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	<title>International Trade - Justia Case Law Summaries</title>
	<link rel="self" href="https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/international-trade/"/>
	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://internationaltradeopinions.justia.com/"/>
	<id>https://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/international-trade/</id>
	<updated>2026-07-31T23:45:56-08:00</updated>
	<author>
		<name>Justia Inc</name>
		<uri>https://www.justia.com/</uri>
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	<generator uri="https://law.justia.com/" version="3.0">Justia Law</generator>
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	<rights>Copyright 2026 Justia Inc</rights>
	        <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1337/25-1337-2026-07-30.html</id>
        	<title>ILDICO INC. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2026-07-30T06:32:02-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-30T06:32:02-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1337/25-1337-2026-07-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		This case concerns the tariff classification of ten models of luxury wristwatches imported from Switzerland by Ildico Inc., the exclusive U.S. distributor of Richard Mille watches. The watches are constructed primarily of 18-karat gold but feature large transparent synthetic sapphire crystal windows on both the front and back. The back crystal allows viewing of the internal components and serves to protect the watch. The central issue is whether the presence of the crystal window on the back means the watch case is not made “wholly of precious metal,” which would affect whether the watches are classified under HTSUS heading 9101 (lower duty rates) or heading 9102 (higher duty rates).

Customs and Border Protection conducted an audit in 2016 and determined that the watches should be classified under heading 9102, rather than the heading 9101 under which Ildico had declared them. Customs’ decision resulted in higher duties. After Customs denied Ildico’s protest, Ildico filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade. The Trade Court agreed with Customs, holding that the sapphire crystal backs were part of the watch cases and, since they were not made wholly of precious metal, the watches did not qualify for heading 9101. The court specifically found that the rear crystal was part of the case, even if it could also be described as “watch glass.”

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that, under the relevant HTSUS provisions, the synthetic sapphire crystal back is part of the “watch case.” Because the case is thus not “wholly of precious metal,” the watches cannot be classified under heading 9101 and are properly classified under heading 9102. The court also held that an alternative argument—that the crystal is a “precious stone”—was not preserved for review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1337/25-1337-2026-07-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ILDICO INC. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                This case concerns the tariff classification of ten models of luxury wristwatches imported from Switzerland by Ildico Inc., the exclusive U.S. distributor of Richard Mille watches. The watches are constructed primarily of 18-karat gold but feature large transparent synthetic sapphire crystal windows on both the front and back. The back crystal allows viewing of the internal components and serves to protect the watch. The central issue is whether the presence of the crystal window on the back means the watch case is not made “wholly of precious metal,” which would affect whether the watches are classified under HTSUS heading 9101 (lower duty rates) or heading 9102 (higher duty rates).

Customs and Border Protection conducted an audit in 2016 and determined that the watches should be classified under heading 9102, rather than the heading 9101 under which Ildico had declared them. Customs’ decision resulted in higher duties. After Customs denied Ildico’s protest, Ildico filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade. The Trade Court agreed with Customs, holding that the sapphire crystal backs were part of the watch cases and, since they were not made wholly of precious metal, the watches did not qualify for heading 9101. The court specifically found that the rear crystal was part of the case, even if it could also be described as “watch glass.”

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that, under the relevant HTSUS provisions, the synthetic sapphire crystal back is part of the “watch case.” Because the case is thus not “wholly of precious metal,” the watches cannot be classified under heading 9101 and are properly classified under heading 9102. The court also held that an alternative argument—that the crystal is a “precious stone”—was not preserved for review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Bryson</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1411/25-1411-2026-07-16.html</id>
        	<title>KG DONGBU STEEL CO., LTD. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2026-07-16T06:01:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-07-16T06:01:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1411/25-1411-2026-07-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Korean steel manufacturer faced severe financial challenges beginning in 2013 and underwent four debt-to-equity conversions during a corporate restructuring overseen by a committee of creditor banks, including a government-controlled institution. The first three conversions, between 2014 and 2018, were conducted by this creditors’ committee, while the fourth, in 2019, involved a public bidding process in which a private consortium acquired the company. The equity infusions were scrutinized as possible government subsidies subject to countervailing duties under U.S. trade law.

Following a 2016 countervailing duty order by the Department of Commerce on certain Korean steel products, Commerce conducted several administrative reviews. In the fourth review, Commerce reversed its earlier findings and determined that the first three debt-to-equity conversions provided a countervailable benefit because private investor participation was found to be insignificant and the company was not equityworthy at the time. Commerce also found that the benefit of these subsidies was not extinguished by the company’s later acquisition, in part because the company did not contest the presumption of benefit pass-through.

The United States Court of International Trade remanded Commerce’s findings, holding that Commerce could not change its practice of not re-examining earlier equity infusions absent new information, and that the agency’s determinations lacked sufficient justification and evidentiary support. On further remand, Commerce, under protest, found no countervailable benefit from the first three conversions, and the trial court sustained this result.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Commerce was permitted to revisit its determinations based on record evidence from later periods, and that its findings of countervailable benefit and benefit pass-through were supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to reinstate Commerce’s original determinations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1411/25-1411-2026-07-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "KG DONGBU STEEL CO., LTD. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Korean steel manufacturer faced severe financial challenges beginning in 2013 and underwent four debt-to-equity conversions during a corporate restructuring overseen by a committee of creditor banks, including a government-controlled institution. The first three conversions, between 2014 and 2018, were conducted by this creditors’ committee, while the fourth, in 2019, involved a public bidding process in which a private consortium acquired the company. The equity infusions were scrutinized as possible government subsidies subject to countervailing duties under U.S. trade law.

Following a 2016 countervailing duty order by the Department of Commerce on certain Korean steel products, Commerce conducted several administrative reviews. In the fourth review, Commerce reversed its earlier findings and determined that the first three debt-to-equity conversions provided a countervailable benefit because private investor participation was found to be insignificant and the company was not equityworthy at the time. Commerce also found that the benefit of these subsidies was not extinguished by the company’s later acquisition, in part because the company did not contest the presumption of benefit pass-through.

The United States Court of International Trade remanded Commerce’s findings, holding that Commerce could not change its practice of not re-examining earlier equity infusions absent new information, and that the agency’s determinations lacked sufficient justification and evidentiary support. On further remand, Commerce, under protest, found no countervailable benefit from the first three conversions, and the trial court sustained this result.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Commerce was permitted to revisit its determinations based on record evidence from later periods, and that its findings of countervailable benefit and benefit pass-through were supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to reinstate Commerce’s original determinations.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-07-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2242/24-2242-2026-06-01.html</id>
        	<title>EREGLI DEMIR VE CELIK FABRIKALARI T.A.S. v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2026-06-01T05:31:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-06-01T05:31:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2242/24-2242-2026-06-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Turkish steel producer was subject to an antidumping-duty order issued in 2016 after the U.S. Department of Commerce found that two Turkish firms, including the appellant, were dumping hot-rolled steel products in the U.S., and the International Trade Commission (ITC) determined that these imports caused material injury to the U.S. industry. The appellant did not challenge the ITC’s injury determination at that time, but both Turkish firms challenged the Commerce dumping determination in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). In 2020, Commerce found that the other Turkish firm’s dumping margin was zero, leading to its exclusion from the antidumping order.

After the exclusion, the appellant sought relief from the ITC, arguing that Turkish imports were now negligible, and requested: (1) reconsideration of the 2016 injury finding, (2) a changed-circumstances review (CCR), and (3) revocation of the order through a five-year sunset review. The ITC denied reconsideration and the CCR, and in the sunset review decided not to revoke the order. The appellant then filed three separate actions in the CIT to challenge these denials.

The CIT sustained the ITC’s refusal to revoke the order in the sunset review, finding the ITC properly relied on its final, unchallenged 2016 injury determination and that the sunset review was forward-looking. The CIT also dismissed the CCR claim, holding that the sunset review provided all the relief a CCR could have provided. Finally, the CIT dismissed the challenge to the denial of reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction, because the appellant could have brought a timely action under the proper statute in 2016.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed all three CIT judgments, holding that the ITC’s actions and the CIT’s dismissals were correct under the law and statutory framework. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2242/24-2242-2026-06-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "EREGLI DEMIR VE CELIK FABRIKALARI T.A.S. v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Turkish steel producer was subject to an antidumping-duty order issued in 2016 after the U.S. Department of Commerce found that two Turkish firms, including the appellant, were dumping hot-rolled steel products in the U.S., and the International Trade Commission (ITC) determined that these imports caused material injury to the U.S. industry. The appellant did not challenge the ITC’s injury determination at that time, but both Turkish firms challenged the Commerce dumping determination in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). In 2020, Commerce found that the other Turkish firm’s dumping margin was zero, leading to its exclusion from the antidumping order.

After the exclusion, the appellant sought relief from the ITC, arguing that Turkish imports were now negligible, and requested: (1) reconsideration of the 2016 injury finding, (2) a changed-circumstances review (CCR), and (3) revocation of the order through a five-year sunset review. The ITC denied reconsideration and the CCR, and in the sunset review decided not to revoke the order. The appellant then filed three separate actions in the CIT to challenge these denials.

The CIT sustained the ITC’s refusal to revoke the order in the sunset review, finding the ITC properly relied on its final, unchallenged 2016 injury determination and that the sunset review was forward-looking. The CIT also dismissed the CCR claim, holding that the sunset review provided all the relief a CCR could have provided. Finally, the CIT dismissed the challenge to the denial of reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction, because the appellant could have brought a timely action under the proper statute in 2016.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed all three CIT judgments, holding that the ITC’s actions and the CIT’s dismissals were correct under the law and statutory framework.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-06-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1258/24-1258-2026-04-29.html</id>
        	<title>LINYI CHENGEN IMPORT AND EXPORT CO., LTD. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2026-04-29T06:02:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-04-29T06:02:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1258/24-1258-2026-04-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns an anti-dumping investigation initiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2016 into hardwood-plywood products produced in and imported from China. Commerce selected two mandatory respondents, Chengen and Bayley, for individual investigation. Several other exporters and producers, including Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB, requested voluntary respondent status. The investigation centered on how Chengen calculated its main raw material input—poplar log volumes—which was crucial for determining dumping margins.

Initially, Chengen responded to Commerce’s questionnaires by referencing third-party invoices but did not disclose that it used a Conversion Chart, possibly a Chinese National Standard, for measuring log volumes. During the verification stage, Commerce discovered this chart and, suspecting Chengen’s prior responses were incomplete, added only the two-page Conversion Chart to the record, rejecting the rest of a 12-page document Chengen provided at that time. Commerce then switched from the usual factors of production analysis to the intermediate input methodology, using veneer values instead of log volumes, and calculated a 183.36% dumping margin for Chengen and non-mandatory respondents.

The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) repeatedly remanded the case, directing Commerce to accept the full 12-page document and reconsider its methodology. On remand, Commerce eventually assigned a 0% margin to Chengen and the non-mandatory respondents, and excluded Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB from the all-others rate due to their qualifying as voluntary respondents.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Commerce did not abuse its discretion by including only the Conversion Chart in the record and not the rest of the 12-page document. The court found substantial evidence supporting Commerce’s use of the intermediate input methodology and reinstated the 183.36% margin for Chengen and non-mandatory respondents. The court also affirmed the Trade Court’s approval of Commerce’s exclusion of Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB from the all-others rate. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1258/24-1258-2026-04-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "LINYI CHENGEN IMPORT AND EXPORT CO., LTD. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns an anti-dumping investigation initiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2016 into hardwood-plywood products produced in and imported from China. Commerce selected two mandatory respondents, Chengen and Bayley, for individual investigation. Several other exporters and producers, including Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB, requested voluntary respondent status. The investigation centered on how Chengen calculated its main raw material input—poplar log volumes—which was crucial for determining dumping margins.

Initially, Chengen responded to Commerce’s questionnaires by referencing third-party invoices but did not disclose that it used a Conversion Chart, possibly a Chinese National Standard, for measuring log volumes. During the verification stage, Commerce discovered this chart and, suspecting Chengen’s prior responses were incomplete, added only the two-page Conversion Chart to the record, rejecting the rest of a 12-page document Chengen provided at that time. Commerce then switched from the usual factors of production analysis to the intermediate input methodology, using veneer values instead of log volumes, and calculated a 183.36% dumping margin for Chengen and non-mandatory respondents.

The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) repeatedly remanded the case, directing Commerce to accept the full 12-page document and reconsider its methodology. On remand, Commerce eventually assigned a 0% margin to Chengen and the non-mandatory respondents, and excluded Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB from the all-others rate due to their qualifying as voluntary respondents.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Commerce did not abuse its discretion by including only the Conversion Chart in the record and not the rest of the 12-page document. The court found substantial evidence supporting Commerce’s use of the intermediate input methodology and reinstated the 183.36% margin for Chengen and non-mandatory respondents. The court also affirmed the Trade Court’s approval of Commerce’s exclusion of Jiangyang Wood and Dehua TB from the all-others rate. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-04-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Leonard Stark</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2059/24-2059-2026-02-24.html</id>
        	<title>PERFORMANCE ADDITIVES, LLC v. US </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-24T07:03:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-24T07:03:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2059/24-2059-2026-02-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The plaintiff, a company seeking a refund of customs duties (drawback) on imported petroleum derivatives, filed a drawback claim with U.S. Customs on March 10, 2020, identifying forty-eight import entries and seeking over $1.3 million. Customs did not liquidate the claim within one year, but on April 30, 2021, it liquidated the claim at zero, determining the plaintiff was not entitled to any drawback. The company&#039;s appeal did not challenge the merits of this determination but argued that, by operation of law, its claim should have been automatically (“deemed”) liquidated at the amount it initially asserted, because Customs did not act within one year. The critical factual issue was that, while all underlying import entries had been liquidated by March 10, 2021, not all had become final, as finality requires an additional 180-day period after liquidation.

The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case, focusing on the statutory provisions governing when drawback claims are deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. § 1504. The court concluded that because the relevant import entries had not yet become final within one year of the drawback claim’s filing, the “deemed liquidation” provision of § 1504(a)(2)(A) did not apply. Instead, the alternative procedures of § 1504(a)(2)(B) governed, which require additional steps by the claimant that were not taken. The court denied the plaintiff&#039;s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the government.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that when the conditions of § 1504(a)(2)(B) are present—specifically, when underlying import entries are not yet final—automatic deemed liquidation under § 1504(a)(2)(A) does not apply. Customs’ action in liquidating the claim at zero was therefore lawful, and the lower court’s judgment was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-2059/24-2059-2026-02-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "PERFORMANCE ADDITIVES, LLC v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The plaintiff, a company seeking a refund of customs duties (drawback) on imported petroleum derivatives, filed a drawback claim with U.S. Customs on March 10, 2020, identifying forty-eight import entries and seeking over $1.3 million. Customs did not liquidate the claim within one year, but on April 30, 2021, it liquidated the claim at zero, determining the plaintiff was not entitled to any drawback. The company&#039;s appeal did not challenge the merits of this determination but argued that, by operation of law, its claim should have been automatically (“deemed”) liquidated at the amount it initially asserted, because Customs did not act within one year. The critical factual issue was that, while all underlying import entries had been liquidated by March 10, 2021, not all had become final, as finality requires an additional 180-day period after liquidation.

The United States Court of International Trade reviewed the case, focusing on the statutory provisions governing when drawback claims are deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. § 1504. The court concluded that because the relevant import entries had not yet become final within one year of the drawback claim’s filing, the “deemed liquidation” provision of § 1504(a)(2)(A) did not apply. Instead, the alternative procedures of § 1504(a)(2)(B) governed, which require additional steps by the claimant that were not taken. The court denied the plaintiff&#039;s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the government.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court held that when the conditions of § 1504(a)(2)(B) are present—specifically, when underlying import entries are not yet final—automatic deemed liquidation under § 1504(a)(2)(A) does not apply. Customs’ action in liquidating the claim at zero was therefore lawful, and the lower court’s judgment was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Evan Wallach</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/607/24-1287/</id>
        	<title>Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-20T07:45:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-20T07:45:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/607/24-1287/"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		President Trump, after taking office, declared national emergencies over two foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China, and persistent trade deficits affecting U.S. manufacturing and supply chains. Invoking authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he imposed tariffs—25% on most Canadian and Mexican imports, 10% on most Chinese imports for drug trafficking, and at least 10% on all imports for trade deficit concerns, with higher rates for dozens of nations and frequent modifications.

