Internet Law - Justia Case Law Summaries

Volokh v James

2026-06-23T10:26:14-08:00

In response to a mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, that was planned, publicized, and broadcast via social media, the state legislature enacted the Hateful Conduct Law (HCL). This statute requires social media networks conducting business in New York to provide a clear, easily accessible mechanism for users to report "hateful conduct" and to maintain a public policy describing how the network will address such reports. "Hateful conduct" is defined as using a social media network to vilify, humiliate, or incite violence against groups based on protected characteristics. Plaintiffs, including operators of social media platforms, challenged the law before it took effect, arguing that it would compel them to speak against certain content and chill protected expression. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the HCL likely violated the First Amendment by compelling social media networks to endorse the state’s definition of hateful conduct and to publish policies about it. The court determined that the law could have a chilling effect on free speech, even though it did not require removal of the content itself. The Attorney General appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which determined that resolution of the constitutional issues depended on the proper interpretation of the HCL under New York law. The Second Circuit certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals concerning the scope of the statute’s requirements. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that social media networks comply with the law if their reporting mechanism and public policy do not explicitly reference or define "hateful conduct," as long as users can report such conduct and learn how reports will be addressed. The court further held that the law does not require networks to respond to reports of hateful conduct. The certified questions were answered accordingly. View "Volokh v James" on Justia Law

Guild Mortgage Company v. CrossCounty Mortgage

2026-05-27T11:31:48-08:00

Guild Mortgage Company LLC and CrossCountry Mortgage LLC are direct competitors in the residential mortgage industry. Over an 18-month period, several Guild employees in the Kirkland, Washington branch, including the branch manager and other high-level staff, were allegedly recruited by CrossCountry while still employed by Guild. According to the complaints, these employees solicited their colleagues to also move to CrossCountry, diverted customers and loan applications, and accessed Guild’s computer systems to take confidential and proprietary information. The employees had signed agreements with Guild prohibiting such conduct, and Guild subsequently lost nearly its entire Kirkland branch workforce to CrossCountry. After Guild initiated arbitration against the former employees and prevailed, it filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of San Diego County against CrossCountry. Guild’s claims included interference with economic advantage, interference with contract, violation of California’s Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CCDAFA), unfair competition, and aiding and abetting tortious conduct. The Superior Court sustained CrossCountry’s demurrers, finding that the claims were preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) or otherwise failed to state a cause of action, and dismissed the case without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that Guild had adequately alleged actionable duties of loyalty and, for the branch manager, fiduciary duty, that were breached by the employees and aided by CrossCountry. The court found that the claims for interference and violation of the CCDAFA were not displaced by CUTSA because they arose from conduct beyond trade secret misappropriation. The court also held that the unfair competition claim could proceed since the other claims were viable. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in favor of CrossCountry and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guild Mortgage Company v. CrossCounty Mortgage" on Justia Law

D'Ambrosio v Meta Platforms, Inc.

2026-05-15T12:31:15-08:00

The case concerns a man who sued several parties after negative posts about him appeared in a large Chicago-based Facebook group where women share experiences about local men. The posts, made in late 2023, included a woman he briefly dated recounting her unpleasant experiences, attaching a screenshot of a profane text message he sent her after their breakup. Other posts by unidentified users included supportive comments and, in one instance, a link to a news article about a criminal case involving someone with a different name and appearance. The plaintiff alleged these posts caused him reputational, economic, and emotional harm. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendants—including the former date, her parents (for allegedly allowing use of their internet connection), the group’s administrators, and Meta Platforms—moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motions, finding the claims legally insufficient and dismissing the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed and voluntarily dismissed claims against unidentified “Jane Doe” defendants to preserve diversity jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to state plausible claims under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act because none of the defendants used his likeness for a commercial purpose. The court also found the “doxing” claim insufficient, as there were no plausible allegations of intent or recklessness regarding harm or stalking. Defamation and related claims failed because the allegedly defamatory material could be innocently interpreted or lacked special damages. The court also concluded that the appeal as to the woman and her parents was frivolous and ordered the plaintiff and his attorneys to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for bringing a meritless appeal and for submitting briefs containing fictitious quotations and misstatements of law. The court awarded costs to other appellees and referred attorney conduct to state disciplinary authorities. View "D'Ambrosio v Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc.

2026-05-14T08:32:09-08:00

An educational technology company was contracted by a county office of education to provide software and technology services to school districts, which involved collecting and storing various types of student data, including medical information. In 2022, the company experienced a data breach that resulted in unauthorized access to student medical records, including those of a minor plaintiff. The minor, through a guardian, filed a class action lawsuit alleging violations of both the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) and the Customer Records Act (CRA), claiming the company was negligent in protecting confidential medical information and failed to provide timely disclosure of the breach. The Superior Court of Ventura County granted the company’s demurrer and dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under either statute, as the company was not a covered entity under the CMIA or CRA and the plaintiff was not a “customer” under the CRA. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reversed, finding that the company fell within the scope of both statutes and that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to support both claims. The appellate court also determined that the trial court erred by denying leave to amend the complaint. The Supreme Court of California reversed the appellate decision. The Court held that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege the company was a “provider of health care” under the CMIA, nor that he was the company’s “customer” under the CRA, so no claim was stated under either statute. However, the Court clarified that under the CMIA, a breach of confidentiality occurs when medical information is exposed to a significant risk of unauthorized access or use, and actual viewing by an unauthorized party is not required. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc." on Justia Law

State v. Simons

2026-03-26T07:40:21-08:00

A defendant accessed the internet using a publicly available Wi-Fi network operated by a local business, A&W, located near his home. Access to the Wi-Fi required users to acknowledge terms of service that, among other things, stated A&W did not actively monitor the network but could cooperate with legal authorities and disclose users’ activities in response to lawful requests. After A&W’s owner and their consultant noticed suspicious activity flagged by their firewall, they informed law enforcement, which then directed A&W to monitor and log the defendant’s internet activity for approximately one year. This surveillance included tracking over 255,000 webpage visits and collecting packet capture data. Information obtained through this monitoring led to the defendant’s identification, arrest, and conviction on charges of encouraging child sexual abuse. The case was first heard in the Lane County Circuit Court, where the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from the year-long monitoring. The trial court found A&W’s owner and consultant acted as state agents but ruled that the defendant had no protected privacy interest in his use of the public Wi-Fi network, and denied the suppression motion. After a stipulated facts trial, the court convicted the defendant. On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant did not have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his internet browsing activities on the public network under the circumstances. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals in part, and reversed the judgment of the circuit court, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, a person retains a right to privacy in their internet browsing activities even when accessing the internet via a public network, and that acknowledging terms of service like those present did not eliminate that privacy right. The year-long warrantless monitoring constituted a “search,” and the State failed to justify the lack of a warrant. View "State v. Simons" on Justia Law

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment

2026-03-25T06:45:08-08:00

Several major music copyright owners, including a leading entertainment company, sought to hold an Internet service provider responsible for copyright infringement committed by its subscribers. The service provider, which serves millions of customers, was notified by a monitoring company of over 160,000 instances where its subscribers’ IP addresses were linked to alleged copyright violations such as illegal music file sharing. Although the provider had policies prohibiting infringement and took steps such as issuing warnings and suspending service, the copyright holders argued these measures were inadequate and brought suit seeking to impose liability on the provider for continuing to serve known infringers. The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. There, the jury found in favor of the copyright owners on both contributory and vicarious liability, and determined the provider’s infringement was willful, awarding $1 billion in statutory damages. After the District Court denied the provider’s post-trial motion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding of contributory liability, reasoning that supplying a service with knowledge it would be used for infringement was sufficient. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed as to vicarious liability and remanded for a new determination of damages. The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case concerning contributory liability. The Court held that a service provider is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only if it either induced the infringement or provided a service tailored for infringement. Because the provider neither encouraged infringement nor offered a service primarily designed for infringement—since Internet access has substantial lawful uses—the provider was not contributorily liable. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment on contributory liability and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment" on Justia Law

United States v. Burger

2026-03-19T15:30:34-08:00

An 18-year-old high school senior from Texas was indicted by a federal grand jury for transmitting threats in interstate commerce, based on statements he made while using the online gaming platform Roblox. The statements, made in a virtual “Church” experience, referenced possessing firearms, preparing munitions, and intentions to commit violence at a Christian event. Other Roblox users, located in Pennsylvania and Nevada, reported these statements to the FBI, believing them to be serious threats rather than mere role-play or trolling. The government alleged the defendant's remarks corresponded to a real concert scheduled in Austin and supported its case with evidence from the defendant’s internet history and statements captured by a keylogger. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the indictment before trial, concluding no reasonable juror could find that the defendant’s statements constituted “true threats” outside the protection of the First Amendment. The court found the context—a role-playing video game environment filled with extreme and offensive avatars—undermined the seriousness of the statements, and excluded evidence of the defendant’s conduct outside Roblox as irrelevant. The district court released the defendant without conditions, later imposing some conditions after a government request. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the question of whether the statements were “true threats” is a factual issue that should ordinarily be decided by a jury at trial, not by the judge on a pretrial motion. The court found that disputed facts and contextual uncertainties required a trial on the merits, and that the district court erred by resolving these issues prematurely. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded for further proceedings. The appeal regarding the defendant’s release was dismissed as moot. View "United States v. Burger" on Justia Law

NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA

2026-03-12T08:31:12-08:00

A national trade association representing large online businesses challenged a recently enacted California statute designed to protect minors’ privacy and well-being online. The law imposes specific requirements on businesses whose online services are likely to be accessed by children under eighteen, including obligations regarding data use, age estimation, and restrictions on certain user interface designs known as “dark patterns.” Before the law took effect, the association brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that several provisions were unconstitutional on First Amendment and vagueness grounds, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement. The district court initially enjoined the entire statute, finding the association was likely to succeed on its facial First Amendment challenge. On the State’s appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated most of the injunction, affirming only as to a specific requirement regarding Data Protection Impact Assessments and related inseverable provisions, and remanded for the district court to analyze the association’s other facial challenges and the issue of severability under the Supreme Court’s clarified standards in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. On remand, the district court again enjoined the entire statute and, in the alternative, seven specific provisions. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the association did not meet its burden for a facial challenge to the law’s coverage definition or its age estimation requirement, vacating the injunction as to those. However, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the law’s data use and dark patterns restrictions on vagueness grounds, finding the provisions failed to clearly delineate prohibited conduct. The court vacated the injunction as to the statute’s remainder and remanded for further proceedings on severability. View "NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

Hale v. ARcare, Inc

2026-02-13T08:01:20-08:00

ARcare, Inc., a nonprofit community health center receiving federal funding, suffered a data breach in early 2022 when an unauthorized third party accessed confidential patient information, including names, social security numbers, and medical treatment details. After ARcare notified affected individuals, several patients filed lawsuits alleging that ARcare failed to adequately safeguard their information as required under federal law. Plaintiffs reported fraudulent invoices and that their information was found for sale on the dark web. The actions were removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, where six class actions were consolidated. ARcare sought to invoke absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) of the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA), which provides immunity for damages resulting from the performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions.” ARcare moved to substitute the United States as defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act, arguing the data breach arose from a “related function.” The district court denied the motion, finding that protecting patient information from cyberattacks was not sufficiently linked to the provision of health care to qualify as a “related function” under the statute. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the statutory immunity issue de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of immunity, holding that the FSHCAA’s language does not extend statutory immunity to claims arising from a health center’s data security practices. The court reasoned that “related functions” must be activities closely connected to the provision of health care, and data security is not such a function. Therefore, ARcare is not entitled to substitute the United States as defendant, and the denial of statutory immunity was affirmed. View "Hale v. ARcare, Inc" on Justia Law

Defense Distributed v. Attorney General New Jersey

2026-02-12T11:00:36-08:00

A Texas-based company distributed files online that enabled the 3D printing of functional, untraceable firearms. After New Jersey’s Attorney General issued a cease-and-desist letter and the state legislature enacted a statute prohibiting the distribution of such files to unlicensed individuals, the company and an affiliated nonprofit restricted New Jersey residents from accessing these files. The plaintiffs challenged the actions, alleging violations of the First, Second, and Fourteenth Amendments. Initially, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Western District of Texas, which dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs then filed a similar suit in the District of New Jersey, alleging the statute constituted criminal censorship. After complex procedural maneuvers—including appeals and transfers between Texas and New Jersey, and requests for retransfer—the litigation proceeded in the District of New Jersey, which consolidated the relevant cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District of New Jersey’s decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s rulings. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying retransfer to Texas. The court further held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a Second Amendment claim, as there were no allegations that any plaintiff or member was prevented from 3D-printing a firearm. The court also found the statute was not void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause, as it provided fair notice of prohibited conduct. Finally, the court held that plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts showing that the computer code at issue was expressive and entitled to First Amendment coverage, as the complaint did not detail the nature or expressive use of the files. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Defense Distributed v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Stokinger v. Armslist, LLC

2026-02-06T09:00:04-08:00

A Pennsylvania-based company operating an online marketplace for firearms was sued under New Hampshire law by a former Boston police officer and his wife. Their claims alleged that the company’s website facilitated the sale of a firearm in New Hampshire in 2015, which was later used to shoot the officer in Boston in 2016. The plaintiffs asserted causes of action including negligence, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, public nuisance, loss of consortium, and loss of support, based on the website’s alleged design and operation in encouraging illegal gun sales. Previously, the plaintiffs had filed a similar suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court against the company and other defendants, but that court dismissed the claims against the company based on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, without ruling on personal jurisdiction. After jurisdictional discovery, the Massachusetts Superior Court subsequently dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs then filed the present action in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, which denied their request for jurisdictional discovery and dismissed their claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding the company had not purposefully availed itself of the protections of New Hampshire’s laws. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part and vacated it in part. The First Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case of purposeful availment based on contacts up to 2016, but concluded that evidence of thousands of “New Hampshire” firearm listings on the website from 2018 onward, when considered with other evidence, sufficed for a prima facie showing of purposeful availment. The court remanded for consideration of relatedness and reasonableness and affirmed denial of jurisdictional discovery. View "Stokinger v. Armslist, LLC" on Justia Law

Svoboda v Amazon.com Inc.

