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	<title>Mergers &amp; Acquisitions - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
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	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/mergers-acquisitions/</id>
	<updated>2026-06-11T05:54:20-08:00</updated>
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		<name>Justia Inc</name>
		<uri>https://www.justia.com/</uri>
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	<rights>Copyright 2026 Justia Inc</rights>
	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1192/25-1192-2026-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>Premca Extra Income Fund LP v. Angle</title>
        	<updated>2026-06-05T13:30:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-05T13:30:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1192/25-1192-2026-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A robotics company, whose primary product is a well-known robot vacuum, agreed in August 2022 to be acquired by a major online retailer. Over the next eighteen months, the companies sought approval for the merger from regulatory authorities in the United States and Europe. In January 2024, facing significant regulatory obstacles, the parties abandoned the merger. Following this, shareholders of the robotics company, led by an investment fund, brought a securities fraud class action against the company’s CEO and CFO. They alleged that during the merger’s review period, company statements misrepresented or omitted material information regarding the likelihood of regulatory approval, particularly concerning the company’s expectation of approval and the acquirer’s cooperation with regulators.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to identify any actionable material misrepresentation or omission and did not adequately allege scienter (the intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). During the appeal, the robotics company entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, resulting in its dismissal from the appeal, which continued as to the individual defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with the district court that the complaint failed to state a claim for most of the statements challenged by the plaintiffs, affirming dismissal as to those. However, the court found that the amended complaint plausibly alleged that an August 24, 2023, proxy statement expressed an opinion about expected regulatory approval while omitting important contrary information regarding European regulatory concerns and the acquirer’s refusal to cooperate. This omission, in the circumstances, was sufficient to state a claim as to that statement. The dismissal was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/25-1192/25-1192-2026-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Premca Extra Income Fund LP v. Angle" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A robotics company, whose primary product is a well-known robot vacuum, agreed in August 2022 to be acquired by a major online retailer. Over the next eighteen months, the companies sought approval for the merger from regulatory authorities in the United States and Europe. In January 2024, facing significant regulatory obstacles, the parties abandoned the merger. Following this, shareholders of the robotics company, led by an investment fund, brought a securities fraud class action against the company’s CEO and CFO. They alleged that during the merger’s review period, company statements misrepresented or omitted material information regarding the likelihood of regulatory approval, particularly concerning the company’s expectation of approval and the acquirer’s cooperation with regulators.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to identify any actionable material misrepresentation or omission and did not adequately allege scienter (the intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). During the appeal, the robotics company entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, resulting in its dismissal from the appeal, which continued as to the individual defendants.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It agreed with the district court that the complaint failed to state a claim for most of the statements challenged by the plaintiffs, affirming dismissal as to those. However, the court found that the amended complaint plausibly alleged that an August 24, 2023, proxy statement expressed an opinion about expected regulatory approval while omitting important contrary information regarding European regulatory concerns and the acquirer’s refusal to cooperate. This omission, in the circumstances, was sufficient to state a claim as to that statement. The dismissal was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Seth R. Aframe</case:judge>
													<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2026/c-a-no-2025-0240-emd.html</id>
        	<title>PPG Holdco, LLC v. RAC PPG Buyer LLC</title>
        	<updated>2026-05-04T11:03:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-05-04T11:03:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2026/c-a-no-2025-0240-emd.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute arose from a stock purchase transaction in which RAC PPG Buyer LLC (the buyer) acquired all issued and outstanding shares of PPG Blocker, Inc. and its subsidiaries from PPG Holdco, LLC (the seller) under a Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA) dated August 15, 2024. The company at issue operated in contract food manufacturing and packaging. After closing, the buyer alleged that the seller had intentionally concealed significant labor and employee relations problems, including I-9 record deficiencies, union organizing activity, untimely wage payments, improper timekeeping practices, and unresolved sexual harassment complaints, all of which were not disclosed prior to the transaction.

Following the closing, the buyer refused to pay the remaining purchase price and to release escrowed funds, citing alleged breaches of representations and warranties. The seller brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the buyer counterclaimed, asserting fraud and breach of contract claims related to the SPA and the seller’s pre-closing conduct.

Previously, the buyer filed counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud. The seller moved to dismiss these counterclaims and also sought judgment on the pleadings for its own claims. The Delaware Court of Chancery considered the SPA’s provisions, including anti-reliance clauses, non-survival clauses, and the definition of “Actual Fraud.” The court found that the breach of contract claim and the fraud claim related to the Pre-Closing Statement were barred by the SPA’s provisions. However, the fraud counterclaim based on misrepresentations and warranties within the SPA itself survived, because the buyer adequately alleged that the seller had actual knowledge of the company’s misrepresentations.

The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the SPA barred breach of contract and extra-contractual fraud claims, but allowed the fraud claim based on intentional misrepresentation of contractual representations and warranties to proceed. The court denied judgment on the pleadings due to the surviving fraud claim, which sought rescission and created material factual disputes. The request for attorneys’ fees was also denied as premature. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2026/c-a-no-2025-0240-emd.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "PPG Holdco, LLC v. RAC PPG Buyer LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute arose from a stock purchase transaction in which RAC PPG Buyer LLC (the buyer) acquired all issued and outstanding shares of PPG Blocker, Inc. and its subsidiaries from PPG Holdco, LLC (the seller) under a Stock Purchase Agreement (SPA) dated August 15, 2024. The company at issue operated in contract food manufacturing and packaging. After closing, the buyer alleged that the seller had intentionally concealed significant labor and employee relations problems, including I-9 record deficiencies, union organizing activity, untimely wage payments, improper timekeeping practices, and unresolved sexual harassment complaints, all of which were not disclosed prior to the transaction.

Following the closing, the buyer refused to pay the remaining purchase price and to release escrowed funds, citing alleged breaches of representations and warranties. The seller brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the buyer counterclaimed, asserting fraud and breach of contract claims related to the SPA and the seller’s pre-closing conduct.

Previously, the buyer filed counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud. The seller moved to dismiss these counterclaims and also sought judgment on the pleadings for its own claims. The Delaware Court of Chancery considered the SPA’s provisions, including anti-reliance clauses, non-survival clauses, and the definition of “Actual Fraud.” The court found that the breach of contract claim and the fraud claim related to the Pre-Closing Statement were barred by the SPA’s provisions. However, the fraud counterclaim based on misrepresentations and warranties within the SPA itself survived, because the buyer adequately alleged that the seller had actual knowledge of the company’s misrepresentations.

The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the SPA barred breach of contract and extra-contractual fraud claims, but allowed the fraud claim based on intentional misrepresentation of contractual representations and warranties to proceed. The court denied judgment on the pleadings due to the surviving fraud claim, which sought rescission and created material factual disputes. The request for attorneys’ fees was also denied as premature.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Eric M. Davis</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2026/2025-0805-lww.html</id>
        	<title>Fortis Advisors, LLC v. Krafton, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2026-03-16T05:32:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-03-16T05:32:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2026/2025-0805-lww.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A South Korean video game conglomerate acquired a U.S.-based game studio known for its hit title, Subnautica, in 2021. The acquisition terms included a $500 million upfront payment and a possible $250 million in contingent earnout payments. To secure the studio’s continued creative success, the buyer contractually guaranteed that the founders and CEO would retain operational control and could only be terminated for cause. As the studio prepared to release Subnautica 2, internal projections showed that the game would likely trigger the large earnout payment. Fearing the contract was too generous, the buyer’s leadership sought ways to block the earnout, including consulting an AI chatbot for takeover strategies. The buyer then locked the studio out of its publishing platform, posted critical messages on its website, and fired the founders and CEO, initially claiming a lack of game readiness as cause.

After the representative of the former shareholders sued in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, the buyer changed its justification, asserting that the executives had abandoned their roles and improperly downloaded company data. The court found that both the studio’s leadership transitions and the data downloads were transparent, known to, and accepted by the buyer before the terminations. The court also found that the buyer’s new grounds for termination were pretextual and not supported by the evidence.

The Court of Chancery held that the buyer breached the acquisition agreement by terminating the key employees without cause and usurping their operational control. As a remedy, the court ordered specific performance: the CEO was reinstated with full operational authority, and the earnout period was equitably extended by the duration of his ouster. Issues regarding potential damages for lost earnout revenue were reserved for a later phase. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2026/2025-0805-lww.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Fortis Advisors, LLC v. Krafton, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A South Korean video game conglomerate acquired a U.S.-based game studio known for its hit title, Subnautica, in 2021. The acquisition terms included a $500 million upfront payment and a possible $250 million in contingent earnout payments. To secure the studio’s continued creative success, the buyer contractually guaranteed that the founders and CEO would retain operational control and could only be terminated for cause. As the studio prepared to release Subnautica 2, internal projections showed that the game would likely trigger the large earnout payment. Fearing the contract was too generous, the buyer’s leadership sought ways to block the earnout, including consulting an AI chatbot for takeover strategies. The buyer then locked the studio out of its publishing platform, posted critical messages on its website, and fired the founders and CEO, initially claiming a lack of game readiness as cause.

After the representative of the former shareholders sued in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, the buyer changed its justification, asserting that the executives had abandoned their roles and improperly downloaded company data. The court found that both the studio’s leadership transitions and the data downloads were transparent, known to, and accepted by the buyer before the terminations. The court also found that the buyer’s new grounds for termination were pretextual and not supported by the evidence.

The Court of Chancery held that the buyer breached the acquisition agreement by terminating the key employees without cause and usurping their operational control. As a remedy, the court ordered specific performance: the CEO was reinstated with full operational authority, and the earnout period was equitably extended by the duration of his ouster. Issues regarding potential damages for lost earnout revenue were reserved for a later phase.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-03-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lori W. Will</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2026/490-2024.html</id>
        	<title>Johnson &amp; Johnson v. Fortis Advisors LLC</title>
        	<updated>2026-01-12T13:33:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-12T13:33:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2026/490-2024.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Johnson &amp; Johnson acquired Auris Health, a medical robotics company, in a transaction where Auris’s shareholders could earn up to $2.35 billion in additional payments if certain regulatory and sales milestones were met for Auris’s surgical devices. These milestones required Johnson &amp; Johnson to use “commercially reasonable efforts,” defined by the contract as efforts comparable to those used for its own priority devices. All regulatory milestones were expressly conditioned on achieving specific FDA “510(k) premarket notification” approvals. After none of the milestones were met, Fortis Advisors, representing Auris’s former shareholders, sued, alleging that Johnson &amp; Johnson failed to meet its efforts obligations and fraudulently induced Auris into accepting a contingent payment for one milestone by misrepresenting its likelihood.

The Delaware Court of Chancery held a trial and found largely in Fortis’s favor. The court ruled that Johnson &amp; Johnson breached the contract by not applying the required level of effort to Auris’s iPlatform system and acted with the intent to avoid earnout payments. For the first milestone, the court relied on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to require Johnson &amp; Johnson to pursue an alternate FDA pathway when the original 510(k) process became unavailable. The court also found that Johnson &amp; Johnson fraudulently induced Auris to accept a contingent payment for the Monarch lung ablation milestone by portraying its achievement as almost certain, despite knowing of a recent patient death and an ongoing FDA investigation.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware agreed with Johnson &amp; Johnson regarding the implied covenant, holding that the merger agreement did not contain a contractual gap and that the risk of an unavailable 510(k) pathway was foreseeable and allocated by the contract. The court reversed the Chancery’s ruling that Johnson &amp; Johnson was required to pursue an alternative regulatory pathway for the first milestone and vacated the related damages. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the findings on breach of contract for the remaining milestones, upheld the damages calculation for those, and affirmed the fraud finding and the conclusion that the contract did not bar extra-contractual fraud claims. The case was remanded for recalculation of damages consistent with this opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2026/490-2024.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Johnson &amp; Johnson v. Fortis Advisors LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Johnson &amp; Johnson acquired Auris Health, a medical robotics company, in a transaction where Auris’s shareholders could earn up to $2.35 billion in additional payments if certain regulatory and sales milestones were met for Auris’s surgical devices. These milestones required Johnson &amp; Johnson to use “commercially reasonable efforts,” defined by the contract as efforts comparable to those used for its own priority devices. All regulatory milestones were expressly conditioned on achieving specific FDA “510(k) premarket notification” approvals. After none of the milestones were met, Fortis Advisors, representing Auris’s former shareholders, sued, alleging that Johnson &amp; Johnson failed to meet its efforts obligations and fraudulently induced Auris into accepting a contingent payment for one milestone by misrepresenting its likelihood.

The Delaware Court of Chancery held a trial and found largely in Fortis’s favor. The court ruled that Johnson &amp; Johnson breached the contract by not applying the required level of effort to Auris’s iPlatform system and acted with the intent to avoid earnout payments. For the first milestone, the court relied on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to require Johnson &amp; Johnson to pursue an alternate FDA pathway when the original 510(k) process became unavailable. The court also found that Johnson &amp; Johnson fraudulently induced Auris to accept a contingent payment for the Monarch lung ablation milestone by portraying its achievement as almost certain, despite knowing of a recent patient death and an ongoing FDA investigation.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware agreed with Johnson &amp; Johnson regarding the implied covenant, holding that the merger agreement did not contain a contractual gap and that the risk of an unavailable 510(k) pathway was foreseeable and allocated by the contract. The court reversed the Chancery’s ruling that Johnson &amp; Johnson was required to pursue an alternative regulatory pathway for the first milestone and vacated the related damages. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the findings on breach of contract for the remaining milestones, upheld the damages calculation for those, and affirmed the fraud finding and the conclusion that the contract did not bar extra-contractual fraud claims. The case was remanded for recalculation of damages consistent with this opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Abigail LeGrow</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2794/24-2794-2025-12-23.html</id>
        	<title>37celsius Capital Partners, L.P. v Intel Corporation</title>
        	<updated>2025-12-23T13:30:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-12-23T13:30:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2794/24-2794-2025-12-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		37celsius Capital Partners, a Milwaukee-based firm specializing in healthcare-related businesses, sought to acquire Care Innovations, a subsidiary of Intel Corporation. The parties entered into a nondisclosure agreement containing a “Hold Harmless” clause that limited damages, and subsequently executed a term sheet outlining the proposed transaction. The term sheet required 37celsius to contribute $12 million by a specified closing date and granted it an exclusivity period during which Intel could not negotiate with other parties regarding Care Innovations. The term sheet expressly limited legal obligations, stating that no binding contract would exist until a definitive agreement was executed, except for certain provisions such as confidentiality and exclusivity.

After 37celsius failed to provide proof of the required funds by the closing date, Intel sold Care Innovations to another buyer. 37celsius filed suit in Wisconsin state court, alleging breach of contract based on Intel’s communications with third parties during the exclusivity period. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which ruled that 37celsius was not entitled to expectation damages under the NDA and subsequently granted summary judgment for Intel, finding no reliance damages and no evidence of causation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. It held that the term sheet was not a binding “Type II” preliminary agreement under Delaware law, as its language did not obligate the parties to negotiate in good faith. Further, even if a binding obligation existed, 37celsius could not show that Intel’s alleged breach was the but-for cause of the failed transaction, as 37celsius did not have the required funds. The court also concluded that the NDA barred expectation damages and 37celsius did not appeal the denial of reliance damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Intel. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2794/24-2794-2025-12-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "37celsius Capital Partners, L.P. v Intel Corporation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                37celsius Capital Partners, a Milwaukee-based firm specializing in healthcare-related businesses, sought to acquire Care Innovations, a subsidiary of Intel Corporation. The parties entered into a nondisclosure agreement containing a “Hold Harmless” clause that limited damages, and subsequently executed a term sheet outlining the proposed transaction. The term sheet required 37celsius to contribute $12 million by a specified closing date and granted it an exclusivity period during which Intel could not negotiate with other parties regarding Care Innovations. The term sheet expressly limited legal obligations, stating that no binding contract would exist until a definitive agreement was executed, except for certain provisions such as confidentiality and exclusivity.

After 37celsius failed to provide proof of the required funds by the closing date, Intel sold Care Innovations to another buyer. 37celsius filed suit in Wisconsin state court, alleging breach of contract based on Intel’s communications with third parties during the exclusivity period. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which ruled that 37celsius was not entitled to expectation damages under the NDA and subsequently granted summary judgment for Intel, finding no reliance damages and no evidence of causation.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. It held that the term sheet was not a binding “Type II” preliminary agreement under Delaware law, as its language did not obligate the parties to negotiate in good faith. Further, even if a binding obligation existed, 37celsius could not show that Intel’s alleged breach was the but-for cause of the failed transaction, as 37celsius did not have the required funds. The court also concluded that the NDA barred expectation damages and 37celsius did not appeal the denial of reliance damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Intel.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-12-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joshua Kolar</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13297/23-13297-2025-11-17.html</id>
        	<title>Al Rushaid Petroleum Investment Company v. Siemens Energy Incorporated</title>
        	<updated>2025-11-17T11:35:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-17T11:35:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13297/23-13297-2025-11-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two Saudi Arabian companies, Al Rushaid Petroleum Investment Company and Al Rushaid Trading Company, specialized in helping foreign manufacturers access the Saudi oil and gas market. Over several decades, they entered into various agreements with Dresser-Rand Group (DRG), including exclusive sales representation and joint venture contracts related to the sale and servicing of DRG products in Saudi Arabia. In 2014, Siemens Energy announced its acquisition of DRG, which was completed in 2015. After the acquisition, Al Rushaid alleged that Siemens excluded them from contracts and joint venture benefits, misused proprietary information, and diverted business opportunities.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida first dismissed Al Rushaid’s original complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading but allowed amendment. Al Rushaid then filed an amended complaint asserting claims for tortious interference, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed all claims without prejudice, finding that Siemens was not a stranger to the relevant business relationships due to its ownership of DRG, that the unfair competition claim was improperly pleaded and lacked necessary elements, and that the unjust enrichment claim failed to meet pleading standards.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. The court held that Siemens, as owner of DRG, was not a stranger to the contracts or business relationships under Florida law, defeating the tortious interference claims. The unfair competition claim was dismissed as a shotgun pleading and for failure to allege required elements. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed for lack of clarity and because express contracts governed the subject matter. The district court’s dismissal of all claims without prejudice was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/23-13297/23-13297-2025-11-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Al Rushaid Petroleum Investment Company v. Siemens Energy Incorporated" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two Saudi Arabian companies, Al Rushaid Petroleum Investment Company and Al Rushaid Trading Company, specialized in helping foreign manufacturers access the Saudi oil and gas market. Over several decades, they entered into various agreements with Dresser-Rand Group (DRG), including exclusive sales representation and joint venture contracts related to the sale and servicing of DRG products in Saudi Arabia. In 2014, Siemens Energy announced its acquisition of DRG, which was completed in 2015. After the acquisition, Al Rushaid alleged that Siemens excluded them from contracts and joint venture benefits, misused proprietary information, and diverted business opportunities.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida first dismissed Al Rushaid’s original complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading but allowed amendment. Al Rushaid then filed an amended complaint asserting claims for tortious interference, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed all claims without prejudice, finding that Siemens was not a stranger to the relevant business relationships due to its ownership of DRG, that the unfair competition claim was improperly pleaded and lacked necessary elements, and that the unjust enrichment claim failed to meet pleading standards.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. The court held that Siemens, as owner of DRG, was not a stranger to the contracts or business relationships under Florida law, defeating the tortious interference claims. The unfair competition claim was dismissed as a shotgun pleading and for failure to allege required elements. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed for lack of clarity and because express contracts governed the subject matter. The district court’s dismissal of all claims without prejudice was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stanley Marcus</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/281-2024.html</id>
        	<title>In re Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. Merger Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-17T11:02:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-17T11:02:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/281-2024.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Canadian energy company acquired a Delaware corporation in a merger, resulting in significant change-in-control payments to three of the acquired corporation’s executives. Two of these executives negotiated the transaction. Stockholders of the acquired corporation sued, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties by the executives and the board of directors, claiming the merger was timed to benefit the executives at the expense of stockholders. They also alleged that the acquiror aided and abetted these breaches and that the executives issued a misleading proxy statement.

The Court of Chancery found that the plaintiffs proved their aiding-and-abetting claims, determining that the acquiror had constructive knowledge of and participated in the breaches. The court assessed damages, entering a judgment of approximately $200 million against the acquiror.

The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case. It reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment, holding that for an acquiror to be liable for aiding and abetting a sell-side breach of fiduciary duty, the acquiror must have actual knowledge of both the target’s breach and the wrongfulness of its own conduct. The court found that the standard of actual knowledge was not met in this case. The court also concluded that the acquiror’s actions did not constitute substantial assistance in the fiduciary breaches, as required for aiding-and-abetting liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/281-2024.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. Merger Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Canadian energy company acquired a Delaware corporation in a merger, resulting in significant change-in-control payments to three of the acquired corporation’s executives. Two of these executives negotiated the transaction. Stockholders of the acquired corporation sued, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties by the executives and the board of directors, claiming the merger was timed to benefit the executives at the expense of stockholders. They also alleged that the acquiror aided and abetted these breaches and that the executives issued a misleading proxy statement.

The Court of Chancery found that the plaintiffs proved their aiding-and-abetting claims, determining that the acquiror had constructive knowledge of and participated in the breaches. The court assessed damages, entering a judgment of approximately $200 million against the acquiror.

The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case. It reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment, holding that for an acquiror to be liable for aiding and abetting a sell-side breach of fiduciary duty, the acquiror must have actual knowledge of both the target’s breach and the wrongfulness of its own conduct. The court found that the standard of actual knowledge was not met in this case. The court also concluded that the acquiror’s actions did not constitute substantial assistance in the fiduciary breaches, as required for aiding-and-abetting liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Gary Traynor</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2025/24-ap-081.html</id>
        	<title>Lynn v. Slang Worldwide, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-13T10:16:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-13T10:16:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2025/24-ap-081.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, Shayne Lynn, was the founder and majority owner of High Fidelity, Inc., a Vermont cannabis business. In late 2020, defendants Peter Miller and Christopher Driessen, who controlled Slang Worldwide, Inc., proposed a merger between High Fidelity and Slang. They assured Lynn that Slang was financially sound and promised an $18 million investment into High Fidelity. Based on these representations, Lynn agreed to the merger in June 2021. However, Lynn later discovered that Slang was financially unstable and needed to borrow $18 million to survive. Lynn was subsequently terminated from his position.

The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Lynn&#039;s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that Lynn did not allege any actionable misrepresentations to support a fraud claim and failed to allege justifiable reliance or the existence of a duty to support a negligent misrepresentation claim. Lynn appealed the decision.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the statements made by Miller and Driessen about Slang&#039;s financial health were opinions and not actionable misrepresentations of fact. The promise of an $18 million investment was a future promise, not a misrepresentation of existing fact, and Lynn did not allege that Miller and Driessen intended to renege on the promise when it was made. The court also found that Lynn&#039;s claim of misleading financial data was not pled with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). 

Regarding the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court held that Lynn did not adequately allege justifiable reliance, as he did not claim that the truth about Slang&#039;s financial status was unavailable to him. The court affirmed the dismissal of Lynn&#039;s complaint. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2025/24-ap-081.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lynn v. Slang Worldwide, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, Shayne Lynn, was the founder and majority owner of High Fidelity, Inc., a Vermont cannabis business. In late 2020, defendants Peter Miller and Christopher Driessen, who controlled Slang Worldwide, Inc., proposed a merger between High Fidelity and Slang. They assured Lynn that Slang was financially sound and promised an $18 million investment into High Fidelity. Based on these representations, Lynn agreed to the merger in June 2021. However, Lynn later discovered that Slang was financially unstable and needed to borrow $18 million to survive. Lynn was subsequently terminated from his position.

The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Lynn&#039;s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that Lynn did not allege any actionable misrepresentations to support a fraud claim and failed to allege justifiable reliance or the existence of a duty to support a negligent misrepresentation claim. Lynn appealed the decision.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the statements made by Miller and Driessen about Slang&#039;s financial health were opinions and not actionable misrepresentations of fact. The promise of an $18 million investment was a future promise, not a misrepresentation of existing fact, and Lynn did not allege that Miller and Driessen intended to renege on the promise when it was made. The court also found that Lynn&#039;s claim of misleading financial data was not pled with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). 

Regarding the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court held that Lynn did not adequately allege justifiable reliance, as he did not claim that the truth about Slang&#039;s financial status was unavailable to him. The court affirmed the dismissal of Lynn&#039;s complaint.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Vermont</case:state>
						<case:court>Vermont Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harold Eaton</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Vermont Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-15992/23-15992-2025-05-07.html</id>
        	<title>FTC V. MICROSOFT CORPORATION,</title>
        	<updated>2025-05-07T08:00:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-05-07T08:00:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-15992/23-15992-2025-05-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) seeking a preliminary injunction to block Microsoft&#039;s acquisition of Activision Blizzard, Inc., a major video game developer. The FTC argued that the merger would likely violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition in the U.S. markets for gaming console devices, gaming subscription services, and gaming cloud-streaming services. The FTC&#039;s primary concern was that Microsoft would make Activision&#039;s popular game, Call of Duty, exclusive to its Xbox console, thereby harming competition.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the FTC&#039;s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held a five-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that the FTC had not raised serious questions regarding whether the proposed merger would likely substantially lessen competition. The court found that Microsoft lacked the incentive to make Call of Duty exclusive to Xbox, as doing so would harm its financial interests and reputation. The court also noted that Activision Blizzard had historically resisted putting its content on subscription services, and there was insufficient evidence to show that this would change absent the merger.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s decision and affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court agreed that the district court applied the correct legal standards and did not abuse its discretion or rely on clearly erroneous findings. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTC failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its Section 7 claim. The court concluded that the FTC had not demonstrated that the merger would likely substantially lessen competition in the relevant markets. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-15992/23-15992-2025-05-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FTC V. MICROSOFT CORPORATION," on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) seeking a preliminary injunction to block Microsoft&#039;s acquisition of Activision Blizzard, Inc., a major video game developer. The FTC argued that the merger would likely violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition in the U.S. markets for gaming console devices, gaming subscription services, and gaming cloud-streaming services. The FTC&#039;s primary concern was that Microsoft would make Activision&#039;s popular game, Call of Duty, exclusive to its Xbox console, thereby harming competition.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the FTC&#039;s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held a five-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that the FTC had not raised serious questions regarding whether the proposed merger would likely substantially lessen competition. The court found that Microsoft lacked the incentive to make Call of Duty exclusive to Xbox, as doing so would harm its financial interests and reputation. The court also noted that Activision Blizzard had historically resisted putting its content on subscription services, and there was insufficient evidence to show that this would change absent the merger.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court&#039;s decision and affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court agreed that the district court applied the correct legal standards and did not abuse its discretion or rely on clearly erroneous findings. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTC failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its Section 7 claim. The court concluded that the FTC had not demonstrated that the merger would likely substantially lessen competition in the relevant markets.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-05-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Daniel P. Collins</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/166-2024.html</id>
        	<title>Thompson Street Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Sonova United States Hearing Instruments, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2025-04-28T06:35:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-28T06:35:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/166-2024.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Delaware limited partnership, acting as the Members’ Representative for former members of a company, engaged in a merger agreement with a Delaware limited liability company. The merger agreement included specific notice requirements for indemnification claims, which required the acquiring company to provide written notice with reasonable detail and all available material written evidence of the claim. The agreement also stated that failure to comply with these requirements would result in forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund.

