Juvenile Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

People v. Black

2026-07-31T14:00:04-08:00

A defendant, who was 15 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted in 1988 of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm following a bench trial. He received a sentence of life without parole for the murder conviction. After the United States Supreme Court decided in *Miller v. Alabama* that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional, and in *Montgomery v. Louisiana* that this rule applies retroactively, the prosecution moved to reimpose the defendant’s life without parole sentence under Michigan law. At his resentencing hearing, the defendant presented expert psychological evidence suggesting his capacity for rehabilitation, while the prosecution presented no witnesses. The trial court reimposed the life without parole sentence, stating the prosecution did not bear the burden of proof. The Michigan Court of Appeals later vacated the amended sentence after the Michigan Supreme Court held in *People v. Taylor* that the prosecution bears the burden of proof at such hearings. On remand, the prosecution requested that the defendant be compelled to undergo a psychological evaluation by its expert or, alternatively, that the defense’s psychological evidence be excluded. The trial court granted this request, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. The Michigan Supreme Court held that if a defendant intends to introduce expert psychological evidence at a Miller resentencing hearing, the trial court may require the defendant to submit to a psychological examination by a prosecution expert, consistent with the constitutional right against self-incrimination. However, evidence from this compelled examination is admissible only as rebuttal and not during the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court also clarified that the second Miller hearing is a new proceeding and vacated any order incorporating the record from the prior hearing. The case was remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "People v. Black" on Justia Law

In re Violet S.

2026-07-30T10:31:59-08:00

After her 18th birthday, a young woman with severe disabilities, requiring 24-hour care and living in a subacute facility since infancy, was placed under extended foster care as a nonminor dependent. She had no family contact and lacked the mental capacity to make independent decisions. Her county child welfare agency regularly submitted reports and transitional independent living plans, documenting her progress and confirming her continued eligibility for extended foster care. The agency recommended continued jurisdiction, especially while her application for supplemental security income was pending, and later reported plans for her care to be managed by a regional center as she approached adulthood. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County repeatedly found that she was making satisfactory progress toward her care goals and met the requirements to remain a nonminor dependent. The court ordered continued jurisdiction until, in a subsequent review, the agency recommended dismissal, citing the transition of her care to the regional center. Following a contested hearing, despite arguments from her counsel and guardian ad litem for continued court oversight, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction. The court reasoned that ongoing jurisdiction was not in her best interest, finding no further benefit to her from county oversight given her new care arrangements. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the appeal. The court held that the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard by terminating jurisdiction based on a subjective best interest determination instead of the statutory criteria. Under section 391, jurisdiction over a nonminor dependent may only be terminated if the nonminor does not wish to remain under jurisdiction, is not participating in a reasonable transitional plan, or cannot be located. None of these circumstances applied. The appellate court therefore reversed the termination order and directed reinstatement of jurisdiction. View "In re Violet S." on Justia Law

Spicuzza v. State

2026-07-28T09:35:56-08:00

The case involved allegations that a father sexually abused his minor daughter, H., over a period of years, and that he also abused her friends and provided them with intoxicating substances when they visited his apartment. The evidence included testimony from H., two of her friends (A.L. and A.B.), and a social worker, describing sexual misconduct and the provision of alcohol, marijuana, and vapes to the minors. The prosecution also introduced evidence that the father showed pornographic material to the girls. The defense denied all allegations and sought to present character witnesses to attest to his honesty. In the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, the defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual abuse of a minor, second-degree rape, and third-degree sexual offense. The court admitted the testimony of H.’s friends regarding other alleged abuses and denied the defendant’s motion to exclude this evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(b). The court also refused to allow the defendant’s character witnesses to testify as to his honesty. Additionally, during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant why his daughter would lie about the allegations, to which the defense objected. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence of other bad acts was admissible to explain the victim’s delayed reporting and to corroborate her testimony, and that the exclusion of character witnesses was proper. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment. It held that the trial court did not err in admitting the other bad acts evidence under the “common scheme or plan” exception to Rule 5-404(b), as the acts were sufficiently connected to show a general plan of abuse involving the daughter and her friends. The Court further held that the prosecutor’s “why-would-she-lie” question was improper but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, it concluded that the trial court properly excluded the defendant’s character evidence for honesty, as the charges were not veracity-impeaching offenses and the defense’s proffers lacked specificity. View "Spicuzza v. State" on Justia Law

United States v. Bogan

2026-07-28T07:01:09-08:00

The defendant, after joining a gang at age 14, participated in a drive-by shooting in Iowa that resulted in the death of a bystander. He was convicted by a state jury of first-degree murder, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. He subsequently pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and related charges and was sentenced to up to 25 years in state prison. Following his release in 2014, he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and later, after further criminal activity including high-speed chases and renewed gang involvement, conspired to distribute cocaine and participated in a shooting incident in 2020. Surveillance footage captured him firing a weapon, and he was later charged federally with RICO conspiracy and felon-in-possession offenses. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment. He had argued that the inclusion of his juvenile conduct in the RICO charge violated the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), and challenged the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The district court rejected both arguments, and the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. It held that post-majority ratification of a conspiracy allows pre-majority conduct to be considered as part of a federal RICO prosecution, making the JDA inapplicable in this context. The court also held that circuit precedent foreclosed the defendant’s Bruen-based challenge to the felon-in-possession statute. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss. View "United States v. Bogan" on Justia Law

In re H.H.

2026-07-28T05:37:03-08:00

Two children were removed from their home after the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) received reports of neglect and abuse by their legal guardians, the paternal great-grandparents. The father, who lived in the home, was found responsible for neglect due to his failure to protect the children from abuse and the unsanitary conditions of his living space. Following removal, the court established objectives for the father to correct the neglect, including maintaining sobriety, obtaining appropriate housing, and prioritizing the children's needs. DCYF provided referrals and assistance to help the father meet these objectives. After several review hearings, the father showed substantial compliance, particularly in bonding with the children and engaging in treatment and counseling, but he failed to secure adequate housing. At a permanency hearing, he was granted a 90-day extension to resolve housing issues and cooperate with an Interstate Compact home study for placement in Vermont. During the extension, the father regressed—he canceled visits, relapsed into substance use, delayed paperwork, and faced criminal charges, leading DCYF to shift from supporting reunification to seeking termination of parental rights. The trial court found that despite DCYF’s reasonable efforts, the father failed to correct the neglect conditions and that termination was in the children's best interests. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the father did not correct the conditions of neglect within twelve months, plus the extension, and that DCYF made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification. The court also determined that termination of parental rights served the children’s best interests, supported by evidence of their improved well-being in a stable foster home. The trial court’s findings were upheld as supported by the record and not erroneous as a matter of law. View "In re H.H." on Justia Law

In re Jewelyette M.

2026-07-28T04:03:32-08:00

A young child was removed from her parents’ custody shortly after birth due to concerns about substance exposure and was placed in foster care. Her mother’s parental rights were terminated, and her father was incarcerated for much of her early life. After the mother’s rights were terminated, the child lived with foster parents for several years. When the father later sought to revoke the child’s commitment, the state agency sought to remove the child from the foster home and place her with a paternal relative, prompting the foster parents to intervene in the case to contest the proposed change. The Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, initially permitted the foster parents limited intervention, but then granted the agency’s motion to remove them as intervenors, relying on an appellate decision that limited foster parent participation. The foster parents appealed, and the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order removing them as intervenors, restoring their status and remanding the case for further proceedings. On remand, without objection from counsel, the trial court appointed the state agency as the child’s statutory parent. The foster parents’ attorney later moved to open (i.e., revisit) this appointment, claiming she had misunderstood the legal implications and failed to object due to that mistake. Before a hearing on this motion could be held, the trial court granted an adoption petition in favor of the child’s paternal relatives. After the adoption, the trial court denied the foster parents’ motion to open as moot, finding it could offer no practical relief. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by failing to consider the merits of the foster parents’ timely motion to open before proceeding with the adoption. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion to open and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to hold a hearing and decide the motion, including an analysis of the child’s best interests. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law

In re X.A.

2026-07-27T12:03:37-08:00

Two children were the subjects of a child welfare proceeding after concerns about their well-being led to the filing of a dependency petition. Their mother denied Native American heritage in earlier proceedings, but the record showed that neither the original county child welfare agency nor the juvenile court made sufficient inquiry into the children’s possible Indian ancestry, as required by both federal and California law. The case was later transferred to a different county, where the new agency also relied mainly on the mother’s denials without contacting extended maternal relatives. After the mother’s parental rights were terminated, she appealed, arguing that the agencies failed to comply with their statutory inquiry obligations. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, previously affirmed the ruling that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply but conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights due to inadequate inquiry into possible Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related state law. On remand, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services conducted an extensive inquiry, attempting to reach multiple maternal relatives and formally noticing several tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The responses indicated the children were not eligible for tribal membership, and most relatives did not provide information substantiating tribal affiliation. After the additional inquiry, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County found no reason to believe the children were Indian children and reinstated termination of parental rights. The mother appealed again, challenging the adequacy of the inquiry. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the child welfare agency’s actions satisfied their statutory duties under ICWA and related laws. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights, holding that the agency undertook reasonable and diligent efforts and that further inquiry or notice was not required on the facts presented. View "In re X.A." on Justia Law

In re: K.B.

2026-07-24T11:08:27-08:00

A minor child, who had been in her grandmother’s custody due to her mother’s intellectual disabilities, became the subject of a child in need of assistance (CINA) case after concerns arose about missed medical appointments and poor academic performance. The Department of Social Services petitioned for CINA status, but the juvenile court initially allowed the child to remain with her grandmother under protective supervision. Over time, further review hearings were held, and eventually a magistrate recommended removing the child from her grandmother’s custody. The child and her grandmother objected, leading to a de novo exceptions hearing. At the exceptions hearing, the Circuit Court for Worcester County, sitting as a juvenile court, excluded the child from the hearing over the objection of her counsel, reasoning generally that it was inappropriate for children under 15, especially those with developmental delays, to attend such contested proceedings. The court later removed the child from her grandmother’s custody and placed her with the Department. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the juvenile court, finding no abuse of discretion, and distinguished this case from prior precedent by concluding the juvenile court had considered the child’s due process rights. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that, although the appeal was moot because the CINA proceedings had been terminated and custody restored to the grandmother, the case presented an issue of public importance warranting review. The Court held the juvenile court violated the child’s procedural due process rights by excluding her from her own CINA hearing without making individualized findings or balancing her due process interests against any potential harm from her presence. The Court articulated a new test requiring courts to make specific findings and narrowly tailor any exclusion of a child party. The judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland was reversed. View "In re: K.B." on Justia Law

In re J.M.

2026-07-23T06:50:58-08:00

A high school student, J.M., and her sisters initiated a physical altercation with another student at school, during which J.M. allegedly shoved a teacher into a wall and punched the student. The teacher later discovered he had a fractured rib, and the student sustained visible injuries. The school resource officer referred the incident to juvenile court, listing misdemeanor assault as the offense. A juvenile probation officer screened the case, classified it as a misdemeanor, and offered J.M. a nonjudicial adjustment agreement, which she accepted and began fulfilling by completing community service. After J.M. completed her community service but before restitution had been resolved, the State disagreed with the misdemeanor classification and filed a delinquency petition alleging three felony offenses: aggravated assault, assault, and riot, all stemming from the same incident. J.M. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that prosecutors could not file charges after substantial compliance with the nonjudicial adjustment. The Third District Juvenile Court denied her motion, reasoning that no statute or rule precluded the State from filing a petition if it viewed the case as involving new allegations or a more serious offense. On interlocutory appeal, J.M. maintained that under Utah statutes governing nonjudicial adjustments, the probation officer’s eligibility determination should control and limit prosecutorial authority. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and held that Utah’s Juvenile Code does not bar a prosecutor from filing a petition when a nonjudicial adjustment has been improperly offered for a disqualifying offense. The determination of whether an offense is disqualifying, such as a felony committed by a minor over age twelve, is an objective legal question not controlled by the referral or probation officer’s assessment. Because J.M. challenged only the prosecutor’s authority, not the felony characterization, the Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

In re: D.E.

2026-07-22T11:38:04-08:00

A twelve-year-old child was charged with robbery and four related offenses following an incident in Baltimore City, where a victim’s purses were taken and liquid was thrown at her. Robbery, a crime of violence, anchored the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the child under Maryland’s Juvenile Justice Reform Act, which restricts jurisdiction for children under thirteen except when charged with a violent crime or an act arising from the same incident. At the adjudicatory hearing, the magistrate found the child not involved in robbery but involved in misdemeanor theft, ruling that the timing of the force element was not established for robbery. After this finding, the child moved to dismiss the theft charge, arguing that jurisdiction was lost when the robbery count—the qualifying offense—was not sustained. The magistrate denied the motion, reasoning that jurisdiction attaches at filing and continues regardless of the adjudicatory outcome, following precedent from the Appellate Court of Maryland in In re J.B. The juvenile court proceeded to disposition, finding the child delinquent and imposing probation. The child’s exceptions and renewed motion to dismiss were also denied by a judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that jurisdiction, once attached by an allegation of a qualifying crime, continues until the child turns twenty-one unless terminated by a specific statutory mechanism. The court clarified that jurisdiction over offenses arising out of the same incident is derivative at filing but durable thereafter, unaffected by a not-sustained finding or dismissal of the anchoring violent charge. Additionally, the court rejected the child’s equal protection claim, finding a rational basis for treating children accused of violent crimes differently from those accused only of misdemeanors. The court affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision. View "In re: D.E." on Justia Law

Johnson v. State of Florida

2026-07-16T07:05:22-08:00

A seventeen-year-old individual planned and carried out a violent attack resulting in the death of one person and serious injuries to two others. After purchasing a knife, he attended a dinner and sleepover with friends. Late at night, he attacked and fatally stabbed one victim, then proceeded to injure two others. The police apprehended him at the scene. He was charged with first-degree murder and two counts of attempted first-degree murder. The jury convicted him on all counts. Because he was a juvenile at the time, a separate sentencing hearing was held to consider mitigating factors under Florida law. The Circuit Court for Palm Beach County sentenced him to life without parole (LWOP) for each count, with the two attempted murder sentences running concurrently but consecutively to the murder sentence. The court announced that he would be eligible for judicial review after serving 25 years on the murder conviction, and again after serving another 25 years on the consecutive sentences for attempted murder. The defendant challenged his sentence, arguing that consecutive LWOP sentences for offenses committed in a single episode violated the Eighth Amendment, relying on Graham v. Florida. The Circuit Court denied relief, and on direct appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the sentences, holding that the structure provided a meaningful opportunity for release consistent with constitutional requirements. The Fourth District certified conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Mack v. State, which had found such consecutive sentences unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and held that the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of a “meaningful opportunity for release” from Graham v. Florida does not apply to juveniles convicted of homicide offenses. Instead, sentencing for juvenile homicide offenders is governed by Miller v. Alabama and Jones v. Mississippi, requiring individualized sentencing but permitting discretionary LWOP. The Court approved the Fourth District’s result, disapproved Mack, and upheld the sentences. View "Johnson v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb.

