expert, Mr. Blok, based his analysis on the value of additional virtual machine hours made possible by the accused features.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas excluded Mr. Blok’s damages testimony, reasoning that his use of unaccused virtual machines as the royalty base improperly included non-infringing activities, relying on Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co. The district court also denied Exafer’s motion to reopen discovery to present an alternative damages theory and granted Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment due to an absence of a remedy, entering final judgment against Exafer.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the damages expert’s testimony. The appellate court found that Mr. Blok’s methodology—linking the value of the accused features to the additional virtual machine hours they enabled—was sufficiently tied to the patented inventions and did not improperly expand the patent’s scope. The court clarified that there is no categorical bar against using an unaccused product as the royalty base if there is a causal connection to the alleged infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s exclusion of Mr. Blok’s testimony, vacated the orders denying reopening of discovery and granting summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2296/24-2296-2026-03-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "EXAFER LTD v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Exafer Ltd. owns two patents related to optimizing communication paths in virtual network environments. Exafer brought suit against Microsoft, alleging that Microsoft’s Azure Platform, specifically its Smart Network Interface Cards and Virtual Filtering Platform Fastpath technology, infringed these patents. To support its damages claim, Exafer submitted expert reports quantifying the technical and financial benefits Microsoft allegedly obtained through the accused features. The damages expert, Mr. Blok, based his analysis on the value of additional virtual machine hours made possible by the accused features.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas excluded Mr. Blok’s damages testimony, reasoning that his use of unaccused virtual machines as the royalty base improperly included non-infringing activities, relying on Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co. The district court also denied Exafer’s motion to reopen discovery to present an alternative damages theory and granted Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment due to an absence of a remedy, entering final judgment against Exafer.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the damages expert’s testimony. The appellate court found that Mr. Blok’s methodology—linking the value of the accused features to the additional virtual machine hours they enabled—was sufficiently tied to the patented inventions and did not improperly expand the patent’s scope. The court clarified that there is no categorical bar against using an unaccused product as the royalty base if there is a causal connection to the alleged infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s exclusion of Mr. Blok’s testimony, vacated the orders denying reopening of discovery and granting summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2001/24-2001-2026-03-06.html</id>
        	<title>MAGNOLIA MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. KURIN, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-03-06T07:34:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-06T07:34:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2001/24-2001-2026-03-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute involves two patents held by Magnolia Medical Technologies concerning devices that improve the accuracy of blood tests by reducing contamination from skin microbes. When a blood sample is drawn, contaminants are most likely present in the initial portion, which can cause false positives and unnecessary treatments. Magnolia’s patents aim to sequester this initial blood volume, improving test reliability. Kurin, Inc. manufactures the Kurin Lock, a device that separates the initial blood draw using a porous plug that functions first as a vent and then as a seal.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially addressed claim construction. Regarding Magnolia’s U.S. Patent 9,855,001, the court determined that the term “diverter” was a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), restricting infringement to devices with corresponding structures detailed in the patent specification. The parties stipulated that the Kurin Lock did not infringe the ’001 patent based on this construction. For U.S. Patent 10,039,483, the case proceeded to trial on the claims related to “vent” and “seal” limitations. The jury found that Kurin Lock infringed these claims. However, Kurin moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), arguing that the Kurin Lock did not have two separate structures corresponding to the “vent” and “seal” as required.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s claim constructions and JMOL grant. The court held that the district court did not err in construing “diverter” as a means-plus-function term for the ’001 patent. It also affirmed that, under the plain and ordinary meaning and precedent, the ’483 patent required separate structures for “vent” and “seal,” which the Kurin Lock did not possess. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Kurin, finding no infringement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2001/24-2001-2026-03-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MAGNOLIA MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. KURIN, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute involves two patents held by Magnolia Medical Technologies concerning devices that improve the accuracy of blood tests by reducing contamination from skin microbes. When a blood sample is drawn, contaminants are most likely present in the initial portion, which can cause false positives and unnecessary treatments. Magnolia’s patents aim to sequester this initial blood volume, improving test reliability. Kurin, Inc. manufactures the Kurin Lock, a device that separates the initial blood draw using a porous plug that functions first as a vent and then as a seal.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially addressed claim construction. Regarding Magnolia’s U.S. Patent 9,855,001, the court determined that the term “diverter” was a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), restricting infringement to devices with corresponding structures detailed in the patent specification. The parties stipulated that the Kurin Lock did not infringe the ’001 patent based on this construction. For U.S. Patent 10,039,483, the case proceeded to trial on the claims related to “vent” and “seal” limitations. The jury found that Kurin Lock infringed these claims. However, Kurin moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), arguing that the Kurin Lock did not have two separate structures corresponding to the “vent” and “seal” as required.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s claim constructions and JMOL grant. The court held that the district court did not err in construing “diverter” as a means-plus-function term for the ’001 patent. It also affirmed that, under the plain and ordinary meaning and precedent, the ’483 patent required separate structures for “vent” and “seal,” which the Kurin Lock did not possess. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Kurin, finding no infringement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1882/23-1882-2026-02-26.html</id>
        	<title>GLOBAL TUBING LLC v. TENARIS COILED TUBES LLC </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-26T07:02:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-26T07:02:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1882/23-1882-2026-02-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns a dispute between two companies involved in the production and sale of coiled tubing for the oil and gas industry. One company, having acquired assets and documents from a predecessor, developed a coiled tubing product and obtained several patents (the ’256, ’074, and ’075 patents) covering aspects of this technology. The predecessor’s documents disclosed a product with overlapping technical specifications compared to at least some claims of these patents. During the patent application process, the company submitted a related public reference to the Patent and Trademark Office (Chitwood), but did not disclose the predecessor’s internal documents (the CYMAX Documents) that contained additional details. Internal discussions reflected uncertainty among inventors and counsel about the relevance and necessity of disclosing these documents.

After disputes arose in the marketplace over alleged patent infringement, the manufacturer of a competing product initiated litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking a declaration of non-infringement. The patent holder counterclaimed for infringement and, as the case proceeded, the competitor amended its claims to include allegations of inequitable conduct (fraud on the Patent Office by withholding material information) and Walker Process fraud (antitrust liability for enforcing a patent obtained by fraud). The district court granted summary judgment to the competitor on the inequitable conduct claim, finding clear evidence of intent to deceive and materiality, and granted summary judgment to the patent holder on the Walker Process fraud claim, finding insufficient evidence of market power.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated both summary judgment rulings. The appellate court held that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on both inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud. The court remanded for further proceedings, allowing both claims to proceed, and affirmed the denial of summary judgment for the patent holder on inequitable conduct. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1882/23-1882-2026-02-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GLOBAL TUBING LLC v. TENARIS COILED TUBES LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns a dispute between two companies involved in the production and sale of coiled tubing for the oil and gas industry. One company, having acquired assets and documents from a predecessor, developed a coiled tubing product and obtained several patents (the ’256, ’074, and ’075 patents) covering aspects of this technology. The predecessor’s documents disclosed a product with overlapping technical specifications compared to at least some claims of these patents. During the patent application process, the company submitted a related public reference to the Patent and Trademark Office (Chitwood), but did not disclose the predecessor’s internal documents (the CYMAX Documents) that contained additional details. Internal discussions reflected uncertainty among inventors and counsel about the relevance and necessity of disclosing these documents.

After disputes arose in the marketplace over alleged patent infringement, the manufacturer of a competing product initiated litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking a declaration of non-infringement. The patent holder counterclaimed for infringement and, as the case proceeded, the competitor amended its claims to include allegations of inequitable conduct (fraud on the Patent Office by withholding material information) and Walker Process fraud (antitrust liability for enforcing a patent obtained by fraud). The district court granted summary judgment to the competitor on the inequitable conduct claim, finding clear evidence of intent to deceive and materiality, and granted summary judgment to the patent holder on the Walker Process fraud claim, finding insufficient evidence of market power.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated both summary judgment rulings. The appellate court held that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on both inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud. The court remanded for further proceedings, allowing both claims to proceed, and affirmed the denial of summary judgment for the patent holder on inequitable conduct.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1408/24-1408-2026-02-20.html</id>
        	<title>REGENXBIO INC. v. SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-20T08:02:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-20T08:02:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1408/24-1408-2026-02-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiffs in this case, owners of a patent involving genetically engineered host cells containing recombinant DNA sequences, accused the defendants of infringing multiple claims of their patent. The technology at issue centers on human-made host cells that include a recombinant nucleic acid molecule encoding a specific adeno-associated virus (AAV) capsid protein, along with a heterologous non-AAV sequence. These recombinant molecules are created by artificially combining genetic material from different species, a process that does not occur in nature. The patented host cells are used in developing gene therapy products, including a product for treating Duchenne muscular dystrophy.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court concluded that the asserted claims were ineligible for patent protection, reasoning that they were directed to a natural phenomenon. The court analogized the claims to those at issue in Supreme Court cases such as Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., finding that merely combining natural sequences did not make the claimed invention patentable. The district court held that the claims lacked an inventive concept and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the decision de novo. The appellate court held that the patented host cells are not naturally occurring and possess markedly different characteristics from any product of nature, consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Myriad Genetics. The Federal Circuit concluded that the claims are not directed to a natural phenomenon and are therefore patent-eligible under § 101. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1408/24-1408-2026-02-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "REGENXBIO INC. v. SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiffs in this case, owners of a patent involving genetically engineered host cells containing recombinant DNA sequences, accused the defendants of infringing multiple claims of their patent. The technology at issue centers on human-made host cells that include a recombinant nucleic acid molecule encoding a specific adeno-associated virus (AAV) capsid protein, along with a heterologous non-AAV sequence. These recombinant molecules are created by artificially combining genetic material from different species, a process that does not occur in nature. The patented host cells are used in developing gene therapy products, including a product for treating Duchenne muscular dystrophy.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court concluded that the asserted claims were ineligible for patent protection, reasoning that they were directed to a natural phenomenon. The court analogized the claims to those at issue in Supreme Court cases such as Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., finding that merely combining natural sequences did not make the claimed invention patentable. The district court held that the claims lacked an inventive concept and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the decision de novo. The appellate court held that the patented host cells are not naturally occurring and possess markedly different characteristics from any product of nature, consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Myriad Genetics. The Federal Circuit concluded that the claims are not directed to a natural phenomenon and are therefore patent-eligible under § 101. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1686/24-1686-2026-02-19.html</id>
        	<title>GENUINE ENABLING TECHNOLOGY LLC v. SONY GROUP CORPORATION </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-19T07:03:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-19T07:03:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1686/24-1686-2026-02-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case concerns a patent dispute involving input devices for computers. The plaintiff, Genuine Enabling Technology LLC (GET), claimed that Sony’s PlayStation 3 and 4 controllers and consoles infringed several claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,219,730. The patent addresses the problem of limited computer resources by combining data streams from multiple input devices, such as keyboards and sensors, into a single stream. The contested claims include a means-plus-function limitation called “encoding means for synchronizing,” which requires synchronizing two input streams and encoding them into a combined data stream.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware handled the case initially. It interpreted the “encoding means” as a means-plus-function limitation and identified logic block 34 in Figure 4A of the patent as the corresponding structure. During litigation, GET’s expert, Dr. Fernald, failed to address most of the elements in logic block 34 when analyzing infringement, focusing primarily on the bit-rate clock signal. The district court excluded Dr. Fernald’s testimony on structural equivalence and ultimately granted Sony summary judgment of noninfringement, finding GET had not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding infringement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that GET’s infringement analysis was deficient because it did not adequately account for the full structure of logic block 34 required by the patent specification. The court emphasized that GET failed to explain why it was permissible to omit certain elements from its equivalence analysis. Thus, GET lacked sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find infringement. The district court’s exclusion of expert testimony and summary judgment were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1686/24-1686-2026-02-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GENUINE ENABLING TECHNOLOGY LLC v. SONY GROUP CORPORATION " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case concerns a patent dispute involving input devices for computers. The plaintiff, Genuine Enabling Technology LLC (GET), claimed that Sony’s PlayStation 3 and 4 controllers and consoles infringed several claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,219,730. The patent addresses the problem of limited computer resources by combining data streams from multiple input devices, such as keyboards and sensors, into a single stream. The contested claims include a means-plus-function limitation called “encoding means for synchronizing,” which requires synchronizing two input streams and encoding them into a combined data stream.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware handled the case initially. It interpreted the “encoding means” as a means-plus-function limitation and identified logic block 34 in Figure 4A of the patent as the corresponding structure. During litigation, GET’s expert, Dr. Fernald, failed to address most of the elements in logic block 34 when analyzing infringement, focusing primarily on the bit-rate clock signal. The district court excluded Dr. Fernald’s testimony on structural equivalence and ultimately granted Sony summary judgment of noninfringement, finding GET had not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding infringement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that GET’s infringement analysis was deficient because it did not adequately account for the full structure of logic block 34 required by the patent specification. The court emphasized that GET failed to explain why it was permissible to omit certain elements from its equivalence analysis. Thus, GET lacked sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find infringement. The district court’s exclusion of expert testimony and summary judgment were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2118/24-2118-2026-02-17.html</id>
        	<title>WILLIS ELECTRIC CO., LTD. v. POLYGROUP LTD.</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-17T07:02:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-17T07:02:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2118/24-2118-2026-02-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on a patented pre-lit artificial tree owned by Willis Electric Co., Ltd., which features separable, modular trunk portions that mechanically and electrically connect to one another, enabling attached lights to illuminate automatically regardless of trunk orientation. The prior art required separate mechanical and electrical connections, but Willis’ patent integrates both functions in a single step. Willis accused Polygroup of infringing claim 15 of its patent, specifically targeting Polygroup trees with the “Quick Set” feature that establishes simultaneous mechanical and electrical connections.

After Willis initiated the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Polygroup filed multiple inter partes review petitions at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) challenging various claims of Willis’ patent. The PTAB upheld claim 15, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that finding. The district court proceedings continued with only claim 15 at issue. Polygroup filed a Daubert motion to exclude Willis’ damages expert, which was denied. At trial, the jury found claim 15 infringed and not invalid, awarding Willis over $42 million in damages. Polygroup then moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on obviousness and a new trial on damages, but the district court denied both motions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL and the motion for a new trial. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine prior art with coaxial barrel connectors as claimed in claim 15, thus affirming nonobviousness. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the damages expert’s testimony, finding the methodology sufficiently reliable under Rule 702. As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2118/24-2118-2026-02-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "WILLIS ELECTRIC CO., LTD. v. POLYGROUP LTD." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on a patented pre-lit artificial tree owned by Willis Electric Co., Ltd., which features separable, modular trunk portions that mechanically and electrically connect to one another, enabling attached lights to illuminate automatically regardless of trunk orientation. The prior art required separate mechanical and electrical connections, but Willis’ patent integrates both functions in a single step. Willis accused Polygroup of infringing claim 15 of its patent, specifically targeting Polygroup trees with the “Quick Set” feature that establishes simultaneous mechanical and electrical connections.

After Willis initiated the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Polygroup filed multiple inter partes review petitions at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) challenging various claims of Willis’ patent. The PTAB upheld claim 15, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that finding. The district court proceedings continued with only claim 15 at issue. Polygroup filed a Daubert motion to exclude Willis’ damages expert, which was denied. At trial, the jury found claim 15 infringed and not invalid, awarding Willis over $42 million in damages. Polygroup then moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on obviousness and a new trial on damages, but the district court denied both motions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL and the motion for a new trial. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine prior art with coaxial barrel connectors as claimed in claim 15, thus affirming nonobviousness. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the damages expert’s testimony, finding the methodology sufficiently reliable under Rule 702. As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1541/24-1541-2026-02-13.html</id>
        	<title>NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-13T07:04:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-13T07:04:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1541/24-1541-2026-02-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case involves a challenge to the validity of a patent owned by DivX, LLC, which claims systems and methods for streaming partly encrypted media content. DivX sued Netflix, Inc. for patent infringement, leading Netflix to petition for inter partes review (IPR) before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Netflix argued that the patent’s claims would have been obvious in view of specific prior-art references. The dispute centered on the proper construction of a claim limitation relating to the location of &quot;encryption information&quot; within the system described by the patent.

After the IPR was instituted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board first issued a final written decision holding that Netflix had not shown the claims were unpatentable, basing its conclusion on issues unrelated to claim construction. Netflix appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which vacated and remanded. On remand, the Board adopted DivX’s proposed claim construction, holding that the limitation required the encryption information itself to be located within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video, and again found in favor of DivX. Netflix appealed again.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s claim construction de novo. The appellate court held that the Board erred in its construction of the disputed limitation. The correct construction, the court explained, is that only the encrypted portions of the video frames, not the encryption information, must be located within the requested portions of the selected stream. The court found that, under this construction, the asserted prior art meets the limitation. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the Board’s claim construction, vacated its decision, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1541/24-1541-2026-02-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case involves a challenge to the validity of a patent owned by DivX, LLC, which claims systems and methods for streaming partly encrypted media content. DivX sued Netflix, Inc. for patent infringement, leading Netflix to petition for inter partes review (IPR) before the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). Netflix argued that the patent’s claims would have been obvious in view of specific prior-art references. The dispute centered on the proper construction of a claim limitation relating to the location of &quot;encryption information&quot; within the system described by the patent.

After the IPR was instituted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board first issued a final written decision holding that Netflix had not shown the claims were unpatentable, basing its conclusion on issues unrelated to claim construction. Netflix appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which vacated and remanded. On remand, the Board adopted DivX’s proposed claim construction, holding that the limitation required the encryption information itself to be located within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video, and again found in favor of DivX. Netflix appealed again.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s claim construction de novo. The appellate court held that the Board erred in its construction of the disputed limitation. The correct construction, the court explained, is that only the encrypted portions of the video frames, not the encryption information, must be located within the requested portions of the selected stream. The court found that, under this construction, the asserted prior art meets the limitation. The Federal Circuit therefore reversed the Board’s claim construction, vacated its decision, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1864/24-1864-2026-02-13.html</id>
        	<title>APPLE INC. v. SQUIRES </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-13T06:33:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-13T06:33:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1864/24-1864-2026-02-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several technology companies challenged instructions issued by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that guided the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) in deciding whether to institute inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. These instructions, known collectively as the NHK-Fintiv instructions, outlined factors for the Board to consider when parallel patent litigation was occurring in district court. The challengers argued that these instructions resulted in too many denials of IPR petitions and were contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and issued without the required notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially found all challenges to the PTO’s instructions to be judicially unreviewable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that while the challenges based on statutory and arbitrary-and-capricious grounds were unreviewable, the claim regarding the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking could proceed. On remand, the district court determined that the instructions were exempt from notice-and-comment requirements because they were “general statements of policy,” not substantive or legislative rules.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court agreed that the Director’s instructions were general statements of policy exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). It emphasized that there is no statutory right to IPR institution, that the instructions do not bind the Director, and that the Director retains unreviewable discretion to institute or deny IPR. The court found that none of the legal standards or precedents cited by the challengers required a different result, and it affirmed the district court’s judgment rejecting the APA-based challenge. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1864/24-1864-2026-02-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "APPLE INC. v. SQUIRES " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several technology companies challenged instructions issued by the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that guided the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) in deciding whether to institute inter partes review (IPR) proceedings. These instructions, known collectively as the NHK-Fintiv instructions, outlined factors for the Board to consider when parallel patent litigation was occurring in district court. The challengers argued that these instructions resulted in too many denials of IPR petitions and were contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and issued without the required notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially found all challenges to the PTO’s instructions to be judicially unreviewable. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that while the challenges based on statutory and arbitrary-and-capricious grounds were unreviewable, the claim regarding the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking could proceed. On remand, the district court determined that the instructions were exempt from notice-and-comment requirements because they were “general statements of policy,” not substantive or legislative rules.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court agreed that the Director’s instructions were general statements of policy exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). It emphasized that there is no statutory right to IPR institution, that the instructions do not bind the Director, and that the Director retains unreviewable discretion to institute or deny IPR. The court found that none of the legal standards or precedents cited by the challengers required a different result, and it affirmed the district court’s judgment rejecting the APA-based challenge.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1577/24-1577-2026-02-11.html</id>
        	<title>INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-11T08:35:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-11T08:35:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1577/24-1577-2026-02-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two companies that manufacture activated carbon honeycombs, used in automotive emission control systems, became embroiled in a legal dispute. One company holds a patent covering certain dual-stage fuel vapor canister systems, but not honeycombs used in air-intake systems. The other company began marketing a competing honeycomb product, prompting a patent infringement lawsuit. In response, the defendant challenged the validity of the patent, argued non-infringement, and asserted counterclaims alleging antitrust violations—specifically, that the patent holder unlawfully tied licenses for the patent to the purchase of its unpatented honeycomb products.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware first granted summary judgment that the patent was invalid due to prior invention. It then denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the antitrust and tortious interference counterclaims, finding a factual dispute about whether the honeycomb products had substantial non-infringing uses. At trial, the jury found the patent holder liable for unlawful tying under federal antitrust law, concluding that it had conditioned patent licenses on customers buying its honeycombs, and awarded significant damages. The district court denied the patent holder’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, confirming the jury’s findings that the honeycombs were staple goods with substantial non-infringing uses and that the conduct was not protected by immunity doctrines.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that the honeycomb products had actual and substantial non-infringing uses, making them staple goods and removing the patent holder’s statutory defense against antitrust liability. The court also rejected the argument that the patent holder’s conduct was immunized from antitrust scrutiny, and upheld the damages award, finding no error in the district court’s rulings or the jury’s determinations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1577/24-1577-2026-02-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "INGEVITY CORPORATION v. BASF CORPORATION " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two companies that manufacture activated carbon honeycombs, used in automotive emission control systems, became embroiled in a legal dispute. One company holds a patent covering certain dual-stage fuel vapor canister systems, but not honeycombs used in air-intake systems. The other company began marketing a competing honeycomb product, prompting a patent infringement lawsuit. In response, the defendant challenged the validity of the patent, argued non-infringement, and asserted counterclaims alleging antitrust violations—specifically, that the patent holder unlawfully tied licenses for the patent to the purchase of its unpatented honeycomb products.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware first granted summary judgment that the patent was invalid due to prior invention. It then denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the antitrust and tortious interference counterclaims, finding a factual dispute about whether the honeycomb products had substantial non-infringing uses. At trial, the jury found the patent holder liable for unlawful tying under federal antitrust law, concluding that it had conditioned patent licenses on customers buying its honeycombs, and awarded significant damages. The district court denied the patent holder’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, confirming the jury’s findings that the honeycombs were staple goods with substantial non-infringing uses and that the conduct was not protected by immunity doctrines.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that the honeycomb products had actual and substantial non-infringing uses, making them staple goods and removing the patent holder’s statutory defense against antitrust liability. The court also rejected the argument that the patent holder’s conduct was immunized from antitrust scrutiny, and upheld the damages award, finding no error in the district court’s rulings or the jury’s determinations.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1669/24-1669-2026-02-09.html</id>
        	<title>GOTV STREAMING, LLC v. NETFLIX, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-09T08:03:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-09T08:03:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1669/24-1669-2026-02-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		GoTV Streaming, LLC owned three related patents that describe a system in which a server receives a content request from a wireless device, tailors the content to that device’s capabilities (such as screen size), and sends the modified content to the device for display. The patents were designed to reduce the burden of developing unique applications for each device type. Instead, the server uses generic templates and custom configurations that are then tailored to the specific device’s needs.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed GoTV’s claims for induced infringement, holding that such claims require the defendant’s knowledge of the patents before the lawsuit. The court also denied Netflix’s motion that the patents were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, finding the claims were not directed to abstract ideas. The court later found all claims of the ’865 patent indefinite and invalid, adopted some of GoTV’s proposed claim constructions, and denied GoTV’s motions to exclude certain Netflix damages evidence. At trial, the jury found Netflix infringed only one patent and awarded GoTV $2.5 million in damages. The district court denied GoTV’s post-trial motions, including for retrial on damages and for prejudgment interest predating the complaint.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It reversed the district court’s indefiniteness finding for the ’865 patent and adopted GoTV’s claim construction. However, it held that all asserted claims were patent-ineligible under § 101 because they were directed to the abstract idea of using a generic template tailored for a user’s device without reciting an inventive concept. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment for GoTV, ordered judgment for Netflix, and vacated the district court’s rulings on inducement and damages evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1669/24-1669-2026-02-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GOTV STREAMING, LLC v. NETFLIX, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                GoTV Streaming, LLC owned three related patents that describe a system in which a server receives a content request from a wireless device, tailors the content to that device’s capabilities (such as screen size), and sends the modified content to the device for display. The patents were designed to reduce the burden of developing unique applications for each device type. Instead, the server uses generic templates and custom configurations that are then tailored to the specific device’s needs.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed GoTV’s claims for induced infringement, holding that such claims require the defendant’s knowledge of the patents before the lawsuit. The court also denied Netflix’s motion that the patents were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, finding the claims were not directed to abstract ideas. The court later found all claims of the ’865 patent indefinite and invalid, adopted some of GoTV’s proposed claim constructions, and denied GoTV’s motions to exclude certain Netflix damages evidence. At trial, the jury found Netflix infringed only one patent and awarded GoTV $2.5 million in damages. The district court denied GoTV’s post-trial motions, including for retrial on damages and for prejudgment interest predating the complaint.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It reversed the district court’s indefiniteness finding for the ’865 patent and adopted GoTV’s claim construction. However, it held that all asserted claims were patent-ineligible under § 101 because they were directed to the abstract idea of using a generic template tailored for a user’s device without reciting an inventive concept. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment for GoTV, ordered judgment for Netflix, and vacated the district court’s rulings on inducement and damages evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2026/2025-0140.html</id>
        	<title>Collision Commc&#039;ns v. Nokia Solutions and Networks OY</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-05T08:11:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-05T08:11:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2026/2025-0140.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, a New Hampshire-based corporation, acquired patents and software from a military contractor and sought to adapt the technology for consumer telecommunications. The defendant, a Finnish multinational, manufactures cellular base stations. In 2015, the parties began discussions about integrating the plaintiff’s software into the defendant’s products. By February 2017, negotiations focused on two main points: a fee for integration work and a lump sum for a perpetual software license. On June 6, 2017, the plaintiff alleges both parties orally agreed to a $3 million integration fee and a $20 million license fee. The defendant disputes whether such an oral agreement occurred. The plaintiff continued work based on this understanding. Later, the defendant offered a lower license fee in a draft written contract, which the plaintiff rejected. Eventually, the defendant canceled the project.