2025-12-17T13:30:16-08:00

Two individuals brought a class action against Amazon, alleging that its Virtual Try-On (VTO) feature—used to preview makeup and eyewear products by rendering them on users’ faces via their mobile devices—violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). The VTO software, developed both in-house and by a third party, captured users’ facial geometry to overlay products for virtual preview. The plaintiffs claimed Amazon collected, stored, and used their facial data and that of many others in Illinois without proper notice, informed consent, or the creation of required data retention and destruction policies as mandated by BIPA. After removal from Illinois state court to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The district court certified a class of all individuals who used Amazon’s VTO feature in Illinois after September 7, 2016. The district court found the class satisfied the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and that common questions—primarily concerning the VTO’s functionality and Amazon’s use of biometric data—predominated over individual questions such as location and damages. It also found a class action was superior due to the size and cost of potential individual litigation. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the class certification decision, focusing on predominance and superiority. The court affirmed the district court’s certification, holding that common questions about Amazon’s alleged statutory violations predominated and that individual questions regarding user location and damages were manageable. The court also agreed that a class action was superior to individual suits, given the complexity and cost of litigation, and affirmed the district court’s discretion. View "Svoboda v Amazon.com Inc." on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara

2025-12-17T11:01:11-08:00

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision. Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Christopherson v. Cinema Entertainment Corp.

2025-12-08T08:30:23-08:00

A company operating movie theaters in several Midwestern states offered free movie trailers on its website to attract customers. After a website visitor viewed these trailers, she began to receive targeted advertisements on her Facebook page. She alleged that the company had installed a program, Meta Pixel, which tracked her activity and shared her personal information with Meta (Facebook’s parent company). She claimed that the company, as a “video tape service provider,” had a duty under the Video Privacy Protection Act not to disclose her personally identifiable information without consent. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the complaint. The district court found that the company was not a “video tape service provider” as defined by the statute, because it was not engaged in the business of renting, selling, or delivering prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials. As a result, the court concluded that the company had no statutory obligation to withhold the plaintiff’s personal information under the Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed with the district court, holding that movie theaters are not “engaged in the business” of renting, selling, or delivering prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials. The court reasoned that the statutory definition requires a physical medium similar to video cassette tapes, which does not include theatrical screenings or free online trailers. The court further determined that offering trailers online did not constitute a separate business of delivering audio visual materials for livelihood or gain. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Christopherson v. Cinema Entertainment Corp." on Justia Law

NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA

2025-09-09T08:31:19-08:00

California enacted a law aimed at addressing concerns about minors’ addiction to social media by regulating how internet platforms provide personalized content to users under 18. The law restricts minors’ access to algorithmic feeds without parental consent, imposes default settings such as hiding like counts and requiring private accounts, and mandates future age-verification procedures. NetChoice, a trade association representing major internet companies, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing it unconstitutionally restricts both platforms’ and users’ speech, and that some provisions are unconstitutionally vague. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against two provisions not at issue in this appeal, but otherwise denied NetChoice’s request for broader injunctive relief. The district court found that NetChoice lacked associational standing to challenge the personalized-feed restrictions as applied to its members, that the age-verification requirements were not ripe for review, and that the default settings provisions (including the like-count and private-mode requirements) were constitutional. The court also rejected NetChoice’s vagueness arguments and found that any unconstitutional provisions could be severed from the Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit agreed that NetChoice lacked associational standing for as-applied challenges to the personalized-feed provisions and that the age-verification requirements were unripe. The court held that the private-mode default setting survived intermediate scrutiny, but found that the like-count default setting was a content-based restriction on speech and failed strict scrutiny. The court determined that the like-count provision was severable and ordered the district court to enjoin its enforcement, while affirming the denial of injunctive relief as to the other challenged provisions. View "NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

In re Subpoena Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC

2025-08-15T08:31:15-08:00

Capstone Studios Corp., a copyright holder, sought to identify 29 subscribers of CoxCom LLC, an Internet service provider, whose IP addresses were allegedly used to share pirated copies of Capstone’s movie via the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol. Capstone petitioned the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii to issue a subpoena under § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to compel Cox to disclose the subscribers’ identities. Cox notified its subscribers, and one, identified as “John Doe,” objected, claiming he had not downloaded the movie and that his Wi-Fi had been unsecured. A magistrate judge treated John Doe’s letter as a motion to quash the subpoena. The magistrate judge found that Cox’s involvement was limited to providing Internet access, qualifying it for the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), which covers service providers acting solely as conduits for data transmission. The magistrate judge concluded that, as a matter of law, a § 512(h) subpoena cannot issue to a § 512(a) service provider. The district court adopted these findings and quashed the subpoena. Capstone’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and Capstone appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the DMCA does not permit a § 512(h) subpoena to issue to a service provider whose role is limited to that described in § 512(a), because such providers cannot remove or disable access to infringing content and thus cannot receive a valid notification under § 512(c)(3)(A), which is a prerequisite for a § 512(h) subpoena. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual finding that Cox acted only as a § 512(a) service provider. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order quashing the subpoena. View "In re Subpoena Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

In re: Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation

2025-06-25T09:00:11-08:00

A data breach occurred at Wawa convenience stores, affecting customers' payment information. Wawa discovered the breach in December 2019 and contained it within days. The breach led to a class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, consolidating 15 actions into three tracks: financial institution, employee, and consumer. The consumer track, which is the focus of this case, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, and violations of state consumer protection laws, seeking both damages and injunctive relief. The District Court preliminarily approved a settlement that included compensation through Wawa gift cards and cash for out-of-pocket losses, as well as injunctive relief to improve Wawa's data security. Class member Theodore Frank objected, arguing that the settlement's attorney's fees were excessive and that the settlement included a clear sailing agreement and a fee reversion clause. The District Court approved the settlement and the attorney's fees, but Frank appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the fee award and remanded the case, instructing the District Court to scrutinize the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and the presence of any side agreements. On remand, the District Court found no clear sailing agreement or collusion and determined that the fee reversion was unintentional. The court reaffirmed the attorney's fee award based on the funds made available to the class, considering the benefits provided, including the injunctive relief. The Third Circuit reviewed the District Court's findings and affirmed the judgment, holding that the attorney's fee award was reasonable and that the settlement process was free of collusion or improper side agreements. The court emphasized the meaningful benefits provided to the class members and the appropriateness of the fee award based on the amount made available rather than the amount claimed. View "In re: Wawa, Inc. Data Security Litigation" on Justia Law

U.S. v. Rosenschein

2025-05-12T07:31:05-08:00

In 2016, an anonymous user uploaded child pornography images to Chatstep, an internet chatroom service. Chatstep identified and reported the uploads to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) using Microsoft’s PhotoDNA. The Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) in New Mexico traced the IP address to Guy Rosenschein and obtained a warrant to search his home, uncovering approximately 21,000 images and videos of child pornography. Rosenschein was indicted on charges of possession and distribution of child pornography. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Rosenschein’s pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, dismiss the case, or compel discovery of the computer programs used by Microsoft and NCMEC. Rosenschein pleaded guilty to one count of possession and seven counts of distribution of child pornography, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of all three motions. The court held that Chatstep and Microsoft were not acting as governmental agents, so the Fourth Amendment did not apply to their conduct. Even if they were considered governmental agents, Rosenschein had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the images he uploaded to a public chatroom. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Rosenschein’s motion to compel discovery of NCMEC’s reporting system, since he had the opportunity to access the information through witness examination. Lastly, the court upheld the district court’s refusal to require expert reports for the government’s witnesses before the suppression hearing, since Rule 16(a)(1)(G) does not apply to suppression hearings. View "U.S. v. Rosenschein" on Justia Law

NetChoice v. Fitch

2025-04-17T15:30:15-08:00

A recently enacted Mississippi statute, House Bill 1126, aims to protect minors from harmful online material by requiring digital service providers (DSPs) to verify users' ages, obtain parental consent for minors, limit data collection, and implement strategies to mitigate harmful content exposure. NetChoice, L.L.C., a trade association for internet-focused companies, challenged the statute's constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its enforcement. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the preliminary injunction, finding that NetChoice was likely to succeed on its claims that the statute was unconstitutional. The court determined that NetChoice had associational standing to bring the suit on behalf of its members and that the statute imposed significant regulatory burdens that could cause financial harm. The Attorney General of Mississippi appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its findings and failed to perform the necessary facial analysis as mandated by the Supreme Court in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court did not conduct the required two-step analysis outlined in Moody. This analysis involves defining the law's scope and determining which applications violate the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit noted that the district court did not fully assess the range of activities and actors regulated by the statute or the specific regulatory burdens imposed on different DSPs. Consequently, the court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further factual analysis consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Moody and Fifth Circuit precedent. View "NetChoice v. Fitch" on Justia Law

Salazar v. Paramount Global

2025-04-03T11:00:17-08:00

Michael Salazar filed a class action lawsuit against Paramount Global, alleging a violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). Salazar claimed that he subscribed to a 247Sports e-newsletter and watched videos on 247Sports.com while logged into his Facebook account. He alleged that Paramount had installed Facebook’s tracking Pixel on 247Sports.com, which enabled Paramount to track and disclose his video viewing history to Facebook without his consent. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Salazar’s complaint. The court found that Salazar had standing because the alleged disclosure of his video viewing history to Facebook constituted a concrete injury. However, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under the VPPA, concluding that Salazar was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court reasoned that Salazar’s subscription to the 247Sports e-newsletter did not qualify him as a “consumer” because the newsletter was not “audio visual materials.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit agreed that Salazar had standing but held that he did not plausibly allege that he was a “consumer” under the VPPA. The court interpreted the term “goods or services” in the context of the VPPA to mean audio-visual materials, and since Salazar’s newsletter subscription did not involve audio-visual materials, he was not a “consumer” under the Act. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, as Salazar had not filed a formal motion to amend his complaint. View "Salazar v. Paramount Global" on Justia Law

USA V. THOMPSON

2025-03-17T08:00:26-08:00

Paige Thompson committed a significant data breach, hacking into Amazon Web Services (AWS) customers' accounts, stealing data from at least 30 entities, and causing tens of millions of dollars in damage. She also used the stolen credentials to mine cryptocurrency, further increasing the financial impact on the victims. Thompson was arrested after she revealed her activities to a cybersecurity professional, leading to an FBI investigation. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington calculated Thompson's sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. However, the court granted a substantial downward variance, sentencing her to time served (approximately 100 days) and five years of probation. The court emphasized Thompson's personal history, including her transgender identity, autism, and past trauma, as significant factors in its decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court overemphasized Thompson's personal story and failed to properly weigh several of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court held that the district court's findings regarding Thompson's lack of malicious intent, her remorse, and the seriousness of her actions were clearly erroneous and not supported by the record. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the district court did not adequately consider the need for general and specific deterrence or the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities. The Ninth Circuit vacated Thompson's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to properly weigh all relevant factors and provide a more substantial justification for any variance from the Guidelines. View "USA V. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

USA V. SULLIVAN

2025-03-13T08:30:29-08:00

Joseph Sullivan, the former Chief Security Officer for Uber Technologies, was convicted of obstruction of justice and misprision of a felony. The case arose from Sullivan's efforts to cover up a significant data breach at Uber while the company was under investigation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for its data security practices. The breach involved hackers accessing and downloading sensitive information from Uber's servers. Sullivan and his team tracked down the hackers and had them sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) in exchange for a payment, recharacterizing the hack as part of Uber's Bug Bounty Program. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial, where a jury found Sullivan guilty. Sullivan appealed, challenging the jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and an evidentiary ruling. He argued that the district court erred in rejecting his proposed jury instructions regarding the "nexus" requirement for the obstruction charge and the "duty to disclose" instruction. He also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his misprision conviction and that the court improperly admitted a guilty plea agreement signed by one of the hackers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed Sullivan's argument regarding the "nexus" instruction and that the district court did not err in rejecting it. The court also found that the omission of the "duty to disclose" instruction was proper, as the theories of liability under Section 1505 and Section 2(b) were conjunctive. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Sullivan's misprision conviction and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hacker's guilty plea agreement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Sullivan's conviction. View "USA V. SULLIVAN" on Justia Law

IN RE: CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN DATA BREACH LITIGATION

2025-02-24T09:00:27-08:00

A cyberattack on California Pizza Kitchen, Inc. (CPK) in September 2021 compromised the personal information of over 100,000 former and current employees. This led to multiple class action lawsuits against CPK, alleging negligence and other claims. The consolidated plaintiffs reached a settlement with CPK, offering cash payments and credit monitoring services to class members, with CPK required to make payments only to those who submitted valid claims. The settlement's monetary value was estimated at around $950,000, while the attorneys sought $800,000 in fees. The United States District Court for the Central District of California approved the settlement but reserved judgment on the attorneys' fees until after the claims process concluded. The consolidated plaintiffs reported a final claims rate of 1.8%, with the maximum monetary value of the claims being around $950,000. Despite expressing concerns about the scope of attorneys' fees, the district court ultimately awarded the full $800,000 in fees and costs. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's approval of the class settlement, finding that the district court had properly applied the heightened standard to review the settlement for collusion and had not abused its discretion in finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the fee award, noting that the district court had not adequately assessed the actual value of the settlement and compared it to the fees requested. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the settlement's actual value to class members and award reasonable and proportionate attorneys' fees. View "IN RE: CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN DATA BREACH LITIGATION" on Justia Law

DOE V. GRINDR INC.