2026-07-15T11:37:14-08:00

A mother surrendered her four-day-old twin sons at a hospital in Maryland under the Safe Haven Act, which allows parents to leave unharmed newborns at designated facilities within sixty days of birth without facing criminal or civil liability for the act of surrender. The mother left the infants with basic information but did not identify herself or provide for their ongoing care. The hospital notified the Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services, which took custody of the children and filed Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) petitions, seeking court intervention to ensure the children’s welfare. The mother was later identified and participated in the proceedings, explaining she acted out of concern for domestic violence. After de novo adjudicatory and disposition hearings in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as a juvenile court, the court found that the mother’s actions constituted “neglect” under the CINA statute—specifically, that leaving the children without a legal custodian or provision for care placed them at a substantial risk of harm. The court denied the mother’s request to award custody to the father at that stage and committed the children to the Department’s custody. The mother appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the juvenile court’s decision, reasoning that the absence of a legal custodian or care plan for the infants following surrender justified a finding of neglect. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The Court held that a parent’s surrender of a newborn under the Safe Haven Act may constitute neglect under the CINA statute if the child is left without a legal custodian or provision for care, thus facing a substantial risk of harm. The Court also held that the Safe Haven Act’s grant of immunity from “civil liability” does not bar a CINA neglect finding, as such a finding is a non-punitive jurisdictional predicate necessary for state intervention and long-term care arrangements. View "In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb." on Justia Law

People v. Garner

2026-07-08T12:03:25-08:00

A defendant committed several serious offenses, including armed robbery, kidnapping, and multiple counts of sexual assault, when he was 14 years old. He pleaded guilty to four felonies and was sentenced at age 15 to a determinate prison term of 50 years. Years later, he filed a petition for recall and resentencing, arguing that his 50-year sentence, imposed for crimes committed as a juvenile, was the functional equivalent of a life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence, making him eligible for relief under California Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). The Superior Court of San Joaquin County denied the petition, finding that the defendant’s sentence was not an LWOP term but a determinate 50-year sentence. The court also reasoned that the relevant precedent did not apply because the defendant’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. On appeal, the Attorney General agreed with the defendant that the sentence functioned as an LWOP, but the San Joaquin County District Attorney’s Office, appearing as amicus curiae, argued in favor of affirmance. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the denial and examined whether the 50-year sentence, in light of developments in law and the enactment of Penal Code section 3051 (which provides for youth offender parole hearings), constituted the functional equivalent of LWOP. The court held that because Penal Code section 3051 made the defendant eligible for a parole hearing during his 15th year of incarceration, his sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. The court rejected arguments that the sentence should be viewed as LWOP based solely on the original sentencing date, emphasizing the effect of section 3051. The judgment denying the petition for recall and resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Garner" on Justia Law

In the Interest of RCR v. The State of Wyoming

2026-07-07T07:17:33-08:00

A minor, RCR, was arrested and charged with several delinquent acts, including burglary and property destruction. At RCR’s initial hearing, he denied the allegations and requested counsel. With agreement from the State, the guardian ad litem, and RCR’s grandmother, the juvenile court ordered that RCR be placed in the custody of the Department of Family Services, with constructive placement at the Wyoming Boys’ School (WBS), pending further proceedings and prior to any adjudication of delinquency. After the court’s order, WBS refused to admit RCR without a formal adjudication of delinquency, citing statutory limitations. In response, the State sought to hold WBS in contempt. The juvenile court found WBS and its superintendent in contempt for not accepting RCR and allowed them to purge the contempt by admitting him. Subsequently, RCR admitted to the allegations and was adjudicated delinquent, after which the court again ordered completion of the WBS program. The Wyoming Attorney General’s Office appealed the contempt finding. The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed the case. The Court first found the appeal technically moot because WBS had already complied with the contempt order and RCR had been adjudicated delinquent. However, the Court determined that exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied, including the matter’s public importance, the need to provide guidance, and the likelihood of recurrence. On the merits, the Court held that Wyoming law does not authorize the placement of alleged, but not yet adjudicated, delinquent juveniles at WBS for detention purposes. Only juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent and otherwise qualify may be placed at WBS. The Court concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion by holding WBS in contempt for not admitting RCR before adjudication. The decision of the juvenile court was reversed. View "In the Interest of RCR v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In re Landon M.

2026-07-02T11:03:28-08:00

Two young children were the subject of a dependency proceeding after their father brandished a loaded handgun at a store employee and then fled police in a high-speed chase with one child in the car. The mother was present at the store but not directly involved in the incident. The Department of Children and Family Services alleged that the mother failed to protect the children, claiming she knew or should have known that the father possessed guns and allowed him unrestricted access to the children. The children were assessed to be well cared for in the mother’s home, and she denied knowledge of the father’s gun possession or drug use. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Juvenile Division, sustained allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), declaring the children dependents of the court. The court found the mother’s denial of knowledge about the father’s gun possession not credible, based on prior incidents. It ordered the children to remain with the mother under Department supervision, with requirements for parenting classes and counseling, and prohibited the father from residing in the home. The mother timely appealed the jurisdiction findings and disposition order. While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, granting the mother sole legal and physical custody. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that the appeal was moot because the jurisdiction finding as to the father was unchallenged and sufficient for jurisdiction, and the termination of dependency jurisdiction left no ongoing order affecting the mother’s rights. The court further determined that the mother’s conduct constituted “general neglect,” not “severe neglect,” so it was not reportable to the Child Abuse Central Index. The appeal was dismissed as moot. View "In re Landon M." on Justia Law

Viva G. v. State

2026-07-02T09:01:30-08:00

A newborn child was taken into state custody shortly after birth due to testing positive for addictive substances and requiring intensive medical care for withdrawal. The mother, who initially sought substance abuse treatment, was involuntarily discharged from her program for rule violations and aggression. After her discharge, she failed to participate in drug testing and further treatment, and disengaged from the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) for about a year. The child, considered an “Indian child” under federal law, was eventually placed in a foster home compliant with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father was largely absent and uninvolved. After nearly the child’s entire life in state custody, the agency petitioned to terminate parental rights. The Superior Court for the Third Judicial District in Anchorage held a termination trial. The OCS presented testimony from a substance abuse expert and a cultural expert from the child’s tribe, as required by ICWA. The cultural expert, who was a tribal elder and had relevant experience, testified generally about substance abuse, the importance of child safety, and the parents’ noncooperation, but provided little detail about the tribe’s specific cultural standards as they related to the mother’s conduct. The superior court found clear and convincing evidence of risk of harm to the child, relied on the expert testimony, and terminated the mother’s parental rights. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska found that, although the expert was qualified, his testimony did not sufficiently contextualize the mother’s conduct within the tribe’s social and cultural standards, as required by ICWA. The court held that such testimony must be specifically grounded in the facts of the case and provide meaningful cultural context. Because this standard was not met, the Supreme Court reversed the termination of parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "Viva G. v. State" on Justia Law

STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. OWNEY

2026-06-29T08:36:36-08:00

A juvenile in Orleans Parish was arrested and evidence was seized pursuant to warrants issued by a juvenile court hearing officer, rather than a judge or magistrate. The authority for the hearing officer to issue arrest and search warrants stemmed from local court rules adopted by the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court. The defendant challenged the validity of both the arrest and the search, arguing that the local rules conflicted with Louisiana statutes and the state constitution, which reserve warrant-issuing authority to judges and magistrates unless otherwise expressly permitted by law. The Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the search and arrest warrants. The court held that the hearing officer acted with apparent authority under the court’s local rules, and that the warrants were valid at the time they were issued. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed whether the local rules authorizing hearing officers to issue arrest and search warrants were valid under Louisiana law, and whether warrants already issued under those rules should be invalidated. The court held that the relevant provisions of the local rules conflicted with the Louisiana Children’s Code, the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Louisiana Constitution, and were therefore null and void. However, applying the de facto officer doctrine, the court found that the hearing officer’s acts were valid because the officer acted under color of authority before the rules were judicially declared invalid. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. OWNEY" on Justia Law

In re J.L.

2026-06-24T12:02:39-08:00

Four minors were found jointly and severally liable for victim restitution totaling $15,850.54 after a juvenile court proceeding in Marin County. The restitution included amounts for lost wages and childcare expenses incurred by the victim’s mother due to the aftermath of an incident involving the victim, Jane Doe, and the four minors. Two of the minors, J.L. and O.V., challenged the portion of the restitution award intended to compensate childcare expenses, disputing the sufficiency of evidence for part of that amount. They further argued that, under a newly amended statute, their liability should be apportioned among the four co-offenders based on each minor’s share of responsibility, rather than joint and several liability. The Superior Court of Marin County, sitting as a juvenile court, held a contested hearing and found the People met their burden to establish the claimed restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence. The juvenile court ordered J.L., O.V., and their co-offenders jointly and severally liable for the full amount. J.L. and O.V. appealed to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, arguing for a reduction in childcare expenses and for retroactive application of the amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, which eliminates joint and several liability for victim restitution and instead requires apportionment. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case on transfer from the California Supreme Court, which directed reconsideration in light of Ellingburg v. United States. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s order. It held that substantial evidence supported the amount of restitution for childcare expenses. The court further held that the new law eliminating joint and several liability for victim restitution operates prospectively, not retroactively, and thus does not apply to J.L. and O.V. The judgment was affirmed. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law

In re Dynastie D.

2026-06-24T04:04:15-08:00

A minor child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families in Connecticut. After her removal from her parents, the child was placed with licensed foster parents in Connecticut, with whom she developed a strong bond and thrived. Despite this, the Commissioner later proposed a permanency plan for the child to be adopted by her paternal grandparents, who lived in Florida, and sought court approval for the child’s out-of-state placement. The child’s attorney objected, emphasizing her attachment to her foster parents and arguing that a move would not be in her best interests. The Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, granted the Commissioner’s motion for out-of-state placement, finding it in the child’s best interests and reasoning that it would maintain her connection to her paternal family. The court’s subsequent articulation stated that the same facts supporting its best interests finding also established good cause for out-of-state placement. The child appealed, but the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding good cause under the statutory standard. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court erred by not recognizing a statutory presumption in favor of in-state placement under § 46b-129 (j) (4). The Supreme Court clarified that out-of-state placement requires the proponent to rebut this presumption by proving good cause, which must be established independently from the child’s best interests. The Court also held that the trial court did not properly apply this good cause standard, as it conflated it with the best interests analysis and failed to address relevant statutory considerations. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings applying the correct legal standard. View "In re Dynastie D." on Justia Law

In the Interest Of: AC v. The State of Wyoming

2026-06-23T07:16:11-08:00

A mother with primary custody of her three children contacted law enforcement, expressing concern that the children’s father was using methamphetamine while caring for two of the children at a motel. During the police investigation, both parents admitted to recent methamphetamine use, and the investigating officer suspected both were under the influence. Hair follicle tests showed that the two minor children were exposed to methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana. The children were placed in protective custody, and the State filed a petition alleging the parents neglected the children by failing to provide adequate care and supervision. Following the State’s petition, the District Court of Platte County held a shelter care and initial hearing, informing the parents of their rights, including the right to appointed counsel. At the subsequent adjudicatory hearing, the mother appeared without counsel, having not completed paperwork for a court-appointed attorney. The juvenile court proceeded, finding that the mother had sufficient opportunity to seek counsel. During the hearing, the court did not initially invite the mother to give opening or closing statements or to cross-examine witnesses, but later explicitly gave her the opportunity to call or question any witness and to testify. The mother declined to question previous witnesses and gave a brief statement on her own behalf. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed whether the juvenile court committed plain error by not inviting the mother to present opening or closing statements or to cross-examine witnesses during their initial testimony. The court held that, although the opportunity to participate was offered later than for other parties, the mother was ultimately afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, as required by law. The Supreme Court concluded there was no plain error and affirmed the juvenile court’s adjudication of neglect. View "In the Interest Of: AC v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In re: K.B.

2026-06-22T09:09:00-08:00

An infant, K.B., was removed from her mother’s care after a police officer witnessed the mother acting abusively toward K.B. and expressing suicidal thoughts. The Baltimore County Department of Social Services filed a petition alleging K.B. was a child in need of assistance (CINA) due to abuse, neglect, and the mother’s history of mental health issues and prior terminations of parental rights. At the adjudication and disposition hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County declared K.B. a CINA, committed her to the Department’s custody, and established supervised visitation. The court’s order included a standard notice that the permanency plan of reunification could later be changed. At a subsequent initial review hearing, the Department recommended changing K.B.’s presumptive plan of reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption. A magistrate adopted this recommendation, and the juvenile court overruled the mother’s exceptions, ordering the concurrent plan. The mother appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that the juvenile court had improperly established a permanency plan before the required permanency plan hearing and without considering the statutory factors or providing proper notice. The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the juvenile court could change the permanency plan at the initial review hearing. It held that the presumptive plan of reunification established at disposition is not a permanency plan as defined by Maryland law. The court ruled that a permanency plan must be determined at a hearing that complies with statutory requirements, including consideration of specific factors and provision of reasonable notice to all parties about the date, time, and purpose of the hearing. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for proper proceedings. View "In re: K.B." on Justia Law

In the Interest of A.R.H. v. Jackson County Department of Child Protection Services

2026-06-19T01:23:45-08:00

A child, A.R.H., was born in November 2022 to Latisha H. and Redonn Malone. At birth, both the child and the mother tested positive for illegal drugs, and Malone was incarcerated on felony charges. As a result, the Jackson County Youth Court placed A.R.H. in the custody of Child Protection Services (CPS), appointed a guardian ad litem, and adjudicated the child as neglected. During subsequent hearings, the youth court found that Latisha was absent and that Malone’s paternity was confirmed. The court was presented with evidence of Malone’s extensive criminal history, including violent offenses, and his ongoing incarceration. The Jackson County Youth Court determined that Malone's criminal history constituted “aggravated circumstances” sufficient to bypass efforts to reunify the child with his father under Mississippi Code Section 43-21-603(7)(c). CPS recommended a service plan aiming for reunification, but the intake officer and guardian ad litem recommended bypassing reunification. The youth court ultimately ordered that reasonable efforts for reunification with Malone would not be required and moved toward termination of Malone’s parental rights. Malone appealed, arguing that the statute was misapplied because his criminal acts had not involved A.R.H. or any child. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the youth court’s decision, applying a deferential standard of review and concluding the court did not err in its findings or reliance on evidence. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo and concluded that Section 43-21-603(7)(c)(i) requires the parent to have subjected the child to aggravated circumstances. The Court held that because Malone had not subjected A.R.H. to his past criminal conduct, bypassing reunification on this basis was not supported by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of both the youth court and the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of A.R.H. v. Jackson County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

Reguli v. Hetzel

2026-06-16T13:00:37-08:00

A lawyer and parents’ rights activist assisted her client in evading a Tennessee juvenile court’s order that awarded temporary custody of the client’s child to the Department of Children’s Services. The client, a single mother, fled with her daughter after being investigated for suspected child neglect. The lawyer joined the client and child at a hotel, and when they received a missing child alert, they disabled their phones and went to the lawyer’s home to avoid authorities. The police located them the following day, and the state took custody of the children. After an extended custody dispute, the state returned the children and dismissed its petition. While the custody case was ongoing, the Department of Children’s Services and local police investigated and eventually indicted both the lawyer and her client on charges related to custodial interference. Both were convicted by juries, but on appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the convictions. The appellate court concluded that the statute at issue required proof that the alleged interference occurred after a period of lawful visitation, an element not present in this case. The lawyer and her client then filed a federal suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and other claims against various officials and the City of Brentwood. The district court dismissed all claims, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified or absolute immunity and that the Monell claim against the city failed because the officers lacked final policymaking authority. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that the individual defendants were entitled to immunity and that the Monell claim failed as a matter of law. The court confirmed that the law provides no recourse against prosecutors and officers acting within their respective protected functions under these circumstances. View "Reguli v. Hetzel" on Justia Law

In re A.T.