The Court of Chancery dismissed the Members’ Representative’s complaint, which sought a declaration that the acquiring company’s claim notice was invalid for failing to meet the contractual requirements. The court held that the notice was valid under the escrow agreement and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the notice provided sufficient detail and was timely.

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the merger agreement and escrow agreement should be read together as an integrated contractual scheme. The court found that the final sentence of the notice provision in the merger agreement created a condition precedent, requiring compliance with the notice requirements to avoid forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund. The court determined that it was reasonably conceivable that the acquiring company failed to comply with the notice requirements, particularly the requirement to include all available material written evidence.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Chancery for further proceedings to determine whether the acquiring company’s noncompliance with the notice requirements could be excused. The court instructed the lower court to consider whether the notice requirements were a material part of the agreed exchange and whether excusing the noncompliance would result in a disproportionate forfeiture. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/166-2024.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Thompson Street Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Sonova United States Hearing Instruments, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Delaware limited partnership, acting as the Members’ Representative for former members of a company, engaged in a merger agreement with a Delaware limited liability company. The merger agreement included specific notice requirements for indemnification claims, which required the acquiring company to provide written notice with reasonable detail and all available material written evidence of the claim. The agreement also stated that failure to comply with these requirements would result in forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund.

The Court of Chancery dismissed the Members’ Representative’s complaint, which sought a declaration that the acquiring company’s claim notice was invalid for failing to meet the contractual requirements. The court held that the notice was valid under the escrow agreement and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the notice provided sufficient detail and was timely.

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the merger agreement and escrow agreement should be read together as an integrated contractual scheme. The court found that the final sentence of the notice provision in the merger agreement created a condition precedent, requiring compliance with the notice requirements to avoid forfeiture of the right to recover from the indemnity escrow fund. The court determined that it was reasonably conceivable that the acquiring company failed to comply with the notice requirements, particularly the requirement to include all available material written evidence.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Chancery for further proceedings to determine whether the acquiring company’s noncompliance with the notice requirements could be excused. The court instructed the lower court to consider whether the notice requirements were a material part of the agreed exchange and whether excusing the noncompliance would result in a disproportionate forfeiture.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Karen L. Valihura</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2025/c-a-no-2019-0798-jtl.html</id>
        	<title>In re Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2025-02-13T07:02:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-13T07:02:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2025/c-a-no-2019-0798-jtl.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A controller orchestrated a merger that consolidated Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Kmart Corporation under Sears Holdings Corporation. The controller, through his investment funds, owned a majority of the new entity. In 2012, Sears Holdings spun off Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. (the Company) as a separate public entity, with the controller retaining a majority stake. In 2019, the Company merged with an acquisition subsidiary, with each share converted into the right to receive $3.21. Some stockholders sought appraisal, while others pursued a plenary action alleging breaches of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware coordinated the appraisal proceeding and the plenary action for discovery and trial. The court certified a class in the plenary action, which was later modified to explicitly include stockholders who sought appraisal. During the appraisal proceeding, the Company and its post-merger parent became insolvent, rendering the appraisal claimants as general creditors with no prospect of recovery. The Fund, an appraisal claimant, opted to join the plenary action. The court found the merger was not entirely fair and determined a fair price of $4.06 per share, awarding incremental damages of $0.85 per share to the class members who had received the merger consideration.

The Fund, having not received the merger consideration, sought to recover the full fair price damages award. The court held that under the precedent set by the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede &amp; Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Fund was entitled to the full fair price damages of $4.06 per share without any offset for the merger consideration it did not receive. The court concluded that the Fund could opt out of the appraisal proceeding and participate in the plenary action remedy, ensuring it was made whole. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2025/c-a-no-2019-0798-jtl.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A controller orchestrated a merger that consolidated Sears, Roebuck and Co. and Kmart Corporation under Sears Holdings Corporation. The controller, through his investment funds, owned a majority of the new entity. In 2012, Sears Holdings spun off Sears Hometown and Outlet Stores, Inc. (the Company) as a separate public entity, with the controller retaining a majority stake. In 2019, the Company merged with an acquisition subsidiary, with each share converted into the right to receive $3.21. Some stockholders sought appraisal, while others pursued a plenary action alleging breaches of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware coordinated the appraisal proceeding and the plenary action for discovery and trial. The court certified a class in the plenary action, which was later modified to explicitly include stockholders who sought appraisal. During the appraisal proceeding, the Company and its post-merger parent became insolvent, rendering the appraisal claimants as general creditors with no prospect of recovery. The Fund, an appraisal claimant, opted to join the plenary action. The court found the merger was not entirely fair and determined a fair price of $4.06 per share, awarding incremental damages of $0.85 per share to the class members who had received the merger consideration.

The Fund, having not received the merger consideration, sought to recover the full fair price damages award. The court held that under the precedent set by the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede &amp; Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Fund was entitled to the full fair price damages of $4.06 per share without any offset for the merger consideration it did not receive. The court concluded that the Fund could opt out of the appraisal proceeding and participate in the plenary action remedy, ensuring it was made whole.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>J. Travis Laster</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/139-2024.html</id>
        	<title>In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2025-01-21T07:04:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-01-21T07:04:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/139-2024.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Oracle Corporation acquired NetSuite Inc. in 2016. Following the acquisition, Oracle stockholders filed a derivative suit against Oracle directors and others, alleging that Lawrence Ellison, a co-founder and substantial equity holder in both companies, forced Oracle to overpay for NetSuite. After the Court of Chancery denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Oracle board formed a special litigation committee (SLC) to review the plaintiffs’ derivative claims. The SLC investigated and tried to settle the suit but eventually returned the case to the plaintiffs to pursue. The parties litigated over five years, and the Court of Chancery held a ten-day trial, ultimately entering judgment for the remaining defendants.

The Court of Chancery found that the special committee negotiated the NetSuite transaction untainted by Ellison’s or Oracle management’s influence. The court concluded that Ellison did not exercise general control over Oracle or specific control over the transaction. The court also found that neither Ellison nor Catz withheld material information or misled the Oracle board and special committee.

On appeal, the stockholders contended that the court erred by allowing the SLC to withhold its interview memos, applying business judgment review to a transaction involving an alleged controlling stockholder, employing the wrong legal standard when evaluating whether Ellison misled the special committee, and finding that Ellison’s alleged undisclosed future operational plans were immaterial. 

The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. The court held that the SLC did not waive work product protection during mediation and that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate substantial need or undue hardship for the interview memos. The court also affirmed the application of business judgment review, finding that Ellison did not exercise actual control over Oracle or the transaction. Finally, the court agreed that Ellison’s undisclosed post-closing plans were immaterial to the special committee’s evaluation and negotiation of the transaction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2025/139-2024.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Oracle Corporation acquired NetSuite Inc. in 2016. Following the acquisition, Oracle stockholders filed a derivative suit against Oracle directors and others, alleging that Lawrence Ellison, a co-founder and substantial equity holder in both companies, forced Oracle to overpay for NetSuite. After the Court of Chancery denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Oracle board formed a special litigation committee (SLC) to review the plaintiffs’ derivative claims. The SLC investigated and tried to settle the suit but eventually returned the case to the plaintiffs to pursue. The parties litigated over five years, and the Court of Chancery held a ten-day trial, ultimately entering judgment for the remaining defendants.

The Court of Chancery found that the special committee negotiated the NetSuite transaction untainted by Ellison’s or Oracle management’s influence. The court concluded that Ellison did not exercise general control over Oracle or specific control over the transaction. The court also found that neither Ellison nor Catz withheld material information or misled the Oracle board and special committee.

On appeal, the stockholders contended that the court erred by allowing the SLC to withhold its interview memos, applying business judgment review to a transaction involving an alleged controlling stockholder, employing the wrong legal standard when evaluating whether Ellison misled the special committee, and finding that Ellison’s alleged undisclosed future operational plans were immaterial. 

The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery’s judgment. The court held that the SLC did not waive work product protection during mediation and that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate substantial need or undue hardship for the interview memos. The court also affirmed the application of business judgment review, finding that Ellison did not exercise actual control over Oracle or the transaction. Finally, the court agreed that Ellison’s undisclosed post-closing plans were immaterial to the special committee’s evaluation and negotiation of the transaction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-01-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Collins Seitz Jr.</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2024/2023-1106-emd.html</id>
        	<title>Shareholder Representative Service LLC v. Renesas Electronics Corp.</title>
        	<updated>2024-12-23T05:12:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-12-23T05:12:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2024/2023-1106-emd.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff, Shareholder Representative Services LLC, acting as the Equityholder Representative, filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, Renesas Electronics Corporation. The dispute arises from a 2021 Merger Agreement under which Renesas acquired Celeno Communications Incorporated. Plaintiff alleges that Renesas failed to pay two Earn-Out Milestone payments related to the development of a semiconductor chip, the [REDACTED] Product, as stipulated in the Merger Agreement. Plaintiff seeks damages and specific performance of certain contractual provisions.

The Court of Chancery assigned the action to the current court on November 6, 2023. Plaintiff filed its Verified Complaint on October 31, 2023, and Renesas moved to partially dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff then filed a Verified Amended Complaint on February 28, 2024, asserting four breach of contract claims. Renesas sought dismissal of Counts One, Two, and Four. Plaintiff opposed the motion, and Renesas replied. A hearing was held on September 5, 2024, after which the court took the motion under advisement.

The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The court granted in part and denied in part Renesas&#039;s partial motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion regarding Counts One and Two, finding that Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the Tape-Out Milestone and Mass Production Milestone were met, despite Renesas&#039;s arguments to the contrary. However, the court granted the motion regarding Count Four, determining that specific performance of the meeting requirement was not warranted, as monetary damages would provide an adequate remedy. The court found that the contractual provision establishing irreparable harm was sufficient but noted that the ultimate relief sought was payment of the Earn-Out Amounts, not a meeting. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2024/2023-1106-emd.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Shareholder Representative Service LLC v. Renesas Electronics Corp." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff, Shareholder Representative Services LLC, acting as the Equityholder Representative, filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, Renesas Electronics Corporation. The dispute arises from a 2021 Merger Agreement under which Renesas acquired Celeno Communications Incorporated. Plaintiff alleges that Renesas failed to pay two Earn-Out Milestone payments related to the development of a semiconductor chip, the [REDACTED] Product, as stipulated in the Merger Agreement. Plaintiff seeks damages and specific performance of certain contractual provisions.

The Court of Chancery assigned the action to the current court on November 6, 2023. Plaintiff filed its Verified Complaint on October 31, 2023, and Renesas moved to partially dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff then filed a Verified Amended Complaint on February 28, 2024, asserting four breach of contract claims. Renesas sought dismissal of Counts One, Two, and Four. Plaintiff opposed the motion, and Renesas replied. A hearing was held on September 5, 2024, after which the court took the motion under advisement.

The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The court granted in part and denied in part Renesas&#039;s partial motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion regarding Counts One and Two, finding that Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the Tape-Out Milestone and Mass Production Milestone were met, despite Renesas&#039;s arguments to the contrary. However, the court granted the motion regarding Count Four, determining that specific performance of the meeting requirement was not warranted, as monetary damages would provide an adequate remedy. The court found that the contractual provision establishing irreparable harm was sufficient but noted that the ultimate relief sought was payment of the Earn-Out Amounts, not a meeting.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-12-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Eric M. Davis</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1137/24-1137-2024-06-17.html</id>
        	<title>INSULET CORP. v. EOFLOW, CO. LTD. </title>
        	<updated>2024-06-17T06:31:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-06-17T06:31:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1137/24-1137-2024-06-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Insulet Corp. and EOFlow are medical device manufacturers that produce insulin pump patches. Insulet began developing its OmniPod product in the early 2000s, and EOFlow started developing its EOPatch product after its founding in 2011. Around the same time, four former Insulet employees joined EOFlow. In 2023, reports surfaced that Medtronic had started a process to acquire EOFlow. Soon after, Insulet sued EOFlow for violations of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to enjoin all technical communications between EOFlow and Medtronic in view of its trade secrets claims.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts temporarily restrained EOFlow from disclosing products or manufacturing technical information related to the EOPatch or OmniPod products. The court then granted Insulet’s request for a preliminary injunction, finding strong evidence that Insulet is likely to succeed on the merits of its trade secrets claim, strong evidence of misappropriation, and that irreparable harm to Insulet crystallized when EOFlow announced an intended acquisition by Medtronic. The injunction enjoined EOFlow from manufacturing, marketing, or selling any product that was designed, developed, or manufactured, in whole or in part, using or relying on alleged trade secrets of Insulet.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The court found that the district court had failed to address the statute of limitations, lacked a tailored analysis as to what specific information actually constituted a trade secret, and found it hard to tell what subset of that information was likely to have been misappropriated by EOFlow. The court also found that the district court had failed to meaningfully engage with the public interest prong. The court concluded that Insulet had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits and other factors for a preliminary injunction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1137/24-1137-2024-06-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "INSULET CORP. v. EOFLOW, CO. LTD. " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Insulet Corp. and EOFlow are medical device manufacturers that produce insulin pump patches. Insulet began developing its OmniPod product in the early 2000s, and EOFlow started developing its EOPatch product after its founding in 2011. Around the same time, four former Insulet employees joined EOFlow. In 2023, reports surfaced that Medtronic had started a process to acquire EOFlow. Soon after, Insulet sued EOFlow for violations of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to enjoin all technical communications between EOFlow and Medtronic in view of its trade secrets claims.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts temporarily restrained EOFlow from disclosing products or manufacturing technical information related to the EOPatch or OmniPod products. The court then granted Insulet’s request for a preliminary injunction, finding strong evidence that Insulet is likely to succeed on the merits of its trade secrets claim, strong evidence of misappropriation, and that irreparable harm to Insulet crystallized when EOFlow announced an intended acquisition by Medtronic. The injunction enjoined EOFlow from manufacturing, marketing, or selling any product that was designed, developed, or manufactured, in whole or in part, using or relying on alleged trade secrets of Insulet.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The court found that the district court had failed to address the statute of limitations, lacked a tailored analysis as to what specific information actually constituted a trade secret, and found it hard to tell what subset of that information was likely to have been misappropriated by EOFlow. The court also found that the district court had failed to meaningfully engage with the public interest prong. The court concluded that Insulet had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits and other factors for a preliminary injunction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-06-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Drugs &amp; Biotech"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2024/c-a-no-2022-0571-lww.html</id>
        	<title>In Re Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV Stockholder Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2024-05-31T12:31:43-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-05-31T12:31:43-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2024/c-a-no-2022-0571-lww.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV, was formed in 2018 with the goal of merging with a private operating company. In 2019, Hennessy completed its initial public offering (IPO), selling units that included shares of common stock and redeemable warrants. In 2020, Hennessy entered into a merger agreement with Canoo Holdings Ltd., an electric vehicle start-up. The merger was approved by Hennessy&#039;s stockholders and closed in December 2020.

In the months following the merger, Canoo&#039;s new board decided to de-emphasize the company&#039;s subscription model and engineering services business line. This decision was announced in March 2021, causing Canoo&#039;s stock price to drop. The plaintiff, a Canoo stockholder, filed a lawsuit alleging that Hennessy&#039;s sponsor and directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose changes to Canoo&#039;s business model prior to the merger.

The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware dismissed the plaintiff&#039;s claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the claim that Hennessy&#039;s directors knew or should have known about the changes to Canoo&#039;s business model before the merger closed. The court also dismissed the plaintiff&#039;s unjust enrichment and aiding and abetting claims, as they were based on the same insufficiently supported allegations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2024/c-a-no-2022-0571-lww.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV, was formed in 2018 with the goal of merging with a private operating company. In 2019, Hennessy completed its initial public offering (IPO), selling units that included shares of common stock and redeemable warrants. In 2020, Hennessy entered into a merger agreement with Canoo Holdings Ltd., an electric vehicle start-up. The merger was approved by Hennessy&#039;s stockholders and closed in December 2020.

In the months following the merger, Canoo&#039;s new board decided to de-emphasize the company&#039;s subscription model and engineering services business line. This decision was announced in March 2021, causing Canoo&#039;s stock price to drop. The plaintiff, a Canoo stockholder, filed a lawsuit alleging that Hennessy&#039;s sponsor and directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose changes to Canoo&#039;s business model prior to the merger.

The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware dismissed the plaintiff&#039;s claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the claim that Hennessy&#039;s directors knew or should have known about the changes to Canoo&#039;s business model before the merger closed. The court also dismissed the plaintiff&#039;s unjust enrichment and aiding and abetting claims, as they were based on the same insufficiently supported allegations.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-05-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>WILL</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2024/49.html</id>
        	<title>Eccles v Shamrock Capital Advisors, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2024-05-23T06:07:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-05-23T06:07:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2024/49.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case revolves around a dispute concerning a 2018 merger between FanDuel Ltd. and the U.S. assets of nonparty Paddy Power Betfair plc. The plaintiffs, founders and shareholders of FanDuel, alleged that the defendants, including FanDuel&#039;s board of directors and certain shareholders, deliberately undervalued FanDuel&#039;s assets during the merger negotiations, resulting in the preferred shareholders receiving all the benefits of the merger while the common shareholders received nothing. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to obtain a fair valuation of the merger consideration and by promoting their own interests at the expense of the common shareholders.

The Supreme Court of New York County partially granted and partially denied the defendants&#039; motions to dismiss the complaint. The court held that New York law applied to the plaintiffs&#039; claims because the internal affairs doctrine was inapplicable where the defendants were not current officers, directors, and shareholders at the time of the lawsuit. The court further held that the plaintiffs adequately stated their claims for breach of fiduciary duty under New York law.

The Appellate Division reversed the order of the Supreme Court, holding that Scots law applied to the plaintiffs&#039; claims under the internal affairs doctrine. The court stated that the directors of a company generally owe duties only to the company as a whole rather than to the shareholders, except in special factual circumstances not present in this case. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Scots law.

The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the order of the Appellate Division, holding that while Scots law applied to the plaintiffs&#039; claims, the plaintiffs&#039; allegations could give rise to a possible inference that special circumstances were present, which could give rise to a cognizable fiduciary duty claim under Scots law. Therefore, the court held that the Appellate Division erroneously granted the defendants&#039; motions to dismiss the first, second, and fourth causes of action. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2024/49.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Eccles v Shamrock Capital Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case revolves around a dispute concerning a 2018 merger between FanDuel Ltd. and the U.S. assets of nonparty Paddy Power Betfair plc. The plaintiffs, founders and shareholders of FanDuel, alleged that the defendants, including FanDuel&#039;s board of directors and certain shareholders, deliberately undervalued FanDuel&#039;s assets during the merger negotiations, resulting in the preferred shareholders receiving all the benefits of the merger while the common shareholders received nothing. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to obtain a fair valuation of the merger consideration and by promoting their own interests at the expense of the common shareholders.

The Supreme Court of New York County partially granted and partially denied the defendants&#039; motions to dismiss the complaint. The court held that New York law applied to the plaintiffs&#039; claims because the internal affairs doctrine was inapplicable where the defendants were not current officers, directors, and shareholders at the time of the lawsuit. The court further held that the plaintiffs adequately stated their claims for breach of fiduciary duty under New York law.

The Appellate Division reversed the order of the Supreme Court, holding that Scots law applied to the plaintiffs&#039; claims under the internal affairs doctrine. The court stated that the directors of a company generally owe duties only to the company as a whole rather than to the shareholders, except in special factual circumstances not present in this case. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Scots law.

The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the order of the Appellate Division, holding that while Scots law applied to the plaintiffs&#039; claims, the plaintiffs&#039; allegations could give rise to a possible inference that special circumstances were present, which could give rise to a cognizable fiduciary duty claim under Scots law. Therefore, the court held that the Appellate Division erroneously granted the defendants&#039; motions to dismiss the first, second, and fourth causes of action.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-05-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>New York</case:state>
						<case:court>New York Court of Appeals</case:court>
							<case:judge>Singas</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="New York Court of Appeals"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2024/305-2023.html</id>
        	<title>City of Sarasota Firefighters&#039; Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2024-05-01T05:32:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-05-01T05:32:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2024/305-2023.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a group of pension funds (plaintiffs) who filed a lawsuit against Inovalon Holdings, Inc., and its board of directors (defendants), challenging an acquisition of Inovalon by a private equity consortium led by Nordic Capital. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and unjustly enriched themselves through the transaction. They also alleged that the company&#039;s charter was violated because the transaction treated Class A and Class B stockholders unequally.

In the lower court, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the transaction satisfied the elements of a legal framework known as MFW, which would subject the board&#039;s actions to business judgment review. The Court of Chancery granted the defendants&#039; motions to dismiss in full.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in holding that the vote of the minority stockholders was adequately informed. The Supreme Court determined that the proxy statement issued to stockholders failed to adequately disclose certain conflicts of interest of the Special Committee’s advisors. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the transaction did not comply with the MFW framework, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2024/305-2023.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "City of Sarasota Firefighters&#039; Pension Fund v. Inovalon Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a group of pension funds (plaintiffs) who filed a lawsuit against Inovalon Holdings, Inc., and its board of directors (defendants), challenging an acquisition of Inovalon by a private equity consortium led by Nordic Capital. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and unjustly enriched themselves through the transaction. They also alleged that the company&#039;s charter was violated because the transaction treated Class A and Class B stockholders unequally.

In the lower court, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the transaction satisfied the elements of a legal framework known as MFW, which would subject the board&#039;s actions to business judgment review. The Court of Chancery granted the defendants&#039; motions to dismiss in full.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed the decision of the Court of Chancery. The Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in holding that the vote of the minority stockholders was adequately informed. The Supreme Court determined that the proxy statement issued to stockholders failed to adequately disclose certain conflicts of interest of the Special Committee’s advisors. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the transaction did not comply with the MFW framework, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-05-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Valihura</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2024/29.html</id>
        	<title>Lelchook v Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL</title>
        	<updated>2024-04-18T07:07:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-04-18T07:07:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2024/29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves 21 U.S. citizens and the family of a deceased U.S. citizen who were victims of rocket attacks by the Hizbollah terrorist organization in Israel in 2006. The plaintiffs allege that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) provided financial services to Hizbollah, including facilitating millions of dollars in wire transfers through a New York-based correspondent bank. In 2011, LCB and Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (SGBL), a private company incorporated in Lebanon, executed a purchase agreement where SGBL acquired all of LCB&#039;s assets and liabilities. In 2019, the plaintiffs brought similar claims against SGBL, as LCB&#039;s successor, in the Eastern District of New York for damages stemming from the 2006 attacks.

The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over SGBL. The court interpreted several Appellate Division and federal decisions to allow imputation of jurisdictional status only in the event of a merger, not an acquisition of all assets and liabilities. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals, asking whether an entity that acquires all of another entity&#039;s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherits the acquired entity&#039;s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, and under what circumstances the acquiring entity would be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York.

The New York Court of Appeals answered the first question affirmatively, stating that where an entity acquires all of another entity&#039;s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, it inherits the acquired entity&#039;s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The court declined to answer the second question as unnecessary. The court reasoned that allowing a successor to acquire all assets and liabilities, but escape jurisdiction in a forum where its predecessor would have been answerable for those liabilities, would allow those assets to be shielded from direct claims for those liabilities in that forum. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2024/29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lelchook v Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves 21 U.S. citizens and the family of a deceased U.S. citizen who were victims of rocket attacks by the Hizbollah terrorist organization in Israel in 2006. The plaintiffs allege that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) provided financial services to Hizbollah, including facilitating millions of dollars in wire transfers through a New York-based correspondent bank. In 2011, LCB and Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (SGBL), a private company incorporated in Lebanon, executed a purchase agreement where SGBL acquired all of LCB&#039;s assets and liabilities. In 2019, the plaintiffs brought similar claims against SGBL, as LCB&#039;s successor, in the Eastern District of New York for damages stemming from the 2006 attacks.

The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over SGBL. The court interpreted several Appellate Division and federal decisions to allow imputation of jurisdictional status only in the event of a merger, not an acquisition of all assets and liabilities. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals, asking whether an entity that acquires all of another entity&#039;s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherits the acquired entity&#039;s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, and under what circumstances the acquiring entity would be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York.

The New York Court of Appeals answered the first question affirmatively, stating that where an entity acquires all of another entity&#039;s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, it inherits the acquired entity&#039;s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. The court declined to answer the second question as unnecessary. The court reasoned that allowing a successor to acquire all assets and liabilities, but escape jurisdiction in a forum where its predecessor would have been answerable for those liabilities, would allow those assets to be shielded from direct claims for those liabilities in that forum.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-04-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>New York</case:state>
						<case:court>New York Court of Appeals</case:court>
							<case:judge>Halligan</case:judge>
													<category term="Banking"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="New York Court of Appeals"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60167/23-60167-2023-12-15.html</id>
        	<title>Illumina v. FTC</title>
        	<updated>2023-12-15T16:30:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-12-15T16:30:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60167/23-60167-2023-12-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2020, Illumina, a for-profit corporation that manufactures and sells next-generation sequencing (NGS) platforms, which are crucial tools for DNA sequencing, entered into an agreement to acquire Grail, a company it had initially founded and then spun off as a separate entity in 2016. Grail specializes in developing multi-cancer early detection (MCED) tests, which are designed to identify various types of cancer from a single blood sample. Illumina&#039;s acquisition of Grail was seen as a significant step toward bringing Grail’s developed MCED test, Galleri, to market.