2025-02-18T09:30:27-08:00

An underage user of the Grindr application, John Doe, filed a lawsuit against Grindr Inc. and Grindr LLC, alleging that the app facilitated his sexual exploitation by adult men. Doe claimed that Grindr's design and operation allowed him to be matched with adults despite being a minor, leading to his rape by four men, three of whom were later convicted. Doe's lawsuit included state law claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a federal claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Doe's claims, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provided Grindr with immunity from liability for the state law claims. The court also found that Doe failed to state a plausible claim under the TVPRA, as he did not sufficiently allege that Grindr knowingly participated in or benefitted from sex trafficking. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 barred Doe's state law claims because they implicated Grindr's role as a publisher of third-party content. The court also agreed that Doe failed to state a plausible TVPRA claim, as he did not allege that Grindr had actual knowledge of or actively participated in sex trafficking. Consequently, Doe could not invoke the statutory exception to Section 230 immunity under the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2018. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Doe's claims in their entirety. View "DOE V. GRINDR INC." on Justia Law

Hay v. Marinkovich

2025-02-06T12:30:53-08:00

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging that he made and retained an unauthorized copy of her computer hard drive, which contained private and confidential data. The complaint included a claim for violation of Penal Code section 502, which prohibits unauthorized use of any computer system for an improper purpose. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney fees. In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a civil jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant on all of the plaintiff's causes of action. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for attorney fees and costs under section 502, subdivision (e). The trial court granted the defendant's costs but denied his request for attorney fees, concluding that section 502 does not permit an award of fees to prevailing defendants and that, even if it did, it would be unreasonable to award fees in this case because there was no evidence that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or abusive. The defendant appealed the order to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California. The appellate court agreed with the defendant that section 502 allows the award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants. However, the court concluded that section 502 defendants may only recover attorney fees where the plaintiff's claim was objectively without foundation when brought, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the plaintiff's claim was not frivolous or abusive and affirmed the order denying attorney fees. View "Hay v. Marinkovich" on Justia Law

Jones v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC

2024-12-24T08:30:21-08:00

Ann Jones filed lawsuits against Bloomingdales.com, LLC, and Papa John's International, Inc., alleging that their websites used "session replay" technology to record her electronic communications, including mouse movements, clicks, and keystrokes, without her knowledge. She claimed this technology invaded her privacy by creating a detailed record of her website visits, which could be used for targeted advertisements and website improvements. In the Eastern District of Missouri, the district court dismissed Jones's complaint against Bloomingdales for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing a lack of concrete injury as she did not allege the capture of sensitive information. In the case against Papa John's, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Jones appealed both dismissals. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the cases and consolidated them for oral argument. The court held that Jones did not plausibly allege a concrete injury in either case, affirming the lower courts' judgments. The court noted that Jones's allegations did not demonstrate that the session-replay technology captured any private or sensitive information, such as social security numbers, medical history, or financial details. The court compared the situation to a security camera in a physical store, where customers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their general movements. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Jones lacked standing to sue because her allegations did not show a concrete harm to her privacy. The court emphasized that merely asserting an invasion of privacy without supporting facts is insufficient to establish standing. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissals of both cases. View "Jones v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC" on Justia Law

M.H., et al. v. Omegle.com LLC

2024-12-09T14:31:03-08:00

C.H., an eleven-year-old, was sexually exploited by a stranger on Omegle.com, an online platform that connects users in video chatrooms. The stranger, referred to as John Doe, threatened C.H. into creating child pornography. C.H.'s parents sued Omegle.com LLC, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (Masha’s Law) for knowingly possessing child pornography and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act for knowingly benefiting from a sex trafficking venture. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the claims, citing section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which protects providers of interactive computer services from being treated as the publisher or speaker of user-provided information. The court also found that the sex trafficking claim did not meet the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) exception to section 230 because C.H.'s parents did not allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of benefiting from sex trafficking. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that C.H.'s parents did not state a claim under Masha’s Law because they failed to allege that Omegle.com knowingly possessed or accessed child pornography. The court also held that the FOSTA exception to section 230 requires actual knowledge of sex trafficking, not just constructive knowledge. Since C.H.'s parents did not plausibly allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of the sex trafficking incident involving C.H., the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims. View "M.H., et al. v. Omegle.com LLC" on Justia Law

Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury

2024-11-26T16:30:14-08:00

The case involves six plaintiffs who are users of Tornado Cash, a cryptocurrency mixing service that uses immutable smart contracts to anonymize transactions. Tornado Cash was sanctioned by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for allegedly facilitating money laundering for malicious actors, including North Korea. The plaintiffs argued that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by designating Tornado Cash as a Specially Designated National (SDN) and blocking its smart contracts. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of the Treasury, finding that Tornado Cash is an entity that can be sanctioned, that its smart contracts constitute property, and that the Tornado Cash DAO has an interest in these smart contracts. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether the immutable smart contracts could be considered "property" under IEEPA. The court concluded that these smart contracts are not property because they are not capable of being owned, controlled, or altered by anyone, including their creators. The court emphasized that property, by definition, must be ownable, and the immutable smart contracts do not meet this criterion. Consequently, the court held that OFAC exceeded its statutory authority by sanctioning Tornado Cash's immutable smart contracts. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to grant the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment based on the Administrative Procedure Act. The court did not address whether Tornado Cash qualifies as an entity or whether it has an interest in the smart contracts, as the determination that the smart contracts are not property was dispositive. View "Van Loon v. Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law

Griggs v. NHS Management, LLC

2024-11-15T06:30:03-08:00

Shymikka Griggs filed a data-breach action against NHS Management, LLC, a consulting firm providing management services for nursing homes and physical-rehabilitation facilities. NHS collects sensitive personal and health information from employees, patients, and vendors. In May 2021, NHS discovered a cyberattack on its network, which lasted 80 days. NHS notified affected individuals, including Griggs, in March 2022. Griggs, a former NHS employee, claimed her personal information was found on the dark web, leading to credit issues, spam communications, and fraudulent activities. Griggs initially filed a class-action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama but later dismissed it. She then filed a class-action complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court in June 2023, alleging negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, breach of confidence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. NHS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed Griggs's complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that Griggs failed to sufficiently plead her claims. Specifically, she did not demonstrate that NHS owed her a duty under Alabama law, failed to establish proximate cause for her negligence per se claim, did not allege intentional conduct for her invasion-of-privacy claim, and did not show that she conferred a benefit on NHS for her unjust-enrichment claim. Additionally, the court found that breach of confidence is not a recognized cause of action in Alabama and that Griggs did not establish a fiduciary relationship between her and NHS. View "Griggs v. NHS Management, LLC" on Justia Law

UMG Recordings v. Grande Communications Networks, LLC

2024-10-09T15:30:19-08:00

A group of major record labels sued Grande Communications Networks, LLC, an internet service provider, for contributory copyright infringement. The plaintiffs alleged that Grande knowingly provided internet services to subscribers who used them to infringe on the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. The plaintiffs presented evidence that Grande received over 1.3 million infringement notices from Rightscorp, a company that identifies infringing activity on peer-to-peer networks, but Grande did not terminate or take action against repeat infringers. Instead, Grande continued to provide internet services to these subscribers, despite knowing about their infringing activities. The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas held a three-week jury trial. The jury found Grande liable for willful contributory copyright infringement and awarded the plaintiffs $46,766,200 in statutory damages. Grande moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the issue of liability and for a new trial on damages, but the district court denied these motions. Grande then appealed, challenging the district court's rulings on its JMOL motion, the jury instructions, and the final judgment. The plaintiffs filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding a jury instruction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the jury's verdict, finding that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of contributory copyright infringement. The court concluded that Grande had knowledge of its subscribers' infringing activities and materially contributed to the infringement by continuing to provide internet services without taking basic measures to prevent further damage. However, the court found that the district court erred in awarding statutory damages for each individual song rather than for each album, as the Copyright Act treats all parts of a compilation as one work for statutory damages purposes. Consequently, the court vacated the damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages. The plaintiffs' conditional cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. View "UMG Recordings v. Grande Communications Networks, LLC" on Justia Law

United States v. Chatrie

2024-07-09T10:30:55-08:00

The case involves Okello Chatrie, who was convicted for robbing a credit union in Virginia. The police, unable to identify the suspect from security footage and witness interviews, obtained a geofence warrant to access Google's Location History data. This data revealed that Chatrie's phone was in the vicinity of the bank during the robbery. Chatrie was subsequently indicted and pleaded not guilty, moving to suppress the evidence obtained via the geofence warrant. The district court denied Chatrie's motion to suppress, citing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Chatrie entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 141 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release. He appealed, arguing that the geofence warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the fruits of the warrant should be suppressed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Chatrie did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the two hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google. Therefore, the government did not conduct a Fourth Amendment search when it obtained this information from Google. The court rejected Chatrie's argument that the geofence warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights, stating that he voluntarily exposed his location information to Google by opting into Location History. The court also noted that the information obtained was far less revealing than that obtained in previous cases involving long-term surveillance. View "United States v. Chatrie" on Justia Law

United States v. Haggerty

2024-07-09T09:00:11-08:00

The case involves Robert Haggerty, a first-time offender who was indicted on three counts of receiving a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, as well as one count of possessing such depictions. Haggerty admitted to communicating with undercover detectives posing as underage girls using online messaging platforms. A search of Haggerty's house and truck yielded two tablets containing a total of 97 still images and 9 videos of child sexual abuse material. The District Court applied multiple Guideline enhancements at sentencing, including a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7), which provides for a graduated enhancement scheme based on the number of "images" involved in a child-exploitation offense. Haggerty objected to the application of a five-level, number-of-images enhancement, arguing that the Guideline is unambiguous and does not include videos. The District Court overruled Haggerty’s objection and applied the five-level enhancement, calculating a total offense level of 32, which yielded an advisory Guideline range of 121 to 151 months in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "image," in the moving picture or video context, unambiguously means "frame." Deference to the Commentary’s 75-images rule is therefore unwarranted. Instead, the number of frames comprising a moving picture or video will determine the specific sentencing enhancement that a District Judge must apply. The court vacated the District Court’s sentencing order and remanded for resentencing in a manner consistent with its holding. View "United States v. Haggerty" on Justia Law

Conlan Abu v. Dickson

2024-07-08T09:30:36-08:00

The case revolves around a dispute between Stanley Dickson, owner of several businesses, and Conlan Abu, a company that purchased the assets of one of Dickson's businesses, the Epicurean Group. After the sale, the relationship between the parties soured and they attempted to unwind the deal. During this period, Dickson's IT administrator, John Massey, preserved some emails from the accounts associated with the Epicurean Group for potential litigation. Conlan Abu filed a lawsuit alleging that Dickson and his accounting firm violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Stored Communications Act by accessing these emails. The district court had previously ruled in favor of Dickson and his associates. It found that Massey, as the IT administrator, did not intentionally act without authorization or exceed his authorization when he accessed the email accounts using his own credentials. The court also found that Massey did not intentionally exceed his authorization under the Act, as he had no reason to know that his conduct was unauthorized. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Massey did not intentionally access the emails without authorization or exceed his authorization under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The court also found that Massey did not intentionally exceed his authorization under the Stored Communications Act. The court concluded that Conlan Abu failed to show that Massey acted without authorization or intentionally exceeded his authorization, and therefore could not recover under either Act. View "Conlan Abu v. Dickson" on Justia Law

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC

2024-07-01T07:54:04-08:00

In 2021, Florida and Texas enacted statutes regulating large social-media companies and other internet platforms. The laws curtailed the platforms' ability to engage in content moderation and required them to provide reasons to a user if they removed or altered her posts. NetChoice LLC, a trade association whose members include Facebook and YouTube, brought First Amendment challenges against the two laws. District courts in both states entered preliminary injunctions. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction of Florida’s law, holding that the state's restrictions on content moderation trigger First Amendment scrutiny. The court concluded that the content-moderation provisions are unlikely to survive heightened scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed and reversed the preliminary injunction of the Texas law. The court held that the platforms’ content-moderation activities are “not speech” at all, and so do not implicate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgments and remanded the cases, stating that neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Fifth Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms. The Court held that the laws interfere with protected speech, as they prevent the platforms from compiling the third-party speech they want in the way they want, thus producing their own distinctive compilations of expression. The Court also held that Texas's asserted interest in correcting the mix of viewpoints that major platforms present is not valid under the First Amendment. View "Moody v. NetChoice, LLC" on Justia Law

XMission, LC v. PureHealth Research

2024-06-28T10:30:54-08:00

The case involves XMission, a Utah-based internet service provider, and PureHealth Research, a Wyoming LLC that sells nutritional supplements online. XMission sued PureHealth in federal district court in Utah, alleging that PureHealth sent thousands of unwanted promotional emails to XMission’s customers in Utah, violating state and federal law. This resulted in increased server maintenance costs and customer complaints for XMission. PureHealth moved to dismiss the case for lack of specific personal jurisdiction, arguing it lacked sufficient contacts with Utah and the lawsuit did not “arise out of or relate to” its forum conduct. The district court granted the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that PureHealth knowingly sent marketing emails to XMission’s customers in Utah, which constituted purposeful direction of its activities at residents of the forum state. The court also found that XMission’s claims arose out of or related to those activities. Therefore, the court concluded that Utah had specific personal jurisdiction over PureHealth. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "XMission, LC v. PureHealth Research" on Justia Law

Dhyne v. People

2024-06-17T08:02:14-08:00

This case revolves around the question of whether a search for internet-related evidence that extended to a previously unknown basement apartment was reasonable, even though the apartment was not specified in the warrant. The police had obtained a warrant to search a property after receiving information that child pornography had been downloaded to a particular IP address associated with that address. The property appeared to be a single-family home. However, during the execution of the warrant, the police encountered Kevin Matthew Dhyne, who lived in a basement apartment on the property and used the same internet access as the rest of the house. The police searched Dhyne’s apartment and found sexually explicit material involving children on his laptop. The trial court agreed with Dhyne's argument that the search violated the U.S. and Colorado constitutions because the warrant was not specific to his basement apartment. However, the court denied Dhyne’s motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that even if the officers had not searched his apartment in conjunction with the original warrant, they would have executed the same search later that day under a warrant specific to the basement apartment, and the evidence would therefore have inevitably been discovered. Dhyne was convicted of two counts of sexual exploitation of a child. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion, though it did so by upholding the search rather than by applying the inevitable discovery exception. The court of appeals agreed that for a multi-dwelling unit, separate dwellings normally require separate, specific warrants. However, the court justified the search of Dhyne’s apartment based on the shared use of the IP address. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the outcome, holding that the warrant's reference to the property's "[h]ouse, garage, and any outbuildings" was sufficiently specific because there were no outward indicators that the basement apartment existed. The court also held that the execution of the warrant was reasonable in this specific scenario, where the warrant was for all buildings on the property and the defendant told the police that he lived in the basement and used the IP address that provided grounds for the search. View "Dhyne v. People" on Justia Law

ZELLMER V. META PLATFORMS, INC.

