Medical Malpractice - Justia Case Law Summaries

Estate Of Harris v. Beaumont Health

2026-07-01T05:00:02-08:00

A woman died from a pulmonary embolism roughly 30 days after undergoing knee replacement surgery. Her estate, through its personal representative, filed a medical malpractice suit in the Oakland Circuit Court against the operating surgeon, his orthopedic practice, and the hospital where the surgery occurred. The estate alleged that the surgeon negligently failed to prescribe a prescription-strength anticoagulant. The complaint was accompanied by an affidavit of merit from an orthopedic surgeon, attesting to his qualifications during the relevant time period. The estate timely identified this surgeon as its expert witness, but difficulty arose when he became unavailable for deposition. The estate attempted to substitute a new expert on its witness list without seeking court approval, prompting litigation over whether this substitution should be permitted. The Oakland Circuit Court struck the amended witness list and ordered the estate to produce the original expert for deposition. When the estate could not do so, it sought to amend its witness list and moved for voluntary dismissal, both of which the circuit court denied. The court found that the estate had not acted diligently, determined the affidavit of merit was invalid due to the expert’s lack of recent practice, and granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, closing the case. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the circuit court abused its discretion by considering only prejudice when denying the motion to amend the witness list and failing to apply the factors from Dean v Tucker. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the correct standard for amending a witness list is the “good-cause” standard of MCR 2.401(I)(2), not the Dean factors. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion under the good-cause standard and that summary disposition was prematurely granted. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Estate Of Harris v. Beaumont Health" on Justia Law

BURGESS v. INTEGRIS HEALTH EDMOND, INC.

2026-06-30T12:51:37-08:00

A 21-year-old college student experienced COVID-19 symptoms and subsequently developed chest pain, shortness of breath, and lightheadedness. After testing positive for COVID-19 at urgent care, he sought emergency treatment at a hospital where the physician noted pleuritic chest pain and performed diagnostic tests, including an EKG and chest x-ray, both showing abnormalities. Due to hospital COVID-19 protocols, his mother was unable to convey his family history of a blood clotting disorder to the physician. The patient was discharged without a pulmonary embolism diagnosis and died twenty days later from cardiac arrest caused by a pulmonary embolism with underlying COVID-19. The parents filed a wrongful death and medical negligence suit in the District Court of Oklahoma County against the hospital, physician, and emergency services group. The defendants argued immunity under both Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act and the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act). The trial court denied summary judgment on both immunity claims, rejected the PREP Act defense at trial, denied the Oklahoma COVID-19 Act immunity as a matter of law, and granted a directed verdict for the parents on intervening/supervening causation. The jury found negligence, awarded damages, and attributed contributory negligence to the decedent. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the defendants are immune from liability for ordinary negligence under Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Act because the patient was impacted by the facility’s COVID-19 policies, and the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict on this immunity. However, the Court held that PREP Act immunity does not apply because the alleged injury was not causally related to the administration or use of covered countermeasures. The Court also affirmed the trial court’s handling of intervening/supervening causation. The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "BURGESS v. INTEGRIS HEALTH EDMOND, INC." on Justia Law

HEATH v. OLAVESON

2026-06-30T08:35:18-08:00

A patient underwent a gallbladder removal surgery in Idaho Falls in 2019, performed by a board-certified general surgeon. The patient alleged that the procedure resulted in severe complications, including organ lacerations and emergency transport for further care. He claimed that the surgeon’s actions fell below the applicable community standard of care and filed a medical malpractice lawsuit. To support his claim, the patient sought to present testimony from an out-of-area, board-certified medical expert, who stated he had familiarized himself with the local standard of care by consulting a local surgeon practicing in the Idaho Falls/Pocatello area. The Seventh Judicial District Court of Idaho, Bonneville County, reviewed the affidavits submitted by the out-of-area expert. The court struck both the original and amended affidavits, finding that neither sufficiently demonstrated the expert’s foundation to testify regarding the community standard of care. The affidavits lacked specific information about the local surgeon’s familiarity with the Idaho Falls community standard and did not establish whether Idaho Falls and Pocatello were overlapping medical communities. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant surgeon, concluding that the plaintiff had not presented admissible evidence on a necessary element of his claim. The court also awarded the defendant costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that Idaho law requires out-of-area experts to demonstrate actual knowledge of the community standard of care, including showing how they became familiar with it, and that board-certified physicians are not automatically subject to a national standard. The court found the affidavits insufficient and upheld the grant of summary judgment and the award of costs to the defendant. The court also denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney fees on appeal. View "HEATH v. OLAVESON" on Justia Law

ALDACO v. WOOD

2026-06-26T06:22:18-08:00

After experiencing ongoing struggles with gender identity, a young adult sought a double mastectomy and was informed by the surgical clinic that a letter from a mental health practitioner was required to proceed. The petitioner requested this letter from her therapist, who had previously counseled her on unrelated matters. The therapist provided a letter recommending the surgery on February 22, 2021. Their therapeutic relationship ended on May 14, 2021. The petitioner underwent surgery on June 11, 2021, subsequently suffered medical complications, and later regretted the procedure. In 2023, she filed suit against the therapist and the therapist’s employer, alleging negligence and fraud in the issuance of the recommendation letter, and sought to hold the employer vicariously and directly liable. The case was first adjudicated in a Texas district court, where the respondents sought summary judgment, arguing that the petitioner’s claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations for health care liability claims under Section 74.251(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The district court granted summary judgment and severed the claims, making the decision final as to the therapist and her employer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date the recommendation letter was provided. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of the statute of limitations. The Court held that, under Section 74.251(a), a claim is timely if filed within two years of the completion of the relevant health care treatment or the occurrence of the tort. Here, treatment concluded on May 14, 2021, and the alleged injury occurred on June 11, 2021, when the surgery was performed. Because the petitioner gave notice of her claims within two years of these events, her suit was not time-barred. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "ALDACO v. WOOD" on Justia Law

Almonte v. Township of Union

2026-06-25T06:07:38-08:00

A twenty-one-month-old child suffered seizures and respiratory distress after a fall at home. His mother called 911, and basic life support EMTs arrived, followed by advanced life support paramedics. The paramedics, employed by Atlantic Ambulance Corporation, administered medications and attempted multiple intubations to open his airway. They communicated twice by phone with Dr. Niti Sharma, a licensed emergency physician, who gave them orders to administer drugs and to intubate the child. After several unsuccessful intubation attempts and continued resuscitation efforts, the child was transported into the hospital, where he was reintubated and resuscitated. He was discharged with an anoxic brain injury and other significant health repercussions. Plaintiffs, the child’s parents, sued Atlantic Ambulance Corporation, its paramedics, and other related parties, alleging negligence and reckless conduct caused the injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing immunity under New Jersey’s Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA), which shields paramedics from civil liability when they perform advanced life support services “in good faith” and “in accordance with” the EMSA. The Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary judgment, finding the paramedics followed physician orders and maintained appropriate communication. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding the paramedics’ actions met statutory requirements for immunity, and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that frequent or continuous communication with the physician was required. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed whether the paramedics acted “in accordance with the act” for purposes of statutory immunity. The Court held that the paramedics maintained direct voice communication and took orders from a licensed physician as required by the EMSA, and that the statute does not mandate continuous communication or specific recontact criteria. The Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, granting them immunity under N.J.S.A. 26:2K-14. View "Almonte v. Township of Union" on Justia Law

Moore v. Mercy Med. Ctr.

2026-06-23T05:16:54-08:00

After a prolonged labor, a mother delivered her son at a hospital, with the child experiencing respiratory distress requiring intubation shortly after birth. The mother alleged that the child’s injuries resulted from medical malpractice by the hospital and two physicians involved in her care during labor and delivery. One physician initially managed her labor, then transferred care to another physician, and later resumed care the following morning, at which point he ordered an emergency cesarean section after being notified of fetal distress. During the litigation, the mother’s medical expert provided a report stating that all involved providers, including both physicians and the nursing staff, deviated from the standard of care by not advocating for a cesarean section on the evening prior to delivery, a time when the physician in question was not present. The physician moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expert's report did not implicate him in the alleged malpractice. In response, the mother submitted an affidavit from the same expert, which incorporated the prior report but added a new opinion that the physician breached the standard of care by not performing a cesarean within thirty minutes of receiving reports of fetal distress on the morning of delivery. The physician moved to strike this affidavit, arguing it contradicted the prior expert report and was submitted only to create an issue of fact. The Stark County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion to strike the affidavit and entered summary judgment for the physician. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit’s new opinion was contradictory and could be disregarded under the sham-affidavit rule. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment. It held that when an expert incorporates an earlier report into a sworn affidavit, the court may consider both documents together for summary judgment purposes. If the affidavit contradicts the report without sufficient explanation, the trial court acts within its discretion to strike it under the sham-affidavit rule. View "Moore v. Mercy Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

CLARK v. LEIGH

2026-06-16T04:25:33-08:00

A woman died after complications from surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, during which her bowel was perforated. Following the procedure, she received post-operative care from several doctors, who were later sued by her husband and daughter. The plaintiffs, acting as statutory wrongful death plaintiff and administrator of the estate, brought claims for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Several defendants settled before trial, but Dr. Leigh, Dr. Shirley, and their practice went to trial. The jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the value of the decedent’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses. After the verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial and to reduce (“remit and amend”) the judgment based on a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases (OCGA § 51-13-1(b)). The State Court of Bibb County denied the new trial but granted the motion to remit, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 under the statutory cap, while leaving pain and suffering and medical expenses unchanged. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defendants to invoke the damages cap for the first time in post-trial motions. The court reaffirmed Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, concluding that Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial prohibits applying OCGA § 51-13-1(b)’s cap to noneconomic damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice actions. Statutory construction principles, in light of Nestlehutt, prevent the cap from being applied to a verdict that includes such damages. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s reduction of the wrongful death award and remanded for consideration of an unresolved excessiveness argument. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC

2026-06-16T04:25:32-08:00

A woman died in a hospital after giving birth by cesarean section, having suffered a rare and severe complication known as placenta accreta spectrum, which led to a massive hemorrhage. She underwent an emergency hysterectomy and was transferred to the intensive care unit for postoperative management. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children, brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against multiple medical providers and the hospital. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only one doctor and a medical staffing agency as defendants. In the Superior Court of Rockdale County, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony alleging breaches of the standard of care by the remaining defendants. The jury found both liable and awarded $42 million in total damages: $10 million for pain and suffering to the estate and $32 million for wrongful death to the children. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for a new trial, and refused to apply Georgia’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, finding it unconstitutional and waived due to the defendants’ failure to raise it earlier. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, awarding over $11 million. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain defense expert testimony or in granting the challenged jury instruction, as the defendants had affirmatively waived any instructional error. The court affirmed that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages could not constitutionally be applied to the judgment. Finally, it upheld the award of attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs’ settlement offer complied with statutory requirements and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

Jorgensen v. Smith

2026-06-12T06:04:05-08:00

After Charlene Jorgensen underwent two breast reduction surgeries by Dr. Adam Smith, she and her husband filed suit in May 2020, alleging the second surgery in 2018 was negligently performed and left Charlene disfigured. Their claims included medical negligence and lack of informed consent against Dr. Smith, medical negligence and respondeat superior against Smith’s professional corporation, and negligent retention and respondeat superior against Tri-State Specialists, LLP. The plaintiffs timely served a certificate of merit affidavit from Dr. Mark Jewell, which addressed Dr. Smith’s surgical care, but did not specifically address negligent retention by Tri-State. The Iowa District Court for Woodbury County denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, which challenged the negligent retention claim based on Iowa Code section 147.140 and section 668.11, arguing the certificate of merit affidavit was insufficient. The defendants sought interlocutory review. In a prior appeal (Jorgensen I), the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that section 147.140 did not apply to the negligent retention claim and distinguishing Struck v. Mercy Health Services-Iowa Corp. The Court also found section 668.11 did not bar the negligent retention claim since Tri-State was not a licensed professional under the statute. Following remand, the defendants filed two further summary judgment motions challenging the sufficiency and applicability of the certificate of merit affidavit. The district court again denied these motions, and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of Iowa, applying the law-of-the-case doctrine, concluded that issues or matters necessarily decided in the prior appeal could not be re-examined. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the summary judgment motions and remanded the case for trial, holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred reconsideration of the certificate of merit issues and applicability of section 147.140 to the negligent retention claim. View "Jorgensen v. Smith" on Justia Law

Hartman v. Pocatello Hospital

2026-06-01T08:04:15-08:00

A woman experiencing severe back pain visited the emergency department at a hospital in Pocatello, Idaho, where she was treated by a physician assistant under the supervision of an emergency medicine physician. She received pain medications, including a transdermal fentanyl patch. After being discharged and returning to the hospital the next day, she was again treated and had another fentanyl patch administered. Subsequently, her orthopedic surgeon prescribed additional fentanyl patches to manage her pain. Her husband applied two more patches at home as instructed. The woman died several days later, with her death certificate listing respiratory depression and acute fentanyl intoxication as causes. The woman’s family filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Idaho’s Sixth Judicial District Court against the hospital, the emergency department providers, the orthopedic surgeon, and others, alleging negligent treatment and failure to obtain informed consent. The defendants requested disclosure of the identities of any non-testifying local experts consulted by the plaintiffs’ out-of-state expert witnesses regarding the local standard of care. The plaintiffs refused, citing concerns for the consultants’ professional standing, and sought a protective order, which was denied. The district court struck the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses for failing to timely disclose the local consultants, and then granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the plaintiffs could not prove breach of the standard of care or causation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to strike the expert witnesses for discovery violations, holding that Idaho law requires disclosure of non-testifying local standard-of-care experts, regardless of the degree of reliance by testifying experts. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on causation, holding that plaintiffs need only show the general risk of harm was foreseeable, not the specific mechanism of injury. The case was remanded for further proceedings against the hospital on the remaining negligence claim. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to certain defendants for defending an aspect of the appeal deemed frivolous. View "Hartman v. Pocatello Hospital" on Justia Law

State ex rel. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Simms

2026-05-29T11:18:22-08:00

Brooke Morton was admitted to the hospital at 37 weeks gestation for labor induction due to cystic fibrosis-induced diabetes. After complications, her baby, Brody Morton, was delivered by emergency cesarean section, resuscitated, transferred to the NICU, and passed away five hours later. Mrs. Morton suffered severe postpartum complications. Mr. Morton consented to an autopsy, allegedly under the impression it would be performed by the state medical examiner, but later learned it was conducted by the hospital, with internal organs not preserved, preventing further autopsy. The Mortons sent two pre-suit notices and screening certificates of merit to the hospital, one for medical negligence related to labor and delivery, and another for emotional distress and related claims concerning the autopsy and handling of organs. The hospital responded by requesting more definite statements and identifying perceived deficiencies, following procedures established in Hinchman v. Gillette. The Mortons replied with additional certificates. The complaint included claims against both the hospital and the West Virginia University Board of Governors (WVUBOG). After mediation, the Mortons settled medical negligence claims with WVUBOG, but not with the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing that the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) applied and the certificates were deficient, depriving the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed some claims but denied dismissal of emotional distress claims, finding MPLA did not apply. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the hospital’s petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court held that while total failure to provide pre-suit notice under the MPLA is jurisdictional, alleged deficiencies in a screening certificate of merit do not deprive a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The writ of prohibition was denied, and the circuit court’s order stands. View "State ex rel. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Simms" on Justia Law

Trask v. Ahmed

2026-05-29T06:04:57-08:00

The plaintiff sought treatment at a hospital for abdominal pain in January 2018. Multiple medical professionals reviewed his CT scan, which showed a suspected mass on his kidney, but none documented or communicated this abnormal finding to him or to other medical staff. He was discharged without being informed of the mass. Over the next several years, other doctors also failed to alert him to the mass despite reviewing his earlier scans. In July 2021, a new MRI revealed a kidney mass, later confirmed to be cancer, resulting in the removal of his right kidney. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit in September 2023. In district court in Linn County, the plaintiff filed certificates of merit to support his claim. After the Iowa Supreme Court decided Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa Corp., which clarified the requirements for such certificates, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the certificates were defective. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice and filed a new but identical lawsuit within six months, citing Iowa’s savings statute, Iowa Code § 614.10. The district court dismissed the second suit, holding that the savings statute did not apply because the failure of the first suit was not compelled and was due to the plaintiff’s own negligence in prosecuting the case. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and held that the savings statute did apply. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to provide compliant certificates of merit was not due to negligence, as the legal requirements were unsettled prior to Miller. Additionally, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to resist summary judgment with futile arguments. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trask v. Ahmed" on Justia Law