However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) objected to the acquisition, arguing that it violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition. The FTC contended that because all MCED tests, including those still in development, relied on Illumina’s NGS platforms, the merger would potentially give Illumina the ability and incentive to foreclose Grail’s rivals from the MCED test market.

Illumina responded by creating a standardized supply contract, known as the &quot;Open Offer,&quot; which guaranteed that it would provide its NGS platforms to all for-profit U.S. oncology customers at the same price and with the same access to services and products as Grail. Despite this, the FTC ordered the merger to be unwound.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the FTC had applied an erroneous legal standard in evaluating the impact of the Open Offer. The court ruled that the FTC should have considered the Open Offer at the liability stage of its analysis, rather than as a remedy following a finding of liability. Furthermore, the court determined that to rebut the FTC&#039;s prima facie case, Illumina was not required to show that the Open Offer would completely negate the anticompetitive effects of the merger, but rather that it would mitigate these effects to a degree that the merger was no longer likely to substantially lessen competition.

The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the FTC’s conclusions regarding the likely substantial lessening of competition and the lack of cognizable efficiencies to rebut the anticompetitive effects of the merger. However, given its finding that the FTC had applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the Open Offer, the court vacated the FTC’s order and remanded the case for further consideration of the Open Offer&#039;s impact under the proper standard. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/23-60167/23-60167-2023-12-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Illumina v. FTC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2020, Illumina, a for-profit corporation that manufactures and sells next-generation sequencing (NGS) platforms, which are crucial tools for DNA sequencing, entered into an agreement to acquire Grail, a company it had initially founded and then spun off as a separate entity in 2016. Grail specializes in developing multi-cancer early detection (MCED) tests, which are designed to identify various types of cancer from a single blood sample. Illumina&#039;s acquisition of Grail was seen as a significant step toward bringing Grail’s developed MCED test, Galleri, to market.

However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) objected to the acquisition, arguing that it violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition. The FTC contended that because all MCED tests, including those still in development, relied on Illumina’s NGS platforms, the merger would potentially give Illumina the ability and incentive to foreclose Grail’s rivals from the MCED test market.

Illumina responded by creating a standardized supply contract, known as the &quot;Open Offer,&quot; which guaranteed that it would provide its NGS platforms to all for-profit U.S. oncology customers at the same price and with the same access to services and products as Grail. Despite this, the FTC ordered the merger to be unwound.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the FTC had applied an erroneous legal standard in evaluating the impact of the Open Offer. The court ruled that the FTC should have considered the Open Offer at the liability stage of its analysis, rather than as a remedy following a finding of liability. Furthermore, the court determined that to rebut the FTC&#039;s prima facie case, Illumina was not required to show that the Open Offer would completely negate the anticompetitive effects of the merger, but rather that it would mitigate these effects to a degree that the merger was no longer likely to substantially lessen competition.

The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the FTC’s conclusions regarding the likely substantial lessening of competition and the lack of cognizable efficiencies to rebut the anticompetitive effects of the merger. However, given its finding that the FTC had applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the Open Offer, the court vacated the FTC’s order and remanded the case for further consideration of the Open Offer&#039;s impact under the proper standard.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-12-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Edith Brown Clement</case:judge>
													<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2023/2022-0666-ksjm.html</id>
        	<title>Crispo v. Musk</title>
        	<updated>2023-10-31T10:32:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-10-31T10:32:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2023/2022-0666-ksjm.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case surrounding the acquisition of Twitter Inc., the Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff&#039;s motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff&#039;s claim was without merit. 

Defendants Elon R. Musk, X Holdings I, Inc., and X Holdings II, Inc. agreed to acquire Twitter Inc. pursuant to an agreement and plan of merger (merger agreement). After Defendants&#039; counsel sent a letter to Twitter claiming to terminate the merger agreement Twitter filed a complaint seeking specific enforcement. Thereafter, the deal closed on the original terms of the merger agreement. Plaintiff, who held 5,500 shares of Twitter common stock, brought suit seeking specific performance and damages, claiming that Elon Musk breached his fiduciary duties as a controller of Twitter and that Defendants breached the merger agreement. This Court issued a memorandum opinion dismissing most of Plaintiff&#039;s complaint, leaving open the possibility that the damages provision in the merger agreement conveyed third-party beneficiary status to stockholders claiming damages for breach of the agreement. Months later, Plaintiff claimed partial credit for the consummation of the deal and petitioned for mootness fees in the amount of $3 million. The Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff&#039;s motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff&#039;s claim was not meritorious when filed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2023/2022-0666-ksjm.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Crispo v. Musk" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case surrounding the acquisition of Twitter Inc., the Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff&#039;s motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff&#039;s claim was without merit. 

Defendants Elon R. Musk, X Holdings I, Inc., and X Holdings II, Inc. agreed to acquire Twitter Inc. pursuant to an agreement and plan of merger (merger agreement). After Defendants&#039; counsel sent a letter to Twitter claiming to terminate the merger agreement Twitter filed a complaint seeking specific enforcement. Thereafter, the deal closed on the original terms of the merger agreement. Plaintiff, who held 5,500 shares of Twitter common stock, brought suit seeking specific performance and damages, claiming that Elon Musk breached his fiduciary duties as a controller of Twitter and that Defendants breached the merger agreement. This Court issued a memorandum opinion dismissing most of Plaintiff&#039;s complaint, leaving open the possibility that the damages provision in the merger agreement conveyed third-party beneficiary status to stockholders claiming damages for breach of the agreement. Months later, Plaintiff claimed partial credit for the consummation of the deal and petitioned for mootness fees in the amount of $3 million. The Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff&#039;s motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff&#039;s claim was not meritorious when filed.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                In this case surrounding the acquisition of Twitter Inc. the Court of Chancery denied Plaintiff&#039;s motion for mootness fees, holding that Plaintiff&#039;s claim was without merit.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-10-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>McCormick</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>2022-0666-KSJM</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2695/21-2695-2023-01-23.html</id>
        	<title>Joy Global Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co.</title>
        	<updated>2023-01-23T12:31:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-01-23T12:31:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2695/21-2695-2023-01-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Joy Global and Komatsu agreed to merge.  Joy sent its investors disclosures required under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n.  Subsequent suits contended that Joy violated the Act by not disclosing some internal projections of Joy’s future growth that could have been used to negotiate a higher price, rendering the proxy statements fraudulent, and that Joy’s directors violated their state law duties by not maximizing the price for the shareholders. The suits settled for $21 million.

The district court held that the $21 million loss is not covered by insurance. The policies do not require indemnification for “any amount of any judgment or settlement of any Inadequate Consideration Claim other than Defense Costs.” An “inadequate consideration claim” is that part of any Claim alleging that the price or consideration paid or proposed to be paid for the acquisition or completion of the acquisition of all or substantially all the ownership interest in or assets of an entity is inadequate. 

The Seventh Circuit affirmed.  The suits assert the wrongful act of failing to disclose documents that could have been used to seek a higher price and are within the definition of “inadequate consideration claim.”  The claims do not identify any false or deficient disclosures about anything other than the price. The only objection to this merger was that Joy should have held out for more money, and that revealing this would have induced the investors to vote “no.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2695/21-2695-2023-01-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Joy Global Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Joy Global and Komatsu agreed to merge.  Joy sent its investors disclosures required under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n.  Subsequent suits contended that Joy violated the Act by not disclosing some internal projections of Joy’s future growth that could have been used to negotiate a higher price, rendering the proxy statements fraudulent, and that Joy’s directors violated their state law duties by not maximizing the price for the shareholders. The suits settled for $21 million.

The district court held that the $21 million loss is not covered by insurance. The policies do not require indemnification for “any amount of any judgment or settlement of any Inadequate Consideration Claim other than Defense Costs.” An “inadequate consideration claim” is that part of any Claim alleging that the price or consideration paid or proposed to be paid for the acquisition or completion of the acquisition of all or substantially all the ownership interest in or assets of an entity is inadequate. 

The Seventh Circuit affirmed.  The suits assert the wrongful act of failing to disclose documents that could have been used to seek a higher price and are within the definition of “inadequate consideration claim.”  The claims do not identify any false or deficient disclosures about anything other than the price. The only objection to this merger was that Joy should have held out for more money, and that revealing this would have induced the investors to vote “no.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Insurance does not require indemnification for the settlement of a suit, claiming violation of the Securities Exchange Act for failure to disclose internal projections of a company&#039;s future growth that could have been used to negotiate a higher price in a merger.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-01-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Frank Hoover Easterbrook</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2695</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/20-2835/20-2835-2021-05-19.html</id>
        	<title>Shepard v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.</title>
        	<updated>2021-05-19T07:30:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-05-19T07:30:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/20-2835/20-2835-2021-05-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of a complaint brought by plaintiff against Employers Mutual and Defendant Kelley, asserting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff was a minority shareholder of EMC, a spin-off from Employers Mutual. Defendant Kelley was the CEO and director of both EMCI and Employers Mutual. Plaintiff alleges that Employers Mutual structured EMCI as a shell company, preventing it from becoming a valuable company or acting independently from Employers Mutual. Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that, in the years leading up to the squeeze-out merger initiated by Employers to purchase EMCI&#039;s remaining shares, defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to him as a minority shareholder of EMCI. 

The court concluded that plaintiff&#039;s claim did not arise in the context of a contractual relationship; his alleged injury arose only from his status as a shareholder of EMCI; and this was insufficient under Iowa law to plausibly plead a special duty arising out of a contractual relationship. Furthermore, plaintiff did not adequately plead that his injury arose from a special duty. The court also concluded that plaintiff did not allege that his voting rights were ever affected by Employers Mutual and Kelley&#039;s alleged mismanagement. Even if this were Iowa law, plaintiff would not meet this exception.

Accordingly, because plaintiff&#039;s claim is derivative in nature, he must satisfy federal and Iowa requirements for a filing a derivative action, which he has failed to do so. In this case, the complaint did not state with particularity plaintiff&#039;s efforts to enforce minority shareholder rights in the years leading up to the squeeze out. Furthermore, the complaint did not allege that he petitioned the directors or other shareholders in writing, or that 90 days have expired since delivery of the demand and EMCI rejected his request, or irreparable injury would result by waiting for the expiration of the ninety days. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/20-2835/20-2835-2021-05-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Shepard v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of a complaint brought by plaintiff against Employers Mutual and Defendant Kelley, asserting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff was a minority shareholder of EMC, a spin-off from Employers Mutual. Defendant Kelley was the CEO and director of both EMCI and Employers Mutual. Plaintiff alleges that Employers Mutual structured EMCI as a shell company, preventing it from becoming a valuable company or acting independently from Employers Mutual. Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that, in the years leading up to the squeeze-out merger initiated by Employers to purchase EMCI&#039;s remaining shares, defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to him as a minority shareholder of EMCI. 

The court concluded that plaintiff&#039;s claim did not arise in the context of a contractual relationship; his alleged injury arose only from his status as a shareholder of EMCI; and this was insufficient under Iowa law to plausibly plead a special duty arising out of a contractual relationship. Furthermore, plaintiff did not adequately plead that his injury arose from a special duty. The court also concluded that plaintiff did not allege that his voting rights were ever affected by Employers Mutual and Kelley&#039;s alleged mismanagement. Even if this were Iowa law, plaintiff would not meet this exception.

Accordingly, because plaintiff&#039;s claim is derivative in nature, he must satisfy federal and Iowa requirements for a filing a derivative action, which he has failed to do so. In this case, the complaint did not state with particularity plaintiff&#039;s efforts to enforce minority shareholder rights in the years leading up to the squeeze out. Furthermore, the complaint did not allege that he petitioned the directors or other shareholders in writing, or that 90 days have expired since delivery of the demand and EMCI rejected his request, or irreparable injury would result by waiting for the expiration of the ninety days.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of a complaint brought by plaintiff against Employers Mutual and Defendant Kelley, asserting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty stemming from a squeeze-out merger.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-05-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Duane Benton</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2835</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/19-2927/19-2927-2021-03-08.html</id>
        	<title>Azarax, Inc. v. Syverson</title>
        	<updated>2021-03-08T08:30:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-03-08T08:30:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/19-2927/19-2927-2021-03-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Azarax filed suit against defendant and his law firm, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Azarax claimed that defendant and his firm were negligent in their representation of Convey Mexico and that Azarax had claims against defendant and his firm as a successor by merger to Convey Mexico. 

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of the complaint and agreed with the district court that Azarax was not a valid successor in interest to Convey Mexico. In this case, the summary judgment record established that the shareholders of Convey Mexico did not unanimously provide written consent for the merger with Azarax Holding, so the merger was not valid. Therefore, Azarax lacked standing to sue defendant and his law firm. The court modified the judgment to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/19-2927/19-2927-2021-03-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Azarax, Inc. v. Syverson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Azarax filed suit against defendant and his law firm, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Azarax claimed that defendant and his firm were negligent in their representation of Convey Mexico and that Azarax had claims against defendant and his firm as a successor by merger to Convey Mexico. 

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of the complaint and agreed with the district court that Azarax was not a valid successor in interest to Convey Mexico. In this case, the summary judgment record established that the shareholders of Convey Mexico did not unanimously provide written consent for the merger with Azarax Holding, so the merger was not valid. Therefore, Azarax lacked standing to sue defendant and his law firm. The court modified the judgment to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of the complaint and agreed with the district court that Azarax was not a valid successor in interest to Convey Mexico.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-03-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven M. Colloton</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-2927</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/19-1397/19-1397-2021-02-18.html</id>
        	<title>Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2021-02-18T11:30:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-02-18T11:30:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/19-1397/19-1397-2021-02-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		JELD-WEN&#039;s customers, Steves and Sons, filed suit challenging JELD-WEN&#039;s acquisition of a competitor. After a jury found that the merger violated the Clayton Antitrust Act and that Steves and Sons was entitled to treble damages, the district court granted Steves and Sons&#039; request to unwind the merger and plans to hold an auction for the merged assets after this appeal. The district court then held another trial before a different jury on JELD-WEN&#039;s countersuit against Steves and Sons for trade secret misappropriation, allowing three individuals to intervene in the case. The jury ruled in favor of Steves and Sons on most of JELD-WEN&#039;s claims and entered judgment for the intervenors.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court properly declined to grant JELD-WEN judgment as a matter of law on whether Steves and Sons demonstrated antitrust injury; the district court acted within its discretion by excluding certain evidence from the antitrust trial and by ordering JELD-WEN to unwind the merger, rejecting JELD-WEN&#039;s laches defense in the process; the district court properly found that equitable relief under the Clayton Act was appropriate because the merger created a significant threat that Steves and Sons will go out of business in 2021; and JELD-WEN has not shown that the district court&#039;s jury instructions in the trade-secrets trial were improper.

However, the court vacated the jury&#039;s award of future lost profits to Steves and Sons in the antitrust trial because the issue is not ripe. The court explained that the injury on which the future lost profits award was premised cannot occur until September 2021, and the Clayton Act requires a plaintiff seeking damages—as opposed to equitable relief—to &quot;show actual injury.&quot; The court also vacated the district court&#039;s entry of judgment for the intervenors in the trade-secrets case because JELD-WEN brought no claims against them. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/19-1397/19-1397-2021-02-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                JELD-WEN&#039;s customers, Steves and Sons, filed suit challenging JELD-WEN&#039;s acquisition of a competitor. After a jury found that the merger violated the Clayton Antitrust Act and that Steves and Sons was entitled to treble damages, the district court granted Steves and Sons&#039; request to unwind the merger and plans to hold an auction for the merged assets after this appeal. The district court then held another trial before a different jury on JELD-WEN&#039;s countersuit against Steves and Sons for trade secret misappropriation, allowing three individuals to intervene in the case. The jury ruled in favor of Steves and Sons on most of JELD-WEN&#039;s claims and entered judgment for the intervenors.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court properly declined to grant JELD-WEN judgment as a matter of law on whether Steves and Sons demonstrated antitrust injury; the district court acted within its discretion by excluding certain evidence from the antitrust trial and by ordering JELD-WEN to unwind the merger, rejecting JELD-WEN&#039;s laches defense in the process; the district court properly found that equitable relief under the Clayton Act was appropriate because the merger created a significant threat that Steves and Sons will go out of business in 2021; and JELD-WEN has not shown that the district court&#039;s jury instructions in the trade-secrets trial were improper.

However, the court vacated the jury&#039;s award of future lost profits to Steves and Sons in the antitrust trial because the issue is not ripe. The court explained that the injury on which the future lost profits award was premised cannot occur until September 2021, and the Clayton Act requires a plaintiff seeking damages—as opposed to equitable relief—to &quot;show actual injury.&quot; The court also vacated the district court&#039;s entry of judgment for the intervenors in the trade-secrets case because JELD-WEN brought no claims against them.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court properly declined to grant JELD-WEN judgment as a matter of law on whether Steves and Sons demonstrated antitrust injury; the court vacated the jury&#039;s award of future lost profits to Steves and Sons in the antitrust trial because the issue is not ripe.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-02-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Albert Diaz</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>19-1397</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2020/368-2019.html</id>
        	<title>City of Fort Myers General Employees&#039; Pension Fund v. Haley</title>
        	<updated>2020-06-30T12:01:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2020-06-30T12:01:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2020/368-2019.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Towers Watson &amp; Co. (“Towers”) and Willis Group Holdings Public Limited Company (“Willis”) executed a merger agreement with closing conditioned on the approval of their respective stockholders. Although Towers had stronger performance and greater market capitalization, Willis stockholders were to receive the majority (50.1 percent) of the post-merger company. Upon the merger’s public announcement, several segments of the investment community criticized the transaction as a bad deal for Towers and a windfall for Willis. Towers’ stock price declined and Willis’s rose in reaction to the news. Proxy advisory firms recommended that the Towers stockholders vote against the merger, and one activist stockholder began questioning whether Towers’ management’s incentives were aligned with stockholder interests. Also, after announcing the merger, ValueAct Capital Management, L.P. (“ValueAct”), an institutional stockholder of Willis, through its Chief Investment Officer, Jeffrey Ubben, presented to John Haley, the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chairman of Towers who was spearheading the merger negotiations, a compensation proposal with the post-merger company that would potentially provide Haley with a five-fold increase in compensation. Haley did not disclose this proposal to the Towers Board. In light of the uncertainty of stockholder approval, Haley renegotiated the transaction terms to increase the special dividend. Towers eventually obtained stockholder approval of the renegotiated merger. The transaction closed in January 2016, and the companies merged to form Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company (“Willis Towers”). Haley became the CEO of Willis Towers and was granted an executive compensation package with a long-term equity opportunity similar to ValueAct’s proposal. At issue were stockholder suits filed in early 2018. Here, Towers stockholders alleged that Haley breached his duty of loyalty by negotiating the merger on behalf of Towers while failing to disclose to the Towers Board the compensation proposal. The Court of Chancery dismissed the claims, holding that the business judgment rule applied because “a reasonable board member would not have regarded the proposal as significant when evaluating the proposed transaction,” and further holding that plaintiffs had failed to plead a non-exculpated bad faith claim against the Towers directors. To the Delaware Supreme Court, plaintiffs argued the Court of Chancery erred in holding the executive compensation proposal was not material to the Towers Board. To this, the Supreme Court concurred, reversed the Court of Chancery, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2020/368-2019.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "City of Fort Myers General Employees&#039; Pension Fund v. Haley" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Towers Watson &amp; Co. (“Towers”) and Willis Group Holdings Public Limited Company (“Willis”) executed a merger agreement with closing conditioned on the approval of their respective stockholders. Although Towers had stronger performance and greater market capitalization, Willis stockholders were to receive the majority (50.1 percent) of the post-merger company. Upon the merger’s public announcement, several segments of the investment community criticized the transaction as a bad deal for Towers and a windfall for Willis. Towers’ stock price declined and Willis’s rose in reaction to the news. Proxy advisory firms recommended that the Towers stockholders vote against the merger, and one activist stockholder began questioning whether Towers’ management’s incentives were aligned with stockholder interests. Also, after announcing the merger, ValueAct Capital Management, L.P. (“ValueAct”), an institutional stockholder of Willis, through its Chief Investment Officer, Jeffrey Ubben, presented to John Haley, the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chairman of Towers who was spearheading the merger negotiations, a compensation proposal with the post-merger company that would potentially provide Haley with a five-fold increase in compensation. Haley did not disclose this proposal to the Towers Board. In light of the uncertainty of stockholder approval, Haley renegotiated the transaction terms to increase the special dividend. Towers eventually obtained stockholder approval of the renegotiated merger. The transaction closed in January 2016, and the companies merged to form Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company (“Willis Towers”). Haley became the CEO of Willis Towers and was granted an executive compensation package with a long-term equity opportunity similar to ValueAct’s proposal. At issue were stockholder suits filed in early 2018. Here, Towers stockholders alleged that Haley breached his duty of loyalty by negotiating the merger on behalf of Towers while failing to disclose to the Towers Board the compensation proposal. The Court of Chancery dismissed the claims, holding that the business judgment rule applied because “a reasonable board member would not have regarded the proposal as significant when evaluating the proposed transaction,” and further holding that plaintiffs had failed to plead a non-exculpated bad faith claim against the Towers directors. To the Delaware Supreme Court, plaintiffs argued the Court of Chancery erred in holding the executive compensation proposal was not material to the Towers Board. To this, the Supreme Court concurred, reversed the Court of Chancery, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2020-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Karen L. Valihura</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>368, 2019</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/18-1764/18-1764-2019-08-07.html</id>
        	<title>Chase v. First Federal Bank of Kansas City</title>
        	<updated>2019-08-07T07:30:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2019-08-07T07:30:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/18-1764/18-1764-2019-08-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of plaintiffs&#039; putative class action against First Federal and former directors of Inter-State. Plaintiffs alleged that Inter-State&#039;s merger with First Federal was inequitable because Inter-State had $25 million more than First Federal in excess capital. Plaintiffs claimed that the surplus should have been distributed to Inter-State&#039;s members instead of becoming part of the merged entity, and that the decision to merge should have been decided by a vote of Intra-State&#039;s members.

The court held that the district court correctly concluded, based on long-standing Supreme Court precedent, that Inter-State&#039;s members did not have an ownership interest in its surplus. Even assuming a provision in Inter-State&#039;s charter was unique and that this was a case of first impression, the court held that Inter-State&#039;s members would not have an ownership interest in the $25 million surplus based on the provision&#039;s plain language. Therefore, without an ownership interest, plaintiffs have not stated a claim against defendants and the district court properly dismissed their claims expressly premised on an ownership interest in the surplus. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/18-1764/18-1764-2019-08-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Chase v. First Federal Bank of Kansas City" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of plaintiffs&#039; putative class action against First Federal and former directors of Inter-State. Plaintiffs alleged that Inter-State&#039;s merger with First Federal was inequitable because Inter-State had $25 million more than First Federal in excess capital. Plaintiffs claimed that the surplus should have been distributed to Inter-State&#039;s members instead of becoming part of the merged entity, and that the decision to merge should have been decided by a vote of Intra-State&#039;s members.

The court held that the district court correctly concluded, based on long-standing Supreme Court precedent, that Inter-State&#039;s members did not have an ownership interest in its surplus. Even assuming a provision in Inter-State&#039;s charter was unique and that this was a case of first impression, the court held that Inter-State&#039;s members would not have an ownership interest in the $25 million surplus based on the provision&#039;s plain language. Therefore, without an ownership interest, plaintiffs have not stated a claim against defendants and the district court properly dismissed their claims expressly premised on an ownership interest in the surplus.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Without an ownership interest, plaintiffs have not stated a claim against defendants, and thus the district court properly dismissed their claims expressly premised on an ownership interest in the surplus at issue.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2019-08-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond W. Gruender</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-1764</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/17-3783/17-3783-2019-06-13.html</id>
        	<title>Federal Trade Commission v. Sanford Health</title>
        	<updated>2019-06-13T07:30:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2019-06-13T07:30:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/17-3783/17-3783-2019-06-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The FTC and the State of North Dakota moved to enjoin Sanford Bismarck&#039;s acquisition of Mid Dakota, alleging that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. The district court determined that plaintiffs would likely succeed in showing the acquisition would substantially lessen competition in four types of physician services in the Bismarck-Mandan area.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s grant of a preliminary injunction, holding that the district court did not improperly shift the ultimate burden of persuasion to defendants and properly followed the analytical framework in U.S. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.ed 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990); the district court did not clearly err in defining the relevant market; and the district court&#039;s finding on merger-specific efficiencies was not clear error. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/17-3783/17-3783-2019-06-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Federal Trade Commission v. Sanford Health" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The FTC and the State of North Dakota moved to enjoin Sanford Bismarck&#039;s acquisition of Mid Dakota, alleging that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. The district court determined that plaintiffs would likely succeed in showing the acquisition would substantially lessen competition in four types of physician services in the Bismarck-Mandan area.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s grant of a preliminary injunction, holding that the district court did not improperly shift the ultimate burden of persuasion to defendants and properly followed the analytical framework in U.S. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.ed 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990); the district court did not clearly err in defining the relevant market; and the district court&#039;s finding on merger-specific efficiencies was not clear error.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court&#039;s grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining Sanford Bismarck&#039;s acquisition of Mid Dakota under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2019-06-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Steven M. Colloton</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>17-3783</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/18-100/18-100-2019-04-12.html</id>
        	<title>Fasano v. Li</title>
        	<updated>2019-04-12T06:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2019-04-12T06:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/18-100/18-100-2019-04-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Second Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s dismissal of plaintiff&#039;s complaint, based on forum non conveniens grounds, alleging claims for damages under federal and state law in connection with a ʺgoing private mergerʺ by which certain controlling defendants purchased American Depositary Shares (ADSs) from Dangdang&#039;s minority shareholders.

The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the forum selection clause contained in the relevant documents and its impact on the forum non conveniens analysis. The court rejected defendants&#039; claim that plaintiffs waived their reliance on the forum selection clause by failing to raise the issue in the district court. The court also held that remand to the district court was necessary for the district court to consider the scope and enforceability of the forum selection clause. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/18-100/18-100-2019-04-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Fasano v. Li" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Second Circuit vacated the district court&#039;s dismissal of plaintiff&#039;s complaint, based on forum non conveniens grounds, alleging claims for damages under federal and state law in connection with a ʺgoing private mergerʺ by which certain controlling defendants purchased American Depositary Shares (ADSs) from Dangdang&#039;s minority shareholders.