After cancellation, the plaintiff sued the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Following a ten-day trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on breach of contract and promissory estoppel, awarding $23 million in damages. The district court, considering the defendant’s statute-of-frauds defense, determined that the core issue was whether the perpetual license agreement could be performed within one year. The court found this, along with other issues, raised novel questions of New Hampshire law without binding precedent, and certified three questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the certified questions. It held that, under New Hampshire law, obligations imposed by a perpetual intellectual property license can be performed within one year, because, absent express language to the contrary, the licensor’s obligations are fulfilled upon granting the license. The court declined to answer the other two certified questions, as its answer to the first resolved the determinative legal issue. The case was remanded to the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2026/2025-0140.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Collision Commc&#039;ns v. Nokia Solutions and Networks OY" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, a New Hampshire-based corporation, acquired patents and software from a military contractor and sought to adapt the technology for consumer telecommunications. The defendant, a Finnish multinational, manufactures cellular base stations. In 2015, the parties began discussions about integrating the plaintiff’s software into the defendant’s products. By February 2017, negotiations focused on two main points: a fee for integration work and a lump sum for a perpetual software license. On June 6, 2017, the plaintiff alleges both parties orally agreed to a $3 million integration fee and a $20 million license fee. The defendant disputes whether such an oral agreement occurred. The plaintiff continued work based on this understanding. Later, the defendant offered a lower license fee in a draft written contract, which the plaintiff rejected. Eventually, the defendant canceled the project.

After cancellation, the plaintiff sued the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Following a ten-day trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on breach of contract and promissory estoppel, awarding $23 million in damages. The district court, considering the defendant’s statute-of-frauds defense, determined that the core issue was whether the perpetual license agreement could be performed within one year. The court found this, along with other issues, raised novel questions of New Hampshire law without binding precedent, and certified three questions to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the certified questions. It held that, under New Hampshire law, obligations imposed by a perpetual intellectual property license can be performed within one year, because, absent express language to the contrary, the licensor’s obligations are fulfilled upon granting the license. The court declined to answer the other two certified questions, as its answer to the first resolved the determinative legal issue. The case was remanded to the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>New Hampshire</case:state>
						<case:court>New Hampshire Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bryan Gould</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="New Hampshire Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1942/24-1942-2026-02-02.html</id>
        	<title>BlueRadios, Inc. v. Hamilton, Brook, Smith &amp; Reynolds, P.C.</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-02T14:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-02T14:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1942/24-1942-2026-02-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Colorado-based technology company specializing in wireless communications collaborated with a Massachusetts micro-display company to develop a headset, formalizing their respective rights in a contract. The contract established joint intellectual property ownership for the project and designated the Massachusetts company to select counsel and prosecute patents. The selected law firm worked with both companies during patent prosecution, opening billing files and receiving powers of attorney from the Colorado company’s employees. Over time, disputes arose regarding patent applications, including amendments that allegedly benefited the Massachusetts company at the expense of the Colorado company, abandonment of applications, and filing disclaimers—often without informing the Colorado company.

After the business relationship ended in 2009, the Colorado company only discovered alleged misconduct by the law firm years later when investigating its patent portfolio in response to a potential acquisition. Subsequent litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado led to the law firm’s disqualification due to a found attorney-client relationship, and discovery revealed possible concealment and conflicts of interest.

The Colorado company then sued the law firm and individual attorneys in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging legal malpractice and related claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the law firm, concluding all claims were untimely under the statute of limitations, not saved by equitable tolling, and that no attorney-client relationship existed.

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that whether the malpractice claims were timely is a factual question suitable for a jury, not summary judgment, and that an attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of law for the relevant period. The appellate court reversed the district court’s timeliness and relationship rulings on the legal malpractice claim, vacated determinations regarding other claims, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/24-1942/24-1942-2026-02-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BlueRadios, Inc. v. Hamilton, Brook, Smith &amp; Reynolds, P.C." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Colorado-based technology company specializing in wireless communications collaborated with a Massachusetts micro-display company to develop a headset, formalizing their respective rights in a contract. The contract established joint intellectual property ownership for the project and designated the Massachusetts company to select counsel and prosecute patents. The selected law firm worked with both companies during patent prosecution, opening billing files and receiving powers of attorney from the Colorado company’s employees. Over time, disputes arose regarding patent applications, including amendments that allegedly benefited the Massachusetts company at the expense of the Colorado company, abandonment of applications, and filing disclaimers—often without informing the Colorado company.

After the business relationship ended in 2009, the Colorado company only discovered alleged misconduct by the law firm years later when investigating its patent portfolio in response to a potential acquisition. Subsequent litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado led to the law firm’s disqualification due to a found attorney-client relationship, and discovery revealed possible concealment and conflicts of interest.

The Colorado company then sued the law firm and individual attorneys in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging legal malpractice and related claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the law firm, concluding all claims were untimely under the statute of limitations, not saved by equitable tolling, and that no attorney-client relationship existed.

Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that whether the malpractice claims were timely is a factual question suitable for a jury, not summary judgment, and that an attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of law for the relevant period. The appellate court reversed the district court’s timeliness and relationship rulings on the legal malpractice claim, vacated determinations regarding other claims, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2427/23-2427-2026-02-02.html</id>
        	<title>RANGE OF MOTION PRODUCTS, LLC v. ARMAID COMPANY INC. </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-02T06:36:42-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-02T06:36:42-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2427/23-2427-2026-02-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Range of Motion Products, LLC owns a design patent for a body massaging apparatus, which is embodied in its product, the Rolflex. Armaid Company Inc. manufactures the Armaid2, an accused product in this suit, as well as an earlier version, the Armaid1, which was covered by a utility patent. RoM alleged that the Armaid2 infringed its design patent. Previously, RoM had filed a similar suit against Armaid in the same court, but that case was dismissed without prejudice following the denial of a preliminary injunction.

In the subsequent action, the United States District Court for the District of Maine construed the design patent, carefully distinguishing between functional and ornamental aspects of the claimed design. The court found that many features, notably the shape of the arms and the base, were primarily functional, narrowing the scope of the claimed design. Upon reviewing the evidence, the district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find the design of the Armaid2 substantially similar to the patented design, and granted summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Armaid.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo and its grant of summary judgment under the First Circuit’s de novo standard. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the district court did not err in identifying the functional versus ornamental aspects of the claimed design, and finding that the designs were plainly dissimilar when considering only the ornamental features. The court further held that, even when comparing the accused and claimed designs alongside prior art, no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity. The judgment of non-infringement was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2427/23-2427-2026-02-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "RANGE OF MOTION PRODUCTS, LLC v. ARMAID COMPANY INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Range of Motion Products, LLC owns a design patent for a body massaging apparatus, which is embodied in its product, the Rolflex. Armaid Company Inc. manufactures the Armaid2, an accused product in this suit, as well as an earlier version, the Armaid1, which was covered by a utility patent. RoM alleged that the Armaid2 infringed its design patent. Previously, RoM had filed a similar suit against Armaid in the same court, but that case was dismissed without prejudice following the denial of a preliminary injunction.

In the subsequent action, the United States District Court for the District of Maine construed the design patent, carefully distinguishing between functional and ornamental aspects of the claimed design. The court found that many features, notably the shape of the arms and the base, were primarily functional, narrowing the scope of the claimed design. Upon reviewing the evidence, the district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find the design of the Armaid2 substantially similar to the patented design, and granted summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Armaid.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo and its grant of summary judgment under the First Circuit’s de novo standard. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the district court did not err in identifying the functional versus ornamental aspects of the claimed design, and finding that the designs were plainly dissimilar when considering only the ornamental features. The court further held that, even when comparing the accused and claimed designs alongside prior art, no reasonable jury could find substantial similarity. The judgment of non-infringement was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Tiffany Cunningham</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1092/24-1092-2026-01-29.html</id>
        	<title>Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-29T07:33:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-29T07:33:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1092/24-1092-2026-01-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centered on technology for streaming media over networks, specifically a method described in a now-expired patent for reducing latency and improving stream quality using intermediate “helper servers” to cache and coordinate content distribution. The patent’s method claim at issue involved several steps, including receiving a request for a streaming media object from a client at a helper server, allocating a buffer at the helper server to cache part of the requested object, downloading that portion to the client while concurrently retrieving the remaining portion, and adjusting the transfer rate. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s system infringed this method claim by directing third-party edge servers to perform these steps.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California previously granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the defendant. The district court found that the accused system did not perform the required steps in the order set out in the claim and that it did not use the kind of “specialized buffer” the patent required. On a prior appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed some claim constructions, vacated the summary judgment, and remanded for further construction of the term “buffer.” On remand, the district court construed “buffer” as “short term storage associated with said requested SM object,” determined that claim 16 required both a specialized buffer and a specific order of steps, and again granted summary judgment for noninfringement.

On the present appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in limiting the claim to a specialized buffer, but correctly construed the claim to require the first two steps to be performed in sequence. Because the accused system did not perform the steps in this required order, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of noninfringement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1092/24-1092-2026-01-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centered on technology for streaming media over networks, specifically a method described in a now-expired patent for reducing latency and improving stream quality using intermediate “helper servers” to cache and coordinate content distribution. The patent’s method claim at issue involved several steps, including receiving a request for a streaming media object from a client at a helper server, allocating a buffer at the helper server to cache part of the requested object, downloading that portion to the client while concurrently retrieving the remaining portion, and adjusting the transfer rate. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s system infringed this method claim by directing third-party edge servers to perform these steps.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California previously granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the defendant. The district court found that the accused system did not perform the required steps in the order set out in the claim and that it did not use the kind of “specialized buffer” the patent required. On a prior appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed some claim constructions, vacated the summary judgment, and remanded for further construction of the term “buffer.” On remand, the district court construed “buffer” as “short term storage associated with said requested SM object,” determined that claim 16 required both a specialized buffer and a specific order of steps, and again granted summary judgment for noninfringement.

On the present appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in limiting the claim to a specialized buffer, but correctly construed the claim to require the first two steps to be performed in sequence. Because the accused system did not perform the steps in this required order, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of noninfringement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1520/24-1520-2026-01-22.html</id>
        	<title>US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC </title>
        	<updated>2026-01-22T07:31:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-22T07:31:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1520/24-1520-2026-01-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,679,637, claimed infringement by the defendant, Google LLC, concerning a patent related to web conferencing systems. The patent describes systems that allow participants to view sessions in real time, with time-shifting capabilities so that sessions can also be viewed with delay or after completion, and at different playback rates while maintaining consistent audio quality. The asserted claims permit asynchronous review of multimedia presentations, such as going back to review one aspect while another continues live.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the complaint, in which the plaintiff alleged infringement of claims 2–5 and 7–9 of the patent. Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the asserted claims were patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the claims were directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept that would make them patent-eligible. The court also denied the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, citing futility.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, applying the Alice two-step test for patent eligibility. The appellate court affirmed that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of asynchronous review of presentations and did not disclose a specific technological improvement or inventive concept. The court found that conventional components and result-oriented language did not suffice for eligibility and agreed that amendment of the complaint would be futile. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. Costs were awarded to Google. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1520/24-1520-2026-01-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US PATENT NO. 7,679,637 LLC v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,679,637, claimed infringement by the defendant, Google LLC, concerning a patent related to web conferencing systems. The patent describes systems that allow participants to view sessions in real time, with time-shifting capabilities so that sessions can also be viewed with delay or after completion, and at different playback rates while maintaining consistent audio quality. The asserted claims permit asynchronous review of multimedia presentations, such as going back to review one aspect while another continues live.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the complaint, in which the plaintiff alleged infringement of claims 2–5 and 7–9 of the patent. Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing the asserted claims were patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the claims were directed to an abstract idea without an inventive concept that would make them patent-eligible. The court also denied the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, citing futility.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, applying the Alice two-step test for patent eligibility. The appellate court affirmed that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of asynchronous review of presentations and did not disclose a specific technological improvement or inventive concept. The court found that conventional components and result-oriented language did not suffice for eligibility and agreed that amendment of the complaint would be futile. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. Costs were awarded to Google.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2226/23-2226-2026-01-20.html</id>
        	<title>BARRY v. DEPUY SYNTHES COMPANIES </title>
        	<updated>2026-01-20T07:00:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-20T07:00:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2226/23-2226-2026-01-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A physician brought suit against several related companies, alleging that they induced surgeons to infringe claims of three patents covering surgical techniques and tools for treating spinal deformities. These patents involve methods and devices for correcting misaligned vertebrae, including the use of “handle means” and “cross-linking members” in en bloc derotation procedures. The defendant companies manufacture derotation devices that, according to the plaintiff, infringe the asserted patents when used in certain configurations. The dispute centered on whether the accused devices contained the claimed “handle means” and whether surgeons actually used the devices in infringing ways.

In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the parties disputed the meaning of “handle means,” and the court adopted the plaintiff’s proposed construction. During the trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from two experts: one on infringement and another who conducted a survey on surgical practices. The defendants moved to exclude both experts under Daubert, challenging the reliability and relevance of their methods and opinions. Initially, the district court denied these motions, finding that the experts’ application of the court’s claim construction and survey methodology affected the weight of their testimony, not its admissibility.

However, following the experts’ testimony at trial, the district court reversed its earlier decision, excluded substantial portions of both experts’ testimony as unreliable and contradictory to the court’s claim construction, and then granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants due to the lack of admissible evidence supporting infringement.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony and erred in granting judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed the district court’s rulings, holding that the excluded testimony did not contradict the court’s claim construction and that any methodological concerns went to evidentiary weight, not admissibility. The case was remanded for a new trial in which both experts may testify. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2226/23-2226-2026-01-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BARRY v. DEPUY SYNTHES COMPANIES " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A physician brought suit against several related companies, alleging that they induced surgeons to infringe claims of three patents covering surgical techniques and tools for treating spinal deformities. These patents involve methods and devices for correcting misaligned vertebrae, including the use of “handle means” and “cross-linking members” in en bloc derotation procedures. The defendant companies manufacture derotation devices that, according to the plaintiff, infringe the asserted patents when used in certain configurations. The dispute centered on whether the accused devices contained the claimed “handle means” and whether surgeons actually used the devices in infringing ways.

In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the parties disputed the meaning of “handle means,” and the court adopted the plaintiff’s proposed construction. During the trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from two experts: one on infringement and another who conducted a survey on surgical practices. The defendants moved to exclude both experts under Daubert, challenging the reliability and relevance of their methods and opinions. Initially, the district court denied these motions, finding that the experts’ application of the court’s claim construction and survey methodology affected the weight of their testimony, not its admissibility.

However, following the experts’ testimony at trial, the district court reversed its earlier decision, excluded substantial portions of both experts’ testimony as unreliable and contradictory to the court’s claim construction, and then granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants due to the lack of admissible evidence supporting infringement.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert testimony and erred in granting judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed the district court’s rulings, holding that the excluded testimony did not contradict the court’s claim construction and that any methodological concerns went to evidentiary weight, not admissibility. The case was remanded for a new trial in which both experts may testify.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1381/24-1381-2025-12-23.html</id>
        	<title>ETHANOL BOOSTING SYSTEMS, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY </title>
        	<updated>2025-12-23T07:01:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-23T07:01:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1381/24-1381-2025-12-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Massachusetts Institute of Technology owns three patents related to fuel management systems for spark ignition engines, which are exclusively licensed to Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC. These patents describe a system that uses both direct and port fuel injection to mitigate engine knock and optimize performance. The system operates with varying injection mechanisms depending on engine torque or manifold pressure, and includes a three-way catalyst to reduce emissions. The patents contain claims focusing on the interplay of injection types with engine operating ranges and the use of anti-knock agents.

Previously, Ford Motor Company petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) for inter partes review (IPR) of all three patents. The PTAB initially denied institution, largely due to a claim construction that restricted the definition of “fuel” in a manner consistent with a district court’s prior interpretation, which required the directly injected fuel to differ from the port-injected fuel and to contain an anti-knock agent other than gasoline. After the Federal Circuit, in Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co., vacated the district court’s construction regarding the “different fuel” requirement (but did not address the anti-gasoline requirement), the PTAB granted Ford’s rehearing request and instituted the IPRs.

On appeal from the PTAB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final written decisions, which found the relevant claims of all three patents unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit rejected EBS’s arguments that the Board lacked authority to delay its rehearing decision and that the Board was bound by the non-appealed portion of the district court’s claim construction. The court affirmed the Board’s adoption of the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed terms and found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s factual findings regarding obviousness. The holding is that the PTAB’s decisions finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious are affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1381/24-1381-2025-12-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ETHANOL BOOSTING SYSTEMS, LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Massachusetts Institute of Technology owns three patents related to fuel management systems for spark ignition engines, which are exclusively licensed to Ethanol Boosting Systems, LLC. These patents describe a system that uses both direct and port fuel injection to mitigate engine knock and optimize performance. The system operates with varying injection mechanisms depending on engine torque or manifold pressure, and includes a three-way catalyst to reduce emissions. The patents contain claims focusing on the interplay of injection types with engine operating ranges and the use of anti-knock agents.

Previously, Ford Motor Company petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) for inter partes review (IPR) of all three patents. The PTAB initially denied institution, largely due to a claim construction that restricted the definition of “fuel” in a manner consistent with a district court’s prior interpretation, which required the directly injected fuel to differ from the port-injected fuel and to contain an anti-knock agent other than gasoline. After the Federal Circuit, in Ethanol Boosting Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co., vacated the district court’s construction regarding the “different fuel” requirement (but did not address the anti-gasoline requirement), the PTAB granted Ford’s rehearing request and instituted the IPRs.

On appeal from the PTAB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s final written decisions, which found the relevant claims of all three patents unpatentable as obvious. The Federal Circuit rejected EBS’s arguments that the Board lacked authority to delay its rehearing decision and that the Board was bound by the non-appealed portion of the district court’s claim construction. The court affirmed the Board’s adoption of the plain and ordinary meaning of the disputed terms and found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s factual findings regarding obviousness. The holding is that the PTAB’s decisions finding all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious are affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2007/23-2007-2025-12-18.html</id>
        	<title>Micron Technology, Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-18T06:33:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-18T06:33:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2007/23-2007-2025-12-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Micron Technology and its subsidiaries, along with the State of Idaho, were sued for patent infringement by Katana Silicon Technologies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The patents at issue related to technology for shrinking semiconductor devices and had expired. In response, Micron asserted a counterclaim under the Idaho Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, alleging that Katana had made bad faith assertions of patent infringement. Katana moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that the Idaho Act was preempted by federal patent law. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, where the State of Idaho intervened to defend the statute. Separately, Micron filed suit in Idaho state court against Longhorn IP, alleging similar bad faith assertions and seeking the imposition of a bond. Longhorn removed that case to federal court and also moved to dismiss on preemption grounds.

The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied both motions to dismiss, holding that federal law did not preempt the Idaho statute. The court also imposed an $8 million bond on Longhorn and Katana pursuant to the Act, finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that a bad faith assertion of patent infringement had occurred. Katana and Longhorn appealed these decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court determined that there was no final judgment from the district court, as the only decisions made were the denial of motions to dismiss and the imposition of a bond, neither of which ended the litigation on the merits. The Federal Circuit also found that none of the exceptions for interlocutory appellate review applied, including those for injunctions, the collateral order doctrine, or mandamus, nor was pendent jurisdiction appropriate. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2007/23-2007-2025-12-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Micron Technology, Inc. v. Longhorn IP LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Micron Technology and its subsidiaries, along with the State of Idaho, were sued for patent infringement by Katana Silicon Technologies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The patents at issue related to technology for shrinking semiconductor devices and had expired. In response, Micron asserted a counterclaim under the Idaho Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, alleging that Katana had made bad faith assertions of patent infringement. Katana moved to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that the Idaho Act was preempted by federal patent law. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, where the State of Idaho intervened to defend the statute. Separately, Micron filed suit in Idaho state court against Longhorn IP, alleging similar bad faith assertions and seeking the imposition of a bond. Longhorn removed that case to federal court and also moved to dismiss on preemption grounds.

The United States District Court for the District of Idaho denied both motions to dismiss, holding that federal law did not preempt the Idaho statute. The court also imposed an $8 million bond on Longhorn and Katana pursuant to the Act, finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that a bad faith assertion of patent infringement had occurred. Katana and Longhorn appealed these decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court determined that there was no final judgment from the district court, as the only decisions made were the denial of motions to dismiss and the imposition of a bond, neither of which ended the litigation on the merits. The Federal Circuit also found that none of the exceptions for interlocutory appellate review applied, including those for injunctions, the collateral order doctrine, or mandamus, nor was pendent jurisdiction appropriate.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2043/23-2043-2025-12-17.html</id>
        	<title>WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-12-17T07:02:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-17T07:02:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2043/23-2043-2025-12-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Wonderland Switzerland AG owns two patents related to child car seats, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,625,043 and 8,141,951. Wonderland sued Evenflo Company, Inc., alleging that five Evenflo convertible car seat models, categorized as “4-in-1” and “3-in-1” seats, infringed claims of both patents. The dispute focused on specific features of the accused car seats, such as mechanisms for attaching the seat back to the seat assembly and the structure of engaging components.

A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that both Evenflo’s 3-in-1 and 4-in-1 seats infringed claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and that the 4-in-1 seats also infringed claims 1 and 5 of the ’951 patent, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury found Evenflo’s infringement of the ’043 patent was not willful. The district court denied both parties’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, granted a permanent injunction covering both patents, and denied Wonderland’s motion for a new trial on willful infringement.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment that Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats infringe claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, finding no substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that point. The court also reversed the permanent injunction as to both patents because the injunction for the ’951 patent was not requested and the showing for irreparable harm as to the ’043 patent was insufficient. Furthermore, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on willful infringement of the ’043 patent (for the 3-in-1 seats only) due to wrongful exclusion of key evidence. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2043/23-2043-2025-12-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "WONDERLAND SWITZERLAND AG v. EVENFLO COMPANY, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Wonderland Switzerland AG owns two patents related to child car seats, U.S. Patent Nos. 7,625,043 and 8,141,951. Wonderland sued Evenflo Company, Inc., alleging that five Evenflo convertible car seat models, categorized as “4-in-1” and “3-in-1” seats, infringed claims of both patents. The dispute focused on specific features of the accused car seats, such as mechanisms for attaching the seat back to the seat assembly and the structure of engaging components.