Two sets of plaintiffs challenged these tariffs. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Learning Resources plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction, as the court found IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The Government&#039;s motion to transfer to the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) was denied. In V.O.S. Selections, plaintiffs prevailed in the CIT, which granted summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, holding that IEEPA’s authority to “regulate… importation” did not authorize such tariffs, as their scope, amount, and duration were unbounded.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that IEEPA does not grant the President authority to impose tariffs, reasoning that the statute’s language—particularly “regulate… importation”—does not include the distinct power to tax or raise revenue through tariffs, a core congressional function. The Court emphasized the absence of explicit authorization and the constitutional structure reserving tariff powers to Congress. The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment in the V.O.S. Selections case and vacated the District Court’s judgment in Learning Resources, remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/607/24-1287/" target="_blank"&gt;View "Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                President Trump, after taking office, declared national emergencies over two foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China, and persistent trade deficits affecting U.S. manufacturing and supply chains. Invoking authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he imposed tariffs—25% on most Canadian and Mexican imports, 10% on most Chinese imports for drug trafficking, and at least 10% on all imports for trade deficit concerns, with higher rates for dozens of nations and frequent modifications.

Two sets of plaintiffs challenged these tariffs. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Learning Resources plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction, as the court found IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The Government&#039;s motion to transfer to the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) was denied. In V.O.S. Selections, plaintiffs prevailed in the CIT, which granted summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, holding that IEEPA’s authority to “regulate… importation” did not authorize such tariffs, as their scope, amount, and duration were unbounded.

The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that IEEPA does not grant the President authority to impose tariffs, reasoning that the statute’s language—particularly “regulate… importation”—does not include the distinct power to tax or raise revenue through tariffs, a core congressional function. The Court emphasized the absence of explicit authorization and the constitutional structure reserving tariff powers to Congress. The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment in the V.O.S. Selections case and vacated the District Court’s judgment in Learning Resources, remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Supreme Court</case:court>
							<case:judge>John Roberts</case:judge>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Supreme Court"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1164/24-1164-2026-02-17.html</id>
        	<title>MAGNUM MAGNETICS CORP. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2026-02-17T07:02:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-17T07:02:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1164/24-1164-2026-02-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The dispute centers on whether imported plastic shelf dividers containing magnets are subject to U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering raw flexible magnets from China. Fasteners for Retail, Inc. imports shelf dividers composed of flexible magnets bonded to rigid plastic, which makes the magnets inflexible. The United States Department of Commerce had previously issued duty orders with scope language covering certain flexible magnets, regardless of shape, color, or packaging. Fasteners for Retail requested a scope ruling from Commerce to clarify whether their shelf dividers fell within the scope of these orders.

Commerce issued a final scope ruling, finding that although the plain language of the duty orders might appear to include Siffron’s shelf dividers, prior scope rulings and interpretative sources (known as (k)(1) sources) provided further guidance. Based on these sources, Commerce determined that magnets rendered inflexible by attachment to other materials, such as plastic, are not included within the term “flexible magnets” under the duty orders. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s ruling and upheld it, finding Commerce’s determination reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the same standard as the Trade Court. The court held that Commerce has discretion under the current regulations to consult (k)(1) sources in interpreting scope language regardless of apparent ambiguity. The court concluded that Commerce’s determination that Siffron’s shelf dividers are not “flexible magnets” under the duty orders was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of International Trade, sustaining Commerce’s scope ruling that the shelf dividers are not subject to the duty orders. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1164/24-1164-2026-02-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MAGNUM MAGNETICS CORP. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The dispute centers on whether imported plastic shelf dividers containing magnets are subject to U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering raw flexible magnets from China. Fasteners for Retail, Inc. imports shelf dividers composed of flexible magnets bonded to rigid plastic, which makes the magnets inflexible. The United States Department of Commerce had previously issued duty orders with scope language covering certain flexible magnets, regardless of shape, color, or packaging. Fasteners for Retail requested a scope ruling from Commerce to clarify whether their shelf dividers fell within the scope of these orders.

Commerce issued a final scope ruling, finding that although the plain language of the duty orders might appear to include Siffron’s shelf dividers, prior scope rulings and interpretative sources (known as (k)(1) sources) provided further guidance. Based on these sources, Commerce determined that magnets rendered inflexible by attachment to other materials, such as plastic, are not included within the term “flexible magnets” under the duty orders. The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s ruling and upheld it, finding Commerce’s determination reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case de novo, applying the same standard as the Trade Court. The court held that Commerce has discretion under the current regulations to consult (k)(1) sources in interpreting scope language regardless of apparent ambiguity. The court concluded that Commerce’s determination that Siffron’s shelf dividers are not “flexible magnets” under the duty orders was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of International Trade, sustaining Commerce’s scope ruling that the shelf dividers are not subject to the duty orders.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-127/25-127-2026-02-02.html</id>
        	<title>In re United States</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-02T07:34:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-02T07:34:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-127/25-127-2026-02-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.

A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-127/25-127-2026-02-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the central issue arose during a countervailing duty investigation into phosphate fertilizers imported from Morocco and Russia. The International Trade Commission (Commission) collected information through questionnaires sent to various parties, including domestic and foreign producers. The Commission’s longstanding practice was to automatically designate all questionnaire responses as confidential, regardless of whether the submitting party requested confidentiality or whether the information would qualify for such treatment under the relevant statute. This led to heavy redactions in the administrative record when the investigation was challenged in court.

A Moroccan producer, OCP S.A., sought review of the Commission’s injury determination in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT initially remanded the injury determination due to insufficient evidentiary support. When the remand record again included substantial redactions, the CIT held a hearing to scrutinize the Commission’s confidentiality designations. After reviewing arguments from the Commission and affected parties, the CIT concluded that the Commission’s practice of automatically treating all questionnaire responses as confidential was unauthorized by law. The CIT found that much of the redacted information was either publicly available, generalized, or outdated, and thus not entitled to confidential treatment, with only a small portion warranting protection.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s Confidentiality Opinion and Order. The Federal Circuit held that the governing statute does not abrogate the common law right of public access to judicial records and that the Commission’s blanket confidentiality rule conflicts with statutory requirements, which demand public disclosure of non-confidential information and proper justification for confidentiality. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s order that required the Commission to comply with statutory standards for confidentiality and to cease automatic confidential designation of questionnaire responses.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1566/24-1566-2026-02-02.html</id>
        	<title>In re United States</title>
        	<updated>2026-02-02T07:02:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-02-02T07:02:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1566/24-1566-2026-02-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.

The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1566/24-1566-2026-02-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "In re United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In a dispute concerning antidumping and countervailing duties on mattresses imported from several countries, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that domestic industry suffered material injury from imports sold at less than fair value and from subsidized imports. The Commission treated certain information submitted in response to its questionnaires as confidential. After the Court of International Trade issued a public opinion sustaining the Commission’s injury determination, it did not redact information the Commission had deemed confidential. The Commission requested retraction of the public opinion and sought redactions for specific company names and numerical data, arguing these deserved confidential treatment.

The parties jointly moved for redaction, relying on the Commission’s practice of treating questionnaire data as confidential and citing statutory provisions. The Court of International Trade denied the motion, reasoning that the information was either publicly available or not linked to specific entities, and that some claims of confidentiality had been waived due to procedural oversight. The court also emphasized the common law right of access and transparency, but did not specifically address the statutory authority for disclosure.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the denial of the joint motion. The court found the case moot because the allegedly confidential information had already been publicly disclosed more than two years earlier, rendering any relief unavailable. The Federal Circuit held that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as the companion case decided that day resolved the same confidentiality issues. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-02-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1142/24-1142-2026-01-08.html</id>
        	<title>MIDWEST-CBK, LLC v. US </title>
        	<updated>2026-01-08T07:01:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2026-01-08T07:01:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1142/24-1142-2026-01-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case centers on Midwest-CBK, LLC, a Minnesota-based retailer of Christmas ornaments. Midwest operated its corporate office in Minnesota and managed inventory and warehousing in Ontario, Canada. Merchandise was purchased from foreign suppliers for export to Canada, stored in Ontario, and sold to U.S. customers by Midwest’s U.S.-based sales staff. Orders were processed in Canada and shipped from Ontario to the United States, with purchase orders stating “FOB Buffalo, NY.” Between 2013 and 2016, Midwest entered merchandise with U.S. Customs and Border Protection using “deductive value.” Customs extended the liquidation deadline and conducted a regulatory audit to determine the correct valuation method, ultimately concluding that “transaction value” should apply, resulting in a recalculated duty assessment.

The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Midwest’s challenge to Customs’ appraisement and its extensions of liquidation. Midwest argued that Customs lacked authority to extend liquidation beyond June 14, 2014, when all requested information had been provided, and asserted that the sales were domestic, not “for exportation to the United States.” The CIT found that Customs had a reasonable basis for the extension, given the ongoing audit and internal review, and determined that the transactions qualified as sales for exportation under the relevant statute. The CIT denied Midwest’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the government.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision. The court held that Customs properly extended the liquidation period and did not abuse its discretion. It further held that Midwest’s sales were “for exportation to the United States” under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1), making transaction value the appropriate basis for appraisement. The judgment of the Court of International Trade was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1142/24-1142-2026-01-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MIDWEST-CBK, LLC v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case centers on Midwest-CBK, LLC, a Minnesota-based retailer of Christmas ornaments. Midwest operated its corporate office in Minnesota and managed inventory and warehousing in Ontario, Canada. Merchandise was purchased from foreign suppliers for export to Canada, stored in Ontario, and sold to U.S. customers by Midwest’s U.S.-based sales staff. Orders were processed in Canada and shipped from Ontario to the United States, with purchase orders stating “FOB Buffalo, NY.” Between 2013 and 2016, Midwest entered merchandise with U.S. Customs and Border Protection using “deductive value.” Customs extended the liquidation deadline and conducted a regulatory audit to determine the correct valuation method, ultimately concluding that “transaction value” should apply, resulting in a recalculated duty assessment.

The United States Court of International Trade reviewed Midwest’s challenge to Customs’ appraisement and its extensions of liquidation. Midwest argued that Customs lacked authority to extend liquidation beyond June 14, 2014, when all requested information had been provided, and asserted that the sales were domestic, not “for exportation to the United States.” The CIT found that Customs had a reasonable basis for the extension, given the ongoing audit and internal review, and determined that the transactions qualified as sales for exportation under the relevant statute. The CIT denied Midwest’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the government.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision. The court held that Customs properly extended the liquidation period and did not abuse its discretion. It further held that Midwest’s sales were “for exportation to the United States” under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1), making transaction value the appropriate basis for appraisement. The judgment of the Court of International Trade was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2026-01-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Andrews</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1431/24-1431-2025-11-17.html</id>
        	<title>KAPTAN DEMIR CELIK ENDUSTRISI VE TICARET A.S. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-11-17T07:31:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-17T07:31:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1431/24-1431-2025-11-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Turkish steel producers, including Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S., were subject to a countervailing duty (CVD) order after the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that the Turkish government subsidized steel rebar exports. During an administrative review, Commerce found that Kaptan sourced steel scrap, a key input for rebar, from several affiliates, including Nur, a shipbuilder. Commerce initially determined that Nur’s steel scrap was primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production, making Nur a cross-owned input supplier whose subsidies should be attributed to Kaptan, thereby increasing Kaptan’s CVD rate.

The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed Commerce’s decision after Kaptan challenged the cross-attribution of Nur’s subsidies. The CIT found that Commerce had not adequately explained whether steel scrap was merely a link in the rebar production chain or addressed prior cases treating steel scrap as a byproduct. The CIT remanded the case for further explanation. On remand, Commerce developed a multi-factor analysis and ultimately reversed its position, finding that Nur’s steel scrap was a common, unprocessed input used in various products and industries, and that Nur’s primary business activity—shipbuilding—was not dedicated almost exclusively to producing rebar. As a result, Commerce concluded that Nur was not a cross-owned input supplier, and Kaptan’s CVD rate was reduced to a de minimis level. The CIT sustained Commerce’s remand decision.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision for abuse of discretion and Commerce’s remand findings for substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce’s determination that Nur’s steel scrap was not primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production was adequately explained, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with the applicable regulation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1431/24-1431-2025-11-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "KAPTAN DEMIR CELIK ENDUSTRISI VE TICARET A.S. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Turkish steel producers, including Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi ve Ticaret A.S., were subject to a countervailing duty (CVD) order after the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that the Turkish government subsidized steel rebar exports. During an administrative review, Commerce found that Kaptan sourced steel scrap, a key input for rebar, from several affiliates, including Nur, a shipbuilder. Commerce initially determined that Nur’s steel scrap was primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production, making Nur a cross-owned input supplier whose subsidies should be attributed to Kaptan, thereby increasing Kaptan’s CVD rate.

The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed Commerce’s decision after Kaptan challenged the cross-attribution of Nur’s subsidies. The CIT found that Commerce had not adequately explained whether steel scrap was merely a link in the rebar production chain or addressed prior cases treating steel scrap as a byproduct. The CIT remanded the case for further explanation. On remand, Commerce developed a multi-factor analysis and ultimately reversed its position, finding that Nur’s steel scrap was a common, unprocessed input used in various products and industries, and that Nur’s primary business activity—shipbuilding—was not dedicated almost exclusively to producing rebar. As a result, Commerce concluded that Nur was not a cross-owned input supplier, and Kaptan’s CVD rate was reduced to a de minimis level. The CIT sustained Commerce’s remand decision.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision for abuse of discretion and Commerce’s remand findings for substantial evidence. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce’s determination that Nur’s steel scrap was not primarily dedicated to Kaptan’s rebar production was adequately explained, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with the applicable regulation.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Linn</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1436/24-1436-2025-11-17.html</id>
        	<title>NUTRICIA NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-11-17T07:31:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-11-17T07:31:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1436/24-1436-2025-11-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Nutricia North America, Inc. imported five products from the United Kingdom that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classified as “medical foods” under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. These products are specially formulated for individuals with specific metabolic or medical conditions, such as phenylketonuria, intractable epilepsy, and other disorders that require nutritional therapy not achievable through ordinary diet modification. The products are administered enterally, contain no active pharmacological ingredients, and are intended for use under medical supervision.

Upon importation in 2014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified these products under subheading 2106.90.99 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), which covers “food preparations not elsewhere specified” and imposes a duty. Nutricia protested, arguing that the products should be classified as “medicaments” under heading 3004 of chapter 30, which would allow duty-free entry, or alternatively under a duty-free provision for articles for handicapped persons in chapter 98. Customs denied the protests, and Nutricia filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the products were excluded from chapter 30 by note 1(a) and thus properly classified under chapter 21.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit held that Nutricia’s medical foods are properly classified under heading 3004 as “medicaments” because they are specially formulated for therapeutic or prophylactic uses under medical supervision. The court found that chapter 30 note 1(a) does not exclude these medical foods from heading 3004. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s judgment and remanded for determination of the appropriate subheading under heading 3004. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1436/24-1436-2025-11-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "NUTRICIA NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Nutricia North America, Inc. imported five products from the United Kingdom that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classified as “medical foods” under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. These products are specially formulated for individuals with specific metabolic or medical conditions, such as phenylketonuria, intractable epilepsy, and other disorders that require nutritional therapy not achievable through ordinary diet modification. The products are administered enterally, contain no active pharmacological ingredients, and are intended for use under medical supervision.

Upon importation in 2014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection classified these products under subheading 2106.90.99 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), which covers “food preparations not elsewhere specified” and imposes a duty. Nutricia protested, arguing that the products should be classified as “medicaments” under heading 3004 of chapter 30, which would allow duty-free entry, or alternatively under a duty-free provision for articles for handicapped persons in chapter 98. Customs denied the protests, and Nutricia filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the products were excluded from chapter 30 by note 1(a) and thus properly classified under chapter 21.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the CIT’s decision de novo. The Federal Circuit held that Nutricia’s medical foods are properly classified under heading 3004 as “medicaments” because they are specially formulated for therapeutic or prophylactic uses under medical supervision. The court found that chapter 30 note 1(a) does not exclude these medical foods from heading 3004. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s judgment and remanded for determination of the appropriate subheading under heading 3004.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-11-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1098/24-1098-2025-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>BRITA LP v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-15T06:33:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-15T06:33:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1098/24-1098-2025-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Brita LP held a patent for a gravity-fed water filter system designed to remove contaminants, particularly lead, from water using filter media that included activated carbon and a lead scavenger. The patent claimed that the filter would achieve a specific performance metric, the Filter Rate and Performance (FRAP) factor, of about 350 or less. Although the patent described various types of filter media, such as carbon blocks and mixed media, it only provided working examples and detailed formulations for carbon-block filters that met the claimed FRAP factor. The patent also included test results showing that only carbon-block filters achieved the required performance, while mixed media filters did not.