The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the forum selection clause contained in the relevant documents and its impact on the forum non conveniens analysis. The court rejected defendants&#039; claim that plaintiffs waived their reliance on the forum selection clause by failing to raise the issue in the district court. The court also held that remand to the district court was necessary for the district court to consider the scope and enforceability of the forum selection clause.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the forum selection clause contained in the relevant documents and its impact on the forum non conveniens analysis.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2019-04-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Per Curiam</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-100</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2018/171098.html</id>
        	<title>Pure Presbyterian Church v. Grace of God Presbyterian Church</title>
        	<updated>2018-08-16T05:11:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2018-08-16T05:11:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2018/171098.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court entering an order enforcing a merger agreement between two churches, holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute.

The two churches in this case entered into a merger agreement memorializing a merger between the churches. When one of the churches (Defendant) decided it wished to withdraw from the “proposed” merger, the other church (Plaintiff), instituted this action. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding that the parties had reached a merger agreement and that Plaintiff had performed its obligations under the merger agreement. The trial court entered a final order in accord with the merger agreement and the jury’s verdict. Defendant sought to vacate the trial court’s order, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter it. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction either to adjudicate a breach of contract claim or to issue a declaratory judgment on the merger contract, and a pending bankruptcy did not foreclose the trial court’s adjudication of the merger contract. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2018/171098.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Pure Presbyterian Church v. Grace of God Presbyterian Church" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court entering an order enforcing a merger agreement between two churches, holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute.

The two churches in this case entered into a merger agreement memorializing a merger between the churches. When one of the churches (Defendant) decided it wished to withdraw from the “proposed” merger, the other church (Plaintiff), instituted this action. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding that the parties had reached a merger agreement and that Plaintiff had performed its obligations under the merger agreement. The trial court entered a final order in accord with the merger agreement and the jury’s verdict. Defendant sought to vacate the trial court’s order, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter it. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction either to adjudicate a breach of contract claim or to issue a declaratory judgment on the merger contract, and a pending bankruptcy did not foreclose the trial court’s adjudication of the merger contract.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2018-08-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Virginia</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Virginia</case:court>
							<case:judge>McCullough</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>171098</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Virginia"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/tennessee/supreme-court/2018/m2015-02222-sc-r11-cv.html</id>
        	<title>Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Duggan</title>
        	<updated>2018-06-08T12:07:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2018-06-08T12:07:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/tennessee/supreme-court/2018/m2015-02222-sc-r11-cv.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		At issue in this dissenters’ rights case was the methods by which a trial court may determine the “fair value” of shares of a dissenting shareholder under Tennessee’s dissenters’ rights statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. 48-23-101, et seq. 

The Supreme Court overruled Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983), to the extent Blasingame implicitly mandates use of the Delaware Block method for determining the fair value of a dissenting shareholder’s stock and adopted the more open approach set forth in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983), which departs from the Delaware Block method and permits fair value to be determined by using any technique or method that is generally acceptable in the financial community and admissible in court.

Defendant minority shareholders were forced out of a corporation as a result of a merger. The corporation sought a determination as to the fair value of the minority shareholders’ stock. The trial court may have based its decision to discredit the testimony of the dissenting shareholders’ expert on the basis that Blasingame compelled use of the Delaware Block method to determine stock value. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider its valuation determination in light of this decision to partially overrule Blasingame. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/tennessee/supreme-court/2018/m2015-02222-sc-r11-cv.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Duggan" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                At issue in this dissenters’ rights case was the methods by which a trial court may determine the “fair value” of shares of a dissenting shareholder under Tennessee’s dissenters’ rights statutes, Tenn. Code Ann. 48-23-101, et seq. 

The Supreme Court overruled Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983), to the extent Blasingame implicitly mandates use of the Delaware Block method for determining the fair value of a dissenting shareholder’s stock and adopted the more open approach set forth in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983), which departs from the Delaware Block method and permits fair value to be determined by using any technique or method that is generally acceptable in the financial community and admissible in court.

Defendant minority shareholders were forced out of a corporation as a result of a merger. The corporation sought a determination as to the fair value of the minority shareholders’ stock. The trial court may have based its decision to discredit the testimony of the dissenting shareholders’ expert on the basis that Blasingame compelled use of the Delaware Block method to determine stock value. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider its valuation determination in light of this decision to partially overrule Blasingame.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2018-06-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Tennessee</case:state>
						<case:court>Tennessee Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kirby</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>M2015-02222-SC-R11-CV</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Tennessee Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2018/ca-2018-0227-agb.html</id>
        	<title>City of North Miami Beach General Employees’ Retirement Plan v. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2018-06-01T08:02:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2018-06-01T08:02:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2018/ca-2018-0227-agb.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		At issue was the availability of appraisal rights under section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.

Section 262 affords stockholders of Delaware corporations a statutory remedy for appraisal of their shares under certain circumstances. The statute provides that appraisal rights shall be available only for the shares of stock of a “constituent corporation” in a merger or consolidation, and the process for determining a stockholder’s entitlement to appraisal contemplates that the stockholder will relinquish its shares in the merger of consolidation. In the instant case, Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. and Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. agreed to combine their businesses. Dr Pepper stated that Dr Pepper stockholders would not have appraisal rights under section 262 in connection with the proposed transaction. Two stockholder plaintiffs filed this action challenging that decision. The Court of Chancery held (1) the term “constituent corporation” as used in section 262 means an entity actually being merged or combined and not the parent of such an entity, and therefore, Dr Pepper’s stockholders do not have a statutory right to appraisal under section 262(b) because Dr Pepper is not a constituent corporation; and (2) Dr Pepper stockholders are not entitled to appraisal because they are retaining their shares in connection with the proposed transaction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2018/ca-2018-0227-agb.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "City of North Miami Beach General Employees’ Retirement Plan v. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                At issue was the availability of appraisal rights under section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.

Section 262 affords stockholders of Delaware corporations a statutory remedy for appraisal of their shares under certain circumstances. The statute provides that appraisal rights shall be available only for the shares of stock of a “constituent corporation” in a merger or consolidation, and the process for determining a stockholder’s entitlement to appraisal contemplates that the stockholder will relinquish its shares in the merger of consolidation. In the instant case, Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. and Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. agreed to combine their businesses. Dr Pepper stated that Dr Pepper stockholders would not have appraisal rights under section 262 in connection with the proposed transaction. Two stockholder plaintiffs filed this action challenging that decision. The Court of Chancery held (1) the term “constituent corporation” as used in section 262 means an entity actually being merged or combined and not the parent of such an entity, and therefore, Dr Pepper’s stockholders do not have a statutory right to appraisal under section 262(b) because Dr Pepper is not a constituent corporation; and (2) Dr Pepper stockholders are not entitled to appraisal because they are retaining their shares in connection with the proposed transaction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2018-06-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bouchard</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA #2018-0227-AGB</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2018/sjc-12391.html</id>
        	<title>Allison v. Eriksson</title>
        	<updated>2018-05-31T04:19:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2018-05-31T04:19:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2018/sjc-12391.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156C, 60(b) provides the exclusive remedy for dissenting members of a limited liability company that has voted to merge, so long as the merger is undertaken in accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156C, 59-63.

In this case, a member of a limited liability company (LLC) conducted a merger in breach of his fiduciary and contractual duties. The judge granted equitable relief. At issue was whether distribution of dissenting members’ interest in the LLC is the exclusive remedy of minority shareholders who objected to the merger and whether the judge erred in declining to rescind the merger. The Supreme Court held (1) where, as here, a merger was not conducted in compliance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156C, 63, the remedy provided by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156C, 60(b) providing for distribution of dissenting members’ interest is not exclusive; (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in fashioning an equitable remedy in this case, as rescission of the merger would be complicated and inequitable; and (3) the portion of the trial judge’s decision that increased Plaintiff’s  interest in the merged LLC to five percent is remanded because there was no basis in the record for that figure. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2018/sjc-12391.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Allison v. Eriksson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156C, 60(b) provides the exclusive remedy for dissenting members of a limited liability company that has voted to merge, so long as the merger is undertaken in accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156C, 59-63.

In this case, a member of a limited liability company (LLC) conducted a merger in breach of his fiduciary and contractual duties. The judge granted equitable relief. At issue was whether distribution of dissenting members’ interest in the LLC is the exclusive remedy of minority shareholders who objected to the merger and whether the judge erred in declining to rescind the merger. The Supreme Court held (1) where, as here, a merger was not conducted in compliance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156C, 63, the remedy provided by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156C, 60(b) providing for distribution of dissenting members’ interest is not exclusive; (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in fashioning an equitable remedy in this case, as rescission of the merger would be complicated and inequitable; and (3) the portion of the trial judge’s decision that increased Plaintiff’s  interest in the merged LLC to five percent is remanded because there was no basis in the record for that figure.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2018-05-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Massachusetts</case:state>
						<case:court>Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kafker</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>SJC-12391</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/17-1589/17-1589-2018-05-30.html</id>
        	<title>Blattman v. Scaramellino</title>
        	<updated>2018-05-30T13:30:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2018-05-30T13:30:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/17-1589/17-1589-2018-05-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Eric Blattman’s motion to compel Thomas Scaramellino to respond to questions regarding certain documents in this appeal arising out of a civil action brought in a Delaware federal court concerning a corporate merger between Efficiency 2.0 LLC (E2.0) and C3, Inc. 

As part of the Delaware action, Blattman attempted to depose Scaramellino, the founder of E2.0. At the deposition, Scaramellino refused to answer questions about the documents at issue by asserting attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Blattman filed a motion to compel Scaramellino to respond to his questions regarding the documents. The district court denied the motion to compel based on Scaramellino’s assertion of the work-product protection. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in ruling that Scaramellino was entitled to assert the work-product protection to defeat Blattman’s motion to compel. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/17-1589/17-1589-2018-05-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Blattman v. Scaramellino" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Eric Blattman’s motion to compel Thomas Scaramellino to respond to questions regarding certain documents in this appeal arising out of a civil action brought in a Delaware federal court concerning a corporate merger between Efficiency 2.0 LLC (E2.0) and C3, Inc. 

As part of the Delaware action, Blattman attempted to depose Scaramellino, the founder of E2.0. At the deposition, Scaramellino refused to answer questions about the documents at issue by asserting attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Blattman filed a motion to compel Scaramellino to respond to his questions regarding the documents. The district court denied the motion to compel based on Scaramellino’s assertion of the work-product protection. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in ruling that Scaramellino was entitled to assert the work-product protection to defeat Blattman’s motion to compel.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2018-05-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>David J. Barron</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>17-1589</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2018/14-1339.html</id>
        	<title>California State Teachers&#039; Retirement System v.  Blankenship</title>
        	<updated>2018-05-25T11:08:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2018-05-25T11:08:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2018/14-1339.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court denying Petitioners’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and dismissing their pending amended complaint, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that, under controlling Delaware law, Petitioners lacked standing to pursue a derivative shareholder suit.

Petitioners filed a derivative lawsuit alleging claims of breach of fiduciary duties against Massey Energy Company’s Board of Directors and corporate officers. Subsequently, faced with a potential merger between Massey and Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., Petitioners filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint seeking to add individual and class action claims on behalf of the shareholders themselves. After the merger, Respondents moved oi dismiss Petitioners’ amended complaint and motion for leave to file the proposed second amended complaint, arguing that, after the merger, Petitioners were no longer Massey shareholders and lacked standing to assert derivative claims, and that amending their complaint a second time would be futile. The circuit court dismissed the amended complaint and denied the motion for leave to file the second amended complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the circuit court’s order because Petitioners were no longer Massey shareholders. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2018/14-1339.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "California State Teachers&#039; Retirement System v.  Blankenship" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court denying Petitioners’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and dismissing their pending amended complaint, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that, under controlling Delaware law, Petitioners lacked standing to pursue a derivative shareholder suit.

Petitioners filed a derivative lawsuit alleging claims of breach of fiduciary duties against Massey Energy Company’s Board of Directors and corporate officers. Subsequently, faced with a potential merger between Massey and Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., Petitioners filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint seeking to add individual and class action claims on behalf of the shareholders themselves. After the merger, Respondents moved oi dismiss Petitioners’ amended complaint and motion for leave to file the proposed second amended complaint, arguing that, after the merger, Petitioners were no longer Massey shareholders and lacked standing to assert derivative claims, and that amending their complaint a second time would be futile. The circuit court dismissed the amended complaint and denied the motion for leave to file the second amended complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the circuit court’s order because Petitioners were no longer Massey shareholders.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2018-05-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>West Virginia</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia</case:court>
							<case:judge>Allen H. Loughry, II</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>14-1339</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2018/16-1101.html</id>
        	<title>St. Mary&#039;s Medical Center, Inc. v. Steel of West Virginia</title>
        	<updated>2018-01-31T12:03:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2018-01-31T12:03:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2018/16-1101.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Supreme Court reversed two orders of the circuit court unsealing an index of 349 documents and directing the Attorney General to produce eighty-nine of those documents. 

Steel of West Virginia, Inc. (Steel) brought this action to enforce its request for production of material under West Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Attorney General received the 349 documents at issue in connection with his investigative powers under the West Virginia Antitrust Act regarding the proposed merger of St. Mary’s Medical Center, Inc. and Cabell Huntington Hospital, Inc. The Attorney General and St. Mary’s contended that the index of the 349 documents and the eighty-nine documents to be produced were exempt from disclosure. The circuit court awarded the production of the index as a sanction against the Attorney General for sharing part of the index with the Federal Trade Commission. The Supreme Court held (1) the sanction was inappropriate; and (2) the eighty-nine documents were not subject to rpdocution because the statutory exemption set forth in W.Va. Code 29B-1-4, which incorporates the confidentiality provisions of the Antitrust Act. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2018/16-1101.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "St. Mary&#039;s Medical Center, Inc. v. Steel of West Virginia" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Supreme Court reversed two orders of the circuit court unsealing an index of 349 documents and directing the Attorney General to produce eighty-nine of those documents. 