A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware found that both Evenflo’s 3-in-1 and 4-in-1 seats infringed claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and that the 4-in-1 seats also infringed claims 1 and 5 of the ’951 patent, both literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. The jury found Evenflo’s infringement of the ’043 patent was not willful. The district court denied both parties’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, granted a permanent injunction covering both patents, and denied Wonderland’s motion for a new trial on willful infringement.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment that Evenflo’s 4-in-1 seats infringe claim 1 of the ’043 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, finding no substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that point. The court also reversed the permanent injunction as to both patents because the injunction for the ’951 patent was not requested and the showing for irreparable harm as to the ’043 patent was insufficient. Furthermore, the court reversed the denial of a new trial on willful infringement of the ’043 patent (for the 3-in-1 seats only) due to wrongful exclusion of key evidence. The judgment was otherwise affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1170/24-1170-2025-12-09.html</id>
        	<title>IBM v. ZILLOW GROUP, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-12-09T07:31:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-09T07:31:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1170/24-1170-2025-12-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		IBM owns a patent concerning single sign-on (SSO) technology, which allows users to access protected resources on a second system using credentials from a first system. In simplified terms, the invention facilitates account creation on a second platform (such as a healthcare provider) using a user identifier already stored by the first platform (such as a social media website), thereby avoiding the need for users to create separate accounts for each service. The patent describes specific systems and processes for transmitting user identifiers and managing account creation in distributed environments.

Ebates Performance Marketing, Inc. (Rakuten) filed petitions for inter partes review of IBM’s patent at the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), asserting anticipation and obviousness based on several prior art references, especially a system disclosed in Sunada. The PTAB adopted IBM’s construction of certain claim terms but found that Sunada taught or suggested most relevant limitations. The Board held claims 1–4, 12–16, and 18–19 unpatentable, while claims 5–11, 17, and 20 were found not unpatentable because the prior art did not disclose a specific process required by those claims.

IBM appealed the PTAB’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Board’s analysis exceeded the scope of Rakuten’s petition and that its findings lacked substantial evidence. Zillow, which had joined the review, cross-appealed regarding claims found not unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s analysis was consistent with the petition and supported by substantial evidence. It found the Board’s distinction between similar claims reasonable and affirmed both the appeal and cross-appeal, leaving the PTAB’s patentability determinations undisturbed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1170/24-1170-2025-12-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IBM v. ZILLOW GROUP, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                IBM owns a patent concerning single sign-on (SSO) technology, which allows users to access protected resources on a second system using credentials from a first system. In simplified terms, the invention facilitates account creation on a second platform (such as a healthcare provider) using a user identifier already stored by the first platform (such as a social media website), thereby avoiding the need for users to create separate accounts for each service. The patent describes specific systems and processes for transmitting user identifiers and managing account creation in distributed environments.

Ebates Performance Marketing, Inc. (Rakuten) filed petitions for inter partes review of IBM’s patent at the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), asserting anticipation and obviousness based on several prior art references, especially a system disclosed in Sunada. The PTAB adopted IBM’s construction of certain claim terms but found that Sunada taught or suggested most relevant limitations. The Board held claims 1–4, 12–16, and 18–19 unpatentable, while claims 5–11, 17, and 20 were found not unpatentable because the prior art did not disclose a specific process required by those claims.

IBM appealed the PTAB’s ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Board’s analysis exceeded the scope of Rakuten’s petition and that its findings lacked substantial evidence. Zillow, which had joined the review, cross-appealed regarding claims found not unpatentable. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s analysis was consistent with the petition and supported by substantial evidence. It found the Board’s distinction between similar claims reasonable and affirmed both the appeal and cross-appeal, leaving the PTAB’s patentability determinations undisturbed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1880/23-1880-2025-12-08.html</id>
        	<title>CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O. v. GOODYEAR TIRE &amp; RUBBER COMPANY</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-08T08:01:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-08T08:01:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1880/23-1880-2025-12-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiffs, Coda Development s.r.o., Coda Innovations s.r.o., and Frantisek Hrabal, brought claims against Goodyear Tire &amp; Rubber Company and Robert Benedict, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets related to self-inflating tire technology and seeking correction of inventorship on a Goodyear patent. Coda claimed that Goodyear misappropriated five specific trade secrets involving technical solutions, testing data, and optimal component placement for this technology. The alleged misappropriation stemmed from communications and interactions between the parties concerning this technology.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the case proceeded to a jury trial on the trade secret claims. The jury found in favor of Coda, concluding that Goodyear misappropriated five trade secrets and awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Following the trial, the district court granted Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, determining that the asserted trade secrets were either not sufficiently definite, not secret, not used by Goodyear, or not adequately conveyed to Goodyear, and thus set aside the jury’s verdict. The court also denied Coda’s claim seeking correction of inventorship on Goodyear’s patent, after considering the parties’ briefing in lieu of a bench trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could have found that all elements required for trade secret misappropriation were met for any of the asserted trade secrets. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the denial of the correction of inventorship claim, concluding that Coda failed to provide evidence that would entitle it to such relief. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1880/23-1880-2025-12-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O. v. GOODYEAR TIRE &amp; RUBBER COMPANY" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiffs, Coda Development s.r.o., Coda Innovations s.r.o., and Frantisek Hrabal, brought claims against Goodyear Tire &amp; Rubber Company and Robert Benedict, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets related to self-inflating tire technology and seeking correction of inventorship on a Goodyear patent. Coda claimed that Goodyear misappropriated five specific trade secrets involving technical solutions, testing data, and optimal component placement for this technology. The alleged misappropriation stemmed from communications and interactions between the parties concerning this technology.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the case proceeded to a jury trial on the trade secret claims. The jury found in favor of Coda, concluding that Goodyear misappropriated five trade secrets and awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Following the trial, the district court granted Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, determining that the asserted trade secrets were either not sufficiently definite, not secret, not used by Goodyear, or not adequately conveyed to Goodyear, and thus set aside the jury’s verdict. The court also denied Coda’s claim seeking correction of inventorship on Goodyear’s patent, after considering the parties’ briefing in lieu of a bench trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, holding that no reasonable jury could have found that all elements required for trade secret misappropriation were met for any of the asserted trade secrets. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the denial of the correction of inventorship claim, concluding that Coda failed to provide evidence that would entitle it to such relief. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Tiffany Cunningham</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1551/24-1551-2025-12-05.html</id>
        	<title>ADNEXUS INC. v. META PLATFORMS, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-12-05T07:02:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-05T07:02:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1551/24-1551-2025-12-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Adnexus, Inc. owns a patent for a system and method of online advertising that aims to deliver targeted advertisements to users without overwhelming them with irrelevant content. Adnexus alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc.&#039;s Lead Ads product infringed at least one claim of this patent. Specifically, Adnexus argued that Lead Ads retrieves a user profile containing delivery method preferences and other information, which matches the patent’s claim requirement. Adnexus attached detailed claim charts and a preliminary infringement analysis to its amended complaint to show how Lead Ads purportedly meets each element of the asserted claim.

In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Meta moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Adnexus failed to plausibly allege that Lead Ads met the claim limitation requiring retrieval of a user profile containing delivery method preferences. The district court agreed with Meta, finding that “contact information” was distinct from “delivery method preferences” and that Adnexus’s allegations were insufficient. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, as Adnexus had already amended its pleading once. The court also dismissed indirect and willful infringement claims, and found Adnexus estopped from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in implicitly construing the claim term “delivery method preferences” against Adnexus, the non-moving party, without providing Adnexus an opportunity to address claim construction. The Federal Circuit found that Adnexus’s amended complaint, when taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Adnexus, plausibly alleged infringement of the relevant claim limitation. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1551/24-1551-2025-12-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ADNEXUS INC. v. META PLATFORMS, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Adnexus, Inc. owns a patent for a system and method of online advertising that aims to deliver targeted advertisements to users without overwhelming them with irrelevant content. Adnexus alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc.&#039;s Lead Ads product infringed at least one claim of this patent. Specifically, Adnexus argued that Lead Ads retrieves a user profile containing delivery method preferences and other information, which matches the patent’s claim requirement. Adnexus attached detailed claim charts and a preliminary infringement analysis to its amended complaint to show how Lead Ads purportedly meets each element of the asserted claim.

In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Meta moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Adnexus failed to plausibly allege that Lead Ads met the claim limitation requiring retrieval of a user profile containing delivery method preferences. The district court agreed with Meta, finding that “contact information” was distinct from “delivery method preferences” and that Adnexus’s allegations were insufficient. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, as Adnexus had already amended its pleading once. The court also dismissed indirect and willful infringement claims, and found Adnexus estopped from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred in implicitly construing the claim term “delivery method preferences” against Adnexus, the non-moving party, without providing Adnexus an opportunity to address claim construction. The Federal Circuit found that Adnexus’s amended complaint, when taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Adnexus, plausibly alleged infringement of the relevant claim limitation. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2424/23-2424-2025-12-02.html</id>
        	<title>SEAGEN INC. v. DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY, LTD. </title>
        	<updated>2025-12-02T06:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-02T06:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2424/23-2424-2025-12-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on a patent for a type of cancer treatment called an antibody-drug conjugate (ADC), which combines an antibody, a cytotoxic drug, and a linker protein. The patent at issue claimed a particular kind of linker, a tetrapeptide consisting only of glycine and phenylalanine amino acids. Seagen, the patent holder, sued Daichii Sankyo and AstraZeneca, alleging that their ADC product, Enhertu, infringed claims of this patent. Notably, Enhertu contains the specific tetrapeptide sequence described in the patent. The patent’s priority was claimed from a 2004 application, though the sequence in question had not been expressly disclosed in that earlier filing.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial. The jury found the asserted patent claims valid, not invalid for lack of written description or enablement, and determined that the defendants had willfully infringed. Damages exceeding $41 million were awarded to Seagen. The district court denied the defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), upholding the jury’s verdict and entering final judgment for Seagen.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in denying JMOL because the original 2004 application did not provide adequate written description support for the claimed subgenus of Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides. The Federal Circuit found that the patent specification failed to demonstrate that the inventors possessed the claimed invention as of the 2004 filing date, and that the patent was not enabled because a skilled artisan would need to engage in undue experimentation to make and use the full scope of the claimed ADCs. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, found the patent invalid, and vacated the jury’s findings of infringement and damages. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2424/23-2424-2025-12-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SEAGEN INC. v. DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY, LTD. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on a patent for a type of cancer treatment called an antibody-drug conjugate (ADC), which combines an antibody, a cytotoxic drug, and a linker protein. The patent at issue claimed a particular kind of linker, a tetrapeptide consisting only of glycine and phenylalanine amino acids. Seagen, the patent holder, sued Daichii Sankyo and AstraZeneca, alleging that their ADC product, Enhertu, infringed claims of this patent. Notably, Enhertu contains the specific tetrapeptide sequence described in the patent. The patent’s priority was claimed from a 2004 application, though the sequence in question had not been expressly disclosed in that earlier filing.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial. The jury found the asserted patent claims valid, not invalid for lack of written description or enablement, and determined that the defendants had willfully infringed. Damages exceeding $41 million were awarded to Seagen. The district court denied the defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), upholding the jury’s verdict and entering final judgment for Seagen.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the district court erred in denying JMOL because the original 2004 application did not provide adequate written description support for the claimed subgenus of Gly/Phe-only tetrapeptides. The Federal Circuit found that the patent specification failed to demonstrate that the inventors possessed the claimed invention as of the 2004 filing date, and that the patent was not enabled because a skilled artisan would need to engage in undue experimentation to make and use the full scope of the claimed ADCs. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, found the patent invalid, and vacated the jury’s findings of infringement and damages.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1075/25-1075-2025-12-01.html</id>
        	<title>In Re GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC </title>
        	<updated>2025-12-01T07:01:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-01T07:01:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1075/25-1075-2025-12-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves Gesture Technology Partners, LLC, which owns U.S. Patent No. 7,933,431 related to methods and apparatus for rapid TV camera and computer-based sensing of objects and human input, usable in devices such as handhelds, cars, and video games. After Samsung Electronics requested an ex parte reexamination of the patent, the United States Patent and Trademark Office initiated proceedings. Concurrently, two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings were filed against the same patent by Unified Patents LLC and other entities, resulting in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board invalidating most claims of the patent.

After the Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued final written decisions in both IPRs, Gesture Technology Partners petitioned the Patent Office to terminate the ex parte reexamination, arguing that Samsung, as a party to the IPR, was estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) from maintaining further proceedings on grounds that could have been raised in the IPRs. The Patent Office denied the petition, holding that the estoppel provision did not apply to ongoing ex parte reexaminations. Subsequently, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claims 11 and 13 as anticipated by a prior patent, Liebermann. Gesture appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) does not apply to ongoing ex parte reexamination proceedings, as the requester does not “maintain” the proceeding—the Patent Office does. The court also affirmed the Board’s finding that the Liebermann patent anticipates claims 11 and 13. Furthermore, it rejected the argument that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the patent had expired, citing continued rights to past damages. The court affirmed the Board’s decision as to claims 11 and 13 and dismissed the appeal as to the previously invalidated claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1075/25-1075-2025-12-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re GESTURE TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS, LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves Gesture Technology Partners, LLC, which owns U.S. Patent No. 7,933,431 related to methods and apparatus for rapid TV camera and computer-based sensing of objects and human input, usable in devices such as handhelds, cars, and video games. After Samsung Electronics requested an ex parte reexamination of the patent, the United States Patent and Trademark Office initiated proceedings. Concurrently, two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings were filed against the same patent by Unified Patents LLC and other entities, resulting in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board invalidating most claims of the patent.

After the Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued final written decisions in both IPRs, Gesture Technology Partners petitioned the Patent Office to terminate the ex parte reexamination, arguing that Samsung, as a party to the IPR, was estopped under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) from maintaining further proceedings on grounds that could have been raised in the IPRs. The Patent Office denied the petition, holding that the estoppel provision did not apply to ongoing ex parte reexaminations. Subsequently, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of claims 11 and 13 as anticipated by a prior patent, Liebermann. Gesture appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the estoppel provision of 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) does not apply to ongoing ex parte reexamination proceedings, as the requester does not “maintain” the proceeding—the Patent Office does. The court also affirmed the Board’s finding that the Liebermann patent anticipates claims 11 and 13. Furthermore, it rejected the argument that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the patent had expired, citing continued rights to past damages. The court affirmed the Board’s decision as to claims 11 and 13 and dismissed the appeal as to the previously invalidated claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1571/24-1571-2025-11-25.html</id>
        	<title>AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. MEDIAPOINTE, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-11-25T07:04:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-25T07:04:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1571/24-1571-2025-11-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Akamai Technologies, Inc. filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement regarding two patents owned by AMHC, Inc. and its subsidiary, MediaPointe, Inc. These patents describe systems and methods for efficiently routing streamed media content over the Internet using an “intelligent distribution network.” After Akamai initiated litigation, MediaPointe counterclaimed for infringement, and Akamai further sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity.

During claim construction, the district court issued an order finding that certain claims containing the terms “optimal” and “best” were invalid for indefiniteness. For the remaining asserted claims, the district court granted Akamai summary judgment of noninfringement. The court excluded key portions of MediaPointe’s expert testimony as untimely, and also found that, even considering that testimony, MediaPointe’s evidence did not create a genuine dispute regarding infringement. Specifically, the court determined that the accused Akamai system did not meet the required limitation of “receiving an initial request for media content” as understood in the context of the patents.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed both the invalidity and noninfringement judgments. The court held that the “optimal” and “best” claim terms were indefinite because the intrinsic record failed to provide objective boundaries for determining what is “optimal” or “best.” The court also concluded that, even with the excluded expert testimony included, MediaPointe had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1571/24-1571-2025-11-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. MEDIAPOINTE, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Akamai Technologies, Inc. filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement regarding two patents owned by AMHC, Inc. and its subsidiary, MediaPointe, Inc. These patents describe systems and methods for efficiently routing streamed media content over the Internet using an “intelligent distribution network.” After Akamai initiated litigation, MediaPointe counterclaimed for infringement, and Akamai further sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity.

During claim construction, the district court issued an order finding that certain claims containing the terms “optimal” and “best” were invalid for indefiniteness. For the remaining asserted claims, the district court granted Akamai summary judgment of noninfringement. The court excluded key portions of MediaPointe’s expert testimony as untimely, and also found that, even considering that testimony, MediaPointe’s evidence did not create a genuine dispute regarding infringement. Specifically, the court determined that the accused Akamai system did not meet the required limitation of “receiving an initial request for media content” as understood in the context of the patents.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed both the invalidity and noninfringement judgments. The court held that the “optimal” and “best” claim terms were indefinite because the intrinsic record failed to provide objective boundaries for determining what is “optimal” or “best.” The court also concluded that, even with the excluded expert testimony included, MediaPointe had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1201/24-1201-2025-11-25.html</id>
        	<title>ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC </title>
        	<updated>2025-11-25T07:04:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-25T07:04:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1201/24-1201-2025-11-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		EscapeX IP, LLC brought a patent infringement suit against Google LLC, alleging that Google’s YouTube Music product infringed its ’113 patent. After Google responded, pointing out factual deficiencies in EscapeX’s claims and highlighting that the accused features either did not exist or predated the patent, EscapeX amended its complaint to target a different Google product. Google repeatedly notified EscapeX that its claims were baseless and requested dismissal, but EscapeX did not respond. The case was transferred from the Western District of Texas to the Northern District of California. Meanwhile, a separate court found all claims of the ’113 patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which EscapeX did not appeal.

Upon transfer, EscapeX attempted to file a joint stipulation of dismissal without Google’s consent, misstating that both parties would bear their own fees. Google demanded withdrawal, and a corrected stipulation was later filed. Google moved for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, arguing EscapeX’s claims were frivolous and that EscapeX had unreasonably prolonged litigation. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Google to be the prevailing party, determined EscapeX’s case was exceptional due to its lack of adequate pre-suit investigation and frivolous claims, and awarded Google attorneys’ fees and costs. EscapeX then moved to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), presenting new declarations as “new evidence,” but the district court denied the motion, finding the evidence was not newly discovered.

Google sought additional attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for costs incurred opposing EscapeX’s Rule 59(e) motion. The district court found EscapeX’s motion frivolous and sanctioned EscapeX and its attorneys jointly and severally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed all of the district court’s orders. The main holdings were that the case was exceptional under § 285, supporting an award of attorneys’ fees, and that sanctions under § 1927 for frivolous litigation conduct were appropriate. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1201/24-1201-2025-11-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ESCAPEX IP, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                EscapeX IP, LLC brought a patent infringement suit against Google LLC, alleging that Google’s YouTube Music product infringed its ’113 patent. After Google responded, pointing out factual deficiencies in EscapeX’s claims and highlighting that the accused features either did not exist or predated the patent, EscapeX amended its complaint to target a different Google product. Google repeatedly notified EscapeX that its claims were baseless and requested dismissal, but EscapeX did not respond. The case was transferred from the Western District of Texas to the Northern District of California. Meanwhile, a separate court found all claims of the ’113 patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which EscapeX did not appeal.

Upon transfer, EscapeX attempted to file a joint stipulation of dismissal without Google’s consent, misstating that both parties would bear their own fees. Google demanded withdrawal, and a corrected stipulation was later filed. Google moved for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, arguing EscapeX’s claims were frivolous and that EscapeX had unreasonably prolonged litigation. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Google to be the prevailing party, determined EscapeX’s case was exceptional due to its lack of adequate pre-suit investigation and frivolous claims, and awarded Google attorneys’ fees and costs. EscapeX then moved to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), presenting new declarations as “new evidence,” but the district court denied the motion, finding the evidence was not newly discovered.

Google sought additional attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for costs incurred opposing EscapeX’s Rule 59(e) motion. The district court found EscapeX’s motion frivolous and sanctioned EscapeX and its attorneys jointly and severally. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed all of the district court’s orders. The main holdings were that the case was exceptional under § 285, supporting an award of attorneys’ fees, and that sanctions under § 1927 for frivolous litigation conduct were appropriate.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1078/24-1078-2025-11-18.html</id>
        	<title>DUKE UNIVERSITY v. SANDOZ INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-11-18T07:10:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-18T07:10:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1078/24-1078-2025-11-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Duke University and Allergan Sales, LLC own a patent relating to methods for treating hair loss using certain prostaglandin F (PGF) analogs. The patent describes a method of growing hair by topically applying a composition containing a PGF analog with specific structural features. Allergan markets Latisse®, a product containing bimatoprost, a PGF analog, for eyelash hair growth. Sandoz manufactures a generic version of Latisse®. Allergan sued Sandoz for patent infringement, specifically asserting claim 30 of the patent, which covers a subgenus of PGF analogs with defined chemical characteristics.

In the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Sandoz stipulated to infringement but challenged the validity of claim 30, arguing it lacked adequate written description, was obvious, and not enabled. After a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Allergan on all grounds, concluding Sandoz had not proven invalidity and awarding damages. Sandoz moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, both of which the district court denied. Sandoz then appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying Tenth Circuit standards. The Federal Circuit held that no reasonable jury could have found that claim 30 was adequately described in the patent specification. The court found that the specification broadly described billions of compounds, while claim 30 covered a much narrower subgenus, and the patent failed to provide sufficient guidance (“blaze marks”) to direct a skilled artisan to the claimed compounds. The court concluded that the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) was not met and reversed the district court’s judgment, holding claim 30 invalid for lack of adequate written description. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1078/24-1078-2025-11-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "DUKE UNIVERSITY v. SANDOZ INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Duke University and Allergan Sales, LLC own a patent relating to methods for treating hair loss using certain prostaglandin F (PGF) analogs. The patent describes a method of growing hair by topically applying a composition containing a PGF analog with specific structural features. Allergan markets Latisse®, a product containing bimatoprost, a PGF analog, for eyelash hair growth. Sandoz manufactures a generic version of Latisse®. Allergan sued Sandoz for patent infringement, specifically asserting claim 30 of the patent, which covers a subgenus of PGF analogs with defined chemical characteristics.