Lofgren v. Simpson

2026-05-29T06:04:55-08:00

A mother consented to have an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) specialist perform surgery on her two-year-old son, but was not informed that a fourth-year medical resident would assist with or perform the procedure. After surgery, the child suffered internal bleeding, was hospitalized twice, and ultimately died from a hemorrhage related to the site of the surgery. The mother, both individually and as administrator for her son’s estate, sued the ENT doctor and his employer for medical negligence in postoperative care and for failure to secure informed consent regarding the resident’s participation. The Iowa District Court for Johnson County dismissed the action with prejudice. The court determined that the certificate of merit (COM) submitted by the plaintiffs did not comply with Iowa Code section 147.140 because it was not signed under oath or penalty of perjury, following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives–Iowa, Corp. The district court concluded that a COM was required for all claims, including the informed-consent claim, and rejected arguments that the defendants had waited too long to challenge the COM or that subsequent affidavits could cure the original defect. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that a COM is not required for a claim alleging lack of informed consent, reversing the district court’s dismissal of that claim. The court reasoned that Iowa’s "patient rule" for informed consent focuses on the information a reasonable patient would want, and expert testimony is not required to establish a prima facie case for lack of informed consent regarding who performs the surgery. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the medical negligence claims due to noncompliance with the COM requirements and rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional and procedural arguments. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the informed-consent claim only. View "Lofgren v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Christianson v. McLean County

2026-05-28T07:01:59-08:00

While detained at the McLean County Detention Center, Dirk Alan Christianson developed a severe leg infection that ultimately resulted in the amputation of his leg above the knee. During his incarceration, Christianson sought medical attention several times and was treated both within and outside the jail, including being evaluated by a jail nurse and a family nurse practitioner. After displaying symptoms such as fever and pain, Christianson was transported to an outside clinic where he was evaluated, tested, and given instructions for follow-up. His condition deteriorated over the next several days, leading to hospitalization, a diagnosis of necrotizing fasciitis, and amputation. Christianson brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota against McLean County, jail officials, medical staff, and the outside clinic, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, Monell municipal liability, and state law medical malpractice. The district court dismissed the Monell and medical malpractice claims, granted summary judgment to all defendants on the deliberate indifference claims, and denied Christianson’s motion to amend his complaint to identify and add John Doe defendants. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that Christianson failed to allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability under Monell, as the complaint did not set forth a specific policy or widespread custom causing constitutional harm. The court also determined that the evidence did not support claims of deliberate indifference by the sheriff, jail nurse, or family nurse practitioner, finding no facts showing that these individuals knew of and disregarded a serious medical need. Additionally, the court ruled that Christianson’s motion to amend was untimely and properly denied, and that dismissal of the John Doe defendants was appropriate. Finally, the court affirmed dismissal of the state law medical malpractice claim, concluding that the required expert affidavit was not timely served. View "Christianson v. McLean County" on Justia Law

Rarick v. Smidt

2026-05-22T06:04:22-08:00

A patient suffered an injury during knee surgery in March 2022 and, together with his wife, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the operating surgeon and the orthopedic clinic in January 2023. Iowa law requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to serve a certificate of merit affidavit within sixty days after the defendant’s answer to the lawsuit. The plaintiffs served a certificate of merit within the deadline. However, the document was not sworn before an authorized officer and did not include the phrase “penalty of perjury” as required by Iowa statutes. Over a year later, the plaintiffs served an amended certificate that met the affidavit requirements, but it was well past the statutory deadline. After the defendants answered and discovery proceeded for more than a year, the defendants moved to dismiss in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, arguing that the timely certificate did not comply with statutory requirements. The district court found that the initial certificate was neither a true affidavit nor a permissible substitute under the relevant statutes. The court also concluded that the late-filed, proper affidavit could not cure the statutory violation because it was not filed within the required sixty days and there was no extension by agreement or motion. The district court dismissed the case. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that substantial compliance with the certificate of merit affidavit requirement means providing either a true affidavit executed before an authorized person or a statement under penalty of perjury within sixty days. The plaintiffs failed to do either within the deadline, and their later submission could not cure the defect. The court also rejected arguments that the defendants had waived the affidavit requirement or that the statutory scheme violated the Iowa Constitution. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Rarick v. Smidt" on Justia Law

Baldwin v. Central Iowa Hospital Corp.

2026-05-22T06:04:21-08:00

A patient was admitted to a hospital with acute pancreatitis and later transferred to the critical care unit, where he received continuous dialysis through a catheter. A nurse on his care team failed to properly secure the dialysis tubing and fastened it to the bedrail without adequate slack. When the patient was repositioned, the catheter was pulled from his neck, leading to air entering the line and causing cardiac arrest. The patient’s wife, who was present, later filed a lawsuit as executor of his estate, alleging that the nurse was negligent and that the hospital was both vicariously liable for the nurse’s actions and directly negligent in retaining her, given her involvement in a previous patient death. The wife also sought damages for her own emotional distress as a bystander and requested punitive damages. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on the claims for negligent retention, bystander emotional distress, and punitive damages. The district court held that Iowa law allowed a negligent retention claim even where the employer had stipulated to vicarious liability for the employee’s conduct, found that there was a triable issue as to whether the wife contemporaneously perceived the negligent event for emotional distress damages, and concluded that punitive damages could not be ruled out as a matter of law. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded the case. The court held that when an employer does not dispute vicarious liability for an employee’s conduct, claims for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are precluded. The court also held that the wife’s claim for bystander emotional distress failed as a matter of law because she did not contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event. Finally, the court concluded there was insufficient evidence for punitive damages against the hospital or the nurse. View "Baldwin v. Central Iowa Hospital Corp." on Justia Law

Willhoite v. Genesis Health System

2026-05-22T06:04:21-08:00

After a woman was injured in a car accident and treated at a hospital, an X-ray suggested a lung nodule, and her medical records recommended a chest CT scan for further investigation. No CT scan was ordered or performed, and she was released. Almost two years later, after suffering a femur fracture, a CT scan at a different hospital revealed cancer, and she subsequently passed away. Her husband and children, representing themselves and her estate, brought a wrongful-death medical malpractice suit against the hospital and multiple providers, alleging failure to properly follow up on the lung nodule. In the Iowa District Court for Scott County, the plaintiffs timely served certificates of merit as required by Iowa Code section 147.140, but these certificates were neither notarized nor included a statement that they were signed under penalty of perjury. Following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp., the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the certificates did not satisfy statutory requirements. The plaintiffs resisted, providing new expert statements but maintaining these were not amendments. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. After the death of one of the original plaintiffs, his son was appointed as executor and administrator for the estates. Notices of appeal were filed, initially signed by the non-lawyer administrator. The Supreme Court of Iowa first determined that the estates’ appeal should not be dismissed due to the unauthorized practice of law in filing the notice of appeal, since counsel promptly appeared and continued representation. On the substantive issue, the court was evenly divided on whether the district court correctly dismissed the suit for noncompliance with section 147.140. As a result, the dismissal was affirmed by operation of law. The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied, but the district court judgment was affirmed. View "Willhoite v. Genesis Health System" on Justia Law

Brunenkant v. Suburban Hospital, Inc.

2026-05-21T11:30:35-08:00

The plaintiff, a lawyer, visited Suburban Hospital in Maryland in October 2015 with abdominal pain and other symptoms. He was diagnosed with gallbladder disease and underwent surgery performed by Dr. Daee, who was presented to him as a hospital agent or employee. Complications from that surgery led to a second operation at a different hospital a month later, where alleged medical malpractice was discovered. During subsequent litigation, the plaintiff learned in May 2022 that Dr. Daee was not a hospital employee but an independent contractor, and that the hospital may have misrepresented this relationship. The plaintiff first filed a medical malpractice action against the hospital and Dr. Daee in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in 2020. In 2022, after discovering new information, he tried to amend his complaint to add fraud and conspiracy claims, but the district court denied this request. He then filed a separate lawsuit in May 2023, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to commit fraud regarding the hospital’s representations about Dr. Daee’s status. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by Maryland’s five-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice under the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court applied the incorrect statute of limitations. It determined that the plaintiff’s fraud and conspiracy claims were not traditional malpractice claims and should be governed by Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations for civil actions, not the five-year period for medical malpractice. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings, without deciding whether the claims were timely under the correct statute. View "Brunenkant v. Suburban Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Ghaphery v. Wheeling Treatment Center

2026-05-18T12:46:21-08:00

A young man, Austin Ghaphery, began exhibiting signs of substance abuse in 2016 and admitted to his father, Dr. Nicholas Ghaphery, that he was using illicit drugs in 2017. Dr. Ghaphery arranged for his son to undergo an initial assessment at Wheeling Treatment Center (WTC), a medication-assisted treatment facility that treats opioid addiction. During the assessment, a counselor conducted a drug screen and determined that Austin was not a candidate for admission because he was not in opioid withdrawal and his drug screen was negative for opioids. However, concerns about possible suicidal ideation were raised during the assessment, prompting WTC’s medical director, Dr. Schultz, to evaluate Austin for suicide risk. After Austin agreed to follow up with his family physician, he was released. He was not admitted into the MAT program. Thirty-six days later, Austin died from a drug overdose. Dr. Ghaphery, as personal representative of Austin’s estate, sued WTC and Dr. Schultz for medical professional liability and wrongful death, alleging that they failed to properly evaluate Austin’s condition and arrange for his transportation to a psychiatric facility. The Circuit Court of Ohio County initially denied summary judgment but later granted it, concluding that no health care provider-patient relationship existed after WTC declined to admit Austin, and thus WTC and Dr. Schultz owed him no legal duty. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that any health care provided was merely incidental and did not give rise to such a relationship or duty. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and reversed. It held that a health care provider-patient relationship was established during the initial assessment, even though Austin was not ultimately admitted for ongoing treatment. Therefore, WTC and Dr. Schultz owed a duty of care to Austin during the assessment process. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ghaphery v. Wheeling Treatment Center" on Justia Law

Newton v. Grajny

2026-05-14T06:33:12-08:00

The appellant filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence against several healthcare providers and associated entities. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, finding it barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to state a claim. After the dismissal, the appellant sought to file a notice of appeal but missed the standard thirty-day deadline, asserting that he did not receive timely notice of the dismissal order due to administrative errors, including misdirected court communications. He filed a motion for leave to late file his notice of appeal, claiming excusable neglect or good cause due to these circumstances. Upon review of the appellant’s motion, the Superior Court denied the request. The court relied on D.C. App. R. 4(a)(7), which allows reopening the time to appeal under limited circumstances, including a fourteen-day deadline after notice of the judgment. Because the motion was filed more than fourteen days after the appellant learned of the judgment, the trial court found it untimely under this provision. The court also cited potential prejudice to appellees from having to defend a “frivolous” appeal. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by applying the timing requirements of Rule 4(a)(7) when the motion was properly brought under Rule 4(a)(5), which provides a different standard for extensions based on excusable neglect or good cause and does not impose the same fourteen-day limit. The appellate court further clarified that the merits of the underlying case and the ordinary burden of defending an appeal are not relevant factors in assessing such motions. View "Newton v. Grajny" on Justia Law

Cole v. Southeast Iowa Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine

2026-05-08T06:03:53-08:00

A resident of a skilled nursing facility signed an arbitration agreement upon admission. Twelve days later, the resident died. The resident’s husband, acting both individually and as executor of her estate, brought suit in Iowa District Court for Henry County against the nursing facility and several related entities, as well as additional healthcare providers. He alleged negligence, gross negligence, wrongful death, and dependent adult abuse. Nearly a year into the litigation, the nursing facility defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement signed by the decedent. The Iowa District Court for Henry County granted the motion to compel arbitration. The court reasoned that, under the existing Iowa precedent, waiver of the right to arbitrate requires both conduct inconsistent with that right and prejudice to the opposing party—a two-part test established in prior Iowa Supreme Court cases. Applying this standard, the district court found limited prejudice to the plaintiff because discovery had not been extensive and the trial date was still far off. The plaintiff was granted interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case for correction of errors at law. The court determined that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed because the agreement involved interstate commerce, and that the FAA preempts Iowa's arbitration-specific waiver rule, which requires a showing of prejudice. Instead, the court held that the generally applicable contract law standard for waiver applies: the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right. Applying this standard, the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the nursing facility had impliedly waived its contractual right to arbitration by participating in litigation and discovery for months after being aware of the arbitration agreement, and by delaying a motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cole v. Southeast Iowa Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine" on Justia Law

BEAN v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL

2026-04-28T06:48:59-08:00

A patient who had recently undergone heart surgery was transported to a hospital after experiencing chest pain. Upon arrival, hospital staff inserted a second intravenous line in her left hand for a CT scan with contrast. During the procedure, contrast agent leaked into the tissue of her hand, and hospital staff followed their protocol to address the infiltration, including administering an antidote and later performing a surgical procedure to drain a hematoma. The patient subsequently alleged that she suffered permanent injury, including Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome, as a result of the infiltration. The patient filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital, relying on a registered nurse as her expert witness to opine on the standard of care and causation. The District Court of Tulsa County granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, finding that the nurse was not qualified to testify as to the physician’s standard of care, and that there was insufficient evidence to establish causation. The patient appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute remained regarding whether non-physician hospital employees were negligent and caused the patient’s injuries. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and concluded that the patient failed to produce a qualified expert to testify regarding the standard of care for physicians, and that the nurse’s opinions could not establish hospital physician negligence. The Court further held that hospital nurses cannot be liable for following physician orders absent evidence that the orders were obviously negligent, and that the patient failed to present proper expert testimony to establish causation between any alleged breach and her injury. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, effectively ruling in favor of the hospital. View "BEAN v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL" on Justia Law

Cyboron v. Merrick County

2026-04-23T05:04:41-08:00

The case involved a medical negligence and wrongful death claim arising from care provided to a resident at a county-owned skilled nursing facility in Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the decedent’s personal representative and surviving spouse, alleged that substandard care by the facility’s staff caused fatal injuries. The suit was initiated against several entities purportedly associated with the facility, but only two remained as defendants after some were dismissed for procedural reasons. After the complaint was filed in the District Court for Merrick County, the primary remaining defendant, identified as Litzenberg Memorial Long Term Care, moved to dismiss the case. The defendant argued that the complaint failed to demonstrate compliance with the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act’s presuit notice requirement, claiming that notice was not properly served on the appropriate official. Before the court ruled on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to clarify factual allegations regarding compliance with presuit notice and to correct the defendant’s name. The proposed amendment included details suggesting that the Merrick County clerk was an appropriate recipient for notice, and asserted that the defendant should be estopped from contesting notice due to representations made by the clerk. The district court denied the motion for leave to amend and granted the motion to dismiss, finding the amendment would be futile because the notice had not been properly served. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that under the applicable procedural rule, the plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaint once as a matter of course prior to any responsive pleading. The court held that filing a motion for leave to amend did not waive this right. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing that the plaintiffs be allowed to amend their complaint. View "Cyboron v. Merrick County" on Justia Law

Memorial Hospital of Converse County v. Gates

2026-04-22T07:21:19-08:00

A patient experienced severe complications following a routine appendectomy at a county hospital in Wyoming, leading to a diagnosis of short bowel syndrome. The surgery was performed by a hospital-employed physician. The following day, the patient suffered further abdominal issues and was transferred to another hospital, where emergency surgery resulted in substantial removal of her small intestine. The patient, initially a minor, sued the hospital and two of its physicians for medical malpractice, alleging their negligence under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The hospital admitted the physicians were employees and that it was vicariously liable for their actions. As a defense, the hospital asserted that liability was limited by statute to $1 million. After these events, the District Court of Converse County denied the patient’s constitutional challenge to the statutory limitation, finding it was a limit on the waiver of immunity rather than damages. The case went to trial, where the jury awarded $8 million in total damages, with $3.2 million allocated against the hospital and the physician found liable. The court entered judgment for the full $3.2 million, despite the statutory limit. Motions for relief and further summary judgment followed, with the patient arguing the hospital’s operation of a statewide commercial healthcare enterprise should negate the statutory cap. The district court denied these motions, but clarified the hospital was not required to pay above the statutory limit. The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held the liability of the hospital and its physician is limited to $1 million under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, unless there is excess insurance coverage. The court found that operating a statewide commercial healthcare enterprise does not constitute a waiver of this statutory limitation. The judgment exceeding $1 million was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the statutory cap. View "Memorial Hospital of Converse County v. Gates" on Justia Law

Denison v. Mississippi Organ Recovery Agency, Inc.