Steel of West Virginia, Inc. (Steel) brought this action to enforce its request for production of material under West Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Attorney General received the 349 documents at issue in connection with his investigative powers under the West Virginia Antitrust Act regarding the proposed merger of St. Mary’s Medical Center, Inc. and Cabell Huntington Hospital, Inc. The Attorney General and St. Mary’s contended that the index of the 349 documents and the eighty-nine documents to be produced were exempt from disclosure. The circuit court awarded the production of the index as a sanction against the Attorney General for sharing part of the index with the Federal Trade Commission. The Supreme Court held (1) the sanction was inappropriate; and (2) the eighty-nine documents were not subject to rpdocution because the statutory exemption set forth in W.Va. Code 29B-1-4, which incorporates the confidentiality provisions of the Antitrust Act.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2018-01-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>West Virginia</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia</case:court>
							<case:judge>Menis E. Ketchum, II</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>16-1101</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>16-1032</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>16-1104</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2018/ca-12742-cb.html</id>
        	<title>IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane</title>
        	<updated>2018-01-26T10:01:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2018-01-26T10:01:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2018/ca-12742-cb.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this action arising out of a reclassification of the shares of NRG Yield, Inc. (“Yield”), a stockholder alleged that members of the Yield board breached their fiduciary duties by approving the reclassification and that NRG Energy, Inc. (“NRG”), which managed Yield’s daily affairs, breached its fiduciary duty by causing Yield to undertake the reclassification. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, holding (1) the reclassification was a conflicted transaction subject to entire fairness review; (2) the analytical framework articulated in Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), applied to the reclassification; and (3) that framework was satisfied in this case from the face of the pleadings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2018/ca-12742-cb.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this action arising out of a reclassification of the shares of NRG Yield, Inc. (“Yield”), a stockholder alleged that members of the Yield board breached their fiduciary duties by approving the reclassification and that NRG Energy, Inc. (“NRG”), which managed Yield’s daily affairs, breached its fiduciary duty by causing Yield to undertake the reclassification. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, holding (1) the reclassification was a conflicted transaction subject to entire fairness review; (2) the analytical framework articulated in Kahn v. M&amp;F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), applied to the reclassification; and (3) that framework was satisfied in this case from the face of the pleadings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2018-01-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bouchard</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA #12742-CB</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-2017-0547-jrs.html</id>
        	<title>Lavin v. West Corp.</title>
        	<updated>2017-12-29T13:32:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2017-12-29T13:32:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-2017-0547-jrs.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff filed a verified complaint against West to inspect its books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The Delaware Court of Chancery held in this post-trial opinion that plaintiff has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis from which the court can infer that wrongdoing related to the merger may have occurred. The court rejected West&#039;s argument that the Corwin doctrine would stand as an impediment to an otherwise properly supported demand for inspection under Section 220. The court explained that any contrary finding would invite defendants improperly to draw the court into adjudicating merits defenses to potential underlying claims in order to defeat otherwise properly supported Section 220 demands. Furthermore, the court should not prematurely adjudicate a Corwin defense when to do so might deprive a putative stockholder plaintiff of the ability to use Section 220 as a means to enhance the quality of his pleading. Therefore, the court ordered a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and directed West to allow inspection of the books and records at issue. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-2017-0547-jrs.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lavin v. West Corp." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff filed a verified complaint against West to inspect its books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The Delaware Court of Chancery held in this post-trial opinion that plaintiff has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, a credible basis from which the court can infer that wrongdoing related to the merger may have occurred. The court rejected West&#039;s argument that the Corwin doctrine would stand as an impediment to an otherwise properly supported demand for inspection under Section 220. The court explained that any contrary finding would invite defendants improperly to draw the court into adjudicating merits defenses to potential underlying claims in order to defeat otherwise properly supported Section 220 demands. Furthermore, the court should not prematurely adjudicate a Corwin defense when to do so might deprive a putative stockholder plaintiff of the ability to use Section 220 as a means to enhance the quality of his pleading. Therefore, the court ordered a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and directed West to allow inspection of the books and records at issue.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2017-12-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Joseph R. Slights, III</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA #2017-0547-JRS</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-12808-vcg.html</id>
        	<title>Morrison v. Berry</title>
        	<updated>2017-09-28T10:32:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2017-09-28T10:32:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-12808-vcg.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Court of Chancery dismissed a case brought by Plaintiff, a stockholder in The Fresh Market, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by the Market’s directors and that Brett Berry, a former CEO and former vice chairman of the company’s board, aided and abetted that breach of fiduciary duty. The Market was acquired by an entity controlled by a private equity firm, and the founder of the Market rolled his equity ownership in the Market into the acquirer as part of the deal. The court held that because there was no coercion applied to the fully informed vote of the common stockholders ratifying the decision of the directors that the merger was in the stockholders’ best interest and the vote was adequately informed so as to serve as a ratification of the board’s decision, the matter must be dismissed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-12808-vcg.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Morrison v. Berry" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Court of Chancery dismissed a case brought by Plaintiff, a stockholder in The Fresh Market, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by the Market’s directors and that Brett Berry, a former CEO and former vice chairman of the company’s board, aided and abetted that breach of fiduciary duty. The Market was acquired by an entity controlled by a private equity firm, and the founder of the Market rolled his equity ownership in the Market into the acquirer as part of the deal. The court held that because there was no coercion applied to the fully informed vote of the common stockholders ratifying the decision of the directors that the merger was in the stockholders’ best interest and the vote was adequately informed so as to serve as a ratification of the board’s decision, the matter must be dismissed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2017-09-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Glasscock</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA#12808-VCG</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2017/a15-0858.html</id>
        	<title>In re Medtronic, Inc. Shareholder Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2017-08-16T08:32:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2017-08-16T08:32:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2017/a15-0858.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the court of appeals’ reversal of the district court’s grant of Company’s motion to dismiss Shareholder’s class action challenge to a merger transaction. The district court concluded (1) some claims were derivative, rather than direct, and were therefore subject to the demand and pleading requirements of Minn. R. Civ. P. 23.09; and (2) Shareholder failed to comply with Rule 23.09. The court of appeals reversed with the exception of one claim, concluding that most of the claims were direct, and therefore, Rule 23.09 did not apply. The Supreme Court clarified the test for distinguishing between direct and derivative claims and held that the district court did not err in dismissing some claims but erred in dismissing others. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2017/a15-0858.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Medtronic, Inc. Shareholder Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the court of appeals’ reversal of the district court’s grant of Company’s motion to dismiss Shareholder’s class action challenge to a merger transaction. The district court concluded (1) some claims were derivative, rather than direct, and were therefore subject to the demand and pleading requirements of Minn. R. Civ. P. 23.09; and (2) Shareholder failed to comply with Rule 23.09. The court of appeals reversed with the exception of one claim, concluding that most of the claims were direct, and therefore, Rule 23.09 did not apply. The Supreme Court clarified the test for distinguishing between direct and derivative claims and held that the district court did not err in dismissing some claims but erred in dismissing others.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2017-08-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Minnesota</case:state>
						<case:court>Minnesota Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lorie Skjerven Gildea</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>A15-0858</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Minnesota Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2017/518-2016.html</id>
        	<title>DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., et al.</title>
        	<updated>2017-08-01T08:30:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2017-08-01T08:30:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2017/518-2016.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		DFC Global Corporation (“DFC”) provided alternative consumer financial services, predominately payday loans. The 2014 transaction giving rise to this appraisal action resulted in DFC being taken private by Lone Star, a private equity firm. DFC was a highly leveraged company. Its capital structure was comprised of about $1.1 billion of debt as compared to a $367.4 million equity market capitalization, 20 resulting in a debt-to-equity ratio of 300% and a debt-to-total capitalization ratio of 75%. In the years leading up to the merger, DFC faced heightened regulatory scrutiny in the US, UK and Canada. The parties challenged DFC’s valuation for merger purposes. The Delaware Supreme Court surmised DFC wanted the Court to establish a presumption that in certain cases involving arm’s-length mergers, the price of the transaction giving rise to appraisal rights was the best estimate of fair value. The Supreme Court declined to do so, which in the Court’s view had no basis in the statutory text, which gave the Court of Chancery in the first instance the discretion to “determine the fair value of the shares” by taking into account “all relevant factors.” The Supreme Court must give deference to the Court of Chancery if its determination of fair value has a reasonable basis in the record and in accepted financial principles relevant to determining the value of corporations and their stock. Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Court of Chancery’s valuation, remanding for the Chancellor to reassess the weight he chooses to afford various factors potentially relevant to fair value, and he may conclude that his findings regarding the competitive process leading to the transaction, when considered in light of other relevant factors, such as the views of the debt markets regarding the company’s expected performance and the failure of the company to meet its revised projections, suggest that the deal price was the most reliable indication of fair value. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2017/518-2016.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                DFC Global Corporation (“DFC”) provided alternative consumer financial services, predominately payday loans. The 2014 transaction giving rise to this appraisal action resulted in DFC being taken private by Lone Star, a private equity firm. DFC was a highly leveraged company. Its capital structure was comprised of about $1.1 billion of debt as compared to a $367.4 million equity market capitalization, 20 resulting in a debt-to-equity ratio of 300% and a debt-to-total capitalization ratio of 75%. In the years leading up to the merger, DFC faced heightened regulatory scrutiny in the US, UK and Canada. The parties challenged DFC’s valuation for merger purposes. The Delaware Supreme Court surmised DFC wanted the Court to establish a presumption that in certain cases involving arm’s-length mergers, the price of the transaction giving rise to appraisal rights was the best estimate of fair value. The Supreme Court declined to do so, which in the Court’s view had no basis in the statutory text, which gave the Court of Chancery in the first instance the discretion to “determine the fair value of the shares” by taking into account “all relevant factors.” The Supreme Court must give deference to the Court of Chancery if its determination of fair value has a reasonable basis in the record and in accepted financial principles relevant to determining the value of corporations and their stock. Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Court of Chancery’s valuation, remanding for the Chancellor to reassess the weight he chooses to afford various factors potentially relevant to fair value, and he may conclude that his findings regarding the competitive process leading to the transaction, when considered in light of other relevant factors, such as the views of the debt markets regarding the company’s expected performance and the failure of the company to meet its revised projections, suggest that the deal price was the most reliable indication of fair value.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2017-08-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leo Strine</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>518, 2016</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2017/cv-15-898.html</id>
        	<title>Booth v. Franks</title>
        	<updated>2017-05-25T07:00:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2017-05-25T07:00:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2017/cv-15-898.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Appellants were minority stockholders in First Community Bank of Crawford County (FBC). After First Bank reached an agreement to merge with FCB, First Bank filed an application with the Arkansas State Banking Board. The Board subsequently approved the merger. Appellants filed a complaint seeking review of the Board’s decision, arguing (1) the Board did not adequately fulfill its duties under administrative law in reaching its decision, and (2) the statues and regulations followed by the Board unconstitutionally infringe on the due process and property rights of minority stockholders. The circuit court concluded that Appellants failed to preserve their substantive objections due to their failure to present these objections before the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellants’ claims, holding that Appellants’ arguments were not preserved for judicial review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2017/cv-15-898.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Booth v. Franks" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Appellants were minority stockholders in First Community Bank of Crawford County (FBC). After First Bank reached an agreement to merge with FCB, First Bank filed an application with the Arkansas State Banking Board. The Board subsequently approved the merger. Appellants filed a complaint seeking review of the Board’s decision, arguing (1) the Board did not adequately fulfill its duties under administrative law in reaching its decision, and (2) the statues and regulations followed by the Board unconstitutionally infringe on the due process and property rights of minority stockholders. The circuit court concluded that Appellants failed to preserve their substantive objections due to their failure to present these objections before the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellants’ claims, holding that Appellants’ arguments were not preserved for judicial review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2017-05-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Arkansas</case:state>
						<case:court>Arkansas Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Womack</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CV-15-898</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Banking"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Arkansas Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/17-5024/17-5024-2017-04-28.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Anthem</title>
        	<updated>2017-04-28T06:31:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2017-04-28T06:31:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/17-5024/17-5024-2017-04-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The court affirmed the issuance of a permanent injunction enjoining the merger of Anthem and Cigna under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the merger based on Anthem&#039;s failure to show the kind of extraordinary efficiencies necessary to offset the conceded anticompetitive effect of the merger in the fourteen Anthem states: the loss of Cigna, an innovative competitor in a highly concentrated market. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the merger based on its separate and independent determination that the merger would have a substantial anticompetitive effect in the Richmond, Virginia large group employer market. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/17-5024/17-5024-2017-04-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Anthem" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The court affirmed the issuance of a permanent injunction enjoining the merger of Anthem and Cigna under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the merger based on Anthem&#039;s failure to show the kind of extraordinary efficiencies necessary to offset the conceded anticompetitive effect of the merger in the fourteen Anthem states: the loss of Cigna, an innovative competitor in a highly concentrated market. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the merger based on its separate and independent determination that the merger would have a substantial anticompetitive effect in the Richmond, Virginia large group employer market.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2017-04-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Judith Ann Wilson Rogers</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>17-5024</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2017/330-2016.html</id>
        	<title>Williams Companies, Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P.</title>
        	<updated>2017-03-23T11:30:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2017-03-23T11:30:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2017/330-2016.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This appeal arose from a merger agreement under which two companies involved in the gas pipeline business, Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. (“ETE”), agreed to acquire the assets of The Williams Companies, Inc., (“Williams”). The Merger Agreement signed by Williams and ETE contemplated two steps: (1) Williams would merge into a new entity, Energy Transfer Corp LP (“ETC”); and (2) the transfer of Williams’ assets to ETE in exchange for Class E partnership units “would” be a tax-free exchange of a partnership interest for assets under Section 721(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. After the parties entered into the Agreement, the energy market suffered a severe decline which caused a significant loss in the value of assets of the type held by Williams and ETE. This caused the transaction to become financially undesirable to ETE. This issue ultimately led to ETE’s tax counsel, Latham &amp; Watkins, LLP (Latham) being unwilling to issue the 721 opinion. Since the 721 opinion was a condition of the transaction, ETE indicated that it would not proceed with the merger. Williams then sought to enjoin ETE from terminating the Merger Agreement. The Court of Chancery rejected Williams’ arguments. After review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Chancery adopted an unduly narrow view of the obligations imposed by the covenants in the Agreement. The Supreme Court agreed with Williams that if a proper analysis of ETE’s covenants led to a conclusion that ETE breached those covenants, the burden would have shifted to ETE to prove that its breaches did not materially contribute to the failure of the closing condition. Since the facts as found by the Court of Chancery were that ETE’s lack of conduct did not contribute to Latham’s decision not to issue the 721 opinion, the Supreme Court was satisfied that when the burden of proving that ETE’s alleged breach of covenants is properly placed on it, ETE did meet its burden of proving that any alleged breach of covenant did not materially contribute to the failure of the Latham condition. The Court also agrees with the Court of Chancery’s finding that ETE was not estopped from terminating the Agreement. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2017/330-2016.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Williams Companies, Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This appeal arose from a merger agreement under which two companies involved in the gas pipeline business, Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. (“ETE”), agreed to acquire the assets of The Williams Companies, Inc., (“Williams”). The Merger Agreement signed by Williams and ETE contemplated two steps: (1) Williams would merge into a new entity, Energy Transfer Corp LP (“ETC”); and (2) the transfer of Williams’ assets to ETE in exchange for Class E partnership units “would” be a tax-free exchange of a partnership interest for assets under Section 721(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. After the parties entered into the Agreement, the energy market suffered a severe decline which caused a significant loss in the value of assets of the type held by Williams and ETE. This caused the transaction to become financially undesirable to ETE. This issue ultimately led to ETE’s tax counsel, Latham &amp; Watkins, LLP (Latham) being unwilling to issue the 721 opinion. Since the 721 opinion was a condition of the transaction, ETE indicated that it would not proceed with the merger. Williams then sought to enjoin ETE from terminating the Merger Agreement. The Court of Chancery rejected Williams’ arguments. After review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Chancery adopted an unduly narrow view of the obligations imposed by the covenants in the Agreement. The Supreme Court agreed with Williams that if a proper analysis of ETE’s covenants led to a conclusion that ETE breached those covenants, the burden would have shifted to ETE to prove that its breaches did not materially contribute to the failure of the closing condition. Since the facts as found by the Court of Chancery were that ETE’s lack of conduct did not contribute to Latham’s decision not to issue the 721 opinion, the Supreme Court was satisfied that when the burden of proving that ETE’s alleged breach of covenants is properly placed on it, ETE did meet its burden of proving that any alleged breach of covenant did not materially contribute to the failure of the Latham condition. The Court also agrees with the Court of Chancery’s finding that ETE was not estopped from terminating the Agreement. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Chancery was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2017-03-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Vaughn</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>330, 2016</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-11388-vcg.html</id>
        	<title>In Re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholder Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2017-01-30T09:30:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2017-01-30T09:30:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-11388-vcg.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		IBM&#039;s proposed purchase of Merge Healthcare was supported by a vote of close to 80% of Merge stockholders. Former Merge stockholders sought post-closing damages against the company’s directors for what they alleged was an improper sale process. Merge did not have an exculpation clause in its corporate charter, so its directors have potential liability for acts violating their duty of care, in the context of an allegedly less-than-rigorous sales process. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed.  Demonstrating such a violation of the duty of care is not trivial: it requires a demonstration of gross negligence, but it is less formidable than showing disloyalty. Regardless of that standard, the uncoerced vote of a majority of disinterested shares in favor of the merger cleansed any such violations, raising the presumption that the directors acted within their proper business judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2017/ca-11388-vcg.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re Merge Healthcare Inc. Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                IBM&#039;s proposed purchase of Merge Healthcare was supported by a vote of close to 80% of Merge stockholders. Former Merge stockholders sought post-closing damages against the company’s directors for what they alleged was an improper sale process. Merge did not have an exculpation clause in its corporate charter, so its directors have potential liability for acts violating their duty of care, in the context of an allegedly less-than-rigorous sales process. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed.  Demonstrating such a violation of the duty of care is not trivial: it requires a demonstration of gross negligence, but it is less formidable than showing disloyalty. Regardless of that standard, the uncoerced vote of a majority of disinterested shares in favor of the merger cleansed any such violations, raising the presumption that the directors acted within their proper business judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2017-01-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Glasscock</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 11388-VCG</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1368/15-1368-2016-11-18.html</id>
        	<title>Cavallaro v. Koskinen</title>
        	<updated>2016-11-18T14:00:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-11-18T14:00:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1368/15-1368-2016-11-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After a merger in 1995, William and Patricia Cavallaro received 38 shares of stock in Camelot, the merged company. Their three sons received 54 shares each. When Camelot was subsequently acquired, the Cavallaros received a total of $10,830,000, and each son received $15,390,000. The IRS issued notices of deficiency to the Cavallaros for tax year 1995, determining that Camelot had a pre-merger value of $0 and that when the merger occurred, William and Patricia each made a taxable gift of $23,085,000 to their sons. Therefore, each of the Cavallaros incurred an increase in tax liability in the amount of $12,696,750. The Tax Court ultimately concluded that William owed $7,652,980 and that Patricia owed $8,009,202. The Cavallaros appealed, arguing that the Tax Court erred by failing to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner. The First Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Tax Court correctly determined that the burden of proof was on the Cavallaros; but (2) the Tax Court misstated the nature of the Cavallaros’ burden of proof. Remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/15-1368/15-1368-2016-11-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cavallaro v. Koskinen" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After a merger in 1995, William and Patricia Cavallaro received 38 shares of stock in Camelot, the merged company. Their three sons received 54 shares each. When Camelot was subsequently acquired, the Cavallaros received a total of $10,830,000, and each son received $15,390,000. The IRS issued notices of deficiency to the Cavallaros for tax year 1995, determining that Camelot had a pre-merger value of $0 and that when the merger occurred, William and Patricia each made a taxable gift of $23,085,000 to their sons. Therefore, each of the Cavallaros incurred an increase in tax liability in the amount of $12,696,750. The Tax Court ultimately concluded that William owed $7,652,980 and that Patricia owed $8,009,202. The Cavallaros appealed, arguing that the Tax Court erred by failing to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner. The First Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Tax Court correctly determined that the burden of proof was on the Cavallaros; but (2) the Tax Court misstated the nature of the Cavallaros’ burden of proof. Remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-11-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jeffrey R. Howard</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>15-1368</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>15-1376</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Tax Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2016/2016-me-168.html</id>
        	<title>Houlton Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission</title>
        	<updated>2016-11-17T08:02:46-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-11-17T08:02:46-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2016/2016-me-168.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Bangor Hydro-Electric (BHE) and Maine Public Service Company (MPS) were regulated utilities engaged in the transmission and distribution of electric it. The companies merged to become Emera Maine during the pendency of this proceeding. BHE and MPS filed a petition for reorganization, under which Emera Maine’s parent company would increase its ownership interest in Algonquin Power &amp; Utilities Corporation (APUC), a publicly-traded company that is in the electricity generation business. The petition was subject to approval by the Maine Public Utilities Commission because of the relationship that would result between Emera Maine, as a transmission and distribution entity, and APUC, a generator. The Commission approved the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order approving the petition, holding that the Commission misconstrued the governing statute in the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. On remand, the Commission once again approved the petition. On the second appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission acted outside of its authority when it imposed conditions that would regulate APUC beyond what the Restructuring Act allows. Remanded with instructions to deny the petition. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2016/2016-me-168.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Houlton Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Bangor Hydro-Electric (BHE) and Maine Public Service Company (MPS) were regulated utilities engaged in the transmission and distribution of electric it. The companies merged to become Emera Maine during the pendency of this proceeding. BHE and MPS filed a petition for reorganization, under which Emera Maine’s parent company would increase its ownership interest in Algonquin Power &amp; Utilities Corporation (APUC), a publicly-traded company that is in the electricity generation business. The petition was subject to approval by the Maine Public Utilities Commission because of the relationship that would result between Emera Maine, as a transmission and distribution entity, and APUC, a generator. The Commission approved the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order approving the petition, holding that the Commission misconstrued the governing statute in the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. On remand, the Commission once again approved the petition. On the second appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission acted outside of its authority when it imposed conditions that would regulate APUC beyond what the Restructuring Act allows. Remanded with instructions to deny the petition.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-11-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Maine</case:state>
						<case:court>Maine Supreme Judicial Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Hjelm</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>2016 ME 168</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Maine Supreme Judicial Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2016/151640.html</id>
        	<title>Shareholder Representative Services v. Airbus Americas, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2016-10-27T06:34:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-10-27T06:34:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2016/151640.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		At issue in this case was a contract dispute between the purchaser (Purchaser) and the seller (Seller) of a corporation pursuant to a corporative merger agreement. The agreement provided for three different liability limitations (damage caps) in the event of Seller’s breaches. Seller breached several requirements of the agreement by failing to use certain accounting principles to accurately establish the financial condition of Seller’s corporation and, accordingly, the appropriate adjustment to the consideration to be paid by Purchaser. The amount of the adjustment was controlled by the indemnity Purchaser was entitled to receive under the relevant damage caps. The circuit court entered final judgment for Purchaser. The agent for the stockholders of Seller and former stockholders of Seller appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly construed the merger agreement as to which damage cap was controlling under the facts of the case. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and reversed, holding that the circuit court applied the incorrect damage cap. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2016/151640.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Shareholder Representative Services v. Airbus Americas, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                At issue in this case was a contract dispute between the purchaser (Purchaser) and the seller (Seller) of a corporation pursuant to a corporative merger agreement. The agreement provided for three different liability limitations (damage caps) in the event of Seller’s breaches. Seller breached several requirements of the agreement by failing to use certain accounting principles to accurately establish the financial condition of Seller’s corporation and, accordingly, the appropriate adjustment to the consideration to be paid by Purchaser. The amount of the adjustment was controlled by the indemnity Purchaser was entitled to receive under the relevant damage caps. The circuit court entered final judgment for Purchaser. The agent for the stockholders of Seller and former stockholders of Seller appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly construed the merger agreement as to which damage cap was controlling under the facts of the case. The Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and reversed, holding that the circuit court applied the incorrect damage cap.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-10-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Virginia</case:state>
						<case:court>Supreme Court of Virginia</case:court>
							<case:judge>Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>151640</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Supreme Court of Virginia"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-10918-vcs.html</id>
        	<title>Larkin v. Shah</title>
        	<updated>2016-08-25T12:31:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-08-25T12:31:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-10918-vcs.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs, former stockholders of Auspex, filed a putative class action to challenge the propriety of the merger with Teva Pharmaceuticals and seek post-closing damages, alleging that the members of Auspex&#039;s board of directors breached their fiduciary duties by permitting senior management to conduct a flawed sales process that ultimately netted stockholders inadequate consideration for their shares. The directors have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, concluding that, even accepting plaintiffs&#039; well-pled facts as true, defendants are entitled to invoke the irrebuttable business judgment rule. In this case, plaintiffs have not pled facts that would allow a reasonable inference that the merger involved a controlling stockholder, much less that a controlling stockholder pushed Auspex into a conflicted transaction in which the controller received nonratable benefits. They are left, then, to overcome the cleansing effect of stockholder approval, which in this case was disinterested, uncoerced and fully informed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-10918-vcs.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Larkin v. Shah" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs, former stockholders of Auspex, filed a putative class action to challenge the propriety of the merger with Teva Pharmaceuticals and seek post-closing damages, alleging that the members of Auspex&#039;s board of directors breached their fiduciary duties by permitting senior management to conduct a flawed sales process that ultimately netted stockholders inadequate consideration for their shares. The directors have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, concluding that, even accepting plaintiffs&#039; well-pled facts as true, defendants are entitled to invoke the irrebuttable business judgment rule. In this case, plaintiffs have not pled facts that would allow a reasonable inference that the merger involved a controlling stockholder, much less that a controlling stockholder pushed Auspex into a conflicted transaction in which the controller received nonratable benefits. They are left, then, to overcome the cleansing effect of stockholder approval, which in this case was disinterested, uncoerced and fully informed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-08-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Slights</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 10918-VCS</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-8388-vcg.html</id>
        	<title>In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2016-08-15T09:01:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-08-15T09:01:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-8388-vcg.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		At issue in this case was the fair value of stock of ISN Software Corp. (Respondent) held by two minority stockholders, Polaris and Ad-Venture, (collectively, Petitioners) at the time of a merger by which the controller cashed out some, but not all, of the stock held by the minority. The Court of Chancery held (1) the method used by the controller to determine the fair value of the stock is unreliable; (2) a discounted cash flow analysis is the most reliable indicator of fair value; and (3) upon consideration of the expert opinions provided by Petitioners and Respondent, the statutory fair value is $98,783 per share. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-8388-vcg.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                At issue in this case was the fair value of stock of ISN Software Corp. (Respondent) held by two minority stockholders, Polaris and Ad-Venture, (collectively, Petitioners) at the time of a merger by which the controller cashed out some, but not all, of the stock held by the minority. The Court of Chancery held (1) the method used by the controller to determine the fair value of the stock is unreliable; (2) a discounted cash flow analysis is the most reliable indicator of fair value; and (3) upon consideration of the expert opinions provided by Petitioners and Respondent, the statutory fair value is $98,783 per share.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Glasscock</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 8388-VCG</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3799/15-3799-2016-08-10.html</id>
        	<title>Hays v. Berlau</title>
        	<updated>2016-08-10T09:03:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-08-10T09:03:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3799/15-3799-2016-08-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2012 Walgreens acquired a 45 percent equity stake in Alliance, plus an option to acquire the rest of Alliance’s equity for a mixture of cash and Walgreens stock. Walgreens later announced its intent to purchase the remainder of Alliance and engineer a reorganization whereby Walgreens would become a wholly-owned subsidiary of a new corporation, Walgreens Boots Alliance. Within two weeks after Walgreens filed a proxy statement seeking shareholder approval, a class action was filed; 18 days later, less than a week before the shareholder vote, the parties agreed to settle. The settlement required Walgreens to issue several requested disclosures and authorized class counsel to request $370,000 in attorneys’ fees, without opposition from Walgreens. The Seventh Circuit reversed approval of the settlement, calling the supplemental disclosures “a trivial addition to the extensive disclosures already made in the proxy statement.” “The oddity of this case is the absence of any indication that members of the class have an interest in challenging the reorganization.... The only concrete interest suggested … is an interest in attorneys’ fees.... Certainly class counsel, if one may judge from their performance in this litigation, can’t be trusted to represent the interests of the class.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/15-3799/15-3799-2016-08-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hays v. Berlau" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2012 Walgreens acquired a 45 percent equity stake in Alliance, plus an option to acquire the rest of Alliance’s equity for a mixture of cash and Walgreens stock. Walgreens later announced its intent to purchase the remainder of Alliance and engineer a reorganization whereby Walgreens would become a wholly-owned subsidiary of a new corporation, Walgreens Boots Alliance. Within two weeks after Walgreens filed a proxy statement seeking shareholder approval, a class action was filed; 18 days later, less than a week before the shareholder vote, the parties agreed to settle. The settlement required Walgreens to issue several requested disclosures and authorized class counsel to request $370,000 in attorneys’ fees, without opposition from Walgreens. The Seventh Circuit reversed approval of the settlement, calling the supplemental disclosures “a trivial addition to the extensive disclosures already made in the proxy statement.” “The oddity of this case is the absence of any indication that members of the class have an interest in challenging the reorganization.... The only concrete interest suggested … is an interest in attorneys’ fees.... Certainly class counsel, if one may judge from their performance in this litigation, can’t be trusted to represent the interests of the class.”
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-08-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Allen Posner</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>15-3799</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Legal Ethics"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/cm-10485-vr.html</id>