Brita filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) under section 337, alleging that several companies imported and sold water filters infringing its patent. After a Markman hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the asserted claims met the written description and enablement requirements and determined there was a violation of section 337. Upon review, the ITC reversed the ALJ’s findings, concluding that the claims were invalid for lack of written description and enablement as to any filter media other than carbon blocks, and that the term “filter usage lifetime claimed by a manufacturer or seller of the filter” was indefinite.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision. The court held that the patent’s specification did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed invention, specifically for non-carbon-block filter media, and that substantial evidence supported the ITC’s findings. The court did not reach the issue of indefiniteness, as the claims were already found invalid. The disposition was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1098/24-1098-2025-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "BRITA LP v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Brita LP held a patent for a gravity-fed water filter system designed to remove contaminants, particularly lead, from water using filter media that included activated carbon and a lead scavenger. The patent claimed that the filter would achieve a specific performance metric, the Filter Rate and Performance (FRAP) factor, of about 350 or less. Although the patent described various types of filter media, such as carbon blocks and mixed media, it only provided working examples and detailed formulations for carbon-block filters that met the claimed FRAP factor. The patent also included test results showing that only carbon-block filters achieved the required performance, while mixed media filters did not.

Brita filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) under section 337, alleging that several companies imported and sold water filters infringing its patent. After a Markman hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the asserted claims met the written description and enablement requirements and determined there was a violation of section 337. Upon review, the ITC reversed the ALJ’s findings, concluding that the claims were invalid for lack of written description and enablement as to any filter media other than carbon blocks, and that the term “filter usage lifetime claimed by a manufacturer or seller of the filter” was indefinite.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision. The court held that the patent’s specification did not adequately describe or enable the full scope of the claimed invention, specifically for non-carbon-block filter media, and that substantial evidence supported the ITC’s findings. The court did not reach the issue of indefiniteness, as the claims were already found invalid. The disposition was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sharon Prost</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1370/24-1370-2025-10-15.html</id>
        	<title>SWEET HARVEST FOODS v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-15T06:02:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-15T06:02:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1370/24-1370-2025-10-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Petitioners representing domestic honey producers requested that the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission investigate whether raw honey imported from Vietnam and other countries was being sold in the United States at less than fair value, causing material injury to the domestic industry. During the investigation, both agencies made affirmative preliminary and final determinations supporting the imposition of antidumping duties. The agencies also found “critical circumstances,” meaning there was a surge of imports after the petition was filed but before the preliminary determination, which could undermine the effectiveness of any eventual duties. As a result, the suspension of liquidation and the imposition of duties were backdated by 90 days to cover these imports.

The importers of Vietnamese honey and their trade association challenged the Commission’s final determination of critical circumstances in the United States Court of International Trade. They argued that the Commission improperly focused on the period before the antidumping duty order was issued, rather than considering whether the import surge would undermine the remedial effect of the order after its issuance. The Trade Court rejected this argument, upholding the Commission’s determination as both lawful and supported by substantial evidence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Trade Court’s decision de novo, applying the same standard. The Federal Circuit held that the statute does not require the Commission to focus solely on the period after the antidumping duty order is issued. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the surge of imports before the preliminary determination is likely to undermine the remedial effect of the order, starting from the suspension date. The court also found that the Commission’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of International Trade. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1370/24-1370-2025-10-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SWEET HARVEST FOODS v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Petitioners representing domestic honey producers requested that the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission investigate whether raw honey imported from Vietnam and other countries was being sold in the United States at less than fair value, causing material injury to the domestic industry. During the investigation, both agencies made affirmative preliminary and final determinations supporting the imposition of antidumping duties. The agencies also found “critical circumstances,” meaning there was a surge of imports after the petition was filed but before the preliminary determination, which could undermine the effectiveness of any eventual duties. As a result, the suspension of liquidation and the imposition of duties were backdated by 90 days to cover these imports.

The importers of Vietnamese honey and their trade association challenged the Commission’s final determination of critical circumstances in the United States Court of International Trade. They argued that the Commission improperly focused on the period before the antidumping duty order was issued, rather than considering whether the import surge would undermine the remedial effect of the order after its issuance. The Trade Court rejected this argument, upholding the Commission’s determination as both lawful and supported by substantial evidence.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Trade Court’s decision de novo, applying the same standard. The Federal Circuit held that the statute does not require the Commission to focus solely on the period after the antidumping duty order is issued. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the surge of imports before the preliminary determination is likely to undermine the remedial effect of the order, starting from the suspension date. The court also found that the Commission’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of International Trade.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1498/24-1498-2025-10-06.html</id>
        	<title>AG DER DILLINGER HUTTENWERKE v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-10-06T08:04:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-10-06T08:04:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1498/24-1498-2025-10-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns an antidumping duty investigation by the U.S. Department of Commerce into certain carbon and alloy steel cut-to-length plate from Germany. The Department selected a German steel producer as a mandatory respondent and required it to provide detailed information about its products and production costs. The producer requested that Commerce modify its model-match methodology to recognize certain steel products—specifically, “sour service” steel used for petroleum transport and pressure vessels—as distinct categories due to their unique properties and higher production costs. Commerce rejected these requests, finding one untimely and the other unsupported. Additionally, the producer was unable to provide product-specific cost data for non-prime steel plate, which is sold as “odds and ends,” and instead reported average costs. Commerce, however, used the likely selling price of non-prime plate as a proxy for its cost of production.

The U.S. Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s determinations multiple times. It affirmed Commerce’s rejection of the proposed new product category for sour pressure vessel plate as untimely, but required Commerce to reconsider its approach to the cost of production for non-prime plate, citing precedent that actual cost data, not likely selling price, should be used. On remand, Commerce maintained its use of likely selling price as facts otherwise available, and the Trade Court ultimately sustained this approach, while also instructing Commerce to accept the new category for sour transport plate in light of analogous precedent.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision to uphold Commerce’s rejection of the untimely model-match proposal for sour pressure vessel plate. However, the Federal Circuit held that it was unreasonable for Commerce to use likely selling price as facts otherwise available for cost of production, as this methodology does not reasonably reflect actual production costs. The court vacated the Trade Court’s decision on this issue and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1498/24-1498-2025-10-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AG DER DILLINGER HUTTENWERKE v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns an antidumping duty investigation by the U.S. Department of Commerce into certain carbon and alloy steel cut-to-length plate from Germany. The Department selected a German steel producer as a mandatory respondent and required it to provide detailed information about its products and production costs. The producer requested that Commerce modify its model-match methodology to recognize certain steel products—specifically, “sour service” steel used for petroleum transport and pressure vessels—as distinct categories due to their unique properties and higher production costs. Commerce rejected these requests, finding one untimely and the other unsupported. Additionally, the producer was unable to provide product-specific cost data for non-prime steel plate, which is sold as “odds and ends,” and instead reported average costs. Commerce, however, used the likely selling price of non-prime plate as a proxy for its cost of production.

The U.S. Court of International Trade reviewed Commerce’s determinations multiple times. It affirmed Commerce’s rejection of the proposed new product category for sour pressure vessel plate as untimely, but required Commerce to reconsider its approach to the cost of production for non-prime plate, citing precedent that actual cost data, not likely selling price, should be used. On remand, Commerce maintained its use of likely selling price as facts otherwise available, and the Trade Court ultimately sustained this approach, while also instructing Commerce to accept the new category for sour transport plate in light of analogous precedent.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision to uphold Commerce’s rejection of the untimely model-match proposal for sour pressure vessel plate. However, the Federal Circuit held that it was unreasonable for Commerce to use likely selling price as facts otherwise available for cost of production, as this methodology does not reasonably reflect actual production costs. The court vacated the Trade Court’s decision on this issue and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-10-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2094/23-2094-2025-09-08.html</id>
        	<title>CORINTH PIPEWORKS PIPE INDUSTRY SA v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-09-08T06:32:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-09-08T06:32:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2094/23-2094-2025-09-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case concerns an administrative review of an antidumping duty order imposed by the United States Department of Commerce on certain large diameter welded pipe imported from Greece. The Greek producer, Corinth Pipeworks Pipe Industry SA, and its U.S. subsidiary, CPW America Co., were the sole exporter and importer of the subject merchandise. During the review period, Commerce required Corinth to submit cost data and a reconciliation of those costs to its financial statements. Corinth submitted responses to Commerce’s initial and two supplemental questionnaires, but Commerce found that the data did not reconcile as required, included double-counted costs, and failed to provide a single, complete reconciliation for the review period.

After receiving Corinth’s responses, Commerce initially issued preliminary results finding no dumping. However, after reviewing the final submissions, Commerce determined that Corinth’s cost data were unreliable and incomplete. Commerce concluded that Corinth had withheld necessary information, failed to provide data in the requested form, and significantly impeded the review. As a result, Commerce applied “facts otherwise available” with an adverse inference, assigning Corinth the highest dumping margin alleged in the original petition. Corinth challenged this determination before the United States Court of International Trade, arguing that Commerce’s actions were unreasonable, that it was not given an opportunity to comment on a change in methodology, and that the adverse inference was not justified.

The United States Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s final determination, finding that Commerce’s use of total adverse facts available was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit held that Commerce’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence and not contrary to law, that Corinth had failed to cooperate to the best of its ability, and that Commerce was not required to provide an additional opportunity to comment under the circumstances. The judgment of the Trade Court was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2094/23-2094-2025-09-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CORINTH PIPEWORKS PIPE INDUSTRY SA v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case concerns an administrative review of an antidumping duty order imposed by the United States Department of Commerce on certain large diameter welded pipe imported from Greece. The Greek producer, Corinth Pipeworks Pipe Industry SA, and its U.S. subsidiary, CPW America Co., were the sole exporter and importer of the subject merchandise. During the review period, Commerce required Corinth to submit cost data and a reconciliation of those costs to its financial statements. Corinth submitted responses to Commerce’s initial and two supplemental questionnaires, but Commerce found that the data did not reconcile as required, included double-counted costs, and failed to provide a single, complete reconciliation for the review period.

After receiving Corinth’s responses, Commerce initially issued preliminary results finding no dumping. However, after reviewing the final submissions, Commerce determined that Corinth’s cost data were unreliable and incomplete. Commerce concluded that Corinth had withheld necessary information, failed to provide data in the requested form, and significantly impeded the review. As a result, Commerce applied “facts otherwise available” with an adverse inference, assigning Corinth the highest dumping margin alleged in the original petition. Corinth challenged this determination before the United States Court of International Trade, arguing that Commerce’s actions were unreasonable, that it was not given an opportunity to comment on a change in methodology, and that the adverse inference was not justified.

The United States Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s final determination, finding that Commerce’s use of total adverse facts available was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit held that Commerce’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence and not contrary to law, that Corinth had failed to cooperate to the best of its ability, and that Commerce was not required to provide an additional opportunity to comment under the circumstances. The judgment of the Trade Court was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-09-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1812/25-1812-2025-08-29.html</id>
        	<title>V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump</title>
        	<updated>2025-08-29T13:33:08-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-29T13:33:08-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1812/25-1812-2025-08-29.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Several small businesses and a coalition of states challenged a series of executive orders issued by the President that imposed new tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods imported from most countries. These tariffs, referred to as the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs, were imposed in response to declared national emergencies related to drug trafficking and trade imbalances. The executive orders directed changes to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, resulting in significant increases in import duties on products from Canada, Mexico, China, and other major trading partners.

The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by imposing these tariffs. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose the challenged tariffs and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The government appealed, and the Federal Circuit consolidated the cases, stayed the injunction pending appeal, and heard the matter en banc.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate” importation does not include the power to impose tariffs of the type and scope at issue. The court found that IEEPA does not mention tariffs, duties, or taxes, and contrasted it with other statutes where Congress has explicitly delegated tariff authority to the President with clear limitations. The court also concluded that the government’s interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns under the major questions and non-delegation doctrines. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s declaratory judgment that the executive orders were invalid, but vacated the universal injunction and remanded for the CIT to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/25-1812/25-1812-2025-08-29.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Several small businesses and a coalition of states challenged a series of executive orders issued by the President that imposed new tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all goods imported from most countries. These tariffs, referred to as the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs, were imposed in response to declared national emergencies related to drug trafficking and trade imbalances. The executive orders directed changes to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, resulting in significant increases in import duties on products from Canada, Mexico, China, and other major trading partners.

The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT), arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by imposing these tariffs. The CIT granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose the challenged tariffs and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The government appealed, and the Federal Circuit consolidated the cases, stayed the injunction pending appeal, and heard the matter en banc.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, holding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate” importation does not include the power to impose tariffs of the type and scope at issue. The court found that IEEPA does not mention tariffs, duties, or taxes, and contrasted it with other statutes where Congress has explicitly delegated tariff authority to the President with clear limitations. The court also concluded that the government’s interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns under the major questions and non-delegation doctrines. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s declaratory judgment that the executive orders were invalid, but vacated the universal injunction and remanded for the CIT to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief in light of recent Supreme Court guidance.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
													<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1189/24-1189-2025-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-08-13T05:01:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-13T05:01:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1189/24-1189-2025-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Valeo North America imported T-series aluminum sheets from China and sought a determination from the U.S. Department of Commerce as to whether these products were subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on common alloy aluminum sheet from China. The dispute centered on whether Valeo’s T-series sheets, which have a manganese-based core but are not registered with the Aluminum Association, fell within the scope of the orders, which cover certain aluminum sheets “as designated by the Aluminum Association.” Valeo argued that only registered alloys were covered and that its heat-treated T-series sheets should be excluded.

The United States Department of Commerce initially ruled that Valeo’s T-series sheets were within the scope of the orders, interpreting the language to include unregistered alloys with the relevant chemical composition. Valeo challenged this determination at the United States Court of International Trade, which found the scope language ambiguous and remanded the case for further explanation, particularly regarding the treatment of unregistered alloys and the impact of heat treatment. On remand, Commerce again found the scope language ambiguous, considered additional regulatory factors, and reaffirmed that Valeo’s products were covered. The Trade Court sustained this remand determination, and Valeo appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the language “as designated by the Aluminum Association” in the orders was ambiguous and did not unambiguously exclude unregistered alloys. The court found that Commerce’s analysis under the regulatory framework was supported by substantial evidence and that Valeo’s arguments regarding heat treatment and the timing of Customs instructions were unpersuasive. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision, upholding Commerce’s determination that Valeo’s T-series sheets are within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1189/24-1189-2025-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "VALEO NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Valeo North America imported T-series aluminum sheets from China and sought a determination from the U.S. Department of Commerce as to whether these products were subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on common alloy aluminum sheet from China. The dispute centered on whether Valeo’s T-series sheets, which have a manganese-based core but are not registered with the Aluminum Association, fell within the scope of the orders, which cover certain aluminum sheets “as designated by the Aluminum Association.” Valeo argued that only registered alloys were covered and that its heat-treated T-series sheets should be excluded.

The United States Department of Commerce initially ruled that Valeo’s T-series sheets were within the scope of the orders, interpreting the language to include unregistered alloys with the relevant chemical composition. Valeo challenged this determination at the United States Court of International Trade, which found the scope language ambiguous and remanded the case for further explanation, particularly regarding the treatment of unregistered alloys and the impact of heat treatment. On remand, Commerce again found the scope language ambiguous, considered additional regulatory factors, and reaffirmed that Valeo’s products were covered. The Trade Court sustained this remand determination, and Valeo appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the language “as designated by the Aluminum Association” in the orders was ambiguous and did not unambiguously exclude unregistered alloys. The court found that Commerce’s analysis under the regulatory framework was supported by substantial evidence and that Valeo’s arguments regarding heat treatment and the timing of Customs instructions were unpersuasive. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s decision, upholding Commerce’s determination that Valeo’s T-series sheets are within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2204/22-2204-2025-08-04.html</id>
        	<title>TAU-KEN TEMIR LLP v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-08-04T06:31:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-08-04T06:31:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2204/22-2204-2025-08-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves Tau-Ken Temir LLP, JSC NMC Tau-Ken Samruk, and the Ministry of Trade and Integration of the Republic of Kazakhstan (collectively, &quot;Tau-Ken&quot;) appealing a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade. The U.S. Department of Commerce had determined that the Republic of Kazakhstan subsidized Tau-Ken’s production of silicon metal, warranting a countervailable subsidy rate of 160%. This determination was based on Commerce rejecting a Tau-Ken submission that was filed 1 hour and 41 minutes past the deadline.