2024-06-17T08:00:29-08:00

The case involves Clayton Zellmer, who sued Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook) for alleged violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). Zellmer, who never used Facebook, claimed that the company violated BIPA when it created a "face signature" from photos of him uploaded by his friends and failed to publish a written policy outlining its retention schedule for collected biometric data. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Meta on Zellmer's claim under Section 15(b) of BIPA. The court reasoned that it would be practically impossible for Meta to comply with BIPA if it had to obtain consent from everyone whose photo was uploaded to Facebook before it could use its Tag Suggestions feature. The court also dismissed Zellmer's claim under Section 15(a) of BIPA for lack of standing, holding that Zellmer did not suffer a particularized injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions but on different grounds. The appellate court rejected the district court's reasoning for granting summary judgment, stating that BIPA's plain text applies to everyone whose biometric identifiers or information is held by Facebook. However, the court concluded that there was no material dispute of fact as to whether Meta violated BIPA's plain terms. The court found that face signatures, which are created from uploaded photos, cannot identify and therefore are not biometric identifiers or information as defined by BIPA. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Zellmer's claim under Section 15(a) of BIPA for lack of standing, agreeing with the district court that Zellmer did not suffer a particularized injury. View "ZELLMER V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

Rutledge v. Menard

2024-05-23T07:35:14-08:00

Tammy and James Rutledge filed a lawsuit against Pamela Menard and Randall Nappi, seeking to recover personal property. The Rutledges followed the instructions on Form CV-218, which was available on the Maine Judicial Branch's website, to serve the defendants. This form was created during the COVID-19 pandemic and instructed plaintiffs to prepare for a telephonic status conference as the first court event. However, by the time the Rutledges filed their lawsuit, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court had rescinded most of the pandemic management orders, and court proceedings had returned to an in-person format. The District Court (Bridgton, Malia, J.) dismissed the Rutledges' complaint with prejudice due to their failure to appear in person for a hearing. The Rutledges had mistakenly believed that the initial court proceeding would be a telephonic status conference, as per the instructions on Form CV-218. They appealed the decision, arguing that the court erred in dismissing their case with prejudice and denying their post-judgment motion to reopen the case or amend the judgment to a dismissal without prejudice. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the District Court did not err in finding that the Rutledges failed to appear. However, it held that the dismissal with prejudice was too drastic a sanction given the circumstances. The court noted that the Judicial Branch's website continued to direct parties to Form CV-218, which no longer reflected current court practices, contributing to the Rutledges' mistaken belief. The court also noted that the Rutledges' nonappearance was neither deliberate nor the result of misconduct, and they made a sustained effort to remedy their error. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a judgment of dismissal without prejudice. View "Rutledge v. Menard" on Justia Law

Rosenthal v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC

2024-05-09T12:00:04-08:00

The case involves Scott Rosenthal, a Massachusetts resident, who filed a class action lawsuit against Bloomingdales.com, LLC, an Ohio-based company with its principal place of business in New York. Rosenthal alleged that Bloomingdales unlawfully intercepted and used information about his activity on its website. The company had commissioned third-party vendors to embed JavaScript computer code on its website, which was deployed onto Rosenthal's internet browser while he visited the site. This code intercepted, recorded, and mapped his electronic communications with the website. Rosenthal claimed that this violated the Massachusetts Wiretapping Act and the Massachusetts Invasion of Privacy Statute. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Rosenthal's complaint for lack of specific personal jurisdiction over Bloomingdales. The court concluded that the defendant's conduct, which formed the basis of Rosenthal's claims, occurred outside of Massachusetts. The court also determined that Bloomingdales had not initiated contact with Massachusetts. Because the complaint failed to identify a 'demonstrable nexus' between Rosenthal's claims and Bloomingdale's contacts with Massachusetts, the court found no basis for specific jurisdiction over Bloomingdales. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court found that Rosenthal failed to provide "affirmative proof" that Bloomingdales purposefully deployed the JavaScript code to intentionally target users in Massachusetts. The court concluded that Rosenthal had not sufficiently established that Bloomingdales purposefully availed itself of what Massachusetts has to offer, thus failing to meet the requirements for specific jurisdiction. View "Rosenthal v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC" on Justia Law

United States v. Escudero

2024-05-02T08:03:18-08:00

In 2021, Hugo Escudero was investigated as a suspected wholesale cocaine dealer based on information provided by a confidential informant. The informant claimed that Escudero and his brother were selling large amounts of cocaine and used a runner, M.G., to deliver the drugs. Law enforcement officers corroborated this information through surveillance and obtained a GPS tracking warrant for Escudero's vehicle. This led to additional search warrants for Escudero's apartment and music studio. In September 2021, officers arrested Escudero and M.G. when they arrived with a kilogram of cocaine for a controlled buy. Escudero was indicted and filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the tracking and search warrants. A federal magistrate judge recommended denying Escudero's motions to suppress, and the district court adopted this recommendation. During the trial, Escudero posted a message on M.G.'s Facebook page, which the court admitted into evidence as it was "probative of the consciousness of guilt" and not unfairly prejudicial. The jury found Escudero guilty of possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, and he was sentenced to 216 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Escudero challenged the legitimacy of the tracking warrant, the admission of his Facebook message, and the sufficiency of evidence for his guilty verdict. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the tracking warrant, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Escudero's Facebook message and witness list comment, and the evidence was sufficient to convict Escudero of possession. View "United States v. Escudero" on Justia Law

Commonwealth v. James

2024-04-24T04:05:27-08:00

The case involves a professional photographer who sexually exploited a minor. The defendant initially contacted the victim through a social networking site and began communicating with her through various means, eventually soliciting and receiving explicit images of the victim. The defendant also met the victim in person and sexually abused her. After the victim's parents reported the exploitation to the police, an investigation was launched. The police seized a computer tower, an external hard drive, and other items from the defendant's former residence. A forensic examination of the hard drives revealed explicit images of the victim, communications between the defendant and the victim, and hundreds of images of unidentified females in various stages of undress. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including aggravated rape of a child and enticement of a minor. He pleaded guilty to all charges, except for the eight counts of aggravated rape of a child, where he pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of statutory rape. After being sentenced, the defendant filed a motion for the return of the seized property. The Commonwealth opposed the return of the property, arguing that it was in the "public interest" to destroy the devices. The Superior Court denied the defendant's request for the return of certain property. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted an application for direct appellate review. The court concluded that the procedural requirements set forth in G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, must be followed before a forfeiture decree may be issued under G. L. c. 276, § 3. The court vacated the Superior Court orders denying the return of certain property to the defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. James" on Justia Law

United States v. Flechs

2024-04-19T07:03:52-08:00

In January 2021, John William Thomas Flechs, using the pseudonym “John Breezy,” began conversations on the Kik online messaging platform with someone he believed to be a 14-year-old boy. In fact, Flechs was messaging Sergeant John Haning, a member of the Rogers County, Oklahoma Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. Over the next four days, Flechs and the minor discussed sexual topics in graphic detail. After they discussed meeting in person, Flechs asked the minor if he would be going to the skatepark. When Flechs arrived at the skatepark, he handed two Dr. Pepper sodas to an officer posing as the minor. Officers then arrested him. A grand jury indicted Flechs for attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). A petit jury returned a guilty verdict. The district court sentenced Flechs to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. Flechs timely appealed. On appeal, Flechs argued that the trial evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to entice the minor or took a substantial step toward enticement. He also argued that the jury instruction on the term “grooming” violated Federal Rule of Evidence 605, contained an unconstitutional presumption on the element of intent, and misstated the law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Flechs of attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The court also held that the jury instruction on the term “grooming” did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 605, did not contain an unconstitutional presumption on the element of intent, and did not misstate the law. View "United States v. Flechs" on Justia Law

State v. Azar

2024-04-18T06:38:58-08:00

The case involves Raji Afife Azar, who was charged with three counts of "computer crime" under ORS 164.377(2)(c) for selling items on eBay that he believed to be stolen. The state argued that by selling stolen merchandise on eBay, Azar had accessed and used a computer system for the purpose of committing theft of property. Azar moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had not proved that he had engaged in "computer hacking," which he asserted was required to establish computer crime. The trial court denied Azar's motion, and a nonunanimous jury convicted him of those counts. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Azar's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court concluded that Azar's conduct of selling stolen property on eBay constituted computer crime under ORS 164.377(2)(c). The court reasoned that "theft" as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses each of the forms of theft described in ORS 164.015, including theft by receiving. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend for the computer crime statute to reach conduct such as Azar's, which may constitute "theft" within the meaning of the Criminal Code but neither interferes with another’s protected interests in a computer, computer system, or computer network nor depends on computer technology as the means of gaining access to the thing that the person seeks to unlawfully obtain. The court held that the trial court erred in denying Azar's motion for judgment of acquittal and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Azar" on Justia Law

United States v. Cody Hopkins

2024-04-04T07:30:25-08:00

In this case, the defendant, Cody Wayne Hopkins, was charged with Attempted Enticement of a Minor Using the Internet, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The accusation revolved around an online conversation Hopkins had with a government agent posing as a 13-year-old girl. Despite knowing her age, Hopkins continued the conversation, making explicit sexual remarks, and arranging to meet her at a nearby high school. Upon arriving, Hopkins was arrested, and in a subsequent interview, admitted to knowing the girl was underage but claimed his intention was only to talk to her. During his trial, Hopkins claimed he was severely sleep-deprived during the interview, which led to confusion. However, the prosecution implied that he was lying about this assertion since it was not mentioned in the interview's transcript, which was redacted and given to the jury. Furthermore, the prosecution argued that Hopkins intended to entice a minor into engaging in illegal sexual activity based on his explicit text messages, despite Hopkins's claims of merely wanting to talk. The jury found Hopkins guilty, and he moved for a new trial citing prosecutorial misconduct. He argued that the prosecution had attacked his credibility based on untrue facts - that he had not mentioned sleep deprivation during the interview - and had repeatedly misstated the elements of the charged crime. However, the district court denied his motion for a new trial. Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found no plain error in the prosecution’s conduct that would affect Hopkins' substantial rights, as the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. The court also did not find any exceptional circumstances warranting reversal due to the prosecutor's alleged misstatement of the elements of the crime during the closing argument. Lastly, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not deny Hopkins a fair trial. View "United States v. Cody Hopkins" on Justia Law

Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC

2024-04-02T13:01:21-08:00

The case involves tech icon Steve Wozniak and 17 other plaintiffs who sued YouTube and Google over a cryptocurrency scam. The scam involved hijacking popular YouTube channels, impersonating tech celebrities, and hosting fake live events promising to double any cryptocurrency sent to a specific account. The plaintiffs claimed that YouTube and Google knowingly hosted, promoted, and profited from the scam for years. The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, which provides immunity to interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision for most of the plaintiffs’ claims. It held that the claims were barred by the CDA as they sought to treat YouTube and Google as publishers of third-party content. However, the court found one claim – that YouTube and Google created their own content and materially contributed to the illegality of the scam by providing verification badges to hijacked YouTube channels – could potentially fall outside the scope of CDA immunity. The court concluded that as currently pleaded, these allegations were inadequate, but there was a reasonable possibility the defects could be cured by amendment. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC" on Justia Law

Weeks v. Interactive Life Forms, LLC

2024-03-25T11:30:59-08:00

An online business, Interactive Life Forms, LLC, was sued by a customer, Brinan Weeks, who alleged that the company falsely advertised a product he purchased. In response, the company invoked an arbitration clause found in the terms of use on its website, claiming that these terms bound customers irrespective of whether they clicked on the link or provided any affirmative assent. The company argued that by using the website and making a purchase, Weeks had agreed to the terms of use, which included a provision mandating arbitration for any disputes. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the company failed to show the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The court held that the link to the terms of use was insufficient to put a reasonable user on notice of the terms of use and the arbitration agreement. On appeal, the Appellate Court of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division One, affirmed the trial court’s decision. It held that the company failed to establish that a reasonably prudent user would be on notice of the terms of use. The court rejected the company's argument that it should depart from precedent, which generally considers browsewrap provisions unenforceable, and also dismissed the company's claim that Federal Arbitration Act preempts California law adverse to browsewrap provisions. The court concluded there were no grounds to deviate from this precedent, and that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt California law concerning browsewrap agreements. The court emphasized that the company had the onus to put users on notice of the terms to which it wished to bind consumers. View "Weeks v. Interactive Life Forms, LLC" on Justia Law

United States v. Orlandella

2024-03-20T13:30:06-08:00

The defendant, Brian Orlandella, was convicted by a jury of sexual exploitation of a minor and transfer of obscene material to a minor. The charges arose from Orlandella's interactions with a minor via the Kik messenger app. On appeal, Orlandella raised five arguments, all of which were rejected by the court. Orlandella argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, but the court held that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he persuaded the minor to produce explicit videos and pictures. Orlandella also contended that the court erred by not giving the jury a specific unanimity instruction on Count One, but the court held that a general unanimity instruction was sufficient. Furthermore, Orlandella claimed that the government violated its obligations to disclose evidence that could have helped his defense. However, the court found that the evidence in question was not material and its suppression did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Orlandella also argued that the court erred by failing to give the jury a missing witness instruction regarding the government's failure to call the minor as a witness. The court found that the minor was not peculiarly available to the government and that Orlandella was not prejudiced by her absence. Finally, Orlandella contended that his incriminating statements were taken in violation of his Miranda rights. The court held that even if there was a Miranda violation, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence against Orlandella. Consequently, his convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Orlandella" on Justia Law

Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC

2024-03-18T10:01:19-08:00

The plaintiffs in this case, Steve Wozniak and 17 individuals who fell victim to a cryptocurrency scam, sued YouTube and Google. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knowingly hosted, promoted, and profited from a scam that falsely claimed Wozniak was hosting a live event, during which anyone who sent cryptocurrency to a specified account would receive double the amount in return. The defendants argued that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 provided immunity because the plaintiffs were trying to treat them as publishers of third-party content. However, the plaintiffs contended that they were not treating the defendants as publishers but were instead seeking to hold them liable for engaging in actions they knew would further criminal activity. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District held that most of the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act as they sought to treat the defendants as publishers of third-party content. However, the court found that the plaintiffs' claim that defendants created their own content and materially contributed to the scam's illegality by providing verification badges to hijacked YouTube channels potentially fell outside the scope of immunity. The court concluded that the trial court erred in not granting leave to amend the claims related to verification badges. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wozniak v. YouTube, LLC" on Justia Law