In the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Sandoz stipulated to infringement but challenged the validity of claim 30, arguing it lacked adequate written description, was obvious, and not enabled. After a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Allergan on all grounds, concluding Sandoz had not proven invalidity and awarding damages. Sandoz moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, both of which the district court denied. Sandoz then appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying Tenth Circuit standards. The Federal Circuit held that no reasonable jury could have found that claim 30 was adequately described in the patent specification. The court found that the specification broadly described billions of compounds, while claim 30 covered a much narrower subgenus, and the patent failed to provide sufficient guidance (“blaze marks”) to direct a skilled artisan to the claimed compounds. The court concluded that the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) was not met and reversed the district court’s judgment, holding claim 30 invalid for lack of adequate written description.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1616/24-1616-2025-11-13.html</id>
        	<title>SMARTREND MANUFACTURING GROUP (SMG), INC. v. OPTI-LUXX INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-11-13T07:01:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-13T07:01:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1616/24-1616-2025-11-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case concerns a dispute between two companies over alleged infringement of two patents related to illuminated school bus signs. The plaintiff, Smartrend Manufacturing Group (SMG), Inc., claimed that Opti-Luxx Inc. infringed both a design patent (D930) and a utility patent (’491) with its single-piece illuminated school bus sign, which features a rigid plastic housing, an LED light board, and a yellow lens with black lettering. The design patent describes certain features as “transparent,” while the utility patent claims a sign with a “frame” that is separate from the sign panel.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan held a jury trial, where the jury found that Opti-Luxx infringed both patents. The district court denied Opti-Luxx’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and issued a permanent injunction against Opti-Luxx. The court construed the term “transparency” in the design patent to mean both “transparent” and “translucent,” and determined that the “frame” in the utility patent must be a separate and distinct component. The trial on the utility patent proceeded under the doctrine of equivalents, as the accused product did not literally have a separate frame.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that Opti-Luxx had forfeited its objection to the plaintiff’s expert testimony regarding the design patent. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred in construing “transparency” to include “translucent,” and ordered a new trial on infringement of the design patent. Regarding the utility patent, the appellate court concluded that no reasonable jury could have found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, as the accused product did not perform the required functions of a separate frame. The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of infringement for the utility patent, vacated the judgment and injunction for the design patent, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1616/24-1616-2025-11-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SMARTREND MANUFACTURING GROUP (SMG), INC. v. OPTI-LUXX INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case concerns a dispute between two companies over alleged infringement of two patents related to illuminated school bus signs. The plaintiff, Smartrend Manufacturing Group (SMG), Inc., claimed that Opti-Luxx Inc. infringed both a design patent (D930) and a utility patent (’491) with its single-piece illuminated school bus sign, which features a rigid plastic housing, an LED light board, and a yellow lens with black lettering. The design patent describes certain features as “transparent,” while the utility patent claims a sign with a “frame” that is separate from the sign panel.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan held a jury trial, where the jury found that Opti-Luxx infringed both patents. The district court denied Opti-Luxx’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and issued a permanent injunction against Opti-Luxx. The court construed the term “transparency” in the design patent to mean both “transparent” and “translucent,” and determined that the “frame” in the utility patent must be a separate and distinct component. The trial on the utility patent proceeded under the doctrine of equivalents, as the accused product did not literally have a separate frame.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that Opti-Luxx had forfeited its objection to the plaintiff’s expert testimony regarding the design patent. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred in construing “transparency” to include “translucent,” and ordered a new trial on infringement of the design patent. Regarding the utility patent, the appellate court concluded that no reasonable jury could have found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, as the accused product did not perform the required functions of a separate frame. The Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of infringement for the utility patent, vacated the judgment and injunction for the design patent, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1932/24-1932-2025-11-12.html</id>
        	<title>Mission Integrated Technologies, LLC v. Clemente</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-12T11:30:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-12T11:30:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1932/24-1932-2025-11-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company developed a specialized vehicle-mounted stairway, with design work primarily performed by the founder’s son, who was promised equity in the business but never received it due to the majority owner’s repeated refusals. The son, with his father’s assistance, eventually obtained a patent for the design, which he used as leverage to seek compensation. Negotiations between the parties failed, leading to the father’s removal as company president and the company filing suit against both the father and son. The company alleged breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, business conspiracy, unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract, while the son counterclaimed for patent infringement.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the father and son on all claims except a breach of contract claim against the father and the son’s patent counterclaim. The court found most claims time-barred or unsupported by evidence, and later, the company voluntarily dismissed its remaining claim. The son’s patent was invalidated by a jury. The district court also awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the father as the prevailing party under the company’s operating agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the company’s claims were either time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations or failed on the merits, as there was no evidence the son benefited from the patent or that he had signed a non-disclosure agreement. The court also affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the father, finding no error in the district court’s application of Delaware law or its determination of the prevailing party. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1932/24-1932-2025-11-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mission Integrated Technologies, LLC v. Clemente" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company developed a specialized vehicle-mounted stairway, with design work primarily performed by the founder’s son, who was promised equity in the business but never received it due to the majority owner’s repeated refusals. The son, with his father’s assistance, eventually obtained a patent for the design, which he used as leverage to seek compensation. Negotiations between the parties failed, leading to the father’s removal as company president and the company filing suit against both the father and son. The company alleged breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, business conspiracy, unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract, while the son counterclaimed for patent infringement.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the father and son on all claims except a breach of contract claim against the father and the son’s patent counterclaim. The court found most claims time-barred or unsupported by evidence, and later, the company voluntarily dismissed its remaining claim. The son’s patent was invalidated by a jury. The district court also awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the father as the prevailing party under the company’s operating agreement.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that the company’s claims were either time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitations or failed on the merits, as there was no evidence the son benefited from the patent or that he had signed a non-disclosure agreement. The court also affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the father, finding no error in the district court’s application of Delaware law or its determination of the prevailing party.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>A. Marvin Quattlebaum Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1466/24-1466-2025-11-12.html</id>
        	<title>CANATEX COMPLETION SOLUTIONS, INC. v. WELLMATICS, LLC </title>
        	<updated>2025-11-12T07:32:14-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-12T07:32:14-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1466/24-1466-2025-11-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Canatex Completion Solutions, Inc. owns a patent for a “releasable connection” device used in oil and gas wells, which consists of two parts that can be disconnected downhole if necessary. Canatex alleged that several companies infringed its patent, specifically claims 1, 4–13, and 15–19. The dispute centered on the claim language “the connection profile of the second part,” which appears in the independent claims and the specification. Canatex argued that this was a clerical error and that a person skilled in the art would recognize the intended meaning as “the connection profile of the first part,” since only the first part’s connection profile is described and depicted in the patent.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case. During claim construction, the defendants argued that the claims were indefinite due to the lack of an antecedent basis for the disputed phrase. The district court agreed, finding the error was not evident from the face of the patent and that the correction was not as simple as Canatex suggested. The court held all asserted claims invalid for indefiniteness and entered final judgment based on a joint stipulation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo. The appellate court held that the error in the claim language was evident on the face of the patent and that the only reasonable correction, based on the intrinsic evidence, was to change “second” to “first.” The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, ruling that judicial correction of the claim was appropriate under the demanding standard for such corrections, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the corrected claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1466/24-1466-2025-11-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CANATEX COMPLETION SOLUTIONS, INC. v. WELLMATICS, LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Canatex Completion Solutions, Inc. owns a patent for a “releasable connection” device used in oil and gas wells, which consists of two parts that can be disconnected downhole if necessary. Canatex alleged that several companies infringed its patent, specifically claims 1, 4–13, and 15–19. The dispute centered on the claim language “the connection profile of the second part,” which appears in the independent claims and the specification. Canatex argued that this was a clerical error and that a person skilled in the art would recognize the intended meaning as “the connection profile of the first part,” since only the first part’s connection profile is described and depicted in the patent.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reviewed the case. During claim construction, the defendants argued that the claims were indefinite due to the lack of an antecedent basis for the disputed phrase. The district court agreed, finding the error was not evident from the face of the patent and that the correction was not as simple as Canatex suggested. The court held all asserted claims invalid for indefiniteness and entered final judgment based on a joint stipulation.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo. The appellate court held that the error in the claim language was evident on the face of the patent and that the only reasonable correction, based on the intrinsic evidence, was to change “second” to “first.” The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, ruling that judicial correction of the claim was appropriate under the demanding standard for such corrections, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the corrected claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1210/25-1210-2025-10-30.html</id>
        	<title>MERCK SERONO S.A. v. HOPEWELL PHARMA VENTURES, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-30T06:35:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-30T06:35:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1210/25-1210-2025-10-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns the validity of certain claims in two patents owned by a pharmaceutical company, which relate to methods of treating multiple sclerosis (MS) using oral administration of cladribine according to a specific dosing regimen. Before the patents’ priority date, cladribine was already known as a treatment for MS, but was typically administered intravenously or subcutaneously due to safety concerns. The patent owner, in partnership with another company, developed an oral formulation and dosing schedule for cladribine. During this collaboration, confidential information was exchanged, and a third party later filed a patent application (the Bodor reference) disclosing a similar dosing regimen. Another prior publication (Stelmasiak) described different cladribine regimens for MS.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) reviewed two inter partes review petitions challenging the patents’ claims as obvious over the combination of the Bodor and Stelmasiak references. The Board determined that the Bodor reference qualified as prior art, finding no complete overlap in inventors between the patents and the reference, and concluded that the patent owner failed to show that all named inventors of the patents contributed to the relevant disclosure in Bodor. The Board also found that the combination of Bodor and Stelmasiak rendered all challenged claims obvious, and rejected arguments that the claims required weight-based dosing or that the prior art failed to teach the claimed regimen.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decisions. The court clarified that, under pre-AIA law, a reference is “by another” and thus prior art unless the inventive entity is identical to that of the challenged patent. The court held that the Board did not err in its legal analysis, factual findings, or claim construction, and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s obviousness determination. The Board’s unpatentability findings were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1210/25-1210-2025-10-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MERCK SERONO S.A. v. HOPEWELL PHARMA VENTURES, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns the validity of certain claims in two patents owned by a pharmaceutical company, which relate to methods of treating multiple sclerosis (MS) using oral administration of cladribine according to a specific dosing regimen. Before the patents’ priority date, cladribine was already known as a treatment for MS, but was typically administered intravenously or subcutaneously due to safety concerns. The patent owner, in partnership with another company, developed an oral formulation and dosing schedule for cladribine. During this collaboration, confidential information was exchanged, and a third party later filed a patent application (the Bodor reference) disclosing a similar dosing regimen. Another prior publication (Stelmasiak) described different cladribine regimens for MS.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) reviewed two inter partes review petitions challenging the patents’ claims as obvious over the combination of the Bodor and Stelmasiak references. The Board determined that the Bodor reference qualified as prior art, finding no complete overlap in inventors between the patents and the reference, and concluded that the patent owner failed to show that all named inventors of the patents contributed to the relevant disclosure in Bodor. The Board also found that the combination of Bodor and Stelmasiak rendered all challenged claims obvious, and rejected arguments that the claims required weight-based dosing or that the prior art failed to teach the claimed regimen.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decisions. The court clarified that, under pre-AIA law, a reference is “by another” and thus prior art unless the inventive entity is identical to that of the challenged patent. The court held that the Board did not err in its legal analysis, factual findings, or claim construction, and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s obviousness determination. The Board’s unpatentability findings were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Linn</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1145/24-1145-2025-10-27.html</id>
        	<title>AORTIC INNOVATIONS LLC v. EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORPORATION </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-27T06:04:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-27T06:04:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1145/24-1145-2025-10-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Aortic Innovations LLC owns four related patents concerning devices used in transcatheter aortic valve replacement, a procedure for treating diseased aortic valves. The patents share a common specification and claim priority to the same provisional applications. The claims focus on a transcatheter valve assembly featuring an “outer frame” and an “inner frame.” Aortic alleged that Edwards Lifesciences’ SAPIEN 3 Ultra valve, which uses a single balloon-expandable frame, infringed these patents.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware presided over the initial litigation. Edwards Lifesciences petitioned for inter partes review before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which instituted review for three of the patents but not the ’735 patent. The district court stayed the case except for the ’735 patent. During claim construction, the parties disputed the meaning of “outer frame.” The district court found that the patentee had acted as their own lexicographer, redefining “outer frame” to mean “a self-expanding frame.” The court applied this construction to all asserted patents and, following a joint stipulation, entered judgment of non-infringement because Edwards’ accused product did not have a self-expanding frame.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s construction, holding that the specification consistently and interchangeably used “outer frame” and “self-expanding frame,” thereby redefining the term. The court affirmed the judgment of non-infringement for three patents and dismissed the appeal as to the fourth patent (’538) for lack of jurisdiction, as its claims had been cancelled by the Patent Office. The Federal Circuit also found that Aortic’s judicial estoppel argument was forfeited. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1145/24-1145-2025-10-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AORTIC INNOVATIONS LLC v. EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORPORATION " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Aortic Innovations LLC owns four related patents concerning devices used in transcatheter aortic valve replacement, a procedure for treating diseased aortic valves. The patents share a common specification and claim priority to the same provisional applications. The claims focus on a transcatheter valve assembly featuring an “outer frame” and an “inner frame.” Aortic alleged that Edwards Lifesciences’ SAPIEN 3 Ultra valve, which uses a single balloon-expandable frame, infringed these patents.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware presided over the initial litigation. Edwards Lifesciences petitioned for inter partes review before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which instituted review for three of the patents but not the ’735 patent. The district court stayed the case except for the ’735 patent. During claim construction, the parties disputed the meaning of “outer frame.” The district court found that the patentee had acted as their own lexicographer, redefining “outer frame” to mean “a self-expanding frame.” The court applied this construction to all asserted patents and, following a joint stipulation, entered judgment of non-infringement because Edwards’ accused product did not have a self-expanding frame.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s claim construction de novo. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s construction, holding that the specification consistently and interchangeably used “outer frame” and “self-expanding frame,” thereby redefining the term. The court affirmed the judgment of non-infringement for three patents and dismissed the appeal as to the fourth patent (’538) for lack of jurisdiction, as its claims had been cancelled by the Patent Office. The Federal Circuit also found that Aortic’s judicial estoppel argument was forfeited.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2027/23-2027-2025-10-22.html</id>
        	<title>CENTRIPETAL NETWORKS, LLC v. PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-22T07:02:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-22T07:02:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2027/23-2027-2025-10-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Centripetal Networks LLC owns a patent related to rule-based network threat detection for encrypted communications. In November 2021, Palo Alto Networks petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of certain claims of Centripetal’s patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted the IPR with a panel of three administrative patent judges (APJs). Subsequently, Cisco Systems and Keysight Technologies filed similar petitions and sought to join the proceedings. During the process, Centripetal discovered that one APJ, McNamara, owned Cisco stock and moved for the recusal of the panel and vacatur of the institution decision, arguing a conflict of interest. After rehearing requests and additional disclosures, APJ McNamara and another APJ withdrew from the panel, but the Board denied Centripetal’s recusal motion as untimely and found no violation of ethics rules or due process.

The PTAB, in its final written decision, held claims 1, 24, and 25 of Centripetal’s patent unpatentable as obvious. Centripetal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging both the merits of the Board’s obviousness determination and the handling of the recusal issue. The Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s recusal analysis for abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions de novo, finding that Centripetal’s recusal motion was untimely and that the APJ’s stock ownership did not violate applicable ethics regulations. The court also determined that Centripetal’s due process rights were not infringed and that the Board’s actions did not warrant vacatur based on recusal concerns.

However, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB failed to adequately consider evidence of copying presented by Centripetal as part of the obviousness analysis. The court vacated the Board’s final written decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Board to properly address the evidence of copying. The disposition by the Federal Circuit was “vacated and remanded.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2027/23-2027-2025-10-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CENTRIPETAL NETWORKS, LLC v. PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Centripetal Networks LLC owns a patent related to rule-based network threat detection for encrypted communications. In November 2021, Palo Alto Networks petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of certain claims of Centripetal’s patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted the IPR with a panel of three administrative patent judges (APJs). Subsequently, Cisco Systems and Keysight Technologies filed similar petitions and sought to join the proceedings. During the process, Centripetal discovered that one APJ, McNamara, owned Cisco stock and moved for the recusal of the panel and vacatur of the institution decision, arguing a conflict of interest. After rehearing requests and additional disclosures, APJ McNamara and another APJ withdrew from the panel, but the Board denied Centripetal’s recusal motion as untimely and found no violation of ethics rules or due process.

The PTAB, in its final written decision, held claims 1, 24, and 25 of Centripetal’s patent unpatentable as obvious. Centripetal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging both the merits of the Board’s obviousness determination and the handling of the recusal issue. The Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s recusal analysis for abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions de novo, finding that Centripetal’s recusal motion was untimely and that the APJ’s stock ownership did not violate applicable ethics regulations. The court also determined that Centripetal’s due process rights were not infringed and that the Board’s actions did not warrant vacatur based on recusal concerns.

However, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB failed to adequately consider evidence of copying presented by Centripetal as part of the obviousness analysis. The court vacated the Board’s final written decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Board to properly address the evidence of copying. The disposition by the Federal Circuit was “vacated and remanded.”
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Tiffany Cunningham</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1231/24-1231-2025-10-17.html</id>
        	<title>BARRETTE OUTDOOR LIVING, INC. v. FORTRESS IRON, LP </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-17T05:33:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-17T05:33:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1231/24-1231-2025-10-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc. owns several related patents describing fencing assemblies that use connectors to attach pickets to rails, allowing the pickets to pivot and slide for easier installation and improved racking ability. The patents describe connectors with “bosses,” “projections,” “nubs,” or “series of axles” that engage holes in the pickets, purportedly providing a fastener-less, pivotal connection. Barrette alleged that products sold by Fortress Iron, LP and Fortress Fence Products, LLC infringed claims of these patents.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas construed the terms “boss,” “projection,” and related terms as requiring the structures to be both integral and fastener-less, based on the patent specification and prosecution history. The court also found that the claim terms related to “sliding” and “causes” were not indefinite, concluding that the specification and prosecution history provided sufficient guidance for a skilled artisan to understand the scope of the claims. Following these constructions, Barrette stipulated it could not prove infringement, and the court entered judgment of non-infringement and no invalidity for indefiniteness.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of non-infringement, but clarified that while the claims should not be limited to fastener-less bosses, Barrette had clearly disclaimed non-integral bosses during prosecution. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that the claims were not indefinite, holding that the specification and prosecution history provided reasonable certainty as to the meaning of the “sliding” and “causes” terms. The court thus affirmed the district court’s judgment of non-infringement and no invalidity for indefiniteness. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1231/24-1231-2025-10-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BARRETTE OUTDOOR LIVING, INC. v. FORTRESS IRON, LP " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc. owns several related patents describing fencing assemblies that use connectors to attach pickets to rails, allowing the pickets to pivot and slide for easier installation and improved racking ability. The patents describe connectors with “bosses,” “projections,” “nubs,” or “series of axles” that engage holes in the pickets, purportedly providing a fastener-less, pivotal connection. Barrette alleged that products sold by Fortress Iron, LP and Fortress Fence Products, LLC infringed claims of these patents.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas construed the terms “boss,” “projection,” and related terms as requiring the structures to be both integral and fastener-less, based on the patent specification and prosecution history. The court also found that the claim terms related to “sliding” and “causes” were not indefinite, concluding that the specification and prosecution history provided sufficient guidance for a skilled artisan to understand the scope of the claims. Following these constructions, Barrette stipulated it could not prove infringement, and the court entered judgment of non-infringement and no invalidity for indefiniteness.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of non-infringement, but clarified that while the claims should not be limited to fastener-less bosses, Barrette had clearly disclaimed non-integral bosses during prosecution. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that the claims were not indefinite, holding that the specification and prosecution history provided reasonable certainty as to the meaning of the “sliding” and “causes” terms. The court thus affirmed the district court’s judgment of non-infringement and no invalidity for indefiniteness. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Linn</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1098/24-1098-2025-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>BRITA LP v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-15T06:33:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-15T06:33:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1098/24-1098-2025-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Brita LP held a patent for a gravity-fed water filter system designed to remove contaminants, particularly lead, from water using filter media that included activated carbon and a lead scavenger. The patent claimed that the filter would achieve a specific performance metric, the Filter Rate and Performance (FRAP) factor, of about 350 or less. Although the patent described various types of filter media, such as carbon blocks and mixed media, it only provided working examples and detailed formulations for carbon-block filters that met the claimed FRAP factor. The patent also included test results showing that only carbon-block filters achieved the required performance, while mixed media filters did not.

Brita filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) under section 337, alleging that several companies imported and sold water filters infringing its patent. After a Markman hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the asserted claims met the written description and enablement requirements and determined there was a violation of section 337. Upon review, the ITC reversed the ALJ’s findings, concluding that the claims were invalid for lack of written description and enablement as to any filter media other than carbon blocks, and that the term “filter usage lifetime claimed by a manufacturer or seller of the filter” was indefinite.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision. The court held that the patent’s specification did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed invention, specifically for non-carbon-block filter media, and that substantial evidence supported the ITC’s findings. The court did not reach the issue of indefiniteness, as the claims were already found invalid. The disposition was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1098/24-1098-2025-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BRITA LP v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Brita LP held a patent for a gravity-fed water filter system designed to remove contaminants, particularly lead, from water using filter media that included activated carbon and a lead scavenger. The patent claimed that the filter would achieve a specific performance metric, the Filter Rate and Performance (FRAP) factor, of about 350 or less. Although the patent described various types of filter media, such as carbon blocks and mixed media, it only provided working examples and detailed formulations for carbon-block filters that met the claimed FRAP factor. The patent also included test results showing that only carbon-block filters achieved the required performance, while mixed media filters did not.

Brita filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) under section 337, alleging that several companies imported and sold water filters infringing its patent. After a Markman hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the asserted claims met the written description and enablement requirements and determined there was a violation of section 337. Upon review, the ITC reversed the ALJ’s findings, concluding that the claims were invalid for lack of written description and enablement as to any filter media other than carbon blocks, and that the term “filter usage lifetime claimed by a manufacturer or seller of the filter” was indefinite.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision. The court held that the patent’s specification did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed invention, specifically for non-carbon-block filter media, and that substantial evidence supported the ITC’s findings. The court did not reach the issue of indefiniteness, as the claims were already found invalid. The disposition was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sharon Prost</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1106/24-1106-2025-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>INLAND DIAMOND PRODUCTS CO. v. CHERRY OPTICAL INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-15T06:33:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-15T06:33:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1106/24-1106-2025-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the plaintiff, a patent holder, brought an infringement suit against the defendant, alleging that certain claims of two patents were infringed. Previously, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) had conducted inter partes reviews (IPRs) of both patents. In those IPRs, the Board found some claims unpatentable but determined that the specific claims asserted in this litigation (the Asserted Claims) had not been proven unpatentable. The Asserted Claims all depended from claims that the Board had found unpatentable. The Board’s decisions were not appealed.

After the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Asserted Claims were invalid for obviousness. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that issue preclusion applied to the limitations of the Asserted Claims that were shared with the previously invalidated claims. The court reasoned that, because the Board had already found the parent claims unpatentable, the plaintiff could not relitigate those issues, and the defendant did not need to independently prove invalidity for those limitations. The court then found the remaining limitations obvious in light of the prior art and granted summary judgment of invalidity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case. The Federal Circuit held that issue preclusion did not apply because the standard of proof in IPRs (preponderance of the evidence) is lower than the standard required in district court (clear and convincing evidence). Therefore, factual findings made by the Board in the IPRs could not have preclusive effect in the district court’s invalidity analysis. The court instructed that any summary judgment of invalidity must be based on evidence and argument presented in court, not on issue preclusion from the IPRs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1106/24-1106-2025-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "INLAND DIAMOND PRODUCTS CO. v. CHERRY OPTICAL INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the plaintiff, a patent holder, brought an infringement suit against the defendant, alleging that certain claims of two patents were infringed. Previously, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) had conducted inter partes reviews (IPRs) of both patents. In those IPRs, the Board found some claims unpatentable but determined that the specific claims asserted in this litigation (the Asserted Claims) had not been proven unpatentable. The Asserted Claims all depended from claims that the Board had found unpatentable. The Board’s decisions were not appealed.

After the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Asserted Claims were invalid for obviousness. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that issue preclusion applied to the limitations of the Asserted Claims that were shared with the previously invalidated claims. The court reasoned that, because the Board had already found the parent claims unpatentable, the plaintiff could not relitigate those issues, and the defendant did not need to independently prove invalidity for those limitations. The court then found the remaining limitations obvious in light of the prior art and granted summary judgment of invalidity.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case. The Federal Circuit held that issue preclusion did not apply because the standard of proof in IPRs (preponderance of the evidence) is lower than the standard required in district court (clear and convincing evidence). Therefore, factual findings made by the Board in the IPRs could not have preclusive effect in the district court’s invalidity analysis. The court instructed that any summary judgment of invalidity must be based on evidence and argument presented in court, not on issue preclusion from the IPRs.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sharon Prost</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1124/24-1124-2025-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>IQE PLC v. NEWPORT FAB, LLC </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-15T06:33:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-15T06:33:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1124/24-1124-2025-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on allegations by a manufacturer of semiconductor wafers that it developed a novel porous silicon technology in 2018 and entered into a non-disclosure agreement with a group of semiconductor companies and their executives. The parties discussed a potential collaboration, during which the manufacturer claims it disclosed proprietary trade secrets. While negotiations were ongoing, the semiconductor companies filed a series of patent applications, which the manufacturer alleges incorporated its confidential technology without crediting its inventors. The negotiations ultimately failed, and the manufacturer was not included as an inventor on any of the resulting patents.