        	<title>In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2016-06-30T12:00:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-06-30T12:00:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/cm-10485-vr.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		At issue in this case was a company that was acquired for $18 per share in an all-cash merger. Five months earlier, the target company declined an offer of $24 per share from the same acquiror. Plaintiffs, former public stockholders of the target company, sued the company’s board of directors and financial advisor, alleging that the board breached its fiduciary duties in approving the merger and that the financial advisor aided and abetted the breaches. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the business judgment rule standard of review applied to Plaintiffs’ allegations and insulated the merger. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/cm-10485-vr.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                At issue in this case was a company that was acquired for $18 per share in an all-cash merger. Five months earlier, the target company declined an offer of $24 per share from the same acquiror. Plaintiffs, former public stockholders of the target company, sued the company’s board of directors and financial advisor, alleging that the board breached its fiduciary duties in approving the merger and that the financial advisor aided and abetted the breaches. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the business judgment rule standard of review applied to Plaintiffs’ allegations and insulated the merger.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-06-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Montgomery-Reeves</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CM 10485-VR</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9322-vcl-0.html</id>
        	<title>In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2016-05-31T06:30:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-05-31T06:30:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9322-vcl-0.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2013, the Company completed a merger that gave rise to appraisal rights. Petitioners, owners of shares of common stock of the Company, seek appraisal. The court concluded that the fair value of the Company on the closing date was $17.62 per share; the legal rate of interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue on this amount from the date of closing until the date of payment; the parties shall cooperate on preparing a final order for the court; and, if there are additional issues for the court to resolve before a final order can be entered, the parties shall submit a joint letter within two weeks that identifies them and recommends a schedule for bringing this case to conclusion, at least at the trial court level. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9322-vcl-0.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2013, the Company completed a merger that gave rise to appraisal rights. Petitioners, owners of shares of common stock of the Company, seek appraisal. The court concluded that the fair value of the Company on the closing date was $17.62 per share; the legal rate of interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue on this amount from the date of closing until the date of payment; the parties shall cooperate on preparing a final order for the court; and, if there are additional issues for the court to resolve before a final order can be entered, the parties shall submit a joint letter within two weeks that identifies them and recommends a schedule for bringing this case to conclusion, at least at the trial court level.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-05-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 9322-VCL</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9640-vcg-ol.html</id>
        	<title>In re Chelsea Therapeutics Int&#039;l Ltd. Stockholders Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2016-05-20T08:30:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-05-20T08:30:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9640-vcg-ol.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Company, a developmental biopharmaceutical company, which has researched and developed a drug called NORTHERA, filed a class action alleging breaches of fiduciary duty against defendants in connection with the sale of Chelsea to Lundbeck through a tender offer and short-form merger (the Transaction). Plaintiffs contend that the Board acted in bad faith by instructing its financial advisors to ignore one set of projections in opining on the fairness of the Transaction, and by choosing to disregard a second set of projections before recommending the Transaction to Chelsea’s stockholders. The court granted defendants&#039; motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The Board, after deliberation and in consideration of the sale of the Company, instructed its advisors not to consider projections that its assets would increase in value, years in the future, on speculation that the FDA would approve one of its products for currently-prohibited uses, or would remove a competing drug from the market altogether. Both sets of projections involved contingencies over which the Company had no control, and which might never come to pass. Such actions do not, on their face, plead a conceivable breach of the Directors loyalty-based duty to act in good faith. No other grounds conceivably leading to a finding of bad faith are pled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9640-vcg-ol.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Chelsea Therapeutics Int&#039;l Ltd. Stockholders Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Company, a developmental biopharmaceutical company, which has researched and developed a drug called NORTHERA, filed a class action alleging breaches of fiduciary duty against defendants in connection with the sale of Chelsea to Lundbeck through a tender offer and short-form merger (the Transaction). Plaintiffs contend that the Board acted in bad faith by instructing its financial advisors to ignore one set of projections in opining on the fairness of the Transaction, and by choosing to disregard a second set of projections before recommending the Transaction to Chelsea’s stockholders. The court granted defendants&#039; motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The Board, after deliberation and in consideration of the sale of the Company, instructed its advisors not to consider projections that its assets would increase in value, years in the future, on speculation that the FDA would approve one of its products for currently-prohibited uses, or would remove a competing drug from the market altogether. Both sets of projections involved contingencies over which the Company had no control, and which might never come to pass. Such actions do not, on their face, plead a conceivable breach of the Directors loyalty-based duty to act in good faith. No other grounds conceivably leading to a finding of bad faith are pled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-05-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Glasscock</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 9640-VCG (ol)</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9322-vcl.html</id>
        	<title>In re Appraisal of Dell Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2016-05-11T12:00:31-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-05-11T12:00:31-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9322-vcl.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Dell Inc. completed a merger that gave rise to appraisal rights. Fourteen appraisal petitioners were mutual funds sponsored by T. Rowe Price &amp; Associates, Inc. (T. Rowe) or institutions that relied on T. Rowe to direct the voting of their shares (collectively, Petitioners). Petitioners held their shares through a custodial bank, which was a participant member in a trust company, which held Petitioners’ shares in the name of Cede &amp; Co., which, for purposes of Delaware law, was the holder of record. Cede was constrained to vote Petitioners’ shares as T. Rowe directed and fulfilled its obligation through a chain of authorizations. Although T. Rowe opposed the merger, its voting system generated instructions to vote Petitioners’ shares in favor of it. Ultimately, Cede voted Petitioners’ shares in favor of the merger. Petitioners sought appraisal in favor of the merger. The Court of Chancery held (1) because the holder of record did not dissent as to the shares for which Petitioners sought appraisal, the dissenter requirement was not met of these shares; and (2) therefore, Petitioners’ shares did not qualify for appraisal, and Petitioners remained entitled to the merger consideration without an award of interest. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2016/ca-9322-vcl.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Appraisal of Dell Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Dell Inc. completed a merger that gave rise to appraisal rights. Fourteen appraisal petitioners were mutual funds sponsored by T. Rowe Price &amp; Associates, Inc. (T. Rowe) or institutions that relied on T. Rowe to direct the voting of their shares (collectively, Petitioners). Petitioners held their shares through a custodial bank, which was a participant member in a trust company, which held Petitioners’ shares in the name of Cede &amp; Co., which, for purposes of Delaware law, was the holder of record. Cede was constrained to vote Petitioners’ shares as T. Rowe directed and fulfilled its obligation through a chain of authorizations. Although T. Rowe opposed the merger, its voting system generated instructions to vote Petitioners’ shares in favor of it. Ultimately, Cede voted Petitioners’ shares in favor of the merger. Petitioners sought appraisal in favor of the merger. The Court of Chancery held (1) because the holder of record did not dissent as to the shares for which Petitioners sought appraisal, the dissenter requirement was not met of these shares; and (2) therefore, Petitioners’ shares did not qualify for appraisal, and Petitioners remained entitled to the merger consideration without an award of interest.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-05-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 9322-VCL</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2016/64.html</id>
        	<title>Jiannaras v. Alfant</title>
        	<updated>2016-05-05T07:07:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-05-05T07:07:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2016/64.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Google Inc. and On2 Technologies, Inc. entered into a merger agreement in 2009. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated On2 shareholders, alleging that On2’s board of directors had breached its fiduciary duty to its shareholders. Plaintiffs subsequently agreed with One2 and its directors to settle all claims with respect to the merger. After a hearing, Supreme Court found the settlement to be fair and in the best interest of the class members but refused to approve the settlement because it did not afford out-of-state class members of the opportunity to opt out, thereby prohibiting class members from pursuing any individual claims that are separate and apart from the class settlement. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower courts properly refused to approve the proposed settlement because the settlement would deprive out-of-state class members of a cognizable property interest. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2016/64.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Jiannaras v. Alfant" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Google Inc. and On2 Technologies, Inc. entered into a merger agreement in 2009. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated On2 shareholders, alleging that On2’s board of directors had breached its fiduciary duty to its shareholders. Plaintiffs subsequently agreed with One2 and its directors to settle all claims with respect to the merger. After a hearing, Supreme Court found the settlement to be fair and in the best interest of the class members but refused to approve the settlement because it did not afford out-of-state class members of the opportunity to opt out, thereby prohibiting class members from pursuing any individual claims that are separate and apart from the class settlement. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower courts properly refused to approve the proposed settlement because the settlement would deprive out-of-state class members of a cognizable property interest.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>New York</case:state>
						<case:court>New York Court of Appeals</case:court>
							<case:judge>Eugene F. Pigott, Jr.</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>64</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="New York Court of Appeals"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2016/54.html</id>
        	<title>In re Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2016-05-05T07:07:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-05-05T07:07:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2016/54.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2012, Defendant Kenneth Cole proposed a going-private merger of Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. that was subject to approval by both a special committee of independent directors and a majority of the minority shareholders. Several shareholders, including Plaintiff, commenced separate class actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty by Cole and the directors. Although the shareholder vote occurred after an amended complaint was filed, 99.8 percent of the minority shareholders voted in favor of the merger. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that Cole and the directors had breached the fiduciary duties they owed to the minority shareholders, an award of damages to the class, and a judgment enjoining the merger. Supreme Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) in reviewing challenges to going-private mergers, New York courts should apply the business judgment rule as long as certain shareholder-protective conditions are present; (2) if those measures are not present, the entire fairness standard should be applied; and (3) applying that standard to this case, the courts below properly determined that Plaintiff’s allegations did not withstand Defendants’ motions to dismiss. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2016/54.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2012, Defendant Kenneth Cole proposed a going-private merger of Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. that was subject to approval by both a special committee of independent directors and a majority of the minority shareholders. Several shareholders, including Plaintiff, commenced separate class actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty by Cole and the directors. Although the shareholder vote occurred after an amended complaint was filed, 99.8 percent of the minority shareholders voted in favor of the merger. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that Cole and the directors had breached the fiduciary duties they owed to the minority shareholders, an award of damages to the class, and a judgment enjoining the merger. Supreme Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) in reviewing challenges to going-private mergers, New York courts should apply the business judgment rule as long as certain shareholder-protective conditions are present; (2) if those measures are not present, the entire fairness standard should be applied; and (3) applying that standard to this case, the courts below properly determined that Plaintiff’s allegations did not withstand Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-05-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>New York</case:state>
						<case:court>New York Court of Appeals</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stein</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>54</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="New York Court of Appeals"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/14-2156/14-2156-2016-04-26.html</id>
        	<title>Mercury Sys., Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2016-04-26T09:30:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2016-04-26T09:30:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/14-2156/14-2156-2016-04-26.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Pursuant to a merger agreement, Sellers agreed to indemnity Buyer for the tax liabilities of the company being sold. The tax bills for indemnification purposes, however, were to be calculated as if certain deductions were not going be taken when both parties knew they would be. These deductions reduced the company’s tax liability to zero. After the merger, the company’s tax prepayments and credits were refunded in their entirety, thus benefitting Buyer. Because the calculation of the indemnity obligation was based on a counterfactual measure of tax liability, that calculation resulted in Sellers’ owing Buyer a substantial amount of liability. Buyer filed this complaint asserting claims for declaratory relief and breach of contract. At issue in this case was whether the prepayments and credits affected the tax indemnification obligation of Sellers. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Sellers, concluding that the indemnification provision unambiguously required that the indemnity obligation be offset by the amount of the refunded prepayments and credits. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the indemnification provision was ambiguous as to how the tax refunds affect the indemnification obligation of Sellers. Remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/14-2156/14-2156-2016-04-26.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mercury Sys., Inc. v. S’holder Representative Servs., Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Pursuant to a merger agreement, Sellers agreed to indemnity Buyer for the tax liabilities of the company being sold. The tax bills for indemnification purposes, however, were to be calculated as if certain deductions were not going be taken when both parties knew they would be. These deductions reduced the company’s tax liability to zero. After the merger, the company’s tax prepayments and credits were refunded in their entirety, thus benefitting Buyer. Because the calculation of the indemnity obligation was based on a counterfactual measure of tax liability, that calculation resulted in Sellers’ owing Buyer a substantial amount of liability. Buyer filed this complaint asserting claims for declaratory relief and breach of contract. At issue in this case was whether the prepayments and credits affected the tax indemnification obligation of Sellers. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Sellers, concluding that the indemnification provision unambiguously required that the indemnity obligation be offset by the amount of the refunded prepayments and credits. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the indemnification provision was ambiguous as to how the tax refunds affect the indemnification obligation of Sellers. Remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2016-04-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kermit Victor Lipez</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>14-2156</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2015/ca-7141-vcl-0.html</id>
        	<title>In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. Derivative Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2015-12-02T07:00:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2015-12-02T07:00:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2015/ca-7141-vcl-0.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2010, El Paso Corporation (“El Paso Parent”) sold member interests in three limited liability companies to El Paso Pipeline Partners, LP (“El Paso MLP”). At the time of the sale, El Paso Parent controlled El Paso MLP through its ownership of El Paso Pipeline GP Company, LLC, the sole general partner of El Paso MLP (“El Paso GP”). In 2015, the Court of Chancery issued a post-trial decision concluding that El Paso GP breached the limited partnership agreement governing El Paso MLP by causing El Paso MLP to buy the member interests (the “Fall Dropdown”). In 2012, Plaintiff brought this action challenging the Fall Droptown. While the litigation was pending, Kinder Morgan, Inc., acquired El Paso Parent and therefore indirectly owned and controlled El Paso GP. After trial, Kinder Morgan, El Paso Parent, El Paso MLP, and El Paso GP consummated a merger that ended El Paso MLP’s separate existence as a publicly traded entity. El Paso GP moved to dismiss this litigation, arguing that because Plaintiff styled his claim as derivative the closing of the merger meant that this case must be dismissed. The Court of Chancery denied El Paso GP’s motion to dismiss, holding that the merger did not extinguish Plaintiff’s standing to pursue the claim, and therefore, this Court can implement the liability award. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2015/ca-7141-vcl-0.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. Derivative Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2010, El Paso Corporation (“El Paso Parent”) sold member interests in three limited liability companies to El Paso Pipeline Partners, LP (“El Paso MLP”). At the time of the sale, El Paso Parent controlled El Paso MLP through its ownership of El Paso Pipeline GP Company, LLC, the sole general partner of El Paso MLP (“El Paso GP”). In 2015, the Court of Chancery issued a post-trial decision concluding that El Paso GP breached the limited partnership agreement governing El Paso MLP by causing El Paso MLP to buy the member interests (the “Fall Dropdown”). In 2012, Plaintiff brought this action challenging the Fall Droptown. While the litigation was pending, Kinder Morgan, Inc., acquired El Paso Parent and therefore indirectly owned and controlled El Paso GP. After trial, Kinder Morgan, El Paso Parent, El Paso MLP, and El Paso GP consummated a merger that ended El Paso MLP’s separate existence as a publicly traded entity. El Paso GP moved to dismiss this litigation, arguing that because Plaintiff styled his claim as derivative the closing of the merger meant that this case must be dismissed. The Court of Chancery denied El Paso GP’s motion to dismiss, holding that the merger did not extinguish Plaintiff’s standing to pursue the claim, and therefore, this Court can implement the liability award.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2015-12-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 7141-VCL</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2015/b256976.html</id>
        	<title>Santa Clarita Org. v. Abercrombie</title>
        	<updated>2015-09-10T10:00:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2015-09-10T10:00:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2015/b256976.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		SCOPE filed suit claiming that the acquisition of the Valenica Water Company by the Castaic Lake Water Agency was void under Government Code section 1090 and the Political Reform Act (PRA), Gov. Code 81000 et seq., because one of the Agency&#039;s ten directors - Keith Abercrombie- was Valencia&#039;s general manager at the time the acquisition was be negotiated. The trial court rejected SCOPE&#039;s conflict of interest claims. The court affirmed the trial court&#039;s decision, concluding that the express exception to section 1090 in the Agency’s enabling legislation applies to a contract to acquire a water company; the express exception to section 1090 also implicitly repeals (and thereby amends) the PRA’s applicability to such an acquisition; and the Legislature complied with the special requirements set forth in section 81012 for amending the PRA, which was originally enacted by voter initiative. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2015/b256976.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Santa Clarita Org. v. Abercrombie" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                SCOPE filed suit claiming that the acquisition of the Valenica Water Company by the Castaic Lake Water Agency was void under Government Code section 1090 and the Political Reform Act (PRA), Gov. Code 81000 et seq., because one of the Agency&#039;s ten directors - Keith Abercrombie- was Valencia&#039;s general manager at the time the acquisition was be negotiated. The trial court rejected SCOPE&#039;s conflict of interest claims. The court affirmed the trial court&#039;s decision, concluding that the express exception to section 1090 in the Agency’s enabling legislation applies to a contract to acquire a water company; the express exception to section 1090 also implicitly repeals (and thereby amends) the PRA’s applicability to such an acquisition; and the Legislature complied with the special requirements set forth in section 81012 for amending the PRA, which was originally enacted by voter initiative.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2015-09-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>California</case:state>
						<case:court>California Courts of Appeal</case:court>
							<case:judge>Brian M. Hoffstadt</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>B256976</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="California Courts of Appeal"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/14-5182/14-5182-2015-06-09.html</id>
        	<title>Pharmaceutical Research v. FTC</title>
        	<updated>2015-06-09T07:01:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2015-06-09T07:01:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/14-5182/14-5182-2015-06-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Act), 15 U.S.C. 18a, added section 7A to the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. 12 et seq., to establish notification and waiting requirements for large acquisitions and mergers. The principal purpose of the Act is to facilitate Government identification of mergers and acquisitions likely to violate federal antitrust laws before the proposed deals are consummated. In 2013, the FTC modified its reportable asset acquisition regulations to clarify that, even if patent holders retain limited manufacturing rights or co-rights, transfers of patent rights within the pharmaceutical industry constitute reportable asset acquisitions if all commercially significant rights are transferred. PhRMA filed suit challenging the FTC&#039;s Rule and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FTC. The court concluded that the Rule does not violate the plain terms of the Act; the court owes deference to the FTC because the contested rule embodies a permissible construction of the Act; and the Commission&#039;s action also survives review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Because the FTC&#039;s action is supported by reasoned decisionmaking and PhRMA&#039;s claims are without merit, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/14-5182/14-5182-2015-06-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Pharmaceutical Research v. FTC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Act), 15 U.S.C. 18a, added section 7A to the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. 12 et seq., to establish notification and waiting requirements for large acquisitions and mergers. The principal purpose of the Act is to facilitate Government identification of mergers and acquisitions likely to violate federal antitrust laws before the proposed deals are consummated. In 2013, the FTC modified its reportable asset acquisition regulations to clarify that, even if patent holders retain limited manufacturing rights or co-rights, transfers of patent rights within the pharmaceutical industry constitute reportable asset acquisitions if all commercially significant rights are transferred. PhRMA filed suit challenging the FTC&#039;s Rule and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FTC. The court concluded that the Rule does not violate the plain terms of the Act; the court owes deference to the FTC because the contested rule embodies a permissible construction of the Act; and the Commission&#039;s action also survives review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Because the FTC&#039;s action is supported by reasoned decisionmaking and PhRMA&#039;s claims are without merit, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2015-06-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Harry Thomas Edwards</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>14-5182</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2015/ca-8059-cb-0.html</id>
        	<title>In re Jefferies Group, Inc. Shareholders Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2015-06-05T09:00:47-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2015-06-05T09:00:47-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2015/ca-8059-cb-0.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This action arose out of the stock-for-stock merger of Jefferies Group, Inc. and Leucadia National Corporation. After the transaction was announced, the first of seven actions challenging the proposed transactions as filed in New York state court. The case subsequently proceeded in Delaware. Before trial began, the parties reached an agreement-in-principle to settle the case. The settlement, which was formally approved by the Court of Chancery, resulted in a payment of $70 million to the Class. Delaware Counsel sought an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses, and New York Plaintiffs filed a motion for a share of the fee award. The Court of Chancery (1) held that Delaware Counsel was entitled to a fee award of $21.5 million, which equated to 23.5 percent of the gross value of the settlement; and (2) denied the New York Plaintiffs’ motion for a share of the fee award in this action, holding that the New York Plaintiffs failed to substantiate their contribution to the results achieved in the Delaware action. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2015/ca-8059-cb-0.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Jefferies Group, Inc. Shareholders Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This action arose out of the stock-for-stock merger of Jefferies Group, Inc. and Leucadia National Corporation. After the transaction was announced, the first of seven actions challenging the proposed transactions as filed in New York state court. The case subsequently proceeded in Delaware. Before trial began, the parties reached an agreement-in-principle to settle the case. The settlement, which was formally approved by the Court of Chancery, resulted in a payment of $70 million to the Class. Delaware Counsel sought an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses, and New York Plaintiffs filed a motion for a share of the fee award. The Court of Chancery (1) held that Delaware Counsel was entitled to a fee award of $21.5 million, which equated to 23.5 percent of the gross value of the settlement; and (2) denied the New York Plaintiffs’ motion for a share of the fee award in this action, holding that the New York Plaintiffs failed to substantiate their contribution to the results achieved in the Delaware action.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2015-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bouchard</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 8059-CB</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-1626/13-1626-2015-03-11.html</id>
        	<title>AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG</title>
        	<updated>2015-03-11T14:00:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2015-03-11T14:00:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-1626/13-1626-2015-03-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff obtained a $23 million judgment in New York against a New Jersey corporation (&quot;Corporation&quot;) with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. Plaintiff sought to secure payment on that judgment by bringing suit in the District of Massachusetts against the Corporation’s president and its corporate parents, alleging that Defendants had looted BI of more than $18 million in assets in order to render it judgment-proof. Plaintiff later learned that one of BI’s corporate parents planned to merge with an Austrian subsidiary, which would place the company’s assets out of Plaintiff’s reach. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, later converted into a preliminary injunction, barring the merger. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to vacate the injunction and then appealed. While the appeal was pending, Defendants effected the merger. The district court issued civil contempt sanctions on Defendant for violating the court’s preliminary injunction order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not exceed the bounds of its authority when it imposed the civil contempt sanctions; and (2) did not err when it declined to vacate the underlying preliminary injunction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-1626/13-1626-2015-03-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff obtained a $23 million judgment in New York against a New Jersey corporation (&quot;Corporation&quot;) with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. Plaintiff sought to secure payment on that judgment by bringing suit in the District of Massachusetts against the Corporation’s president and its corporate parents, alleging that Defendants had looted BI of more than $18 million in assets in order to render it judgment-proof. Plaintiff later learned that one of BI’s corporate parents planned to merge with an Austrian subsidiary, which would place the company’s assets out of Plaintiff’s reach. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, later converted into a preliminary injunction, barring the merger. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to vacate the injunction and then appealed. While the appeal was pending, Defendants effected the merger. The district court issued civil contempt sanctions on Defendant for violating the court’s preliminary injunction order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not exceed the bounds of its authority when it imposed the civil contempt sanctions; and (2) did not err when it declined to vacate the underlying preliminary injunction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2015-03-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stahl</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>13-1626</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-35173/14-35173-2015-02-10.html</id>
        	<title>St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke&#039;s Health Sys.</title>
        	<updated>2015-02-10T10:00:57-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2015-02-10T10:00:57-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-35173/14-35173-2015-02-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The FTC and the State filed suit alleging that the 2012 merger of two health care providers in Nampa, Idaho violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, and state law. The district court found that the merger violated section 7 and ordered divestiture. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court&#039;s determination that Nampa was the relevant geographic market was supported by the record; the district court did not clearly err in holding that plaintiffs established a prima facie case that the merger will probably lead to anticompetitive effects in the market; and defendant failed to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that efficiencies resulting from the merger would have a positive effect on competition. Therefore, in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing divestiture. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/14-35173/14-35173-2015-02-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke&#039;s Health Sys." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The FTC and the State filed suit alleging that the 2012 merger of two health care providers in Nampa, Idaho violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, and state law. The district court found that the merger violated section 7 and ordered divestiture. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court&#039;s determination that Nampa was the relevant geographic market was supported by the record; the district court did not clearly err in holding that plaintiffs established a prima facie case that the merger will probably lead to anticompetitive effects in the market; and defendant failed to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that efficiencies resulting from the merger would have a positive effect on competition. Therefore, in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing divestiture.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2015-02-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Andrew David Hurwitz</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>14-35173</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9079-vcl.html</id>
        	<title>In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2014-12-09T11:02:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-12-09T11:02:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9079-vcl.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After David H. Murdock, the CEO and controlling stockholder of Dole Food Company, Inc., acquired all the shares of Dole common stock that he did not already own, Petitioners pursued their statutory right to an appraisal of their shares of Dole common stock. During discovery, Dole sought information about any valuations of Dole common stock that Petitioners prepared, reviewed, or considered when buying to selling Dole common stock or when seeking appraisal. Petitioners objected to the document requests. Dole subsequently served notices of deposition for each Petitioner pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 30(b)(6) and identified the valuations as a topic of questioning. During the depositions, Petitioners’ counsel instructed the Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses not to testify about the valuations on the basis of relevance. Dole moved to compel production of the valuation-related information and for supplemental Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that, under the circumstances, Petitioners’ failure to provide the discovery was not substantially justified. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9079-vcl.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After David H. Murdock, the CEO and controlling stockholder of Dole Food Company, Inc., acquired all the shares of Dole common stock that he did not already own, Petitioners pursued their statutory right to an appraisal of their shares of Dole common stock. During discovery, Dole sought information about any valuations of Dole common stock that Petitioners prepared, reviewed, or considered when buying to selling Dole common stock or when seeking appraisal. Petitioners objected to the document requests. Dole subsequently served notices of deposition for each Petitioner pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 30(b)(6) and identified the valuations as a topic of questioning. During the depositions, Petitioners’ counsel instructed the Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses not to testify about the valuations on the basis of relevance. Dole moved to compel production of the valuation-related information and for supplemental Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that, under the circumstances, Petitioners’ failure to provide the discovery was not substantially justified.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-12-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 9079-VCL</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9405-vcp.html</id>
        	<title>Cigna Health &amp; Life Ins. Co. v. Audax Health Solutions, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2014-11-26T13:00:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-11-26T13:00:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9405-vcp.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff, Cigna Health and Life Insurance Co., challenged Optum Services, Inc’s acquisition by merger, via Audax Holdings, Inc., of Audax Health Solutions, Inc. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that certain provisions of the merger agreement were contrary to the Delaware General Corporation Law. Those provisions related to a release of claims, an indemnification requirement, and the appointment of a stockholder representative. The Court of Chancery granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding (1) the release of claims lacks any force because the buyer attempted to impose that obligation in a contract lacking consideration; (2) the indemnification provision violates 8 Del. Cas. 251; and (3) Plaintiff failed to brief the stockholder representative issue sufficiently to support its request for judgment as a matter of law. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9405-vcp.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Cigna Health &amp; Life Ins. Co. v. Audax Health Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff, Cigna Health and Life Insurance Co., challenged Optum Services, Inc’s acquisition by merger, via Audax Holdings, Inc., of Audax Health Solutions, Inc. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that certain provisions of the merger agreement were contrary to the Delaware General Corporation Law. Those provisions related to a release of claims, an indemnification requirement, and the appointment of a stockholder representative. The Court of Chancery granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding (1) the release of claims lacks any force because the buyer attempted to impose that obligation in a contract lacking consideration; (2) the indemnification provision violates 8 Del. Cas. 251; and (3) Plaintiff failed to brief the stockholder representative issue sufficiently to support its request for judgment as a matter of law.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-11-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Parsons</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 9405-VCP</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2173/13-2173-2014-11-12.html</id>
        	<title>Baker v. Goldman, Sachs &amp; Co.</title>
        	<updated>2014-11-12T13:30:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-11-12T13:30:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2173/13-2173-2014-11-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Dragon Systems, Inc. (Dragon), a voice recognition software company that faced a deteriorating financial situation, hired Goldman Sachs (Goldman) to provide financial advice and assistance in connection with a possible merger. In 2000, Lernout &amp; Hauspie Speech Products N.V. (Lernout &amp; Hauspie) acquired Dragon. When it was discovered that Lernout &amp; Hauspie had fraudulently overstated its earnings, the merged company filed for bankruptcy, and the Dragon name and technology were sold from the estate. Plaintiffs, two groups of Dragon shareholders, filed suit against Goldman, alleging negligent and intentional misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. A jury found in favor of Goldman on Plaintiffs’ common law claims, and district court found that Goldman had not violated chapter 93A. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly articulated the legal standard applicable to Plaintiffs’ chapter 93A claims and correctly applied that standard to its factual findings; and (2) Plaintiffs’ arguments that they were entitled to a new trial on their common law claims because of evidentiary errors and erroneous jury instructions were without merit. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2173/13-2173-2014-11-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Baker v. Goldman, Sachs &amp; Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Dragon Systems, Inc. (Dragon), a voice recognition software company that faced a deteriorating financial situation, hired Goldman Sachs (Goldman) to provide financial advice and assistance in connection with a possible merger. In 2000, Lernout &amp; Hauspie Speech Products N.V. (Lernout &amp; Hauspie) acquired Dragon. When it was discovered that Lernout &amp; Hauspie had fraudulently overstated its earnings, the merged company filed for bankruptcy, and the Dragon name and technology were sold from the estate. Plaintiffs, two groups of Dragon shareholders, filed suit against Goldman, alleging negligent and intentional misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. A jury found in favor of Goldman on Plaintiffs’ common law claims, and district court found that Goldman had not violated chapter 93A. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly articulated the legal standard applicable to Plaintiffs’ chapter 93A claims and correctly applied that standard to its factual findings; and (2) Plaintiffs’ arguments that they were entitled to a new trial on their common law claims because of evidentiary errors and erroneous jury instructions were without merit.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-11-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sandra Lea Lynch</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>13-2173</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>13-2208</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Banking"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-7865-vcn-0.html</id>