Lindke v. Freed

2024-03-15T07:35:15-08:00

In a case involving a city manager's personal social media account, a citizen sued the city manager under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his First Amendment rights were violated when the manager deleted his comments and blocked him from commenting further. The city manager argued that he operated his social media account in his private capacity, thus not constituting state action required for §1983 liability. The District Court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed this view, determining that the city manager's social media conduct did not constitute state action. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. The court held that a public official's social media activity constitutes state action under §1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the State's behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts. The court emphasized that the first prong is grounded in the requirement that the conduct causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State. The second prong requires that the official must purport to use that authority. The court noted that the nature of the technology matters to the state-action analysis and that the state-action doctrine requires a fact-intensive inquiry. View "Lindke v. Freed" on Justia Law

Williams v. Binance

2024-03-08T07:31:13-08:00

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who used the online cryptocurrency exchange, Binance, to purchase crypto-assets known as "tokens". They allege Binance violated the Securities Act of 1933 and the "Blue Sky" securities laws of various states by selling these tokens without registration. They also sought to rescind contracts they entered into with Binance under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, alleging Binance contracted to sell securities without being registered as a securities exchange or broker-dealer. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as impermissible extraterritorial applications of these statutes and also dismissed their federal claims as untimely. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this decision. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that their transactions on Binance were domestic transactions, thereby making the application of federal and state securities laws permissible. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' federal claims did not accrue until after they made the relevant purchases, and therefore their claims arising from purchases made during the year before filing suit were timely. This case is significant as it addresses the application of federal and state securities laws to transactions involving cryptocurrencies, and the extraterritorial reach of these laws in the context of online cryptocurrency exchanges. View "Williams v. Binance" on Justia Law

State of Iowa v. Miller

2024-03-08T07:04:09-08:00

A case was brought before the Supreme Court of Iowa involving Kadin Miller, who was convicted of harassment after he posted a video of himself and his ex-girlfriend engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on a pornography website without her consent. This act was done to "annoy" and "get back at" his ex-girlfriend after their relationship ended on bad terms. As a result of his conviction, Miller was sentenced to two years in prison and was required to register as a sex offender. The main issue in the appeal was whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 692A. Under Iowa law, individuals convicted of any sex offense are required to register as a sex offender if they reside, are employed, or attend school in the state. The law sets forth a comprehensive list of sex offenses that require an offender to register as a sex offender. However, the crime Miller was convicted of, harassment in the first degree, is not a per se sex offense. For non-per se sex offenses, an offender is required to register only if the state proves “beyond a reasonable doubt” to “a judge or jury” that the offense was “sexually motivated.” In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller's crime was sexually motivated. The court found that the district court's reasoning did not focus on the relevant statutory inquiry—whether the crime was sexually motivated—and instead focused on whether Miller had a sexual interest in the video. The court also noted that there was no evidence to support the district court's finding that Miller's commission of the crime of harassment was done for the purpose of his own sexual gratification. As such, the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's finding that Miller's crime was sexually motivated, and therefore, Miller was not required to register as a sex offender. View "State of Iowa v. Miller" on Justia Law

Benvenuto v. Brookman

2024-03-06T05:01:25-08:00

This case involves a lieutenant with the Hartford Police Department who filed a bill of discovery against a blogger who writes about Hartford municipal governance. The plaintiff is seeking to compel the defendant to release data that would reveal the identities of anonymous commenters on the blog who posted allegedly defamatory statements about him. The plaintiff also wants the defendant's laptop and cellphone to be submitted for forensic analysis. The trial court granted the plaintiff's bill of discovery, stating that the plaintiff had shown probable cause for his defamation claim against the authors of certain anonymous comments. The court ordered that the parties should try to agree on a protective order and search protocols to safeguard the defendant's privacy during the forensic analysis. If they couldn't agree, the court would resolve the dispute. The defendant appealed the decision before any negotiations took place. The Supreme Court of Connecticut dismissed the defendant's appeal, stating that the trial court's decision was not an appealable final judgment. The Court explained that the final judgment rule applies to a pure bill of discovery, and the trial court's decision wouldn't become a final judgment until the scope of discovery was clearly defined either by the parties' agreement or by court order. In this case, the parties hadn't yet complied with the court's order to either agree on the terms of the protective order and search protocols or to return to the court for resolution of those issues. Therefore, the trial court's decision was not a final judgment. View "Benvenuto v. Brookman" on Justia Law

US v. Crater

2024-02-27T10:00:04-08:00

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant, Randall Crater, was convicted of wire fraud, unlawful monetary transactions, and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business based on his involvement in a cryptocurrency scheme. The trial lasted eight days and was based on Crater's management of My Big Coin (MBC), a cryptocurrency company that allegedly misrepresented itself as a gold-backed digital currency and claimed a partnership with MasterCard. The defendant appealed two of the district court's rulings. Firstly, Crater argued that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process by refusing to enforce subpoenas against three federal agency witnesses due to Crater's non-compliance with the agencies' Touhy regulations. Secondly, Crater contended that the district court did not perform its gatekeeping duty by admitting testimony from the government's cryptocurrency expert without holding a Daubert hearing. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Crater's arguments could not be reconciled with controlling precedent or the record in the case. The court found that Crater's failure to show how the excluded testimony of the federal agents would have been both material and favorable to his defense invalidated his Sixth Amendment claim. Furthermore, the court held that Crater's objections to the expert witness's qualifications and methodology were insufficient to necessitate a Daubert hearing. View "US v. Crater" on Justia Law

United States v. Rider

2024-02-23T16:31:02-08:00

In this case, Chad Michael Rider was convicted of three counts of producing or attempting to produce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and was sentenced to 720 months’ imprisonment. The evidence presented included numerous videos that Rider had taken of minors, in various stages of undress, in places where they expected privacy such as bathrooms. Rider appealed his conviction and sentence on several bases, including arguing that his conversation with police officers, where he admitted to setting up cameras, should have been suppressed, that expert testimony about his lack of pedophilic tendencies should have been admitted, that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, and that his sentence was unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected all of Rider's arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. The court found that Rider was not in custody when he spoke to the officers, and so his statements were not involuntary. The court also found that there was no error in excluding the expert testimony, as it was not relevant to any element of the charges that the government had to prove. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, as there was ample evidence that Rider had the intent and took the necessary steps to produce child pornography. The court also ruled that the jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment. Finally, the court found that the sentence was not unreasonable, given the uniquely disturbing facts of the case and Rider's lack of remorse. View "United States v. Rider" on Justia Law

United States v. Zelaya-Veliz

2024-02-16T11:30:43-08:00

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, six men affiliated with the transnational criminal organization MS-13 were convicted of sex trafficking a thirteen-year-old girl by force, fraud, or coercion, and conspiracy to do the same. The accused appealed the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained from Facebook warrants, arguing the warrants failed the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. One of the accused also appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, contending that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The court held that the Facebook warrants were supported by probable cause, as they were based on substantial evidence linking the accused’s use of Facebook to their criminal activities. The court also held that the warrants were sufficiently particular as they identified the items to be seized by reference to the suspected criminal offenses and confined the officers’ discretion by restricting them from rummaging through the accused’s social media data in search of unrelated criminal activities. However, the court noted that future warrants enhance their claims to particularity by requesting data only from the period of time during which the defendant was suspected of taking part in the criminal conspiracy. The court rejected one appellant's sufficiency challenge to his conviction and affirmed his convictions, finding that substantial evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that he was guilty of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor under fourteen or of a minor by force, fraud, or coercion, and of conspiracy to transport a minor in interstate commerce with intent for the minor to engage in prostitution or illegal sexual activity. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "United States v. Zelaya-Veliz" on Justia Law

DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

2024-02-14T09:31:46-08:00

In this case, the plaintiff, a victim of sex trafficking, brought a putative class action against various entities, including foreign-based defendants who operated websites on which videos of her abuse were uploaded and viewed. The district court dismissed the claims against the foreign-based defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated in part, holding that the district court erred in its conclusion. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over two foreign defendants, WebGroup Czech Republic, a.s. ("WGCZ") and NKL Associates, s.r.o. ("NKL"), which operated the websites. The court concluded that the plaintiff had shown that these defendants had purposefully directed their activities toward the United States, that her claims arose from these forum-related activities, and that the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. The court based its decision on several factors. WGCZ and NKL had contracted with U.S.-based content delivery network services to ensure faster website loading times and a more seamless viewing experience for U.S. users, demonstrating that they had actively targeted the U.S. market. They also profited significantly from U.S. web traffic. Furthermore, the harm the plaintiff suffered—namely, the publication of videos of her abuse on the defendants' websites—had occurred in the U.S., and a substantial volume of the widespread publication of the videos occurred in the U.S. As for the remaining foreign defendants, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of them because it was based solely on the incorrect assumption that there was no personal jurisdiction over WGCZ and NKL. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether personal jurisdiction could be asserted against these additional defendants. View "DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S." on Justia Law

PATRICK V. RUNNING WAREHOUSE, LLC

2024-02-12T09:31:35-08:00

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's order to compel arbitration and dismiss without prejudice a series of lawsuits against several sports goods e-commerce companies (the defendants). The lawsuits were brought by several plaintiffs, who were consumers that purchased goods online from the defendants and had their personal information stolen during a data breach on the defendants' websites. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in their terms of use. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the arbitration provision and that the arbitration clause was not invalid under California law, was not unconscionable, and did not prohibit public injunctive relief. Furthermore, the parties agreed to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator according to the commercial rules and procedures of JAMS, a private alternative dispute resolution provider. View "PATRICK V. RUNNING WAREHOUSE, LLC" on Justia Law

People v. Campos

2024-01-22T11:31:18-08:00

This case involves a dispute over the use of electronic information evidence in a murder trial. The defendant, Christian Steve Campos, was charged with premeditated murder and convicted of second-degree murder. He argued that electronic evidence, obtained by the government from his Facebook account and cellphone records under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA), should have been suppressed because he was not properly notified of its acquisition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, agreed that the government did not properly notify the defendant pursuant to the CalECPA, but concluded that suppression of the evidence was unwarranted. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed the judgment. The court found that while the government did violate the CalECPA's notice provisions, the purpose of the CalECPA was achieved despite the notice error because the efforts of law enforcement to obtain the defendant's electronic information were eventually made known to him before trial began. As a result, the court concluded that suppression of the evidence was not the appropriate remedy for the notice violations. View "People v. Campos" on Justia Law

State v. Odiah

2024-01-16T08:20:39-08:00

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Somayina Odiah, the defendant, was appealing his conviction for one count of indecent solicitation of a child. The defendant had been communicating online with a person he believed to be a 14-year-old transitioning from male to female named “Alice.” However, “Alice” was a fictitious character created by the Rhode Island State Police for an undercover operation. The defendant was arrested after arranging to meet “Alice” in person. The defendant's argument on appeal focused on the claim that the state had not proven that “Alice” was “over the age of fourteen,” a necessary element for the charged offense. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the conviction. It held that even if “Alice” had turned fourteen on the day of the charged offense, under Rhode Island law, a person reaches their next year in age at the first moment of the day prior to the anniversary date of their birth. Therefore, “Alice” would have been considered to be exactly fourteen years old on the day before the charged offense. The court concluded that the defendant was planning to meet a fourteen-year-old child, with whom he had communicated about sexual activity, and that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the charge on the basis of the state not proving "Alice" was "over the age of fourteen." Thus, the defendant's judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Odiah" on Justia Law

State v. Scheetz

2024-01-12T07:33:34-08:00

The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had overturned Mark Scheetz's convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy, rape, sexual exploitation of a child, and victim intimidation. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the cumulative effect of various trial errors denied Scheetz his constitutional right to a fair trial. However, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in its analysis, as Scheetz failed to make a timely and specific objection at trial to preserve an evidentiary challenge for appellate review as required by K.S.A. 60-404. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found the internet search history evidence was relevant to establish Scheetz's sexual desire for underage girls, a required element of the sexual exploitation of a child charge. The Supreme Court also concluded the prosecutor did not commit error in his closing arguments as the panel had determined. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Scheetz's convictions. View "State v. Scheetz" on Justia Law

Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google LLC

2024-01-11T09:30:52-08:00

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Best Carpet Values, Inc. and Thomas D. Rutledge initiated a class action lawsuit against Google, LLC. The plaintiffs argued that Google, through its Search App on Android phones, displayed their websites in a way that occupied valuable space for which Google should have paid. They contended that Google received all the benefits of advertising from the use of that space. The plaintiffs made state-law claims for trespass to chattels, implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment, and violation of California's Unfair Competition Law. The court reviewed questions certified by the district court for interlocutory review. In response to the first question, the court ruled that the website copies displayed on a user's screen should not be protected as chattel, concluding that a cognizable property right did not exist in a website copy. As a result, the plaintiffs’ trespass to chattels claim was dismissed. Addressing the third question, the court held that website owners cannot invoke state law to control how their websites are displayed on a user's screen without being preempted by federal copyright law. The court determined that the manner in which the plaintiffs’ websites were displayed fell within the subject matter of federal copyright law. It also found that the rights asserted by the plaintiffs’ implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment claim were equivalent to the rights provided by federal copyright law. Thus, the plaintiffs’ state-law claim was preempted by federal copyright law. Given these findings, the court did not address the other certified questions. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in denying Google’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lierman

2024-01-10T12:01:28-08:00

In this case, the United States Chamber of Commerce and three other trade associations sued to stop the enforcement of a new state tax in Maryland known as the Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act. The law requires large technology companies to pay a tax based on gross revenue they earn from digital advertising in the state. The plaintiffs alleged that the Act violates the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed three of the counts as barred by the Tax Injunction Act, which prevents federal courts from stopping the collection of state taxes when state law provides an adequate remedy. The court dismissed the fourth count on mootness grounds after a state trial court declared the Act unconstitutional in a separate proceeding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the first three counts, but vacated the judgment to the extent it dismissed those counts with prejudice, ordering that the dismissal be entered without prejudice. The appellate court also vacated the dismissal of the fourth count and remanded for further proceedings, as the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to the Act's prohibition on passing the tax onto consumers was not moot. View "Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lierman" on Justia Law