The manufacturer filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting federal claims for trade secret misappropriation and correction of inventorship, as well as several California state law claims, including trade secret misappropriation and interference with economic advantage. The defendants moved to dismiss and also filed a special motion to strike the state law claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to quickly dismiss lawsuits targeting protected speech or petitioning activity. The district court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, and denied the anti-SLAPP motion to strike. The defendants appealed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the denial of a California anti-SLAPP motion to strike is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine as a matter of Federal Circuit law. The court found that the district court erred by conflating the two steps of the anti-SLAPP analysis, improperly considering the merits of the trade secret claims at the first step. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of the motion to strike and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1124/24-1124-2025-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IQE PLC v. NEWPORT FAB, LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on allegations by a manufacturer of semiconductor wafers that it developed a novel porous silicon technology in 2018 and entered into a non-disclosure agreement with a group of semiconductor companies and their executives. The parties discussed a potential collaboration, during which the manufacturer claims it disclosed proprietary trade secrets. While negotiations were ongoing, the semiconductor companies filed a series of patent applications, which the manufacturer alleges incorporated its confidential technology without crediting its inventors. The negotiations ultimately failed, and the manufacturer was not included as an inventor on any of the resulting patents.

The manufacturer filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting federal claims for trade secret misappropriation and correction of inventorship, as well as several California state law claims, including trade secret misappropriation and interference with economic advantage. The defendants moved to dismiss and also filed a special motion to strike the state law claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which is designed to quickly dismiss lawsuits targeting protected speech or petitioning activity. The district court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, and denied the anti-SLAPP motion to strike. The defendants appealed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the denial of a California anti-SLAPP motion to strike is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine as a matter of Federal Circuit law. The court found that the district court erred by conflating the two steps of the anti-SLAPP analysis, improperly considering the merits of the trade secret claims at the first step. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of the motion to strike and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1769/23-1769-2025-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-15T06:02:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-15T06:02:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1769/23-1769-2025-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Causam Enterprises, Inc. owns several patents related to “demand response” technology, which allows electrical utilities to reduce power demand in response to certain conditions. Causam filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), alleging that Resideo Smart Homes Technology (Tianjin) and its affiliate Ademco, Inc. were importing and selling internet-connected smart thermostats that infringed method claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 10,394,268, which Causam claimed to own. Causam sought to exclude these products from importation. During the ITC investigation, respondents argued that Causam did not own the patent and that Resideo’s products did not infringe the asserted claims.

The assigned administrative law judge (ALJ) at the ITC found that Causam did not own the ’268 patent and that Resideo’s products did not infringe the claims. The full Commission, upon review, adopted only the noninfringement finding and did not address the ownership issue. Causam appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging the noninfringement determination and seeking a ruling on ownership. Meanwhile, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) held, in a separate inter partes review, that claim 1 of the ’268 patent was unpatentable, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision in a companion case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Causam owns the ’268 patent, interpreting the relevant assignment agreements to exclude continuations-in-part from a prior assignment, thus leaving ownership with Causam. However, the court did not reach the noninfringement issue because its affirmance of the PTAB’s finding that claim 1 is unpatentable rendered the appeal moot. The court therefore dismissed the appeal as moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1769/23-1769-2025-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Causam Enterprises, Inc. owns several patents related to “demand response” technology, which allows electrical utilities to reduce power demand in response to certain conditions. Causam filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), alleging that Resideo Smart Homes Technology (Tianjin) and its affiliate Ademco, Inc. were importing and selling internet-connected smart thermostats that infringed method claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 10,394,268, which Causam claimed to own. Causam sought to exclude these products from importation. During the ITC investigation, respondents argued that Causam did not own the patent and that Resideo’s products did not infringe the asserted claims.

The assigned administrative law judge (ALJ) at the ITC found that Causam did not own the ’268 patent and that Resideo’s products did not infringe the claims. The full Commission, upon review, adopted only the noninfringement finding and did not address the ownership issue. Causam appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging the noninfringement determination and seeking a ruling on ownership. Meanwhile, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) held, in a separate inter partes review, that claim 1 of the ’268 patent was unpatentable, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision in a companion case.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Causam owns the ’268 patent, interpreting the relevant assignment agreements to exclude continuations-in-part from a prior assignment, thus leaving ownership with Causam. However, the court did not reach the noninfringement issue because its affirmance of the PTAB’s finding that claim 1 is unpatentable rendered the appeal moot. The court therefore dismissed the appeal as moot.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1958/24-1958-2025-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-15T06:02:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-15T06:02:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1958/24-1958-2025-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Causam Enterprises, Inc. owns a patent related to methods for managing electric power flow within a grid, specifically focusing on demand response load management, where utilities can control customer appliances to reduce power consumption during peak periods. Ecobee Technologies ULC filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, challenging all but one claim of the patent on grounds of obviousness, citing prior art references. Causam did not dispute its ownership of the patent in the IPR, though ownership had been contested by ecobee in a separate International Trade Commission (ITC) proceeding.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) instituted the IPR and ultimately found all challenged claims unpatentable for obviousness, determining that ecobee had properly served the patent owner of record, Causam, and that the statutory requirements for institution were met. The Board also construed a key claim limitation to include both actual measurements and estimates of power savings, rejecting Causam’s narrower interpretation. The Director of the PTO denied further review, and Causam appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit first determined that Causam had constitutional standing to appeal, based on its status as the assignee of record and its unequivocal assertion of ownership. The court rejected Causam’s argument that the Board’s failure to resolve ownership denied due process to a potential third-party owner, holding that Causam could not assert the constitutional rights of others. On the merits, the court upheld the Board’s claim construction and its finding of obviousness, concluding that the Board committed no reversible error. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, leaving the challenged patent claims unpatentable. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1958/24-1958-2025-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Causam Enterprises, Inc. owns a patent related to methods for managing electric power flow within a grid, specifically focusing on demand response load management, where utilities can control customer appliances to reduce power consumption during peak periods. Ecobee Technologies ULC filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, challenging all but one claim of the patent on grounds of obviousness, citing prior art references. Causam did not dispute its ownership of the patent in the IPR, though ownership had been contested by ecobee in a separate International Trade Commission (ITC) proceeding.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) instituted the IPR and ultimately found all challenged claims unpatentable for obviousness, determining that ecobee had properly served the patent owner of record, Causam, and that the statutory requirements for institution were met. The Board also construed a key claim limitation to include both actual measurements and estimates of power savings, rejecting Causam’s narrower interpretation. The Director of the PTO denied further review, and Causam appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit first determined that Causam had constitutional standing to appeal, based on its status as the assignee of record and its unequivocal assertion of ownership. The court rejected Causam’s argument that the Board’s failure to resolve ownership denied due process to a potential third-party owner, holding that Causam could not assert the constitutional rights of others. On the merits, the court upheld the Board’s claim construction and its finding of obviousness, concluding that the Board committed no reversible error. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, leaving the challenged patent claims unpatentable.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1396/24-1396-2025-10-03.html</id>
        	<title>US INVENTOR, INC. v. PTO </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-03T07:33:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-03T07:33:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1396/24-1396-2025-10-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two advocacy organizations submitted a petition to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) seeking a rule that would limit the PTO’s discretion to institute inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR) proceedings under the America Invents Act. Their proposed rule would have prevented institution of such proceedings in certain circumstances when the patent owner objected and met specific criteria, such as being the original applicant and having small entity status. The PTO denied the petition, stating that the issues overlapped with topics already under consideration in a separate request for public comment and that the suggestions would be considered in any future rulemaking.

After the denial, the organizations filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the PTO’s denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the America Invents Act. They argued that the PTO failed to act within a reasonable time, did not provide adequate reasons for denial, and was required to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking. The PTO moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. The district court granted the motion, finding that the organizations lacked both organizational and associational standing because they failed to show that any member faced a concrete, non-speculative injury as a result of the PTO’s denial.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the organizations lacked associational standing because they did not demonstrate that any member suffered an actual or imminent injury traceable to the PTO’s denial of the petition. The court found the alleged injury too speculative, relying on a chain of uncertain future events involving third-party actions. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1396/24-1396-2025-10-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US INVENTOR, INC. v. PTO " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two advocacy organizations submitted a petition to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) seeking a rule that would limit the PTO’s discretion to institute inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR) proceedings under the America Invents Act. Their proposed rule would have prevented institution of such proceedings in certain circumstances when the patent owner objected and met specific criteria, such as being the original applicant and having small entity status. The PTO denied the petition, stating that the issues overlapped with topics already under consideration in a separate request for public comment and that the suggestions would be considered in any future rulemaking.

After the denial, the organizations filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the PTO’s denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the America Invents Act. They argued that the PTO failed to act within a reasonable time, did not provide adequate reasons for denial, and was required to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking. The PTO moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. The district court granted the motion, finding that the organizations lacked both organizational and associational standing because they failed to show that any member faced a concrete, non-speculative injury as a result of the PTO’s denial.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the organizations lacked associational standing because they did not demonstrate that any member suffered an actual or imminent injury traceable to the PTO’s denial of the petition. The court found the alleged injury too speculative, relying on a chain of uncertain future events involving third-party actions. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1072/24-1072-2025-10-02.html</id>
        	<title>REX MEDICAL, L.P. v. INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-02T06:31:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-02T06:31:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1072/24-1072-2025-10-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Rex Medical, L.P. and Intuitive Surgical, Inc. are competitors in the medical device industry, specifically in the market for surgical stapling products. Rex accused Intuitive of infringing U.S. Patent No. 9,439,650, which covers a system for stapling tissue during surgery. The accused products included several models of Intuitive’s SureForm staplers. Rex initially asserted two patents, but after Intuitive challenged one in an inter partes review, Rex withdrew it, leaving only the ’650 patent at issue. The dispute centered on claim 6 of the ’650 patent, which describes a stapling apparatus with specific structural features.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware presided over the case. Before trial, the court excluded Rex’s damages expert from testifying about a prior license agreement, finding the expert failed to apportion the value of the asserted patent from other patents in the agreement. At trial, neither party’s damages expert testified, and Rex relied on lay testimony regarding damages. The jury found Intuitive infringed claim 6 and that the claim was not invalid, awarding Rex $10 million in damages. After post-trial motions, the district court entered judgment for Rex on infringement and validity but reduced the damages award to $1, finding insufficient evidence to support the jury’s damages calculation and denying Rex’s request for a new trial on damages.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Federal Circuit held that the exclusion of Rex’s damages expert was proper because the expert did not adequately apportion the value of the asserted patent. The court also affirmed the reduction of damages to $1, finding the record lacked sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably determine damages for the ’650 patent alone. The Federal Circuit further affirmed the district court’s findings on infringement and validity, rejecting Intuitive’s arguments regarding claim construction and written description. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1072/24-1072-2025-10-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "REX MEDICAL, L.P. v. INTUITIVE SURGICAL, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Rex Medical, L.P. and Intuitive Surgical, Inc. are competitors in the medical device industry, specifically in the market for surgical stapling products. Rex accused Intuitive of infringing U.S. Patent No. 9,439,650, which covers a system for stapling tissue during surgery. The accused products included several models of Intuitive’s SureForm staplers. Rex initially asserted two patents, but after Intuitive challenged one in an inter partes review, Rex withdrew it, leaving only the ’650 patent at issue. The dispute centered on claim 6 of the ’650 patent, which describes a stapling apparatus with specific structural features.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware presided over the case. Before trial, the court excluded Rex’s damages expert from testifying about a prior license agreement, finding the expert failed to apportion the value of the asserted patent from other patents in the agreement. At trial, neither party’s damages expert testified, and Rex relied on lay testimony regarding damages. The jury found Intuitive infringed claim 6 and that the claim was not invalid, awarding Rex $10 million in damages. After post-trial motions, the district court entered judgment for Rex on infringement and validity but reduced the damages award to $1, finding insufficient evidence to support the jury’s damages calculation and denying Rex’s request for a new trial on damages.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Federal Circuit held that the exclusion of Rex’s damages expert was proper because the expert did not adequately apportion the value of the asserted patent. The court also affirmed the reduction of damages to $1, finding the record lacked sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably determine damages for the ’650 patent alone. The Federal Circuit further affirmed the district court’s findings on infringement and validity, rejecting Intuitive’s arguments regarding claim construction and written description.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1446/23-1446-2025-09-30.html</id>
        	<title>Focus Products Group International, LLC v. Kartri Sales Co.</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-30T06:01:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-30T06:01:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1446/23-1446-2025-09-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on allegations of intellectual property infringement involving shower curtains designed with embedded rings, eliminating the need for traditional hooks. The plaintiffs, a group of related companies, own several patents covering these “hookless” shower curtains, as well as registered and unregistered trademark and trade dress rights. The defendants, two companies that manufactured and sold similar shower curtains, were accused of infringing these patents, trademarks, and trade dress. The accused products featured rings with a flat upper edge and a slit, allowing the curtain to be attached to a rod without hooks.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendants’ motion to transfer venue was denied as untimely. The district court granted summary judgment of patent infringement in favor of the plaintiffs, based on its claim constructions, and precluded the defendants’ unclean hands defense for being raised too late. After a bench trial, the court found that the defendants infringed the asserted patents, the HOOKLESS® and EZ ON trademarks, and the claimed trade dress, and that some infringement was willful. The court awarded lost profits, reasonable royalties, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of the venue transfer and the exclusion of the unclean hands defense. However, it reversed the findings of infringement for the ’248 and ’609 patents as to one defendant, vacated the ’088 patent infringement finding as to that defendant, and affirmed the patent infringement findings as to the other. The court also vacated the trade dress infringement and willfulness findings, reversed the EZ ON trademark infringement finding, and vacated the HOOKLESS® trademark infringement finding. The award of attorneys’ fees was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. The court clarified the standards for claim construction, trade dress functionality, and standing to assert trademark rights. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1446/23-1446-2025-09-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Focus Products Group International, LLC v. Kartri Sales Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on allegations of intellectual property infringement involving shower curtains designed with embedded rings, eliminating the need for traditional hooks. The plaintiffs, a group of related companies, own several patents covering these “hookless” shower curtains, as well as registered and unregistered trademark and trade dress rights. The defendants, two companies that manufactured and sold similar shower curtains, were accused of infringing these patents, trademarks, and trade dress. The accused products featured rings with a flat upper edge and a slit, allowing the curtain to be attached to a rod without hooks.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendants’ motion to transfer venue was denied as untimely. The district court granted summary judgment of patent infringement in favor of the plaintiffs, based on its claim constructions, and precluded the defendants’ unclean hands defense for being raised too late. After a bench trial, the court found that the defendants infringed the asserted patents, the HOOKLESS® and EZ ON trademarks, and the claimed trade dress, and that some infringement was willful. The court awarded lost profits, reasonable royalties, attorneys’ fees, and costs.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of the venue transfer and the exclusion of the unclean hands defense. However, it reversed the findings of infringement for the ’248 and ’609 patents as to one defendant, vacated the ’088 patent infringement finding as to that defendant, and affirmed the patent infringement findings as to the other. The court also vacated the trade dress infringement and willfulness findings, reversed the EZ ON trademark infringement finding, and vacated the HOOKLESS® trademark infringement finding. The award of attorneys’ fees was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. The court clarified the standards for claim construction, trade dress functionality, and standing to assert trademark rights.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1039/24-1039-2025-09-24.html</id>
        	<title>FINESSE WIRELESS LLC v. AT&amp;T MOBILITY LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-09-24T06:02:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-24T06:02:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1039/24-1039-2025-09-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Finesse Wireless LLC owns two patents related to methods for mitigating interference in radios caused by intermodulation products (IMPs), which can arise when radio signals interact with passive obstacles. Finesse alleged that AT&amp;T Mobility LLC, by using a particular feature in Nokia radios, infringed specific claims of both patents. Nokia intervened in the case. The dispute centered on whether the accused radios performed the patented methods for reducing IMP interference, specifically whether they sampled the required signals and performed certain signal multiplications as described in the patent claims.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial in which the jury found all asserted claims of both patents valid and infringed, awarding Finesse a lump-sum damages amount for the remaining life of the patents. After the verdict, AT&amp;T and Nokia moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement and for a new trial on damages, but the district court denied these motions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL de novo, applying Fifth Circuit law. The Federal Circuit found that Finesse’s evidence, particularly its expert’s testimony, was insufficient and self-contradictory regarding whether the accused radios sampled both the “signals of interest” and “interference generating signals” as required by the first patent. For the second patent, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have found the accused radios performed the seven specific signal multiplications required by the claims. As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL of noninfringement for both patents and vacated the damages award. Costs were awarded to the defendants-appellants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1039/24-1039-2025-09-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FINESSE WIRELESS LLC v. AT&amp;T MOBILITY LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Finesse Wireless LLC owns two patents related to methods for mitigating interference in radios caused by intermodulation products (IMPs), which can arise when radio signals interact with passive obstacles. Finesse alleged that AT&amp;T Mobility LLC, by using a particular feature in Nokia radios, infringed specific claims of both patents. Nokia intervened in the case. The dispute centered on whether the accused radios performed the patented methods for reducing IMP interference, specifically whether they sampled the required signals and performed certain signal multiplications as described in the patent claims.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas presided over a jury trial in which the jury found all asserted claims of both patents valid and infringed, awarding Finesse a lump-sum damages amount for the remaining life of the patents. After the verdict, AT&amp;T and Nokia moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of noninfringement and for a new trial on damages, but the district court denied these motions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL de novo, applying Fifth Circuit law. The Federal Circuit found that Finesse’s evidence, particularly its expert’s testimony, was insufficient and self-contradictory regarding whether the accused radios sampled both the “signals of interest” and “interference generating signals” as required by the first patent. For the second patent, the court determined that no reasonable jury could have found the accused radios performed the seven specific signal multiplications required by the claims. As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL of noninfringement for both patents and vacated the damages award. Costs were awarded to the defendants-appellants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2434/23-2434-2025-09-23.html</id>
        	<title>BAYER PHARMA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-09-23T05:31:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-23T05:31:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2434/23-2434-2025-09-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on a patent owned by a pharmaceutical company, which describes methods for reducing the risk of cardiovascular events in patients with coronary artery disease or peripheral artery disease by administering specific doses of rivaroxaban and aspirin. The patent claims include both general methods of administering these drugs and a particular claim involving a “first product” that combines both drugs in a single dosage form. The patent is based on results from a clinical trial known as COMPASS, which evaluated the efficacy and safety of this drug combination.

Three generic drug manufacturers challenged the patent’s validity by filing petitions for inter partes review with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), arguing that the claims were anticipated or obvious in light of prior art references, including published articles describing similar drug regimens and ongoing clinical trials. The PTAB joined the proceedings and ultimately held that claims 1–2 were unpatentable as anticipated and claims 1–8 were unpatentable as obvious, relying on the prior art and its interpretation of the patent’s claim language.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s decision. The court affirmed the PTAB’s finding that claims 1–4 were unpatentable, holding that the phrase “clinically proven effective” in the claims, even if considered limiting, did not create a patentable distinction because it was functionally unrelated to the method itself. However, the court found that the PTAB had incorrectly construed the “first product” limitation in claims 5–8, which should require a single dosage form containing both drugs. The court vacated the PTAB’s unpatentability finding for claims 5–8 and remanded for further proceedings under the correct claim construction. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case, with no costs awarded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2434/23-2434-2025-09-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BAYER PHARMA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on a patent owned by a pharmaceutical company, which describes methods for reducing the risk of cardiovascular events in patients with coronary artery disease or peripheral artery disease by administering specific doses of rivaroxaban and aspirin. The patent claims include both general methods of administering these drugs and a particular claim involving a “first product” that combines both drugs in a single dosage form. The patent is based on results from a clinical trial known as COMPASS, which evaluated the efficacy and safety of this drug combination.

Three generic drug manufacturers challenged the patent’s validity by filing petitions for inter partes review with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), arguing that the claims were anticipated or obvious in light of prior art references, including published articles describing similar drug regimens and ongoing clinical trials. The PTAB joined the proceedings and ultimately held that claims 1–2 were unpatentable as anticipated and claims 1–8 were unpatentable as obvious, relying on the prior art and its interpretation of the patent’s claim language.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB’s decision. The court affirmed the PTAB’s finding that claims 1–4 were unpatentable, holding that the phrase “clinically proven effective” in the claims, even if considered limiting, did not create a patentable distinction because it was functionally unrelated to the method itself. However, the court found that the PTAB had incorrectly construed the “first product” limitation in claims 5–8, which should require a single dosage form containing both drugs. The court vacated the PTAB’s unpatentability finding for claims 5–8 and remanded for further proceedings under the correct claim construction. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case, with no costs awarded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1056/23-1056-2025-09-09.html</id>
        	<title>FUTURE LINK SYSTEMS, LLC v. REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION </title>
        	<updated>2025-09-09T07:32:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-09T07:32:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1056/23-1056-2025-09-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A patent owner brought two infringement lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against a semiconductor company, alleging that certain integrated circuit products infringed three patents related to electronic circuitry and power-saving features. The accused products included specific chips that allegedly implemented a particular feature. After the lawsuits were filed, the defendant challenged the cases on grounds including improper service, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. During the litigation, the plaintiff produced a licensing agreement with a third party, and subsequently entered into another agreement covering the accused products. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed both cases without prejudice.

Following the dismissals, the defendant moved for attorneys’ fees, costs, and sanctions, arguing that the lawsuits were baseless. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, costs under Rule 54(d)(1), and sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but converted the voluntary dismissals to dismissals with prejudice as a sanction. The court also denied the defendant’s discovery requests related to confidentiality and access to certain materials.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in denying fees under § 285 and costs under Rule 54(d)(1), because the defendant became a prevailing party when the dismissals were converted to dismissals with prejudice. The Federal Circuit vacated those portions of the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions and fees under § 1927, finding no abuse of discretion. It also affirmed the denial of the remaining discovery request, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the protective order. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1056/23-1056-2025-09-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FUTURE LINK SYSTEMS, LLC v. REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A patent owner brought two infringement lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against a semiconductor company, alleging that certain integrated circuit products infringed three patents related to electronic circuitry and power-saving features. The accused products included specific chips that allegedly implemented a particular feature. After the lawsuits were filed, the defendant challenged the cases on grounds including improper service, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. During the litigation, the plaintiff produced a licensing agreement with a third party, and subsequently entered into another agreement covering the accused products. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed both cases without prejudice.

Following the dismissals, the defendant moved for attorneys’ fees, costs, and sanctions, arguing that the lawsuits were baseless. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, costs under Rule 54(d)(1), and sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, but converted the voluntary dismissals to dismissals with prejudice as a sanction. The court also denied the defendant’s discovery requests related to confidentiality and access to certain materials.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in denying fees under § 285 and costs under Rule 54(d)(1), because the defendant became a prevailing party when the dismissals were converted to dismissals with prejudice. The Federal Circuit vacated those portions of the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions and fees under § 1927, finding no abuse of discretion. It also affirmed the denial of the remaining discovery request, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the protective order. The judgment was thus vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1342/24-1342-2025-09-08.html</id>
        	<title>MAGEMA TECHNOLOGY LLC v. PHILLIPS 66 </title>
        	<updated>2025-09-08T07:02:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-08T07:02:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1342/24-1342-2025-09-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A company developed and patented a process for desulfurizing heavy marine fuel oil (HMFO) to comply with international sulfur content standards. The patented process involves taking a high-sulfur HMFO that meets certain physical property requirements and then hydroprocessing it to reduce its sulfur content. The company marketed its technology to various refineries, including the defendants, but no licensing agreement was reached. The defendants later modified their refineries to produce low-sulfur HMFO, prompting the plaintiff to sue for patent infringement, specifically alleging that the defendants’ processes at one refinery infringed two claims of the relevant patent.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the parties disputed the proper construction of certain claim terms and the appropriate method and location for testing the fuel’s compliance with the required standards. During discovery, the defendants argued that it was too dangerous to obtain certain test samples, and the court accepted their position, allowing the plaintiff to use an estimation formula instead. On the eve of trial, however, the defendants introduced a new noninfringement theory, arguing that only actual test data—not estimates—could prove compliance. The district court allowed this argument, and the jury returned a general verdict of noninfringement. The district court later found the defendants’ argument improper and prejudicial but deemed the error harmless and denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the error harmless because the jury’s general verdict made it impossible to determine whether the improper argument affected the outcome. The appellate court reversed the denial of a new trial and remanded for further proceedings, also affirming the district court’s construction of the disputed claim term. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1342/24-1342-2025-09-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MAGEMA TECHNOLOGY LLC v. PHILLIPS 66 " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A company developed and patented a process for desulfurizing heavy marine fuel oil (HMFO) to comply with international sulfur content standards. The patented process involves taking a high-sulfur HMFO that meets certain physical property requirements and then hydroprocessing it to reduce its sulfur content. The company marketed its technology to various refineries, including the defendants, but no licensing agreement was reached. The defendants later modified their refineries to produce low-sulfur HMFO, prompting the plaintiff to sue for patent infringement, specifically alleging that the defendants’ processes at one refinery infringed two claims of the relevant patent.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the parties disputed the proper construction of certain claim terms and the appropriate method and location for testing the fuel’s compliance with the required standards. During discovery, the defendants argued that it was too dangerous to obtain certain test samples, and the court accepted their position, allowing the plaintiff to use an estimation formula instead. On the eve of trial, however, the defendants introduced a new noninfringement theory, arguing that only actual test data—not estimates—could prove compliance. The district court allowed this argument, and the jury returned a general verdict of noninfringement. The district court later found the defendants’ argument improper and prejudicial but deemed the error harmless and denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the error harmless because the jury’s general verdict made it impossible to determine whether the improper argument affected the outcome. The appellate court reversed the denial of a new trial and remanded for further proceedings, also affirming the district court’s construction of the disputed claim term.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Renée Bumb</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2009/23-2009-2025-08-26.html</id>
        	<title>GLOBAL HEALTH SOLUTIONS LLC v. SELNER </title>
        	<updated>2025-08-26T06:02:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-26T06:02:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2009/23-2009-2025-08-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Global Health Solutions LLC and Marc Selner each filed patent applications in August 2017 for a method of preparing a wound treatment ointment containing nanodroplets of an aqueous biocide suspended in petrolatum jelly without emulsifiers. Selner filed his application four days before GHS, making him the first-filer under the America Invents Act (AIA) “first-inventor-to-file” system. GHS alleged that its founder, Bradley Burnam, conceived the invention and communicated it to Selner, who then derived the invention and filed first. Both parties agreed that their applications claimed the same invention, and the dispute centered on who conceived the invention and when.