2026-06-05T11:32:03-08:00

Two children, A.T. and R.T., were placed under the legal guardianship of R.G. In August 2024, authorities became involved after A.T., then four years old, was observed with visible injuries and signs of malnourishment while accompanied by R.G. at a mall. Medical examination revealed severe physical abuse and malnutrition. Both children were subsequently removed from R.G.’s care: A.T. was hospitalized for nearly two weeks, and R.T. was placed in foster care. The San Bernardino County Children and Family Services filed dependency petitions on behalf of both minors, alleging multiple grounds for juvenile court intervention, including serious physical harm and failure to protect. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing in April 2025. By that time, A.T. had turned five and R.T. was six years old. The juvenile court sustained allegations under section 300(e) of the Welfare and Institutions Code—severe physical abuse of a child under five—against both minors, as well as other allegations. R.G. appealed, arguing the (e) finding as to A.T. was improper because he was five at the jurisdiction hearing, and that R.T. had not suffered severe physical abuse. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, exercised discretionary review despite acknowledging the appeal was technically moot due to unchallenged findings. The court held that section 300(e) jurisdiction requires the child to be under five years old at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, not merely when the alleged abuse occurred. Because A.T. was over five by the hearing date, and because R.T. had not suffered severe physical abuse, the appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s section 300(e) findings as to both children. All other unchallenged findings remained undisturbed. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law

State v. Turner

2026-06-03T05:02:14-08:00

A 16-year-old was involved in a fatal shooting and was charged in juvenile court with multiple offenses, including aggravated murder and having a weapon while under a disability. After a probable cause hearing, the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas found probable cause for several offenses but not for the weapon under disability charge. As required by law, the court transferred the case to adult court for prosecution of the offenses for which probable cause was found. Once in adult court, a grand jury indicted the defendant on all the original charges from the juvenile complaint plus additional charges, including attempted murder and new counts related to other alleged victims and conduct. The defendant pleaded guilty to murder (an offense for which probable cause had been found), having a weapon while under a disability (for which the juvenile court found no probable cause), and attempted murder (which had not been charged in the juvenile complaint). The trial court sentenced him accordingly. The defendant appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the adult court lacked jurisdiction over the attempted murder and weapon under disability charges because the juvenile court had not found probable cause for those. The appellate court, relying on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior decisions in State v. Smith and State v. Burns, vacated those convictions. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the matter and overruled its prior decisions in Smith and Burns, holding that when a juvenile court transfers a case to adult court—whether by mandatory or discretionary bindover—it transfers the entire case, including all acts charged in the juvenile complaint. The adult court’s jurisdiction then extends to any offense indicted by the grand jury, not just those for which the juvenile court found probable cause. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District’s judgment, reinstated the convictions, and remanded for further proceedings on remaining assignments of error. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

State v. I. Pehringer

2026-06-02T14:36:52-08:00

The case concerns a defendant who, as a youth, was convicted of several offenses in two related criminal matters. He was charged under statutes allowing prosecution in district court rather than youth court, resulting in convictions for felony assault on a peace officer and other offenses. He received concurrent 10-year sentences to the Department of Corrections, with 5 years suspended. The judgments failed to identify him as a criminally convicted youth subject to the Criminally Convicted Youth Act (CCYA) and did not incorporate the procedural and rehabilitative provisions required under that statute, including ongoing status reports and sentence review before he turned 21. After sentencing, the defendant did not receive the mandatory status reports or sentence review contemplated by the CCYA. Nearly three years later, after turning 21, he requested a sentence review hearing, arguing that the lack of compliance with the CCYA deprived him of rehabilitative opportunities and the ability to demonstrate substantial rehabilitation. The Sixteenth Judicial District Court held a sentence review hearing, found it retained jurisdiction past age 21, but determined that the evidence did not support sentence modification. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to include the statutory CCYA provisions in the judgments and failing to review the defendant’s sentence before he turned 21. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was denied the rehabilitative benefits and procedural safeguards of the CCYA for nearly three years, resulting in substantial injustice. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of immediate sentence modification, but reversed in part and remanded, directing the Department of Corrections and the district court to apply the CCYA rehabilitative provisions for two years, after which a meaningful sentence review hearing must be held. View "State v. I. Pehringer" on Justia Law

State v. I. Pehringer

2026-06-02T14:36:46-08:00

A youth was charged with aggravated burglary and obstructing a peace officer after committing the offenses at age 17. He was prosecuted as an adult after the District Court denied transfer to Youth Court. He pled guilty to both counts and received a 15-year sentence to the Department of Corrections with 11 years suspended for the felony, and a concurrent suspended sentence for the misdemeanor. At sentencing, the court failed to include the mandatory provisions of the Montana Criminally Convicted Youth Act (CCYA), which require ongoing rehabilitative oversight and status reports for youthful offenders. After the youth turned 21, he moved for a sentence review hearing under the CCYA, highlighting that for nearly three years, the Department of Corrections had not provided the required status reports, and the court had not conducted the mandated sentence review before his 21st birthday. The District Court subsequently issued a nunc pro tunc order to correct the judgment and held a belated sentence review hearing, but ultimately denied any sentence modification, finding the youth had not demonstrated substantial rehabilitation. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court abused its discretion by not including the mandatory CCYA provisions in the original judgment and by failing to ensure the youth received the statutory rehabilitative process, including regular status reports and timely sentence review. The Supreme Court determined that these omissions constituted a substantial injustice, as the youth was denied opportunities for rehabilitation and meaningful sentence review as intended by statute. The court affirmed the denial of discharge but reversed in part, remanding for application of the CCYA provisions and requiring a two-year period of compliance before a new sentence review hearing. View "State v. I. Pehringer" on Justia Law

People v. Lawrence

2026-06-02T07:32:43-08:00

The defendant, who was a minor at the time he was arrested, was charged in district court by direct filing with several serious offenses, including first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. He was initially detained at a Division of Youth Services (DYS) facility. After turning eighteen, he was transferred to the county jail by law enforcement. The day after his transfer, the defendant objected, asserting that the transfer was unlawful and unconstitutional, and argued that the district court had discretion to keep him in DYS custody. He also claimed that his transfer to county jail violated his right to equal protection because another defendant in a different case had been allowed to remain in DYS custody after turning eighteen. The La Plata County District Court reviewed the People’s motion to transfer the defendant to county jail. After a hearing, the district court concluded that section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) of the Children’s Code required the defendant’s transfer to county jail upon turning eighteen and provided no discretion to rule otherwise. The court expressed discomfort with the result but determined it was bound by the statute. The defendant then sought relief in the Supreme Court of Colorado through an original proceeding. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) plainly and unambiguously requires a person who turns eighteen while detained on charges filed directly in district court to be transferred to county jail, leaving no discretion for the district court to order continued DYS custody. The court further held that the defendant’s equal protection rights were not violated because he was not similarly situated to the other defendant who remained in DYS custody. Consequently, the Supreme Court discharged its order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

In re E.G.S

2026-06-01T08:18:48-08:00

A juvenile was charged in Newport County Family Court with two counts of first-degree child molestation, based on sexual acts he engaged in with a minor who was twelve years old at the time. Prior to trial, a competency hearing was held. Two experts in forensic psychology evaluated the respondent and testified that he had limited understanding of the legal process, particularly about sex offender registration, plea bargains, and the role of the prosecutor. Their report concluded that he did not sufficiently demonstrate factual or rational understanding or adequate decision-making abilities. However, the respondent had no prior mental health diagnoses, cognitive impairments, or psychiatric history. The Family Court judge considered the expert testimony and report but concluded that the respondent’s answers, while imperfect, demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the proceedings and the ability to assist in his defense. The judge found the respondent competent to stand trial. Following a bench trial, the respondent was found delinquent on both counts beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, an expert social worker recommended against sex offender registration, describing the respondent as non-predatory and not a danger to the community. The judge rejected this recommendation, citing deficiencies in the expert’s knowledge of the case facts and the circumstances of the offenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the Family Court’s findings. The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in finding the respondent competent, as the trial judge is the ultimate factfinder on competency and need not accept uncontradicted expert testimony. The Court also held that the trial justice did not err or abuse her discretion in imposing the full fifteen-year sex offender registration period, finding the respondent’s conduct was criminal not solely because of the victim’s age but also because of his actions. The orders of the Family Court were affirmed. View "In re E.G.S" on Justia Law

State v. Adkisson

2026-05-29T12:16:20-08:00

A seventeen-year-old defendant was implicated in the fatal shootings of two individuals at an apartment complex in Milan, Tennessee. Law enforcement identified the defendant and a co-defendant as suspects based on anonymous tips and information from onlookers. The defendant was interrogated at the police station without the presence of his mother, despite her being at the station and his repeated requests for her. Over the course of nearly seven hours, he ultimately confessed to participating in the shootings after being told, among other things, that he could face the death penalty and subjected to other coercive tactics. No weapons were recovered, but ballistics indicated two firearms were used. Cell phone records and eyewitness testimony linked the defendant to the scene. The Gibson County Juvenile Court held a transfer hearing and, after considering statutory factors and the evidence presented, found probable cause and transferred the defendant to Circuit Court to be tried as an adult. The court suppressed the defendant’s confession for purposes of the transfer decision. Subsequently, the Circuit Court denied a motion to suppress the confession, finding it voluntary and admissible. At trial, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the transfer was appropriate and the confession voluntary. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case. It held that the juvenile court properly transferred the defendant after finding probable cause and satisfying all statutory requirements. The Supreme Court further held that the defendant validly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. However, the court found that the confession was involuntary, having been obtained through coercion in violation of the Due Process Clause. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings, excluding the coerced confession from any retrial. View "State v. Adkisson" on Justia Law

In re F.B.

2026-05-29T11:18:22-08:00

This case involves allegations that two children, S.H. and F.B., were abused and neglected by their mother and stepfather. The West Virginia Department of Human Services filed a Sixth Amended Petition after an altercation between Mother and S.H. that was recorded on video. The petition included claims of physical abuse, substance abuse, and failure by the stepfather to protect the children. After the incident, both children were removed from the home. The record shows that the parents had previously completed improvement periods related to earlier petitions involving allegations of abuse and neglect. The Circuit Court of Wood County conducted two adjudicatory hearings where it heard testimony from the parents, a Child Protective Services worker, a police officer, and others. The court admitted videos of the altercation and forensic interviews of the children. Despite conflicting evidence, the circuit court found that clear and convincing evidence did not establish that S.H. or F.B. were abused or neglected and dismissed the petition. In a supplemental order, the circuit court acknowledged significant evidence on both sides but maintained that the Department of Human Services had not met its burden of proof. The guardian ad litem for F.B. appealed, arguing that the court failed to make sufficient factual findings and failed to adjudicate the parents as abusive or neglectful. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court did not comply with statutory requirements or procedural rules, which mandate explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether a child is abused or neglected. The appellate court vacated the circuit court’s orders as to F.B. and remanded the case with instructions for the circuit court to enter a new adjudicatory order containing adequate findings and conclusions. View "In re F.B." on Justia Law

In re K.L.

2026-05-29T11:03:01-08:00

A child, K.L., was removed from his mother’s custody after allegations of substance abuse and child endangerment. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition on K.L.’s behalf, and he was placed with his half-siblings at their maternal aunt’s home. The mother’s whereabouts were frequently unknown, and she made only limited appearances during the proceedings. The father, J.A., was not initially involved but later established his biological relationship to K.L. and participated in reunification efforts, which ultimately were terminated after the court found his progress insufficient. The juvenile court then terminated both parents’ rights after determining K.L. was likely to be adopted, and no exception to adoption applied. After the termination of his parental rights, the father appealed, arguing that DCFS failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and corresponding California law. Specifically, he asserted that DCFS should have made greater efforts to contact the maternal grandmother to determine whether K.L. might have Indian ancestry. The father contended that the failure to interview the maternal grandmother rendered the inquiry insufficient and warranted conditional reversal of the termination order. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the record and determined that DCFS fulfilled its initial inquiry obligations by contacting all reasonably available relatives, including the parents, paternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and others. The court found that maternal grandmother was not reasonably available, as her contact information could not be obtained and the maternal aunt declined to provide it without her consent. The court held that DCFS was not required to take additional investigative steps. The order terminating parental rights was affirmed. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

In re Interest of Bosileo D.

2026-05-29T05:08:03-08:00

The case involved Christopher J., the natural father of three children, whose parental rights were challenged following their removal from his care in January 2021. This removal came after allegations by the children of physical abuse, exposure to domestic violence, and substance abuse. Prior to this, in 2016, a juvenile court case involving the family had resulted in the children being returned to Christopher’s care for five months before the subsequent removal. The children's mother had previously had her parental rights terminated and was not involved in this appeal. After the 2021 removal, the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County adjudicated the children under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a). Christopher appealed the adjudication, but the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s decision in March 2022. Following adjudication, Christopher’s visitation with the children was initially permitted but later suspended pending a psychological evaluation. Despite attempts, visitation never resumed, due in part to Christopher’s lack of engagement with services and the therapists’ recommendations. In September 2023, the State filed to terminate Christopher’s parental rights, presenting evidence of neglect, failure of reunification efforts, prolonged out-of-home placement, aggravated circumstances, and the children’s best interests. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It found clear and convincing evidence that the statutory basis for termination was satisfied, specifically that the children had been in out-of-home placement for 15 or more months of the most recent 22 months. The Court held that termination of Christopher’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children, citing his refusal to acknowledge past abuse and inability to rehabilitate. The Court rejected Christopher’s argument of improper delegation regarding visitation decisions, concluding no such delegation occurred. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. View "In re Interest of Bosileo D." on Justia Law

In re N.S.

2026-05-26T11:32:00-08:00

A 15-year-old minor was the subject of three separate juvenile wardship petitions in Santa Barbara County. The petitions involved several charges: forcible rape and sexual battery by restraint with an offense date of December 17, 2023; forcible rape, false imprisonment by violence, and a lewd act upon a child on March 3, 2023; and attempted forcible rape along with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury on June 9, 2023. At the same hearing, the minor admitted sexual battery by restraint (from the most recent incident), a lewd act upon a child, and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. All other charges were dismissed. The Santa Barbara County Superior Court conducted a dispositional hearing. For the first two petitions, the court ordered probation and time served. For the third petition, relating to the June 9, 2023 assault, the court committed the minor to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF), relying on the fact that this offense was listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that under section 875, a juvenile may only be committed to a SYTF if the “most recent offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated” is listed in section 707, subdivision (b). Since the most recent offense—the sexual battery by restraint on December 17, 2023—was not a qualifying offense, the juvenile court lacked authority to order the SYTF commitment. The Court of Appeal reversed the commitment order and remanded for a new dispositional hearing. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

In re P.F. and M.F.-1

2026-05-22T11:16:59-08:00

The Department of Human Services initiated abuse and neglect proceedings against two parents, alleging that they subjected their teenage children to domestic violence and failed to provide safe housing. At an adjudicatory hearing, both parents stipulated to the allegations and were adjudicated as abusive and neglectful. Ahead of disposition, the Department sought termination of parental rights, while the parents requested improvement periods. After the court denied improvement periods, the parents voluntarily relinquished custodial (but not parental) rights, leading to a subsidized legal guardianship arrangement. The court dismissed the parents as parties and relieved their attorneys. Subsequently, due to the guardian’s change in circumstances, the Department moved to modify the disposition and terminate parental rights. Following their dismissal, the parents were not served notice of subsequent hearings. They filed a pro se motion to restore custody, but were absent from a permanency hearing where the court reinstated them as parties and reappointed counsel. At a later hearing, neither parent appeared, but their attorneys did. The court denied the parents’ motion to restore custody and granted the Department’s motion to modify disposition and terminate parental rights, focusing on changed circumstances and the children’s best interests without making statutory findings required for termination. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court committed significant procedural errors by dismissing the parents while they retained parental rights and by failing to follow statutory and rule-based requirements for terminating those rights. The Court held that parents cannot be dismissed as parties if they retain parental rights and that all procedural requirements for disposition, including evidentiary hearings and specific findings, must be met when modifying disposition. The Court vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with these requirements. View "In re P.F. and M.F.-1" on Justia Law

STEPHENS v. STATE

2026-05-22T09:01:12-08:00

Stephanie Stephens and Demetrius Kovacs were involved in contentious family and juvenile court proceedings concerning custody of their two minor children. Following allegations of abuse and parental alienation, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) removed the children from both parents and initiated a dependency action. The juvenile court initially found the children dependent as to both parents, but after the children later admitted to being coached by Kovacs, the dependency was dismissed and the children were returned to Stephens. The Superior Court of Maricopa County dismissed Stephens’s wrongful institution of civil proceedings (WICP) claim against DCS and its employees under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding she failed to allege that the dependency action was initiated or maintained without probable cause, a required element of the claim. The court distinguished between the vacatur of the dependency finding and the initial determination of probable cause for removal, noting that the latter was never vacated. The court later denied Stephens’s motion for a new trial. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Stephens had adequately alleged both absence of probable cause and malice, based on claims that DCS intentionally concealed material facts regarding parental alienation and coaching. However, the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case de novo, vacated the appellate court’s decision, and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that prior adjudications in the removal and dependency proceedings—unless obtained by fraud, perjury, or corrupt means—establish probable cause as a matter of law. Stephens’s allegations did not plausibly indicate DCS knowingly presented false evidence or suppressed material facts. Therefore, she failed to state a viable WICP claim. View "STEPHENS v. STATE" on Justia Law

In re Interest of Mechi J.