2026-04-17T06:09:12-08:00

After Paula Denison was declared dead at a hospital in Meridian, Mississippi, her family consented to organ donation. She was transferred to a transplant facility, where it was later discovered that she was actually alive. Denison was then returned to the original hospital, where her condition deteriorated and she was pronounced dead the following day. Denison’s estate, through her daughter Brooke Denison as administratrix, and Brooke individually, brought separate lawsuits against the Mississippi Organ Recovery Agency, Dr. Shirley Schlessinger, and Dr. Dustin Shea Allen, among others, alleging claims such as negligence and infliction of emotional distress. In the Lauderdale County Circuit Court, the defendants moved to dismiss both complaints. In the estate’s case, the court granted dismissal based on the immunity provisions of the Revised Mississippi Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, finding the defendants acted in good faith and in reliance on the family’s authorization. In Brooke’s individual case, the court granted dismissal because her complaint did not allege that she was present or witnessed any negligent acts, thus failing to establish bystander liability. Brooke and the estate appealed these decisions. The Supreme Court of Mississippi consolidated the appeals. The Court held that the trial court erred by considering material outside the pleadings in the estate’s case without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and thus reversed and remanded that case for further proceedings. However, the Court found that Brooke’s individual allegations failed to meet the requirements for bystander liability under Mississippi law and affirmed the dismissal of her claims. The Court expressly declined to decide whether immunity under the Anatomical Gift Act applied, noting the need for further factual development. View "Denison v. Mississippi Organ Recovery Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Lee v. Doolittle

2026-04-17T06:09:08-08:00

A woman with a complex medical history, including autoimmune hepatitis and cirrhosis, was admitted to a regional medical center with symptoms of weakness, nausea, and vomiting. After consultation and diagnostic imaging suggested gallstones and cholecystitis, a general surgeon evaluated her and determined she was not a surgical candidate due to end-stage liver disease. She was treated non-surgically, showed some improvement, and was discharged. Two days later, she was admitted to another hospital with sepsis and subsequently died from cardiopulmonary arrest due to urosepsis. Her daughter, on behalf of her wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed a medical malpractice suit against, among others, the general surgeon. The plaintiff sought to introduce a board-certified interventional radiologist as her medical expert, whose testimony suggested that the surgeon failed to meet the standard of care by not pursuing further diagnostic testing or recommending non-surgical interventions. The Washington County Circuit Court struck this expert’s testimony, holding that the radiologist was not qualified to testify about the standard of care for a general surgeon, and granted summary judgment for the surgeon. The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the expert. Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702 in excluding the expert’s testimony, as the expert did not demonstrate sufficient familiarity with the field of general surgery or with the relevant procedures. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated, and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, thereby upholding the exclusion of the expert testimony and the grant of summary judgment. View "Lee v. Doolittle" on Justia Law

Garcia-Navarro v. Universal Insurance Company

2026-04-10T13:00:04-08:00

The plaintiff brought a suit under Puerto Rico law after her mother died while residing in an assisted living facility. The plaintiff alleged that the facility's staff, including a licensed practical nurse, incorrectly informed treating physicians that her mother was a Jehovah's Witness. As a result, necessary blood transfusions were not administered, and the mother died from heart failure. The facility’s insurer had denied coverage for the incident under its general liability policy, claiming that the alleged wrongful acts were excluded as “professional services.” The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico first granted partial summary judgment for the insurer, finding that certain actions—such as failing to call 911—were excluded as “professional services,” but allowed the case to proceed on claims related to record-keeping and miscommunication, concluding those were not “professional services” under existing precedent. After the case was reassigned, the new district judge reaffirmed that ruling, and a damages trial resulted in a verdict against the facility. Subsequent to a decision by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Rivera-Matos v. Commonwealth, which clarified the scope of “professional services” exclusions, the district judge permitted the insurer to relitigate the coverage issue, ultimately finding that the exclusion did apply to the acts in question and entering judgment for the insurer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiff had forfeited her argument that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s decision should not be applied retroactively, as she had not raised it below. The court further found no plain error in the application of the new precedent. The judgment of the district court in favor of the insurer was affirmed. View "Garcia-Navarro v. Universal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Wren v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital Milwaukee, Inc.

2026-04-10T06:18:45-08:00

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute granting immunity to health care providers from civil liability for certain acts or omissions occurring between March 12, 2020, and July 11, 2020. Savannah Wren, whose pregnancy was considered high risk, experienced the stillbirth of her child after multiple visits to Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital. She alleged negligent care and subsequently filed suit for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the hospital and associated medical professionals. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the immunity provided by WIS. STAT. § 895.4801. Wren challenged the statute’s constitutionality on several grounds, including vagueness, overbreadth, and violations of her rights to redress, jury trial, due process, and equal protection. The circuit court struck her supplemental equal protection claim and ultimately dismissed her complaint with prejudice, finding the statute constitutional. Upon appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. It held that § 895.4801 was facially unconstitutional because it deprived litigants of their right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed only whether § 895.4801 facially violates the state constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that because the legislature has the authority to abrogate or suspend common law causes of action under Article XIV, Section 13, and because the statute eliminated Wren’s causes of action during the specified period, her right to a jury trial did not attach. The court concluded that § 895.4801 does not implicate the constitutional jury trial right, reversed the court of appeals’ decision, and remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved issues. View "Wren v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital Milwaukee, Inc." on Justia Law

IN RE LAPUERTA

2026-04-10T06:18:24-08:00

A man suffered a serious injury to his right index finger in a bandsaw accident and was treated by a plastic surgeon who recommended amputation. The patient refused amputation, and the doctor attempted to salvage the finger through surgery and follow-up care. Another surgeon later treated the patient and ultimately performed a “ray amputation,” removing the entire finger and a portion of the hand. The patient sued the original doctor, alleging that negligent treatment led to an infection and necessitated the more extensive amputation. Medical experts for both sides testified that the initial injury left a very low chance of saving the finger. The case was tried to a jury in a Texas district court, which rendered an 11–1 defense verdict, finding neither the doctor nor the patient proximately caused the injury. The charge included a “loss of chance” instruction, requiring the jury to find the finger had more than a 50% chance of survival with proper care. The patient objected to this instruction before and after the verdict, arguing it was not appropriate under Texas law. After trial, the patient moved for a new trial, attaching a letter from the dissenting juror describing deliberations and alleged confusion about the charge. The district court granted a new trial, later amending its order to provide seven reasons, mainly contesting the “loss of chance” instruction. The doctor sought mandamus relief from the Texas Court of Appeals, which denied relief. The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and conditionally granted mandamus relief. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on legally incorrect grounds, including its misunderstanding of the “loss of chance” doctrine, which is recognized under Texas law in both death and injury cases. The Court directed the district court to vacate its new trial order and render judgment on the jury’s verdict. View "IN RE LAPUERTA" on Justia Law

Shontz v. Mercy Medical Center-Clinton, Inc.

2026-04-03T06:03:33-08:00

A patient underwent surgery on September 4, 2020, and died twelve days later. Her estate and children brought a medical malpractice suit against the surgeon and hospital, alleging negligence. The defendants sought dismissal, arguing the plaintiffs had not satisfied Iowa’s certificate of merit requirements under Iowa Code section 147.140(1), which mandates a supporting expert affidavit early in medical malpractice litigation. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The defendants then sought interlocutory review from the Iowa Supreme Court. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial, finding the plaintiffs had not complied with the statutory affidavit requirement, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case with prejudice. Following the remand, the plaintiffs attempted to file dismissals without prejudice before and after the district court’s order of dismissal with prejudice. Despite these filings, the district court entered a dismissal with prejudice as directed by the Iowa Supreme Court. The plaintiffs then filed a new lawsuit asserting the same claims against the same defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss this second action, citing claim preclusion (res judicata) and the statute of limitations. The Iowa District Court for Clinton County dismissed the second action. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The court held that its prior mandate required dismissal with prejudice, and any attempt by the plaintiffs to dismiss without prejudice was contrary to that mandate and thus ineffective. The court found that the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied: the parties and claims were identical to the prior action, and there was a final judgment on the merits. Accordingly, the second lawsuit was barred. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. View "Shontz v. Mercy Medical Center-Clinton, Inc." on Justia Law

DiFraia v. Ransom

2026-03-31T10:00:56-08:00

A Pennsylvania state prisoner with a history of opioid addiction participated in a prison Medication Assisted Treatment program, receiving Suboxone to help control his cravings. After prison officials twice accused him of possessing contraband and diverting his medication to other prisoners, he was removed from the treatment program. Instead of abruptly ending his medication, a prison doctor tapered his doses over a week to reduce withdrawal symptoms. The prisoner later suffered withdrawal effects and mental health challenges but was not reinstated in the program despite his requests. He claimed the diversion finding was unfair but did not allege personal animus or pretext by the officials involved. He filed a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against various prison officials and a doctor, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and a state-law negligence claim. The District Court dismissed all claims, finding the federal claims inadequately pleaded and the state-law claim procedurally improper for lack of a certificate of merit under Pennsylvania law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, holding that the complaint failed to allege deliberate indifference to medical needs as required by precedent; the officials’ actions were judged to be good-faith medical decisions, not constitutionally blameworthy conduct. The court also affirmed dismissal of the ADA claim, finding no plausible allegation that the prisoner was excluded from treatment “by reason of” his disability, but rather for diversion of medication. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the state-law negligence claim, as recent Supreme Court precedent abrogated the procedural requirement relied upon by the District Court, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "DiFraia v. Ransom" on Justia Law

Urizar-Mota v. US

2026-03-27T13:00:06-08:00

A mother of four regularly sought care at a federally funded health center in Rhode Island from 2006 onward. Over a period of several years, she repeatedly reported persistent, weeks-long headaches with changing characteristics to her primary-care providers, also disclosing experiences of domestic abuse. Despite these reports, she was diagnosed with migraines and prescribed medication, but was never referred to a neurologist or for neuroimaging. In 2019, her symptoms worsened, and she lost consciousness, leading to hospitalization and the discovery of a slow-growing brain tumor, which had caused a buildup of cerebral fluid. Surgery to remove the tumor resulted in cerebellar strokes and permanent neurological damage, severely limiting her mobility and ability to care for her family. After the Department of Health and Human Services denied her administrative claim, she and her family filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The district court found negligence by the primary-care providers, awarded her damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and homemaker loss, and awarded her children damages for loss of consortium. The government appealed, arguing that the children’s consortium claims were not properly presented administratively, that the homemaker damages were excessive, and that the findings on standard of care, causation, and medical expenses were erroneous. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the children’s loss-of-consortium claims were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and reversed those damages. The court vacated the homemaker damages award as excessive and unsupported by the evidence, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s findings on negligence and causation and upheld the pain and suffering awards, but reduced the medical expense award by the cost of an unrelated spinal MRI. The judgment was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified in part, and remanded. View "Urizar-Mota v. US" on Justia Law

Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care

2026-03-27T10:09:50-08:00

A woman in her mid-30s suffered a severe stroke that left her paralyzed and unable to speak, requiring months of inpatient care at a rehabilitation hospital operated by a corporate defendant. While at the facility, she was assigned daily intimate care, including by a male certified nursing assistant. She later alleged that this male attendant sexually assaulted her multiple times during her stay. After her discharge, she sued the hospital, its corporate parent, and the attendant, asserting claims for assault, battery, negligence, and abuse of a dependent adult. The case went to a jury trial in Marin County Superior Court. The jury found in favor of the attendant on all claims, concluding he had not assaulted, abused, or been negligent towards the plaintiff. However, the jury found the hospital and its parent negligent, and determined their negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. The jury awarded her $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages. The hospital and its parent then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing there was no causal link established between their negligence and the plaintiff’s harm. The trial court agreed, granting the motion and entering judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the hospital’s failure to offer the plaintiff, or her representative, the option of receiving intimate care from a female caregiver (as required by the Patient’s Bill of Rights) was a substantial factor in causing her emotional distress. The court found this basis for liability was independent of the alleged sexual assault and did not require expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed the trial court to reinstate the judgment in accordance with the jury’s special verdict. View "Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care" on Justia Law

Mallette v. Revette

2026-03-27T01:17:52-08:00

Mitchell Glenn Revette sought medical care from Dr. Andrew Mallette at The Surgical Clinic Associates, P.A. for abdominal pain and underwent surgery for diverticulitis in June 2021. He later returned for a follow-up surgery in January 2022, after which he died due to complications related to respiratory depression. His wife, Nitkia Revette, brought a wrongful death and medical negligence lawsuit on behalf of his estate, alleging that negligent anesthesia and pain management led to his death. The defendants, Dr. Mallette and the Clinic, moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement included in an intake packet mailed to Mitchell. The agreement was signed "Mitchell Revette," but during a hearing in the Hinds County Circuit Court, Nitkia testified that she signed her husband’s name without his knowledge or presence, and she stated she had no authority to sign for him. The Clinic’s staff testified that patients were required to sign such agreements personally. The circuit court found that Mitchell did not sign the arbitration agreement and that Nitkia lacked authority to bind him, thus ruling the agreement unenforceable and denying the motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s findings, applying a deferential standard to factual determinations and de novo review to the denial of arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Nitkia lacked both actual and apparent authority to sign for Mitchell and that there was no basis for binding the estate via direct-benefits estoppel. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Mallette v. Revette" on Justia Law

Secrist v. Rush Medical Foundation

2026-03-27T01:17:42-08:00

James Secrist, after recovering from COVID-19, began experiencing significant neurological symptoms, including leg weakness and inability to urinate. He was evaluated by various healthcare professionals at Rush Medical Foundation and Cardiovascular Institute of the South between March and June 2021. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with transverse myelitis attributed to COVID-19. James and his wife Dawn filed a medical malpractice suit against the involved healthcare providers, alleging negligence in failing to recognize and urgently address his worsening neurological condition. The case was brought in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting immunity under Mississippi Code Section 11-71-7, which provides legal immunity to healthcare professionals and facilities for acts or omissions related to healthcare services performed during the COVID-19 state of emergency. The circuit court found that the alleged negligent acts occurred during the COVID-19 state of emergency, that James’s condition was caused by COVID-19, and that the defendants’ actions were covered by the statutory immunity. The court therefore dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory language and the facts alleged in the complaint de novo. The Supreme Court determined that Section 11-71-7 immunity applied because James’s injuries resulted from treatment for a condition caused by COVID-19 during the COVID-19 state of emergency. The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the statute should be construed more narrowly to exclude these facts, and also found extrajurisdictional cases cited by plaintiffs to be distinguishable. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal, holding that the defendants are immune from liability under Section 11-71-7. View "Secrist v. Rush Medical Foundation" on Justia Law

BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Bonnie Town

2026-03-26T13:30:37-08:00

Linda Elam, after suffering significant medical issues including a stroke and complications from cancer treatment, was admitted to a nursing home operated by BLC Lexington SNF, LLC for rehabilitation. Her sister, Bonnie Townsend, acting under a power of attorney, handled the admission process and signed both the admission and an optional arbitration agreement as Elam’s representative. Following further health decline, Elam died, and her estate alleged that her death resulted from negligent care at the facility. After the estate filed suit in Kentucky state court against BLC Lexington and a former administrator, BLC Lexington responded in federal court, seeking to compel arbitration based on the agreement Townsend signed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky compelled arbitration for nearly all claims except wrongful death claims by nonsignatories. An arbitrator, after a week-long hearing, ruled in favor of BLC Lexington on all claims, finding Townsend had not met her burden of proof. The district court then confirmed the arbitration award, denying Townsend’s motions for reconsideration and to vacate the award. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Townsend argued that compelling arbitration was improper because she did not sign as attorney-in-fact, that the arbitration agreement was indefinite, and that post-arbitration relief was warranted due to alleged arbitrator misconduct and the application of an incorrect legal standard. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under Kentucky law, Townsend had acted as Elam’s representative, and no intervening change in law or arbitrator misconduct justified vacating the award. The court also found the arbitrator applied the correct evidentiary standard. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Bonnie Town" on Justia Law

Machelle Pearson v. MDOC

2026-03-26T13:30:37-08:00

Four women incarcerated at the Huron Valley Correctional Facility in Michigan suffered from persistent, painful rashes between 2016 and 2019. Despite repeated complaints, medical staff—contracted through Corizon Health—failed to diagnose scabies, instead providing ineffective treatments and attributing the condition to environmental factors like improper laundering. It was only after an outside dermatologist intervened that scabies was correctly identified, prompting prison-wide treatment efforts. However, these efforts were delayed and, in some cases, inadequate, resulting in prolonged suffering for the affected inmates. After their experiences, the four women filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against multiple defendants, including high-level Michigan Department of Corrections officials and Wayne State University medical officers, alleging Eighth Amendment violations and state-law negligence. The district court found that the women’s complaint plausibly alleged “clearly established” Eighth Amendment violations by all defendants and denied the officials’ request for qualified immunity. The court also rejected a claim of state-law immunity, finding that the officials could be the proximate cause of the inmates’ injuries under Michigan law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denials. The Sixth Circuit held that existing precedent did not “clearly establish” that the non-treating prison officials’ reliance on contracted medical providers was so unreasonable as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Thus, it reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the federal damages claims. However, the appellate court affirmed the denial of state-law immunity, finding the plaintiffs adequately pleaded proximate cause under Michigan law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Machelle Pearson v. MDOC" on Justia Law

Sondag v. Orthopaedic Speciatists, P.C.