        	<title>In re TPC Group Inc. S’holders Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2014-10-30T15:01:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-10-30T15:01:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-7865-vcn-0.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After TPC Group Inc. announced its acquisition by First Reserve Corporation, SK Capital Partners, and their affiliates (collectively, the PE Group), Plaintiffs, shareholders of TPC, brought a class action against TPC, the TPC’s board of directors, and the PE Group (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs’ claims were later mooted, and the Court of Chancery awarded attorneys’ fees for the disclosures resulting from Plaintiffs’ efforts. At issue before the Court was whether Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys’ fees for the increase in the merger price achieved between the commencement of this litigation and the acquisition’s closing under an amended merger agreement. The Court of Chancery denied Plaintiffs’ application for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses for the increase in the merger price, concluding that Plaintiffs did not cause the price increase in any way. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-7865-vcn-0.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re TPC Group Inc. S’holders Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After TPC Group Inc. announced its acquisition by First Reserve Corporation, SK Capital Partners, and their affiliates (collectively, the PE Group), Plaintiffs, shareholders of TPC, brought a class action against TPC, the TPC’s board of directors, and the PE Group (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs’ claims were later mooted, and the Court of Chancery awarded attorneys’ fees for the disclosures resulting from Plaintiffs’ efforts. At issue before the Court was whether Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys’ fees for the increase in the merger price achieved between the commencement of this litigation and the acquisition’s closing under an amended merger agreement. The Court of Chancery denied Plaintiffs’ application for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses for the increase in the merger price, concluding that Plaintiffs did not cause the price increase in any way.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-10-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Noble</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 7865-VCN</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9210-cb-0.html</id>
        	<title>In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC Shareholder Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2014-10-14T12:01:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-10-14T12:01:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9210-cb-0.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2004, KKR &amp; Co. LP (KKR) acquired KKR Financial Holdings LLC (KFN) in a stock-for-stock merger. Plaintiffs, stockholders of KFN, challenged the merger by filing a class action complaint, asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against the members of the KFN board and KKR. The Court of Chancery dismissed the action for failure to state a claim for relief, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim against KKR premised on the theory that KKR was a controlling stockholder of KFN failed, as KKR did not control the board of KFN  when it approved the merger; and (2) Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim against the directors of KFN failed because the board’s approval of the merger was subject to business judgment review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9210-cb-0.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC Shareholder Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2004, KKR &amp; Co. LP (KKR) acquired KKR Financial Holdings LLC (KFN) in a stock-for-stock merger. Plaintiffs, stockholders of KFN, challenged the merger by filing a class action complaint, asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against the members of the KFN board and KKR. The Court of Chancery dismissed the action for failure to state a claim for relief, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim against KKR premised on the theory that KKR was a controlling stockholder of KFN failed, as KKR did not control the board of KFN  when it approved the merger; and (2) Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim against the directors of KFN failed because the board’s approval of the merger was subject to business judgment review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-10-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bouchard</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-6350-vcl-0.html</id>
        	<title>In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2014-10-10T13:01:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-10-10T13:01:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-6350-vcl-0.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A class of stockholders of Rural/Metro Corporation (Rural) filed a class action against RBC Capital Markets, LLC (RBC) for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of directors of Rural in relation to a merger between Rural and Warburg Pincus, LLC. The post-trial decision held RBC liable to Plaintiffs but did not fix an amount of damages suffered by the class. This opinion quantified the amount of damages for which RBC was liable, setting the amount of RBC’s liability to the class at $75,798,550, which represented eighty-three percent of the total damages. The court also awarded pre- and post-judgment interest at the legal rate from June 30, 2011, until the date of payment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-6350-vcl-0.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A class of stockholders of Rural/Metro Corporation (Rural) filed a class action against RBC Capital Markets, LLC (RBC) for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of directors of Rural in relation to a merger between Rural and Warburg Pincus, LLC. The post-trial decision held RBC liable to Plaintiffs but did not fix an amount of damages suffered by the class. This opinion quantified the amount of damages for which RBC was liable, setting the amount of RBC’s liability to the class at $75,798,550, which represented eighty-three percent of the total damages. The court also awarded pre- and post-judgment interest at the legal rate from June 30, 2011, until the date of payment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-10-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
													<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9795-cb.html</id>
        	<title>City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2014-09-08T13:15:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-09-08T13:15:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9795-cb.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		First Citizens BancShares, Inc. (FC North), a bank holding company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Raleigh, North Carolina, adopted by forum selection bylaw (the “Forum Selection Bylaw”) the same day it announced it had entered into a merger agreement to acquire First Citizens Bancorporation, Inc. The Forum Selection Bylaw selected as the forum the federal or state courts of North Carolina instead of the state or federal courts of Delaware. The City of Providence filed complaints challenging as invalid the Forum Selection Bylaw and asserting various claims against the FC North board of directors concerning the proposed merger. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss both complaints for failure to state a claim, holding (1) the Forum Selection Bylaw is facially valid; and (2) it is not unreasonable, unjust, or inequitable to enforce the Forum Selection Bylaw in this case. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9795-cb.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                First Citizens BancShares, Inc. (FC North), a bank holding company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Raleigh, North Carolina, adopted by forum selection bylaw (the “Forum Selection Bylaw”) the same day it announced it had entered into a merger agreement to acquire First Citizens Bancorporation, Inc. The Forum Selection Bylaw selected as the forum the federal or state courts of North Carolina instead of the state or federal courts of Delaware. The City of Providence filed complaints challenging as invalid the Forum Selection Bylaw and asserting various claims against the FC North board of directors concerning the proposed merger. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss both complaints for failure to state a claim, holding (1) the Forum Selection Bylaw is facially valid; and (2) it is not unreasonable, unjust, or inequitable to enforce the Forum Selection Bylaw in this case.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-09-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bouchard</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 9795-CB</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Banking"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2273/13-2273-2014-08-06.html</id>
        	<title>MAZ Partners LP v. PHC, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2014-08-06T13:30:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-08-06T13:30:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2273/13-2273-2014-08-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs, holders of PHC, Inc. stock, filed separate but similar class actions suits in Massachusetts, alleging that an announced merger between PHC and Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. was the result of an unfair process that provided them with too little compensation. A federal district court consolidated the two cases and, after the merger was consummated, granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that they suffered an actual injury. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the court abused its discretion by not allowing discovery before ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2273/13-2273-2014-08-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MAZ Partners LP v. PHC, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs, holders of PHC, Inc. stock, filed separate but similar class actions suits in Massachusetts, alleging that an announced merger between PHC and Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. was the result of an unfair process that provided them with too little compensation. A federal district court consolidated the two cases and, after the merger was consummated, granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that they suffered an actual injury. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that the court abused its discretion by not allowing discovery before ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-08-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>McConnell</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>13-2273</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/12-1750/12-1750-2014-05-14.html</id>
        	<title>Bricklayers &amp; Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC</title>
        	<updated>2014-05-14T12:00:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-05-14T12:00:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/12-1750/12-1750-2014-05-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A pension fund and other America Online (AOL) shareholders brought a class action against Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), former CSFB analysts, and other related defendants (collectively, Defendants), alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and of SEC Rule 10b-5. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed (1) CSFB made material misstatements and fraudulently withheld relevant information from the market in its reporting on the AOL-Time Warner merger; and (2) the shareholders purchased stock in the new company at artificially inflated prices as a result of the alleged misstatements and omissions. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in excluding the shareholders’ expert testimony for lack of reliability; and (2) without the expert’s testimony, Plaintiffs were unable to establish loss causation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/12-1750/12-1750-2014-05-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bricklayers &amp; Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A pension fund and other America Online (AOL) shareholders brought a class action against Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), former CSFB analysts, and other related defendants (collectively, Defendants), alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and of SEC Rule 10b-5. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed (1) CSFB made material misstatements and fraudulently withheld relevant information from the market in its reporting on the AOL-Time Warner merger; and (2) the shareholders purchased stock in the new company at artificially inflated prices as a result of the alleged misstatements and omissions. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in excluding the shareholders’ expert testimony for lack of reliability; and (2) without the expert’s testimony, Plaintiffs were unable to establish loss causation.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-05-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jeffrey R. Howard</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>12-1750</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-5090/13-5090-2014-04-11.html</id>
        	<title>Catholic Healthcare West v. Sebelius</title>
        	<updated>2014-04-11T07:07:00-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-04-11T07:07:00-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-5090/13-5090-2014-04-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff, CHW, was the surviving entity after a merger between Marian and the hospitals previously constituting CHW. Plaintiff&#039;s claim related to depreciation taken by Marian in the years before the merger. Plaintiff argued that the merger transaction revealed the inadequacy of that depreciation and that, under the statute and regulations applicable to the merger, the deficiency was subject to recoupment as part of Medicare providers&#039; general entitlement to compensation for the &quot;reasonable cost&quot; of services rendered, 42 U.S.C. 1395f(b)(1). The Secretary rejected the claim, reasoning that the implicit selling price showed a transfer for much less than Marian&#039;s true worth, so that the merger did not present a &quot;bona fide sale&quot; between &quot;unrelated parties,&quot; a prerequisite for use of the transaction as evidence that the prior depreciation had been inadequate. The court concluded that, under the valuation methods permitted prior to the Program Memorandum at issue and in fact championed by plaintiff here and in the administrative proceedings, there was a gross disparity between Marian&#039;s value and the implicit price paid. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment affirming the Secretary. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-5090/13-5090-2014-04-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Catholic Healthcare West v. Sebelius" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff, CHW, was the surviving entity after a merger between Marian and the hospitals previously constituting CHW. Plaintiff&#039;s claim related to depreciation taken by Marian in the years before the merger. Plaintiff argued that the merger transaction revealed the inadequacy of that depreciation and that, under the statute and regulations applicable to the merger, the deficiency was subject to recoupment as part of Medicare providers&#039; general entitlement to compensation for the &quot;reasonable cost&quot; of services rendered, 42 U.S.C. 1395f(b)(1). The Secretary rejected the claim, reasoning that the implicit selling price showed a transfer for much less than Marian&#039;s true worth, so that the merger did not present a &quot;bona fide sale&quot; between &quot;unrelated parties,&quot; a prerequisite for use of the transaction as evidence that the prior depreciation had been inadequate. The court concluded that, under the valuation methods permitted prior to the Program Memorandum at issue and in fact championed by plaintiff here and in the administrative proceedings, there was a gross disparity between Marian&#039;s value and the implicit price paid. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment affirming the Secretary.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-04-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stephen Fain Williams</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>13-5090</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-5878-vcl.html</id>
        	<title>Chen v. Anderson</title>
        	<updated>2014-04-08T07:03:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-04-08T07:03:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-5878-vcl.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After Occam Networks, Inc. merged with Calix, Inc., Plaintiffs filed an action contending that Defendants, Occam directors and others, breached their fiduciary duties by making decisions during Occam’s sale process that fell outside the range of reasonableness and by issuing a proxy statement for Occam’s stockholder vote on the merger that contained materially misleading disclosures and material omissions. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Court of Chancery (1) granted the director defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that a provision in Occam’s certificate of incorporation exculpated them from liability; and (2) denied summary judgment as to the disclosure claims because genuine issues of material fact existed as to these claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-5878-vcl.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Chen v. Anderson" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After Occam Networks, Inc. merged with Calix, Inc., Plaintiffs filed an action contending that Defendants, Occam directors and others, breached their fiduciary duties by making decisions during Occam’s sale process that fell outside the range of reasonableness and by issuing a proxy statement for Occam’s stockholder vote on the merger that contained materially misleading disclosures and material omissions. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The Court of Chancery (1) granted the director defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that a provision in Occam’s certificate of incorporation exculpated them from liability; and (2) denied summary judgment as to the disclosure claims because genuine issues of material fact existed as to these claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-04-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 5878-VCL</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-7840-vcl.html</id>
        	<title>In Re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2014-02-28T13:02:09-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-02-28T13:02:09-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-7840-vcl.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Since 2007, Dimensional Associates, LLC, a private equity fund, had controlled Orchard Enterprises, Inc., a Delaware corporation. In 2010, Dimensional squeezed out the minority stockholders of Orchard. The merger consideration was $2.05 per share, but in 2012, the then-Chancellor determined that the fair value of the common stock at the time of the merger was $4.76 per share. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this breach of fiduciary action, contending that Dimensional and the directors who approved the merger should be held liable for damages. Plaintiffs also named Orchard as a defendant. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Court of Chancery (1) denied Plaintiffs’ motion except in two respects: one of Plaintiffs’ claimed violations of Defendants&#039; duty of disclosure was a material misrepresentation, and entire fairness was the operative standard of review with the burden of persuasion on Defendants; and (2) denied Defendants’ motions except in two respects: one of the alleged disclosure violations was factually accurate, and Orchard could not be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty or for aiding and abetting. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-7840-vcl.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Since 2007, Dimensional Associates, LLC, a private equity fund, had controlled Orchard Enterprises, Inc., a Delaware corporation. In 2010, Dimensional squeezed out the minority stockholders of Orchard. The merger consideration was $2.05 per share, but in 2012, the then-Chancellor determined that the fair value of the common stock at the time of the merger was $4.76 per share. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this breach of fiduciary action, contending that Dimensional and the directors who approved the merger should be held liable for damages. Plaintiffs also named Orchard as a defendant. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Court of Chancery (1) denied Plaintiffs’ motion except in two respects: one of Plaintiffs’ claimed violations of Defendants&#039; duty of disclosure was a material misrepresentation, and entire fairness was the operative standard of review with the burden of persuasion on Defendants; and (2) denied Defendants’ motions except in two respects: one of the alleged disclosure violations was factually accurate, and Orchard could not be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty or for aiding and abetting.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-02-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 7840-VCL</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-8131-vcn.html</id>
        	<title>In re McMoRan Exploration Co. Stockholder Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2014-02-07T16:01:26-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2014-02-07T16:01:26-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-8131-vcn.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs in this case were former shareholders of McMoRan Exploration Company (MMR). Plaintiffs challenged MMR’s acquisition by Freeport-McMoRan Copper &amp; Gold, Inc. The case settled, and the only remaining issue was an award to Plaintiff of their attorneys’ fees and expenses upon the Court of Chancery’s discretion. After a consideration of numerous factors, the most important of which was the benefits achieved by Plaintiffs for the shareholder class, the Court of Chancery concluded that the appropriate award of fees and expenses for the efforts of Plaintiffs’ attorneys was $2.4 million. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-8131-vcn.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re McMoRan Exploration Co. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs in this case were former shareholders of McMoRan Exploration Company (MMR). Plaintiffs challenged MMR’s acquisition by Freeport-McMoRan Copper &amp; Gold, Inc. The case settled, and the only remaining issue was an award to Plaintiff of their attorneys’ fees and expenses upon the Court of Chancery’s discretion. After a consideration of numerous factors, the most important of which was the benefits achieved by Plaintiffs for the shareholder class, the Court of Chancery concluded that the appropriate award of fees and expenses for the efforts of Plaintiffs’ attorneys was $2.4 million.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2014-02-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Noble</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 8131-VCN</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2013/149.html</id>
        	<title>Belzberg v. Verus Invs. Holdings Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2013-10-17T06:05:48-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2013-10-17T06:05:48-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2013/149.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Petitioner and Ajmal Khan, principal of Verus Investment Holdings, purchased securities in a company to arbitrage a merger between that company and another company (the trade). Petitioner and Khal used Verus&#039; account at Jefferies &amp; Co. and Winton Capital Holding to complete the purchase. After the merger, Jefferies wired to Verus the original investment and profits attributable to the Winton funds. Verus wired the investment money to Winton and the profits to Doris Lindbergh, a friend of Petitioner. Tax authorities later informed Jefferies it owed withholding tax on the trade. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in an agreement between Jefferies and Verus, Jefferies commenced an arbitration against Verus for the unpaid taxes. Verus, in turn, asserted thirty-party arbitration claims against Petitioner, Lindbergh, and others for their share of the taxes. After a hearing, Supreme Court determined that nonsignatories Petitioner and Lindbergh could not be compelled to arbitrate. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Petitioner should be estopped from avoiding arbitration because he knowingly exploited and received direct benefits from the agreement between Jefferies and Verus. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner did not receive a direct benefit from the arbitration agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2013/149.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Belzberg v. Verus Invs. Holdings Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Petitioner and Ajmal Khan, principal of Verus Investment Holdings, purchased securities in a company to arbitrage a merger between that company and another company (the trade). Petitioner and Khal used Verus&#039; account at Jefferies &amp; Co. and Winton Capital Holding to complete the purchase. After the merger, Jefferies wired to Verus the original investment and profits attributable to the Winton funds. Verus wired the investment money to Winton and the profits to Doris Lindbergh, a friend of Petitioner. Tax authorities later informed Jefferies it owed withholding tax on the trade. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in an agreement between Jefferies and Verus, Jefferies commenced an arbitration against Verus for the unpaid taxes. Verus, in turn, asserted thirty-party arbitration claims against Petitioner, Lindbergh, and others for their share of the taxes. After a hearing, Supreme Court determined that nonsignatories Petitioner and Lindbergh could not be compelled to arbitrate. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Petitioner should be estopped from avoiding arbitration because he knowingly exploited and received direct benefits from the agreement between Jefferies and Verus. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner did not receive a direct benefit from the arbitration agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2013-10-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>New York</case:state>
						<case:court>New York Court of Appeals</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jenny Rivera</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>149</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="New York Court of Appeals"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-8075-vcg.html</id>
        	<title>ENI Holdings, LLC v. KBR Group Holdings, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2013-09-13T08:02:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2013-09-13T08:02:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-8075-vcg.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This matter involved the acquisition of R&amp;S by KBR from ENI pursuant to a stock purchase agreement (SPA). At issue was whether the entire escrow fund should be released to ENI or whether it was entitled to a portion of this fund. KBR sought a preliminary injunction of any further proceedings before the arbitrator. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction because the issues involved in this request were largely mooted by clarification of the parties&#039; positions during briefing and by clarification of the law by the Supreme Court in Viacom International v. Winchell, which was decided while this matter was being briefed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-8075-vcg.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ENI Holdings, LLC v. KBR Group Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This matter involved the acquisition of R&amp;S by KBR from ENI pursuant to a stock purchase agreement (SPA). At issue was whether the entire escrow fund should be released to ENI or whether it was entitled to a portion of this fund. KBR sought a preliminary injunction of any further proceedings before the arbitrator. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction because the issues involved in this request were largely mooted by clarification of the parties&#039; positions during briefing and by clarification of the law by the Supreme Court in Viacom International v. Winchell, which was decided while this matter was being briefed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2013-09-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Glasscock III</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 8075-VCG</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Arbitration &amp; Mediation"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/12-3886/12-3886-2013-09-03.html</id>
        	<title>Horras v. American Capital Strategies, Ltd.</title>
        	<updated>2013-09-03T07:31:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2013-09-03T07:31:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/12-3886/12-3886-2013-09-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff, an Iowa citizen with a home health care business, merged his business with other home health care providers to form Auxi, Inc., a Delaware corporation. After the merger, ACS acquired control of Auxi and then sold Auxi to HHC. Auxi did not inform plaintiff of the sale and plaintiff received no compensation for his shares of Auxi stock. Plaintiff filed suit against ACS claiming breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. The court concluded that plaintiff pleaded insufficient facts to support a claim that ACS breached its fiduciary duties as a majority shareholder; although plaintiff&#039;s complaint alleged damages, it contained no facts identifying the existence of a contract between ACS and plaintiff or its terms; and plaintiff pleaded no facts suggesting that the alleged contract between ACS and HHC manifested an intent to benefit him. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of both claims. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its &quot;considerable discretion,&quot; in concluding that it was not required to allow plaintiff to amend the post-judgment complaint where plaintiff never sought to amend until after dismissal, despite being on notice of the need to amend.  &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/12-3886/12-3886-2013-09-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Horras v. American Capital Strategies, Ltd." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff, an Iowa citizen with a home health care business, merged his business with other home health care providers to form Auxi, Inc., a Delaware corporation. After the merger, ACS acquired control of Auxi and then sold Auxi to HHC. Auxi did not inform plaintiff of the sale and plaintiff received no compensation for his shares of Auxi stock. Plaintiff filed suit against ACS claiming breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. The court concluded that plaintiff pleaded insufficient facts to support a claim that ACS breached its fiduciary duties as a majority shareholder; although plaintiff&#039;s complaint alleged damages, it contained no facts identifying the existence of a contract between ACS and plaintiff or its terms; and plaintiff pleaded no facts suggesting that the alleged contract between ACS and HHC manifested an intent to benefit him. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s dismissal of both claims. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its &quot;considerable discretion,&quot; in concluding that it was not required to allow plaintiff to amend the post-judgment complaint where plaintiff never sought to amend until after dismissal, despite being on notice of the need to amend. 
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2013-09-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond W. Gruender</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>12-3886</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-ol-1512-vcl.html</id>
        	<title>In re Trados Inc. S&#039;holders Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2013-08-16T06:01:28-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2013-08-16T06:01:28-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-ol-1512-vcl.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2000, Trados Inc. obtained venture capital (VC) to support a growth strategy that could lead to an initial public offering. The VC firms received preferred stock and placed representatives on the Trados board of directors (the Board). Trados, however, failed to satisfy its VC backers. The Board subsequently adopted a management incentive plan (MIP) that compensated management for achieving a sale even if the sale yielded nothing for the common stock. In 2005, SDL plc acquired Trados for $60 million. The merger constituted a liquidation that entitled the preferred stockholders to a liquidation preference of $57.9 million. Without the MIP, the common stockholders would have received $2.1 million. With the MIP, the common stockholders received nothing. Plaintiff contended that instead of selling to SDL, the board had a fiduciary duty to continue operating Trados independently to generate value for the common stock. The Court of Chancery held that Defendants proved the decision to approve the merger was fair, as the common stock had no economic value before the merger, making it fair for its holders to receive in the merger the substantial equivalent of what they had before. Likewise, the fair value of the common stock for purposes of appraisal was zero. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-ol-1512-vcl.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Trados Inc. S&#039;holders Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2000, Trados Inc. obtained venture capital (VC) to support a growth strategy that could lead to an initial public offering. The VC firms received preferred stock and placed representatives on the Trados board of directors (the Board). Trados, however, failed to satisfy its VC backers. The Board subsequently adopted a management incentive plan (MIP) that compensated management for achieving a sale even if the sale yielded nothing for the common stock. In 2005, SDL plc acquired Trados for $60 million. The merger constituted a liquidation that entitled the preferred stockholders to a liquidation preference of $57.9 million. Without the MIP, the common stockholders would have received $2.1 million. With the MIP, the common stockholders received nothing. Plaintiff contended that instead of selling to SDL, the board had a fiduciary duty to continue operating Trados independently to generate value for the common stock. The Court of Chancery held that Defendants proved the decision to approve the merger was fair, as the common stock had no economic value before the merger, making it fair for its holders to receive in the merger the substantial equivalent of what they had before. Likewise, the fair value of the common stock for purposes of appraisal was zero.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2013-08-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA OL 1512-VCL</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/12-20654/12-20654-2013-07-15.html</id>
        	<title>Memorial Hermann Hospital v. Sebelius</title>
        	<updated>2013-07-16T04:00:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2013-07-16T04:00:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/12-20654/12-20654-2013-07-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		After Hermann Hospital merged with Memorial Hospital System, creating the Memorial Herman Hospital System (MHHS), the Administrator denied MHHS&#039;s request for a Medicare loss payment under 42 C.F.R. 413.134(l). The court joined all other circuits that have ruled on the issue by holding that statutory mergers must be bona fide sales in order to be eligible for a depreciation adjustment under 42 U.S.C. 413.134(l). The court found that substantial evidence supported the Administrator&#039;s conclusion that the merger at issue failed to constitute a bona fide sale and, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the district court. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/12-20654/12-20654-2013-07-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Memorial Hermann Hospital v. Sebelius" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                After Hermann Hospital merged with Memorial Hospital System, creating the Memorial Herman Hospital System (MHHS), the Administrator denied MHHS&#039;s request for a Medicare loss payment under 42 C.F.R. 413.134(l). The court joined all other circuits that have ruled on the issue by holding that statutory mergers must be bona fide sales in order to be eligible for a depreciation adjustment under 42 U.S.C. 413.134(l). The court found that substantial evidence supported the Administrator&#039;s conclusion that the merger at issue failed to constitute a bona fide sale and, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the district court.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2013-07-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>E. Grady Jolly</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>12-20654</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Public Benefits"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-126/11-126-2013-05-31.html</id>
        	<title>Terra Firma Investments v. Citigroup</title>
        	<updated>2013-05-31T06:30:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2013-05-31T06:30:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-126/11-126-2013-05-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs appealed from the district court&#039;s grant of judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs brought claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage against defendants related to the auction of a company plaintiffs purchased. The court concluded that the district court, in its instructions to the jury, erred in its description of the English burden-shifting rule. Accordingly, the district court&#039;s order granting judgment for defendants on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim was vacated and the case was remanded for a new trial. The district court&#039;s dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim at summary judgment and of the fraudulent concealment claim as a matter of law were affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-126/11-126-2013-05-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Terra Firma Investments v. Citigroup" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs appealed from the district court&#039;s grant of judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs brought claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage against defendants related to the auction of a company plaintiffs purchased. The court concluded that the district court, in its instructions to the jury, erred in its description of the English burden-shifting rule. Accordingly, the district court&#039;s order granting judgment for defendants on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim was vacated and the case was remanded for a new trial. The district court&#039;s dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim at summary judgment and of the fraudulent concealment claim as a matter of law were affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2013-05-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Walker, Jr.</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>11-126</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Personal Injury"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-6566-cs.html</id>
        	<title>In re MFW S&#039;holders Litig.</title>
        	<updated>2013-05-29T13:02:43-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2013-05-29T13:02:43-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-6566-cs.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A holding company (Company) whose equity was solely owned by Defendant owned forty-three percent of M&amp;F Worldwide (MFW). Company offered to purchase the rest of the corporation&#039;s equity in a going private merger. The merger was conditioned on both independent committee approval and a majority-of-the-minority vote. A special committee was formed, which picked its own legal and financial advisors. After the committee successfully negotiated with Company to raise its bid by $1 per share, the merger was approved by the majority of the stockholders unaffiliated with the controlling stockholder (the minority stockholders). Company, Defendant, and other directors of MFW were sued by stockholders, who alleged that the merger was unfair. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants&#039; motion for summary judgment, holding that when a controlling stockholder merger has, from the time of the controller&#039;s first overture, been subject to (i) negotiation and approval by a special committee of independent directors empowered to say no, and (ii) approval by an uncoerced, fully informed vote of majority of the minority investors, the business judgment rule standard of review applies, under which the Court was required to dismiss the challenge to the merger in this case. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-6566-cs.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re MFW S&#039;holders Litig." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A holding company (Company) whose equity was solely owned by Defendant owned forty-three percent of M&amp;F Worldwide (MFW). Company offered to purchase the rest of the corporation&#039;s equity in a going private merger. The merger was conditioned on both independent committee approval and a majority-of-the-minority vote. A special committee was formed, which picked its own legal and financial advisors. After the committee successfully negotiated with Company to raise its bid by $1 per share, the merger was approved by the majority of the stockholders unaffiliated with the controlling stockholder (the minority stockholders). Company, Defendant, and other directors of MFW were sued by stockholders, who alleged that the merger was unfair. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants&#039; motion for summary judgment, holding that when a controlling stockholder merger has, from the time of the controller&#039;s first overture, been subject to (i) negotiation and approval by a special committee of independent directors empowered to say no, and (ii) approval by an uncoerced, fully informed vote of majority of the minority investors, the business judgment rule standard of review applies, under which the Court was required to dismiss the challenge to the merger in this case.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2013-05-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Strine</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6566-CS</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-1167/11-1167-2012-08-10.html</id>
        	<title>Petroleum Enhancer, L.L.C. v. Woodward</title>
        	<updated>2012-08-10T06:00:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-08-10T06:00:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-1167/11-1167-2012-08-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Polar Holding was sole shareholder of PMC, a company engaged in the petroleum-additive business. PMC was in default on a loan for which it had pledged valuable intellectual property as collateral, and Polar Holding was in the midst of an internal dispute between members of its board of directors regarding business strategy for PMC. One of the directors, Socia, formed a competing company, Petroleum, for the purpose of acquiring PMC’s promissory note and collateral from the holder of PMC’s loan. Petroleum brought suit against Woodward, an escrow agent in possession of PMC’s collateral, alleging that PMC was in default on the payment of its promissory note. Polar Holding and PMC intervened and filed counterclaims against Petroleum and a third-party complaint against additional parties, including Socia. Polar Holding and PMC allleged breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference. After PMC filed for bankruptcy, its claims became the property of the bankruptcy trustee. Polar Holding’s claims were later dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a tortious interference claim as addressed by the district court, but reversed dismissal of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against Socia and a civil-conspiracy claim against individual third-party defendants. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-1167/11-1167-2012-08-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Petroleum Enhancer, L.L.C. v. Woodward" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Polar Holding was sole shareholder of PMC, a company engaged in the petroleum-additive business. PMC was in default on a loan for which it had pledged valuable intellectual property as collateral, and Polar Holding was in the midst of an internal dispute between members of its board of directors regarding business strategy for PMC. One of the directors, Socia, formed a competing company, Petroleum, for the purpose of acquiring PMC’s promissory note and collateral from the holder of PMC’s loan. Petroleum brought suit against Woodward, an escrow agent in possession of PMC’s collateral, alleging that PMC was in default on the payment of its promissory note. Polar Holding and PMC intervened and filed counterclaims against Petroleum and a third-party complaint against additional parties, including Socia. Polar Holding and PMC allleged breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference. After PMC filed for bankruptcy, its claims became the property of the bankruptcy trustee. Polar Holding’s claims were later dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a tortious interference claim as addressed by the district court, but reversed dismissal of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against Socia and a civil-conspiracy claim against individual third-party defendants.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-08-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Ronald Lee Gilman</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>11-1167</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Bankruptcy"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Commercial Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/10-5277/10-5277-2012-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>Pinnacle Health Hospitals v. Sebelius</title>