The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s decision, finding that Commerce did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the late submission and applying an adverse inference when selecting from facts otherwise available. The Trade Court likened the case to Dongtai Peak Honey Industries Co. v. United States, where Commerce had similarly rejected untimely submissions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce abused its discretion in rejecting Tau-Ken’s submission. The court noted that the rejection significantly impeded the goal of determining an accurate countervailable subsidy rate and that accepting the late submission would not have burdened Commerce or implicated finality concerns. The court also found that Tau-Ken had made diligent efforts to comply with the deadlines and that the technical issues encountered were legitimate.

The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions for Commerce to accept the September 16 submission and proceed with the countervailing duty investigation accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of determining subsidy rates as accurately as possible and found that Commerce’s rejection of the submission was a clear error of judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2204/22-2204-2025-08-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "TAU-KEN TEMIR LLP v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves Tau-Ken Temir LLP, JSC NMC Tau-Ken Samruk, and the Ministry of Trade and Integration of the Republic of Kazakhstan (collectively, &quot;Tau-Ken&quot;) appealing a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade. The U.S. Department of Commerce had determined that the Republic of Kazakhstan subsidized Tau-Ken’s production of silicon metal, warranting a countervailable subsidy rate of 160%. This determination was based on Commerce rejecting a Tau-Ken submission that was filed 1 hour and 41 minutes past the deadline.

The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s decision, finding that Commerce did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the late submission and applying an adverse inference when selecting from facts otherwise available. The Trade Court likened the case to Dongtai Peak Honey Industries Co. v. United States, where Commerce had similarly rejected untimely submissions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce abused its discretion in rejecting Tau-Ken’s submission. The court noted that the rejection significantly impeded the goal of determining an accurate countervailable subsidy rate and that accepting the late submission would not have burdened Commerce or implicated finality concerns. The court also found that Tau-Ken had made diligent efforts to comply with the deadlines and that the technical issues encountered were legitimate.

The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions for Commerce to accept the September 16 submission and proceed with the countervailing duty investigation accordingly. The court emphasized the importance of determining subsidy rates as accurately as possible and found that Commerce’s rejection of the submission was a clear error of judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-08-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sharon Prost</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2245/23-2245-2025-07-28.html</id>
        	<title>JILIN FOREST INDUSTRY JINQIAO FLOORING GROUP CO. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-07-28T06:32:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-07-28T06:32:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2245/23-2245-2025-07-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Jilin Forest Industry Jinqiao Flooring Group Co. (&quot;Jilin&quot;) is an exporter of multilayered wood flooring in China. In November 2010, the Department of Commerce (&quot;Commerce&quot;) initiated an antidumping investigation into the sale of this product from China, treating China as a non-market economy (&quot;NME&quot;) country. Commerce applied a presumption that all companies in an NME country are subject to government control and should be assessed a single antidumping duty rate unless they can demonstrate independence. Jilin successfully demonstrated independence and received a separate rate of 3.31 percent.

In the fifth administrative review initiated in February 2017, Commerce selected Jilin as a mandatory respondent. Despite Jilin&#039;s cooperation, Commerce found that Jilin failed to rebut the presumption of government control and assigned it the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate of 25.62 percent. Jilin challenged this decision at the Court of International Trade (&quot;CIT&quot;), which questioned the lawfulness of Commerce&#039;s NME policy and ordered Commerce to calculate an individual rate for Jilin. On remand, Commerce calculated a zero percent rate for Jilin under protest, and the CIT entered that rate in its final judgment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Commerce&#039;s practice of applying the NME presumption and assigning a single NME-wide rate to exporters that fail to rebut the presumption is lawful. The court cited binding precedents, including Sigma Corp. v. United States and China Manufacturers Alliance, LLC v. United States, which upheld Commerce&#039;s authority to use the NME presumption and assign a single rate to the NME-wide entity. The court reversed the CIT&#039;s decision, reinstating the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate of 25.62 percent for Jilin. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2245/23-2245-2025-07-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "JILIN FOREST INDUSTRY JINQIAO FLOORING GROUP CO. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Jilin Forest Industry Jinqiao Flooring Group Co. (&quot;Jilin&quot;) is an exporter of multilayered wood flooring in China. In November 2010, the Department of Commerce (&quot;Commerce&quot;) initiated an antidumping investigation into the sale of this product from China, treating China as a non-market economy (&quot;NME&quot;) country. Commerce applied a presumption that all companies in an NME country are subject to government control and should be assessed a single antidumping duty rate unless they can demonstrate independence. Jilin successfully demonstrated independence and received a separate rate of 3.31 percent.

In the fifth administrative review initiated in February 2017, Commerce selected Jilin as a mandatory respondent. Despite Jilin&#039;s cooperation, Commerce found that Jilin failed to rebut the presumption of government control and assigned it the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate of 25.62 percent. Jilin challenged this decision at the Court of International Trade (&quot;CIT&quot;), which questioned the lawfulness of Commerce&#039;s NME policy and ordered Commerce to calculate an individual rate for Jilin. On remand, Commerce calculated a zero percent rate for Jilin under protest, and the CIT entered that rate in its final judgment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Commerce&#039;s practice of applying the NME presumption and assigning a single NME-wide rate to exporters that fail to rebut the presumption is lawful. The court cited binding precedents, including Sigma Corp. v. United States and China Manufacturers Alliance, LLC v. United States, which upheld Commerce&#039;s authority to use the NME presumption and assign a single rate to the NME-wide entity. The court reversed the CIT&#039;s decision, reinstating the PRC-wide antidumping duty rate of 25.62 percent for Jilin.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-07-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Bryson</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60209/24-60209-2025-06-24.html</id>
        	<title>Texas Corn Producers v. EPA</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-25T04:00:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-25T04:00:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60209/24-60209-2025-06-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Petitioners, including various agricultural and trade organizations, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over a rule that set an equation for calculating vehicle fuel economy, specifically the &quot;Ra factor.&quot; They argued that the Ra factor was set arbitrarily low, which effectively increased federal fuel economy standards and decreased demand for gasoline, harming their businesses.

The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners contended that the EPA&#039;s rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by ignoring significant comments and data that flagged flaws in the determination of the Ra factor. They pointed out that the EPA&#039;s test program used too few and outdated vehicles, included data from a malfunctioning vehicle, and excluded data from a properly functioning one. Additionally, they argued that the EPA failed to consider alternative data sources, such as manufacturer certification data, which showed a higher Ra factor.

The Fifth Circuit found that the EPA&#039;s rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA did not adequately respond to significant comments that raised substantial issues with the test program&#039;s sample size, the representativeness of the vehicles tested, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain test data. The court also found that the EPA failed to justify its rejection of alternative data sources. As a result, the court held that the EPA did not demonstrate that its decision was the product of reasoned decision-making.

The court granted the petition for review and vacated the portion of the EPA&#039;s rule that set and implemented the Ra factor of 0.81. The court concluded that there was no serious possibility that the EPA could substantiate its decision on remand, and thus, vacatur was the appropriate remedy. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/24-60209/24-60209-2025-06-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Texas Corn Producers v. EPA" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Petitioners, including various agricultural and trade organizations, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over a rule that set an equation for calculating vehicle fuel economy, specifically the &quot;Ra factor.&quot; They argued that the Ra factor was set arbitrarily low, which effectively increased federal fuel economy standards and decreased demand for gasoline, harming their businesses.

The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners contended that the EPA&#039;s rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by ignoring significant comments and data that flagged flaws in the determination of the Ra factor. They pointed out that the EPA&#039;s test program used too few and outdated vehicles, included data from a malfunctioning vehicle, and excluded data from a properly functioning one. Additionally, they argued that the EPA failed to consider alternative data sources, such as manufacturer certification data, which showed a higher Ra factor.

The Fifth Circuit found that the EPA&#039;s rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA did not adequately respond to significant comments that raised substantial issues with the test program&#039;s sample size, the representativeness of the vehicles tested, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain test data. The court also found that the EPA failed to justify its rejection of alternative data sources. As a result, the court held that the EPA did not demonstrate that its decision was the product of reasoned decision-making.

The court granted the petition for review and vacated the portion of the EPA&#039;s rule that set and implemented the Ra factor of 0.81. The court concluded that there was no serious possibility that the EPA could substantiate its decision on remand, and thus, vacatur was the appropriate remedy.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jerry Smith</case:judge>
													<category term="Agriculture Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-55063/22-55063-2025-06-23.html</id>
        	<title>ISLAND INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SIGMA CORPORATION</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-23T08:01:17-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-23T08:01:17-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-55063/22-55063-2025-06-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Island Industries, Inc. filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Sigma Corporation, alleging that Sigma made false statements on customs forms to avoid paying antidumping duties on welded outlets imported from China. Island claimed that Sigma falsely declared that the products were not subject to antidumping duties and misrepresented the products as steel couplings instead of welded outlets. The jury found in favor of Island, concluding that Sigma was liable under the FCA.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. Sigma requested a scope ruling from the Department of Commerce, which determined that Sigma’s welded outlets fell within the scope of the antidumping duty order on certain carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings from China. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed this ruling. Sigma’s appeal was stayed pending the Federal Circuit’s decision, which ultimately affirmed the scope ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the case and that the action did not need to be initiated in the Court of International Trade. The court also held that 19 U.S.C. § 1592, which provides a mechanism for the United States to recover fraudulently avoided customs duties, does not displace the FCA. The court rejected Sigma’s argument that it lacked an “obligation to pay” antidumping duties under the FCA and concluded that Island’s theory that Sigma violated the FCA by knowingly falsely declaring that no antidumping duties were owed was legally valid and supported by sufficient evidence. The court also found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under either of Island’s theories of liability. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/22-55063/22-55063-2025-06-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ISLAND INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SIGMA CORPORATION" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Island Industries, Inc. filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Sigma Corporation, alleging that Sigma made false statements on customs forms to avoid paying antidumping duties on welded outlets imported from China. Island claimed that Sigma falsely declared that the products were not subject to antidumping duties and misrepresented the products as steel couplings instead of welded outlets. The jury found in favor of Island, concluding that Sigma was liable under the FCA.

The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. Sigma requested a scope ruling from the Department of Commerce, which determined that Sigma’s welded outlets fell within the scope of the antidumping duty order on certain carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings from China. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed this ruling. Sigma’s appeal was stayed pending the Federal Circuit’s decision, which ultimately affirmed the scope ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the case and that the action did not need to be initiated in the Court of International Trade. The court also held that 19 U.S.C. § 1592, which provides a mechanism for the United States to recover fraudulently avoided customs duties, does not displace the FCA. The court rejected Sigma’s argument that it lacked an “obligation to pay” antidumping duties under the FCA and concluded that Island’s theory that Sigma violated the FCA by knowingly falsely declaring that no antidumping duties were owed was legally valid and supported by sufficient evidence. The court also found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under either of Island’s theories of liability.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Michelle T. Friedland</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1219/24-1219-2025-06-17.html</id>
        	<title>AG DER DILLINGER HUTTENWERKE v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-06-17T07:02:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-17T07:02:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1219/24-1219-2025-06-17.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the appellants, a group of German steel companies, challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce&#039;s determination of a 22.9 percent antidumping duty on their steel plate products. Commerce applied an adverse inference based on the appellants&#039; failure to provide complete manufacturer information for certain sales by their affiliated reseller, which Commerce deemed necessary for calculating the dumping margin.

The U.S. Court of International Trade (Trade Court) sustained Commerce&#039;s decision, finding that the appellants did not cooperate to the best of their ability. The Trade Court noted that the appellants failed to provide reasonable alternative forms of the missing information, which could have mitigated the burden of manually retrieving the data. The court suggested that a statistical analysis or randomized sampling could have been a reasonable alternative.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and held that Commerce&#039;s request for the missing manufacturer information imposed an unreasonable burden on the appellants. However, the court also found that the appellants did not propose reasonable alternative forms of the missing data as required by statute. Consequently, Commerce&#039;s application of adverse facts available was deemed permissible.

The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce&#039;s use of the highest non-aberrational net price among the disputed sales to fill the information gap, concluding that this approach was reasonable given the size of the information gap and the need to deter non-cooperation. The court found that Commerce&#039;s choice of adverse inference was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/24-1219/24-1219-2025-06-17.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "AG DER DILLINGER HUTTENWERKE v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the appellants, a group of German steel companies, challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce&#039;s determination of a 22.9 percent antidumping duty on their steel plate products. Commerce applied an adverse inference based on the appellants&#039; failure to provide complete manufacturer information for certain sales by their affiliated reseller, which Commerce deemed necessary for calculating the dumping margin.

The U.S. Court of International Trade (Trade Court) sustained Commerce&#039;s decision, finding that the appellants did not cooperate to the best of their ability. The Trade Court noted that the appellants failed to provide reasonable alternative forms of the missing information, which could have mitigated the burden of manually retrieving the data. The court suggested that a statistical analysis or randomized sampling could have been a reasonable alternative.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and held that Commerce&#039;s request for the missing manufacturer information imposed an unreasonable burden on the appellants. However, the court also found that the appellants did not propose reasonable alternative forms of the missing data as required by statute. Consequently, Commerce&#039;s application of adverse facts available was deemed permissible.

The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce&#039;s use of the highest non-aberrational net price among the disputed sales to fill the information gap, concluding that this approach was reasonable given the size of the information gap and the need to deter non-cooperation. The court found that Commerce&#039;s choice of adverse inference was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-17</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2060/23-2060-2025-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>La Molisana S.p.A. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2025-06-05T06:31:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-06-05T06:31:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2060/23-2060-2025-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Two Italian pasta manufacturers, La Molisana S.p.A. and Valdigrano Di Flavio Pagani S.r.L., challenged the United States Department of Commerce&#039;s final results from the twenty-third administrative review of an antidumping order on certain pasta from Italy. The dispute centered on Commerce&#039;s methodology for determining the protein content of pasta, which affects the classification of pasta as either standard or premium quality. Commerce used the protein content listed on product labels, which is subject to U.S. FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen-to-protein conversion factors in the U.S. and Italy. La Molisana argued that this methodology caused inaccuracies in comparing pasta products.

The United States Court of International Trade sustained Commerce&#039;s final results, concluding that La Molisana had not demonstrated that the alleged flaws in Commerce&#039;s methodology were commercially significant. The court found that Commerce&#039;s reliance on packaging labels for protein content fostered transparency and consistency, and that La Molisana&#039;s evidence, including a market report and a new definition from the Bologna Grain Exchange, was insufficient to compel a change in the protein breakpoint from 12.5% to 13.5%.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce&#039;s methodology failed to compare products based on identical physical characteristics, as required by statute. The court held that the FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen conversion factors introduced inaccuracies that Commerce could not dismiss as commercially insignificant. However, the court agreed with Commerce and the Trade Court that La Molisana&#039;s evidence did not provide a compelling reason to change the protein breakpoint. The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court&#039;s judgment regarding the rounding rules and nitrogen conversion factors, affirmed the judgment on the protein breakpoint, and remanded for further proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2060/23-2060-2025-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "La Molisana S.p.A. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Two Italian pasta manufacturers, La Molisana S.p.A. and Valdigrano Di Flavio Pagani S.r.L., challenged the United States Department of Commerce&#039;s final results from the twenty-third administrative review of an antidumping order on certain pasta from Italy. The dispute centered on Commerce&#039;s methodology for determining the protein content of pasta, which affects the classification of pasta as either standard or premium quality. Commerce used the protein content listed on product labels, which is subject to U.S. FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen-to-protein conversion factors in the U.S. and Italy. La Molisana argued that this methodology caused inaccuracies in comparing pasta products.

The United States Court of International Trade sustained Commerce&#039;s final results, concluding that La Molisana had not demonstrated that the alleged flaws in Commerce&#039;s methodology were commercially significant. The court found that Commerce&#039;s reliance on packaging labels for protein content fostered transparency and consistency, and that La Molisana&#039;s evidence, including a market report and a new definition from the Bologna Grain Exchange, was insufficient to compel a change in the protein breakpoint from 12.5% to 13.5%.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that Commerce&#039;s methodology failed to compare products based on identical physical characteristics, as required by statute. The court held that the FDA rounding rules and different nitrogen conversion factors introduced inaccuracies that Commerce could not dismiss as commercially insignificant. However, the court agreed with Commerce and the Trade Court that La Molisana&#039;s evidence did not provide a compelling reason to change the protein breakpoint. The Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court&#039;s judgment regarding the rounding rules and nitrogen conversion factors, affirmed the judgment on the protein breakpoint, and remanded for further proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kara Farnandez Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1877/23-1877-2025-04-22.html</id>
        	<title>MARMEN INC. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-04-22T07:31:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-22T07:31:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1877/23-1877-2025-04-22.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., and Marmen Energy Co. (collectively, “Marmen”) appealed the U.S. Court of International Trade’s (CIT) decision that sustained the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) final determination of a 4.94% dumping margin for utility-scale wind towers from Canada. Commerce had initiated an antidumping (AD) investigation in July 2019, and in June 2020, issued its final AD determination. Marmen challenged Commerce’s decision on three grounds: the weight-averaging of steel plate costs, the rejection of a USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation, and the use of the average-to-transaction (A-to-T) methodology based on Cohen’s d test.