2026-03-20T06:04:09-08:00

Jenna Sondag underwent hip surgery performed by Dr. John Hoffman at Orthopaedic Specialists, P.C. in February 2017. She filed a medical malpractice action in January 2019, agreeing to designate expert witnesses by a deadline set under Iowa Code section 668.11. Sondag missed this deadline due to a combination of her attorneys’ involvement in a lengthy trial, a medical emergency affecting one attorney, and a calendaring error by their docketing software. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the missed deadline, while Sondag sought an extension to name her expert witnesses. The Iowa District Court for Scott County held a hearing on both motions, and in 2019, found good cause for Sondag’s delay due to the circumstances described. The court denied summary judgment and extended the expert designation deadline. The defendants did not seek interlocutory appeal at that time. Nearly four years later, days before trial, the district court revisited its prior order after the defendants filed a motion in limine to decertify Sondag’s expert. The court reversed its earlier finding, excluded the expert, and dismissed the case for failure to timely designate an expert witness. Sondag appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, siding with the district court’s 2023 decision. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted further review. The Supreme Court held that while a district court may correct an erroneous ruling before final judgment, its 2019 order extending the deadline was not an abuse of discretion, but its 2023 order excluding the expert and dismissing the case was an abuse of discretion. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for trial. View "Sondag v. Orthopaedic Speciatists, P.C." on Justia Law

Armour v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center

2026-03-20T05:31:13-08:00

The appellant arrived at the emergency room of a medical center with severe lower back pain, right flank pain, and numbness and weakness in her left leg. Initial evaluations suggested symptoms consistent with sciatica, but further testing revealed profound anemia and a herniated disk, which did not warrant surgery. Imaging also showed a nonoccluding thrombus in her aorta. She was discharged after several days, with recommendations for follow-up. About two weeks later, she returned to the hospital with ischemic symptoms in her left leg, which led to an above-the-knee amputation due to advanced ischemia. The matter was initially heard in the Houston Circuit Court, where the appellant sued the medical center and a physician for negligence, alleging that improper evaluation and failure to initiate anticoagulant therapy resulted in limb loss. The physician was dismissed as a defendant, leaving the case against the medical center. After discovery, the medical center moved for summary judgment, arguing the appellant lacked substantial evidence of causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that causation could not be established. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standard that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court found that the appellant failed to present expert testimony establishing a proximate causal connection between the alleged breach and her injury. The medical expert's causation testimony was deemed speculative, as it relied on hypothetical actions by a vascular surgeon outside the expert’s specialty. The medical center’s expert, a vascular surgeon, testified that no different treatment would have been provided. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Armour v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center" on Justia Law

COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER

2026-03-16T08:01:44-08:00

Susan Cox, a resident of Albion, Washington, died from an alleged overdose of medications prescribed by her primary care physician, Dr. Patricia Marciano. Susan’s husband, Mark Cox, and her estate initiated a wrongful-death and survivor action against Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center after Susan’s death. The Coxes had lived in Washington, while Dr. Marciano and Gritman are based in Idaho, with all medical treatment having taken place in Idaho. However, at Susan’s request, her prescriptions were regularly transmitted by Dr. Marciano and Gritman to pharmacies in Washington, and Gritman engaged in marketing and accepted patients from the Washington area. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Idaho-based defendants, holding that Washington’s long-arm statute did not reach them and the exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process. The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery relating to general personal jurisdiction over Gritman, and did not address the issue of venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center was proper under both Washington’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. The court found that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Washington, as they cultivated relationships with Washington residents and regularly transmitted prescriptions to Washington pharmacies in compliance with Washington law. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington because a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred there. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings and affirmed the dismissal only as to one defendant who was conceded to be properly dismissed. View "COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law

Beard v. Everett Clinic, PLLC

2026-03-12T07:18:24-08:00

A woman with a long history of lupus, a chronic autoimmune disease, was under the care of a rheumatologist who managed her symptoms with medications over several years. In early 2018, the patient experienced severe joint pain and other symptoms, and her physician adjusted treatments accordingly. In February, she visited a walk-in clinic with fever and chills; tests were negative for infection, but a chest X-ray showed a possible abnormality. As a precaution, antibiotics were prescribed, and her symptoms improved. In March, she again presented with a fever and minor symptoms. The rheumatologist ordered new tests and increased her medication but did not urgently refer her to an infectious disease specialist or order new chest imaging. Over the following weeks, her symptoms worsened, leading to hospitalization, emergency surgery, and ultimately her death from intestinal tuberculosis. Her spouse, representing her estate, filed a medical malpractice suit against the treating physician and clinic, alleging a failure to meet the standard of care by not acting more urgently on March 1 and 2. Both sides presented expert testimony about the standard of care. The plaintiff objected to a jury instruction allowing the jury to consider whether the physician’s exercise of judgment in choosing among alternative treatments was reasonable, arguing it was unwarranted and prejudicial. The Snohomish County Superior Court gave the instruction, and the jury found for the defense. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that evidence supported the instruction because the physician made choices among treatments and exercised clinical judgment. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the record contained sufficient evidence to justify the "exercise of judgment" instruction. The court held that such an instruction is proper when the record contains evidence that the physician’s decision-making process and treatment choices complied with the applicable standard of care. The court affirmed, concluding the trial court acted within its discretion. View "Beard v. Everett Clinic, PLLC" on Justia Law

Nichols v. Alghannam

2026-03-06T14:31:36-08:00

A woman with a Medtronic infusion pump for fentanyl died from an overdose while hospitalized for a hernia repair. Her doctors included her pain management physician, who managed her pump, and a surgeon at a hospital. After surgery, she continued receiving fentanyl from the pump and self-administered additional doses. Hospital staff noticed changes in her mental status, but the actuator allowing self-administration was not removed. The family alleged that the managing pain doctor treated her at the hospital without proper staff privileges and failed to turn off the pump when asked. Her children filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Yuba County, initially against other medical providers, and later amended their complaints several times to add the pain management physician as a defendant, more than four years after their mother’s death. They asserted claims for professional negligence, lack of informed consent, wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse. The Superior Court of Yuba County sustained the pain management physician’s demurrer to the fifth amended complaint without leave to amend. It found that the medical negligence claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the complaint did not sufficiently allege elder abuse. Judgment was entered for the physician, and the plaintiffs appealed. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 applied to the negligence-based claims because the alleged acts constituted “professional negligence” and did not fall within exclusions for acts outside the scope of hospital-imposed restrictions. The court also found no factual basis for tolling the statute for intentional concealment and concluded that the claims did not relate back to the original complaint against fictitiously named defendants. Finally, the court agreed that the elder abuse allegations were deficient and found no abuse of discretion in denying further leave to amend. View "Nichols v. Alghannam" on Justia Law

Jones v. Lindell

2026-03-06T07:03:48-08:00

The plaintiff underwent a total hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, performed by a board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist at a medical center. Subsequently, she experienced symptoms that led to the discovery of a ureteral injury requiring surgical repair at a different facility. She alleged that the defendants were negligent in both the performance of the surgery and the postoperative care. To support her claims, she designated a board-certified urologist as her expert witness to opine on the applicable standard of care and alleged breach. After the expert’s deposition, the defendants moved to strike his testimony, arguing that he was not qualified under Iowa Code section 147.139 because he was not board-certified in the same or a substantially similar specialty as the defendant physician. The Iowa District Court for Polk County agreed, concluding that urology was not substantially similar to obstetrics and gynecology, and therefore the plaintiff’s expert was not qualified to testify about the standard of care or breach. Lacking a qualified expert, the district court also granted summary judgment for the defendants, effectively dismissing the case. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed whether the district court erred in its application of the statutory requirements for expert qualification. The court held that, while both physicians were licensed to practice medicine, the statute required that, where the defendant is board-certified, the plaintiff’s expert must also be board-certified in the same or a substantially similar specialty. The court concluded that urology and obstetrics/gynecology are not substantially similar specialties. As a result, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court’s decision to strike the expert and grant summary judgment for the defendants. View "Jones v. Lindell" on Justia Law

Estate of Waggoner v. Anonymous Health System, Inc.

2026-03-04T12:03:25-08:00

A patient was hospitalized after contracting COVID-19 and, as his condition worsened, was transferred between several hospitals in Kentucky and Indiana. During his treatment, he was intubated, placed on a ventilator, and medically immobilized. While under this care, he developed a severe bed sore that progressed to necrotizing fasciitis. Despite ongoing treatment, he ultimately died, with his death certificate listing multiple causes including cardiopulmonary arrest and sepsis. His estate claimed that negligence in the treatment of the bed sore caused his death and filed a proposed medical malpractice complaint against more than eighty healthcare providers. The case began when the estate filed its complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance, while a medical-review panel was being requested. Before the panel was constituted, the providers moved for summary judgment in Vanderburgh Superior Court, arguing they were immune from liability under Indiana’s Healthcare Immunity Act, Premises Immunity Act, and the federal PREP Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the providers, finding that statutory immunity applied and that the court, not the medical-review panel, could decide the immunity issue. The estate appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the question of immunity required expert input from the medical-review panel, especially regarding causation. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. It held that the trial court could make a preliminary determination on statutory immunity without waiting for a medical-review panel’s opinion, since the facts relating to the connection between the patient’s COVID-19 treatment and his injury were undisputed for summary judgment purposes. The court further held that the providers were immune from civil liability under both state and federal law, as the patient’s injuries arose from treatment provided in response to the COVID-19 emergency. The court affirmed summary judgment for the providers. View "Estate of Waggoner v. Anonymous Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

Battieste v. United States

2026-02-27T16:30:29-08:00

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022. In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

Cataldo v. RCHP-Ottumwa, LLC

2026-02-27T07:03:44-08:00

A woman underwent knee replacement surgery at a hospital and soon developed respiratory distress. Shortly after the operation, she allegedly suffered a femur fracture in a fall while hospitalized, which her doctor failed to detect on an X-ray. The following day, she fell again, reportedly because a nurse fell on her while assisting her, resulting in a more severe fracture. This severe injury caused fat emboli to enter her bloodstream and led to a pulmonary embolism. She was transferred to another hospital, where her deteriorating condition was documented. She died nearly two weeks later. Her estate filed a wrongful-death lawsuit alleging that the defendants’ negligence in failing to diagnose and prevent the fracture ultimately caused her death. The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the lawsuit as untimely under Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations on medical malpractice actions. The district court determined that the estate knew or should have known of the injury and its cause by February 5, 2021, the date the decedent was transferred and her injury was documented. Because the estate filed its petition on February 17, 2023, more than two years later, the court found the claims time-barred. Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that, under Iowa law, wrongful-death claims based on medical malpractice are derivative of the decedent’s personal injury claims. When the injury and its negligent cause are known during the decedent’s lifetime, the limitations period begins at that time, not the date of death. Because the estate had knowledge of the injury and its cause by February 5, 2021, the wrongful-death action was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. View "Cataldo v. RCHP-Ottumwa, LLC" on Justia Law

Hickson v. St. David's Healthcare Partnership

2026-02-25T16:30:29-08:00

Michael Hickson, who had become severely disabled following cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury in 2017, was hospitalized multiple times for recurring infections but recovered from several serious episodes. In June 2020, while hospitalized for pneumonia, sepsis, and suspected COVID-19, his doctors at St. David’s Healthcare assessed him as having a 70% chance of survival. Despite this, he was placed on hospice care and a do-not-resuscitate order was issued, with medical staff indicating that his inability to walk or talk equated to a poor quality of life. Life-sustaining treatment, including food and fluids, was withdrawn, even as his condition temporarily improved. Michael’s family, led by his wife Melissa Hickson, sought answers and attempted to visit him, but were repeatedly denied access and information. Michael ultimately passed away, and subsequent public statements by the hospital disclosed protected health information and cast aspersions on Melissa’s fitness as a guardian. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed or granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, including disability discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 1557 of the ACA, § 1983 claims, state-law medical negligence, informed consent, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs objected to the recommendations for dismissal of the disability discrimination and § 1983 claims; the district court overruled these objections and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The remaining state-law claims were later resolved on summary judgment. Upon de novo review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disability discrimination claims based on alleged denial of medical treatment solely due to disability are cognizable and may proceed. The court also vacated and remanded the dismissals of the informed consent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims and other state-law claims. View "Hickson v. St. David's Healthcare Partnership" on Justia Law

Pearson v. Medstar Washington Hospital Center

2026-02-19T07:02:37-08:00

A patient was admitted to a hospital after suffering chest pains and remained hospitalized for three months until his death. During his stay, he developed a severe Stage 4 sacral ulcer. The patient’s widow, acting individually and as personal representative of his estate, filed suit against the hospital and associated medical providers for negligence and medical malpractice, alleging that failures in wound care, skin monitoring, and repositioning caused the ulcer and contributed to his suffering and death. She also asserted a claim for lack of informed consent regarding risks of long-term hospitalization. The case was first reviewed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. During proceedings, the plaintiff shifted her theory to res ipsa loquitur, arguing that negligence could be inferred solely from the development of a Stage 4 ulcer during hospitalization. The Superior Court rejected application of res ipsa loquitur, expressing skepticism about the informed consent claim, and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert testimony but gave little explanation for its reasoning. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals conducted de novo review and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a triable res ipsa loquitur case because her experts did not sufficiently address the patient’s multiple comorbidities, which were shown by defense evidence to have contributed to the unavoidable development and worsening of the ulcer. The court also held that the lack of informed consent claim failed due to the absence of expert testimony establishing that long-term hospitalization posed distinct risks compared to alternative care, or that the patient had a meaningful choice. Thus, summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Pearson v. Medstar Washington Hospital Center" on Justia Law

Nichols v. Alghannam

2026-02-18T11:01:58-08:00

After the death of Sandra Robinson from a fentanyl overdose, her adult children brought suit against Muhammad Alghannam, M.D., and others, alleging professional negligence, lack of informed consent, wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse. Sandra had an implanted fentanyl infusion pump managed by Alghannam and underwent surgery at Rideout Health. Post-surgery, she continued to receive fentanyl through the pump and self-administer doses, with clinical staff observing changes in her mental status. Plaintiffs claimed Alghannam treated Sandra without proper hospital staff privileges, failed to turn off the pain pump as requested, and did not obtain valid consent. The Superior Court of Yuba County sustained Alghannam’s demurrer to the fifth amended complaint without leave to amend, finding the medical negligence claims time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 and the elder abuse allegations insufficient. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the medical negligence statute of limitations did not apply, that tolling should occur due to intentional concealment, and that the claims related back to the original complaint under section 474. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. It held that section 340.5 applied because Alghannam’s alleged actions fit within the statutory definition of professional negligence. The plaintiffs failed to plead facts supporting intentional concealment or timely substitution under section 474. The court also determined the elder abuse claim was insufficient, as there was no well-pleaded allegation of a caretaking relationship or physical abuse with the requisite culpability. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show a reasonable possibility of amendment. View "Nichols v. Alghannam" on Justia Law

COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER

2026-02-11T09:01:06-08:00

Susan Cox, a resident of Albion, Washington, died from an overdose of medications prescribed by her primary care physician, Dr. Patricia Marciano. Dr. Marciano, along with Gritman Medical Center, both based in Idaho near the Washington border, had treated Susan for several years. Although Susan lived in Washington, her medical treatment occurred in Idaho. At Susan’s request, her prescriptions were regularly transmitted to pharmacies in Washington. Susan’s husband, Mark Cox, and her estate brought a wrongful death and survivor action in the Eastern District of Washington, alleging that Susan’s death resulted from negligent over-prescription of pharmaceuticals. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery regarding general personal jurisdiction over Gritman and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court found that Washington’s long-arm statute did not confer jurisdiction and that exercising specific jurisdiction would violate due process, as the defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the Washington forum. The district court did not reach the question of venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court of appeals held that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants was proper under Washington’s long-arm statute and consistent with the Due Process Clause because the defendants maintained ongoing, deliberate relationships with Washington residents and regularly sent prescriptions to Washington pharmacies in compliance with state law. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington since a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred there. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with dismissal affirmed only for one defendant whom the plaintiffs conceded was properly dismissed. View "COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law

Estate of Tornell v. Trinity Health Corporation

2026-02-06T09:08:04-08:00

A woman died after a rapid health decline while receiving emergency and critical care at a West Des Moines hospital. Her husband, who was appointed as the administrator of her estate, filed a wrongful-death medical malpractice lawsuit against various medical providers. He brought the suit both on behalf of the estate and in his individual capacity, alleging multiple claims including negligence and seeking damages for emotional and financial loss. The husband, a nonlawyer, filed the petition without legal counsel and argued that, as the sole beneficiary, he should be allowed to proceed pro se or, alternatively, be given time to retain an attorney if one was required. The Iowa District Court for Polk County dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the petition was a legal nullity because a nonlawyer cannot represent an estate or other parties in court, and denied the husband’s request for more time to secure counsel. The court also denied his motion to amend the petition. On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that the wrongful-death action could not proceed without a lawyer and finding that the request for additional time had not been properly preserved for appeal. Two appellate judges dissented, concluding the husband was entitled to a warning and additional time to obtain counsel. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted further review. The court held that a nonlawyer cannot represent an estate or other persons in a wrongful-death action in district court. However, it found that the district court abused its discretion by not granting the husband reasonable time to retain counsel before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to allow at least thirty days for the husband to secure trial counsel. View "Estate of Tornell v. Trinity Health Corporation" on Justia Law

Keister v. Neurology Consultants of Huntsville, P.C.