The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) instituted a derivation proceeding. After reviewing evidence, including contemporaneous emails, the Board found that Burnam communicated the invention to Selner by 4:04 p.m. on February 14, 2014, but also found that Selner had independently conceived the invention earlier that same day, by 12:55 p.m. The Board determined that Selner did not derive the invention from Burnam and ruled in favor of Selner. GHS appealed, arguing that the Board erred in its evidentiary rulings, burden of proof allocation, and failure to require reduction to practice for conception, and also requested that Burnam be named a co-inventor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that the Board’s focus on “first-to-invent” was harmless error, as Selner’s independent conception was dispositive under the AIA. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s evidentiary rulings, burden allocation, or treatment of reduction to practice. The court also held that GHS failed to properly preserve its request for correction of inventorship. The Board’s judgment for Selner was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2009/23-2009-2025-08-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GLOBAL HEALTH SOLUTIONS LLC v. SELNER " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Global Health Solutions LLC and Marc Selner each filed patent applications in August 2017 for a method of preparing a wound treatment ointment containing nanodroplets of an aqueous biocide suspended in petrolatum jelly without emulsifiers. Selner filed his application four days before GHS, making him the first-filer under the America Invents Act (AIA) “first-inventor-to-file” system. GHS alleged that its founder, Bradley Burnam, conceived the invention and communicated it to Selner, who then derived the invention and filed first. Both parties agreed that their applications claimed the same invention, and the dispute centered on who conceived the invention and when.

The United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) instituted a derivation proceeding. After reviewing evidence, including contemporaneous emails, the Board found that Burnam communicated the invention to Selner by 4:04 p.m. on February 14, 2014, but also found that Selner had independently conceived the invention earlier that same day, by 12:55 p.m. The Board determined that Selner did not derive the invention from Burnam and ruled in favor of Selner. GHS appealed, arguing that the Board erred in its evidentiary rulings, burden of proof allocation, and failure to require reduction to practice for conception, and also requested that Burnam be named a co-inventor.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that the Board’s focus on “first-to-invent” was harmless error, as Selner’s independent conception was dispositive under the AIA. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s evidentiary rulings, burden allocation, or treatment of reduction to practice. The court also held that GHS failed to properly preserve its request for correction of inventorship. The Board’s judgment for Selner was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2350/23-2350-2025-08-13.html</id>
        	<title>LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v. QIAGEN SCIENCES, LLC </title>
        	<updated>2025-08-14T05:01:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-14T05:01:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2350/23-2350-2025-08-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns two patents related to methods for preparing DNA samples for sequencing, owned by Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, Labcorp Genetics, Inc., and The General Hospital Corporation. The patents describe techniques for enriching specific regions of DNA to make sequencing more efficient, using various types of primers and adaptors. The dispute centers on whether certain DNA preparation kits sold by Qiagen and its affiliates infringe these patents, specifically regarding the design and function of the primers used in Qiagen’s kits.

After the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging infringement of both patents, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that Qiagen willfully infringed the asserted claims of both patents—under the doctrine of equivalents for one patent and literally for the other—and awarded the plaintiffs approximately $4.7 million in damages. The district court denied Qiagen’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on non-infringement, invalidity, and damages, and also denied Qiagen’s alternative request for a new trial.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL de novo. The Federal Circuit held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of infringement for either patent. The court determined that the district court erred in allowing the jury to interpret the claim term “identical” as “identical to a portion,” and found that the evidence did not support infringement under the doctrine of equivalents or literal infringement as required by the patent claims and their constructions. As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL of non-infringement for both patents, and remanded with instructions to grant JMOL of non-infringement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2350/23-2350-2025-08-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v. QIAGEN SCIENCES, LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns two patents related to methods for preparing DNA samples for sequencing, owned by Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, Labcorp Genetics, Inc., and The General Hospital Corporation. The patents describe techniques for enriching specific regions of DNA to make sequencing more efficient, using various types of primers and adaptors. The dispute centers on whether certain DNA preparation kits sold by Qiagen and its affiliates infringe these patents, specifically regarding the design and function of the primers used in Qiagen’s kits.

After the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging infringement of both patents, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found that Qiagen willfully infringed the asserted claims of both patents—under the doctrine of equivalents for one patent and literally for the other—and awarded the plaintiffs approximately $4.7 million in damages. The district court denied Qiagen’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on non-infringement, invalidity, and damages, and also denied Qiagen’s alternative request for a new trial.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL de novo. The Federal Circuit held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of infringement for either patent. The court determined that the district court erred in allowing the jury to interpret the claim term “identical” as “identical to a portion,” and found that the evidence did not support infringement under the doctrine of equivalents or literal infringement as required by the patent claims and their constructions. As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL of non-infringement for both patents, and remanded with instructions to grant JMOL of non-infringement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1177/24-1177-2025-08-11.html</id>
        	<title>POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS, INC. v. IFIT, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-08-11T07:02:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-11T07:02:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1177/24-1177-2025-08-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on a patent for a system that automates the adjustment of selectorized dumbbells using an electric motor. The patent describes a dumbbell with stacks of weight plates on each side, a handle, and a movable selector that, when positioned, couples different numbers of plates to the handle. The innovation lies in using an electric motor, operatively connected to the selector, to move it into the desired position based on user input, thereby automating the weight selection process and addressing safety and convenience issues present in prior manual systems.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah reviewed the case after the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the asserted patent claims were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court applied the Supreme Court’s two-step framework for patent eligibility and determined that all but one claim (claim 19) were directed to an abstract idea and implemented using generic components, thus failing the eligibility test. The court granted the motion to dismiss as to claims 1–18 and 20, but denied it for claim 19, finding that the parties had not sufficiently addressed its eligibility.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit held that the relevant claims were not directed to an abstract idea but instead to a specific mechanical improvement in selectorized dumbbells. The court found that the claims recited a sufficiently specific structure and method, including the use of an electric motor to automate weight selection, and thus did not preempt all forms of automated weight adjustment. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of claims 1–18 and 20 and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1177/24-1177-2025-08-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "POWERBLOCK HOLDINGS, INC. v. IFIT, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on a patent for a system that automates the adjustment of selectorized dumbbells using an electric motor. The patent describes a dumbbell with stacks of weight plates on each side, a handle, and a movable selector that, when positioned, couples different numbers of plates to the handle. The innovation lies in using an electric motor, operatively connected to the selector, to move it into the desired position based on user input, thereby automating the weight selection process and addressing safety and convenience issues present in prior manual systems.

The United States District Court for the District of Utah reviewed the case after the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the asserted patent claims were ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court applied the Supreme Court’s two-step framework for patent eligibility and determined that all but one claim (claim 19) were directed to an abstract idea and implemented using generic components, thus failing the eligibility test. The court granted the motion to dismiss as to claims 1–18 and 20, but denied it for claim 19, finding that the parties had not sufficiently addressed its eligibility.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit held that the relevant claims were not directed to an abstract idea but instead to a specific mechanical improvement in selectorized dumbbells. The court found that the claims recited a sufficiently specific structure and method, including the use of an electric motor to automate weight selection, and thus did not preempt all forms of automated weight adjustment. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of claims 1–18 and 20 and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2117/23-2117-2025-08-08.html</id>
        	<title>Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-08T07:31:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-08T07:31:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2117/23-2117-2025-08-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on allegations by Mondis Technology Ltd. and related entities that LG Electronics Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary infringed claims 14 and 15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180. The patent describes a display unit, such as a computer monitor, that stores identification numbers in memory to control access by external devices. The key issue was whether the patent’s written description supported a claim limitation requiring an “identification number for identifying at least a type of said display unit,” as opposed to identifying a specific unit.

After Mondis filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and stayed for patent reexamination. When some claims survived, litigation resumed on claims 14 and 15. A jury found the claims not invalid and infringed, awarding damages to Mondis. The district court denied LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on invalidity, relying on the presumption of validity and the jury’s ability to weigh expert testimony. The court vacated the initial damages award and ordered a retrial, after which a reduced damages award was entered. Both parties appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL. The appellate court held that no reasonable jury could find the patent’s written description adequately supported the claim limitation requiring identification of a type of display unit. The court found that the patent only disclosed identification of specific units, not types, and that neither expert testimony nor the prosecution history provided substantial evidence to the contrary. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, held claims 14 and 15 invalid for lack of written description, and ordered judgment for LG. All other issues were deemed moot. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2117/23-2117-2025-08-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mondis Technology Ltd. v. LG Electronics Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on allegations by Mondis Technology Ltd. and related entities that LG Electronics Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary infringed claims 14 and 15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180. The patent describes a display unit, such as a computer monitor, that stores identification numbers in memory to control access by external devices. The key issue was whether the patent’s written description supported a claim limitation requiring an “identification number for identifying at least a type of said display unit,” as opposed to identifying a specific unit.

After Mondis filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and stayed for patent reexamination. When some claims survived, litigation resumed on claims 14 and 15. A jury found the claims not invalid and infringed, awarding damages to Mondis. The district court denied LG’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on invalidity, relying on the presumption of validity and the jury’s ability to weigh expert testimony. The court vacated the initial damages award and ordered a retrial, after which a reduced damages award was entered. Both parties appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of JMOL. The appellate court held that no reasonable jury could find the patent’s written description adequately supported the claim limitation requiring identification of a type of display unit. The court found that the patent only disclosed identification of specific units, not types, and that neither expert testimony nor the prosecution history provided substantial evidence to the contrary. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, held claims 14 and 15 invalid for lack of written description, and ordered judgment for LG. All other issues were deemed moot.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2335/24-2335-2025-08-01.html</id>
        	<title>FMC CORPORATION v. SHARDA USA, LLC </title>
        	<updated>2025-08-01T07:31:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-01T07:31:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2335/24-2335-2025-08-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		FMC Corporation owns U.S. Patent Nos. 9,107,416 and 9,596,857, which relate to insecticidal and miticidal compositions. FMC sued Sharda USA, LLC for patent infringement, alleging that Sharda&#039;s product, WINNER, infringed on these patents. The patents claim compositions comprising bifenthrin and a cyano-pyrethroid, with specific weight ratios. FMC sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Sharda from importing, marketing, selling, or distributing WINNER.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania initially denied FMC&#039;s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. However, the court issued a claim construction of the term &quot;composition,&quot; limiting it to stable compositions based on disclosures in the provisional application and a related patent. FMC renewed its motion, and the district court granted a temporary restraining order, which converted into a preliminary injunction. The court rejected Sharda&#039;s invalidity defenses, including anticipation and obviousness, based on the construed definition of &quot;composition.&quot;

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its construction of &quot;composition&quot; by limiting it to stable compositions, as the asserted patents did not include the stability disclosures present in the provisional application and related patent. The Federal Circuit held that &quot;composition&quot; should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Consequently, the court found that the district court&#039;s anticipation and obviousness analyses were flawed due to the erroneous claim construction.

The Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to reconsider Sharda&#039;s invalidity defenses under the correct claim construction. The court emphasized that Sharda only needed to raise a substantial question of invalidity to defeat the preliminary injunction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2335/24-2335-2025-08-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FMC CORPORATION v. SHARDA USA, LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                FMC Corporation owns U.S. Patent Nos. 9,107,416 and 9,596,857, which relate to insecticidal and miticidal compositions. FMC sued Sharda USA, LLC for patent infringement, alleging that Sharda&#039;s product, WINNER, infringed on these patents. The patents claim compositions comprising bifenthrin and a cyano-pyrethroid, with specific weight ratios. FMC sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Sharda from importing, marketing, selling, or distributing WINNER.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania initially denied FMC&#039;s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. However, the court issued a claim construction of the term &quot;composition,&quot; limiting it to stable compositions based on disclosures in the provisional application and a related patent. FMC renewed its motion, and the district court granted a temporary restraining order, which converted into a preliminary injunction. The court rejected Sharda&#039;s invalidity defenses, including anticipation and obviousness, based on the construed definition of &quot;composition.&quot;

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its construction of &quot;composition&quot; by limiting it to stable compositions, as the asserted patents did not include the stability disclosures present in the provisional application and related patent. The Federal Circuit held that &quot;composition&quot; should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Consequently, the court found that the district court&#039;s anticipation and obviousness analyses were flawed due to the erroneous claim construction.

The Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to reconsider Sharda&#039;s invalidity defenses under the correct claim construction. The court emphasized that Sharda only needed to raise a substantial question of invalidity to defeat the preliminary injunction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1715/23-1715-2025-07-28.html</id>
        	<title>JIAXING SUPER LIGHTING ELECTRIC APPLIANCE, CO. v. CH LIGHTING TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. </title>
        	<updated>2025-07-28T06:32:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-28T06:32:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1715/23-1715-2025-07-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Super Lighting sued CH Lighting for infringing three patents related to LED tube lamps. CH Lighting conceded infringement of two patents before trial. The district court excluded CH Lighting&#039;s evidence on the validity of these two patents and granted Super Lighting&#039;s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that the patents were not invalid. A jury found the third patent infringed and not invalid, awarding damages for all three patents. CH Lighting appealed.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. The court excluded evidence from CH Lighting regarding the validity of the two patents and granted JMOL in favor of Super Lighting. The jury found the third patent infringed and awarded damages. CH Lighting&#039;s motions for JMOL on invalidity and for a new trial were denied, and the court doubled the damages award.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in granting JMOL on the validity of the two patents because it improperly excluded CH Lighting&#039;s evidence. The court held that a new trial was required to determine the validity of these patents. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the jury&#039;s verdicts of infringement and no invalidity for the third patent. Additionally, the court instructed the district court to reassess the reliability of Super Lighting&#039;s damages expert&#039;s testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1715/23-1715-2025-07-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "JIAXING SUPER LIGHTING ELECTRIC APPLIANCE, CO. v. CH LIGHTING TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Super Lighting sued CH Lighting for infringing three patents related to LED tube lamps. CH Lighting conceded infringement of two patents before trial. The district court excluded CH Lighting&#039;s evidence on the validity of these two patents and granted Super Lighting&#039;s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that the patents were not invalid. A jury found the third patent infringed and not invalid, awarding damages for all three patents. CH Lighting appealed.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially reviewed the case. The court excluded evidence from CH Lighting regarding the validity of the two patents and granted JMOL in favor of Super Lighting. The jury found the third patent infringed and awarded damages. CH Lighting&#039;s motions for JMOL on invalidity and for a new trial were denied, and the court doubled the damages award.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in granting JMOL on the validity of the two patents because it improperly excluded CH Lighting&#039;s evidence. The court held that a new trial was required to determine the validity of these patents. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the jury&#039;s verdicts of infringement and no invalidity for the third patent. Additionally, the court instructed the district court to reassess the reliability of Super Lighting&#039;s damages expert&#039;s testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2374/23-2374-2025-07-25.html</id>
        	<title>Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Alkermes PLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-25T07:02:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-25T07:02:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2374/23-2374-2025-07-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. developed Ampyra®, a drug for multiple sclerosis, and had a licensing agreement with Alkermes PLC, which owned a patent for Ampyra’s active ingredient. The patent expired in July 2018, but Acorda continued to make royalty payments to Alkermes until July 2020, when it began making payments under protest. Acorda initiated arbitration in July 2020, seeking a declaration that the royalty provisions were unenforceable post-patent expiration and a refund of royalties paid since July 2018.

The arbitration tribunal agreed that the royalty provisions were unenforceable but ruled that Acorda could only recoup payments made under formal protest. Acorda then petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to confirm the tribunal’s rulings except for the denial of recoupment of unprotested payments. The district court rejected Acorda’s arguments, which were based on the tribunal’s alleged “manifest disregard” of federal patent law and a non-patent-law principle, and confirmed the award in full.

Acorda appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, seeking to reverse the district court’s denial of the 2018–2020 recoupment. The Federal Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because Acorda’s petition did not necessarily raise a federal patent law issue. The court determined that the petition’s request for confirmation did not require a determination of federal patent law, and the request for modification presented alternative grounds, one of which did not involve patent law. Consequently, the Federal Circuit transferred the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2374/23-2374-2025-07-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Alkermes PLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. developed Ampyra®, a drug for multiple sclerosis, and had a licensing agreement with Alkermes PLC, which owned a patent for Ampyra’s active ingredient. The patent expired in July 2018, but Acorda continued to make royalty payments to Alkermes until July 2020, when it began making payments under protest. Acorda initiated arbitration in July 2020, seeking a declaration that the royalty provisions were unenforceable post-patent expiration and a refund of royalties paid since July 2018.

The arbitration tribunal agreed that the royalty provisions were unenforceable but ruled that Acorda could only recoup payments made under formal protest. Acorda then petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to confirm the tribunal’s rulings except for the denial of recoupment of unprotested payments. The district court rejected Acorda’s arguments, which were based on the tribunal’s alleged “manifest disregard” of federal patent law and a non-patent-law principle, and confirmed the award in full.

Acorda appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, seeking to reverse the district court’s denial of the 2018–2020 recoupment. The Federal Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because Acorda’s petition did not necessarily raise a federal patent law issue. The court determined that the petition’s request for confirmation did not require a determination of federal patent law, and the request for modification presented alternative grounds, one of which did not involve patent law. Consequently, the Federal Circuit transferred the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2262/23-2262-2025-07-22.html</id>
        	<title>IGT v. Zynga, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-22T06:31:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-22T06:31:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2262/23-2262-2025-07-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		IGT owns an expired U.S. Patent No. 7,168,089, which addresses secure communication in gaming environments. In 2003, Zynga&#039;s predecessor copied claims from IGT&#039;s application into its own, leading to an interference declared by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in 2010. Zynga moved for judgment that IGT&#039;s claims were unpatentable for obviousness, but the Board dismissed this motion as moot, terminating the interference because Zynga&#039;s claims lacked written description support.

In 2021, Zynga petitioned for an inter partes review (IPR) of certain claims of IGT&#039;s patent, alleging obviousness based on new prior-art references. IGT argued that interference estoppel barred Zynga&#039;s challenge. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted the IPR, rejecting the estoppel argument, and the Director of the PTO affirmed this decision. The PTAB ultimately found all challenged claims unpatentable for obviousness.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the PTAB&#039;s decision not to apply interference estoppel was unreviewable under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), as it was closely tied to the decision to institute the IPR. The court also found no &quot;shenanigans&quot; or legal errors in the PTAB&#039;s decision. On the merits, the court affirmed the PTAB&#039;s findings that the prior art taught the claimed elements, including the &quot;software authorization agent&quot; and the required messages for authorizing gaming software transfers. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the PTAB&#039;s findings and affirmed the decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2262/23-2262-2025-07-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IGT v. Zynga, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                IGT owns an expired U.S. Patent No. 7,168,089, which addresses secure communication in gaming environments. In 2003, Zynga&#039;s predecessor copied claims from IGT&#039;s application into its own, leading to an interference declared by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in 2010. Zynga moved for judgment that IGT&#039;s claims were unpatentable for obviousness, but the Board dismissed this motion as moot, terminating the interference because Zynga&#039;s claims lacked written description support.

In 2021, Zynga petitioned for an inter partes review (IPR) of certain claims of IGT&#039;s patent, alleging obviousness based on new prior-art references. IGT argued that interference estoppel barred Zynga&#039;s challenge. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted the IPR, rejecting the estoppel argument, and the Director of the PTO affirmed this decision. The PTAB ultimately found all challenged claims unpatentable for obviousness.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the PTAB&#039;s decision not to apply interference estoppel was unreviewable under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), as it was closely tied to the decision to institute the IPR. The court also found no &quot;shenanigans&quot; or legal errors in the PTAB&#039;s decision. On the merits, the court affirmed the PTAB&#039;s findings that the prior art taught the claimed elements, including the &quot;software authorization agent&quot; and the required messages for authorizing gaming software transfers. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the PTAB&#039;s findings and affirmed the decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Gaming Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/supreme-court/2025/cv-24-0048-pr.html</id>
        	<title>McAlister v. Loeb</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-17T09:30:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-17T09:30:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/supreme-court/2025/cv-24-0048-pr.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Roy McAlister invented and patented technologies related to clean fuels and incorporated McAlister Technologies, L.L.C. (MT) to hold and license these patents. In 2009, MT entered into a licensing agreement with Advanced Green Technologies, L.L.C. (AGT), which later retained Loeb &amp; Loeb, L.L.P. for patent matters. Conflicts arose, leading McAlister to terminate the agreement, alleging AGT&#039;s breach. McAlister and MT claimed that Loeb &amp; Loeb&#039;s actions clouded their patents, causing prospective licensees to back out, resulting in lost profits.

The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Loeb &amp; Loeb on the lost profit damages, finding the plaintiffs&#039; evidence speculative and lacking reasonable certainty. The court excluded the plaintiffs&#039; expert testimony on damages and ruled against them on claims for trespass to chattel, slander of title, and aiding and abetting, but allowed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision to proceed. Plaintiffs conceded no triable damages remained and stipulated to final judgment against them.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment on most lost profit claims but reversed on a $5 million initial payment claim, remanding for further proceedings. It also reversed the summary judgment on trespass to chattel and slander of title claims.

The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim. It concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the lost profit damages with reasonable certainty, as material terms of the prospective licensing agreement were unresolved. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Loeb &amp; Loeb on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim, vacating the relevant parts of the Court of Appeals&#039; decision. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the slander of title claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/supreme-court/2025/cv-24-0048-pr.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "McAlister v. Loeb" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Roy McAlister invented and patented technologies related to clean fuels and incorporated McAlister Technologies, L.L.C. (MT) to hold and license these patents. In 2009, MT entered into a licensing agreement with Advanced Green Technologies, L.L.C. (AGT), which later retained Loeb &amp; Loeb, L.L.P. for patent matters. Conflicts arose, leading McAlister to terminate the agreement, alleging AGT&#039;s breach. McAlister and MT claimed that Loeb &amp; Loeb&#039;s actions clouded their patents, causing prospective licensees to back out, resulting in lost profits.

The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Loeb &amp; Loeb on the lost profit damages, finding the plaintiffs&#039; evidence speculative and lacking reasonable certainty. The court excluded the plaintiffs&#039; expert testimony on damages and ruled against them on claims for trespass to chattel, slander of title, and aiding and abetting, but allowed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision to proceed. Plaintiffs conceded no triable damages remained and stipulated to final judgment against them.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment on most lost profit claims but reversed on a $5 million initial payment claim, remanding for further proceedings. It also reversed the summary judgment on trespass to chattel and slander of title claims.