McDonough v. Garcia

2024-01-10T10:04:28-08:00

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit partially affirmed and partially reversed a lower court's ruling in a case involving James McDonough, a citizen activist, who was banned from future meetings and arrested for disorderly conduct and cyberstalking by the City of Homestead, Florida. McDonough claimed these actions violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The court determined that the city council meetings were designated public forums, and the ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest as required, thus violating McDonough's First Amendment rights. The court also found that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest McDonough for disorderly conduct, which involved swearing at officers and making obscene gestures. The court stated that such actions do not constitute disorderly conduct and are protected under the First Amendment. However, the court ruled that the City had probable cause to arrest McDonough for cyberstalking, as it was not unreasonable for the City to interpret Florida’s cyberstalking statute as barring McDonough from targeting one of its officers with his series of posts. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "McDonough v. Garcia" on Justia Law

United States v. Grabau

2024-01-03T08:31:09-08:00

This case concerns the appeal of Gordon Grabau's sentence for receiving child pornography, with the appellant arguing that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement because he knowingly distributed child pornography. The United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, maintaining that Grabau, who was a field technician for a technology company and held a bachelor's degree in computer science, demonstrated superior knowledge about how software works. This knowledge, in conjunction with his use of the peer-to-peer file-sharing program BitTorrent and his possession of a large collection of child pornography, was deemed by the court as sufficient evidence that Grabau knowingly distributed child pornography. Therefore, the application of the two-level enhancement was found to be appropriate. View "United States v. Grabau" on Justia Law

DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

2024-01-02T09:31:16-08:00

The plaintiff, a survivor of childhood sex trafficking, filed a class action suit against a group of foreign and domestic corporations, alleging that they violated federal and California laws by distributing videos of her sexual abuse on the internet. The defendants included the owners and operators of two pornography websites based in the Czech Republic. The plaintiff argued that the court had personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), which allows for jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if the claim arises under federal law, the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts, and exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the U.S. Constitution and laws. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's dismissal. The court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case that the Czech website operators had purposefully directed their websites at the United States. The court also held that the plaintiff's claims arose from the defendants' forum-related activities, and that the defendants failed to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action against the Czech defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court also vacated the district court's dismissal of nine additional foreign defendants. The district court had dismissed these defendants solely on the grounds that there was no personal jurisdiction over the Czech defendants. The appellate court instructed the district court to address on remand whether personal jurisdiction could be asserted against these additional defendants. View "DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S." on Justia Law

BLIGE VS. TERRY

2023-12-28T10:08:58-08:00

The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld a judgment from a lower court in a case involving extortion claims related to cryptocurrency. The case involves Christopher Terry, who sued Ava Blige, alleging she extorted cryptocurrency and money from him under threat of publishing his personal information. Blige failed to respond to court-ordered discovery requests, leading the district court to enter a default judgment in favor of Terry. The court found that Terry had established a prima facie case for conversion, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, awarding him damages accordingly. The court also found that the factual allegations supported a claim for extortion, even though it was not specifically pleaded in the complaint. On appeal, Blige argued that the district court erroneously determined that she had impliedly consented to being sued under the unpleaded legal theory of extortion. The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed with Blige on this issue, stating that a defaulting party cannot be found to have impliedly consented to try claims that were not pleaded in the complaint. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that Blige wrongfully dispossessed Terry of the cryptocurrency and money for cars through extortive acts under the theories of conversion, unjust enrichment, and caused him emotional distress. View "BLIGE VS. TERRY" on Justia Law

Paglia & Associates Construction v. Hamilton

2023-12-27T13:31:34-08:00

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight, the plaintiff, a construction company, sued the defendant, a homeowner, for defamation after the homeowner posted critical comments about the company online. The homeowner had hired the construction company to repair her home after it was damaged by a fallen tree. Dissatisfied with the work, the homeowner reported the company to the Contractors State License Board and began posting negative reviews of the company on her blog and Yelp. In response to the defamation lawsuit, the homeowner filed a special motion to strike, arguing that her comments were protected by the litigation privilege. The trial court denied the motion, and the homeowner appealed. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the homeowner's online posts were not covered by the litigation privilege. The court explained that the litigation privilege applies only to communications made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings that have some connection to the litigation. The homeowner's posts were public criticisms of the construction company, some of which did not even mention the Contractors State License Board. Therefore, the court found that the posts were akin to press releases and lacked the necessary connection to the proceedings before the board. The court also rejected the homeowner's arguments that the construction company failed to plead that her statements were unprivileged, that her statements were true, and that her statements were merely her opinions. View "Paglia & Associates Construction v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Johnson v. Griffin

2023-10-31T12:01:07-08:00

While Johnson, CEO of VisuWell, had dinner at a Franklin, Tennessee hotel, 40-50 teenagers taking prom pictures created a disturbance. Johnson asked the chaperone to settle them down. One teenager, wearing a red prom dress, confronted Johnson, while his boyfriend filmed the interaction. The video captures Johnson saying that the student in the dress “look[s] like an idiot.” Johnson left. The boyfriend posted the video to TikTok and it was reposted to Twitter. VisuWell’s Board assured Johnson that VisuWell would stand by him. Days later, the celebrity Kathy Griffin retweeted the clip to her two million followers: “If this is Sam Johnson in Nashville, Tennessee, the CEO of @VisuWell, healthcare-tech-growth strategist, married to Jill Johnson where they may reside in Franklin, Tennessee, it seems like he’s dying to be online famous,” with a caption: “Homophobic POS in Tennessee harasses a teenager for wearing a dress to prom.” Later, Griffin tweeted pictures of Johnson with the caption: THIS Sam Johnson of Franklin Tennessee. Several VisuWell customers threatened to reevaluate their business ties. VisuWell fired Johnson and announced this decision in a reply to Griffin’s original tweet. Griffin then warned against keeping him on the Board. Johnson sued Griffin in federal court. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Griffin’s repeated emphasis of Johnson’s residence and VisuWell’s home base indicates that she knew that the “focal point” of her tweets concerned Tennessee. View "Johnson v. Griffin" on Justia Law

United States v. Agbi

2023-10-18T12:31:11-08:00

Agbi, born and raised in Nigeria but a resident of the U.S. since 2016, acted as a middleman in a scheme to use fake online dating accounts to solicit hundreds of thousands of dollars from unwitting elderly people. Agbi collected cash at his Indianapolis apartment, took his “cut,” and transferred the rest to accounts in Nigeria. More than 30 months after his arrest, Agbi’s counsel notified the government that Agbi intended to pursue a duress defense, claiming, for the first time, that members of the conspiracy located in Nigeria had threatened Agbi’s family. The district court granted a motion to preclude the defense. At trial, two of the scheme’s victims testified that they were deceived into believing that they were in relationships and sent “hundreds of thousands of dollars.” Secret Service agents described the details of a controlled delivery and Agbi’s subsequent interview. Agbi was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; use of a fictitious name in furtherance of mail fraud, section 1342; conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 1341, 1349; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 1956(a)(1), 1956(h) and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence supporting each count was legally sufficient to support a conviction. The district court appropriately employed the obstruction of justice enhancement based on its finding that Agbi knowingly submitted a “fake” police report concerning threats against his family. View "United States v. Agbi" on Justia Law

City of East St. Louis v. Netflix, Inc.

2023-10-13T11:00:54-08:00

The Illinois Cable and Video Competition Law requires operators to obtain statewide authorization and become a “holder” and requires anyone who wants to provide cable or video service to obtain permission from state or local authorities and pay a fee, as a condition of using public rights of way. In recent years traditional cable services have been supplemented or replaced by streaming services that deliver their content through the Internet. East St. Louis, contending that all streaming depends on cables buried under streets or strung over them, sought to compel each streaming service to pay a fee. None of the defendants were “holders.” A magistrate dismissed the complaint, concluding that only the Attorney General of Illinois is authorized to sue an entity that needs but does not possess, “holder” status. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first concluding that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Normally the citizenship of any entity other than a corporation depends on the citizenship of its partners and members but, under section 1332(d), part of the Class Action Fairness Act, an unincorporated entity is treated like a corporation. The court then held that the statutory system applies to any “cable service or video service” and the defendants do not offer either. If “phone calls over landline cables, electricity over wires, and gas routed through pipes are not trespasses on the City’s land— and they are not—neither are the electrons that carry movies and other videos.” View "City of East St. Louis v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

Priceline.com Incorporated n/k/a Booking Holdings, Inc., et al. v. Mississippi

2023-09-29T01:16:12-08:00

"This case hinges on whether Online Travel Companies (OTCs) are encompassed by the definition of hotels found in Mississippi Code Section 41-49-3 (Rev. 2023) and are therefore subject to the tax levied against hotels in Mississippi Code Section 27-65-23 (Rev. 2017)." The chancery court found that the tax was a broad transaction tax that encompassed the OTCs. The chancery court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State on the issue of liability, rendering the OTCs liable for more than $10 million in past due taxes. The trial court further found that the OTCs had acted willfully and knowingly and in intentional disregard and assessed penalties and interest for a total judgment of more than $50 million. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the OTCs were not hotels as contemplated by Section 41-49-3. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the State on the issue of liability and renders judgment in favor of the OTCs. View "Priceline.com Incorporated n/k/a Booking Holdings, Inc., et al. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Liapes v. Facebook, Inc.

2023-09-21T13:01:23-08:00

Liapes filed a class action against Facebook, alleging it does not provide women and older people equal access to insurance ads. The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits businesses from discriminating against people with protected characteristics (Civ. Code 51, 51.5, 52(a)). Liapes alleged Facebook requires all advertisers to choose the age and gender of users who will receive ads; companies offering insurance products routinely tell it to not send their ads to women or older people. She further alleged Facebook’s ad-delivery algorithm discriminates against women and older people. The trial court dismissed, finding Facebook’s tools neutral on their face and concluding that Facebook was immune under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. The court of appeal reversed. Liapes has stated an Unruh Act claim. Facebook, a business establishment, does not dispute women and older people were categorically excluded from receiving various insurance ads. Facebook, not the advertisers, classifies users based on their age and gender via the algorithm. The complaint also stated a claim under an aiding and abetting theory of liability An interactive computer service provider only has immunity if it is not also the content provider. That advertisers are the content providers does not preclude Facebook from also being a content provider by helping develop at least part of the information at issue. View "Liapes v. Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

State of Missouri v. Biden

2023-09-08T15:31:03-08:00

Plaintiffs—three doctors, a news website, a healthcare activist, and two states—had posts and stories removed or downgraded by the platforms. Their content touched on a host of divisive topics. Plaintiffs maintain that although the platforms stifled their speech, the government officials were the ones pulling the strings. They sued the officials for First Amendment violations and asked the district court to enjoin the officials’ conduct. In response, the officials argued that they only “sought to mitigate the hazards of online misinformation” by “calling attention to content” that violated the “platforms’ policies,” a form of permissible government speech. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and granted preliminary injunctive relief. In reaching that decision, it reviewed the conduct of several federal offices but only enjoined the White House, the Surgeon General, the CDC, the FBI, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of State. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the injunction in part, and modified the injunction in part. The court explained that the White House officials, in conjunction with the Surgeon General’s office, coerced and significantly encouraged the platforms to moderate content. As a result, the platforms’ actions “must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Further, the court held that the CDC officials likely significantly encouraged the platforms’ moderation decisions. However, the court found that for the NIAID officials, it is not apparent that they ever communicated with the social media platforms. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC

2023-08-30T14:30:53-08:00

Brown’s credit-monitoring business used a “negative option feature” on its websites, offering visitors a free credit report but automatically enrolling them in a $29.94 monthly subscription when they applied for that report. Information about the monthly membership was buried . Brown’s contractors created website traffic by posting Craigslist advertisements for fake rental properties and directing applicants to the websites for a “free” credit score. The FTC sued under Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) section 13(b), which authorizes restraining orders and permanent injunctions to enjoin conduct that violates its prohibition of unfair or deceptive trade practices. On its face, section 13(b) authorizes only injunctive relief but the Commission long interpreted it to permit restitution awards—an interpretation adopted by the Seventh Circuit and others. The district court entered a permanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than $5 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit overruled its precedent and held that section 13(b) does not authorize restitution awards. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that section 13(b) does not authorize equitable monetary relief. On remand, the Commission argued that the Court’s decision had significantly changed the law and successfully requested the reimposition of the restitution award under the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act and FTCA section 19. The Seventh Circuit modified the new judgment. Its direction that any funds remaining after providing consumer redress shall be “deposited to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement” exceeds the remedial scope of section 19, which is limited to redressing consumer injuries. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Baysal v. Midvale Indemnity Co.

2023-08-22T13:00:31-08:00

Midvale created an “instant quote” feature on their websites. Anyone who supplied basic identifying information could receive a quote for auto insurance. Each site would auto-fill some information, including the number of the applicant’s driver’s license. Anyone could enter a stranger’s name and home address, which caused the form to disclose the number of the stranger’s driver’s license. Midvale discontinued the autofill feature after observing unusual activity suggesting misuse, and notified people whose information had been disclosed improperly. Three people who received Midvale’s notice filed a purported class action under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721–25. The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, having failed to show a concrete injury traceable to the disclosure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that whether the Act applies at all is questionable. Its principal rule is directed to state officials rather than private actors. A driver’s-license number is not potentially embarrassing or an intrusion on seclusion. It is a neutral fact derived from public records, a fact legitimately known to many private actors and freely revealed to banks, insurers, hotels, and others. Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Midvale’s disclosure of their numbers caused them any injury, and the disclosure of a number in common use by both public and private actors does not correspond to any tort. View "Baysal v. Midvale Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

In re: Sealed Case (AMENDED REDACTED OPINION)

2023-08-09T09:05:51-08:00

The district court issued a search warrant in a criminal case, directing appellant Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter") to produce information to the government related to the Twitter account "@realDonaldTrump." The search warrant was served along with a nondisclosure order that prohibited Twitter from notifying anyone about the existence or contents of the warrant. Although Twitter ultimately complied with the warrant, the company did not fully produce the requested information until three days after a court-ordered deadline. The district court held Twitter in contempt and imposed a $350,000 sanction for its delay. On appeal, Twitter argued that the nondisclosure order violated the First Amendment and the Stored Communications Act, that the district court should have stayed its enforcement of the search warrant, and that the district court abused its discretion by holding Twitter in contempt and imposing the sanction. The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that it affirmed the district court's rulings in all respects. The court wrote that the district court properly rejected Twitter's First Amendment challenge to the nondisclosure order. Moreover, the district court acted within the bounds of its discretion to manage its docket when it declined to stay its enforcement of the warrant while the First Amendment claim was litigated. Finally, the district court followed the appropriate procedures before finding Twitter in contempt of court - including giving Twitter an opportunity to be heard and a chance to purge its contempt to avoid sanctions. Under the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion when it ultimately held Twitter in contempt and imposed a $350,000 sanction. View "In re: Sealed Case (AMENDED REDACTED OPINION)" on Justia Law

Heath v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc.