2026-02-06T09:01:53-08:00

A woman underwent cervical spine surgery and subsequently developed neurological symptoms, including balance problems, dizziness, and sensory changes. Her surgeon referred her to a neurologist at a specialty clinic, where she was evaluated by a physician who ordered a brain MRI. The MRI report noted findings that could not exclude multiple sclerosis (MS), but the neurologist did not inform the patient of these results, believing there were no dangerous findings that required immediate notification. The patient was not scheduled for further follow-up and continued to experience worsening symptoms over the next 19 months. Eventually, her primary doctor referred her to another neurologist, who diagnosed her with MS and began treatment, after which her condition stabilized. The patient and her husband filed a medical malpractice suit in Madison Circuit Court, alleging that the neurologist and the clinic negligently failed to inform her of her abnormal MRI results and failed to provide appropriate follow-up, leading to a significant delay in her MS diagnosis and treatment. During discovery, the plaintiffs’ expert testified that the delay worsened her symptoms, but when questioned, he stated he could not say with certainty that an earlier diagnosis would have changed her outcome. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding insufficient evidence of causation, and later struck the expert’s postjudgment affidavit as untimely. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s decision to strike the late-filed affidavit but reversed the summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that, when viewing the expert’s testimony as a whole and in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether the neurologist’s failure to inform and follow up probably worsened the patient’s condition. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Keister v. Neurology Consultants of Huntsville, P.C." on Justia Law

Bianco v. Rudnicki

2026-02-01T10:03:11-08:00

Alexander Rudnicki suffered permanent brain damage at birth due to Dr. Peter Bianco’s negligent use of a vacuum extractor, resulting in lifelong medical needs and disabilities. Nine years after the injury, Rudnicki’s parents filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Bianco on his behalf. Their individual claims were dismissed as time-barred, but the claim for Alexander proceeded. A jury found Bianco liable and awarded $4 million in damages. The trial court found good cause to exceed Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act ("HCAA") $1 million damages cap, citing the unfairness of limiting recovery given Rudnicki’s extensive care requirements. The court reduced the award by $391,000, excluding pre-majority medical expenses based on then-existing precedent. On appeal, this reduction was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court, which reinstated the $391,000 in damages. After remand, the trial court reinstated the previously excluded damages and awarded prejudgment interest, including $319,120 in prefiling interest, resulting in a total judgment of about $1,357,000. The court maintained its finding of good cause and awarded the full amount, holding that the statutory cap did not limit the inclusion of prejudgment interest. Bianco appealed, arguing that prefiling interest could only be awarded up to $1 million, even if the good cause exception applied. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, interpreting the HCAA to treat prefiling interest as part of economic damages, subject to the cap and the good cause exception. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the statutory language and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that prefiling interest accruing on economic damages is part of the economic damages award and thus falls within the good cause exception to the HCAA’s $1 million cap. The Court clarified that prefiling interest is not a separate category of damages and overruled conflicting precedent. View "Bianco v. Rudnicki" on Justia Law

Health v. Gresser

2026-02-01T10:03:08-08:00

Chance and Erin Gresser sued Banner Health on behalf of their minor daughter, C.G., alleging medical malpractice during labor, delivery, and postpartum care that resulted in severe, permanent injuries to C.G., including neurological damage and cerebral palsy. The jury found Banner Health negligent and awarded the Gressers over $27 million in economic damages, including past and future medical expenses and lost wages. Given Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act (HCAA) generally imposes a $1 million cap on such damages, the Gressers moved to exceed the cap based on good cause and unfairness, while Banner Health sought to reduce the award to the statutory limit. The Weld County District Court determined that imposing the statutory cap would be unfair under the circumstances and found good cause to exceed it. The court concluded its role was limited to a binary choice: either impose the cap or allow the full jury award, subject only to challenges for insufficient evidence or excessive damages. After finding the evidence supported the jury’s award and that the amount was not manifestly excessive or based on improper motives, the court entered judgment for the full amount, nearly $40 million with interest. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, though it reasoned the trial court retained some discretion in determining damages after finding good cause to exceed the cap. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that, once a trial court finds good cause and unfairness under section 13-64-302(1)(b) of the HCAA to exceed the damages cap, the amount of damages is governed by common law. The jury retains authority to determine the amount of damages, subject only to remittitur and sufficiency-of-evidence review by the court. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the full judgment awarded to the Gressers. View "Health v. Gresser" on Justia Law

Ex parte University of Alabama Health Services Foundation

2026-01-30T08:00:49-08:00

The case involves the family of a deceased inmate who alleged that certain medical professionals and a health services foundation, after performing an autopsy at the request of correctional authorities, removed and retained the decedent’s organs without family consent. The family contended they were not informed or asked for permission regarding the autopsy or retention of organs, and only learned the organs were missing when preparing the funeral. They claimed to have relied on statements from hospital staff that such practices were standard, and only discovered in December 2023, through media reports, that retention of organs without next-of-kin consent was allegedly unlawful. The Montgomery Circuit Court reviewed and denied the defendants’ consolidated motion to dismiss, finding that statutory limitations could be tolled due to alleged fraudulent concealment. The court determined that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could justify equitable tolling under Alabama law, and that the family’s claims were not time-barred because they filed suit within two years of learning the alleged conduct was illegal. On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a petition for writ of mandamus by the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation and Dr. Stephanie Reilly. The Court held that mandamus relief was appropriate because, from the face of the complaint, the claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. The Court reasoned the causes of action accrued by November 6, 2021, when the family learned the organs were missing, and rejected arguments for tolling or for treating the alleged conduct as a continuous tort. The Court distinguished between statutes of limitations governing different claims, and found that all claims against the petitioners except the AUAGA claim were time-barred. It therefore granted the petition and directed dismissal of all claims against the petitioners except for the AUAGA claim. View "Ex parte University of Alabama Health Services Foundation" on Justia Law

Walton V. Huron Regional Medical Center

2026-01-29T08:08:32-08:00

A patient in his mid-thirties, with a history of neurological complaints but no similar recent issues, was hospitalized twice in early April 2018 for severe testicular pain at a regional medical center. During the second admission, he received high doses of opioid medications, with documented warnings about their risks and instructions for monitoring his respiratory function. On the last day of his hospitalization, he exhibited abnormal drowsiness and a low respiratory rate. Shortly after discharge, his wife observed sudden, profound cognitive and behavioral changes, including confusion, speech difficulties, and memory problems. Over the following months, he underwent multiple neurological and psychiatric evaluations, many of which failed to show physiological brain abnormalities. Several providers ultimately diagnosed him with functional neurological (conversion) disorder, while a brain injury rehabilitation center noted a history of hypoxia based on family accounts. The patient and his wife filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital and a treating physician in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Beadle County, South Dakota. They alleged negligent overprescription of opioids and inadequate monitoring, resulting in a hypoxic brain injury. The defendants moved to exclude the plaintiffs’ causation expert, arguing that his methods were unreliable under Daubert and state law. The circuit court excluded the expert’s testimony and granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that without expert causation testimony, the plaintiffs could not establish a genuine issue of material fact. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the exclusion of the expert’s testimony and the grant of summary judgment were proper. The court held that the circuit court erred by failing to assess the reliability of the expert’s overall differential diagnosis methodology and by excluding all his opinions based solely on certain quantitative tests. The Supreme Court reversed the exclusion of most of the expert’s testimony (except regarding two specific tests) and reversed summary judgment, allowing the case to proceed. View "Walton V. Huron Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, S.C.

2026-01-23T07:34:47-08:00

The plaintiff, who is a type 1 diabetic, received treatment from the defendants for foot pain following an injury. Over several visits in January 2017, the treating physician diagnosed cellulitis and prescribed antibiotics and pain medication, but did not diagnose a fracture. Subsequent evaluation by a podiatrist revealed a dislocated fracture and other breaks in the foot, which ultimately led to multiple surgeries and the amputation of the plaintiff’s left leg below the knee. The plaintiff alleged that the physician misdiagnosed his condition, causing him to continue using the injured foot and suffer further harm. A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court of Adams County, and after six days of testimony, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict for the defendants. During deliberations, the jury sent several notes to the court, including one from a juror who expressed personal belief in the physician’s negligence but agreed to sign the verdict for the defendants to end deliberations. The plaintiff’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on this note, but the trial court denied the motion, gave the jury a supplemental Prim instruction to guide further deliberations, and subsequently polled the jury after the verdict was reached. All jurors affirmed the verdict. The trial court also denied motions for a new trial and for additional polling of jurors. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding no abuse of discretion. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial or refusing to conduct additional polling. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, upholding the verdict for the defendants. View "Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, S.C." on Justia Law

Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC

2026-01-23T07:05:43-08:00

Jack Rose was a resident at Oakland Manor, a skilled nursing facility in Iowa. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Rose was hospitalized and later returned to the facility, where he was placed in precautionary isolation following public health guidance. After attending off-site medical appointments, he was again isolated but was subsequently hospitalized for a suspected stroke and tested positive for COVID-19. Rose died in the hospital, with COVID-19 listed as the immediate cause of death. A federal inspection later found Oakland Manor had failed to fully comply with recommended infection-control protocols, including inconsistent use of personal protective equipment and incomplete isolation measures. The plaintiffs, Rose’s sons, brought wrongful death and other related claims against Oakland Manor, alleging reckless and willful misconduct in failing to follow federal and state COVID-19 prevention guidelines. The Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County granted summary judgment in favor of Oakland Manor, holding that the plaintiffs' evidence—primarily a federal inspection report and an expert witness disclosure—did not establish reckless or willful misconduct as required to overcome statutory immunity provided to health care providers for COVID-19-related injuries. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding insufficient evidence of recklessness and, in addition, lack of qualified evidence regarding causation. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding recklessness or willful misconduct under Iowa Code section 686D.6(2). The Court vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals decision related to causation, holding that the deficiencies at Oakland Manor amounted at most to negligence, not recklessness, and thus statutory immunity applied. View "Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Berk v. Choy

2026-01-20T07:45:05-08:00

Harold Berk, while traveling in Delaware, suffered a fractured ankle and sought treatment at Beebe Medical Center, where Dr. Wilson Choy recommended a protective boot. Berk alleged that hospital staff improperly fitted the boot, worsening his injury, and that Dr. Choy failed to order an immediate follow-up X-ray, resulting in delayed treatment and the need for surgery. Berk, a citizen of another state, filed a medical malpractice suit in federal court against both the hospital and Dr. Choy under Delaware law. Delaware law requires that a medical malpractice complaint be accompanied by an affidavit of merit from a medical professional. Berk requested an extension to file this affidavit, which was granted, but ultimately failed to secure the required affidavit and instead filed his medical records under seal. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed Berk’s suit for failing to comply with Delaware’s affidavit of merit statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding the state law substantive and applicable in federal court because, in its view, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address the affidavit requirement. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Delaware’s affidavit of merit requirement does not apply in federal court. The Court reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which governs the information a plaintiff must provide at the outset of a lawsuit, sets the standard for pleadings and does not require supporting evidence such as an affidavit. Because Rule 8 is a valid procedural rule under the Rules Enabling Act and regulates the manner and means by which claims are presented, it displaces the contrary Delaware law. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Berk v. Choy" on Justia Law

Estate of Athy v. Edgewood

2026-01-13T14:26:37-08:00

A woman with dementia became a resident at a memory care facility in Montana in June 2021. She died in November 2021 after suffering infections and complications. Her son, acting both individually and as personal representative of her estate, filed suit against the facility and related entities in November 2023, alleging claims including wrongful death, negligence, infliction of emotional distress, elder abuse, unjust enrichment, and contract rescission. The claims centered on allegations that the facility’s staff failed to provide adequate care, leading to the woman’s injuries and death. The original complaint, and a subsequent first amended complaint filed in November 2024, were never served on any defendant. The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, dismissed all claims with prejudice in March 2025, finding that the son’s claims were medical malpractice actions subject to the two-year statute of limitations and six-month service requirement under Montana law. The court concluded that because the complaints were not timely served, and the amended complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired, the claims were time-barred. The court also rejected arguments that the filing of the original complaint tolled the statute or that the amended complaint related back to the original complaint. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the care-related claims (Counts I-VI) were medical malpractice claims subject to the statutory time limits and service requirements, and affirmed their dismissal as time-barred. However, the court found that the unjust enrichment and contract rescission claims (Counts VII and VIII) were not medical malpractice claims and were not subject to those limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of those two counts and remanded for further proceedings solely on those claims. View "Estate of Athy v. Edgewood" on Justia Law

DosSantos v. Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital-Milton, Inc.