The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim. It concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the lost profit damages with reasonable certainty, as material terms of the prospective licensing agreement were unresolved. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Loeb &amp; Loeb on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim, vacating the relevant parts of the Court of Appeals&#039; decision. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the slander of title claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Arizona</case:state>
						<case:court>Arizona Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kathryn Hackett King</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
										<category term="Arizona Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2191/24-2191-2025-07-17.html</id>
        	<title>Top Brand LLC v. Cozy Comfort Co.</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-17T07:31:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-17T07:31:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2191/24-2191-2025-07-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Top Brand and Cozy Comfort are competitors in the market for oversized hooded sweatshirts. Cozy Comfort owns a design patent (D788 patent) and two trademarks for &quot;THE COMFY&quot; related to blanket throws. Top Brand sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of the design patent, while Cozy Comfort counterclaimed for infringement of both the design patent and trademarks. The jury found in favor of Cozy Comfort, determining that Top Brand had infringed both the design patent and the trademarks, and awarded Cozy Comfort $15.4 million for patent infringement and $3.08 million for trademark infringement.

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Top Brand&#039;s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and entered judgment based on the jury&#039;s verdict. Top Brand then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit held that the principles of prosecution history disclaimer apply to design patents. The court found that Top Brand was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement of the design patent because the accused design fell within the scope of the subject matter surrendered during prosecution. The court also concluded that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict of trademark infringement. Consequently, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL and found in favor of Top Brand on both the design patent and trademark infringement claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2191/24-2191-2025-07-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Top Brand LLC v. Cozy Comfort Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Top Brand and Cozy Comfort are competitors in the market for oversized hooded sweatshirts. Cozy Comfort owns a design patent (D788 patent) and two trademarks for &quot;THE COMFY&quot; related to blanket throws. Top Brand sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of the design patent, while Cozy Comfort counterclaimed for infringement of both the design patent and trademarks. The jury found in favor of Cozy Comfort, determining that Top Brand had infringed both the design patent and the trademarks, and awarded Cozy Comfort $15.4 million for patent infringement and $3.08 million for trademark infringement.

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Top Brand&#039;s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and entered judgment based on the jury&#039;s verdict. Top Brand then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

The Federal Circuit held that the principles of prosecution history disclaimer apply to design patents. The court found that Top Brand was entitled to JMOL of noninfringement of the design patent because the accused design fell within the scope of the subject matter surrendered during prosecution. The court also concluded that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict of trademark infringement. Consequently, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of JMOL and found in favor of Top Brand on both the design patent and trademark infringement claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1864/23-1864-2025-07-14.html</id>
        	<title>Shockwave Medical, Inc. v. Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-14T08:02:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-14T08:02:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1864/23-1864-2025-07-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Shockwave Medical, Inc. owns U.S. Patent No. 8,956,371, which is directed to a method for treating atherosclerosis using intravascular lithotripsy (IVL). Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. (CSI) filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition challenging all 17 claims of the &#039;371 patent as obvious over various prior art combinations. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) found claims 1-4 and 6-17 unpatentable as obvious but upheld the patentability of claim 5.

The Board&#039;s decision was appealed by Shockwave regarding claims 1-4 and 6-17, and cross-appealed by CSI regarding claim 5. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Shockwave argued that the Board improperly relied on applicant admitted prior art (AAPA) and erred in its claim construction and factual findings. CSI argued that the Board failed to consider the combined teachings of the prior art in its analysis of claim 5.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board&#039;s determination that claims 1-4 and 6-17 were unpatentable as obvious. The court found that the Board properly used AAPA as evidence of general background knowledge and that the Board&#039;s claim construction and factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that Shockwave&#039;s secondary considerations evidence did not outweigh the evidence of obviousness.

Regarding CSI&#039;s cross-appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board&#039;s determination that claim 5 was not shown to be unpatentable. The court found that the Board failed to consider the combined teachings of the prior art and that the placement of electrodes as claimed in claim 5 would have been a routine design choice for an ordinarily skilled artisan.

In conclusion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board&#039;s decision on claims 1-4 and 6-17 and reversed the decision on claim 5, finding it unpatentable as obvious. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1864/23-1864-2025-07-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Shockwave Medical, Inc. v. Cardiovascular Systems, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Shockwave Medical, Inc. owns U.S. Patent No. 8,956,371, which is directed to a method for treating atherosclerosis using intravascular lithotripsy (IVL). Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. (CSI) filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition challenging all 17 claims of the &#039;371 patent as obvious over various prior art combinations. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) found claims 1-4 and 6-17 unpatentable as obvious but upheld the patentability of claim 5.

The Board&#039;s decision was appealed by Shockwave regarding claims 1-4 and 6-17, and cross-appealed by CSI regarding claim 5. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Shockwave argued that the Board improperly relied on applicant admitted prior art (AAPA) and erred in its claim construction and factual findings. CSI argued that the Board failed to consider the combined teachings of the prior art in its analysis of claim 5.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board&#039;s determination that claims 1-4 and 6-17 were unpatentable as obvious. The court found that the Board properly used AAPA as evidence of general background knowledge and that the Board&#039;s claim construction and factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. The court also found that Shockwave&#039;s secondary considerations evidence did not outweigh the evidence of obviousness.

Regarding CSI&#039;s cross-appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board&#039;s determination that claim 5 was not shown to be unpatentable. The court found that the Board failed to consider the combined teachings of the prior art and that the placement of electrodes as claimed in claim 5 would have been a routine design choice for an ordinarily skilled artisan.

In conclusion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board&#039;s decision on claims 1-4 and 6-17 and reversed the decision on claim 5, finding it unpatentable as obvious.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1450/24-1450-2025-07-08.html</id>
        	<title>Brainchild Surgical Devices, LLC v. CPA Global Limited</title>
        	<updated>2025-07-08T10:30:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-08T10:30:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1450/24-1450-2025-07-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Brainchild Surgical Devices, LLC, a medical device developer, entered into a contract with CPA Global Limited for patent renewal services. Brainchild alleged that CPA overcharged it by marking up fees beyond the actual costs and sued for breach of contract and fraud. The district court excluded Brainchild’s expert witnesses, granted summary judgment for CPA on the breach of contract claim, dismissed the fraud claim, and denied leave to amend the fraud claim.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Brainchild’s fraud claim for lack of particularity and denied leave to amend. The court granted summary judgment for CPA on the breach of contract claim, finding that Brainchild’s theories were inconsistent with the contract’s terms. The court excluded Brainchild’s expert witnesses, David Cass and John Keogh, for offering legal conclusions and lacking qualifications.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of Cass’ testimony due to lack of qualification and improper legal conclusions. The court also affirmed the exclusion of Keogh’s testimony for failing to disclose the bases of his opinions and offering legal conclusions but reversed the decision to disqualify him based on confidential information. The court agreed with the district court that Brainchild’s pass-through cost and implied covenant of good faith theories failed to overcome summary judgment. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for CPA on the theory that CPA applied Country Charges unrelated to the required personnel, infrastructure, and third parties for renewals in particular jurisdictions. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this theory. The court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend the fraud claim. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/24-1450/24-1450-2025-07-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Brainchild Surgical Devices, LLC v. CPA Global Limited" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Brainchild Surgical Devices, LLC, a medical device developer, entered into a contract with CPA Global Limited for patent renewal services. Brainchild alleged that CPA overcharged it by marking up fees beyond the actual costs and sued for breach of contract and fraud. The district court excluded Brainchild’s expert witnesses, granted summary judgment for CPA on the breach of contract claim, dismissed the fraud claim, and denied leave to amend the fraud claim.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Brainchild’s fraud claim for lack of particularity and denied leave to amend. The court granted summary judgment for CPA on the breach of contract claim, finding that Brainchild’s theories were inconsistent with the contract’s terms. The court excluded Brainchild’s expert witnesses, David Cass and John Keogh, for offering legal conclusions and lacking qualifications.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of Cass’ testimony due to lack of qualification and improper legal conclusions. The court also affirmed the exclusion of Keogh’s testimony for failing to disclose the bases of his opinions and offering legal conclusions but reversed the decision to disqualify him based on confidential information. The court agreed with the district court that Brainchild’s pass-through cost and implied covenant of good faith theories failed to overcome summary judgment. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for CPA on the theory that CPA applied Country Charges unrelated to the required personnel, infrastructure, and third parties for renewals in particular jurisdictions. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this theory. The court also affirmed the denial of leave to amend the fraud claim.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>A. Marvin Quattlebaum Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1228/25-1228-2025-07-08.html</id>
        	<title>JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-07-08T07:01:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-08T07:01:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1228/25-1228-2025-07-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Janssen Pharmaceutica NV (collectively, Janssen) sued Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Teva) in 2018, alleging infringement of Janssen’s U.S. Patent No. 9,439,906, which describes dosing regimens for long-acting injectable antipsychotic medications. Teva admitted to infringement but contested the patent’s validity, arguing that all claims were invalid for obviousness and some for indefiniteness.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held a bench trial and ruled that Teva had not proven the claims invalid. Teva appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the indefiniteness challenge but vacated the obviousness ruling, remanding for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again found that Teva had not proven the claims invalid for obviousness, leading to Teva’s current appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Teva did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine or modify the prior art to achieve the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success. The court also rejected Teva’s argument for a presumption of obviousness based on overlapping ranges, finding that the specific combination of dosages and timing in the claimed regimen was not sufficiently addressed by the prior art. The court upheld the district court’s findings on the lack of motivation to combine references and the lack of reasonable expectation of success, as well as the non-obviousness of the claims related to renal impairment and particle size. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1228/25-1228-2025-07-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Janssen Pharmaceutica NV (collectively, Janssen) sued Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Teva) in 2018, alleging infringement of Janssen’s U.S. Patent No. 9,439,906, which describes dosing regimens for long-acting injectable antipsychotic medications. Teva admitted to infringement but contested the patent’s validity, arguing that all claims were invalid for obviousness and some for indefiniteness.

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held a bench trial and ruled that Teva had not proven the claims invalid. Teva appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the indefiniteness challenge but vacated the obviousness ruling, remanding for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again found that Teva had not proven the claims invalid for obviousness, leading to Teva’s current appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Teva did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine or modify the prior art to achieve the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success. The court also rejected Teva’s argument for a presumption of obviousness based on overlapping ranges, finding that the specific combination of dosages and timing in the claimed regimen was not sufficiently addressed by the prior art. The court upheld the district court’s findings on the lack of motivation to combine references and the lack of reasonable expectation of success, as well as the non-obviousness of the claims related to renal impairment and particle size.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1428/23-1428-2025-07-07.html</id>
        	<title>EGENERA, INC. v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-07-07T07:31:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-07T07:31:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1428/23-1428-2025-07-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Egenera, Inc. alleged that Cisco Systems, Inc. infringed its U.S. Patent No. 7,231,430, which describes a digitalized processing platform for deploying virtual systems through configuration commands. The patent aims to improve conventional server systems by allowing virtual management of processing resources without physical rewiring. Egenera claimed that Cisco&#039;s Unified Computing System (UCS) infringed claims 1, 3-5, and 7-8 of the patent. The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement for claims 1 and 5 and, following a jury trial, entered judgment of noninfringement for claims 3 and 7.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that Cisco&#039;s UCS did not infringe the asserted claims. The court granted summary judgment of noninfringement for claims 1 and 5, concluding that the UCS CPUs did not emulate Ethernet functionality as required by the claims. The jury found noninfringement for claims 3 and 7, and the district court denied Egenera&#039;s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) or a new trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decisions. The appellate court agreed that Egenera failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the UCS CPUs emulated Ethernet functionality, as required by claims 1 and 5. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the jury&#039;s verdict of noninfringement for claims 3 and 7, particularly regarding the network topology limitation. Additionally, the appellate court upheld the district court&#039;s denial of Egenera&#039;s motion for a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the court&#039;s handling of jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and closing arguments. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1428/23-1428-2025-07-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "EGENERA, INC. v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Egenera, Inc. alleged that Cisco Systems, Inc. infringed its U.S. Patent No. 7,231,430, which describes a digitalized processing platform for deploying virtual systems through configuration commands. The patent aims to improve conventional server systems by allowing virtual management of processing resources without physical rewiring. Egenera claimed that Cisco&#039;s Unified Computing System (UCS) infringed claims 1, 3-5, and 7-8 of the patent. The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement for claims 1 and 5 and, following a jury trial, entered judgment of noninfringement for claims 3 and 7.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that Cisco&#039;s UCS did not infringe the asserted claims. The court granted summary judgment of noninfringement for claims 1 and 5, concluding that the UCS CPUs did not emulate Ethernet functionality as required by the claims. The jury found noninfringement for claims 3 and 7, and the district court denied Egenera&#039;s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) or a new trial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court&#039;s decisions. The appellate court agreed that Egenera failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the UCS CPUs emulated Ethernet functionality, as required by claims 1 and 5. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the jury&#039;s verdict of noninfringement for claims 3 and 7, particularly regarding the network topology limitation. Additionally, the appellate court upheld the district court&#039;s denial of Egenera&#039;s motion for a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the court&#039;s handling of jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and closing arguments.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2173/23-2173-2025-06-30.html</id>
        	<title>EYE THERAPIES, LLC v. SLAYBACK PHARMA LLC </title>
        	<updated>2025-06-30T07:13:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-30T07:13:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2173/23-2173-2025-06-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Eye Therapies, LLC owns the &#039;742 patent, which describes a method to reduce eye redness using a low-concentration dose of brimonidine. The independent claims of the patent specify that the method consists essentially of administering brimonidine at certain concentrations. During patent prosecution, the examiner initially rejected the claims for being anticipated by prior art, specifically U.S. Patent No. 6,242,442 (Dean), which disclosed the use of brimonidine in combination with another active ingredient, brinzolamide. The applicant amended the claims to replace &quot;comprising&quot; with &quot;consisting essentially of&quot; and argued that the claimed methods did not require any other active ingredients besides brimonidine. The examiner allowed the amended claims based on this representation.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted an inter partes review on petition by Slayback Pharma, LLC and concluded that all challenged claims were unpatentable. The Board interpreted the phrase &quot;consisting essentially of&quot; to allow the inclusion of additional active ingredients that do not materially affect the basic and novel properties of the invention. Based on this construction, the Board found that the prior art taught or suggested each limitation of the challenged claims and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the Board&#039;s claim construction. The court held that the phrase &quot;consisting essentially of&quot; in the &#039;742 patent should be interpreted to exclude the use of active ingredients other than brimonidine, based on the prosecution history. The court vacated the Board&#039;s obviousness finding and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the corrected claim construction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2173/23-2173-2025-06-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "EYE THERAPIES, LLC v. SLAYBACK PHARMA LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Eye Therapies, LLC owns the &#039;742 patent, which describes a method to reduce eye redness using a low-concentration dose of brimonidine. The independent claims of the patent specify that the method consists essentially of administering brimonidine at certain concentrations. During patent prosecution, the examiner initially rejected the claims for being anticipated by prior art, specifically U.S. Patent No. 6,242,442 (Dean), which disclosed the use of brimonidine in combination with another active ingredient, brinzolamide. The applicant amended the claims to replace &quot;comprising&quot; with &quot;consisting essentially of&quot; and argued that the claimed methods did not require any other active ingredients besides brimonidine. The examiner allowed the amended claims based on this representation.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted an inter partes review on petition by Slayback Pharma, LLC and concluded that all challenged claims were unpatentable. The Board interpreted the phrase &quot;consisting essentially of&quot; to allow the inclusion of additional active ingredients that do not materially affect the basic and novel properties of the invention. Based on this construction, the Board found that the prior art taught or suggested each limitation of the challenged claims and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the references.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the Board&#039;s claim construction. The court held that the phrase &quot;consisting essentially of&quot; in the &#039;742 patent should be interpreted to exclude the use of active ingredients other than brimonidine, based on the prosecution history. The court vacated the Board&#039;s obviousness finding and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the corrected claim construction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Mark Scarsi</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1187/23-1187-2025-06-18.html</id>
        	<title>Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. International Trade Commission</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-18T07:03:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-18T07:03:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1187/23-1187-2025-06-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Future Link Systems, LLC entered into a license agreement with MediaTek, Inc. in 2019, which stipulated that MediaTek would pay Future Link a lump sum if Future Link filed a lawsuit against Realtek Semiconductor Corporation. Future Link subsequently filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) accusing Realtek of patent infringement. During the litigation, Future Link settled with a third party and informed Realtek, leading Realtek to file a motion for sanctions against Future Link before the administrative law judge (ALJ).

The ALJ expressed concerns about the legality of the agreement between Future Link and MediaTek but ultimately denied Realtek&#039;s motion for sanctions, concluding that the agreement did not influence Future Link&#039;s decision to file the complaint. Future Link then withdrew its complaint and moved to terminate the investigation, which the ALJ granted. The ITC terminated the investigation when no petition for review was filed. Realtek petitioned the ITC to review the ALJ&#039;s order denying sanctions, but the ITC declined and terminated the sanctions proceeding.

Realtek appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, seeking an order for Future Link to pay a fine to the Commission. The Federal Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Realtek&#039;s appeal, as the Commission&#039;s decision on sanctions was not a &quot;final determination&quot; under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) that would affect the exclusion or non-exclusion of articles from entry. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that jurisdiction over such matters likely lies with the district courts, not the Federal Circuit. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1187/23-1187-2025-06-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Future Link Systems, LLC entered into a license agreement with MediaTek, Inc. in 2019, which stipulated that MediaTek would pay Future Link a lump sum if Future Link filed a lawsuit against Realtek Semiconductor Corporation. Future Link subsequently filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) accusing Realtek of patent infringement. During the litigation, Future Link settled with a third party and informed Realtek, leading Realtek to file a motion for sanctions against Future Link before the administrative law judge (ALJ).

The ALJ expressed concerns about the legality of the agreement between Future Link and MediaTek but ultimately denied Realtek&#039;s motion for sanctions, concluding that the agreement did not influence Future Link&#039;s decision to file the complaint. Future Link then withdrew its complaint and moved to terminate the investigation, which the ALJ granted. The ITC terminated the investigation when no petition for review was filed. Realtek petitioned the ITC to review the ALJ&#039;s order denying sanctions, but the ITC declined and terminated the sanctions proceeding.

Realtek appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, seeking an order for Future Link to pay a fine to the Commission. The Federal Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Realtek&#039;s appeal, as the Commission&#039;s decision on sanctions was not a &quot;final determination&quot; under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) that would affect the exclusion or non-exclusion of articles from entry. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that jurisdiction over such matters likely lies with the district courts, not the Federal Circuit.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Bryson</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1925/22-1925-2025-06-16.html</id>
        	<title>OPTIS WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY, LLC v. APPLE INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-06-16T07:02:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-16T07:02:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1925/22-1925-2025-06-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Optis Cellular Technology, LLC, Optis Wireless Technology, LLC, PanOptis Patent Management, LLC, Unwired Planet International Limited, and Unwired Planet, LLC (collectively, “Optis”) sued Apple Inc. (“Apple”) for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Optis asserted that various Apple products implementing the LTE standard infringed five of its standard-essential patents. The jury found Apple infringed certain claims of the asserted patents and awarded $506,200,000 in damages. Apple moved for a new trial, arguing the jury did not hear evidence regarding Optis’s obligation to license the patents on FRAND terms. The district court granted a new trial on damages, and the jury awarded $300,000,000 in the retrial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated both the infringement and second damages judgments, remanding for a new trial on infringement and damages. The court dismissed Optis’s cross-appeal to reinstate the original damages verdict. The court also reversed the district court’s findings that claims 6 and 7 of the ’332 patent are not directed to an abstract idea under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that claim 1 of the ’557 patent does not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. The court affirmed the district court’s construction of claim 8 of the ’833 patent. Additionally, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the Apple-Qualcomm settlement agreement and related expert testimony into evidence.

The Federal Circuit held that the single infringement question on the verdict form violated Apple’s right to a unanimous verdict, as it did not ensure all jurors agreed on the same patent being infringed. The court also determined that claims 6 and 7 of the ’332 patent are directed to an abstract idea and remanded for further analysis under Alice step two. The court found that “selecting unit” in claim 1 of the ’557 patent invokes § 112 ¶ 6 and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1925/22-1925-2025-06-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "OPTIS WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY, LLC v. APPLE INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Optis Cellular Technology, LLC, Optis Wireless Technology, LLC, PanOptis Patent Management, LLC, Unwired Planet International Limited, and Unwired Planet, LLC (collectively, “Optis”) sued Apple Inc. (“Apple”) for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Optis asserted that various Apple products implementing the LTE standard infringed five of its standard-essential patents. The jury found Apple infringed certain claims of the asserted patents and awarded $506,200,000 in damages. Apple moved for a new trial, arguing the jury did not hear evidence regarding Optis’s obligation to license the patents on FRAND terms. The district court granted a new trial on damages, and the jury awarded $300,000,000 in the retrial.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated both the infringement and second damages judgments, remanding for a new trial on infringement and damages. The court dismissed Optis’s cross-appeal to reinstate the original damages verdict. The court also reversed the district court’s findings that claims 6 and 7 of the ’332 patent are not directed to an abstract idea under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that claim 1 of the ’557 patent does not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. The court affirmed the district court’s construction of claim 8 of the ’833 patent. Additionally, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the Apple-Qualcomm settlement agreement and related expert testimony into evidence.

The Federal Circuit held that the single infringement question on the verdict form violated Apple’s right to a unanimous verdict, as it did not ensure all jurors agreed on the same patent being infringed. The court also determined that claims 6 and 7 of the ’332 patent are directed to an abstract idea and remanded for further analysis under Alice step two. The court found that “selecting unit” in claim 1 of the ’557 patent invokes § 112 ¶ 6 and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sharon Prost</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1639/23-1639-2025-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION v. PNC BANK N.A. </title>
        	<updated>2025-06-12T08:32:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-12T08:32:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1639/23-1639-2025-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		United Services Automobile Association (USAA) owns U.S. Patent No. 10,402,638, which is directed to remote check deposit technology. The patent describes a system where a customer uses a personal mobile device to take a picture of a check and transmit the image to a financial institution. The system includes steps for error checking and optical character recognition (OCR) to ensure the check image is of sufficient quality. USAA sued PNC Bank, N.A. for infringement of this and other patents.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted USAA’s motion for summary judgment, finding the asserted claims patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The court denied PNC’s cross-motion for summary judgment. A jury trial followed, where the jury found no invalidity and that PNC had infringed USAA’s patents. PNC appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling on § 101.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the asserted claim of the ’638 patent is directed to the abstract idea of depositing a check using a handheld mobile device and does not contain an inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. The court concluded that the claim recites routine data collection and analysis steps implemented by a generic device, which is insufficient for patent eligibility under § 101. Consequently, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and did not address USAA’s cross-appeal regarding damages testimony. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1639/23-1639-2025-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION v. PNC BANK N.A. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                United Services Automobile Association (USAA) owns U.S. Patent No. 10,402,638, which is directed to remote check deposit technology. The patent describes a system where a customer uses a personal mobile device to take a picture of a check and transmit the image to a financial institution. The system includes steps for error checking and optical character recognition (OCR) to ensure the check image is of sufficient quality. USAA sued PNC Bank, N.A. for infringement of this and other patents.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted USAA’s motion for summary judgment, finding the asserted claims patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The court denied PNC’s cross-motion for summary judgment. A jury trial followed, where the jury found no invalidity and that PNC had infringed USAA’s patents. PNC appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling on § 101.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the asserted claim of the ’638 patent is directed to the abstract idea of depositing a check using a handheld mobile device and does not contain an inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. The court concluded that the claim recites routine data collection and analysis steps implemented by a generic device, which is insufficient for patent eligibility under § 101. Consequently, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and did not address USAA’s cross-appeal regarding damages testimony.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1687/23-1687-2025-06-12.html</id>
        	<title>MITEK SYSTEMS, INC. v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION </title>
        	<updated>2025-06-12T08:32:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-12T08:32:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1687/23-1687-2025-06-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Mitek Systems, Inc. (Mitek) filed a declaratory judgment action against United Services Automobile Association (USAA) seeking a declaration of non-infringement concerning four patents related to its MiSnap software product. Mitek argued that it faced potential liability for direct, induced, and contributory infringement, as well as indemnification demands from its licensees after USAA sent them letters seeking to sell licenses to USAA patents.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas initially dismissed Mitek’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively declined to exercise jurisdiction. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct a more detailed analysis. On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, finding no subject-matter jurisdiction and reiterating its decision to decline jurisdiction even if it existed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court agreed that Mitek did not have a reasonable apprehension of suit for direct, induced, or contributory infringement based on the record evidence, including USAA’s allegations and claim charts from prior litigation. The court also found that Mitek’s potential indemnification liability was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction, as the indemnification agreements contained applicable carve-outs and did not create a reasonable potential for liability. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s discretionary decision to decline jurisdiction, noting that intervention in future litigation involving Mitek’s customers would be a more effective remedy. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1687/23-1687-2025-06-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MITEK SYSTEMS, INC. v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Mitek Systems, Inc. (Mitek) filed a declaratory judgment action against United Services Automobile Association (USAA) seeking a declaration of non-infringement concerning four patents related to its MiSnap software product. Mitek argued that it faced potential liability for direct, induced, and contributory infringement, as well as indemnification demands from its licensees after USAA sent them letters seeking to sell licenses to USAA patents.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas initially dismissed Mitek’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively declined to exercise jurisdiction. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct a more detailed analysis. On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, finding no subject-matter jurisdiction and reiterating its decision to decline jurisdiction even if it existed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court agreed that Mitek did not have a reasonable apprehension of suit for direct, induced, or contributory infringement based on the record evidence, including USAA’s allegations and claim charts from prior litigation. The court also found that Mitek’s potential indemnification liability was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction, as the indemnification agreements contained applicable carve-outs and did not create a reasonable potential for liability. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s discretionary decision to decline jurisdiction, noting that intervention in future litigation involving Mitek’s customers would be a more effective remedy.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2186/23-2186-2025-06-11.html</id>
        	<title>AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. SYNTHEGO CORP. </title>
        	<updated>2025-06-11T06:34:54-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-11T06:34:54-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2186/23-2186-2025-06-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Agilent Technologies, Inc. appealed two final written decisions by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) that determined all claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 10,337,001 and 10,900,034 to be unpatentable. The patents in question relate to CRISPR-Cas systems for gene editing, specifically focusing on chemically modified guide RNAs (gRNAs) used in these systems. The Board found that the claims were anticipated by prior art, specifically a reference known as Pioneer Hi-Bred, and that certain claims were also obvious in view of additional references, Threlfall and Deleavey.