2023-08-02T09:02:29-08:00

The 1996 E-Rate program (Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support program, Telecommunications Act 110 Stat. 56), is intended to keep telecommunications services affordable for schools and libraries in rural and economically disadvantaged areas. The program subsidizes services and requires providers to charge these customers rates less than or equal to the lowest rates they charge to similarly situated customers. Heath brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that Wisconsin Bell charged schools and libraries more than was allowed under the program, causing the federal government to pay more than it should have. The district court granted Wisconsin Bell summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While Heath’s briefing and evidence focused more on which party bore the burden of proving violations than on identifying specific violations in his voluminous exhibits and lengthy expert report, Heath identified enough specific evidence of discriminatory pricing to allow a reasonable jury to find that Wisconsin Bell, acting with the required scienter, charged specific schools and libraries more than it charged similarly situated customers. It is reasonable to infer that government funds were involved and that if the government knew of actual overcharges, it would not approve claims. View "Heath v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

Kass v. PayPal Inc.

2023-07-27T13:30:48-08:00

PayPal users can transfer money to businesses and people; they can donate to charities through the Giving Fund, its 501(c)(3) charitable organization. Kass created a PayPal account and accepted PayPal’s 2004 User Agreement, including a non-mandatory arbitration clause and allowing PayPal to amend the Agreement at any time by posting the amended terms on its website. In 2012 PayPal amended the Agreement, adding a mandatory arbitration provision. Users could opt out until December 2012. In 2016, PayPal sent emails to Kass encouraging her to make year-end donations. Kass donated $3,250 to 13 charities through the Giving Fund website. Kass alleges she later learned that only three of those charities actually received her gifts; none knew that Kass had made the donations. Kass claims that, although Giving Fund created profile pages for these charities, it would transfer donated funds only to charities that created a PayPal “business” account; otherwise PayPal would “redistribute” the funds to similar charities. Kass and a charity to which she had donated filed a purported class action. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration, then affirmed the arbitrator’s decision in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit vacated. In concluding that Kass had consented to the amended Agreement, the district court erred by deciding a disputed issue of fact that must be decided by a trier of fact: whether Kass received notice of the amended Agreement and implicitly agreed to the new arbitration clause. View "Kass v. PayPal Inc." on Justia Law

CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL

2023-07-13T08:31:29-08:00

Google owns YouTube, an online video-sharing platform that is popular among children. Google’s targeted advertising is aided by technology that delivers curated, customized advertising based on information about specific users. Google’s technology depends partly on what Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulations call “persistent identifiers,” information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services.” In 2013, the FTC adopted regulations under COPPA that barred the collection of children’s “persistent identifiers” without parental consent. The plaintiff class alleged that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent. They pleaded only state law causes of action but also alleged that Google’s activities violated COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were preempted by COPPA. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the third amended complaint on preemption grounds. The court remanded so that the district court can consider, in the first instance, the alternative arguments for dismissal to the extent those arguments were properly preserved. The panel held that state laws that supplement, or require the same thing as federal law, do not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives, and are not “inconsistent.” The panel was not persuaded that the insertion of “treatment” in the preemption clause evinced clear congressional intent to create an exclusive remedial scheme for enforcement of COPPA requirements. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by COPPA. View "CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey

2023-06-29T06:06:53-08:00

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether Facebook could be compelled to provide the contents of two users’ accounts every 15 minutes for 30 days into the future based only on probable cause, the ordinary standard for a search warrant, or whether the State must instead satisfy certain requirements and apply for a wiretap order, which required an enhanced showing -- one beyond probable cause -- because gaining access to private communications in real time is considerably more intrusive than a typical search. In the two matters under review, trial courts quashed the State’s request for prospective information based on a Communications Data Warrant (CDW), which was the equivalent of a search warrant and can be issued on a showing of probable cause. The Appellate Division consolidated the cases and held that the State could obtain prospective electronic communications with a CDW, reasoning that the wiretap statute applied to the contemporaneous interception of electronic communications, not efforts to access communications in storage. The Supreme Court concluded that based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. "The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution." View "Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Vitamins Online, Inc. v. HeartWise, Inc.

2023-06-27T07:32:41-08:00

Plaintiff Vitamins Online, Inc. believed that its competitor, Defendant Heartwise, Inc. (d/b/a NatureWise), was misrepresenting the ingredients of its competitive nutritional supplements and manipulating those products’ Amazon reviews. Vitamins Online sued for violations of the Lanham Act and Utah’s common law Unfair Competition Law. The case proceeded to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which the district court ruled for Vitamins Online and ordered disgorgement of NatureWise’s profits for 2012 and 2013. The court also awarded Vitamins Online attorney fees and costs for NatureWise’s willful misrepresentation and for various discovery abuses. Both parties appealed. NatureWise contended the district court erred in finding that it made false or misleading representations about its own nutritional supplements’ ingredients and its Amazon reviews. NatureWise further asserted the district court erred in concluding that Vitamins Online was entitled to a presumption of injury for these misrepresentations. Vitamins Online contended the district court erred in bifurcating Vitamins Online’s injury into two separate time periods and requiring Vitamins Online to prove that a presumption of injury was applicable separately for each period. Vitamins Online also argued the district court erred in denying disgorgement for the second time period, and for failing to consider an award of punitive damages and an injunction as to NatureWise’s further manipulation of reviews. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not clearly err in applying a presumption of injury, and affirmed the award of profits, attorney fees, and costs, and found no reversable error in the amount awarded. The Court also held the district court failed to consider properly Vitamins Online’s request for punitive damages and an injunction; the Court remanded for the district court to reconsider. View "Vitamins Online, Inc. v. HeartWise, Inc." on Justia Law

Carlos Ramirez v. The Paradies Shops, LLC

2023-06-05T12:02:09-08:00

Plaintiff worked for a company later acquired by the Paradies Shops. He, like many employees, entrusted his employer with sensitive, personally identifiable information (PII). In October 2020, Paradies suffered a ransomware attack on its administrative systems in which cybercriminals obtained the Social Security numbers of Plaintiff and other current and former employees. Shortly after learning of the data breach, Plaintiff brought claims for negligence and breach of implied contract on behalf of himself and those affected by the data breach, arguing Paradies should have protected the PII. He now appeals from the district court’s order granting Paradies’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. He contends the district court demanded too much at the pleadings stage. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the breach of implied contract claim and reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that, as the Georgia Supreme Court has noted, “traditional tort law is a rather blunt instrument for resolving all of the complex tradeoffs at issue in a case such as this, tradeoffs that may well be better resolved by the legislative process.” Nevertheless, having applied Georgia’s traditional tort principles, the court concluded Plaintiff has pled facts giving rise to a duty of care on the part of Paradies. Getting past summary judgment may prove a tougher challenge, but Plaintiff has pled enough for his negligence claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. View "Carlos Ramirez v. The Paradies Shops, LLC" on Justia Law

Morton v. Young

2023-05-19T06:39:35-08:00

Plaintiff Ava Morton appealed the denial of her complaint for an order against stalking. In May 2022, plaintiff’s mother filed a complaint on behalf of plaintiff, who was then seventeen years old, seeking an anti-stalking order against defendant Mayah Young. The affidavit attached to the complaint alleged that in April 2022, defendant had posted a video on the social media platform TikTok that included a half-naked picture of plaintiff. Plaintiff’s mother called the police, who went to defendant’s home, directed her to delete plaintiff’s picture from her phone, and warned her that she could end up in a lot of trouble because plaintiff was a minor. The complaint alleged that afterward, defendant posted another video in which she threatened to hurt plaintiff, followed by two more videos in which she suggested that she still had the picture and might send it to others. The civil division declined to issue a temporary order, concluding that the alleged conduct did not fall within the definition of stalking. Finding no reversible error in the civil division's judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Morton v. Young" on Justia Law

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh

2023-05-18T08:35:15-08:00

A 2017 terrorist attack on an Istanbul nightclub, committed on behalf of ISIS, killed Alassaf and 38 others. Alassaf’s family sued Facebook, Twitter, and Google (which owns YouTube) under 18 U.S.C. 2333, which permits U.S. nationals who have been injured by an act of international terrorism to sue for damages. They alleged that the companies knowingly allowed ISIS and its supporters to use their platforms and “recommendation” algorithms for recruiting, fundraising, and spreading propaganda and have profited from the advertisements placed on ISIS content. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, section 2333(d)(2), imposes secondary civil liability on anyone “who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” The Court concluded that it is not enough for a defendant to have given substantial assistance to a transcendent enterprise. A defendant must have knowingly provided substantial assistance in the commission of the actionable wrong—here, an act of international terrorism. The allegations do not show that the defendants gave ISIS such knowing and substantial assistance that they culpably participated in the attack. There are no allegations that the platforms were used to plan the attack; that the defendants gave ISIS special treatment; nor that the defendants carefully screened content before allowing users to upload it. The mere creation of media platforms is no more culpable than the creation of email, cell phones, or the internet generally. The allegations rest primarily on passive nonfeasance. The plaintiffs identify no duty that would require communication-providing services to terminate customers after discovering that the customers were using the service for illicit ends. The expansive scope of the claims would necessarily hold the defendants liable for aiding and abetting every ISIS terrorist act committed anywhere in the world. The Ninth Circuit improperly focused primarily on the value of the platforms to ISIS, rather than whether the defendants culpably associated themselves with the attack. View "Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh" on Justia Law

Gonzalez v. Google LLC

2023-05-18T08:35:10-08:00

In 2015, ISIS terrorists unleashed coordinated attacks across Paris, killing 130 victims, including Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U.S. citizen. Gonzalez’s family sued Google under 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), (d)(2). They alleged that Google was directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez, citing the use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates, by ISIS and ISIS supporters. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, finding most of the claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1). The sole exceptions were claims based on allegations that Google approved ISIS videos for advertisements and then shared proceeds with ISIS through YouTube’s revenue-sharing system. The court held that these potential claims were not barred by section 230, but that the allegations nonetheless failed to state a viable claim. The complaint neither plausibly alleged that “Google reached an agreement with ISIS,” as required for conspiracy liability, nor that Google’s acts were “intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to influence or affect a government,” as required for a direct-liability claim. The Supreme Court vacated. The complaint. independent of section 230, states little if any claim for relief. The Court noted its contemporaneously-issued “Twitter” decision and held that the complaint fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting. The Court remanded the case for consideration in light of the Twitter decision. View "Gonzalez v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

State of New York v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

2023-04-27T06:33:23-08:00

Meta Platforms, Inc. owns and operates the social media network Facebook. Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and the Territory of Guam joined in a civil complaint charging Facebook with violating the antitrust laws (“the States.”) The States alleged that Facebook committed these violations as a result of its acquisitions of several actual or potential competitors and its restrictions on developers of applications that linked to Facebook. The States sought equitable relief. The district court dismissed their Complaint. The DC Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the States unduly delayed in bringing suit. The court further wrote that the district court properly considered the actual text of Facebook’s 2011 policy as quoted in the FTC’s complaint and properly disregarded the States’ allegations where those allegations were contrary to the policy’s text. In light of the complete text of Facebook’s competitor integration policy, the court rejected the States’ challenge to that policy. Further, the court held that the States’ exclusive dealing theory fails as a matter of law. View "State of New York v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

New Hampshire v. Lamontagne

2023-04-26T05:05:27-08:00

Defendant Justin Lamontagne was convicted by jury on four counts of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. Defendant and the victim were in a three-year romantic relationship. The relationship ended, but defendant and the victim stayed in contact. During the summer of 2019, defendant learned that the victim was in a relationship with another man. Defendant saw an image on the internet of a naked woman tied in ropes and hanging from a tree (the “bondage image”). The woman’s face was blurred and the image contained no information identifying her. Defendant believed the bondage image depicted the victim. Defendant sent the image to the victim through Facebook Messenger. This interaction led to a discussion of possible sexual activity in which defendant and the victim could engage, including making a video of them having sex. According to defendant, he and the victim formed an agreement whereby if the victim did not break up with her new boyfriend, defendant could send the video to whomever he wished. Defendant and the victim created the video, after this alleged agreement. According to the State, the sexual encounter and the filming of the video were consensual, but there was no agreement for the video’s release. Rather, the State contended that after making the video, defendant indicated that, amongst other things, the victim must see him once a week and end her relationship with her new boyfriend or defendant would release the video. The State contended that every time the victim tried to offer an excuse for why she could not see defendant, he would become angry and threaten to release the video. On August 4, 2019, defendant sent a video to four individuals. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding his proffered testimony that he believed the bondage image depicted the victim. The trial court held, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred, the proffered evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Judgment was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lamontagne" on Justia Law

TocMail Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation

2023-04-25T12:02:02-08:00

Microsoft Corporation offers email security software to shield users from cyber threats. TocMail, Inc. is a relative newcomer to the cybersecurity scene and offers a product geared towards a specific type of threat called Internet Protocol (IP) evasion. TocMail sued Microsoft for false advertising—all within two months. In its complaint, TocMail alleged that Microsoft misled the public into believing that Microsoft’s product offered protection from IP evasion. And TocMail—who had been selling its product for two months, spent almost nothing on advertising and had not made a single sale—alleged billions of dollars in lost profits. TocMail brought two counts: false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act (count one); and contributory false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Microsoft. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of standing. The court explained that to establish an injury, in fact, a plaintiff must show “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The court wrote that TocMail failed to meet this standard because TocMail has offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that it suffered any injury. TocMail didn’t offer testimony from any witness saying that he or she would have purchased TocMail’s product if not for Microsoft’s advertising. TocMail didn’t offer any expert testimony calculating TocMail’s lost sales from consumers who went with Microsoft. View "TocMail Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation" on Justia Law