The CIT affirmed Commerce’s weight-averaging of Marmen’s steel plate costs but remanded the case on the other two issues. Commerce again rejected the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation on remand, arguing it would double count an exchange-rate adjustment. Commerce also maintained its use of Cohen’s d test, despite concerns raised by the Federal Circuit in Stupp Corp. v. United States. The CIT sustained Commerce’s determination on both issues, leading to Marmen’s appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Commerce’s rejection of the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation was not supported by substantial evidence, as the proposed adjustment did not duplicate other adjustments and was reliable. The court also concluded that Commerce’s use of Cohen’s d test was unreasonable because the data did not meet the necessary assumptions of normal distribution, equal variability, and sufficient size. The court vacated Commerce’s calculated dumping margin and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1877/23-1877-2025-04-22.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MARMEN INC. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., and Marmen Energy Co. (collectively, “Marmen”) appealed the U.S. Court of International Trade’s (CIT) decision that sustained the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) final determination of a 4.94% dumping margin for utility-scale wind towers from Canada. Commerce had initiated an antidumping (AD) investigation in July 2019, and in June 2020, issued its final AD determination. Marmen challenged Commerce’s decision on three grounds: the weight-averaging of steel plate costs, the rejection of a USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation, and the use of the average-to-transaction (A-to-T) methodology based on Cohen’s d test.

The CIT affirmed Commerce’s weight-averaging of Marmen’s steel plate costs but remanded the case on the other two issues. Commerce again rejected the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation on remand, arguing it would double count an exchange-rate adjustment. Commerce also maintained its use of Cohen’s d test, despite concerns raised by the Federal Circuit in Stupp Corp. v. United States. The CIT sustained Commerce’s determination on both issues, leading to Marmen’s appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Commerce’s rejection of the USD-to-CAD cost reconciliation was not supported by substantial evidence, as the proposed adjustment did not duplicate other adjustments and was reliable. The court also concluded that Commerce’s use of Cohen’s d test was unreasonable because the data did not meet the necessary assumptions of normal distribution, equal variability, and sufficient size. The court vacated Commerce’s calculated dumping margin and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-22</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Sharon Prost</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1419/23-1419-2025-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>DONGKUK S&amp;C CO., LTD. v. US</title>
        	<updated>2025-04-21T07:00:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-21T07:00:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1419/23-1419-2025-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Dongkuk S&amp;C Co., Ltd., a Korean producer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the United States Department of Commerce&#039;s final determination that its wind towers were being sold in the United States at less than fair value, resulting in an antidumping duty order. Commerce&#039;s investigation covered sales from July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019, and found that Dongkuk&#039;s sales were below normal value, leading to the imposition of antidumping duties.

The Court of International Trade (CIT) initially remanded Commerce&#039;s decision to adjust Dongkuk&#039;s steel plate costs, questioning the analytical support for Commerce&#039;s determination. Commerce provided additional analysis on remand, demonstrating that the cost variations were due to the timing of steel plate purchases rather than the physical characteristics of the wind towers. The CIT subsequently sustained Commerce&#039;s remand redetermination and upheld the choice of surrogate financial data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT&#039;s decision. The court held that Commerce&#039;s determination to adjust Dongkuk&#039;s steel plate costs was supported by substantial evidence, as the cost variations were unrelated to the physical characteristics of the wind towers. Additionally, the court upheld Commerce&#039;s use of SeAH Steel Holdings Corporation&#039;s consolidated financial statement as a reasonable source of surrogate data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses, despite Dongkuk&#039;s preference for SeAH Steel Corporation&#039;s standalone financial data. The court found that Commerce&#039;s decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1419/23-1419-2025-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "DONGKUK S&amp;C CO., LTD. v. US" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Dongkuk S&amp;C Co., Ltd., a Korean producer of utility scale wind towers, challenged the United States Department of Commerce&#039;s final determination that its wind towers were being sold in the United States at less than fair value, resulting in an antidumping duty order. Commerce&#039;s investigation covered sales from July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019, and found that Dongkuk&#039;s sales were below normal value, leading to the imposition of antidumping duties.

The Court of International Trade (CIT) initially remanded Commerce&#039;s decision to adjust Dongkuk&#039;s steel plate costs, questioning the analytical support for Commerce&#039;s determination. Commerce provided additional analysis on remand, demonstrating that the cost variations were due to the timing of steel plate purchases rather than the physical characteristics of the wind towers. The CIT subsequently sustained Commerce&#039;s remand redetermination and upheld the choice of surrogate financial data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT&#039;s decision. The court held that Commerce&#039;s determination to adjust Dongkuk&#039;s steel plate costs was supported by substantial evidence, as the cost variations were unrelated to the physical characteristics of the wind towers. Additionally, the court upheld Commerce&#039;s use of SeAH Steel Holdings Corporation&#039;s consolidated financial statement as a reasonable source of surrogate data for calculating constructed value profit and selling expenses, despite Dongkuk&#039;s preference for SeAH Steel Corporation&#039;s standalone financial data. The court found that Commerce&#039;s decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Utilities Law"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2274/23-2274-2025-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>TARGET CORPORATION v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-04-21T06:00:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-04-21T06:00:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2274/23-2274-2025-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Target Corporation (Target) imported goods subject to an antidumping duty order and paid duties at a lower rate than specified in a final judgment. The United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) later realized the error but did not correct it within the statutory 90-day window. The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) ordered Customs to reliquidate the entries at the correct rate, despite the statutory finality provisions.

In the lower court, the CIT granted the government&#039;s motion to dismiss Target&#039;s challenge to the reliquidation, relying on its previous decision in Home Products International, Inc. v. United States. The CIT held that it had the authority to enforce its judgments and that the principle of finality in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 did not bar correcting Customs&#039; errors in liquidating entries covered by a trade action.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the CIT&#039;s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the case was governed by its precedent in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, which established that Customs&#039; liquidation decisions, even if erroneous, are final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) unless specific statutory exceptions apply. The court rejected the CIT&#039;s interpretation that it could use its equitable powers to override the statutory finality provisions. The Federal Circuit emphasized that Congress has carefully crafted a statutory scheme for finality and that any remedy for the harshness of the statute should come from Congress, not the courts. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2274/23-2274-2025-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "TARGET CORPORATION v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Target Corporation (Target) imported goods subject to an antidumping duty order and paid duties at a lower rate than specified in a final judgment. The United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) later realized the error but did not correct it within the statutory 90-day window. The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) ordered Customs to reliquidate the entries at the correct rate, despite the statutory finality provisions.

In the lower court, the CIT granted the government&#039;s motion to dismiss Target&#039;s challenge to the reliquidation, relying on its previous decision in Home Products International, Inc. v. United States. The CIT held that it had the authority to enforce its judgments and that the principle of finality in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 did not bar correcting Customs&#039; errors in liquidating entries covered by a trade action.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the CIT&#039;s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the case was governed by its precedent in Cemex, S.A. v. United States, which established that Customs&#039; liquidation decisions, even if erroneous, are final and conclusive under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) unless specific statutory exceptions apply. The court rejected the CIT&#039;s interpretation that it could use its equitable powers to override the statutory finality provisions. The Federal Circuit emphasized that Congress has carefully crafted a statutory scheme for finality and that any remedy for the harshness of the statute should come from Congress, not the courts.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1095/23-1095-2025-03-18.html</id>
        	<title>REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2025-03-18T06:31:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-03-18T06:31:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1095/23-1095-2025-03-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Realtek Semiconductor Corporation appealed a decision by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) regarding a motion for sanctions against DivX, LLC. DivX had filed a complaint alleging a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 by Realtek and others, which was later withdrawn. Realtek then sought sanctions against DivX for alleged misconduct occurring months prior. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the motion on procedural grounds, and the ITC adopted this decision without comment.

Realtek petitioned for the ITC to issue a show cause order sua sponte, which the ITC declined to do. Realtek argued that the ITC&#039;s failure to issue the order violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The ITC and DivX contended that the appeal should be dismissed due to lack of standing, jurisdiction, and because the decision was unreviewable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the ITC&#039;s decision not to issue a show cause order sua sponte was within its discretion and thus unreviewable under the APA. The court noted that such decisions are committed to agency discretion by law and are not subject to judicial review. Consequently, the court dismissed Realtek&#039;s appeal. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1095/23-1095-2025-03-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Realtek Semiconductor Corporation appealed a decision by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) regarding a motion for sanctions against DivX, LLC. DivX had filed a complaint alleging a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 by Realtek and others, which was later withdrawn. Realtek then sought sanctions against DivX for alleged misconduct occurring months prior. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the motion on procedural grounds, and the ITC adopted this decision without comment.

Realtek petitioned for the ITC to issue a show cause order sua sponte, which the ITC declined to do. Realtek argued that the ITC&#039;s failure to issue the order violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The ITC and DivX contended that the appeal should be dismissed due to lack of standing, jurisdiction, and because the decision was unreviewable.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the ITC&#039;s decision not to issue a show cause order sua sponte was within its discretion and thus unreviewable under the APA. The court noted that such decisions are committed to agency discretion by law and are not subject to judicial review. Consequently, the court dismissed Realtek&#039;s appeal.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-03-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1245/23-1245-2025-03-05.html</id>
        	<title>LASHIFY, INC. v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2025-03-05T07:33:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-03-05T07:33:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1245/23-1245-2025-03-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Lashify, Inc., an American company, distributes and sells eyelash extensions and related products in the United States, which are manufactured abroad. Lashify holds patents on these products and filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging that other importers were infringing on its patents, specifically a utility patent (U.S. Patent No. 10,721,984) and two design patents (U.S. Design Patent Nos. D877,416 and D867,664). Lashify sought relief under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which requires the existence of a domestic industry related to the patented articles.

The ITC denied Lashify relief, ruling that Lashify failed to meet the economic-prong requirement of the domestic-industry test, which demands significant investment in plant and equipment, significant employment of labor or capital, or substantial investment in exploitation of the patents. The ITC excluded expenses related to sales, marketing, warehousing, quality control, and distribution, deeming them insufficient to establish a domestic industry. Additionally, the ITC found that Lashify&#039;s products did not satisfy the technical-prong requirement for the utility patent, as the products did not meet the &quot;heat fused&quot; claim limitations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Lashify that the ITC applied an incorrect legal standard for the economic-prong requirement. The court held that significant employment of labor or capital should include expenses related to sales, marketing, warehousing, quality control, and distribution. The court vacated the ITC&#039;s decision on the economic prong and remanded for reevaluation regarding the design patents. However, the court affirmed the ITC&#039;s finding that Lashify failed to satisfy the technical-prong requirement for the utility patent, upholding the construction of &quot;heat fused&quot; to mean joined to form a single entity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1245/23-1245-2025-03-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "LASHIFY, INC. v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Lashify, Inc., an American company, distributes and sells eyelash extensions and related products in the United States, which are manufactured abroad. Lashify holds patents on these products and filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) alleging that other importers were infringing on its patents, specifically a utility patent (U.S. Patent No. 10,721,984) and two design patents (U.S. Design Patent Nos. D877,416 and D867,664). Lashify sought relief under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which requires the existence of a domestic industry related to the patented articles.

The ITC denied Lashify relief, ruling that Lashify failed to meet the economic-prong requirement of the domestic-industry test, which demands significant investment in plant and equipment, significant employment of labor or capital, or substantial investment in exploitation of the patents. The ITC excluded expenses related to sales, marketing, warehousing, quality control, and distribution, deeming them insufficient to establish a domestic industry. Additionally, the ITC found that Lashify&#039;s products did not satisfy the technical-prong requirement for the utility patent, as the products did not meet the &quot;heat fused&quot; claim limitations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Lashify that the ITC applied an incorrect legal standard for the economic-prong requirement. The court held that significant employment of labor or capital should include expenses related to sales, marketing, warehousing, quality control, and distribution. The court vacated the ITC&#039;s decision on the economic prong and remanded for reevaluation regarding the design patents. However, the court affirmed the ITC&#039;s finding that Lashify failed to satisfy the technical-prong requirement for the utility patent, upholding the construction of &quot;heat fused&quot; to mean joined to form a single entity.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-03-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1078/23-1078-2025-02-27.html</id>
        	<title>ALL ONE GOD FAITH, INC. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-02-27T08:01:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-27T08:01:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1078/23-1078-2025-02-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Appellants, including GL    B Energy Corporation and others, were accused of transshipping xanthan gum from China through India to evade antidumping duties imposed by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) initiated an investigation based on allegations from CP Kelco U.S., a domestic producer, and found substantial evidence that the xanthan gum was of Chinese origin and subject to antidumping duties. Customs applied adverse inferences against the manufacturers for not cooperating with information requests, concluding that the merchandise was transshipped to evade duties.

The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed the case and affirmed Customs&#039; determinations. The CIT dismissed claims related to finally liquidated entries for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the importers failed to timely appeal the denial of their protests. The CIT also denied the remaining motions for judgment on the agency record, finding that Customs&#039; determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary or capricious.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the CIT that Customs&#039; evasion determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were in accordance with the law. The court also found that the CIT had jurisdiction to review the evasion determinations, even for finally liquidated entries, based on the precedent set in Royal Brush Mfg., Inc. v. United States. However, the court affirmed the CIT&#039;s decision, noting that the CIT would have denied the motions for judgment on the agency record for the same reasons stated for the other entries. The court concluded that Customs&#039; evasion determinations were lawful and supported by substantial evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1078/23-1078-2025-02-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ALL ONE GOD FAITH, INC. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Appellants, including GL    B Energy Corporation and others, were accused of transshipping xanthan gum from China through India to evade antidumping duties imposed by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) initiated an investigation based on allegations from CP Kelco U.S., a domestic producer, and found substantial evidence that the xanthan gum was of Chinese origin and subject to antidumping duties. Customs applied adverse inferences against the manufacturers for not cooperating with information requests, concluding that the merchandise was transshipped to evade duties.

The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) reviewed the case and affirmed Customs&#039; determinations. The CIT dismissed claims related to finally liquidated entries for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the importers failed to timely appeal the denial of their protests. The CIT also denied the remaining motions for judgment on the agency record, finding that Customs&#039; determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were not arbitrary or capricious.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the CIT that Customs&#039; evasion determinations were supported by substantial evidence and were in accordance with the law. The court also found that the CIT had jurisdiction to review the evasion determinations, even for finally liquidated entries, based on the precedent set in Royal Brush Mfg., Inc. v. United States. However, the court affirmed the CIT&#039;s decision, noting that the CIT would have denied the motions for judgment on the agency record for the same reasons stated for the other entries. The court concluded that Customs&#039; evasion determinations were lawful and supported by substantial evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1217/23-1217-2025-02-13.html</id>
        	<title>US SYNTHETIC CORP. v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2025-02-13T07:02:34-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-13T07:02:34-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1217/23-1217-2025-02-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		US Synthetic Corp. (USS) filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (Commission) alleging that several intervenors violated 19 U.S.C. § 1337 by importing and selling products that infringe five of USS’s patents. The focus of this appeal is U.S. Patent No. 10,508,502 (’502 patent), which claims a polycrystalline diamond compact (PDC) with specific structural and magnetic properties.

The Commission instituted an investigation, and the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the asserted claims of the ’502 patent were infringed and not invalid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, or 112. However, the ALJ found the claims patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as they were directed to an abstract idea. The Commission reviewed and affirmed the ALJ’s determination, concluding that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of achieving desired magnetic properties, which were seen as side effects of the manufacturing process.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the asserted claims of the ’502 patent are not directed to an abstract idea but to a specific, non-abstract composition of matter defined by its constituent elements, dimensional information, and quantified material properties. The court found that the magnetic properties are integrally related to the structure of the PDC and are not merely side effects. Therefore, the claims are not directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one, and the court did not reach Alice step two.