The Board&#039;s decisions were based on findings that Pioneer Hi-Bred disclosed the claimed gRNA functionality and that the reference was enabling. The Board also found that the additional references provided sufficient motivation and reasonable expectation of success for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Pioneer Hi-Bred with those of Threlfall and Deleavey.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board&#039;s findings. The court affirmed the Board&#039;s determination that Pioneer Hi-Bred disclosed the claimed gRNA functionality, noting that substantial evidence supported the Board&#039;s findings. The court also agreed with the Board&#039;s conclusion that Pioneer Hi-Bred was an enabling reference, rejecting Agilent&#039;s arguments that undue experimentation would be required to practice the disclosed invention.

Additionally, the court upheld the Board&#039;s finding that the dependent claims, which included specific chemical modifications, were obvious in view of the combined teachings of Pioneer Hi-Bred, Threlfall, and Deleavey. The court found that the Board had provided a thorough analysis and that substantial evidence supported the Board&#039;s conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the claimed modifications.

In conclusion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board&#039;s decisions, holding that all claims of the &#039;001 and &#039;034 patents were unpatentable. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2186/23-2186-2025-06-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. SYNTHEGO CORP. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Agilent Technologies, Inc. appealed two final written decisions by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) that determined all claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 10,337,001 and 10,900,034 to be unpatentable. The patents in question relate to CRISPR-Cas systems for gene editing, specifically focusing on chemically modified guide RNAs (gRNAs) used in these systems. The Board found that the claims were anticipated by prior art, specifically a reference known as Pioneer Hi-Bred, and that certain claims were also obvious in view of additional references, Threlfall and Deleavey.

The Board&#039;s decisions were based on findings that Pioneer Hi-Bred disclosed the claimed gRNA functionality and that the reference was enabling. The Board also found that the additional references provided sufficient motivation and reasonable expectation of success for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Pioneer Hi-Bred with those of Threlfall and Deleavey.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board&#039;s findings. The court affirmed the Board&#039;s determination that Pioneer Hi-Bred disclosed the claimed gRNA functionality, noting that substantial evidence supported the Board&#039;s findings. The court also agreed with the Board&#039;s conclusion that Pioneer Hi-Bred was an enabling reference, rejecting Agilent&#039;s arguments that undue experimentation would be required to practice the disclosed invention.

Additionally, the court upheld the Board&#039;s finding that the dependent claims, which included specific chemical modifications, were obvious in view of the combined teachings of Pioneer Hi-Bred, Threlfall, and Deleavey. The court found that the Board had provided a thorough analysis and that substantial evidence supported the Board&#039;s conclusion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the claimed modifications.

In conclusion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board&#039;s decisions, holding that all claims of the &#039;001 and &#039;034 patents were unpatentable.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sharon Prost</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/25-1407/25-1407-2025-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>Amgen Inc v. Celltrion USA Inc</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-05T09:00:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-05T09:00:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/25-1407/25-1407-2025-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Amgen Inc., a biotechnology company, holds patents in the U.S. and South Korea for denosumab, a drug used in treating certain bone cancers. Amgen filed patent infringement suits against Celltrion Inc. (Celltrion Korea) in both countries. To support its case, Amgen sought discovery from Celltrion Korea’s subsidiary, Celltrion USA, located in New Jersey. Amgen filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the District of New Jersey to subpoena Celltrion USA for documents and testimony related to Celltrion Korea’s denosumab products.

The Magistrate Judge granted Amgen’s § 1782 application, rejecting Celltrion USA’s argument that § 1782 cannot compel it to produce information held by its foreign parent company. The Judge also found the request not unduly burdensome and ordered the parties to meet and confer to agree on a confidentiality agreement. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order, leading Celltrion USA to appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the order under § 1782 was final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court concluded that the order was not final because the scope of permissible discovery had not been conclusively defined. The Court emphasized that without a definite scope of discovery, it could not properly review whether the District Court had abused its discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting discovery under § 1782 but leaving the scope of discovery unresolved is not a final order under § 1291. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/25-1407/25-1407-2025-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Amgen Inc v. Celltrion USA Inc" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Amgen Inc., a biotechnology company, holds patents in the U.S. and South Korea for denosumab, a drug used in treating certain bone cancers. Amgen filed patent infringement suits against Celltrion Inc. (Celltrion Korea) in both countries. To support its case, Amgen sought discovery from Celltrion Korea’s subsidiary, Celltrion USA, located in New Jersey. Amgen filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the District of New Jersey to subpoena Celltrion USA for documents and testimony related to Celltrion Korea’s denosumab products.

The Magistrate Judge granted Amgen’s § 1782 application, rejecting Celltrion USA’s argument that § 1782 cannot compel it to produce information held by its foreign parent company. The Judge also found the request not unduly burdensome and ordered the parties to meet and confer to agree on a confidentiality agreement. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s order, leading Celltrion USA to appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if the order under § 1782 was final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Court concluded that the order was not final because the scope of permissible discovery had not been conclusively defined. The Court emphasized that without a definite scope of discovery, it could not properly review whether the District Court had abused its discretion. Consequently, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting discovery under § 1782 but leaving the scope of discovery unresolved is not a final order under § 1291.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2110/23-2110-2025-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation v. Unified Patents, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-05T06:31:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-05T06:31:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2110/23-2110-2025-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation (Dolby) owns U.S. Patent No. 10,237,577, which is directed to a prediction method using an in-loop filter. Unified Patents, LLC (Unified) filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) challenging claims 1, 7, and 8 of the patent as anticipated and obvious. Unified certified it was the sole real party in interest (RPI). Dolby identified nine other entities it believed should also have been named as RPIs. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) declined to adjudicate whether these entities were RPIs and instituted the review with Unified as the sole RPI. The Board ultimately held that Unified failed to show any of the challenged claims were unpatentable.

The Board&#039;s final written decision did not address the RPI dispute, explaining that there was no evidence any of the alleged RPIs were time-barred or estopped from bringing the IPR, or that Unified purposefully omitted any RPIs to gain an advantage. Dolby appealed the Board&#039;s decision, arguing that the Board&#039;s refusal to adjudicate the RPI dispute caused various harms, including potential breaches of license agreements, conflicts of interest, improper estoppel in future proceedings, and disincentivizing Unified from filing IPRs.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Dolby failed to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing to appeal. The court found Dolby&#039;s claims of harm to be too speculative, noting that Dolby did not provide evidence of any actual or imminent injury. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Dolby&#039;s substantive challenges. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2110/23-2110-2025-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation v. Unified Patents, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation (Dolby) owns U.S. Patent No. 10,237,577, which is directed to a prediction method using an in-loop filter. Unified Patents, LLC (Unified) filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) challenging claims 1, 7, and 8 of the patent as anticipated and obvious. Unified certified it was the sole real party in interest (RPI). Dolby identified nine other entities it believed should also have been named as RPIs. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) declined to adjudicate whether these entities were RPIs and instituted the review with Unified as the sole RPI. The Board ultimately held that Unified failed to show any of the challenged claims were unpatentable.

The Board&#039;s final written decision did not address the RPI dispute, explaining that there was no evidence any of the alleged RPIs were time-barred or estopped from bringing the IPR, or that Unified purposefully omitted any RPIs to gain an advantage. Dolby appealed the Board&#039;s decision, arguing that the Board&#039;s refusal to adjudicate the RPI dispute caused various harms, including potential breaches of license agreements, conflicts of interest, improper estoppel in future proceedings, and disincentivizing Unified from filing IPRs.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Dolby failed to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing to appeal. The court found Dolby&#039;s claims of harm to be too speculative, noting that Dolby did not provide evidence of any actual or imminent injury. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and did not reach the merits of Dolby&#039;s substantive challenges.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2357/23-2357-2025-06-04.html</id>
        	<title>ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. MODERNA, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-06-04T06:31:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-04T06:31:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2357/23-2357-2025-06-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. filed two lawsuits against Moderna, Inc., ModernaTX, Inc., and Moderna US, Inc. (collectively Moderna) in the District Court for the District of Delaware. Alnylam alleged that Moderna’s mRNA-based COVID-19 vaccine SPIKEVAX® infringed U.S. Patent Nos. 11,246,933 and 11,382,979, which cover cationic lipids used for delivering nucleic acids. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the term “branched alkyl” in the patent claims, specifically whether it required a carbon atom bound to at least three other carbon atoms.

The District Court for the District of Delaware concluded that Alnylam had acted as a lexicographer in defining “branched alkyl” in the patent specification. The court adopted Moderna’s proposed construction, which required that a “branched alkyl” must have a carbon atom bound to at least three other carbon atoms. Based on this construction, the parties stipulated that Moderna did not infringe the asserted patent claims, as Moderna’s product did not meet this requirement. The district court entered final judgment of noninfringement accordingly.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Federal Circuit agreed that the specification’s definition of “branched alkyl” was clear and unequivocal, requiring a carbon atom bound to at least three other carbon atoms. The court found no evidence in the claims, specification, or prosecution history that specified otherwise for the asserted claims. Consequently, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s claim construction and the resulting judgment of noninfringement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2357/23-2357-2025-06-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. MODERNA, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. filed two lawsuits against Moderna, Inc., ModernaTX, Inc., and Moderna US, Inc. (collectively Moderna) in the District Court for the District of Delaware. Alnylam alleged that Moderna’s mRNA-based COVID-19 vaccine SPIKEVAX® infringed U.S. Patent Nos. 11,246,933 and 11,382,979, which cover cationic lipids used for delivering nucleic acids. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the term “branched alkyl” in the patent claims, specifically whether it required a carbon atom bound to at least three other carbon atoms.

The District Court for the District of Delaware concluded that Alnylam had acted as a lexicographer in defining “branched alkyl” in the patent specification. The court adopted Moderna’s proposed construction, which required that a “branched alkyl” must have a carbon atom bound to at least three other carbon atoms. Based on this construction, the parties stipulated that Moderna did not infringe the asserted patent claims, as Moderna’s product did not meet this requirement. The district court entered final judgment of noninfringement accordingly.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Federal Circuit agreed that the specification’s definition of “branched alkyl” was clear and unequivocal, requiring a carbon atom bound to at least three other carbon atoms. The court found no evidence in the claims, specification, or prosecution history that specified otherwise for the asserted claims. Consequently, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s claim construction and the resulting judgment of noninfringement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2211/23-2211-2025-05-23.html</id>
        	<title>SIGRAY, INC. v. CARL ZEISS X-RAY MICROSCOPY, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-05-23T07:32:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-23T07:32:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2211/23-2211-2025-05-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Sigray, Inc. filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) requesting inter partes review of all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,400,704, owned by Carl Zeiss X-Ray Microscopy, Inc. The patent claims X-ray imaging systems incorporating projection magnification. The PTO&#039;s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) granted the petition, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims was unpatentable. However, in its final written decision, the PTAB declined to hold any of the asserted claims unpatentable. Sigray appealed the PTAB&#039;s decision regarding the unpatentability of claims 1-6 based on the prior art reference Jorgensen.

The PTAB found that Sigray had not shown that Jorgensen inherently disclosed projection magnification within the claimed range. The PTAB concluded that there was a dispute about whether Jorgensen taught a diverging X-ray beam and found that Sigray failed to demonstrate that Jorgensen&#039;s X-ray beam diverged enough to result in projection magnification between 1 and 10 times.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB&#039;s decision. The court found that the PTAB had implicitly construed the claim limitation &quot;between 1 and 10&quot; to exclude small amounts of magnification, which was an error. The court held that the plain meaning of &quot;between 1 and 10&quot; includes even tiny, undetectable magnification. The court concluded that Jorgensen inherently contained projection magnification, as the evidence showed that Jorgensen&#039;s X-ray beams were not completely parallel and must result in some magnification. Therefore, the court reversed the PTAB&#039;s decision regarding claims 1, 3, and 4, finding them anticipated by Jorgensen. The court vacated the PTAB&#039;s decision regarding claims 2, 5, and 6 and remanded for further proceedings to determine if these claims would have been obvious in light of the opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2211/23-2211-2025-05-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SIGRAY, INC. v. CARL ZEISS X-RAY MICROSCOPY, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Sigray, Inc. filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) requesting inter partes review of all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,400,704, owned by Carl Zeiss X-Ray Microscopy, Inc. The patent claims X-ray imaging systems incorporating projection magnification. The PTO&#039;s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) granted the petition, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the challenged claims was unpatentable. However, in its final written decision, the PTAB declined to hold any of the asserted claims unpatentable. Sigray appealed the PTAB&#039;s decision regarding the unpatentability of claims 1-6 based on the prior art reference Jorgensen.

The PTAB found that Sigray had not shown that Jorgensen inherently disclosed projection magnification within the claimed range. The PTAB concluded that there was a dispute about whether Jorgensen taught a diverging X-ray beam and found that Sigray failed to demonstrate that Jorgensen&#039;s X-ray beam diverged enough to result in projection magnification between 1 and 10 times.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTAB&#039;s decision. The court found that the PTAB had implicitly construed the claim limitation &quot;between 1 and 10&quot; to exclude small amounts of magnification, which was an error. The court held that the plain meaning of &quot;between 1 and 10&quot; includes even tiny, undetectable magnification. The court concluded that Jorgensen inherently contained projection magnification, as the evidence showed that Jorgensen&#039;s X-ray beams were not completely parallel and must result in some magnification. Therefore, the court reversed the PTAB&#039;s decision regarding claims 1, 3, and 4, finding them anticipated by Jorgensen. The court vacated the PTAB&#039;s decision regarding claims 2, 5, and 6 and remanded for further proceedings to determine if these claims would have been obvious in light of the opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1653/22-1653-2025-05-12.html</id>
        	<title>THE BROAD INSTITUTE, INC. v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA </title>
        	<updated>2025-05-12T07:31:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-12T07:31:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1653/22-1653-2025-05-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a patent interference proceeding between the Regents of the University of California, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively “Regents”) and the Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the President and Fellows of Harvard College (collectively “Broad”). The dispute centers on the priority of invention for a CRISPR-Cas9 system that edits DNA in eukaryotic cells using a single-guide RNA.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) issued a final decision concluding that Broad has priority over Regents for the CRISPR-Cas9 system. The PTAB determined that Broad reduced the invention to practice by October 5, 2012, when Broad&#039;s scientist, Feng Zhang, submitted a manuscript to Science. The PTAB rejected Regents&#039; earlier asserted dates of conception and reduction to practice, which were based on various disclosures and experiments conducted by Regents&#039; scientists. The PTAB also denied Regents&#039; motion to be accorded the benefit of the filing date of its first and second provisional patent applications, determining that they lacked written description support for the claimed invention.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the PTAB legally erred by conflating the standards for conception and reduction to practice, requiring Regents&#039; scientists to know their invention would work to prove conception. The court vacated the PTAB&#039;s decision on conception and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal framework. The court affirmed the PTAB&#039;s decision on written description, finding no legal error in the PTAB&#039;s analysis. The court dismissed Broad&#039;s cross-appeal on claim construction as moot, as the PTAB&#039;s denial of Broad&#039;s preliminary motions was based on independently sufficient grounds unrelated to claim construction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1653/22-1653-2025-05-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "THE BROAD INSTITUTE, INC. v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a patent interference proceeding between the Regents of the University of California, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier (collectively “Regents”) and the Broad Institute, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the President and Fellows of Harvard College (collectively “Broad”). The dispute centers on the priority of invention for a CRISPR-Cas9 system that edits DNA in eukaryotic cells using a single-guide RNA.

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) issued a final decision concluding that Broad has priority over Regents for the CRISPR-Cas9 system. The PTAB determined that Broad reduced the invention to practice by October 5, 2012, when Broad&#039;s scientist, Feng Zhang, submitted a manuscript to Science. The PTAB rejected Regents&#039; earlier asserted dates of conception and reduction to practice, which were based on various disclosures and experiments conducted by Regents&#039; scientists. The PTAB also denied Regents&#039; motion to be accorded the benefit of the filing date of its first and second provisional patent applications, determining that they lacked written description support for the claimed invention.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the PTAB legally erred by conflating the standards for conception and reduction to practice, requiring Regents&#039; scientists to know their invention would work to prove conception. The court vacated the PTAB&#039;s decision on conception and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal framework. The court affirmed the PTAB&#039;s decision on written description, finding no legal error in the PTAB&#039;s analysis. The court dismissed Broad&#039;s cross-appeal on claim construction as moot, as the PTAB&#039;s denial of Broad&#039;s preliminary motions was based on independently sufficient grounds unrelated to claim construction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1300/23-1300-2025-05-07.html</id>
        	<title>INCYTE CORPORATION v. SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, INC. </title>
        	<updated>2025-05-07T07:31:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-07T07:31:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1300/23-1300-2025-05-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Incyte Corporation appealed a post-grant review (PGR) final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) which held that Incyte failed to prove claims 1–7 and 9–21 of U.S. Patent No. 10,561,659 were unpatentable. The &#039;659 patent, owned by Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc., discloses a method of treating hair-loss disorders using deuterium-modified ruxolitinib. Incyte petitioned for PGR, arguing the claims were obvious, but the Board found Incyte&#039;s arguments unpersuasive and upheld the claims. Incyte&#039;s request for rehearing was also denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Sun argued that Incyte lacked Article III standing to appeal. The court noted that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that must be addressed before reaching the merits of an appeal. To establish standing, Incyte needed to demonstrate an injury in fact, which it attempted to do by claiming potential infringement liability and invoking the competitor standing doctrine.

The court found that Incyte&#039;s plans to develop a deuterated ruxolitinib product were too speculative to establish concrete plans for future activity that would create a substantial risk of future infringement. The court also determined that Incyte&#039;s reliance on the competitor standing doctrine was insufficient because Incyte did not show it was currently engaging in or had nonspeculative plans to engage in conduct covered by the claims of the &#039;659 patent.

Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Incyte failed to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1300/23-1300-2025-05-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "INCYTE CORPORATION v. SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, INC. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Incyte Corporation appealed a post-grant review (PGR) final written decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) which held that Incyte failed to prove claims 1–7 and 9–21 of U.S. Patent No. 10,561,659 were unpatentable. The &#039;659 patent, owned by Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc., discloses a method of treating hair-loss disorders using deuterium-modified ruxolitinib. Incyte petitioned for PGR, arguing the claims were obvious, but the Board found Incyte&#039;s arguments unpersuasive and upheld the claims. Incyte&#039;s request for rehearing was also denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Sun argued that Incyte lacked Article III standing to appeal. The court noted that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that must be addressed before reaching the merits of an appeal. To establish standing, Incyte needed to demonstrate an injury in fact, which it attempted to do by claiming potential infringement liability and invoking the competitor standing doctrine.

The court found that Incyte&#039;s plans to develop a deuterated ruxolitinib product were too speculative to establish concrete plans for future activity that would create a substantial risk of future infringement. The court also determined that Incyte&#039;s reliance on the competitor standing doctrine was insufficient because Incyte did not show it was currently engaging in or had nonspeculative plans to engage in conduct covered by the claims of the &#039;659 patent.

Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Incyte failed to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1367/23-1367-2025-05-07.html</id>
        	<title>INGENICO INC. v. IOENGINE, LLC </title>
        	<updated>2025-05-07T06:31:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-07T06:31:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1367/23-1367-2025-05-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Ingenico Inc. filed a declaratory judgment action against IOENGINE, LLC, in the District of Delaware, asserting that IOENGINE&#039;s patents were invalid. The patents in question, U.S. Patent No. 9,059,969 and U.S. Patent No. 9,774,703, relate to a portable device, such as a USB thumb drive, that includes a processor for network communication. IOENGINE counterclaimed, alleging infringement. Ingenico argued that the patents were invalid due to prior art, specifically a USB device known as the DiskOnKey System, which included a Firmware Upgrader.

The District Court for the District of Delaware held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict finding the claims of the patents invalid as anticipated and obvious. IOENGINE filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a motion for a new trial, both of which were denied by the district court. IOENGINE then appealed the decision, challenging the jury&#039;s findings and the district court&#039;s rulings on jury instructions and the introduction of prior art.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that substantial evidence supported the jury&#039;s verdict that the DiskOnKey System, including the Firmware Upgrader, was in public use before the critical date, thus invalidating the patents. The court also held that the district court did not err in its jury instructions or in allowing Ingenico to introduce the prior art at trial. The court clarified that IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) did not preclude Ingenico from using the DiskOnKey System to argue that the claimed invention was known or used by others, on sale, or in public use, as these grounds could not have been raised during the IPR.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment, upholding the jury&#039;s verdict of invalidity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1367/23-1367-2025-05-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "INGENICO INC. v. IOENGINE, LLC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Ingenico Inc. filed a declaratory judgment action against IOENGINE, LLC, in the District of Delaware, asserting that IOENGINE&#039;s patents were invalid. The patents in question, U.S. Patent No. 9,059,969 and U.S. Patent No. 9,774,703, relate to a portable device, such as a USB thumb drive, that includes a processor for network communication. IOENGINE counterclaimed, alleging infringement. Ingenico argued that the patents were invalid due to prior art, specifically a USB device known as the DiskOnKey System, which included a Firmware Upgrader.

The District Court for the District of Delaware held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict finding the claims of the patents invalid as anticipated and obvious. IOENGINE filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a motion for a new trial, both of which were denied by the district court. IOENGINE then appealed the decision, challenging the jury&#039;s findings and the district court&#039;s rulings on jury instructions and the introduction of prior art.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that substantial evidence supported the jury&#039;s verdict that the DiskOnKey System, including the Firmware Upgrader, was in public use before the critical date, thus invalidating the patents. The court also held that the district court did not err in its jury instructions or in allowing Ingenico to introduce the prior art at trial. The court clarified that IPR estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) did not preclude Ingenico from using the DiskOnKey System to argue that the claimed invention was known or used by others, on sale, or in public use, as these grounds could not have been raised during the IPR.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment, upholding the jury&#039;s verdict of invalidity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
    </feed>