Flickinger v. King

2023-04-21T08:00:11-08:00

Birmingham attorney Daniel Flickinger posted a message on his personal Facebook social-media page in which he appeared to reference the death George Floyd, which occurred while Floyd was being arrested and was recorded. The social-media post, along with an allegedly "counterfeit" social-media "profile," was later shared with Flickinger's supervising attorney at his law firm by Lawrence Tracy King, an attorney with the Birmingham law firm of King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. Shortly thereafter, Flickinger was forced to resign. Flickinger's post was also shared by members of a "private" Facebook group, who then posted a series of offensive comments about him both personally and professionally. Flickinger sued King and the King law firm asserting claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The King defendants filed a motion to dismiss Flickinger's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the circuit court granted the motion. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims. However, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's tortious-interference claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

People v. Ung

2023-02-28T15:01:50-08:00

Ung stole cryptocurrencies from multiple victims in 2018, exploiting a common website security feature: A user can prompt a website hosting an account to send a text message to the user’s phone with a security code that temporarily allows access to the account. Ung employed “SIM swapping” in which the thief tricks the victim’s phone carrier into switching the victim’s phone number to a SIM card in the thief’s phone. The thief then prompts the website hosting the victim’s financial account to send a temporary security code to the hijacked phone; the thief accesses the account and transfers the assets. In 2021, Ung pleaded no contest to identity theft, attempted grand theft, and 10 counts of felony grand theft. He admitted a white-collar crime enhancement; he committed three offenses after his bail was revoked. The court imposed a 10-year prison term, entered a general restitution order, and later ordered Ung to make restitution by transferring cryptocurrencies to the victims in the same kinds and amounts he had stolen. Ung argued the order violated his due process rights to notice. He estimates the value of the cryptocurrencies was about $1.56 million when he stole them; the value was about $15.9 million by the time of the restitution hearing. The court of appeal affirmed. Under the statute, the value of stolen property is the replacement cost of like property. By stealing the victims’ cryptocurrency, Ung deprived them of the ability to sell it for a profit after its value increased; whatever profits they lost were a direct consequence of Ung’s conduct. View "People v. Ung" on Justia Law

Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc.

2023-02-28T11:08:35-08:00

Skillz provides a mobile platform that hosts games in which players compete for cash prizes. To participate in paid-entry competitions, a user must save the player account; after entering a date of birth, the user must tap a box with the word “Next.” Below the “Next” box is the advisory statement: “By tapping ‘Next,’ I agree to the Terms of Service and the Privacy Policy.” A hyperlink, if tapped, takes the user to Skillz’s terms of service. Gostev saved a Skillz player account in 2019. The Terms of Service then had 15 pages. Gostev sued Skillz, alleging that its games constituted illegal gambling, predatory and unlawful practices, and violated the Unfair Competition Law and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Gostev alleged the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. Skillz argued that Gostev’s challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration provision had to be submitted to an arbitrator. The court of appeal affirmed a finding that the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court noted provisions that a plaintiff’s damages are limited, the arbitration must occur in San Francisco, a plaintiff only has one year to bring his claim, the parties must split the arbitration fees and costs, and the defendant can obtain equitable relief without posting a bond or security. Unconscionability ”permeates the agreement such that severance is unavailable,” View "Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc." on Justia Law

Paymentech v. Landry's

2023-02-27T07:32:14-08:00

A major data breach compromised sensitive consumer information on thousands of credit cards. In this appeal, we address who must pay for the cleanup. Beginning in 2014, hackers compromised credit card data at multiple businesses owned by Landry’s Inc. (“Landry’s”). Many of those cards belonged to Visa and Mastercard. In response, Visa and Mastercard imposed over twenty million dollars in assessments on JPMorgan Chase and its subsidiary Paymentech (collectively, “Chase”), who were responsible for securely processing card purchases at Landry’s properties. Chase then sued Landry’s for indemnification, and Landry’s impleaded Visa and Mastercard. The district court dismissed Landry’s third-party complaints against Visa and Mastercard and granted summary judgment for Chase, finding that Landry’s had a contractual obligation to indemnify Chase. Landry’s argued that it should not have to indemnify Chase because the assessments are not an enforceable form of liquidated damages. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that since Landry’s indemnification obligation stems from its own acts or omissions under the Merchant Agreement, the debt is its own. Further, the court wrote that Landry’s alleged for its deceptive business practices claims that the assessments were “invalid” under the Payment Brand Rules and “applicable law” and, therefore, the Payment Brands’ “imposition and collection of the [assessments] was an unlawful business practice.” Because these claims turn on the assessments’ enforceability under Chase’s contracts with the Payment Brands, they are functionally the same as the subrogated claims. Since Landry’s cannot challenge the Payment Brands over those contracts as Chase’s subrogee, it cannot do so through a change in labeling. View "Paymentech v. Landry's" on Justia Law

SkyHop Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Praveen Narra, et al.

2023-01-26T13:07:19-08:00

Plaintiffs SkyHop Global, LLC, SkyHop Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “SkyHop”) and Defendant company owner and his company Indyzen, Inc. (collectively, “Indyzen”) have developed and deployed digital software aimed at transporting crew members to and from airports across the country. SkyHop has about eighty contracts with fifteen airlines, including major carriers like Delta, American, and United. SkyHop and Indyzen dispute who owns the digital software. And beyond that, they disagree on where their dispute should be decided. Indyzen has filed an arbitration action in California (where it is based), alleging various forms of breach of contract and other promises. Meanwhile, SkyHop has filed a federal lawsuit in Florida (where it is based), alleging that Indyzen violated the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and the Florida Computer Abuse and Data Recovery Act (“CADRA”). In response, Indyzen sought to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court entered an order dismissing SkyHop’s complaint. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The court reasoned that the allegations in SkyHop’s complaint suggest that SkyHop is the rightful owner of the digital software. And because Indyzen has refused to relinquish possession of the digital software without additional payment, SkyHop’s complaint states a cause of action under the CFAA. The complaint therefore satisfies the Florida long-arm statute. And it also meets the requirements of the Due Process Clause because the emails that Indyzen sent into Florida triggered SkyHop’s claims. View "SkyHop Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Praveen Narra, et al." on Justia Law

City of Creve Coeur v. DirecTV LLC

2023-01-26T08:31:20-08:00

DirecTV and Dish Network (“Defendants”) provide video services in part through the Internet. The City of Creve Coeur filed this class action in Missouri state court on behalf of local government authorities, seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants are liable under the Video Services Providers Act (“VSPA”) and implementing local ordinances, plus injunctive relief, an accounting of unpaid fees, and damages. Defendants removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After the state court entered an interlocutory order declaring that VSPA payments are fees, rather than taxes, DirecTV filed a second notice of removal, arguing this order established the required federal jurisdiction. The district court granted Creve Coeur’s motion to remand. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The court explained that the district court’s remand order plainly stated that the remand was based on comity principles as articulated in Levin, not on “state-tax based comity concerns.” Comity as a basis to remand was raised and fully argued in the first remand proceeding. Federal courts have long precluded two bites at this apple. Second, the Supreme Court in Levin emphatically stated that the century-old comity doctrine is not limited to the state-tax-interference concerns that later led Congress to enact the TIA. Third, the state court’s December 2020 Order addressed, preliminarily, only the VSPA fee-or-tax issue under state law. It did not address the broader considerations comity addresses. The state court order in no way overruled or undermined the basis for the district court’s first remand order. Therefore, DirecTV failed to establish the essential basis for a second removal. View "City of Creve Coeur v. DirecTV LLC" on Justia Law

The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Shenzhen Stone Network Information Ltd.

2023-01-24T11:31:02-08:00

Appellant Shenzhen Stone Network Information Ltd. (“SSN”) appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on Appellee Prudential Insurance Company of America’s (“Prudential”) cybersquatting claim. Prudential owns several registered trademarks on the term PRU and other PRU-formative marks. Prudential initiated the underlying action after discovering that SSN had registered the domain name PRU.COM. Prudential alleged that SSN violated the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), by registering a domain name identical to Prudential’s distinctive mark with the bad faith intent to profit. The district court determined that SSN could be held liable for cybersquatting because the ACPA is not limited to the initial registration of a domain name but encompasses subsequent re-registrations as well. The district court concluded that SSN possessed the bad faith intent to profit from the disputed domain name and granted Prudential’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, SSN contests the district court’s ruling that SSN acted in bad faith when registering the disputed domain name. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that SSN acted in bad faith and that SSN is not entitled to the benefit of the ACPA’s safe harbor provision. The court reasoned that SSN failed to satisfy the statute’s safe harbor provision. First, SSN’s self-serving denials of subjective belief that its use of the PRU.COM domain name was lawful are insufficient to defeat summary judgment absent objective corroboration. Further, SSN did not have reasonable grounds to believe that its registration of the PRU.COM domain name was otherwise lawful. View "The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Shenzhen Stone Network Information Ltd." on Justia Law

In Re Google LLC

2023-01-09T06:32:24-08:00

Google’s 093 patent application discloses methods for filtering the results of an internet search query such that only results appropriate for the user (e.g., age-appropriate) are displayed.. According to the disclosed method, each result of a search query is assigned a “content rating class” indicating the suitability of the associated content (e.g., suitable for all ages). The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed an examiner’s rejection of multiple claims of the application, citing 35 U.S.C. 103. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected arguments that the claims were obvious in light of prior art because those arguments did not reflect the reasoning or findings the Board actually invoked. Although the Board concluded that modifying prior art to take into account query length would have been obvious, there was no discussion of how such a modification would be accomplished. The Board’s expressed reasoning cannot sustain its rejection of the claims. The prior art arguments rest on factual predicates unaddressed by the examiner or Board. View "In Re Google LLC" on Justia Law

CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL

2022-12-28T09:31:25-08:00

Plaintiffs, a class of children, appearing through their guardians ad litem, filed a lawsuit against Google LLC and others, alleging that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent in violation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”). They pled only state law claims arising under the constitutional, statutory, and common law of California, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Tennessee, but also allege Google’s activities violate COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were squarely covered, and preempted, by COPPA. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal on preemption grounds. The panel considered the question of whether COPPA preempts state law claims based on underlying conduct that also violates COPPA’s regulations. The Supreme Court has identified three different types of preemption—express, conflict, and field. First, express preemption is a question of statutory construction. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to, or proscribe, the same conduct forbidden by, COPPA. Accordingly, express preemption does not apply to the plaintiff class’s claims. Second, even if express preemption is not applicable, preemptive intent may be inferred through conflict preemption principles. The panel held that although express and conflict preemption are analytically distinct inquiries, they effectively collapse into one when the preemption clause uses the term “inconsistent.” For the same reasons that the panel concluded there was no express preemption, the panel concluded that conflict preemption did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims. View "CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Prager University v. Google LLC

2022-12-05T16:02:02-08:00

YouTube, a video-sharing website, places “advertising restrictions” on certain videos to prevent the user who posted the video from realizing advertising revenues. Network administrators and individual subscribers can also elect to limit user access to YouTube videos using “Restricted Mode.” YouTube considers whether the content involves drugs, alcohol, sex, violence, tragedies, inappropriate language, and whether the content is "gratuitously incendiary, inflammatory, or demeaning towards an individual or group.” YouTube uses an “automated filtering algorithm.” Users whose videos have been restricted or demonetized may request human review. Prager has posted more than 250 YouTube videos and has been prohibited from monetizing over 50 of its videos. In some cases, other users have posted videos identical to Prager’s restricted videos; the copycat videos have not been restricted. Prager claims the restrictions are based on its political identity or viewpoints. After a district court dismissed its federal lawsuit, Prager sued in state court. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, for interactive computer service providers acting as “publishers or speakers” of content provided by others. The challenged conduct is the exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions, The court rejected arguments that the defendants are themselves information content providers, that their terms of service and public pronouncements subjected them to liability notwithstanding the Act, and that the Act, in immunizing defendants from Prager’s state law claims, is unconstitutional. View "Prager University v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

Carr v. Mississippi Lottery Corporation

2022-11-11T02:28:06-08:00

In a matter of first impression before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the issue presented for review required an interpretation and application of the federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Jonathan Carr registered five domain names that included variations of the identifying marks of the Mississippi Lottery Corporation (MLC). After an unfavorable decision from a national arbitration board, Carr brought a reverse domain name hijacking claim against the MLC, which countersued for cybersquatting. The Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed Carr’s first appeal in this case for lack of a final appealable judgment. Carr appealed the trial judge’s Order Granting and Denying Motions for Injunctive Relief, Order on Motion for New Trial, or In the Alternative, Motion for a Trial By Jury, and Order on Motion for New Trial and/or In the Alternative, to Alter or Amend the Judgment. After a careful review of federal and state law, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court on all issues. View "Carr v. Mississippi Lottery Corporation" on Justia Law

JANE DOES, ET AL V. REDDIT, INC.

2022-10-31T12:58:10-08:00

Users of Reddit, a social media platform, posted and circulated sexually explicit images and videos of minors online. The victims, or their parents, sued Reddit pursuant to Section 1595, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. Rhe panel held that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c)(1), shielded defendant Reddit, Inc., from liability. The panel held that Reddit, an “interactive computer services” provider, generally enjoys immunity from liability for user-posted content under Section 230(c)(1). However, pursuant to the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2018 (“FOSTA”), Section 230 immunity does not apply to child sex trafficking claims if the conduct underlying the claim also violates 18 U.S.C. Section 1591, the criminal child sex trafficking statute. The panel held that the plain text of FOSTA, as well as precedent interpreting a similar immunity exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, established that the availability of FOSTA’s immunity exception is contingent upon a plaintiff proving that a defendant-website’s own conduct—rather than its users’ conduct—resulted in a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1591. The panel held that FOSTA’s wider statutory context confirmed its reading. In Section II.C, the panel held that its reading was also supported by the legislative history of FOSTA. View "JANE DOES, ET AL V. REDDIT, INC." on Justia Law