2026-01-07T05:07:10-08:00

After experiencing medical complications following a delayed appendectomy, a nineteen-year-old patient brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital, its corporate affiliate, and several health care providers. The patient had gone to the hospital's emergency department with abdominal pain and other symptoms and was initially diagnosed with a urinary tract infection and discharged. She returned the next day with worsening pain, was diagnosed with acute appendicitis, and underwent surgery after a twelve-hour delay. The appendicitis had perforated, resulting in additional surgeries and complications, including abdominal abscess and pleural effusion, and a prolonged hospital stay. The patient filed her complaint in the Superior Court, alleging negligence and adverse consequences from delayed diagnosis and treatment. She moved to impound her medical records, arguing for their confidentiality, but the judge denied her motion, citing failure to show good cause and allowing her to refile with more specificity, which she declined. She also sought a protective order, which was similarly denied. For the medical malpractice tribunal process, the plaintiff submitted an expert opinion letter without her medical records. The tribunal found the offer of proof insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability for judicial inquiry. The plaintiff failed to post the required bond within thirty days of the tribunal’s finding, resulting in dismissal of her claims. The Appeals Court affirmed both the dismissal and the denial of impoundment. On further appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the judge did not abuse discretion in denying impoundment of the medical records, as the plaintiff failed to provide particularized information or establish good cause. The court also held that the medical malpractice tribunal did not err in finding the offer of proof insufficient, as it lacked specific information regarding each defendant’s conduct. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed both the denial of the impoundment motion and the judgment of dismissal. View "DosSantos v. Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital-Milton, Inc." on Justia Law

Cothran v. Jauregui

2025-12-30T05:32:23-08:00

Renee Jauregui brought a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Shannon J. Cothran, her OB/GYN, alleging that between May and October 2018 she repeatedly informed Dr. Cothran about a lump in her breast during pregnancy-related visits. Jauregui stated that Dr. Cothran dismissed her concerns, diagnosing a clogged milk duct and assuring her that the lump was normal and would resolve itself. At her postpartum visit in October 2018, Jauregui was told to monitor the lump and call if there were changes. When Jauregui noticed a change in July 2019, she returned for a follow-up in August, resulting in a diagnosis of metastatic breast cancer. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County granted Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar, finding that Jauregui’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court determined there was neither a continuous nor substantially uninterrupted course of examination or treatment after October 2018, thus the continuing treatment rule did not apply. The court concluded that no ongoing physician-patient relationship existed regarding the breast lump after the October 2018 appointment. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the continuing treatment rule does not require specific treatment and that Jauregui’s return in August 2019, pursuant to Dr. Cothran’s prior instructions, established a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination for the same condition. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court did not err in sustaining Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar. It clarified that the continuing treatment rule requires a mostly continuous physician-patient relationship regarding a specific malady, and found that the ten-month gap between appointments constituted a substantial interruption. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Jauregui’s claim was time-barred. View "Cothran v. Jauregui" on Justia Law

J.M. v. Sessions

2025-12-23T07:30:05-08:00

C.B., a 34-year-old man with developmental and psychiatric disabilities, died while residing at the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment, a secure state-run facility operated by the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. Although C.B. was admitted voluntarily, the facility imposed substantial restrictions on his liberty, including limits on leaving the premises and accessing medical care. In the days leading up to his death from cardiomyopathy, C.B. exhibited clear symptoms of heart failure and repeatedly asked staff for help, but his pleas were allegedly ignored or inadequately addressed by his caretakers. J.M., C.B.’s mother and administrator of his estate, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging violations of C.B.’s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for negligence and medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal claim, holding that C.B., as a voluntarily admitted resident, had no constitutional right to adequate medical care, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court also denied J.M.’s motion to amend her complaint to add a new defendant, finding lack of diligence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that C.B. was entitled to substantive due process protections regardless of his voluntary admission status. The court clarified that when the state exercises sufficient control over a resident’s life such that the individual cannot care for himself, due process guarantees apply, consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County, LLC

2025-12-19T16:30:53-08:00

Ana Faiaipau, an elderly woman recovering from heart surgery, was transferred to a long-term acute care hospital operated by Kindred Healthcare. During her stay, Ana allegedly suffered neglect, including lack of dialysis, malnutrition, inadequate hygiene care, and failure to properly monitor her ventilator. The ventilator became disconnected, leading to a severe anoxic brain injury and Ana’s subsequent death. Ana’s daughters, Jennifer and Faamalieloto, acting both individually and as successors in interest, filed suit against Kindred for negligence, elder neglect, fraud, violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and wrongful death. The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed Kindred’s motion to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by Jennifer as Ana’s legal representative. The court granted arbitration for survivor claims brought on behalf of Ana, including negligence, elder neglect, fraud, and UCL claims, but denied arbitration for Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s individual claims for wrongful death, fraud, and violation of the UCL. The court also stayed litigation of the individual claims pending arbitration. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the appeal. Citing the California Supreme Court’s decision in Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., the appellate court held that the wrongful death claim—premised on failure to monitor and reconnect Ana’s ventilator—constituted professional negligence and must be arbitrated under the arbitration agreement. However, the court affirmed the denial of arbitration for Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s individual fraud and UCL claims, finding Kindred had not shown that the agreement bound them in their individual capacities. The order was modified to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim and affirmed as modified. View "Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County, LLC" on Justia Law

BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC. V. KITCHEN

2025-12-18T07:05:34-08:00

A patient was admitted to a hospital for liver disease and, while in an altered mental state, fell while accompanied by a caregiver. She suffered a fractured hip, requiring surgery, and was later discharged. The patient filed a negligence lawsuit against the hospital, alleging a failure to prevent or appropriately respond to her fall. During discovery, she requested all incident reports related to her fall. The hospital identified an Incident Report and a Root Cause Analysis but refused to produce them, invoking federal and state privileges that protect certain internal analyses and reports of medical errors. The McCracken Circuit Court ordered the hospital to produce the Incident Report and to provide the Root Cause Analysis with redactions for portions covered by federal privilege. The trial court found that the Incident Report and parts of the Root Cause Analysis contained factual information not otherwise available in the patient's medical records and ruled that such information should be discoverable. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's order after the hospital sought a writ of prohibition. It held that the Incident Report was not privileged under federal or state law but concluded the Root Cause Analysis was fully protected by federal privilege, even its factual portions, and thus could not be disclosed. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act privilege protected the entire Root Cause Analysis from disclosure, with no exception for factual information within the document. However, it held that the Incident Report was not protected by either the federal or state privileges because it was generated in compliance with regulatory obligations, not as part of the hospital's privileged peer review or patient safety evaluation system. As a result, the Incident Report was discoverable, while the Root Cause Analysis was not. View "BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC. V. KITCHEN" on Justia Law

JACKSON V. MAYFIELD KY OPCO, LLC

2025-12-18T07:05:33-08:00

An elderly woman with significant medical issues, including heart and lung conditions, was a resident at a nursing home from 2018 until her death in December 2020. In late November 2020, she tested positive for COVID-19 and was transferred to a COVID unit within the facility. On December 3, 2020, she was found unresponsive by staff but did not receive immediate medical intervention for nearly five hours. She was eventually transported to a hospital, where she died the same day from acute respiratory distress. Her medical records indicated care being provided after her death, raising questions about record accuracy. Her estate administrator brought suit against the nursing home and related parties, alleging negligence, medical negligence, wrongful death, and other claims, asserting that her death resulted from neglect rather than COVID-19 itself. The case was first reviewed by the Graves Circuit Court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were immune under Kentucky’s COVID-19 immunity statute (KRS 39A.275). The court found that the decedent died from COVID-19 as evidenced by her death certificate and that no gross negligence had been sufficiently shown. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, reasoning that immunity applied under the statute because COVID-19 was a factor and that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient proof of gross negligence. Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts’ decisions. It held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether the woman's injuries and death were actually caused by COVID-19 or by the nursing home's alleged neglect. The Court clarified that the immunity statute requires a causal connection between the harm and COVID-19, and does not automatically apply to all injuries during the emergency period. The case was remanded for additional proceedings and further discovery. View "JACKSON V. MAYFIELD KY OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law

Medstar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. v. Kaplan

2025-12-18T07:03:21-08:00

David Kaplan brought a lawsuit against MedStar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. and an affiliated medical group, alleging that they failed to meet the national standard of care in treating his Crohn’s disease and did not obtain his informed consent for treatment. As a result of the alleged medical negligence, Kaplan endured prolonged use of steroids, which did not alleviate his condition and ultimately led to the complete deterioration of his hip bones. He subsequently required three hip replacement surgeries, experiencing significant physical pain, emotional distress, and limitations on his lifestyle and activities. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over a jury trial, where the jury found MedStar liable for both breaching the standard of care and failing to obtain informed consent. The jury awarded Kaplan $4 million in damages, allocating separate amounts for past and future physical injury and for past and future emotional distress. MedStar timely objected to the verdict form, aspects of Kaplan’s closing argument, and the amount of damages, and subsequently filed a post-trial motion seeking judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a reduction in damages. The trial court denied these motions. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the verdict form to separately list damages for physical injury and emotional distress, as these are conceptually distinct forms of harm. The court further found that any improper argument in Kaplan’s closing was adequately addressed by curative instructions, and that the damages award was not so excessive as to shock the conscience or require remittitur. The judgment in favor of Kaplan was affirmed in its entirety. View "Medstar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Cottle v. Mankin

2025-12-12T08:37:48-08:00

A teenage patient experienced persistent back pain and, in 2010, was treated by an orthopedic physician at a medical clinic. The physician misdiagnosed her condition and performed unnecessary surgeries in 2010 and 2012. Over the following years, internal complaints and concerns surfaced among other physicians and administrators at the clinic regarding this doctor’s substandard care, but the clinic did not take corrective action until the physician resigned in 2013. Subsequent medical evaluations revealed the original diagnosis was incorrect and the surgeries were not properly performed, resulting in further harm to the patient. The patient and her parents brought suit in Wake County Superior Court in 2016, alleging medical malpractice against the physician, and both vicarious liability and direct claims—specifically negligent retention and supervision—against the clinic. The trial court dismissed the malpractice claims as untimely under North Carolina’s four-year statute of repose, but allowed the negligent retention and supervision claims to proceed. On summary judgment, however, the trial court concluded that all remaining claims were also time-barred. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on most claims but reversed as to the negligent retention claim, reasoning that such a claim against a corporate medical practice was not subject to the statute of repose for medical malpractice actions. On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a negligent retention claim against a corporate medical practice qualifies as a “medical malpractice action” under N.C.G.S. § 90-21.11, and thus is subject to—and barred by—the statute of repose in N.C.G.S. § 1-15(c). The court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision on this point, holding that summary judgment was properly granted on the negligent retention claim. The court declined to review the dismissal of other tort claims. View "Cottle v. Mankin" on Justia Law

Ex parte Coosa Valley Medical Center

2025-12-12T06:30:05-08:00

A mother, acting on behalf of her minor child, brought medical malpractice claims against a hospital, a medical practice, and a physician after her child suffered injuries during birth. She alleged that the defendants failed to meet the applicable standard of care before, during, and after delivery, including failing to discuss delivery options, improperly conducting the delivery resulting in a shoulder injury, and failing to perform certain ultrasounds. The original and first amended complaints detailed specific alleged breaches of care. After fact discovery concluded, the mother disclosed expert witnesses whose opinions went beyond the scope of the existing pleadings, addressing acts or omissions not previously alleged. The defendants moved to strike the portions of the expert disclosures related to these new allegations. In response, the mother filed second amended complaints, adding new claims based on the acts and omissions identified by her experts, including allegations concerning the administration of Pitocin, repair of a perineal tear, and additional alleged nursing errors. The defendants then moved to dismiss these new allegations, arguing they were untimely under Alabama’s Medical Liability Act (AMLA), which requires timely amendment of complaints upon learning of new or different acts or omissions. The Talladega Circuit Court denied the motions to dismiss and motions to strike, reasoning that the amendments were timely because they were filed more than 90 days before trial and soon after the close of discovery. Reviewing the matter on petitions for writs of mandamus, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the new allegations in the second amended complaints were not timely under AMLA § 6-5-551. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had knowledge of the facts underlying the new claims well before amending and failed to act promptly as required by statute. The Court directed the trial court to grant the motions to dismiss the new allegations, but the plaintiff’s remaining, timely claims could proceed. View "Ex parte Coosa Valley Medical Center" on Justia Law

RENOWN REGIONAL MED. CENTER VS DIST. CT.

2025-12-11T09:05:43-08:00

A patient with multiple serious health conditions was taken to a hospital after being found unconscious by his minor daughter. He was treated briefly and discharged in the middle of the night, despite the absence of any adult at home to care for him. His wife, who was away at the time, had expressed concerns to the hospital staff about his ability to manage his condition at home, but her concerns were neither documented nor communicated to the attending physician. The patient was sent home alone via ride-share, and was later found by his wife in a severely deteriorated state. He died after subsequent hospitalization. The patient’s wife filed suit in the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada, alleging professional negligence as well as ordinary negligence, including a claim for negligent credentialing, hiring, training, supervision, and retention. The defendants moved to dismiss the ordinary negligence claim, arguing it was inseparable from professional negligence. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that some aspects—such as discharge decisions—were administrative and could support a claim for ordinary negligence. The district court also denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration after new case law was issued. The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that claims relating to the discharge decision and alleged failures in credentialing, hiring, training, supervision, and retention were not independent of the medical relationship and therefore sounded in professional negligence, not ordinary negligence. The court ruled that such claims must be subsumed under the existing professional negligence claim and are subject to the requirements for professional negligence actions. The court directed the district court to vacate its prior order and subsume the challenged claim under the professional negligence claim. View "RENOWN REGIONAL MED. CENTER VS DIST. CT." on Justia Law

Stone v. Witt

2025-12-11T08:28:02-08:00

A group of medical professionals and a pharmacy were alleged to have negligently prescribed and dispensed controlled substances to a patient with a history of substance abuse. The patient, while impaired by these drugs, drove her vehicle, crossed the center line, and fatally struck a cyclist. The personal representative of the cyclist’s estate brought wrongful death claims against the patient and the medical providers, asserting that the providers’ negligence foreseeably led to the fatal collision. In the Deschutes County Circuit Court, the medical providers and pharmacy moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, under Oregon law, medical professionals can only be liable in negligence to their own patients or those with whom they have a special relationship, not to third parties like the deceased cyclist. The trial court agreed, relying in part on prior Supreme Court precedent, and dismissed the claims against these defendants. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the complaint stated a claim for relief under ordinary negligence principles, finding that prior case law did not bar such claims. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that, under Oregon’s common-law negligence principles, a plaintiff can state a claim against medical professionals for physical harm to nonpatients if the professionals’ conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk of the kind of harm that occurred. The Court rejected the argument that liability should be limited only to patients or those with a special relationship, declining to create an exception for medical professionals. The Court reversed the circuit court’s limited judgments and remanded for further proceedings, clarifying that ordinary negligence liability extends to foreseeable physical harm to nonpatients caused by medical professionals’ unreasonable conduct. View "Stone v. Witt" on Justia Law

Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas Department of Veteran Affairs

2025-11-20T16:30:13-08:00

A patient received treatment for diabetes at VA facilities from 2016 to 2022. In early 2020, he reported worsening symptoms and expressed dissatisfaction with his medical care, believing negligence contributed to his condition. Two years later, he filed a complaint with the Office of the Inspector General, alleging improper diagnosis and treatment at VA facilities. He also submitted a Standard Form-95 (SF-95) to the Office of the General Counsel, naming himself as claimant and his wife as a witness and property owner. The agency denied his claim, and he was informed of his right to sue. The couple then filed a pro se lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligent medical care caused kidney disease. Subsequently, the wife filed her own SF-95, asserting power of attorney, but the agency denied this claim as duplicative and because the couple had already sought judicial remedy. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the wife’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, dismissed both plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred, and denied leave to amend as futile. The plaintiffs objected, but the district court adopted the recommendations and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court erred in finding the wife failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her property damage claim, because the administrative filing gave sufficient notice for that claim. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the alternative ground that all claims were barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations, as the plaintiffs’ injuries and property damages were or should have been known more than two years before the administrative claims were filed. The denial of leave to amend was also affirmed. View "Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas Department of Veteran Affairs" on Justia Law

Swink v. Southern Health Partners Inc.

2025-11-20T11:30:53-08:00

David Ray Gunter, who had a mechanical heart valve and required daily anticoagulant medication (Coumadin), was arrested and detained at two North Carolina county jails. During his detention, Gunter did not consistently receive his prescribed medication, missing doses over several days due to failures by the contracted medical provider and jail staff. After his release, he suffered serious medical complications, including blood clots and subsequent surgeries. Gunter alleged these injuries were the result of inadequate medical care during his incarceration. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for defendants on Gunter’s constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including deliberate indifference and Monell claims, finding insufficient evidence that jail officials or contracted medical providers acted with deliberate indifference or that county policies caused the deprivation. The district court also granted summary judgment to Southern Health Partners, Inc. (SHP) on the medical malpractice claim, finding that Gunter’s expert testimony did not establish a breach of the standard of care by SHP, and excluded expert evidence it found speculative. However, the district court found genuine disputes of fact regarding medical malpractice claims against two individual medical providers, but ultimately found no proximate cause. The district court denied Gunter’s motion to compel deposition of the defendants’ expert as untimely and granted a motion to strike a post-deposition declaration from Gunter’s expert. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Gunter’s deliberate indifference claim against the medical provider defendants, the Monell claim against the counties, and the medical malpractice claims against SHP and two medical providers, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained. The appellate court also reversed the exclusion of certain expert testimony and the grant of the motion to strike, but affirmed the denial of the motion to compel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Swink v. Southern Health Partners Inc." on Justia Law

Stanford v. Brandon Nursing

2025-11-20T11:00:16-08:00

Mark Stanford, an incapacitated resident of a Mississippi nursing facility, suffered severe burns after starting a fire in his room. The Mississippi State Department of Health determined that the nursing center failed to adequately supervise Stanford and maintain a safe environment, citing the facility for violating federal regulations regarding the safety and supervision of residents. Stanford, through his conservator, brought a lawsuit alleging negligence and medical malpractice against the nursing facility and related entities. Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement signed in 2017 by Stanford’s brother, Russell Phillips, who acted as Stanford’s health surrogate during his admission. Stanford opposed arbitration, arguing that the agreement was invalid because Phillips lacked authority under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act to bind Stanford, since Stanford’s adult son—a higher-priority family member under the statute—was reasonably available and willing to serve as surrogate. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that Phillips was not a proper surrogate under the statute and denied the motion to compel arbitration. Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to both the denial of arbitration and interpretation of state law. The Fifth Circuit determined that the key issue was whether, under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, a health care provider must ensure that no higher-priority family member is “reasonably available” before accepting decisions from a lower-priority family member acting as surrogate. Noting the statutory ambiguity and lack of controlling Mississippi precedents, the Fifth Circuit did not resolve the merits but instead certified this question of state law to the Mississippi Supreme Court for authoritative interpretation. View "Stanford v. Brandon Nursing" on Justia Law