2026-05-22T05:04:24-08:00

A 17-year-old, Mechi J., was adjudicated as a juvenile under Nebraska law in two separate cases and was placed on probation. At an October 2024 hearing, Mechi requested that a termination date be set for his probation. The juvenile court stated that if Mechi did not comply with the terms of probation, its remedies would likely be limited to not sealing his records, which Mechi acknowledged as an incentive to comply. Shortly after, the court ordered that Mechi remain on probation for six months, that his record would be sealed upon successful completion of probation if there were no objections, and that probation would automatically terminate on April 28, 2025, unless a hearing was requested before then. Mechi was also ordered to pay $71 in court costs. The record showed no payment of court costs or further filings before April 29, 2025, when the juvenile court issued orders terminating its jurisdiction and Mechi’s probation, and directed that his records not be sealed due to nonpayment of court costs. The court did not characterize the termination as “unsuccessful,” nor specify the evidence relied upon. Mechi appealed, asserting that the court failed to comply with statutory procedures and deprived him of due process. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the juvenile court did not revoke probation or change the disposition but rather acted in accordance with its prior orders. The Supreme Court found that the statutory procedures for revoking probation did not apply because there was no motion to revoke or change disposition. It further held that due process was satisfied by the notice and opportunity for a hearing Mechi received before the October 2024 orders, and that Mechi failed to use available postdeprivation remedies to contest the non-sealing of his records. The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. View "In re Interest of Mechi J." on Justia Law

State v. Villalobos

2026-05-18T08:38:10-08:00

A fifteen-year-old defendant with an intellectual disability, having an IQ of 64, was arrested and charged with first-degree murder and tampering with evidence after the death of a twelve-year-old child. Unable to post a high bond, he remained incarcerated from his arrest in February 2014. The issue of his competency to stand trial was raised at his arraignment, and subsequent proceedings to resolve competency spanned over three years due to repeated delays, largely attributable to his assigned defense counsel’s neglect in arranging timely evaluations. After being found competent in June 2017, the case experienced additional delays, including a fourteen-month interlocutory appeal by the State. The District Court for Santa Fe County denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, finding much of the delay attributable to defense counsel. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed, weighing the reasons for delay and the assertion of the right to a speedy trial against the defendant, and declined to consider the defendant’s youth and disability as factors heightening prejudice from pretrial incarceration. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the case. It held that, under these disturbing facts, the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. The Court emphasized that extraordinary delays caused by neglect of defense counsel cannot be weighed against a defendant who, due to intellectual disability, cannot meaningfully guide litigation or assert speedy trial rights. The Court further held that the State shares responsibility for failing to monitor and move the case forward. The Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and ordered the indictment dismissed, clarifying that in such cases, prejudice to the defendant is presumed where the length and reason-for-delay factors weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor. View "State v. Villalobos" on Justia Law

State v. Laman

2026-05-12T13:35:46-08:00

The case concerns a seventeen-year-old defendant charged with multiple counts of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual abuse of children involving four victims, all minors, with incidents taking place between December 2020 and May 2022. The evidence was uncovered after law enforcement investigated explicit content found on a phone, leading to forensic interviews with the victims, who detailed repeated instances of sexual abuse and manipulation by the defendant. Digital evidence, including videos and images, further corroborated the allegations. The defendant was eventually charged with six counts of sexual intercourse without consent and two counts of sexual abuse of children. The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, conducted a transfer hearing to determine whether to retain the case in district court or transfer it to Youth Court. The court heard testimony from mental health professionals and a juvenile probation officer regarding the defendant’s risk of recidivism, level of maturity, the nature of the offenses, and the limitations of juvenile probation. Although experts noted that a transfer to Youth Court might be in the defendant’s best interest, the probation officer emphasized the challenges of supervising a high-risk adult on juvenile probation and the serious risk to community safety. The District Court found that, while a Youth Court transfer would serve the defendant’s interests, the interests of community protection and the serious nature of the offenses warranted prosecution in district court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in retaining the matter. The Supreme Court held that the District Court properly weighed the statutory factors under § 41-5-206(3), MCA, and found substantial evidence supporting its decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order to prosecute the case in district court, concluding that community protection and the gravity of the offenses justified the decision. View "State v. Laman" on Justia Law

In the Matter of an Impounded Case

2026-05-11T04:05:11-08:00

Three young children were removed from their father's care and placed in foster care with their paternal grandmother after their father was arrested and their mother went missing. The Department of Children and Families (DCF) later decided to move the children to the home of their maternal aunt and uncle. The grandmother challenged this decision through DCF’s administrative fair hearing process, which initially stayed DCF’s removal decision. However, the stay was lifted after DCF determined that remaining with the grandmother would endanger the children, and the children were relocated. After a multi-day hearing, the hearing officer ultimately ruled in favor of the grandmother, finding that DCF’s removal decision violated its own regulations. Despite this, DCF did not return the children. The grandmother then filed a complaint in the Superior Court, seeking a declaration that DCF had violated its regulations by ignoring the fair hearing outcome and requesting an injunction to return the children to her care. A Superior Court judge, who also served as a Juvenile Court judge, dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding only the Juvenile Court could address placement decisions for children in DCF custody. The grandmother appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to itself. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Superior Court has no authority to grant injunctive relief related to the placement of children in DCF custody; such matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. However, the Court also held that the Superior Court does have jurisdiction to issue declaratory relief regarding whether DCF’s practices or procedures consistently violated its own regulations. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the declaratory relief claim. View "In the Matter of an Impounded Case" on Justia Law

In the Interest of J.B. and R.R.

2026-05-08T06:03:53-08:00

Two young children were removed from their parents’ custody soon after birth due to parental substance abuse and unstable living conditions. After an initial relative placement was deemed unsafe, the children lived with foster parents for an extended period. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) identified the children’s great-aunt in Tennessee as a potential adoptive placement, and her home was approved under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. The juvenile court authorized efforts to assess the suitability of this placement, but the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) expressed concerns about the lack of an existing relationship between the children and the great-aunt and advocated for guardianship to remain with the foster parents. Following termination of parental rights, the Iowa District Court for Polk County declined to transfer guardianship and custody to HHS, citing disapproval of HHS’s plan for out-of-state placement with the great-aunt and instead appointed the foster parents as guardians, treating them as “fictive kin.” The State appealed this decision. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court, interpreting Iowa Code section 232.117(3) as permitting, but not requiring, appointment of HHS as guardian. The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and found that the statute mandates transfer of guardianship and custody to HHS if HHS had custody at the time of the termination petition and did not waive its priority. The court clarified that the statute is not discretionary and also reaffirmed its recent interpretation of “fictive kin,” holding that foster parents with no prior connection to the children do not qualify. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, reversed the juvenile court’s order, and remanded for entry of an order appointing HHS as guardian and custodian of the children. View "In the Interest of J.B. and R.R." on Justia Law

In re O.M.

2026-05-07T13:02:04-08:00

A two-year-old child, O.M., was hospitalized with a fractured femur and significant nutritional deficiencies. Medical staff determined that O.M. was underweight, anemic, and deficient in key nutrients, with his diet primarily consisting of watered-down soy milk and vegan foods. Hospital staff also observed the mother diluting the child’s formula. The parents provided inconsistent accounts of the injury leading to the femur fracture, and medical professionals could not definitively determine whether the injury was accidental or intentional. O.M.’s sibling, E.M., was also reported to be underweight. The family’s vegan diet, the parents’ approach to nutrition, and their understanding of the children’s medical needs became central issues. The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed dependency petitions alleging that O.M. and E.M. were at risk due to parental failure to protect, inadequate nutrition, and, in O.M.’s case, severe physical abuse. After a contested jurisdictional hearing in the Humboldt County Superior Court, the juvenile court dismissed all petitions. The court concluded there was insufficient evidence to support findings of intentional harm or a current risk of harm, reasoning that the parents lacked awareness of O.M.’s nutritional needs but had since gained insight and were willing to address the deficiencies. The court expressed concern for the children but declined to take jurisdiction. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that while the evidence did not compel a finding of intentional physical abuse, it did compel a finding, as a matter of law, that O.M. suffered and remained at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to parental failure to provide adequate nutrition, and that E.M. was also at risk. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s dismissal of the counts related to malnutrition and remanded with instructions to enter jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). All other orders were affirmed. View "In re O.M." on Justia Law

In re M.W.

2026-05-07T06:32:16-08:00

A juvenile, M.W., was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his mother, which was involved in an argument with another vehicle occupied by Nira Monk, Bernard Boyd, and Monk’s children in a parking lot. During and after the argument, multiple gunshots were fired as the cars left the scene. Surveillance footage, ShotSpotter alerts, shell casings, and witness testimony indicated gunfire occurred, and bullet holes were found in Monk's vehicle. Both Monk and Boyd, who had prior convictions, testified for the prosecution. The defense argued that the gunshots originated from Monk’s car and that the bullet holes were either preexisting or fabricated for insurance fraud. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over the trial. During the proceedings, the defense attempted to introduce hearsay statements made by a third party, Arrington Archie, who was near the scene. These statements, relayed to police officers shortly after the shooting, potentially supported the defense’s theory. The trial court excluded these statements, finding insufficient evidence to treat them as admissible under the present sense impression or excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. The trial continued, and Archie ultimately testified, but did not support the defense’s version of events. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court erred in excluding the hearsay statements. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, finding that the statements lacked sufficient evidence of spontaneity, contemporaneity, and the declarant’s state of excitement to qualify for either exception. The appellate court determined that the defense failed to meet its burden of establishing admissibility and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

DICKEY v. THE STATE

2026-05-05T04:04:02-08:00

The appellant was convicted for the malice murder of Justin McKinney and other related offenses after participating in a planned robbery and shooting at McKinney’s residence. The evidence showed that the appellant, along with several co-defendants, discussed and executed a plan to rob and kill McKinney and his girlfriend, Anna Franklin. On the night of the crime, the appellant and two others went to the victims’ house, where the appellant shot McKinney in the head with a shotgun, killing him, and a co-defendant shot Franklin, who survived. The appellant later confessed to shooting McKinney. Forensic evidence corroborated the confessions and eyewitness testimony. The Superior Court of Fannin County held a jury trial, after which the appellant was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to life in prison and additional consecutive and concurrent terms for other offenses. The appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. He argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress his confession, claiming the court’s findings were insufficient and that his waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing and voluntary. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court was not required to make specific, on-the-record findings for each aspect of the totality-of-the-circumstances test when evaluating the admissibility of a juvenile’s confession. The Supreme Court affirmed that the trial court appropriately considered the relevant circumstances and that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The Court found that neither the absence of the appellant’s mother during the interview nor a brief postponement of a requested restroom break rendered his waiver involuntary. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion to suppress. View "DICKEY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

State v. Doe

2026-05-04T14:02:27-08:00

A sixteen-year-old juvenile, while driving, made an illegal U-turn and collided with an oncoming motorcycle, resulting in the death of the motorcyclist. The State charged her with vehicular manslaughter under Idaho law, subjecting her to the provisions of the Juvenile Corrections Act (JCA). After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate court found her guilty and imposed a sentence that included ninety days in detention (with forty-eight days suspended), ten days to be served immediately, 250 hours of community service, a three-year driver’s license suspension, three years of probation, and additional fines and fees. The magistrate court explained that the sentence was intended to promote accountability for the juvenile’s actions. The juvenile appealed to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, arguing that the magistrate court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence that did not adequately promote the JCA’s goals of accountability, community protection, and competency development. The district court reviewed whether the magistrate court’s sentencing decision aligned with the JCA’s sentencing goals and concluded that the magistrate court had acted within its discretion, emphasizing the necessity of accountability in light of the offense’s seriousness. The district court affirmed the sentence. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision and the magistrate court’s exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court properly applied the legal standards of the JCA, and that the magistrate court’s sentence was explained with reference to the statutory sentencing goals, particularly accountability. The Supreme Court clarified that the JCA grants magistrate courts broad discretion and does not limit accountability-based sentencing to only restitution, community service, or correctional costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s intermediate appellate decision upholding the juvenile’s sentence. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

In re Parker B.

2026-05-04T11:02:13-08:00

A 15-year-old minor was declared a ward of the court after he was found to have committed two separate assaults at school—one at age 13 and one at age 14. For both incidents, he faced charges of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and battery inflicting serious bodily injury. After a contested adjudication, the juvenile court found the allegations true, placed him on probation in his father’s custody, and imposed a firearm prohibition until age 30 due to the nature of the offense. After six months of compliance with probation, the minor moved to dismiss the petition and set aside the findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 and to seal his records under section 786. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted the dismissal and sealed the records for all counts except the assault committed when the minor was 14, citing section 786(d), which generally prohibits sealing records for certain offenses committed after age 14 unless “the finding on that offense was dismissed.” The court also declined to relieve the minor from the firearm prohibition. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the section 782 dismissal should be interpreted as encompassing the findings on all offenses in the petition, including the assault committed at age 14. Therefore, the minor was entitled to sealing of the record regarding that offense under section 786. The court, however, affirmed the lower court’s decision to maintain the firearm restriction, explaining that the statutes governing sealing and dismissal do not override the specific firearm prohibition in Penal Code section 29820, which applies “notwithstanding any other law.” The appellate court modified the order to require sealing of all records and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "In re Parker B." on Justia Law

State v. Flores

2026-05-01T05:04:58-08:00

A group of juveniles, including the defendant, participated in a series of criminal acts over several days in June 2021. The incidents began with the theft of a vehicle from Emmanuel Jacinto Franco outside a public pool, during which one juvenile brandished a handgun and forcibly took the vehicle. The defendant, present during the planning and execution of the theft, later joined the others in fleeing with the stolen car. Over the following days, the group committed additional crimes, including multiple shootings targeting individuals they believed were affiliated with a rival gang. One person was killed, others were injured, and the group later stole another vehicle. Law enforcement eventually apprehended the defendant and his associates, aided by tracking technology. The District Court for Douglas County conducted a joint jury trial for the defendant and a co-defendant. The defendant faced several felony charges, including first-degree murder, robbery, assault, and multiple counts involving the use of a firearm. The State presented extensive evidence, including witness testimony and forensic analysis. The defendant did not testify. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. The court denied the defendant’s proposed jury instruction on “mere presence” and sentenced him to consecutive prison terms totaling 320 years to life. Each sentence fell within the statutory limits. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence for certain convictions, error in jury instructions, and that his sentences were excessive and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s convictions for robbery and use of a firearm under an aiding and abetting theory. The court found no error in the district court’s refusal to give the defendant’s proposed jury instruction, as the instructions provided were adequate and not misleading. The court also held that the sentences imposed were not excessive nor did they constitute cruel and unusual punishment, even though they amounted to a de facto life sentence. The judgment and sentences of the district court were affirmed. View "State v. Flores" on Justia Law

In re P.M.S.

2026-05-01T05:02:12-08:00

A 14-year-old boy was accused of raping a 15-year-old boy at a youth home where both resided. The alleged incident took place behind a shed on the property, where a staff member observed the younger boy holding the older boy by the waist and thrusting into him, after overhearing the older boy refuse to engage in further sexual activity. The alleged victim testified that he did not want to participate, felt forced, and had expressed his lack of consent, but did not report any threats or physical harm beyond the act itself. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court magistrate adjudicated the younger boy delinquent for rape, finding that sufficient evidence of force was present, based on testimony that the victim felt compelled and the offender physically held and moved him during the act. The trial judge adopted this finding regarding the incident behind the shed, though dismissed other related charges. The case was then transferred to the Warren County Juvenile Court for disposition, which committed the juvenile to the Department of Youth Services. On appeal, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudication, determining that the evidence could support a finding of physical compulsion or constraint sufficient to meet the statutory definition of force. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether sufficient evidence supported the element of force under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) for rape in a juvenile delinquency adjudication. Applying the standard used in adult criminal cases, the court held that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender used force, as defined by Ohio law, to compel the victim to submit to sexual conduct. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals. View "In re P.M.S." on Justia Law

J.M.I. v. State

2026-04-30T07:13:02-08:00

Several former foster children brought lawsuits against the State of Washington, alleging that the State negligently placed them in foster homes where they suffered abuse and failed to adequately investigate reports of abuse. To support their claims, the plaintiffs requested discovery of various records from the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), including their own child welfare records, records about their biological and foster families, reports of abuse, and information about other children placed with the same foster parents. These records were sought to show whether the State breached its duty to protect them. In response, the State asserted that disclosure of these records was barred by statutory privilege under RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) and by confidentiality requirements under RCW 13.50.100. The State moved for protective orders in the trial courts, but the trial courts denied the State’s motions, ordered the requested records produced (with redaction and protective orders to limit their use), and specified procedures to maintain confidentiality. The State sought discretionary review, and the Supreme Court of the State of Washington granted review, consolidating the cases and staying the trial courts’ orders pending its decision. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while the records sought by the plaintiffs are privileged under RCW 74.04.060(1)(a), an exception in the statute applies because these lawsuits directly concern the administration of the foster care program. Therefore, the privilege does not prevent disclosure. The court also held that RCW 13.50.100 does not bar disclosure of the requested records, as the information pertains to the plaintiffs. The court affirmed the trial courts’ orders compelling discovery, denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees and costs, and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M.I. v. State" on Justia Law

In re Z.G.