        	<updated>2012-06-05T06:31:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-06-05T06:31:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/10-5277/10-5277-2012-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 1995, two non-profit hospitals consolidated to form Pinnacle. Pinnacle subsequently submitted a Medicare reimbursement claim for the losses the hospitals had incurred through the sale of their depreciable assets in the consolidation. The Administrator denied Pinnacle&#039;s claim, and that order became the final decision of the Secretary. On Pinnacle&#039;s Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., challenge, the district court upheld the Secretary&#039;s decision in full. Because the Secretary&#039;s interpretation of the relevant Medicare regulations was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, the court concluded that the Secretary reasonably applied the bona fide sale requirement to a reimbursement request from a participant in a &quot;statutory merger.&quot; The court also held that the Secretary&#039;s finding that the bona fide sale requirement applied to consolidations involving non-profit Medicare providers, like Pinnacle, was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Finally, substantial evidence supported the Secretary&#039;s finding that Pinnacle did not satisfy the bona fide sale requirement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/10-5277/10-5277-2012-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Pinnacle Health Hospitals v. Sebelius" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 1995, two non-profit hospitals consolidated to form Pinnacle. Pinnacle subsequently submitted a Medicare reimbursement claim for the losses the hospitals had incurred through the sale of their depreciable assets in the consolidation. The Administrator denied Pinnacle&#039;s claim, and that order became the final decision of the Secretary. On Pinnacle&#039;s Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., challenge, the district court upheld the Secretary&#039;s decision in full. Because the Secretary&#039;s interpretation of the relevant Medicare regulations was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, the court concluded that the Secretary reasonably applied the bona fide sale requirement to a reimbursement request from a participant in a &quot;statutory merger.&quot; The court also held that the Secretary&#039;s finding that the bona fide sale requirement applied to consolidations involving non-profit Medicare providers, like Pinnacle, was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Finally, substantial evidence supported the Secretary&#039;s finding that Pinnacle did not satisfy the bona fide sale requirement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court&#039;s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Janice Rogers Brown</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>10-5277</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Health Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Non-Profit Corporations"/>
							<category term="Public Benefits"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/682-2011.html</id>
        	<title>Central Laborers Pension Fund v. News Corp.</title>
        	<updated>2012-05-29T12:01:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-05-29T12:01:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/682-2011.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Central Laborers instituted this action under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, section 220, to compel News Corp. to produce its books and records related to its acquisition of Shine. The court held that Section 220 permitted a stockholder to inspect books and records of a corporation if the stockholder complied with the procedural requirements of the statute and then showed a proper purpose for the inspection. Section 220 required a stockholder seeking to inspect books and records to establish that such stockholder had complied with the form and manner of making demand for inspection of such documents. Central Laborers had not made that showing. Because Central Laborers&#039; Inspection Demand did not satisfy the procedural requirements of Section 220, it did not establish its standing to inspect the books and records of News Corp. On that basis alone, and without reaching the issue of proper purpose, the court affirmed the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/682-2011.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Central Laborers Pension Fund v. News Corp." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Central Laborers instituted this action under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, section 220, to compel News Corp. to produce its books and records related to its acquisition of Shine. The court held that Section 220 permitted a stockholder to inspect books and records of a corporation if the stockholder complied with the procedural requirements of the statute and then showed a proper purpose for the inspection. Section 220 required a stockholder seeking to inspect books and records to establish that such stockholder had complied with the form and manner of making demand for inspection of such documents. Central Laborers had not made that showing. Because Central Laborers&#039; Inspection Demand did not satisfy the procedural requirements of Section 220, it did not establish its standing to inspect the books and records of News Corp. On that basis alone, and without reaching the issue of proper purpose, the court affirmed the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-05-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Randy J. Holland</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>682, 2011</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-7102-cs.html</id>
        	<title>Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co.</title>
        	<updated>2012-05-21T04:01:20-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-05-21T04:01:20-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-7102-cs.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case arose when Martin Marietta sought to purchase all of Vulcan&#039;s outstanding shares (Exchange Offer). At issue was the meaning of confidentiality agreements entered into by both parties. The court found in favor of Vulcan on its counterclaims for breach of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) (Count I), and the joint defense and confidentiality agreement (JDA)(Count II), and against Martin Marietta on its claim that it did not breach the NDA (Count I). Martin Marietta shall be enjoined for a period of four months from prosecuting a proxy contest, making an exchange or tender offer, or otherwise taking steps to acquire control of Vulcan shares or assets. During that period, it is also enjoined from any further violations of the NDA and JDA. Vulcan shall submit a conforming final judgment within five days, upon approval as to form by Martin Marietta. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-7102-cs.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case arose when Martin Marietta sought to purchase all of Vulcan&#039;s outstanding shares (Exchange Offer). At issue was the meaning of confidentiality agreements entered into by both parties. The court found in favor of Vulcan on its counterclaims for breach of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) (Count I), and the joint defense and confidentiality agreement (JDA)(Count II), and against Martin Marietta on its claim that it did not breach the NDA (Count I). Martin Marietta shall be enjoined for a period of four months from prosecuting a proxy contest, making an exchange or tender offer, or otherwise taking steps to acquire control of Vulcan shares or assets. During that period, it is also enjoined from any further violations of the NDA and JDA. Vulcan shall submit a conforming final judgment within five days, upon approval as to form by Martin Marietta.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-05-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Strine</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 7102-CS</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/577-2011.html</id>
        	<title>RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2012-05-21T04:01:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-05-21T04:01:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/577-2011.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		RAA appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court that dismissed its complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). RAA&#039;s complaint alleged that Savage told RAA, one of several potential bidders for Savage, at the outset of their discussions that there was &quot;no significant unrecorded liabilities or claims against Savage,&quot; but then during RAA&#039;s due diligence into Savage, Savage disclosed three such matters, which caused RAA to abandon negotiations for the transactions. The complaint contended that had RAA known of those matters at the outset, it never would have proceeded to consider purchasing Savage. Therefore, according to RAA, Savage should be liable for the entirety of RAA&#039;s alleged $1.2 million in due diligence and negotiation costs. The court held that, under Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA), RAA acknowledged that in the event no final &quot;Sale Agreement&quot; on a transaction was reached, Savage would have no liability, and could not be sued, for any allegedly inaccurate or incomplete information provided by Savage to RAA during the due diligence process. The court also held that RAA could not rely on the peculiar-knowledge exception to support its claims. Finally, the court held that, when Savage and RAA entered into the NDA, both parties knew how the non-reliance clauses had been construed by Delaware courts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/577-2011.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                RAA appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court that dismissed its complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). RAA&#039;s complaint alleged that Savage told RAA, one of several potential bidders for Savage, at the outset of their discussions that there was &quot;no significant unrecorded liabilities or claims against Savage,&quot; but then during RAA&#039;s due diligence into Savage, Savage disclosed three such matters, which caused RAA to abandon negotiations for the transactions. The complaint contended that had RAA known of those matters at the outset, it never would have proceeded to consider purchasing Savage. Therefore, according to RAA, Savage should be liable for the entirety of RAA&#039;s alleged $1.2 million in due diligence and negotiation costs. The court held that, under Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA), RAA acknowledged that in the event no final &quot;Sale Agreement&quot; on a transaction was reached, Savage would have no liability, and could not be sued, for any allegedly inaccurate or incomplete information provided by Savage to RAA during the due diligence process. The court also held that RAA could not rely on the peculiar-knowledge exception to support its claims. Finally, the court held that, when Savage and RAA entered into the NDA, both parties knew how the non-reliance clauses had been construed by Delaware courts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-05-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Randy J. Holland</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>577, 2011</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-5233-vcp.html</id>
        	<title>Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2012-05-14T04:01:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-05-14T04:01:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-5233-vcp.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This was an appraisal proceeding brought pursuant to 8 Del. C. 262. Petitioners, former shareholders and managers of a prison healthcare detention company, sought appraisal of their shares following an all cash acquisition of the company for $40 million. The court found that the fair value of Just Care as of September 30, 2009 was $34,244,570. The parties shall cooperate to determine the amount of the interest award in accordance with the rulings in the opinion and petitioners shall present, on notice, an appropriate proposed order of final judgment specifying, among other things, the corresponding fair value per common share and per Series A preferred share within 10 days. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-5233-vcp.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This was an appraisal proceeding brought pursuant to 8 Del. C. 262. Petitioners, former shareholders and managers of a prison healthcare detention company, sought appraisal of their shares following an all cash acquisition of the company for $40 million. The court found that the fair value of Just Care as of September 30, 2009 was $34,244,570. The parties shall cooperate to determine the amount of the interest award in accordance with the rulings in the opinion and petitioners shall present, on notice, an appropriate proposed order of final judgment specifying, among other things, the corresponding fair value per common share and per Series A preferred share within 10 days.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-04-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Parsons</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 5233-VCP</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-3148-vcn.html</id>
        	<title>Dawson v. Pittco Capital Partners, L.P.</title>
        	<updated>2012-05-14T04:01:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-05-14T04:01:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-3148-vcn.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This dispute arose from the merger between plaintiff&#039;s start-up company, LaneScan, and VSAC. Plaintiffs complained that the Merger improperly deprived them of their Notes and that a return of capital provision was inappropriately excised from LaneScan&#039;s Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement in conjunction with the merger. For damages, plaintiffs requested a return of their original investment in LaneScan with pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys&#039; fees and expenses. The court granted plaintiffs&#039; request for a declaratory judgment with respect to the Notes and the Security Agreement, and it reserved decision on plaintiffs&#039; request for an award of legal fees and expenses related to the Notes Claims, to the extent such request was based upon section 2.3 of the Notes and plaintiffs&#039; successful showing on the declaratory judgment claim. The court ruled in favor of defendants with respect to all of plaintiffs&#039; other claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-3148-vcn.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Dawson v. Pittco Capital Partners, L.P." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This dispute arose from the merger between plaintiff&#039;s start-up company, LaneScan, and VSAC. Plaintiffs complained that the Merger improperly deprived them of their Notes and that a return of capital provision was inappropriately excised from LaneScan&#039;s Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement in conjunction with the merger. For damages, plaintiffs requested a return of their original investment in LaneScan with pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys&#039; fees and expenses. The court granted plaintiffs&#039; request for a declaratory judgment with respect to the Notes and the Security Agreement, and it reserved decision on plaintiffs&#039; request for an award of legal fees and expenses related to the Notes Claims, to the extent such request was based upon section 2.3 of the Notes and plaintiffs&#039; successful showing on the declaratory judgment claim. The court ruled in favor of defendants with respect to all of plaintiffs&#039; other claims.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-04-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Noble</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 3148-VCN</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6875-vcn.html</id>
        	<title>JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co. v. American Century Co.</title>
        	<updated>2012-05-10T04:01:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-05-10T04:01:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6875-vcn.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiffs brought their Verified Complaint asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against defendant. J.P.Morgan also asserted a claim for attorneys&#039; fees and costs under an option agreement that J.P. Morgan and defendant entered into, which was the contract central to the dispute. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that J.P. Morgan has failed to state a claim that defendant breached the express terms of the Option Agreement and therefore, defendant&#039;s motion to dismiss was granted as to Count I. Defendant&#039;s motion to dismiss was denied as to Count II because J.P. Morgan&#039;s allegations, taken together, were sufficient to state a claim of the implied covenant. Finally, defendant&#039;s motion to dismiss was denied as to Count III where J.P. Morgan could eventually be the prevailing party in this action. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6875-vcn.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co. v. American Century Co." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiffs brought their Verified Complaint asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against defendant. J.P.Morgan also asserted a claim for attorneys&#039; fees and costs under an option agreement that J.P. Morgan and defendant entered into, which was the contract central to the dispute. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that J.P. Morgan has failed to state a claim that defendant breached the express terms of the Option Agreement and therefore, defendant&#039;s motion to dismiss was granted as to Count I. Defendant&#039;s motion to dismiss was denied as to Count II because J.P. Morgan&#039;s allegations, taken together, were sufficient to state a claim of the implied covenant. Finally, defendant&#039;s motion to dismiss was denied as to Count III where J.P. Morgan could eventually be the prevailing party in this action.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-04-26</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Noble</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6875-VCN</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Securities Law"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6170-vcn.html</id>
        	<title>In re Answers Corp. Shareholders Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2012-04-25T04:01:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-04-25T04:01:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6170-vcn.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This action arose out of the merger of Answers with A-Team, a wholly-owned subsidiary of AFCV, which in turn, was a portfolio company of the private equity firm Summit (collectively, with A-Team and AFCV, the Buyout Group). Plaintiffs, owners of Answers&#039; stock, filed a purported class action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated public stockholders of Answers. The court concluded that the complaint adequately alleged that all of the members of the Board breached their fiduciary duties. Therefore, the motions to dismiss the First Cause of Action were denied, except as to the disclosure claim that plaintiffs have abandoned. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pled that the Buyout Group aided and abetted a breach of the Board&#039;s fiduciary duty. Therefore, the motions to dismiss the Second Cause of Action were denied.  &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6170-vcn.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Answers Corp. Shareholders Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This action arose out of the merger of Answers with A-Team, a wholly-owned subsidiary of AFCV, which in turn, was a portfolio company of the private equity firm Summit (collectively, with A-Team and AFCV, the Buyout Group). Plaintiffs, owners of Answers&#039; stock, filed a purported class action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated public stockholders of Answers. The court concluded that the complaint adequately alleged that all of the members of the Board breached their fiduciary duties. Therefore, the motions to dismiss the First Cause of Action were denied, except as to the disclosure claim that plaintiffs have abandoned. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have adequately pled that the Buyout Group aided and abetted a breach of the Board&#039;s fiduciary duty. Therefore, the motions to dismiss the Second Cause of Action were denied. 
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-04-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Noble</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6170-VCN</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6304-vcp.html</id>
        	<title>In re Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2012-04-23T07:01:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-04-23T07:01:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6304-vcp.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This putative class action was before the court on an application for the approval of settlement of the class&#039;s claims for, among other things, breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a merger of two publicly traded Delaware corporations. The target&#039;s largest stockholder, which acquired the vast majority of its shares after the challenged transaction was announced, objected to the proposed settlement. In addition, defendants&#039; and plaintiffs&#039; counsel disagreed about the appropriate level of attorneys&#039; fees that should be awarded. The court certified the class under Rules 23(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2) with NOERS as class representative; denied BVF&#039;s request to certify the class on only an opt out basis; approved the settlement as fair and reasonable; and awarded attorneys&#039; fees to plaintiffs&#039; counsel in the amount of $1,350,000, inclusive of expenses.  &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6304-vcp.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This putative class action was before the court on an application for the approval of settlement of the class&#039;s claims for, among other things, breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a merger of two publicly traded Delaware corporations. The target&#039;s largest stockholder, which acquired the vast majority of its shares after the challenged transaction was announced, objected to the proposed settlement. In addition, defendants&#039; and plaintiffs&#039; counsel disagreed about the appropriate level of attorneys&#039; fees that should be awarded. The court certified the class under Rules 23(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2) with NOERS as class representative; denied BVF&#039;s request to certify the class on only an opt out basis; approved the settlement as fair and reasonable; and awarded attorneys&#039; fees to plaintiffs&#039; counsel in the amount of $1,350,000, inclusive of expenses. 
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-03-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Parsons</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6304-VCP</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Professional Malpractice &amp; Ethics"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6301-vcp.html</id>
        	<title>In re K-Sea Transportation Partners L.P. Unitholders Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2012-04-23T07:01:57-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-04-23T07:01:57-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6301-vcp.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This was a class action brought on behalf of the common unit holders of a publicly-traded Delaware limited partnership. In March 2011, the partnership agreed to be acquired by an unaffiliated third party at a premium to its common units&#039; trading price. The merger agreement, which governed the transaction, also provided for a separate payment to the general partner to acquire certain partnership interests it held exclusively. The court concluded that defendants&#039; approval of the merger agreement could not constitute a breach of any contractual or fiduciary duty, regardless of whether the conflict committee&#039;s approval was effective. The court also found that the disclosures authorized by defendants were not materially misleading. Therefore, plaintiffs could not succeed on their claims under any reasonable conceivable set of circumstances and defendants&#039; motion to dismiss was granted. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6301-vcp.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re K-Sea Transportation Partners L.P. Unitholders Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This was a class action brought on behalf of the common unit holders of a publicly-traded Delaware limited partnership. In March 2011, the partnership agreed to be acquired by an unaffiliated third party at a premium to its common units&#039; trading price. The merger agreement, which governed the transaction, also provided for a separate payment to the general partner to acquire certain partnership interests it held exclusively. The court concluded that defendants&#039; approval of the merger agreement could not constitute a breach of any contractual or fiduciary duty, regardless of whether the conflict committee&#039;s approval was effective. The court also found that the disclosures authorized by defendants were not materially misleading. Therefore, plaintiffs could not succeed on their claims under any reasonable conceivable set of circumstances and defendants&#039; motion to dismiss was granted.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-04-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Parsons</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6301-VCP</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/11-11122/11-11122-2012-04-17.html</id>
        	<title>Holston Investments Inc. B.V.I., et al. v. LanLogistics, Corp.</title>
        	<updated>2012-04-17T12:31:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-04-17T12:31:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/11-11122/11-11122-2012-04-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Holston sued LanLogistics for breach of contract when LanLogistics never gave Holston an opportunity to match Gartlan&#039;s offer to purchase LanBox. Holston was a citizen of Florida and LanLogistics was incorporated in Delaware, maintaining its corporate headquarters in Miami, Florida. But by the time Holston filed suit, LanLogistics had dissolved and formally forfeited its authority to conduct business in Florida. At issue on appeal was the citizenship of a dissolved corporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and whether summary judgment was appropriately entered where there could have been a genuine issue of material fact. The court held that LanLogistics was only a citizen of Delaware and the court had subject matter jurisdiction where LanLogistics dissolved and formerly withdrew from business before Holston filed suit. The court reversed the district court&#039;s supplemental summary judgment order and remanded for a determination regarding the fair market value of each company in the package deal to identify the percentage of the purchase price used to purchase LanBox. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/11-11122/11-11122-2012-04-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Holston Investments Inc. B.V.I., et al. v. LanLogistics, Corp." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Holston sued LanLogistics for breach of contract when LanLogistics never gave Holston an opportunity to match Gartlan&#039;s offer to purchase LanBox. Holston was a citizen of Florida and LanLogistics was incorporated in Delaware, maintaining its corporate headquarters in Miami, Florida. But by the time Holston filed suit, LanLogistics had dissolved and formally forfeited its authority to conduct business in Florida. At issue on appeal was the citizenship of a dissolved corporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and whether summary judgment was appropriately entered where there could have been a genuine issue of material fact. The court held that LanLogistics was only a citizen of Delaware and the court had subject matter jurisdiction where LanLogistics dissolved and formerly withdrew from business before Holston filed suit. The court reversed the district court&#039;s supplemental summary judgment order and remanded for a determination regarding the fair market value of each company in the package deal to identify the percentage of the purchase price used to purchase LanBox.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-04-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
															<case:docket_number>11-11122</case:docket_number>
																<case:docket_number>11-13442</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6790-vcn.html</id>
        	<title>ODN Holding Corp. v. Hsu</title>
        	<updated>2012-04-13T04:01:23-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-04-13T04:01:23-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6790-vcn.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This action arose out of plaintiff Lawrence Ng&#039;s sale (the Sale) of a majority of the common stock of plaintiff ODN to plaintiff Oak Hill. Defendant Lawrence Hsu initially filed an action challenging the Sale (the First Delaware Action) and subsequently dismissed the First Delaware Action with prejudice two weeks after it was filed, and no defendant ever appeared in that action. More than 20 months later, Hsu and three other plaintiffs filed another action challenging the Sale (California Action). Three weeks after that, defendants in the California Action filed the current action (Second Delaware Action), seeking, among other things, a declaration that they did not commit certain wrongs alleged in the California Action. Hsu has moved to dismiss, or alternatively, to stay the Second Delaware Action in favor of the California Action. The court denied Hsu&#039;s motion but granted his motion to stay the Second Delaware action because the California Action was in its initial stages. Depending on what happened in the California Action, the court might move forward with the Second Delaware Action. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6790-vcn.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ODN Holding Corp. v. Hsu" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This action arose out of plaintiff Lawrence Ng&#039;s sale (the Sale) of a majority of the common stock of plaintiff ODN to plaintiff Oak Hill. Defendant Lawrence Hsu initially filed an action challenging the Sale (the First Delaware Action) and subsequently dismissed the First Delaware Action with prejudice two weeks after it was filed, and no defendant ever appeared in that action. More than 20 months later, Hsu and three other plaintiffs filed another action challenging the Sale (California Action). Three weeks after that, defendants in the California Action filed the current action (Second Delaware Action), seeking, among other things, a declaration that they did not commit certain wrongs alleged in the California Action. Hsu has moved to dismiss, or alternatively, to stay the Second Delaware Action in favor of the California Action. The court denied Hsu&#039;s motion but granted his motion to stay the Second Delaware action because the California Action was in its initial stages. Depending on what happened in the California Action, the court might move forward with the Second Delaware Action.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-03-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Noble</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6790-VCN</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6120-vcn.html</id>
        	<title>Frank v. Elgamel, et al.</title>
        	<updated>2012-04-13T04:01:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-04-13T04:01:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6120-vcn.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This action arose out of the merger of American Surgical with merger Sub, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Holdings, which, in turn, was an affiliate of Great Point. Plaintiff brought this purported class action to challenge the merger and alleged that American&#039;s Surgical Board and its Control Group breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the merger. Plaintiff also alleged that the Purchasing Entities aided and abetted those breaches of fiduciary duty. The court granted defendants&#039; motion to dismiss Cause of Action IV, which alleged that the Purchasing Entities aided and abetted the breaches of fiduciary duty committed by the members of the Control Group and Board. The court, however, denied the motion to dismiss as to Causes of Action I, II, and III.  &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6120-vcn.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Frank v. Elgamel, et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This action arose out of the merger of American Surgical with merger Sub, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Holdings, which, in turn, was an affiliate of Great Point. Plaintiff brought this purported class action to challenge the merger and alleged that American&#039;s Surgical Board and its Control Group breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the merger. Plaintiff also alleged that the Purchasing Entities aided and abetted those breaches of fiduciary duty. The court granted defendants&#039; motion to dismiss Cause of Action IV, which alleged that the Purchasing Entities aided and abetted the breaches of fiduciary duty committed by the members of the Control Group and Board. The court, however, denied the motion to dismiss as to Causes of Action I, II, and III. 
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-03-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Noble</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6120-VCN</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6949-cs.html</id>
        	<title>In Re El Paso Corporation Shareholder Litigation</title>
        	<updated>2012-04-02T04:01:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-04-02T04:01:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6949-cs.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Stockholder plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin a merger between El Paso and Kinder Morgan. The CEO of El Paso undertook sole responsibility for negotiating the sale of El Paso to Kinder Morgan in the merger but did not disclose to El Paso&#039;s Board his interest in working with other El Paso managers in making a bid to buy El Paso&#039;s exploration and production (E&amp;P) business. Further, the Board and management of El Paso relied in part on advice given by a financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, which owned 19% of Kinder Morgan and controlled two Kinder Morgan board seats. The court concluded that plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that the merger was tainted by disloyalty. Because, however, there was no other bid on the table and the stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice whether to turn down the merger themselves, the balance of harms counseled against a preliminary injunction. Although the pursuit of a monetary damages award could not be likely to promise full relief, the record did not instill in the court the confidence to deny, by grant of an injunction, El Paso&#039;s stockholders from accepting a transaction that they could find desirable in current market conditions, despite the disturbing behavior that led to its final terms. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6949-cs.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In Re El Paso Corporation Shareholder Litigation" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Stockholder plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin a merger between El Paso and Kinder Morgan. The CEO of El Paso undertook sole responsibility for negotiating the sale of El Paso to Kinder Morgan in the merger but did not disclose to El Paso&#039;s Board his interest in working with other El Paso managers in making a bid to buy El Paso&#039;s exploration and production (E&amp;P) business. Further, the Board and management of El Paso relied in part on advice given by a financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, which owned 19% of Kinder Morgan and controlled two Kinder Morgan board seats. The court concluded that plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that the merger was tainted by disloyalty. Because, however, there was no other bid on the table and the stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice whether to turn down the merger themselves, the balance of harms counseled against a preliminary injunction. Although the pursuit of a monetary damages award could not be likely to promise full relief, the record did not instill in the court the confidence to deny, by grant of an injunction, El Paso&#039;s stockholders from accepting a transaction that they could find desirable in current market conditions, despite the disturbing behavior that led to its final terms.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-02-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Strine</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6949-CS</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6539-vcl.html</id>
        	<title>Buerger, et al. v. Apfel, et al.</title>
        	<updated>2012-04-02T04:01:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-04-02T04:01:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6539-vcl.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This derivative action challenged a series of related-party transactions. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that laches barred the bulk of the claims. Defendants were partly right, laches barred the challenges to certain stock options granted in 2004 and 2005. Laches also barred a portion of the challenge to compensation received under certain employment agreements and rent-free sublease. With respect to these claims, the doctrine applied to the extent the compensation was paid and rent-free space provided before March 18, 2008. The doctrine did not apply to the extent that compensation was paid and rent-free space provided on or after March 18, 2008. On a final set of claims, the court granted plaintiffs leave to replead because although the complaint alleged facts sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, the pleading failed to identify when plaintiffs subsequently found out about the self-dealing transactions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-6539-vcl.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Buerger, et al. v. Apfel, et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This derivative action challenged a series of related-party transactions. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that laches barred the bulk of the claims. Defendants were partly right, laches barred the challenges to certain stock options granted in 2004 and 2005. Laches also barred a portion of the challenge to compensation received under certain employment agreements and rent-free sublease. With respect to these claims, the doctrine applied to the extent the compensation was paid and rent-free space provided before March 18, 2008. The doctrine did not apply to the extent that compensation was paid and rent-free space provided on or after March 18, 2008. On a final set of claims, the court granted plaintiffs leave to replead because although the complaint alleged facts sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, the pleading failed to identify when plaintiffs subsequently found out about the self-dealing transactions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-03-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Court of Chancery</case:court>
							<case:judge>Laster</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>CA 6539-VCL</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Corporate Compliance"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
							<category term="Real Estate &amp; Property Law"/>
										<category term="Delaware Court of Chancery"/>
															</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/531-2011.html</id>
        	<title>BLGH Holdings LLC v. Enxco LFG Holding, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2012-03-28T08:01:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2012-03-28T08:01:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/531-2011.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2010, BLGH entered into an agreement with enXco to sell BLGH&#039;s renewable energy business, Beacon, to enXco. The Unit Purchase Agreement that governed the sale of Beacon (UPA) called for a purchase price of $12 million, plus a &quot;bonus payment&quot; to BLGH if certain conditions were met. The sale of Beacon took place and BLGH was paid $12 million. A dispute arose, however, over whether BLGH was entitled to the additional bonus payment. enXco claimed that no bonus payment was legally due. BLGH responded by filing a Superior Court action against enXco for breach of contract. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to enXco, holding that no bonus payment was owed to BLGH under the UPA. The court reversed and held that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment to enXco where the transaction &quot;outlined&quot; in the letter of intent met the requirements of Section 1.7 of the UPA, triggering BLGH&#039;s right to a bonus payment, and nothing more was required by the UPA for BLGH to become legally entitled to the bonus payment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2012/531-2011.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BLGH Holdings LLC v. Enxco LFG Holding, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2010, BLGH entered into an agreement with enXco to sell BLGH&#039;s renewable energy business, Beacon, to enXco. The Unit Purchase Agreement that governed the sale of Beacon (UPA) called for a purchase price of $12 million, plus a &quot;bonus payment&quot; to BLGH if certain conditions were met. The sale of Beacon took place and BLGH was paid $12 million. A dispute arose, however, over whether BLGH was entitled to the additional bonus payment. enXco claimed that no bonus payment was legally due. BLGH responded by filing a Superior Court action against enXco for breach of contract. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to enXco, holding that no bonus payment was owed to BLGH under the UPA. The court reversed and held that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment to enXco where the transaction &quot;outlined&quot; in the letter of intent met the requirements of Section 1.7 of the UPA, triggering BLGH&#039;s right to a bonus payment, and nothing more was required by the UPA for BLGH to become legally entitled to the bonus payment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2012-03-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>state</case:jurisdiction>
							<case:state>Delaware</case:state>
						<case:court>Delaware Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jack B. Jacobs</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>531, 2011</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="Mergers &amp; Acquisitions"/>
										<category term="Delaware Supreme Court"/>
															</entry>
    </feed>