Snover v. Gupta

2025-11-18T15:01:50-08:00

Adria Snover, represented by her spouse and guardian ad litem, suffered permanent brain injury and entered a coma following complications during a cesarean section. She sued Dr. Aruna Gupta, Riverside Community Hospital, and another doctor, alleging negligent diagnosis and treatment. Before trial, Snover settled with the hospital for $2.5 million and with the other doctor for $1 million. The hospital’s settlement included $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son for waiving a potential future wrongful death claim. The case proceeded to trial solely against Dr. Gupta. A jury in the Riverside County Superior Court awarded Snover $17,458,474 in total damages: $7,458,474 in economic damages and $10 million in noneconomic damages. The jury found Gupta 15 percent at fault, the other doctor 80 percent, and a nurse 5 percent. After trial, the court applied the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) cap to the noneconomic damages, reducing them to $250,000, and then held Gupta liable for 15 percent of that amount ($37,500). For economic damages, the court used the Mayes rule, first applying the MICRA cap, then calculating the percentage of economic damages and applying that percentage to the settlement amounts, resulting in a setoff of $3,142,750. The court did not exclude the $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son from the setoff calculation. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court correctly applied the MICRA cap before apportioning liability for noneconomic damages among health care providers, consistent with Gilman v. Beverly California Corp. and Rashidi v. Moser. The court also affirmed the use of the Mayes rule for calculating the economic damages setoff and found no abuse of discretion in including the $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son. The judgment was affirmed. View "Snover v. Gupta" on Justia Law

Lakeland Premier Women's Clinic, PLLC v. Jackson

2025-11-18T11:21:26-08:00

A patient underwent a laparoscopic bilateral tubal ligation and endometrial ablation performed by a physician at a women’s clinic. About a week after the procedure, she experienced severe abdominal pain and was hospitalized for sepsis. An exploratory surgery revealed a perforated small bowel, which was surgically repaired. The patient subsequently recovered. The patient filed a medical negligence lawsuit in the Hinds County Circuit Court against the clinic and the physician, attaching the required certificate of expert consultation to her complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supporting their motion with an expert affidavit. The plaintiff did not timely file an expert affidavit or testimony in response. On the day before the scheduled summary judgment hearing, she filed a response without any expert affidavit. The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion and granted her an additional thirty days to obtain an expert affidavit. After she submitted an expert affidavit and a second hearing was held, the circuit court again denied summary judgment, finding that the competing expert affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment de novo and its grant of additional time for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that, in medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff must produce sworn expert testimony to survive summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide such testimony before the initial hearing and that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting additional time without a specific finding of diligence or good faith. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Lakeland Premier Women's Clinic, PLLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law

AUSTBO v. GREENBRIAR

2025-11-18T11:14:43-08:00

A woman with COVID-19 and multiple underlying health conditions was admitted to a hospital and then transferred to a skilled nursing facility for ongoing treatment. During her stay at the facility, she was under the care of a physician who prescribed various treatments for her COVID-19 infection. Despite these interventions, her condition deteriorated, and she developed additional complications, including pressure wounds and dehydration. After being discharged from the facility without hospice or home health arrangements, she was readmitted to the hospital, where her condition continued to decline. She was eventually discharged home under hospice care and died shortly thereafter. Her surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the facility and physician were negligent in her care. The District Court of Garfield County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they were immune from liability under both the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act and Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act. The district court reasoned that the acts and omissions in question were incident to the provision of care for a COVID-19 patient and thus fell within the scope of the immunity statutes. The plaintiff appealed this decision. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of immunity. The court found that the defendants failed to provide evidence establishing a causal relationship between the administration or use of covered countermeasures and the plaintiff’s injuries, as required for PREP Act immunity. Additionally, the court determined that the defendants did not meet the evidentiary burden to show the requisite impact under the state COVID-19 Act, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding gross negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AUSTBO v. GREENBRIAR" on Justia Law

FRANKLIN v. OU MEDICINE

2025-11-18T10:48:28-08:00

A mother, acting on behalf of her mentally incapacitated adult daughter, brought suit against a hospital, its health partners, and a registered nurse after her daughter suffered an anoxic brain injury. The injury occurred when the nurse, while cleaning the patient, dislodged the patient’s cuffed tracheostomy tube, which had been placed to treat COVID-19 pneumonia. The tube was out for approximately seven minutes, resulting in cardiac arrest and brain injury. The patient had been admitted with COVID-19 and was receiving oxygen through the tracheostomy at the time of the incident. The defendants moved to dismiss the case in the District Court of Oklahoma County, arguing that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act provided them immunity from suit and liability, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court considered documentary evidence submitted by the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the district court, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the defendants were not immune from suit. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the cuffed tracheostomy was a “covered countermeasure” under the PREP Act, the claims had a causal relationship with the administration and use of that countermeasure, and the defendants qualified as “covered persons.” The court found that the PREP Act confers both immunity from liability and suit for such claims, except for willful misconduct, which must be brought exclusively in federal court. Therefore, Oklahoma courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "FRANKLIN v. OU MEDICINE" on Justia Law

Bennett v. Collins

2025-11-18T05:12:12-08:00

The case concerns the medical treatment of a fifty-eight-year-old man who suffered a shoulder injury and subsequently died from septic shock, acute septic arthritis, metabolic acidosis, and renal failure. After his initial visit to the emergency department, he was diagnosed with rotator cuff tendinitis and cellulitis, and discharged with antibiotics. His condition worsened over several weeks, leading to multiple emergency department visits and consultations with various medical providers, including nurse practitioner Michael Collins. Collins attended to the patient on August 4-5, 2020, and discharged him after administering fluids and pain medication, advising follow-up with orthopedics. The patient returned to the hospital two days later in a deteriorated state, was diagnosed with sepsis and septic arthritis, and died shortly thereafter. The plaintiff, acting as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a medical malpractice action in the Massachusetts Superior Court against several providers, including Collins. The plaintiff submitted an offer of proof supported by medical records and expert opinion, alleging that Collins failed to meet the standard of care by not recognizing symptoms of septic arthritis, failing to order appropriate imaging and bloodwork, and not admitting the patient for further treatment. Collins and other defendants requested a medical malpractice tribunal under G. L. c. 231, § 60B. The tribunal found the plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability against Collins, leading to dismissal of the claims after the plaintiff did not post the required bond. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the tribunal’s decision. It held that the tribunal erred in finding the plaintiff’s offer of proof insufficient, as the expert opinion was factually based and rooted in the medical records, and adequately raised a legitimate question of liability and causation. The Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s claims against Collins to proceed without posting a bond. View "Bennett v. Collins" on Justia Law

Ex parte Taylor

2025-11-07T06:30:02-08:00

The plaintiff underwent a vein-ablation procedure on her right leg in August 2016, performed by a physician other than the defendant. She subsequently developed an infection and was treated by the defendant, who performed several irrigation and debridement procedures over the following months. In March 2017, a 4" x 4" piece of gauze was removed from the plaintiff’s wound, raising questions about whether it had been negligently left in the wound during one of the defendant’s procedures or during subsequent wound care. The plaintiff filed a medical-malpractice complaint in July 2018, alleging that the defendant left a sponge in her body during a September 2016 surgery, which the defendant denied ever performing. The Shelby Circuit Court initially denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her claims. After depositions and further discovery, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to correct the date of the alleged negligent procedure from September 21, 2016, to October 26, 2016, but continued to reference a vein ablation rather than the actual irrigation and debridement procedure. The defendant moved to strike the amended complaint, arguing undue delay and lack of specificity as required by the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). The circuit court denied the motion to strike and allowed the amendment. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. It held that the plaintiff’s delay in amending her complaint was truly inordinate and unexplained, especially given the information available to her and the defendant’s repeated assertion of his rights under AMLA § 6-5-551. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by allowing the amendment and directed it to vacate its order granting leave to amend and to strike the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The petition for writ of mandamus was granted. View "Ex parte Taylor" on Justia Law

McMahon v. Sanford

2025-11-05T09:37:08-08:00

The plaintiff received medical care at Sanford medical facilities in Fargo, North Dakota, in April 2022. He alleged that Sanford and its staff, including nurse Shannon Mulinex, refused to provide him pain medication, verbally abused and humiliated him, failed to investigate his complaints, engaged in a pattern of hostile conduct, and discharged him against his wishes. Based on these events, he brought six claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), as well as claims for general negligence, defamation, discrimination, and violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act. The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the case after Sanford moved for summary judgment. Sanford argued that the plaintiff failed to serve an expert affidavit within three months as required by North Dakota law for professional negligence claims, and that the IIED claims did not allege conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous. The district court denied the plaintiff’s oral motion for a continuance, finding he had received adequate notice of the hearing. The court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims, concluding that several IIED claims required an expert affidavit and the remaining IIED claims did not meet the legal threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct. A supplemental order granted summary judgment to Mulinex for the same reasons. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, that the plaintiff had not preserved the issue of additional discovery for appeal, and that the requirement for an expert affidavit applied to IIED claims involving medical decisions. The court further held that the conduct alleged in the remaining IIED claims did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. The amended judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "McMahon v. Sanford" on Justia Law

Calderon-Amezquita v. Rivera-Cruz

2025-10-30T13:30:03-08:00

A 68-year-old man experiencing abdominal pain was brought to a hospital emergency room in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, in January 2016. After a delayed CT scan revealed a perforated intestine, he underwent surgery and remained in intensive care until his death in February 2016. His son, a physician residing in Florida, later learned of the seriousness of his father’s condition during a visit. The son filed a lawsuit against several doctors, the hospital, and related entities, alleging that negligent medical care led to his father’s death. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reviewed the case after a contentious discovery period. The court granted summary judgment in favor of five defendants: three doctors, a corporate entity managing the emergency room, and the emergency room’s medical director. The court found that the claims against the doctors and the corporate entity were time-barred under Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations for tort claims, and that Puerto Rico law did not provide a basis for liability against the medical director, as he had not directly treated the patient. The court also disregarded certain evidence submitted by the plaintiff and denied his motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the district court erred in converting two doctors’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment without giving the plaintiff adequate notice or an opportunity to present evidence. The appellate court also held that the district court abused its discretion in disregarding the plaintiff’s declaration regarding when he learned of one doctor’s involvement. The court vacated and remanded the summary judgments for the three doctors and the medical director on the first cause of action, but affirmed summary judgment for the corporate entity and the medical director on the second cause of action. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "Calderon-Amezquita v. Rivera-Cruz" on Justia Law

Wunderly v. Saint Luke's Hosp.

2025-10-23T05:49:02-08:00

A patient was involuntarily admitted to a hospital for mental health treatment due to dementia-related aggression. During his stay, he developed and experienced worsening pressure ulcers. After being transferred to another facility, he died ten days later. The estate of the patient filed a wrongful death and survival action against the hospital, alleging negligence and corporate negligence in the care and treatment of the patient’s pressure ulcers, claiming these injuries contributed to his decline and death. The Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas granted the hospital’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the hospital’s care for the pressure ulcers was incidental to the patient’s mental health treatment. The court concluded that, under Section 114 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), the hospital was immune from liability for ordinary negligence because the care provided was coincident to mental health treatment, and the complaint did not allege willful misconduct or gross negligence. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this decision, holding that the immunity provision of the MHPA applied to the hospital’s conduct. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the MHPA’s immunity provision applied to the hospital’s treatment of the patient’s physical ailments during his mental health admission. The Court held that the MHPA’s immunity provision covers not only treatment directly related to mental illness but also medical care coincident to mental health treatment, including foreseeable physical complications like pressure ulcers. Because the estate’s complaint alleged only ordinary negligence and not gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the hospital. View "Wunderly v. Saint Luke's Hosp." on Justia Law

Lewis v. MedCentral Health Sys.

2025-10-23T05:08:54-08:00

A patient alleged that she suffered a neck fracture after falling from her hospital bed while medicated and unattended at a hospital. She filed a complaint against the hospital within the one-year statute of limitations for medical claims, also naming ten John Doe defendants described as unknown medical providers involved in her care. The hospital was served and answered the complaint, but the plaintiff did not obtain summonses or attempt service on the John Doe defendants. Several months later, with the hospital’s consent, she amended her complaint to replace the John Doe defendants with specific individuals and entities, including two doctors and a medical group. The newly named defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them were time-barred because they were not named before the statute of limitations expired and the plaintiff had not complied with Ohio Civil Rule 15(D), which governs the naming and service of unknown defendants. The Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion, holding that the statutory 180-day extension for joining additional defendants in medical-claim actions did not apply to defendants who were “obvious” at the outset and that the plaintiff was required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D). The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statutory extension applied to any additional defendants not named in the original complaint, regardless of whether their existence was contemplated at filing. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision. It held that a plaintiff is not required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D) to name additional defendants in an amended complaint under R.C. 2323.451(D)(1), and that the 180-day extension under R.C. 2323.451(D)(2) is not limited to newly discovered defendants. Because the plaintiff properly amended her complaint to join the additional defendants, the extension applied and her action was timely commenced. View "Lewis v. MedCentral Health Sys." on Justia Law

HENKE v. HOSPITAL

2025-10-22T09:00:35-08:00

A patient with a history of aortic valve replacement visited an urgent care facility with symptoms including fever, headache, and chills. The urgent care doctor suspected bacterial endocarditis, a potentially fatal infection, and referred the patient to the emergency department at a hospital, providing a note and calling ahead. At the emergency department, the attending physician reviewed the note but dismissed the suspicion of endocarditis, diagnosing the patient with a viral syndrome and discharging him. The patient later saw his primary care provider, who also suspected endocarditis, but he died two days later. An autopsy confirmed death from complications of sepsis due to acute bacterial endocarditis. The patient’s family filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the hospital and emergency physician’s failure to diagnose and treat endocarditis caused his death. The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s expert testimony did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required by Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-572 for emergency department malpractice claims. The court reasoned that the experts did not state causation to a high degree of medical probability. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the expert opinions were insufficient to meet the heightened standard and that summary judgment was appropriate. The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed and remanded. It held that the clear and convincing evidence standard in § 12-572 is a standard of proof, not a prima facie element of the claim. The Court clarified that a plaintiff’s expert testimony that negligence “likely” caused the injury is sufficient to establish causation for purposes of surviving summary judgment. The factfinder must consider all relevant, admissible evidence—not just expert testimony—when determining whether causation has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "HENKE v. HOSPITAL" on Justia Law

SanMiguel v. Grimaldi

2025-10-21T08:12:28-08:00

After her pregnancy extended past her due date, a woman was admitted to a hospital and came under the care of a physician who, along with hospital staff, induced labor. When a vacuum extraction delivery attempt failed, the physician performed an emergency cesarean section, delivering a baby who was born alive but in critical condition. The infant died eight days later after being treated in neonatal intensive care and ultimately removed from life support. The woman brought suit against the physician, the hospital, and a nurse-midwife, asserting several claims, including medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, both on behalf of her deceased son’s estate and on her own behalf. As relevant here, she sought damages for her own emotional distress based on an alleged lack of informed consent for the vacuum extraction procedure. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted summary judgment dismissing her direct medical malpractice claim but denied summary judgment on her lack of informed consent claim, finding factual disputes. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that precedent barring recovery for purely emotional damages in prenatal torts did not apply to lack of informed consent claims, and alternatively invited the Court of Appeals to revisit its precedent. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether its prior decision in Sheppard-Mobley v King, which bars recovery for purely emotional damages by a birthing parent when medical malpractice causes in utero injury to a fetus born alive, also applies to lack of informed consent claims. The Court held that it does, reasoning that lack of informed consent is a form of medical malpractice and that no legal or logical basis exists to treat such claims differently for purposes of emotional damages. The Court declined to overrule its precedent, reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissed the lack of informed consent claim for emotional damages, and answered the certified question in the negative. View "SanMiguel v. Grimaldi" on Justia Law

Land v. Whitley

2025-10-17T07:40:56-08:00

During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, a patient received medical care that included a hysterectomy performed by a physician at a local medical center. Following the procedure, the patient experienced significant complications, including infection, sepsis, and additional surgeries, which led to prolonged recovery and ongoing health issues. The patient and her husband filed a lawsuit against the physician, the medical practice, and the hospital, alleging negligence and gross negligence in the performance of the surgery and subsequent care. The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that they were immune from civil liability under North Carolina’s Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act, which was enacted in response to the pandemic. They asserted that the Act provided them with immunity because the care was rendered during the pandemic and was impacted by it, and that the complaint did not allege bad faith. The Superior Court in Pitt County denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the requirements for statutory immunity under the Emergency Act were not met on the face of the complaint. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss was an interlocutory order and not immediately appealable. The Court concluded that the Emergency Act provides immunity from liability, not from suit, and therefore does not create a substantial right warranting immediate appeal. The Court also found that the denial of the motions did not implicate personal jurisdiction under the relevant statute. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Land v. Whitley" on Justia Law