2026-04-27T08:33:05-08:00

The case concerns a mother whose two children were the subject of dependency proceedings after one child, Z.G., was found with methamphetamine in her system. The San Bernardino County Children and Family Services initiated proceedings based on allegations of parental substance abuse and domestic violence. Initially, both parents engaged in services, and the children were returned to their custody. However, after the birth of a second child, A.G., new dependency petitions were filed, and both children remained in the mother's care while the father lost custody due to ongoing concerns. Eventually, after the mother allegedly stopped cooperating with her case plan and drug testing, the children were removed from her custody. The department then moved to terminate reunification services and set a permanency planning hearing. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for both children and set a permanency planning hearing, even though the mother had not yet received reunification services for A.G. The mother’s counsel failed to assert her statutory right to reunification services for A.G. and did not file a writ petition to challenge the termination of services or the setting of the hearing. The juvenile court subsequently terminated the mother's parental rights as to both children following a finding that they were likely to be adopted. The Court of Appeal affirmed the termination, reasoning that a finding of likely adoption was sufficient and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges to the earlier order. The Supreme Court of California held that a juvenile court may not terminate parental rights based solely on a finding of likely adoption; it must also make an additional statutory finding, such as that reunification services were provided, bypassed, or properly terminated. The Court further held that the mother received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to assert her right to reunification services and to challenge the relevant orders. The Court reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Z.G." on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Ushon U.

2026-04-27T04:04:27-08:00

A high school student reposted on his public TikTok account an image depicting a man in a school hallway aiming an assault rifle, with the phrase “Me at School” across it. The image was seen by another student, the juvenile’s former girlfriend, who reported it to school officials because she found it frightening. This led to an investigation, a search of the juvenile’s home (with parental consent), and subsequent charges against the juvenile for communicating a threat against a place, in violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 269, section 14(b). The Middlesex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department heard the case. A jury found the juvenile delinquent. After the verdict, the judge vacated the finding, continued the case without a finding, and imposed probation conditions until the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday. The case was dismissed upon completion of probation, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed direct appellate review due to the possible collateral consequences of the delinquency complaint. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that, following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), the Commonwealth must prove as an element of G. L. c. 269, § 14(b) that the defendant “consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence.” The Court found that the jury had not been properly instructed on this requirement, constituting a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, even though the evidence was sufficient to support the adjudication. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, clarifying the mens rea required for convictions under the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Ushon U." on Justia Law

In the Interest Of: Ag, Minor Child v. The State of Wyoming

2026-04-23T07:25:12-08:00

A newborn child was taken into protective custody shortly after birth due to testing positive for methamphetamine and being abandoned by her mother at the hospital. The mother did not return, and the Department of Family Services (Department) was given custody. The child’s father was identified but was incarcerated at the time. Paternity was later confirmed. The Department developed a case plan for the father, which included requirements related to mental health, substance abuse, parenting, housing, and compliance with criminal proceedings. Because the father remained incarcerated, most aspects of his case plan could not be completed. He was able to participate in video visits and some treatment programs while in custody, but could not demonstrate sobriety or stability in the community. After the child was adjudicated neglected, the District Court of Natrona County initially ordered a permanency plan of reunification, contingent on successful completion of the case plan. Throughout the following year, the Department and multi-disciplinary team periodically reviewed the case. As months passed and the father’s release date remained uncertain, the Department recommended a concurrent plan of adoption. At a permanency hearing, evidence showed that, despite the father’s efforts within the limits of incarceration, reunification would require many more months, delaying stability for the child. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion by changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. It found that sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that the child’s need for permanency and stability outweighed further delays inherent in waiting for the father to complete his case plan. The court affirmed the order changing the permanency plan to adoption, holding that adoption was in the child’s best interests. View "In the Interest Of: Ag, Minor Child v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

State v. Doe

2026-04-22T18:12:25-08:00

A sixteen-year-old juvenile, while making an illegal U-turn, collided with an oncoming motorcycle, resulting in the motorcyclist’s death. The State brought proceedings under the Juvenile Corrections Act (JCA), alleging vehicular manslaughter. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate court found the juvenile guilty. A probation officer’s report, along with letters and statements from the juvenile’s supporters and the victim’s family, was considered at sentencing. The report recommended informal adjustment, citing the juvenile’s remorse, efforts toward competency development, and lack of further legal violations. The magistrate court instead sentenced the juvenile to ninety days’ detention (with forty-eight days suspended), three years’ probation, a three-year driver’s license suspension, community service, counseling, victim-offender mediation (at the victim’s family’s option), and various fees. The juvenile appealed to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, contending that the magistrate court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence inconsistent with the JCA’s goals of accountability, community protection, and competency development. The district court affirmed, finding the magistrate court acted within its discretion, particularly in emphasizing accountability for the consequences of the offense. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court properly applied juvenile, rather than adult, sentencing standards and whether the magistrate court abused its discretion. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court applied the correct legal framework and that the magistrate court’s sentence was within its statutory discretion under the JCA. The Court emphasized that the JCA gives magistrate courts broad latitude in fashioning sentences to promote accountability, competency development, and community protection, and that detention is a permissible sentencing tool for accountability in serious cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

State v. Doe

2026-04-22T10:32:45-08:00

A sixteen-year-old juvenile collided with a motorcyclist while making an illegal U-turn, resulting in the motorcyclist’s death. The State charged the juvenile with vehicular manslaughter under Idaho law, and the case proceeded under the Juvenile Corrections Act. At sentencing, the magistrate court considered a social history report, statements from the juvenile, her family, her pediatrician, and the victim’s family, as well as recommendations from a probation officer who suggested informal adjustment and mediation rather than detention. Despite these recommendations and evidence of the juvenile’s remorse, academic success, and lack of intentionality, the magistrate court imposed ninety days of detention (with forty-eight days suspended), 250 hours of community service, a three-year license suspension, three years of probation, counseling, and various fees. The juvenile appealed to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, arguing that the magistrate court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence inconsistent with the goals of the Juvenile Corrections Act—namely accountability, community protection, and competency development—and by failing to sufficiently justify each aspect of the disposition. The district court affirmed the sentence, concluding that it promoted the goal of accountability and fell within the magistrate court’s statutory discretion. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court properly analyzed the sentence under the Juvenile Corrections Act’s standards, not adult sentencing standards, and that the magistrate court acted within its discretion. The Court concluded that the magistrate court adequately explained and tailored the sentence to promote accountability, as permitted by statute, and did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

Interest of W.S.

2026-04-22T07:09:03-08:00

Three children were removed multiple times from the home of their parents, S.S. and T.C., due to concerns about drug use and domestic violence. Initially, two children were removed in 2018, and all three children were subsequently placed in and out of care between 2018 and 2023. After a guardianship arrangement expired in 2023, law enforcement again found evidence of drug use in S.S.’s home, leading to another removal of the children in early 2024. The children were placed in the care of the Mountrail McKenzie Human Service Zone (MMHSZ). The State petitioned in 2025 to terminate the parental rights of both S.S. and T.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, found that the children were in need of protection and had been in care for the statutory number of nights required under North Dakota law. The juvenile court issued an order terminating S.S.’s parental rights. S.S. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not making a specific finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify him with his children. The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, under the relevant statutes, a specific finding on reasonable efforts to reunify is not required at the time of termination of parental rights when the statutory criteria of need for protection and number of nights in care are met. The court further concluded that the juvenile court’s findings demonstrated sufficient consideration of the efforts made by social services and that its decision to terminate S.S.’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order. View "Interest of W.S." on Justia Law

Matter of A.J.C.

2026-04-21T18:19:30-08:00

Four children were removed from their parents’ custody after reports of exposure to domestic violence and methamphetamine use. Both parents tested positive for methamphetamine, and the father had a recent suicide attempt and a history of violent incidents, including an incident where he was charged with strangulation. The children had previously tested positive for methamphetamine and had been removed from the home in a prior proceeding but were later returned after the parents complied with treatment plans. Following the 2023 removal, the father was offered a court-approved treatment plan with requirements such as chemical dependency treatment, drug testing, mental health counseling, and stable housing and income. The father failed to meaningfully engage with the treatment plan for nearly a year, continued to use methamphetamine, and was inconsistent with drug testing and other requirements. Despite eventual partial compliance, concerns remained regarding his substance use, lack of protective capacity, and minimal progress addressing mental health issues. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court in Yellowstone County adjudicated the children as youths in need of care and approved the Department’s petitions for removal and temporary custody. The father stipulated to the treatment plan, but failed to comply with its requirements. The Department petitioned for termination of parental rights based on chronic abuse/neglect and failure to complete the treatment plan. Following a multi-day hearing, the District Court found the father’s unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, given his delayed engagement, ongoing substance use, and inability to protect the children from their mother’s influence. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Court held that the father waived his right to challenge the appropriateness of the treatment plan by failing to object to it when it was created. The Court found that substantial evidence supported termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, and the District Court was not required to consider guardianship before termination. View "Matter of A.J.C." on Justia Law

STATE OF ARKANSAS v. MINOR CHILD

2026-04-16T07:01:59-08:00

A juvenile, referred to as MC, was charged with capital murder and aggravated robbery following the fatal shooting of a fifteen-year-old in Little Rock, Arkansas. After being charged in Pulaski County Circuit Court, MC filed a motion to have his case transferred to the court’s juvenile division, citing the juvenile transfer statute. MC presented evidence including his lack of criminal history, good school performance, and positive behavior in custody, along with testimony from supportive witnesses. The State offered evidence about the violent circumstances of the crime, including details from the lead detective about the shooting and the discovery of a firearm at MC’s grandmother’s home. The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted MC’s motion, finding that he had met the burden of proof for transfer and making written findings on the statutory factors. Most notably, the court found there was no evidence regarding whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner. The State appealed, arguing that the juvenile transfer statute allows either party to appeal a transfer order. Both parties acknowledged that prior Arkansas Supreme Court precedent in State v. A.G. had foreclosed such appeals by the State. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. It overruled State v. A.G., holding that the Arkansas Constitution allows the legislature to authorize appeals from non-final orders, including juvenile transfer decisions. The court found that the circuit court clearly erred in concluding there was no evidence of violence in the manner of the offense, given the direct testimony about the shooting. The Supreme Court reversed the transfer order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "STATE OF ARKANSAS v. MINOR CHILD" on Justia Law

In re Sebastian C.

2026-04-15T15:02:33-08:00

A 14-year-old youth admitted to voluntary manslaughter with personal use of a firearm and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility for a four-year baseline term. At regular review hearings, his baseline term was later reduced by the juvenile court. When approximately nine months remained, the probation department requested that he be transferred to a Supervised Independent Living Placement (SILP) in his adult sister’s home, arguing this would constitute a less restrictive program under Welfare and Institutions Code section 875, subdivision (f). The proposal included intensive probation supervision and coordination with community-based agencies for services. The Superior Court of Solano County denied the request, finding that the sister’s home did not qualify as a “less restrictive program” under the statute, as it was not itself a program providing or coordinating the required programming and community transition services. The court later transferred the youth to an approved less restrictive program, Rise Up House, and subsequently, after an alleged violation, remanded him to the secure facility. Ultimately, he was placed in his mother’s home with services, under a different judge’s order, with a stipulated extension of his baseline term. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that although the appeal was moot due to the youth’s subsequent placement, it would exercise its discretion to clarify the law. It determined that placement in a family home, with supervision and programming provided by a community-based agency, can meet the requirements of a less restrictive program under section 875, subdivision (f). The court dismissed the appeal as moot but clarified that a family home, when accompanied by appropriate supervision and programming, may qualify as a less restrictive program under the statute. View "In re Sebastian C." on Justia Law

O.W. v. Carr

2026-04-09T11:00:26-08:00

A 13-year-old male student at a Virginia Beach middle school received a sexually explicit photo from a female classmate and, several months later, showed the image to other students during the school day. After teachers reported the incident, the assistant principal removed the student from class, questioned him, and searched his phone’s photo gallery. The school resource police officer was notified and began a criminal investigation. The student ultimately showed the explicit photo to the officer, was read his Miranda rights, arrested, and charged in juvenile court with possession of child pornography. The juvenile court found sufficient evidence for guilt but deferred disposition; the charge was dismissed after the student completed court-imposed conditions. The student, through his mother and later counsel, sued the assistant principal, the school resource officer, the Virginia Beach School Board, and the City of Virginia Beach in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. He alleged violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as conspiracy and Monell claims. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding the phone search reasonable under New Jersey v. T.L.O., the confession voluntary, no evidence of unlawful conspiracy, and no underlying constitutional violations to support Monell liability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the assistant principal’s search of the student’s phone was justified at its inception and reasonable in scope under T.L.O., and that Riley v. California did not displace this standard in the school context. The court also held the student’s confession was voluntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, found no evidence of a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and determined Monell liability could not attach absent an underlying constitutional violation. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. View "O.W. v. Carr" on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Sonny S.

2026-04-08T05:04:27-08:00

A juvenile was charged with involuntary manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide by reckless operation following a 2019 incident at age sixteen. He pleaded guilty as a youthful offender and was sentenced under the relevant statute to a combination sentence: commitment to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until age twenty-one, followed by a five-to-seven-year State prison sentence, suspended for five years pending successful probation. After spending approximately eighteen months in a secure DYS facility, he was released on conditional liberty. Less than two years later, he violated probation, and the previously suspended State prison sentence was imposed. The Essex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department denied his motion seeking credit toward his State prison sentence for the 549 days spent in DYS custody, which he argued constituted confinement. The judge granted him credit only for time spent in adult custody before pleading guilty and time held on the probation violation. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. The Court held that neither statutory law nor equitable principles entitle a juvenile in these circumstances to credit toward an adult sentence for time spent serving the DYS portion of a combination sentence. The statutes providing for jail credit apply only to time spent in custody before sentencing, not to time spent serving a sentence. The time in DYS custody was deemed part of the sentence, not “dead time.” The Court also determined that the sentencing judge lacked discretion to award such credit at the probation violation stage, and that equal protection arguments did not require a different result. Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order denying the motion for jail credit. View "Commonwealth v. Sonny S." on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Donovan

2026-04-01T05:05:25-08:00

In this case, the defendant was charged with sexual assaults that occurred in 1993, when he was fifteen years old and the victim was nine. The assaults were not reported until 2016, when the victim, then an adult, saw the defendant and contacted the police. The defendant, who was thirty-nine years old when charged, faced both charges of rape of a child with force and statutory rape. Because the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offenses but an adult when charges were brought, a transfer hearing was held to determine whether he should be tried as an adult or discharged. A judge in the Norfolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department conducted the transfer hearing under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 119, section 72A. The judge found probable cause that the defendant committed the offenses and, after considering arguments, decided that public interest warranted transfer to adult court. The defendant’s counsel objected, believing the hearing would be bifurcated and was unprepared to present evidence relevant to the defendant’s maturity and rehabilitation. The judge denied a continuance and ordered transfer. The defendant was indicted and convicted in the Superior Court. He later moved for a new trial, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel at the transfer hearing. The Superior Court judge denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that a section 72A transfer hearing is a critical stage of the criminal process at which a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. The Court found that the defendant was denied such assistance because his counsel was unprepared to present evidence relevant to the transfer decision. The Court vacated the order denying the motion for a new trial and remanded for a new transfer hearing, directing that the defendant’s convictions would remain provisionally in place pending the outcome of the new hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Donovan" on Justia Law

In re J.H.

2026-03-27T15:01:31-08:00

A juvenile, J.H., was charged with multiple offenses, including attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, following an incident where he stabbed a police officer who was attempting to detain him. J.H. pled no contest to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted a great bodily injury enhancement. At disposition, the court imposed a baseline confinement term of four years, considering various materials including a victim impact statement. J.H.’s progress was later reviewed at a six-month hearing, at which time the probation department and review board recommended a 26-day sentence reduction based on his participation in programs, despite some disciplinary issues. Previously, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the baseline term but remanded for clarification of a probation condition. Upon remand, the juvenile court conducted the six-month review hearing. During this hearing, the court admitted a new victim impact statement submitted by the injured officer over J.H.’s objection, who argued it was improper at this stage and should only be considered at disposition or included in probation materials. The court acknowledged the hearing’s rehabilitative focus but found the victim’s ongoing experience relevant to J.H.’s rehabilitation. The court declined to reduce J.H.’s baseline term, citing insufficient rehabilitative progress. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether admitting and considering the victim impact statement at the six-month review hearing was error. The court held that both the California Constitution and Welfare and Institutions Code section 656.2 guarantee victims the right to submit impact statements at all juvenile court hearings, including progress reviews. However, the court’s consideration of such statements must be limited to relevance for the minor’s rehabilitation, not punishment. The appellate court found no error in the juvenile court’s admission or manner of consideration, and affirmed the order. View "In re J.H." on Justia Law

In re Interest of Joel T.