The court also addressed the alternative argument that the claims were not enabled. The court found no error in the Commission’s conclusion that the claims were enabled, as the respondents failed to prove a lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence. The court reversed the Commission’s conclusion on patent ineligibility, affirmed the enablement conclusion, and remanded the case. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1217/23-1217-2025-02-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "US SYNTHETIC CORP. v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                US Synthetic Corp. (USS) filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission (Commission) alleging that several intervenors violated 19 U.S.C. § 1337 by importing and selling products that infringe five of USS’s patents. The focus of this appeal is U.S. Patent No. 10,508,502 (’502 patent), which claims a polycrystalline diamond compact (PDC) with specific structural and magnetic properties.

The Commission instituted an investigation, and the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that the asserted claims of the ’502 patent were infringed and not invalid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, or 112. However, the ALJ found the claims patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as they were directed to an abstract idea. The Commission reviewed and affirmed the ALJ’s determination, concluding that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of achieving desired magnetic properties, which were seen as side effects of the manufacturing process.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the asserted claims of the ’502 patent are not directed to an abstract idea but to a specific, non-abstract composition of matter defined by its constituent elements, dimensional information, and quantified material properties. The court found that the magnetic properties are integrally related to the structure of the PDC and are not merely side effects. Therefore, the claims are not directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one, and the court did not reach Alice step two.

The court also addressed the alternative argument that the claims were not enabled. The court found no error in the Commission’s conclusion that the claims were enabled, as the respondents failed to prove a lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence. The court reversed the Commission’s conclusion on patent ineligibility, affirmed the enablement conclusion, and remanded the case.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2266/23-2266-2025-02-11.html</id>
        	<title>PIRELLI TYRE CO., LTD. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-02-11T07:00:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-11T07:00:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2266/23-2266-2025-02-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Pirelli Tyre Co., Ltd. (Pirelli China), a foreign producer and exporter of certain tires, sought to establish independence from the Chinese government to obtain a separate antidumping duty rate. The United States Department of Commerce conducted an administrative review of merchandise covered by a 2015 antidumping-duty order for tires from China, covering entries between August 1, 2017, and July 31, 2018. Commerce applied a rebuttable presumption that all exporters within China are subject to government control, assigning a PRC-wide antidumping-duty rate unless the exporter demonstrates sufficient independence.

The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) upheld Commerce’s determination that Pirelli China had not demonstrated its independence from government control. Commerce found that Pirelli China did not show autonomy from the Chinese government in selecting its management, a key criterion for obtaining a separate rate. Pirelli China’s arguments based on Italian law were rejected because the relevant provisions were not included in the record.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Trade Court’s decision. The court held that Commerce’s interpretation of the rebuttable presumption and its requirement for Pirelli China to demonstrate autonomy from government control were reasonable. The court also found that Commerce’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, including the indirect ownership and control by state-owned enterprises and the shared management between Pirelli entities and Chinese government-controlled entities. The court concluded that Commerce acted within its discretion in rejecting Pirelli China’s unsupported interpretations of Italian law and upheld the assignment of the PRC-wide antidumping-duty rate to Pirelli China. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-2266/23-2266-2025-02-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "PIRELLI TYRE CO., LTD. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Pirelli Tyre Co., Ltd. (Pirelli China), a foreign producer and exporter of certain tires, sought to establish independence from the Chinese government to obtain a separate antidumping duty rate. The United States Department of Commerce conducted an administrative review of merchandise covered by a 2015 antidumping-duty order for tires from China, covering entries between August 1, 2017, and July 31, 2018. Commerce applied a rebuttable presumption that all exporters within China are subject to government control, assigning a PRC-wide antidumping-duty rate unless the exporter demonstrates sufficient independence.

The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) upheld Commerce’s determination that Pirelli China had not demonstrated its independence from government control. Commerce found that Pirelli China did not show autonomy from the Chinese government in selecting its management, a key criterion for obtaining a separate rate. Pirelli China’s arguments based on Italian law were rejected because the relevant provisions were not included in the record.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Trade Court’s decision. The court held that Commerce’s interpretation of the rebuttable presumption and its requirement for Pirelli China to demonstrate autonomy from government control were reasonable. The court also found that Commerce’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, including the indirect ownership and control by state-owned enterprises and the shared management between Pirelli entities and Chinese government-controlled entities. The court concluded that Commerce acted within its discretion in rejecting Pirelli China’s unsupported interpretations of Italian law and upheld the assignment of the PRC-wide antidumping-duty rate to Pirelli China.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1389/23-1389-2025-02-07.html</id>
        	<title>WUHAN HEALTHGEN BIOTECHNOLOGY CORP. v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2025-02-07T08:00:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-02-07T08:00:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1389/23-1389-2025-02-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Wuhan Healthgen Biotechnology Corp. (Healthgen) appealed a final determination from the International Trade Commission (Commission) which found that Healthgen’s clinical grade albumin products infringed claims of U.S. Patent No. 10,618,951, owned by Ventria Bioscience Inc. (Ventria). The patent pertains to cell culture media containing recombinant human serum albumin produced in a genetically modified plant. Healthgen imports clinical and medium grade recombinant human serum albumin (rHSA) products, and Ventria alleged that these imports violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 due to patent infringement.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially found that Healthgen’s clinical and medium grade rHSA products infringed the patent and that Ventria satisfied the domestic industry requirement based on six rHSA products. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s finding of infringement for the clinical grade products but not for the medium grade products. The Commission also affirmed that Ventria satisfied the domestic industry requirement based on one product, Optibumin, without further analysis of the other five products.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s findings. The court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Healthgen’s clinical grade products infringed the patent based on SEC-HPLC data showing less than 2% aggregated albumin. The court also upheld the Commission’s finding that Ventria satisfied the domestic industry requirement, noting that all investments and activities related to Optibumin occurred within the United States and that the investment-to-revenue ratio indicated significant investment despite low revenue.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s decision, concluding that Healthgen’s clinical grade products infringed the patent and that Ventria met the domestic industry requirement. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1389/23-1389-2025-02-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "WUHAN HEALTHGEN BIOTECHNOLOGY CORP. v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Wuhan Healthgen Biotechnology Corp. (Healthgen) appealed a final determination from the International Trade Commission (Commission) which found that Healthgen’s clinical grade albumin products infringed claims of U.S. Patent No. 10,618,951, owned by Ventria Bioscience Inc. (Ventria). The patent pertains to cell culture media containing recombinant human serum albumin produced in a genetically modified plant. Healthgen imports clinical and medium grade recombinant human serum albumin (rHSA) products, and Ventria alleged that these imports violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 due to patent infringement.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially found that Healthgen’s clinical and medium grade rHSA products infringed the patent and that Ventria satisfied the domestic industry requirement based on six rHSA products. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s finding of infringement for the clinical grade products but not for the medium grade products. The Commission also affirmed that Ventria satisfied the domestic industry requirement based on one product, Optibumin, without further analysis of the other five products.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s findings. The court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Healthgen’s clinical grade products infringed the patent based on SEC-HPLC data showing less than 2% aggregated albumin. The court also upheld the Commission’s finding that Ventria satisfied the domestic industry requirement, noting that all investments and activities related to Optibumin occurred within the United States and that the investment-to-revenue ratio indicated significant investment despite low revenue.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s decision, concluding that Healthgen’s clinical grade products infringed the patent and that Ventria met the domestic industry requirement.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-02-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Moore</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1661/23-1661-2025-01-07.html</id>
        	<title>OMAN FASTENERS, LLC v. US </title>
        	<updated>2025-01-07T08:00:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2025-01-07T08:00:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1661/23-1661-2025-01-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Oman Fasteners, LLC, a foreign producer and exporter of steel nails, was subject to a 2015 antidumping-duty order by the U.S. Department of Commerce. During the 2020-2021 administrative review, Oman Fasteners submitted a response to Commerce&#039;s detailed questionnaire 16 minutes past the 5:00 PM deadline. Commerce rejected the late submission and applied an adverse inference, resulting in a 154.33% antidumping-duty rate for Oman Fasteners.

Oman Fasteners challenged Commerce&#039;s decision in the Court of International Trade (Trade Court), seeking a preliminary injunction against the imposition of the 154.33% duty rate. The Trade Court consolidated the preliminary injunction proceeding with a trial on the merits and held that Commerce abused its discretion. The court remanded the case to Commerce for recalculation and issued an injunction limiting cash deposits to the pre-existing 1.65% rate.

Mid Continent Steel &amp; Wire, Inc., a domestic steel-nail producer, intervened and filed an interlocutory appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit concluded that Mid Continent had standing and that the appeal was not moot. The court affirmed the Trade Court&#039;s injunction, agreeing that Commerce&#039;s application of the 154.33% rate was unsupported by substantial evidence and constituted an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the slight delay in submission did not justify such a punitive rate and that the balance of hardships favored Oman Fasteners, which faced irreparable harm without the injunction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1661/23-1661-2025-01-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "OMAN FASTENERS, LLC v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Oman Fasteners, LLC, a foreign producer and exporter of steel nails, was subject to a 2015 antidumping-duty order by the U.S. Department of Commerce. During the 2020-2021 administrative review, Oman Fasteners submitted a response to Commerce&#039;s detailed questionnaire 16 minutes past the 5:00 PM deadline. Commerce rejected the late submission and applied an adverse inference, resulting in a 154.33% antidumping-duty rate for Oman Fasteners.

Oman Fasteners challenged Commerce&#039;s decision in the Court of International Trade (Trade Court), seeking a preliminary injunction against the imposition of the 154.33% duty rate. The Trade Court consolidated the preliminary injunction proceeding with a trial on the merits and held that Commerce abused its discretion. The court remanded the case to Commerce for recalculation and issued an injunction limiting cash deposits to the pre-existing 1.65% rate.

Mid Continent Steel &amp; Wire, Inc., a domestic steel-nail producer, intervened and filed an interlocutory appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit concluded that Mid Continent had standing and that the appeal was not moot. The court affirmed the Trade Court&#039;s injunction, agreeing that Commerce&#039;s application of the 154.33% rate was unsupported by substantial evidence and constituted an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the slight delay in submission did not justify such a punitive rate and that the balance of hardships favored Oman Fasteners, which faced irreparable harm without the injunction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2025-01-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1570/23-1570-2024-12-13.html</id>
        	<title>Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2024-12-13T07:01:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-12-13T07:01:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1570/23-1570-2024-12-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Meyer Corporation, U.S. (Meyer) imported cookware manufactured in Thailand and China, which was sold to distributors in Macau and Hong Kong before being imported to the U.S. Meyer requested that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Customs) value the cookware based on the first-sale price paid by the distributors to the manufacturers. Customs rejected this request and assessed duties based on the second-sale price Meyer paid to the distributors. Meyer protested and appealed to the Court of International Trade.

The Court of International Trade affirmed Customs&#039; decision, holding that Meyer failed to prove the first-sale prices were free of market-distortive influences, particularly due to the lack of financial documents from Meyer’s parent company, Meyer International Holdings, Ltd. (Meyer Holdings). Meyer appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the trial court to reconsider without imposing requirements beyond the statute and regulations.

On remand, the trial court again held that Meyer could not rely on the first-sale price, citing Meyer’s failure to produce Meyer Holdings&#039; financial documents as dispositive. The trial court presumed that the absence of these documents indicated potential market-distortive influences.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court improperly applied an evidentiary presumption against Meyer and failed to address other record evidence. The appellate court vacated the trial court&#039;s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of whether Meyer may rely on the first-sale price, instructing the trial court to evaluate the extensive record without relying on speculative adverse inferences. The appellate court did not address Meyer’s argument regarding the interpretation of &quot;the firm&quot; in the relevant regulation, as the trial court&#039;s decision did not hinge on this interpretation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1570/23-1570-2024-12-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Meyer Corporation, U.S. (Meyer) imported cookware manufactured in Thailand and China, which was sold to distributors in Macau and Hong Kong before being imported to the U.S. Meyer requested that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Customs) value the cookware based on the first-sale price paid by the distributors to the manufacturers. Customs rejected this request and assessed duties based on the second-sale price Meyer paid to the distributors. Meyer protested and appealed to the Court of International Trade.

The Court of International Trade affirmed Customs&#039; decision, holding that Meyer failed to prove the first-sale prices were free of market-distortive influences, particularly due to the lack of financial documents from Meyer’s parent company, Meyer International Holdings, Ltd. (Meyer Holdings). Meyer appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, instructing the trial court to reconsider without imposing requirements beyond the statute and regulations.

On remand, the trial court again held that Meyer could not rely on the first-sale price, citing Meyer’s failure to produce Meyer Holdings&#039; financial documents as dispositive. The trial court presumed that the absence of these documents indicated potential market-distortive influences.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court improperly applied an evidentiary presumption against Meyer and failed to address other record evidence. The appellate court vacated the trial court&#039;s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of whether Meyer may rely on the first-sale price, instructing the trial court to evaluate the extensive record without relying on speculative adverse inferences. The appellate court did not address Meyer’s argument regarding the interpretation of &quot;the firm&quot; in the relevant regulation, as the trial court&#039;s decision did not hinge on this interpretation.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-12-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1550/23-1550-2024-12-09.html</id>
        	<title>Risen Energy Co., LTD. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2024-12-09T07:01:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-12-09T07:01:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1550/23-1550-2024-12-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Risen Energy Co., Ltd. (Risen), a Chinese exporter of solar cells, was subject to an antidumping order by the Department of Commerce (Commerce). In the Sixth Administrative Review, Commerce used surrogate values from Malaysia to calculate normal values for Risen&#039;s products. Risen challenged Commerce&#039;s surrogate value calculations for its backsheet and ethyl vinyl acetate (EVA) inputs, as well as the overhead ratio calculation.

The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) initially found Commerce&#039;s surrogate value calculations for Risen&#039;s backsheet and EVA inputs unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter for further explanation. Commerce then provided additional evidence from ASTM standards to support its choice of HTS categories for these inputs, which the Trade Court sustained. However, the Trade Court upheld Commerce&#039;s surrogate financial ratio calculation for overhead despite some reservations about Commerce&#039;s rationale.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Commerce&#039;s use of the HTS categories for &quot;sheet&quot; to value Risen&#039;s backsheet and EVA inputs, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found Commerce&#039;s surrogate overhead ratio calculation unsupported by substantial evidence. The court noted that Commerce&#039;s reliance on the Hanwha financial statement and the IFRS standard was unclear and speculative.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court&#039;s decision regarding the surrogate value calculations for backsheet and EVA inputs but vacated the decision on the surrogate overhead ratio calculation. The case was remanded to Commerce for further proceedings to provide substantial evidence for its overhead calculation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1550/23-1550-2024-12-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Risen Energy Co., LTD. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Risen Energy Co., Ltd. (Risen), a Chinese exporter of solar cells, was subject to an antidumping order by the Department of Commerce (Commerce). In the Sixth Administrative Review, Commerce used surrogate values from Malaysia to calculate normal values for Risen&#039;s products. Risen challenged Commerce&#039;s surrogate value calculations for its backsheet and ethyl vinyl acetate (EVA) inputs, as well as the overhead ratio calculation.

The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) initially found Commerce&#039;s surrogate value calculations for Risen&#039;s backsheet and EVA inputs unsupported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter for further explanation. Commerce then provided additional evidence from ASTM standards to support its choice of HTS categories for these inputs, which the Trade Court sustained. However, the Trade Court upheld Commerce&#039;s surrogate financial ratio calculation for overhead despite some reservations about Commerce&#039;s rationale.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Commerce&#039;s use of the HTS categories for &quot;sheet&quot; to value Risen&#039;s backsheet and EVA inputs, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found Commerce&#039;s surrogate overhead ratio calculation unsupported by substantial evidence. The court noted that Commerce&#039;s reliance on the Hanwha financial statement and the IFRS standard was unclear and speculative.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court&#039;s decision regarding the surrogate value calculations for backsheet and EVA inputs but vacated the decision on the surrogate overhead ratio calculation. The case was remanded to Commerce for further proceedings to provide substantial evidence for its overhead calculation.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-12-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy Dyk</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1652/23-1652-2024-10-10.html</id>
        	<title>J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2024-10-10T07:00:55-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-10-10T07:00:55-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1652/23-1652-2024-10-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce&#039;s assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court&#039;s residual jurisdiction.