Mobile Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Sliman

2025-10-17T05:30:04-08:00

An 84-year-old man with a history of dementia was admitted to a hospital after several falls and subsequently transferred to a nursing home for rehabilitation. His wife, acting as his “Authorized Representative,” signed an optional arbitration agreement as part of his admission paperwork. During his stay, the man developed a pressure wound that became septic, leading to his removal from the facility and subsequent death. The wife, as personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home and its administrator, alleging medical negligence and asserting that the man was incompetent and unable to make decisions for himself at the time of admission. The Mobile Circuit Court reviewed the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, which was based on the signed agreement. The wife opposed the motion, arguing she lacked authority to bind her husband to arbitration because he was permanently incapacitated due to dementia. She provided medical records and her own affidavit to support her claim of his incapacity. The defendants countered with evidence suggesting the man had periods of lucidity and was not permanently incapacitated. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration and later denied a postjudgment motion by the defendants that included additional medical records. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It held that the wife did not meet her burden to prove the man was permanently incapacitated or temporarily incapacitated at the time the arbitration agreement was executed. The Court found that the evidence showed the man had lucid intervals and was at times alert and able to communicate, and that no contemporaneous evidence established incapacity at the time of signing. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case, holding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable. View "Mobile Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Sliman" on Justia Law

Denson ex rel. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge

2025-10-13T12:20:41-08:00

A woman died after being treated at a hospital and left behind two minor children. Her mother took custody of the children following a juvenile court order that granted her authority over their care. The mother, acting as custodian, sent pre-suit notice to the health care providers she believed responsible for her daughter’s death, identifying herself as the “claimant authorizing the notice” but not mentioning the minor children. She later filed a wrongful death lawsuit, initially on her own behalf and on behalf of the children, but ultimately pursued the claim solely for the children. The Circuit Court for Anderson County first granted, then vacated, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that the mother had substantially complied with the pre-suit notice requirements and that the omission of the children’s names did not prejudice the defendants. The court also found that while the children held the right to the claim, the mother was the claimant on their behalf. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision, holding that the pre-suit notice was deficient because it failed to identify the children as claimants, and that this failure prejudiced the defendants. The appellate court did agree that the mother had standing to bring the suit on behalf of her grandchildren. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B), the “claimant authorizing the notice” is the person who asserts the right and formally approves giving pre-suit notice. Since the minor children could not act for themselves, their legal custodian was the proper person to authorize notice and file suit on their behalf. The Court concluded that the mother complied with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Denson ex rel. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge" on Justia Law

Meka v. Haddad

2025-10-10T04:00:04-08:00

A husband and wife brought a lawsuit after the wife suffered a pelvic fracture during a forceps-assisted delivery performed by a doctor at a women’s health group. They alleged that the doctor failed to obtain the wife’s informed consent by not disclosing the risks associated with the procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that this omission violated Massachusetts law and sought damages for the resulting injury. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts handled the case initially. During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing that the plaintiffs had not made their experts available for deposition as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs did not respond to this motion, and the District Court granted it, excluding the expert testimony. The plaintiffs later failed to appear at a pretrial conference, citing email issues, and only addressed the missed conference, not the exclusion of their experts. The District Court declined to vacate its order striking the experts, finding the plaintiffs’ delay and lack of explanation unjustified. Subsequently, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to support the informed consent claim under Massachusetts law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider the order striking the expert witnesses, given the plaintiffs’ prolonged inaction and failure to address the underlying issues. The First Circuit also held that, under Massachusetts law, expert testimony was required to establish that the risk of pelvic fracture from a forceps-assisted delivery was more than negligible, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Meka v. Haddad" on Justia Law

Thompsonl v. Heartway Corp.

2025-10-07T10:33:23-08:00

A nursing home resident’s legal representative, acting under a durable power of attorney, sued a nursing home for alleged medical negligence during the resident’s stay. Upon admission, the representative signed several documents, including an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the resident’s care. The representative later claimed not to recall signing the documents but did not dispute her signature. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on the signed agreement, which expressly stated it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, signed by both an authorized agent of the nursing home and the legal representative. The court determined that the FAA applied due to the involvement of interstate commerce and that the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act’s (NHCA) prohibition of arbitration agreements was preempted by federal law. The court granted the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the FAA preempts the NHCA’s categorical prohibition of arbitration agreements in the nursing home context when interstate commerce is involved and the agreement expressly invokes the FAA. The court found the arbitration agreement was validly executed and not unconscionable, distinguishing this case from prior Oklahoma precedent and aligning with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "Thompsonl v. Heartway Corp." on Justia Law

Barfell v. Freeman Health System

2025-09-30T09:16:58-08:00

The plaintiff sought medical care for severe headaches and related symptoms from various providers in Oklahoma and Missouri, including Freeman Health System (FHS) and Dr. Gulshan Uppal in Joplin, Missouri. After multiple visits and treatments, she was ultimately diagnosed with serious neurological conditions and suffered lasting health consequences. She alleged that several healthcare providers, including FHS and Dr. Uppal, negligently diagnosed, treated, and discharged her. She filed suit in the District Court of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, naming multiple defendants. FHS and Dr. Uppal moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing their actions and contacts were insufficient for Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, finding it lacked both general and specific personal jurisdiction over these defendants, primarily because the relevant treatment occurred in Missouri and the claims did not arise from FHS’s Oklahoma contacts. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the district court erred by only considering whether the suit “arose out of” the defendants’ contacts with Oklahoma, and not whether it “related to” those contacts, as required by the two-pronged standard for specific personal jurisdiction clarified in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 8th Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff met her burden regarding FHS’s contacts with Oklahoma, warranting further proceedings to determine if her claims “relate to” those contacts. However, the plaintiff failed to show sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction over Dr. Uppal. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s opinion, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Uppal, reversed the dismissal of FHS, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barfell v. Freeman Health System" on Justia Law

Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals

2025-09-19T14:30:56-08:00

An adolescent female, who was continuously enrolled as a dependent under her mother’s Kaiser health care plans from 2005 to 2023, received gender-affirming medical care between the ages of 13 and 17. After experiencing negative outcomes and later detransitioning, she filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, The Permanente Medical Group, and several individual providers. The claims alleged that the care provided was not medically justified, that risks were not adequately disclosed, and that the providers failed to meet the standard of care in both treatment and informed consent. The Superior Court of San Joaquin County reviewed Kaiser’s petition to compel arbitration, which was based on arbitration provisions in the health plan documents. Kaiser argued that the plaintiff, as a dependent, was bound by arbitration agreements incorporated in the evidence of coverage and benefits booklets for both the union-based and self-funded plans. The trial court found that Kaiser failed to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, noting that the relevant documents referenced in the enrollment forms were not provided, and there was no evidence of the plaintiff or her mother expressly agreeing to the specific arbitration provisions Kaiser sought to enforce. The court denied the petition to compel arbitration and later denied Kaiser’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that Kaiser did not meet its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a valid and binding arbitration agreement covering the controversy. The court emphasized that mere enrollment and general references to arbitration were insufficient; the precise arbitration provision must be clearly incorporated and agreed to. The order denying the petition to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

ROEBUCK v MAYO CLINIC

2025-09-12T09:00:32-08:00

Robin Roebuck, who had previously undergone a heart transplant, was hospitalized at the Mayo Clinic in Arizona in April 2020 for COVID-19. During his stay, an arterial blood gas test was performed as part of his treatment, which led to complications requiring surgery and resulting in significant scarring and reduced function in his right arm and hand. In January 2021, Roebuck filed a medical negligence lawsuit against the Mayo Clinic and two of its medical professionals, alleging that the test was negligently performed. He did not claim gross negligence. The Superior Court of Maricopa County initially denied Mayo Clinic’s motion to dismiss, finding that Roebuck had sufficiently alleged the test was part of his heart treatment rather than COVID-19 care. After discovery, the court determined the test was related to COVID-19 treatment and granted summary judgment for Mayo Clinic, holding that Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-516 provided immunity from ordinary negligence claims during the pandemic, requiring proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct instead. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that § 12-516’s bar on ordinary negligence claims for pandemic-related medical care violated the Arizona Constitution’s anti-abrogation clause. The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that § 12-516(A) unconstitutionally abrogates the right to recover damages for injuries caused by ordinary negligence by health care providers during a public health emergency. The Court found that gross negligence is not a reasonable alternative to ordinary negligence and that the statute’s limitation impermissibly abolishes a protected right of action. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, while vacating part of the court of appeals’ reasoning and replacing it with its own. View "ROEBUCK v MAYO CLINIC" on Justia Law

Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc.

2025-09-12T06:30:11-08:00

A Georgia corporation operates several hospitals and clinics in west Georgia and, through an affiliated entity, also operates a small hospital and clinics in east Alabama. An Alabama resident sought treatment at the Alabama hospital and was subsequently transferred by ambulance to the corporation’s Georgia facility for a heart-catheterization procedure. The procedure was performed by a Georgia-based physician employed by the corporation, who is not licensed in Alabama and has never practiced there. The patient alleges that the physician’s negligence during the procedure in Georgia caused him to suffer renal failure and require further medical intervention. The patient sued both the corporation and the physician in the Randolph Circuit Court in Alabama, asserting claims under both Alabama and Georgia medical liability statutes and alleging the corporation’s vicarious liability for the physician’s actions. The physician and the corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that venue was improper. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the corporation’s motion to dismiss. The corporation then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against it. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama, as it was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. However, the Court found that specific personal jurisdiction existed because the patient’s treatment began at the Alabama facility operated by the corporation, and the subsequent care in Georgia was sufficiently related to the corporation’s activities in Alabama. The Court also concluded that the corporation had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal based on improper venue, as it had not adequately addressed whether Alabama’s venue statute applied to claims brought under another state’s law. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

O'Brien v. United States

2025-09-11T13:00:03-08:00

Melissa Allen experienced multiple seizures at home and was taken to Lowell General Hospital, where she was found to be seven months pregnant and suffering from severe hypertension. Dr. Fernando Roca, an obstetrician affiliated with Lowell Community Health Center (LCHC), determined an emergency caesarian section was necessary. After the procedure, Allen suffered a devastating neurological injury and died eleven days later at a Boston hospital. The cause of death was listed as intracranial hemorrhage and eclampsia. Brad O'Brien, as personal representative of Allen’s estate, initially filed a wrongful death medical malpractice suit in Massachusetts state court against Dr. Roca and the hospital. At the time of the incident, Dr. Roca was employed by LCHC, a federally funded health center deemed under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to have federal employee status for certain purposes. The United States substituted itself as defendant and removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the suit as time-barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). On O'Brien’s first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the substitution order due to reliance on the wrong statutory basis and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again substituted the United States as defendant and dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Secretary’s regulation allowing for “pre-deeming” FTCA coverage in certain hospital on-call scenarios was consistent with the PHSA, and that Dr. Roca’s treatment of Allen fell within this coverage. The court also held that O’Brien’s claim was untimely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations and that the FTCA’s savings clause did not apply. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. United States" on Justia Law

Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

2025-09-10T04:11:09-08:00

A woman was injured when a heat lamp manufactured by a company made contact with her foot during an acupuncture session performed by a physician. She initially sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice. The physician then filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer, alleging product liability. The injured woman subsequently filed a direct product liability claim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer raised special defenses, asserting that both the woman and the physician bore comparative responsibility for her injuries and that, if found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from the physician. Before trial concluded, the physician withdrew his third-party complaint. The jury found the manufacturer 80 percent responsible and the physician 20 percent responsible for the woman’s damages. After judgment was rendered, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the medical malpractice claim against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but affirmed the product liability judgment, including the jury’s allocation of comparative responsibility. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the manufacturer’s petition for certification to appeal, and the woman withdrew her appeals after receiving payment in satisfaction of the judgment. The manufacturer and its insurer then filed a contribution action against the physician, seeking to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to the injured woman. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer. On appeal, the physician argued that he was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and that the contribution action was untimely. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether they are product sellers, are subject to comparative responsibility under the statute. The Court also held that a contribution action is timely if brought within one year after all appellate proceedings in the underlying action are final. The judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer was affirmed. View "Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang" on Justia Law

WILLIAMS v. REGENCY HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC

2025-08-26T04:08:35-08:00

A woman, acting as conservator for her mother, filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and ordinary negligence against a hospital and a nurse practitioner. The mother had suffered a stroke, became permanently disabled, and was transferred to the hospital for long-term care. During her stay, she developed a severe tongue injury that ultimately required amputation. The conservator was appointed nearly two years after the injury, and the lawsuit was filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice occurred. The plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the mother’s mental incompetence. The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions under Georgia law was not tolled for mental incompetence, based on the “nontolling” provision in OCGA § 9-3-73(b). The court relied on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s prior decision in Deen v. Stevens, which upheld the constitutionality of this provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was bound by Deen and rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection challenge to the statute. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether Deen controlled the case and whether the statute’s treatment of mentally incompetent medical malpractice plaintiffs violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court held that Deen was controlling and that the statute’s classification was subject to rational basis review. The court found that the legislative decision not to toll the statute of limitations for mentally incompetent plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases was rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as ensuring affordable healthcare and preventing stale claims. The court also rejected new arguments regarding the expert affidavit requirement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "WILLIAMS v. REGENCY HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

Moreno v. Bosholm

2025-08-15T12:00:36-08:00

While incarcerated at a North Carolina state prison in February 2016, Manuel Moreno developed flu-like symptoms and sought medical attention. A nurse examined him and recorded slightly elevated respiration, but otherwise normal vital signs. Dr. Carol Bosholm, the on-duty physician, did not personally examine Moreno but reviewed the nurse’s notes, diagnosed sinus congestion and pharyngitis, and prescribed antibiotics. That same day, several inmates from Moreno’s housing area also reported similar symptoms, and some tested positive for influenza. Dr. Bosholm ordered Moreno and others to be quarantined for seventy-two hours, leaving general instructions for monitoring but no specific orders to check oxygen saturation or respiratory rates. Over the weekend, medical staff made routine rounds, but there is no record that Moreno’s oxygen or respiration were measured, nor that he reported worsening symptoms. By Monday, Moreno’s condition had deteriorated significantly, leading to hospitalization, a seizure, and long-term complications. Moreno filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, alleging state law medical malpractice and gross negligence, as well as a federal claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court excluded his expert’s testimony on the standard of care for the malpractice claim, finding the expert did not meet North Carolina’s requirements for such testimony. At trial, the court granted Dr. Bosholm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, concluding Moreno failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, breach of the standard of care, or the heightened culpability required for gross negligence and deliberate indifference. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 required application of North Carolina’s expert competency rule for medical malpractice claims, and that Moreno’s expert was properly excluded. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the gross negligence and deliberate indifference claims, upholding judgment for Dr. Bosholm. View "Moreno v. Bosholm" on Justia Law

Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc.

2025-08-14T11:09:06-08:00

The case concerns the death of Skyler A. Womack, a dependent adult with disabilities who resided at a 24-hour skilled nursing facility operated by Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. After Skyler’s death, his parents filed suit against the facility, alleging that neglect—including understaffing, failure to maintain the facility, and inadequate provision of basic needs—led to his injuries and death. The claims included survivor actions and a wrongful death claim. Notably, Skyler had signed an arbitration agreement upon admission, which stated that any medical malpractice disputes would be subject to arbitration and purported to bind his heirs. In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of all claims based on the arbitration agreement and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz v. Podolsky. The trial court compelled arbitration of the survivor claims but denied arbitration for the parents’ wrongful death claim, reasoning that the claim was based on neglect under the Elder Abuse Act, not professional negligence. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the wrongful death claim was subject to arbitration because it was based on professional negligence as defined by the agreement and relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that the exception recognized in Ruiz v. Podolsky applies only to wrongful death claims that are based on medical malpractice as defined by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), specifically disputes about whether medical services were improperly rendered. The Court clarified that not all wrongful death claims against health care providers fall within this exception—claims based on custodial neglect, as opposed to professional negligence in medical care, are not subject to arbitration under section 1295 and Ruiz. The Court remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to clarify the basis of their wrongful death claim. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law