2026-03-27T05:05:33-08:00

Four children were removed from their mother’s home in January 2023 due to allegations of physical abuse. The State filed petitions to adjudicate the children as juveniles under Nebraska law, identifying both parents as parties. The juvenile court adjudicated the children and, following a disposition hearing for the father, ordered him to comply with a case plan. This plan required him to address anger issues, participate in therapy and parenting classes, and maintain appropriate care for the children. During the case, the father suffered a medical episode, faced a pending criminal case, and was found temporarily incompetent, but later restored to competency. He had not seen his children since February 2022. After the children spent over 15 months in out-of-home placement, the State filed supplemental petitions to terminate the father’s parental rights. At the termination hearing, a caseworker testified to the father’s minimal and late progress toward the case plan goals, lack of cooperation, and absence of meaningful relationship with the children. The father testified regarding his medical issues and recent efforts but admitted to violating a no-contact order and being incarcerated. The County Court for York County found statutory grounds for termination based on neglect, failure to correct conditions, and the children’s lengthy out-of-home placement. The court also found termination to be in the children’s best interests, emphasizing the father’s lack of contact and insufficient rehabilitation efforts. The father appealed. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s adoption of the case plan did not violate due process, that the statutory bases for termination were satisfied, and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The court’s order was affirmed. View "In re Interest of Joel T." on Justia Law

In re E.J.

2026-03-26T15:01:39-08:00

In 2018, a juvenile wardship petition alleged that E.J. committed several offenses, including assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm. E.J. admitted to that charge as part of a negotiated disposition, and the juvenile court found the allegations true, dismissed the remaining counts, declared E.J. a ward of the court, and placed him on probation. In 2019, the court reduced the offense to a misdemeanor, terminated probation, discharged E.J. as a ward, and sealed the record. Despite these actions, E.J. remained subject to a statutory firearm prohibition until age 30 under Penal Code section 29820. In 2025, E.J. filed a motion in the Superior Court of San Bernardino County to terminate the firearm prohibition. The juvenile court denied the motion. E.J. appealed, arguing that Penal Code section 29820 was facially unconstitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming it failed to align with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, improperly used age as a proxy for dangerousness, and did not provide a mechanism for individualized assessment regarding dangerousness. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that section 29820 is not facially unconstitutional. It found that firearm prohibitions based on juvenile adjudications for certain offenses are consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation and that the statute’s application based on prior adjudication—not age alone—does not offend the Second Amendment. The court also held that due process does not require an individualized assessment of dangerousness when the statute’s application is triggered solely by a prior adjudication. The court further found that any as-applied challenge was forfeited because it was not raised in the trial court or in E.J.’s opening brief. The order was affirmed. View "In re E.J." on Justia Law

State v. K. R. C.

2026-03-26T05:45:58-08:00

A 12-year-old seventh-grade student was accused by a classmate of inappropriate touching at school. The following day, two police officers, neither previously known to the student, removed him from class for questioning. The first interrogation took place in a small, closed office used by the school resource officer, with one officer questioning the child and another, fully uniformed and armed, standing in front of the door. No Miranda warnings were given, and the student was not told he could leave, refuse to answer, or contact his parents. He eventually admitted that he may have accidentally touched the other student. Less than an hour later, questioning continued in a school suspension cubicle, where multiple authority figures, including the officers and an assistant principal, stood around him and asked more direct questions, resulting in a similar admission. The State charged the student with Fourth Degree Sexual Assault. Before trial in the Manitowoc County Circuit Court, the student sought to suppress his statements to law enforcement, arguing violations of Miranda v. Arizona and involuntariness. The circuit court denied suppression, finding the interrogations non-custodial and voluntary. After a bench trial, the court adjudicated the student delinquent. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Miranda did not apply because the student was not in custody and that his statements were voluntary. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case. It concluded that the student was in custody for Miranda purposes during both interrogations and that the lack of Miranda warnings rendered his statements inadmissible. However, the court found that admitting the statements was harmless error: the essential evidence was provided by other witnesses, and the statements were not crucial to the finding of delinquency. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. View "State v. K. R. C." on Justia Law

In the Interest of: G.G.B.

2026-03-26T05:15:12-08:00

A child was born prematurely in a hospital in West Virginia. At the time of the birth, the child’s mother resided in Fayette County, Pennsylvania, and the father resided in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The child remained in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit in West Virginia and had never been in Allegheny County. Shortly after the birth, Allegheny County authorities sought emergency custody and commenced dependency proceedings in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, raising concerns about the parents’ compliance with medical advice and prior involvement with another dependent child. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas initially found it lacked jurisdiction but, after rehearing, determined that Allegheny County was a proper venue because the father resided there and the child’s best interests would be served by keeping proceedings in that county. The court granted custody to the county agency. The mother’s request to transfer venue to Fayette County was denied. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the relevant statutes and rules require venue to be based on the child’s location or residence, not the parents’, and that the mother had not shown venue should be transferred. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine the correct standard for venue in dependency proceedings where a child is born and remains in a county where neither parent resides. The court held that under Section 6321 of the Juvenile Act and Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 1300, venue is proper only in the county where the child is present or resides, not where the parents live. Because the child was neither present nor a resident in Allegheny County, venue there was improper. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of: G.G.B." on Justia Law

In re DDH

2026-03-25T10:17:28-08:00

A petitioner sought temporary custody of her nephew, a Guatemalan-born minor, after he entered the United States and was released to her care by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. The petitioner, the child's maternal aunt, resided with him in Central Falls, Rhode Island. She was granted guardianship by the Central Falls Probate Court and then filed a petition with the Rhode Island Family Court for temporary custody and special findings of fact, which were necessary for her nephew’s Special Juvenile Immigration petition. The petition was filed before the child’s eighteenth birthday but was not heard until after he turned eighteen. The biological parents consented to the proceedings and did not oppose the petition. The case was first considered by a magistrate of the Family Court, who, after noting that the child had turned eighteen before the hearing, determined that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because its statutory authority extended only to persons under eighteen. The magistrate dismissed the petition and found that the court could not issue an order nunc pro tunc to the petition’s filing date. On appeal to the Chief Judge of the Family Court, the decision was upheld, with the Chief Judge concurring that the court lacked jurisdiction once the child was no longer a minor under Rhode Island law. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the appeal. The Court held that, under the statutory framework in effect at the time of the hearing, the Family Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the individual was no longer under eighteen years of age. The Court also rejected the petitioner’s arguments for nunc pro tunc relief and for retroactive application of a subsequent statutory amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s dismissal of the petition. View "In re DDH" on Justia Law

In re O.F.

2026-03-13T11:31:43-08:00

A minor, who joined a criminal gang at age 14, accumulated a record of delinquency including robbery, assault, and firearm offenses. At age 16, he was charged with participating, alongside two adult gang members, in the shooting deaths of two minors from a rival gang. After his arrest, he spent over two years in juvenile hall, where he consistently engaged in rehabilitation programs, made academic progress, and received positive evaluations from staff and experts regarding his potential for maturity and growth. The Alameda County Superior Court held an extended amenability hearing to determine whether the minor should remain under juvenile jurisdiction or be transferred to adult criminal court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. Despite uncontradicted evidence of the minor’s engagement and progress, the juvenile court found that all five statutory criteria favored transfer, including a finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation before the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction. The court ordered his transfer to criminal court, emphasizing his history of reoffending, ties to gang culture, and the gravity of the offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case in light of recent changes in the law. These changes heightened the prosecution’s burden of proof, required specific findings on amenability, and made consideration of certain statutory factors mandatory. The appellate court found the juvenile court’s decision was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and failed to properly weigh all relevant factors regarding rehabilitation potential. The appellate court reversed the transfer order and remanded the case for a new amenability determination consistent with current law. View "In re O.F." on Justia Law

In re the Interest of L.P

2026-03-13T06:04:36-08:00

A newborn child, L.P., was removed from her mother’s custody shortly after birth due to the mother’s substance abuse and prior terminations of parental rights. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) placed L.P. in a foster home, but because the foster parents had travel plans, L.P. was placed for respite care with the Smiths, who were not relatives or licensed foster parents at that time. The Smiths provided extensive care and later became licensed foster parents. Meanwhile, HHS attempted to locate relatives for possible placement, eventually identifying the adoptive parents of L.P.’s half-siblings in both Iowa and Illinois, who then expressed interest in caring for L.P. The Iowa District Court for Polk County adjudicated L.P. as a child in need of assistance and later granted the Smiths’ motion to intervene as fictive kin, finding that they had a significant relationship with L.P. The juvenile court ultimately ordered that L.P. be placed with the Smiths, concluding that HHS had not properly prioritized L.P.’s best interests or timely considered relative placements. The court also denied the motion by the Iowa relatives to seek guardianship. HHS and the Iowa relatives appealed these decisions. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s orders, holding that the Smiths qualified as fictive kin and could intervene, and that the juvenile court had properly considered the statutory placement preferences. On further review, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that under Iowa’s 2022 legislation, “fictive kin” refers to individuals with an emotionally positive significant relationship with the child or the child’s family that existed before the child’s removal from parental custody. The court concluded the Smiths did not qualify as fictive kin, vacated the appellate decision, reversed the juvenile court’s intervention and dispositional orders, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re the Interest of L.P" on Justia Law

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: L.K.

2026-03-12T01:14:18-08:00

Twin infants who are eligible for tribal membership were placed in emergency foster care with licensed, non-tribal foster parents after being born with serious medical issues. The county obtained temporary legal custody of the children through a Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) proceeding, and the children were eventually moved from the foster parents’ home to the home of maternal relatives who are members of the same tribe as the children. The foster parents, after learning of the planned move, sought to intervene permissively in the CHIPS case, filed a third-party custody petition, and moved to stay the placement change, arguing in part that tribal placement preference statutes were unconstitutional. The Minnesota District Court denied the foster parents’ motions to intervene and for a stay, and dismissed the third-party custody petition without considering their constitutional arguments. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It directed the district court to reconsider intervention and third-party custody, and addressed the constitutionality of the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), finding it constitutional. On remand, the district court again denied intervention and dismissed the third-party custody petition, concluding the foster parents were not proper parties and could not file such petitions in the ongoing CHIPS proceeding. The Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated the appeals. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention, as such intervention was not in the children’s best interests. The court also held that a third-party custody petition is not available in juvenile court CHIPS proceedings and may only be brought as a petition to transfer custody by a party to the action. Because the foster parents were not parties, the court declined to address their constitutional challenges to ICWA and MIFPA, and vacated the Court of Appeals’ discussion of those constitutional issues. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: L.K." on Justia Law

In re L.G.

2026-03-06T12:31:50-08:00

A mother with a longstanding history of mental illness, including diagnoses of major depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, and PTSD, became the subject of a dependency proceeding concerning her infant daughter. After giving birth, the mother lived with her sister and relied on family support to care for her child. In late 2024, the mother’s mental health deteriorated—she stopped taking her medication, experienced suicidal thoughts, and her behavior became erratic. Family members expressed concern for the mother’s stability, and the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services (the Bureau) responded to allegations of neglect. An initial home assessment found the child safe, and a safety plan was created involving the child’s maternal grandmother providing primary care while the mother addressed her mental health. The Contra Costa County Superior Court sustained allegations that the mother’s mental health issues impaired her ability to provide regular care, and ordered the child removed from her custody. The court required the mother to engage in mental health services, substance abuse assessment, and random drug testing as conditions for reunification. The Bureau’s reports indicated some efforts to prevent removal but did not provide a detailed explanation or evidence that less restrictive alternatives—such as in-home support or involvement of other family members—had been adequately considered. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the mother’s mental illness created a substantial risk of harm to her child, justifying jurisdiction. However, the appellate court found the dispositional orders removing the child from the mother’s custody unsupported by clear and convincing evidence that there were no reasonable means to protect the child short of removal, or that the Bureau made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. The appellate court affirmed the jurisdictional findings but reversed the dispositional orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re L.G." on Justia Law

State v. Damore

2026-03-06T06:06:12-08:00

The case concerns a fatal stabbing involving a 14-year-old, Damore, who was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon. The incident began with an altercation between two groups of teenagers at a convenience store in Lincoln, Nebraska, which escalated when the victim’s vehicle was damaged. The victim’s mother went to Damore’s residence to address the damage, leading to a confrontation. The victim arrived, a physical altercation ensued, and Damore stabbed the victim twice, resulting in the victim’s death. Damore was subsequently charged and sought to have his case transferred from district court to juvenile court. After Damore was bound over to the District Court for Lancaster County, he filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. The district court conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing, considering testimony from various witnesses and extensive documentary evidence. The district court made specific findings and evaluated each statutory factor required by Nebraska law, ultimately finding that most factors supported retaining the case in district court and denying the motion to transfer. Damore timely appealed. The Nebraska Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion and affirmed, concluding that the lower court’s findings and ultimate decision were not clearly untenable. Damore then sought further review, arguing that the Court of Appeals misstated and misapplied the abuse of discretion standard, and incorrectly reviewed the case. The Supreme Court of Nebraska addressed Damore’s arguments, clarified the abuse of discretion standard, and explained that the Court of Appeals had properly applied the standard. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not misstate or misapply the abuse of discretion standard and affirmed its decision, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Damore’s motion to transfer the case to juvenile court. View "State v. Damore" on Justia Law

L.M. v. Graham

2026-02-27T11:01:24-08:00

A student with autism, Y.A., reported to his family that he had been sexually assaulted by fellow students at his middle school. The family’s report to the school prompted an investigation led by Detective Jonathan Graham. Another student, A.D., claimed to have witnessed the assault and identified three perpetrators, including a boy with the same first name as L.M. Although A.D. could not pick L.M. out of a photo lineup, the school later identified L.M. as the individual A.D. had previously accused of bullying. Based on the forensic interviews and supporting evidence, Graham submitted his findings to the Loudoun County Juvenile Intake Office, which determined that probable cause existed for a juvenile petition and issued a detention order for L.M. The charges against L.M. were later dropped when inconsistencies in A.D.’s statements came to light. L.M., joined by other plaintiffs, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Graham and others, alleging violations of Virginia law and the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, concluding that L.M. had not plausibly alleged that his seizure was unsupported by probable cause or that Graham was the cause of his detention, given the independent determination by the Juvenile Intake Officer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the facts alleged did not support a plausible claim for malicious prosecution under federal or state law because probable cause existed and there were no allegations that Graham withheld material information or misled the Juvenile Intake Officer. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "L.M. v. Graham" on Justia Law

In re Child of Danielle H.

2026-02-26T09:10:23-08:00

A mother’s parental rights were terminated after her child was born drug-affected, prompting the Department of Health and Human Services to seek a child protection order. The mother, struggling with opioid use disorder, spent significant periods in jail and various treatment facilities. Despite participating in an Adult Treatment and Recovery Court program, she experienced multiple relapses and did not complete her treatment programs. At the time of the termination hearing, she remained in treatment with no clear plan for when she could care for her child. The District Court (Springvale) conducted a hearing on the Department’s petition to terminate parental rights. The court received evidence that the mother had a long-standing substance use disorder and inconsistent participation in treatment. The guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to the case did not meet several statutory obligations, including meeting the mother in person, observing visits, attending family meetings, and filing timely reports. Nevertheless, the court found the mother unfit based on statutory criteria and concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother appealed, arguing that the court misunderstood addiction and that deficiencies in the GAL’s performance undermined the best interest determination. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case for clear error and abuse of discretion. The court held that the evidence supported a finding of parental unfitness under at least one statutory ground, and deficiencies in the GAL’s performance did not prevent the trial court from independently determining the child’s best interest. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to explicitly consider a permanency guardianship. Accordingly, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights. View "In re Child of Danielle H." on Justia Law

Interest Of J.A.D.

2026-02-26T08:18:25-08:00

A minor, J.A.D., was charged as a juvenile delinquent in South Dakota after threatening to shoot a school counselor, other students, and himself, during a conversation with a school official. These statements, made at school, led staff to initiate a soft lockdown and notify law enforcement. J.A.D. left the school, was later located at his grandfather’s home, and was arrested. The State charged him with aggravated assault, simple assault, and making a terrorist threat; the aggravated and simple assault charges were presented as alternatives. The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit found J.A.D. not delinquent on aggravated assault, concluding the State had not established use of a deadly weapon or imminence of harm. However, the court found him delinquent on the simple assault and terrorist threat charges, determining that his statements constituted a credible threat and placed the counselor in fear, and that he threatened a crime of violence with the intent to impair a public service. For disposition, the court committed J.A.D. to the Department of Corrections, finding that less restrictive alternatives were not viable due to his prior unsuccessful treatments and risk to public safety. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the evidence supported findings of simple assault and making a terrorist threat, and whether commitment to the Department of Corrections was proper. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the simple assault adjudication because J.A.D.’s threat was not imminent, but affirmed the adjudication for making a terrorist threat, finding sufficient evidence of a specific intent to substantially impair a public service. The Supreme Court also affirmed the commitment to the Department of Corrections, holding that the circuit court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and that it did not abuse its discretion. View "Interest Of J.A.D." on Justia Law

In re Christian V.