The CIT dismissed JDI&#039;s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI&#039;s action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT&#039;s dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI&#039;s suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel&#039;s decision. Therefore, the CIT&#039;s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1652/23-1652-2024-10-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "J.D. IRVING, LTD. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A Canadian company, J.D. Irving (JDI), challenged the U.S. Department of Commerce&#039;s assignment of an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 11.59% on its softwood lumber products from Canada. This rate was determined in the final results of the second administrative review (AR 2) of an antidumping duty order. JDI argued that its cash deposit rate should remain at 1.57%, the rate assigned in the first administrative review (AR 1). JDI filed a complaint with the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), asserting that the CIT had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the court&#039;s residual jurisdiction.

The CIT dismissed JDI&#039;s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was not appropriate because jurisdiction could have been available under § 1581(c). The CIT noted that JDI&#039;s action was essentially a challenge to the final results of AR 2, which is reviewable under § 1581(c). Additionally, the CIT found that JDI had not demonstrated that the remedy provided by administrative review and binational panel review under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) would be manifestly inadequate.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT&#039;s dismissal. The court held that the true nature of JDI&#039;s suit was a challenge to the AR 2 final results, making § 1581(c) the proper jurisdiction. The court also determined that JDI had not met its burden to show that the alternative remedies of administrative review and binational panel review would be manifestly inadequate. The court emphasized that binational panels have the authority to review and remand final antidumping determinations, and Commerce must take action consistent with the panel&#039;s decision. Therefore, the CIT&#039;s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1581(i) was affirmed.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-10-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stoll</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1532/23-1532-2024-10-08.html</id>
        	<title>WORLDWIDE DOOR COMPONENTS, INC. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2024-10-08T07:01:24-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-10-08T07:01:24-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1532/23-1532-2024-10-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves the importation of door thresholds by Worldwide Door Components, Inc. and Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC. These companies sought a determination from the Department of Commerce that their imported door thresholds were not subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China. The door thresholds in question are assemblies containing both extruded aluminum and non-aluminum components, which the companies argued should be excluded from the orders under the finished merchandise exception.

The United States Court of International Trade initially reviewed the case and remanded it to the Department of Commerce for further consideration. The court found that the Department had misinterpreted the scope of the orders and failed to properly consider whether the door thresholds qualified for the finished merchandise exception. On remand, the Department again found the thresholds to be within the scope of the orders, categorizing them as subassemblies. The Court of International Trade disagreed, remanding the case multiple times for further analysis and clarification.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Department of Commerce&#039;s determination that the door thresholds were subassemblies was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Department had provided a thorough analysis of the scope language and relevant record evidence, including statements from the companies themselves. The court also clarified that subassemblies and finished merchandise are mutually exclusive categories under the orders, meaning that the Department was not required to consider the finished merchandise exception once it determined the thresholds were subassemblies.

The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade&#039;s second remand order and reinstated the Department of Commerce&#039;s first remand redetermination, which found the door thresholds to be subassemblies and therefore within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. The court vacated all subsequent opinions and orders by the Court of International Trade. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1532/23-1532-2024-10-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "WORLDWIDE DOOR COMPONENTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves the importation of door thresholds by Worldwide Door Components, Inc. and Columbia Aluminum Products, LLC. These companies sought a determination from the Department of Commerce that their imported door thresholds were not subject to existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China. The door thresholds in question are assemblies containing both extruded aluminum and non-aluminum components, which the companies argued should be excluded from the orders under the finished merchandise exception.

The United States Court of International Trade initially reviewed the case and remanded it to the Department of Commerce for further consideration. The court found that the Department had misinterpreted the scope of the orders and failed to properly consider whether the door thresholds qualified for the finished merchandise exception. On remand, the Department again found the thresholds to be within the scope of the orders, categorizing them as subassemblies. The Court of International Trade disagreed, remanding the case multiple times for further analysis and clarification.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Department of Commerce&#039;s determination that the door thresholds were subassemblies was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the Department had provided a thorough analysis of the scope language and relevant record evidence, including statements from the companies themselves. The court also clarified that subassemblies and finished merchandise are mutually exclusive categories under the orders, meaning that the Department was not required to consider the finished merchandise exception once it determined the thresholds were subassemblies.

The Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade&#039;s second remand order and reinstated the Department of Commerce&#039;s first remand redetermination, which found the door thresholds to be subassemblies and therefore within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders. The court vacated all subsequent opinions and orders by the Court of International Trade.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-10-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Michael Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1827/22-1827-2024-08-12.html</id>
        	<title>CELANESE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2024-08-12T06:00:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-12T06:00:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1827/22-1827-2024-08-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Celanese International Corporation, Celanese (Malta) Company 2 Limited, and Celanese Sales U.S. Ltd. (collectively, “Celanese”) filed a petition with the United States International Trade Commission (the “Commission”), alleging that Anhui Jinhe Industrial Co., Ltd., Jinhe USA LLC (collectively, “Jinhe”), and other entities violated 19 U.S.C. § 337 by importing Ace-K (an artificial sweetener) made using a process that infringed Celanese’s patents. The patents in question had an effective filing date of September 21, 2016. It was undisputed that Celanese had sold Ace-K made using the patented process in the United States before the critical date of September 21, 2015.

The presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Jinhe’s motion for a summary determination of no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 337, concluding that Celanese’s prior sales triggered the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The ALJ found that the America Invents Act (AIA) did not overturn settled pre-AIA precedent, which held that sales of products made using a secret process could trigger the on-sale bar, precluding the patentability of that process. The Commission denied Celanese’s petition for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commission.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court held that the AIA did not alter the pre-AIA rule that a patentee’s sale of an unpatented product made according to a secret method triggers the on-sale bar to patentability. The court concluded that Celanese’s pre-2015 sales of Ace-K made using its secret process triggered the on-sale bar, rendering the later-sought patent claims on that process invalid. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1827/22-1827-2024-08-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "CELANESE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Celanese International Corporation, Celanese (Malta) Company 2 Limited, and Celanese Sales U.S. Ltd. (collectively, “Celanese”) filed a petition with the United States International Trade Commission (the “Commission”), alleging that Anhui Jinhe Industrial Co., Ltd., Jinhe USA LLC (collectively, “Jinhe”), and other entities violated 19 U.S.C. § 337 by importing Ace-K (an artificial sweetener) made using a process that infringed Celanese’s patents. The patents in question had an effective filing date of September 21, 2016. It was undisputed that Celanese had sold Ace-K made using the patented process in the United States before the critical date of September 21, 2015.

The presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Jinhe’s motion for a summary determination of no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 337, concluding that Celanese’s prior sales triggered the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The ALJ found that the America Invents Act (AIA) did not overturn settled pre-AIA precedent, which held that sales of products made using a secret process could trigger the on-sale bar, precluding the patentability of that process. The Commission denied Celanese’s petition for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commission.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission’s decision. The court held that the AIA did not alter the pre-AIA rule that a patentee’s sale of an unpatented product made according to a secret method triggers the on-sale bar to patentability. The court concluded that Celanese’s pre-2015 sales of Ace-K made using its secret process triggered the on-sale bar, rendering the later-sought patent claims on that process invalid.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2128/22-2128-2024-08-07.html</id>
        	<title>PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2024-08-07T07:01:27-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-08-07T07:01:27-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2128/22-2128-2024-08-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. and other appellants challenged the United States Department of Commerce&#039;s calculation of an all-others antidumping duty rate for non-selected respondents in the fourth administrative review of an antidumping duty order on certain steel nails from Taiwan. Commerce had assigned an adverse facts available (AFA) rate of 78.17% to the mandatory respondents, who failed to cooperate, and used this rate to calculate the all-others rate for non-selected respondents, including Liang Chyuan.

The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) upheld Commerce&#039;s decision, finding that the use of the expected method to calculate the all-others rate was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. The Trade Court determined that the burden of proof lay with the non-selected respondents to show that the expected method was not reasonable, which they failed to do. The court also rejected PrimeSource&#039;s argument that Liang Chyuan should receive an individual rate, noting that Liang Chyuan did not meet the statutory requirements to be considered a voluntary respondent.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court&#039;s decision. The court held that Commerce&#039;s use of the expected method was appropriate and that the burden was on the appellants to demonstrate that the method was not feasible or did not reasonably reflect the potential dumping margins of the non-selected respondents. The court found that the appellants failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of representativeness of the mandatory respondents. Additionally, the court agreed that Liang Chyuan was not entitled to an individual rate as it did not submit the necessary information in a timely manner to be considered a voluntary respondent. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2128/22-2128-2024-08-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "PRIMESOURCE BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. and other appellants challenged the United States Department of Commerce&#039;s calculation of an all-others antidumping duty rate for non-selected respondents in the fourth administrative review of an antidumping duty order on certain steel nails from Taiwan. Commerce had assigned an adverse facts available (AFA) rate of 78.17% to the mandatory respondents, who failed to cooperate, and used this rate to calculate the all-others rate for non-selected respondents, including Liang Chyuan.

The United States Court of International Trade (Trade Court) upheld Commerce&#039;s decision, finding that the use of the expected method to calculate the all-others rate was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. The Trade Court determined that the burden of proof lay with the non-selected respondents to show that the expected method was not reasonable, which they failed to do. The court also rejected PrimeSource&#039;s argument that Liang Chyuan should receive an individual rate, noting that Liang Chyuan did not meet the statutory requirements to be considered a voluntary respondent.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court&#039;s decision. The court held that Commerce&#039;s use of the expected method was appropriate and that the burden was on the appellants to demonstrate that the method was not feasible or did not reasonably reflect the potential dumping margins of the non-selected respondents. The court found that the appellants failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of representativeness of the mandatory respondents. Additionally, the court agreed that Liang Chyuan was not entitled to an individual rate as it did not submit the necessary information in a timely manner to be considered a voluntary respondent.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-08-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan David Lourie</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2105/22-2105-2024-07-15.html</id>
        	<title>ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US </title>
        	<updated>2024-07-15T07:00:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-07-15T07:00:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2105/22-2105-2024-07-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves a dispute over the distribution of interest associated with antidumping and countervailing duties under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA). Plaintiffs, who are affected domestic producers, argued that the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) unlawfully excluded delinquency interest from the distributions they were entitled to receive under the CDSOA. Customs had been distributing only interest charged on antidumping and countervailing duties at liquidation, as specified by 19 U.S.C. § 1677g, and not delinquency interest assessed under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).

The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) initially dismissed claims related to distributions made more than two years before the complaints were filed, citing the statute of limitations. The CIT found that the Final Rule published by Customs in 2001 provided adequate notice of its decision to exclude delinquency interest. The CIT also denied plaintiffs&#039; motions for reconsideration, maintaining that the Final Rule sufficiently informed the public of Customs&#039; decision. Finally, the CIT denied plaintiffs&#039; motions for judgment on the agency record, holding that the CDSOA did not require Customs to distribute delinquency interest.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT&#039;s decisions. The Federal Circuit held that the Final Rule provided adequate notice of Customs&#039; decision to exclude delinquency interest, thus supporting the CIT&#039;s dismissal of claims outside the two-year statutory period. The court also concluded that the CDSOA unambiguously excludes delinquency interest from distributions to affected producers. Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT&#039;s judgment in favor of the government, upholding Customs&#039; practice of excluding delinquency interest from CDSOA distributions. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2105/22-2105-2024-07-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ADEE HONEY FARMS v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves a dispute over the distribution of interest associated with antidumping and countervailing duties under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA). Plaintiffs, who are affected domestic producers, argued that the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) unlawfully excluded delinquency interest from the distributions they were entitled to receive under the CDSOA. Customs had been distributing only interest charged on antidumping and countervailing duties at liquidation, as specified by 19 U.S.C. § 1677g, and not delinquency interest assessed under 19 U.S.C. § 1505(d).

The United States Court of International Trade (CIT) initially dismissed claims related to distributions made more than two years before the complaints were filed, citing the statute of limitations. The CIT found that the Final Rule published by Customs in 2001 provided adequate notice of its decision to exclude delinquency interest. The CIT also denied plaintiffs&#039; motions for reconsideration, maintaining that the Final Rule sufficiently informed the public of Customs&#039; decision. Finally, the CIT denied plaintiffs&#039; motions for judgment on the agency record, holding that the CDSOA did not require Customs to distribute delinquency interest.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the CIT&#039;s decisions. The Federal Circuit held that the Final Rule provided adequate notice of Customs&#039; decision to exclude delinquency interest, thus supporting the CIT&#039;s dismissal of claims outside the two-year statutory period. The court also concluded that the CDSOA unambiguously excludes delinquency interest from distributions to affected producers. Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT&#039;s judgment in favor of the government, upholding Customs&#039; practice of excluding delinquency interest from CDSOA distributions.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-07-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Cunningham</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1807/22-1807-2024-06-21.html</id>
        	<title>GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US </title>
        	<updated>2024-06-21T06:31:49-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-06-21T06:31:49-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1807/22-1807-2024-06-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves an appeal by Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., Marmen Energy Co., the Government of Québec, and the Government of Canada against a decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce had imposed countervailing duties on imports of certain utility scale wind towers from Canada, arguing that the Canadian government had provided illegal subsidies to the producers and exporters of these towers. 

The case was initially reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade, which upheld the Department of Commerce&#039;s decision. The appellants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 

The appellants argued that the Department of Commerce had erred in its assessment of three government programs and its computation of the sales denominator used to calculate the subsidy rate. They contended that the subsidy rate should have been de minimis, meaning it was too trivial or minor to merit consideration. 

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade, ruling that the Department of Commerce&#039;s determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court rejected the appellants&#039; arguments, finding that the Department of Commerce had reasonably determined that the auditor&#039;s adjustment was unreliable, and that the three subsidy programs at issue did provide countervailable subsidies. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1807/22-1807-2024-06-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves an appeal by Marmen Inc., Marmen Énergie Inc., Marmen Energy Co., the Government of Québec, and the Government of Canada against a decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce had imposed countervailing duties on imports of certain utility scale wind towers from Canada, arguing that the Canadian government had provided illegal subsidies to the producers and exporters of these towers. 

The case was initially reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade, which upheld the Department of Commerce&#039;s decision. The appellants then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 

The appellants argued that the Department of Commerce had erred in its assessment of three government programs and its computation of the sales denominator used to calculate the subsidy rate. They contended that the subsidy rate should have been de minimis, meaning it was too trivial or minor to merit consideration. 

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade, ruling that the Department of Commerce&#039;s determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court rejected the appellants&#039; arguments, finding that the Department of Commerce had reasonably determined that the auditor&#039;s adjustment was unreliable, and that the three subsidy programs at issue did provide countervailable subsidies.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-06-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1162/23-1162-2024-05-20.html</id>
        	<title>ASOCIACION DE EXPORTADORES E INDUSTRIALES v. US </title>
        	<updated>2024-05-20T05:32:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-05-20T05:32:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1162/23-1162-2024-05-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves three organizations of Spanish olive producers (collectively “Asemesa”) who appealed a decision by the Court of International Trade (“the Trade Court”) regarding a countervailing duty imposed on olives imported from Spain. Asemesa argued that an order from the Department of Commerce imposing a countervailing duty on imported olives was contrary to law and that the Trade Court should have overturned the order. The United States and the Coalition for Fair Trade in Ripe Olives argued that Commerce’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the Trade Court’s decision should be upheld.

The Trade Court had previously reversed a decision by Commerce, concluding that the evidence that table olives accounted for 8 percent of the demand for raw olives did not show that the demand for raw olives was “substantially dependent” on the demand for table olives. The case was remanded to Commerce for further analysis. On remand, Commerce redefined the market for the prior stage product as the raw olives that the olive industry considers principally suitable for use in the production of table olives. The Trade Court rejected Commerce’s analysis, reasoning that Commerce’s market definition would “render the requirements of Section 1677–2 largely self-fulfilling.” The case was remanded to Commerce for a second time to correctly define the relevant market for the prior stage product and analyze whether the demand for the prior stage product was substantially dependent on the demand for table olives.

On the second remand, Commerce again redefined the relevant market for the prior stage product, this time defining that market as consisting of the olives from varietals that the Spanish government considers suitable for processing into table olives, including dual-use varietals. Commerce calculated that 55.28 percent of all olives from varietals suitable for processing into table olives were indeed sold as table olives. Commerce adopted the Trade Court’s interpretation of the “substantially dependent” provision in section 1677–2 as requiring that more than half of the prior stage product be processed into the relevant finished good. Accordingly, Commerce determined that the demand for olive varietals suitable for processing into table olives was substantially dependent on the demand for table olives, and that a countervailing duty on table olives from Spain was warranted to offset the subsidies provided to Spanish olive growers. This time, the Trade Court sustained Commerce’s analysis.