2026-02-24T11:31:56-08:00

A minor admitted to committing vandalism causing property damage exceeding $400. The juvenile court adjudged the minor a ward of the court, placed him on probation, and reserved jurisdiction over restitution. At a later hearing, the court accepted a stipulation between the minor and the prosecution regarding the amount of restitution and ordered the minor, his co-offender, and his parents jointly and severally liable for payment. The minor did not appeal the initial dispositional or restitution orders. Subsequently, after a statutory amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 eliminated joint and several liability for co-offenders in juvenile restitution, the minor requested that the court divide liability, making him responsible solely for half the restitution. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied this request, reaffirmed joint and several liability, and after the minor successfully completed probation, dismissed the petition and sealed his records. The minor appealed the postjudgment orders, arguing the new law should apply retroactively to his case because his case was not yet final. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the case was final for purposes of retroactive application of ameliorative legislation under the Estrada rule. The court held that a juvenile case becomes final for these purposes when the dispositional order is not appealed within the allowed time and direct review is exhausted. The court found that the minor’s case became final before the new statute took effect because he did not appeal the dispositional or restitution orders. As a result, the amendment did not apply retroactively to his case. The court affirmed the postjudgment orders. View "In re Christian V." on Justia Law

Castaner v. The State of Wyoming

2026-02-24T08:13:53-08:00

A 15-year-old boy shot and killed his former girlfriend, a 17-year-old, after sending her harassing and threatening messages. The confrontation occurred at a park following an exchange with the victim’s cousin, which escalated into a plan to fight. The defendant brought his mother’s handgun to the scene and, during the confrontation, shot the victim in the face as she approached him. He was apprehended shortly after the shooting and confessed to law enforcement. The State originally charged the defendant with first-degree murder and misdemeanor stalking. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to second-degree murder and stalking. At sentencing, the prosecutor and defense agreed that an individualized hearing was appropriate, given the defendant’s juvenile status. The prosecution recommended a sentence of 44 to 75 years for the murder conviction, referencing Wyoming’s Bear Cloud line of cases and statutory limits for juvenile offenders. The defense argued that, under Wyoming law and constitutional principles, the maximum allowable sentence for a juvenile convicted of homicide should be 22.5 years to life, or at most a minimum term not exceeding 43 years. The District Court of Natrona County sentenced the defendant to 42 to 75 years for second-degree murder and time served for stalking. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed whether (1) Wyoming’s juvenile parole eligibility statute applied, (2) the sentence exceeded statutory limits, and (3) the sentence violated the Wyoming Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment. The Court held that the parole eligibility statute applied only to life sentences, not to terms of years. The sentence fell within statutory limits for second-degree murder. Finally, the Court found the sentence was not “unusual” under the state constitution because there was no consensus among legislatures or courts that such a sentence for a juvenile was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Castaner v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In re B.G.

2026-02-20T08:13:08-08:00

A child was removed from the care of their mother in Utah after the mother experienced a mental health crisis, leading to the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) taking protective custody of the child. The father, living in Georgia, sought custody. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to request a home study from Georgia officials via the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). Georgia attempted to conduct the home visit twice, but was unable to complete it because the father lacked a stable residence. The court found the child could not safely be returned to the father and ultimately terminated his parental rights. The Second District Juvenile Court in Weber County initially adjudicated the child dependent as to the mother and neglected as to the father due to abandonment, later revising the finding to dependency after the father argued he had been denied access by the mother. Despite the father's efforts to establish paternity and seek visitation, the court maintained the child in DCFS custody with a goal of reunification. After two failed ICPC home studies due to the father's unstable housing, the court changed the permanency goal to adoption and terminated reunification services. DCFS then filed to terminate the father’s parental rights, and after trial, the juvenile court issued an order terminating those rights. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on certification from the Utah Court of Appeals. The father argued that his appointed counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the use of the ICPC process or proposing alternatives for the required home visit. The Supreme Court held that counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable under the Strickland standard, noting that the ICPC was commonly used in these circumstances and alternatives were impractical or unlikely to be accepted. The court affirmed the termination of the father’s parental rights. View "In re B.G." on Justia Law

People v Guerrero

2026-02-17T07:36:56-08:00

A defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, participated in a premeditated and armed home invasion along with several accomplices. The group entered the victim’s home with knives and a handgun, threatened the victim, and inflicted physical injury by striking him with a shotgun. Prior to this incident, the defendant had a history of escalating criminal behavior, including multiple arrests and Family Court appearances since age thirteen. He had received Family Court services for about five years, including supervision and therapy for several diagnosed mental health conditions. Following indictment on charges of first-degree burglary and first-degree robbery, the People moved to prevent the case’s transfer from the youth part of County Court to Family Court, citing “extraordinary circumstances.” The youth part convened a hearing, considered the defendant’s history of receiving Family Court services, and determined, after weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, that extraordinary circumstances existed warranting retention of the case in the youth part. The defendant was subsequently convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to a state prison term. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the violent nature of the offense, the defendant’s lack of positive response to prior Family Court services, and his continued escalated criminal activity supported the youth part’s determination. One Justice dissented, arguing for a stricter interpretation of “extraordinary circumstances,” but leave to appeal was granted. The New York State Court of Appeals reviewed whether the youth part abused its discretion in denying removal to Family Court. The Court held that the youth part did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law, emphasizing the broad judicial discretion provided by the legislature in determining extraordinary circumstances under the Raise the Age statute. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Guerrero" on Justia Law

Interest of D.G.

2026-02-12T08:36:06-08:00

Two children were removed from their parents’ home in June 2020 and subsequently found by the Juvenile Court of Williams County, North Dakota, to be children in need of protection. The children remained in the custody of North Star Human Service Zone. In 2022, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents, but those petitions were denied. On April 1, 2025, the State filed new petitions to terminate parental rights. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found that termination was in the children’s best interests and ordered that the parental rights of G.G. (the father) and S.F. (the mother) be terminated. The court issued oral and written findings supporting its decision, but neither addressed whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. G.G. appealed the termination of his parental rights, contending that the juvenile court’s findings were inadequate because they failed to determine whether ICWA applied. The State responded that ICWA was not applicable. The Supreme Court of North Dakota noted that in termination proceedings, a juvenile court must make a threshold inquiry and finding as to whether ICWA applies whenever there is reason to know the child may be an Indian child. The Supreme Court further explained that this inquiry is required for each new petition, and the absence of such a finding constitutes clear error. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the juvenile court’s failure to make a threshold finding on ICWA applicability was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the juvenile court with instructions to make a finding on whether ICWA applies, based on the existing record or with additional evidence if necessary. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction during the remand. View "Interest of D.G." on Justia Law

In re M.L.O.-L.

2026-02-10T16:06:21-08:00

A young child was removed from her mother’s care, along with her two siblings, due to concerns of neglect and abuse. After initial placement with their maternal grandmother, the grandmother asked for the children to be removed, and the subject child was subsequently placed with a licensed foster parent, J.D., where she remained. The child’s brother was later hospitalized and, upon discharge, was placed with the grandmother, while the subject child remained with J.D. Over the course of the proceedings, professional testimony described the child’s attachment disorder, trauma history, and the risks posed by placement changes. Reports also indicated the child was thriving in her current placement and that sibling reunification was not in her best interest due to safety and emotional concerns. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, held multiple hearings regarding placement and permanency. After terminating parental rights and granting permanent legal custody to the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, the court denied the grandmother’s request for placement, finding good cause to depart from statutory placement preferences based on the child’s extraordinary mental and emotional needs. The court incorporated findings from previous orders, relied on professional testimony and a report from the Court Appointed Special Advocate, and approved adoption by J.D. as the permanency plan. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in approving adoption as the permanency plan and denying the grandmother’s placement request. The Supreme Court held that, despite some imprecise language, the District Court applied the correct statutory standards, made sufficient findings regarding the child’s best interests, and did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order. View "In re M.L.O.-L." on Justia Law

In re Reyna R.

2026-02-09T12:17:26-08:00

The case concerns a father and mother with four minor children. Dependency jurisdiction was initially asserted over the children due to the father’s alcohol abuse and the mother’s failure to protect the children. After the parents entered into a stipulation, restrictions on the father’s visitation were removed, and joint custody was restored. However, a subsequent domestic violence incident involving the father led to a new dependency petition. The father was accused of slapping the mother while possibly intoxicated, which was witnessed by the eldest child. The investigation also revealed prior domestic violence calls. As a result, the children were detained from the father and released to the mother, with the father granted monitored visitation. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained allegations against the father for domestic violence and alcohol abuse, declared the children dependents, and removed them from the father’s custody. The mother was given family preservation services, while the father received enhancement services and monitored visitation. At a six-month review hearing, it was reported that the father completed a substance abuse program but continued to engage in concerning behavior, including leaving threatening voicemails, appearing intoxicated, and being physically aggressive toward the mother. The mother obtained a restraining order, and the Department of Children and Family Services recommended terminating jurisdiction with sole custody to the mother and monitored visitation for the father. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the lower court erred in requiring the father to pay for a professional visitation monitor as a condition of visitation without considering his ability to pay or reasonable alternatives. The appellate court held that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not inquiring into the father’s financial ability or considering alternatives such as an unpaid monitor. The order requiring the father to pay for a professional monitor was reversed and remanded for further proceedings; the custody order was otherwise affirmed. View "In re Reyna R." on Justia Law

In re Interest of Aaden S.

2026-02-06T09:13:17-08:00

A 16-year-old juvenile was charged with serious offenses, including first degree sexual assault, terroristic threats, assault by strangulation or suffocation, and third degree domestic assault, all stemming from two incidents involving his then-girlfriend. After an investigation initiated by a friend's report, law enforcement gathered police reports, photographs, text message screenshots, and a video interview of the alleged victim. The State moved to transfer the juvenile’s case from the juvenile court to the adult docket of the county court. At the transfer hearing in the County Court for Buffalo County, the State did not call any witnesses and instead offered documentary and video exhibits without authentication or supporting testimony. The juvenile’s counsel objected on due process, foundation, and confrontation grounds, arguing he could not cross-examine or otherwise challenge the evidence. The court overruled the objections, received the evidence, and concluded that most statutory factors favored transfer, despite finding some factors supported retention in juvenile court. The court found the State met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence and ordered the case transferred. The Nebraska Court of Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the juvenile court’s actions. The majority held that the juvenile’s due process rights were satisfied because he had a hearing, representation by counsel, and a specific written decision, relying on the standards set forth in Kent v. United States. The dissent disagreed, arguing the lack of authentication and sponsoring witnesses for the State’s exhibits deprived the juvenile of due process. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that the juvenile’s due process rights were not violated under these facts, as counsel had access to the State’s evidence and an opportunity to respond, and the evidence bore sufficient indicia of reliability. The Court also concluded that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the transfer to adult court. View "In re Interest of Aaden S." on Justia Law

MERRELL v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

2026-02-05T08:02:03-08:00

A juvenile was arrested at age twelve for the murder and aggravated robbery of a convenience store clerk. Surveillance video showed the juvenile entering the store multiple times, stealing items, and ultimately shooting the victim eight times. After the murder, he calmly stole additional items and discarded evidence. The juvenile confessed to the crimes and exhibited a history of violent and antisocial behavior, documented by family members, school officials, therapists, and juvenile detention staff. Multiple psychological evaluations were conducted, yielding conflicting diagnoses of autism, conduct disorder, and schizophrenia, but all agreed he knew right from wrong. The juvenile division of the Miller County Circuit Court designated him as an extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ) offender. He was adjudicated delinquent by a jury, committed to the Arkansas Division of Youth Services (DYS), and the imposition of an adult sentence was suspended pending further review. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed these rulings. Over several years, DYS provided rehabilitative services. After several petitions concerning release and adult sentencing, the State filed a petition to impose an adult sentence as the juvenile approached age twenty, citing ongoing concerns about rehabilitation and public safety. At the subsequent hearing, DYS staff testified that the juvenile had made progress and completed treatment goals, but the State introduced evidence of recent violent incidents and inconsistencies in staff testimony. The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the circuit court’s order imposing an adult sentence, applying a clearly erroneous standard. The court affirmed the circuit court’s findings that the juvenile was not amenable to treatment and that public safety required the imposition of an adult sentence. The court held that the circuit court’s assessment of the statutory factors and credibility determinations were not clearly erroneous, and affirmed the life sentence with the possibility of parole after thirty years. View "MERRELL v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Mitchell v. People

2026-02-04T08:06:52-08:00

Four juveniles conspired to rob a victim of vaping products in Colorado in 2019. During the incident, one of the juveniles, who is Black, shot and killed the victim. All four were initially charged with felony murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Subsequent investigation revealed that the shooter acted alone in confronting and shooting the victim, while the other three, including two non-Black juveniles, had more limited roles and cooperated with law enforcement. The two non-Black juveniles received plea deals allowing them to be tried in juvenile court and were sentenced to two years in the Division of Youth Services, while the two Black defendants, including the shooter, were prosecuted in district court and faced substantially harsher potential sentences. The District Court for Arapahoe County denied the shooter's motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, finding that he was not similarly situated to his non-Black codefendants due to his greater culpability as the shooter. The court also found that statistical evidence provided did not establish discriminatory purpose by the prosecution. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted the shooter, who was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after forty years. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, agreeing that the shooter was not similarly situated to the other defendants. The appellate division did not address whether the statistical evidence sufficed to show discriminatory purpose. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that the defendant failed to establish a claim of selective prosecution because he did not show a discriminatory effect or purpose. Specifically, he was not similarly situated to his non-Black codefendants, and his statistical evidence did not demonstrate that similarly situated non-Black individuals were treated differently. View "Mitchell v. People" on Justia Law

People ex rel. S.G.H.

2026-02-01T10:03:09-08:00

A teenager, S.G.H., was accused of using generative artificial intelligence to create explicit composite images of three underage female classmates by digitally blending their actual faces and clothed bodies with computer-generated images of naked intimate body parts. These manipulated images were discovered on S.G.H.’s school email account during a police investigation prompted by an automated alert regarding inappropriate content. The images made it appear as though the classmates were nude, but the explicit portions were entirely computer-generated and not derived from actual photographs of the victims. In the Morgan County District Court, the People of the State of Colorado filed a delinquency petition charging S.G.H. with six counts of sexual exploitation of a child under section 18-6-403(3)(b) and (3)(b.5), C.R.S. (2024). S.G.H. moved to dismiss, arguing that the images did not constitute “sexually exploitative material” under the law then in effect, since they did not depict actual naked children and the explicit body parts were computer-generated. The District Court denied the motion, interpreting the statute as encompassing digitally manipulated images bearing a child’s actual features combined with simulated intimate parts, and found probable cause for all charges. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case under its original jurisdiction. The Court held that, as of December 2023, the statutory definition of “sexually exploitative material” did not cover images created or altered using generative AI to fabricate explicit content. The Court found that recent legislative amendments expanding the definition to include such computer-generated images represented a change, not a clarification, of the law. Concluding that the District Court erred in finding probable cause, the Supreme Court made absolute its order to show cause and remanded with instructions to dismiss all charges against S.G.H. View "People ex rel. S.G.H." on Justia Law

South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice

2026-01-29T11:31:20-08:00

Three advocacy organizations filed suit against the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and its executive director, seeking institutional reforms to address alleged unconstitutional and unlawful conditions in the state’s juvenile detention facilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the facilities were overcrowded, understaffed, and dangerous, resulting in violence, isolation, and inadequate services for juveniles. They based their standing on their advocacy and direct representation work with affected youth, and described both the harm to juveniles and the impact on their own organizational missions. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The district court found that Disability Rights South Carolina (DRSC) had standing to sue on behalf of certain juveniles, but those claims were rendered moot when those juveniles left custody. The court also determined that Justice 360 had standing in its own right but concluded that its claims failed on the merits. The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP was found to lack standing. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that the advocacy organizations lacked Article III standing to pursue the claims because they failed to demonstrate a sufficient personal stake in the outcome. The court found that DRSC did not meet the requirements for associational standing as its constituents lacked indicia of membership. The court also concluded that none of the organizations suffered a cognizable injury directly caused by the defendants’ actions, but rather incurred self-imposed costs through voluntary advocacy. The court further held that the plaintiffs could not bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of rights belonging to others, as they had not alleged violations of their own federal rights. The dismissal was affirmed. View "South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice" on Justia Law

In re S.M.

2026-01-29T07:33:10-08:00

A juvenile, S.M., was alleged to have committed theft and shoplifting. Initially released pending resolution, S.M. repeatedly absconded, leading to her detention to secure her attendance and protect others’ property. After being detained at the Youth Services Center, S.M. was moved to the Youth Shelter House, but following further incidents of insubordination and unauthorized departures, the trial court ordered her returned to the Youth Services Center. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued the order changing S.M.’s place of detention from the Youth Shelter House back to the Youth Services Center. S.M. appealed, arguing that such a move to a more restrictive facility required a specific finding that it was necessary for safety or to secure her appearance, as per D.C. Code § 16-2310(a). The District countered that the order was not subject to the emergency interlocutory review provision of D.C. Code § 16-2328 and that the trial court did not need to make such a finding for placement decisions. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that (1) it had jurisdiction under Section 16-2328 to review the order, as it was a detention order; (2) a child can challenge both the fact of detention and the specific place of detention on an emergency interlocutory appeal; and (3) the trial court, when deciding the specific place of detention, is not required to find that placement in a particular facility is necessary to protect safety or ensure appearance. Instead, the selection of the place of detention is a discretionary decision guided by statutory goals, including placing children in the least restrictive setting necessary. The court clarified that the statutory detention criteria apply to the decision to detain, not to the specific location of detention. The disposition affirmed the trial court’s order. View "In re S.M." on Justia Law

ROLFE v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

2026-01-22T08:01:29-08:00

A seventeen-year-old was charged in the St. Francis County Circuit Court with three counts of capital murder and one count of felony theft after his mother, her boyfriend, and his twelve-year-old sister were found shot to death in their home. The evidence included the recovery of the victims’ vehicle, a firearm, gunshot residue on the accused’s clothing, and DNA evidence. The accused denied involvement but was contradicted by testimony from his four-year-old sister and other evidence. The defense presented testimony about his background, mental health, and the potential for rehabilitation. After the accused moved to transfer the case to the juvenile division, the St. Francis County Circuit Court held a hearing and denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found that the circuit court had failed to address a required statutory factor and remanded for additional findings. The circuit court entered an amended order again denying transfer. The accused then appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court. The Arkansas Supreme Court first ruled that the accused's constitutional challenge to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318 was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised in the circuit court. The court also held that the circuit court properly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction. Reviewing the denial of transfer for clear error, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the amended order adequately addressed all statutorily required factors, gave appropriate weight to the seriousness and violent nature of the offenses, and was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to transfer the case to the juvenile division. View "ROLFE v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

In re Bella L.

2026-01-20T13:32:00-08:00

The case concerns two children whose parents were subject to dependency proceedings after allegations of domestic violence and failure to protect were brought by a county child welfare agency. The children were ultimately removed from their parents' custody and placed with extended family members. Over the course of the proceedings, the social services department conducted multiple inquiries with both parents and a number of extended family members about possible Native American heritage, as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law. Each person asked denied any such heritage. After the initial dependency petition, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the allegations, ordered reunification services, and later returned the children to their parents. Following further incidents of domestic violence, the children were again removed, and supplemental petitions were sustained. The agency continued its ICWA inquiry, interviewing additional family members but did not specifically question the paternal grandfather, though he was interviewed on other subjects. The Superior Court terminated parental rights after finding the children adoptable and determined there was no reason to know the children were Indian children under ICWA. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether the agency’s failure to inquire specifically of the paternal grandfather required reversal of the order terminating parental rights. The court held that, under the standard articulated in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, a finding that the initial ICWA inquiry was adequate is supported by substantial evidence where the agency interviewed the parents and several extended family members, even if not every possible relative was asked. The court found the agency’s efforts sufficient and affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re Bella L." on Justia Law

In re K.R.

2026-01-16T07:36:11-08:00

A mother left her ten-month-old son, K.R., with his paternal grandmother without specifying when she would return, leading to concerns about the child’s safety and the mother's alleged drug use. Law enforcement and child welfare agencies became involved, and K.R. was placed in temporary custody with his grandmother. The initial case plan aimed for the child’s reintegration with the mother, contingent on her maintaining sobriety, stable housing, and mental health services. Due to the mother's lack of progress, the permanency goal was later changed to adoption. After a missed drug test and absence from a court hearing, the district court terminated the mother's parental rights by default, without receiving evidence. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the initial termination because the district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing, as required by statute, and remanded for proper proceedings. On remand, after an evidentiary hearing where the mother demonstrated significant improvement—maintaining sobriety, stable housing, and employment—the district court again terminated her parental rights. However, while the court found the mother unfit, it did not make a finding that her unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. A different Court of Appeals panel affirmed the termination, concluding that sufficient evidence supported both the finding of unfitness and the likelihood it would not change. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed whether termination was proper without an explicit district court finding that the mother’s unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, as required by K.S.A. 38-2269(a). The court held that absent this specific finding, the district court lacked authority to terminate parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with statutory requirements. View "In re K.R. " on Justia Law

In re Interest of Johnny H.

2026-01-16T06:09:21-08:00

A juvenile born in 2007 was adjudicated at age 14 for habitual truancy and placed on indefinite probation. Over the next several years, he was adjudicated in four separate delinquency cases—primarily theft and assault-related—and placed on indefinite probation in each case. While still on probation in all five cases, the State filed a felony criminal complaint against him for attempted robbery. In response, the State moved in all juvenile cases for a finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitative services under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, requesting that the court terminate jurisdiction “unsuccessfully.” The Separate Juvenile Court of Sarpy County held a consolidated hearing, receiving evidence regarding the juvenile’s history, participation in probation and services, and recent criminal charges. The court found him nonamenable to rehabilitative services and ordered termination of both probation and the court’s jurisdiction, specifying that the record would not be sealed. The juvenile appealed these orders. The Nebraska Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals, and the Nebraska Supreme Court moved them to its docket to address statutory interpretation and procedural issues regarding Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that a finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03 must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, with the State bearing the burden when it moves for such a finding. The Court affirmed the juvenile court’s determination of nonamenability, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it held there is no statutory authority for a juvenile court to terminate probation or jurisdiction based solely on a finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the nonamenability finding, but vacated the orders terminating probation and jurisdiction, remanding the cases for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Johnny H." on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. Demos D.

2026-01-14T05:15:04-08:00

During a daytime traffic stop in Lawrence, Massachusetts, a police officer encountered a sixteen-year-old juvenile who had been reported missing by the Department of Children and Families. The juvenile was seated in a vehicle with an infant and three adults, one of whom was known by the officer to be affiliated with a street gang. The officer ordered the juvenile out of the car without asking any questions and immediately conducted a patfrisk, discovering a handgun on the juvenile’s person. The juvenile was subsequently charged with multiple firearms offenses and indicted as a youthful offender on one count. The Essex County Juvenile Court reviewed the juvenile’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the exit order and patfrisk, arguing violation of constitutional rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the judge granted the motion to suppress, finding the officer's actions unjustified under the circumstances. The Commonwealth sought interlocutory review, and a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk allowed the appeal. The Appeals Court reversed the suppression order, concluding the officer’s actions were reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Judicial Court then granted further appellate review. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the officer’s exit order was justified under the community caretaking doctrine, as the officer was acting to ensure the safety and well-being of a missing juvenile. However, due to inconsistencies in the Juvenile Court judge’s findings regarding the credibility of the officer’s testimony about key facts supporting the patfrisk, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the suppression order. The case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for clarification of factual findings and reconsideration of the legal conclusions in light of those findings and the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Demos D." on Justia Law

IN RE: N.D.

2026-01-08T09:07:04-08:00

The Clark County Department of Family Services filed a petition under Nevada law seeking protection for three minor children, alleging they were in need of protection from their father and stepmother. The allegations against the stepmother were withdrawn prior to trial. The juvenile court in Clark County conducted a full evidentiary hearing regarding the father and ultimately found that the allegations were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, resulting in dismissal of the petition against him. Following this dismissal, both the Department and the minor children appealed the juvenile court’s order to the Supreme Court of Nevada. However, concerns arose regarding the appealability of such an order, as prior precedent—specifically In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764—held that orders from juvenile proceedings concerning child custody were not substantively appealable under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure (NRAP) 3A. The Supreme Court temporarily halted the appeal and directed appellants to show cause why jurisdiction existed. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that the jurisdictional analysis in In re A.B. was flawed. The court determined that an order completely dismissing and thus finally resolving a petition for child protection under NRS Chapter 432B meets the definition of a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1), because it disposes of all issues in the case. The court overruled In re A.B. to the extent that it held such orders were unappealable, clarifying that NRAP 3A(b)(1) allows an appeal from a final judgment entered by a district court—even when it arises from juvenile proceedings involving child custody. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the order dismissing the petition is appealable and allowed the appeal to proceed. View "IN RE: N.D." on Justia Law

In the Interest Of: DC

2026-01-07T08:13:42-08:00

The case concerns a child, DC, who was removed from his parents’ care shortly after birth due to substantiated concerns about neglect, failure to thrive, domestic violence, mental health issues, substance abuse, and instability within the family. The child was placed with maternal grandparents, and a permanency plan for family reunification was established. The father, AC, was given a case plan with specific requirements addressing sobriety, mental health, parenting skills, stable housing, and employment. Over the next eighteen months, the father was incarcerated for nearly a year of that period, including a new sentence of five to seven years for felony offenses. He failed to make consistent progress on his case plan goals, particularly concerning mental health and substance abuse treatment, employment, and securing stable housing. The District Court of Platte County—sitting as a juvenile court—initially ordered reunification, then shifted to a concurrent goal of reunification and adoption as the father’s progress stalled and his incarceration continued. The Department of Family Services documented extensive, tailored efforts to facilitate reunification, including arranging for services while the father was both in and out of custody. Despite these efforts, the father did not meaningfully participate in or complete the required treatment, counseling, or parenting programs. At an evidentiary review hearing, the court found the Department’s efforts reasonable and accessible, and that it was in the child’s best interests to change the permanency plan to adoption. The father appealed the change, arguing insufficient efforts were made to accommodate his incarceration. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the juvenile court’s decision for abuse of discretion. It held that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify father and child, even considering the constraints of incarceration, and that the child’s need for stability outweighed the father’s incomplete progress. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order changing the permanency plan to adoption. View "In the Interest Of: DC" on Justia Law

S.L. v. 4th Judicial District Court

2026-01-06T14:36:39-08:00

A 16-year-old individual was criminally charged in Montana with several offenses, including aggravated burglary and assault on a peace officer. The prosecution filed an Information in the District Court, and a hearing was scheduled to decide whether the matter should be transferred to Youth Court, as permitted by Montana law for certain juvenile defendants. Before being arraigned, the defendant moved to substitute the presiding judge, arguing the motion was timely since arraignment had not yet occurred. The Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, denied the substitution motion without prejudice, reasoning that such motions are prohibited in Youth Court actions and would only be considered if the case remained in District Court following the transfer hearing. The court also issued an order for evaluation to assist in the transfer determination, but the order was initially filed under an incorrect cause number. The defendant then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control, claiming the denial of the substitution motion was erroneous because the case was pending in District Court as a criminal action, not a Youth Court matter. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that after the State files an Information in District Court, jurisdiction over the criminal matter rests with the District Court, and the action is not a Youth Court case at that stage. The court further clarified that under Montana law, a defendant’s right to substitute a judge in criminal cases may be exercised any time before arraignment, and that the 10-day window for substitution closes at arraignment rather than opening at that point. The Supreme Court granted the petition for supervisory control, set aside the District Court’s order denying substitution, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "S.L. v. 4th Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

United States v. Johnson

2026-01-05T08:30:23-08:00

An 11-year-old child, L.D., was placed in foster care with Trina Mae Johnson. Over a period of fifteen months, Johnson inflicted severe abuse on L.D., including physical torture, starvation, denial of medical care, and psychological torment. The abuse resulted in significant weight loss, untreated injuries, and lasting trauma. Johnson concealed the abuse, enlisted others in her household to participate, and intimidated L.D. into silence. The abuse came to light when Johnson brought L.D. to a youth shelter, prompting an investigation by child services and the FBI. Johnson and several co-defendants were indicted on charges of child torture, child neglect, child endangerment, and assaulting a minor with a dangerous weapon in both federal and Minnesota state law violations. Some co-defendants pleaded guilty, while Johnson’s sister went to trial. Johnson was unable to accept a plea agreement because it was contingent on both sisters pleading guilty. She ultimately pleaded guilty without an agreement. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota sentenced Johnson to 216 months in prison, after considering the relevant sentencing factors and victim impact statements. The sentence was below the government’s recommendation but above the prior plea offer. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Johnson argued that the district court judge’s direct, sympathetic comments to L.D. at sentencing demonstrated judicial bias and violated her due process right to an impartial tribunal. The Eighth Circuit applied plain error review, noting Johnson did not object to the judge’s comments at sentencing or seek recusal. The court held that the judge’s empathetic remarks to the victim did not display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Finding no plain error or due process violation, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

United States v. Cole

2025-12-24T08:32:58-08:00

The case centers on Brett Dewayne Cole, who was charged with three counts stemming from allegations of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter, K.Z., a member of the Choctaw tribe. In May 2019, K.Z., then ten years old, disclosed to school personnel and a nurse examiner that Cole had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions at their family home, including acts of touching and oral and anal penetration. Cole denied any inappropriate conduct. During trial, the government sought to introduce testimony from three witnesses—Cole’s half-sister, half-brother, and stepcousin—about prior instances in which Cole allegedly molested them as children, with these incidents occurring when Cole himself was a juvenile. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma presided over Cole’s case. At the first trial in January 2023, evidence of Cole’s prior acts as a juvenile was admitted over his belated objection, but the jury failed to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. In a second trial held in March 2023, similar evidence was presented, and the jury convicted Cole on all counts. Cole appealed, arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 414 did not permit admission of the prior acts because he was a juvenile at the time, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that acts of child molestation committed as a juvenile qualify as “crimes” under Rule 414 and are admissible. It further found that the district court properly balanced the probative value against any prejudicial impact and did not abuse its discretion. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Cole’s conviction. View "United States v. Cole" on Justia Law

In re K.G.

2025-12-23T14:30:48-08:00

The case concerns a child who was removed from his parents due to domestic violence, the father’s criminal history, and the mother’s untreated mental illness. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services placed the child with a caretaker and provided reunification services to the parents, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Parental rights were ultimately terminated, and adoption was set as the permanent plan. Throughout the proceedings, the Department investigated whether the child might have Native American heritage, as required under California law analogous to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the Department’s efforts to determine the child's possible Native American ancestry. The parents had initially denied any such heritage, but at one point the father suggested there might be Native American ancestry. The Department interviewed or attempted to contact numerous relatives and family associates about possible Native American ancestry, but did not contact four specific known relatives. After reviewing the Department's inquiry, the juvenile court found there was no reason to know that ICWA applied in this case. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the adequacy of the Department’s inquiry under the deferential standard established by the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal held that the Department had adequately discharged its duty of reasonable inquiry by asking those persons it would normally contact whether the child might have Native American heritage, and was not required to contact every possible relative. The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order, explicitly disagreeing with a contrary approach that would impose broader duties on the Department. View "In re K.G." on Justia Law

In re J.L.

2025-12-23T12:30:56-08:00

Four juveniles were found jointly and severally liable for victim restitution in the amount of $15,850.54, after an incident involving Jane Doe and her family. Two of the minors, J.L. and O.V., appealed the restitution order, specifically challenging a portion related to childcare expenses incurred by Doe’s mother. Both minors accepted the legitimacy of some childcare costs but argued for reductions in the total awarded based on their interpretation of supporting evidence. Additionally, J.L. and O.V. sought apportionment of the total restitution among the four co-offenders, referencing a recent amendment to the Welfare and Institutions Code that eliminated joint and several liability in juvenile delinquency restitution matters, effective January 1, 2025. The Superior Court of Marin County initially heard the matter. The juvenile court found that the People had established the restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence and ordered all four minors jointly and severally liable for the total sum. J.L. and O.V. subsequently appealed the restitution order to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the evidentiary record and legal arguments. The appellate court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $3,850 for childcare expenses, finding sufficient factual support for the amount claimed. Regarding apportionment, the appellate court concluded that the recent statutory amendment to eliminate joint and several liability for victim restitution applies prospectively and not retroactively. Thus, J.L. and O.V. were not entitled to have their restitution obligations apportioned under the new law. The judgment of the juvenile court was affirmed. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law