Asemesa now appeals the Trade Court’s determination. Asemesa argues that Commerce’s interpretation of the statute was contrary to law, and that Commerce’s factual analysis was not supported by substantial evidence. Although the court&#039;s interpretation of section 1677–2 and its analysis of the factual record in this case differ from the Trade Court’s, the court agrees with that court’s ultimate conclusion on both issues. The court affirms the Trade Court&#039;s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1162/23-1162-2024-05-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ASOCIACION DE EXPORTADORES E INDUSTRIALES v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves three organizations of Spanish olive producers (collectively “Asemesa”) who appealed a decision by the Court of International Trade (“the Trade Court”) regarding a countervailing duty imposed on olives imported from Spain. Asemesa argued that an order from the Department of Commerce imposing a countervailing duty on imported olives was contrary to law and that the Trade Court should have overturned the order. The United States and the Coalition for Fair Trade in Ripe Olives argued that Commerce’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the Trade Court’s decision should be upheld.

The Trade Court had previously reversed a decision by Commerce, concluding that the evidence that table olives accounted for 8 percent of the demand for raw olives did not show that the demand for raw olives was “substantially dependent” on the demand for table olives. The case was remanded to Commerce for further analysis. On remand, Commerce redefined the market for the prior stage product as the raw olives that the olive industry considers principally suitable for use in the production of table olives. The Trade Court rejected Commerce’s analysis, reasoning that Commerce’s market definition would “render the requirements of Section 1677–2 largely self-fulfilling.” The case was remanded to Commerce for a second time to correctly define the relevant market for the prior stage product and analyze whether the demand for the prior stage product was substantially dependent on the demand for table olives.

On the second remand, Commerce again redefined the relevant market for the prior stage product, this time defining that market as consisting of the olives from varietals that the Spanish government considers suitable for processing into table olives, including dual-use varietals. Commerce calculated that 55.28 percent of all olives from varietals suitable for processing into table olives were indeed sold as table olives. Commerce adopted the Trade Court’s interpretation of the “substantially dependent” provision in section 1677–2 as requiring that more than half of the prior stage product be processed into the relevant finished good. Accordingly, Commerce determined that the demand for olive varietals suitable for processing into table olives was substantially dependent on the demand for table olives, and that a countervailing duty on table olives from Spain was warranted to offset the subsidies provided to Spanish olive growers. This time, the Trade Court sustained Commerce’s analysis.

Asemesa now appeals the Trade Court’s determination. Asemesa argues that Commerce’s interpretation of the statute was contrary to law, and that Commerce’s factual analysis was not supported by substantial evidence. Although the court&#039;s interpretation of section 1677–2 and its analysis of the factual record in this case differ from the Trade Court’s, the court agrees with that court’s ultimate conclusion on both issues. The court affirms the Trade Court&#039;s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-05-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>BRYSON</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2181/22-2181-2024-05-15.html</id>
        	<title>SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US </title>
        	<updated>2024-05-15T07:06:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-05-15T07:06:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2181/22-2181-2024-05-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves an appeal by Wheatland Tube Company against a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade, which affirmed the U.S. Department of Commerce’s remand determination concerning the scope of an antidumping duty order on certain steel pipes imported from Thailand. The dispute centers on whether certain imports of steel pipes, specifically those that are &quot;dual-stenciled&quot; as both standard pipes and line pipes, fall within the scope of the existing antidumping duty order. 

The U.S. Court of International Trade initially found that the Department of Commerce unlawfully expanded the scope of the antidumping duty order by determining that it covered dual-stenciled pipes. On remand, the Department of Commerce, under protest, concluded that the antidumping duty order did not cover dual-stenciled pipes. The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained this determination.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Commerce’s initial determination that dual-stenciled pipes fall within the scope of the antidumping duty order was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals found that the lower court&#039;s interpretation lacked support in the record and failed to give sufficient deference to the Department of Commerce under the substantial evidence standard of review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2181/22-2181-2024-05-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves an appeal by Wheatland Tube Company against a decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade, which affirmed the U.S. Department of Commerce’s remand determination concerning the scope of an antidumping duty order on certain steel pipes imported from Thailand. The dispute centers on whether certain imports of steel pipes, specifically those that are &quot;dual-stenciled&quot; as both standard pipes and line pipes, fall within the scope of the existing antidumping duty order. 

The U.S. Court of International Trade initially found that the Department of Commerce unlawfully expanded the scope of the antidumping duty order by determining that it covered dual-stenciled pipes. On remand, the Department of Commerce, under protest, concluded that the antidumping duty order did not cover dual-stenciled pipes. The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained this determination.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade. The Court of Appeals held that the Department of Commerce’s initial determination that dual-stenciled pipes fall within the scope of the antidumping duty order was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals found that the lower court&#039;s interpretation lacked support in the record and failed to give sufficient deference to the Department of Commerce under the substantial evidence standard of review.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-05-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Reyna</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1649/22-1649-2024-05-08.html</id>
        	<title>ZIRCON CORP. v. ITC </title>
        	<updated>2024-05-08T07:09:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-05-08T07:09:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1649/22-1649-2024-05-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2020, Zircon Corp. filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission alleging that Stanley Black &amp; Decker, Inc. and Black &amp; Decker (U.S.), Inc. violated section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing and selling electronic stud finders that infringed on Zircon&#039;s patents. The Commission instituted an investigation based on Zircon&#039;s complaint. A Commission Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found no violation of section 337. On review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ&#039;s finding of no violation.

The Commission&#039;s decision was based on two independent reasons. First, it affirmed the ALJ&#039;s determination that Zircon had not satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. Zircon had argued that it met this requirement based on its investment in plant and equipment, its employment of labor and capital, and its investment in the exploitation of the asserted patents. However, the Commission found that Zircon had not provided an adequate basis to evaluate the investments and the significance of those investments with respect to each asserted patent. 

Second, the Commission found each of the claims of the patents that were before the Commission were either invalid or not infringed. The Commission found that all the asserted claims of one patent would have been obvious in view of four prior art references; that several claims of two other patents were invalid as anticipated by or obvious in light of Zircon’s original stud finder; and that several of the claims of these two patents were not infringed. 

Zircon appealed the Commission&#039;s decision, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission&#039;s decision. The court agreed with the Commission&#039;s interpretation of section 337 and found that substantial evidence supported the Commission&#039;s finding that Zircon failed to meet its burden to prove the existence of a domestic industry relating to articles protected by each of its patents. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1649/22-1649-2024-05-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ZIRCON CORP. v. ITC " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2020, Zircon Corp. filed a complaint with the United States International Trade Commission alleging that Stanley Black &amp; Decker, Inc. and Black &amp; Decker (U.S.), Inc. violated section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing and selling electronic stud finders that infringed on Zircon&#039;s patents. The Commission instituted an investigation based on Zircon&#039;s complaint. A Commission Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found no violation of section 337. On review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ&#039;s finding of no violation.

The Commission&#039;s decision was based on two independent reasons. First, it affirmed the ALJ&#039;s determination that Zircon had not satisfied the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement. Zircon had argued that it met this requirement based on its investment in plant and equipment, its employment of labor and capital, and its investment in the exploitation of the asserted patents. However, the Commission found that Zircon had not provided an adequate basis to evaluate the investments and the significance of those investments with respect to each asserted patent. 

Second, the Commission found each of the claims of the patents that were before the Commission were either invalid or not infringed. The Commission found that all the asserted claims of one patent would have been obvious in view of four prior art references; that several claims of two other patents were invalid as anticipated by or obvious in light of Zircon’s original stud finder; and that several of the claims of these two patents were not infringed. 

Zircon appealed the Commission&#039;s decision, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission&#039;s decision. The court agreed with the Commission&#039;s interpretation of section 337 and found that substantial evidence supported the Commission&#039;s finding that Zircon failed to meet its burden to prove the existence of a domestic industry relating to articles protected by each of its patents.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-05-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>BRYSON</case:judge>
													<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2079/22-2079-2024-04-08.html</id>
        	<title>Rimco Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2024-04-08T06:06:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-04-08T06:06:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2079/22-2079-2024-04-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves Rimco Inc., an importer and reseller of wheels, who appealed against the United States Court of International Trade&#039;s dismissal of its action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rimco sought judicial review of a denied protest against the assessment of countervailing and antidumping duties by Customs and Border Protection. Rimco argued that the Court of International Trade had exclusive jurisdiction to review the denial of protests under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), or alternatively, residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).

Previously, the Court of International Trade had dismissed Rimco&#039;s action, stating that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(a) because Customs&#039; application of antidumping and countervailing duties was not a protestable decision. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i) because jurisdiction under § 1581(c) would have been available if Rimco had sought administrative review of Commerce’s antidumping and countervailing duties determinations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade&#039;s dismissal. The court held that Customs&#039; ministerial assessment of antidumping and countervailing duties was not a protestable decision. Furthermore, the court found that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) would have been available and not manifestly inadequate if Rimco had not failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Therefore, the Court of International Trade correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2079/22-2079-2024-04-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Rimco Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves Rimco Inc., an importer and reseller of wheels, who appealed against the United States Court of International Trade&#039;s dismissal of its action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rimco sought judicial review of a denied protest against the assessment of countervailing and antidumping duties by Customs and Border Protection. Rimco argued that the Court of International Trade had exclusive jurisdiction to review the denial of protests under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), or alternatively, residual jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).

Previously, the Court of International Trade had dismissed Rimco&#039;s action, stating that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(a) because Customs&#039; application of antidumping and countervailing duties was not a protestable decision. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i) because jurisdiction under § 1581(c) would have been available if Rimco had sought administrative review of Commerce’s antidumping and countervailing duties determinations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade&#039;s dismissal. The court held that Customs&#039; ministerial assessment of antidumping and countervailing duties was not a protestable decision. Furthermore, the court found that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) would have been available and not manifestly inadequate if Rimco had not failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Therefore, the Court of International Trade correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-04-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Michael Hughes</case:judge>
													<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2078/22-2078-2024-04-04.html</id>
        	<title>United States Steel Corporation v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2024-04-04T05:33:22-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-04-04T05:33:22-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2078/22-2078-2024-04-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case at hand involves United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel), an Australian producer and exporter of hot-rolled steel, BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd., and its affiliated U.S. importer, BlueScope Steel Americas, Inc. U.S. Steel alleged that the Australian company had reimbursed its U.S. affiliate for antidumping duties, a claim which BlueScope denied. The core dispute arose from differing interpretations of a supply agreement between the companies, which determined the pricing of the steel products.

Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the case was reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade. This lower court sustained the Department of Commerce&#039;s determination that BlueScope had not reimbursed its U.S. importer for antidumping duties. The court found that the agency&#039;s determination was supported by substantial evidence and was otherwise in accordance with the law.

Upon reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court reviewed the decisions of the Court of International Trade de novo, applying the same standard of review used by the trial court in reviewing the administrative record before the agency. The appeals court upheld the decision made by the lower court, finding that the agency&#039;s determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court also held that the agency did not err in its interpretation of the antidumping duty regulation, and therefore did not depart from an established practice. As a result, the appeals court affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-2078/22-2078-2024-04-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States Steel Corporation v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case at hand involves United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel), an Australian producer and exporter of hot-rolled steel, BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd., and its affiliated U.S. importer, BlueScope Steel Americas, Inc. U.S. Steel alleged that the Australian company had reimbursed its U.S. affiliate for antidumping duties, a claim which BlueScope denied. The core dispute arose from differing interpretations of a supply agreement between the companies, which determined the pricing of the steel products.

Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the case was reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade. This lower court sustained the Department of Commerce&#039;s determination that BlueScope had not reimbursed its U.S. importer for antidumping duties. The court found that the agency&#039;s determination was supported by substantial evidence and was otherwise in accordance with the law.

Upon reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court reviewed the decisions of the Court of International Trade de novo, applying the same standard of review used by the trial court in reviewing the administrative record before the agency. The appeals court upheld the decision made by the lower court, finding that the agency&#039;s determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court also held that the agency did not err in its interpretation of the antidumping duty regulation, and therefore did not depart from an established practice. As a result, the appeals court affirmed the lower court&#039;s decision.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-04-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>HUGHES</case:judge>
													<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1210/23-1210-2024-03-07.html</id>
        	<title>RKW KLERKS INC. v. US </title>
        	<updated>2024-03-07T07:31:53-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2024-03-07T07:31:53-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1210/23-1210-2024-03-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves RKW Klerks Inc. (RKW), an importer of net wraps used to wrap round bales of harvested crops, who contested the classification of its products by the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Customs had classified the net wraps under HTSUS Chapter 60 under subheading 6005.39.00 as “warp knit fabric,” dutiable at the rate of 10% ad valorem. RKW argued that the net wraps should be classified under Chapter 84, subheading 8433.90.50 as “parts” of harvesting machinery or alternatively subheading 8436.99.00 as “parts” of other agricultural machinery.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the decision of the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) that the net wraps were not a part of harvesting or other agricultural machinery. The court reasoned that the net wraps were not dedicated solely for use with baling machines, nor were they integral to the function of the machines. The court further noted that the net wraps performed a function outside of the machine, maintaining the shape of the bale after it had been compressed and released, and thus could not be classified as a part of the machine. 

The court therefore affirmed the CIT’s decision that the net wraps were correctly classified under HTSUS Chapter 60 under subheading 6005.39.00 as “warp knit fabric,” rather than as parts of harvesting or other agricultural machinery. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/23-1210/23-1210-2024-03-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "RKW KLERKS INC. v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves RKW Klerks Inc. (RKW), an importer of net wraps used to wrap round bales of harvested crops, who contested the classification of its products by the United States Customs and Border Protection (Customs) under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Customs had classified the net wraps under HTSUS Chapter 60 under subheading 6005.39.00 as “warp knit fabric,” dutiable at the rate of 10% ad valorem. RKW argued that the net wraps should be classified under Chapter 84, subheading 8433.90.50 as “parts” of harvesting machinery or alternatively subheading 8436.99.00 as “parts” of other agricultural machinery.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the decision of the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) that the net wraps were not a part of harvesting or other agricultural machinery. The court reasoned that the net wraps were not dedicated solely for use with baling machines, nor were they integral to the function of the machines. The court further noted that the net wraps performed a function outside of the machine, maintaining the shape of the bale after it had been compressed and released, and thus could not be classified as a part of the machine. 

The court therefore affirmed the CIT’s decision that the net wraps were correctly classified under HTSUS Chapter 60 under subheading 6005.39.00 as “warp knit fabric,” rather than as parts of harvesting or other agricultural machinery.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2024-03-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Chen</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-10256/22-10256-2023-12-20.html</id>
        	<title>USA v. Sotis</title>
        	<updated>2023-12-20T07:39:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-12-20T07:39:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-10256/22-10256-2023-12-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the case involved Peter Sotis, who was convicted for violating export controls. He had conspired to export diving equipment, specifically rebreathers, to Libya without a license, despite the Department of Commerce requiring a license to export certain products to Libya that implicate the United States’ national security interests. 

Sotis challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support each count of his conviction, the opinion testimony presented at trial, and the reasonableness of his 57-month sentence. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove willfulness, to prove that he and another individual had acted in conspiracy, and to prove that the rebreathers were closed-circuit, which would have resulted in a material and prejudicial variance from the indictment. He also claimed that one expert witness and one lay witness invaded the province of the jury by opining on an ultimate issue in the case. 

The Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Sotis had sufficient knowledge of the illegality of his conduct to have willfully violated the export control laws. The Court also found that the government sufficiently proved that Sotis conspired with another individual to violate the export control laws. Moreover, the Court rejected Sotis&#039;s argument that there was a material variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. 

Regarding the expert and lay witness testimonies, the Court held that the testimonies were not improper. The Court also found that the district court did not err in applying the sentencing guidelines and that Sotis&#039;s sentence was not substantively unreasonable. As a result, the Court affirmed Sotis&#039;s conviction and sentence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/22-10256/22-10256-2023-12-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USA v. Sotis" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the case involved Peter Sotis, who was convicted for violating export controls. He had conspired to export diving equipment, specifically rebreathers, to Libya without a license, despite the Department of Commerce requiring a license to export certain products to Libya that implicate the United States’ national security interests. 

Sotis challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support each count of his conviction, the opinion testimony presented at trial, and the reasonableness of his 57-month sentence. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove willfulness, to prove that he and another individual had acted in conspiracy, and to prove that the rebreathers were closed-circuit, which would have resulted in a material and prejudicial variance from the indictment. He also claimed that one expert witness and one lay witness invaded the province of the jury by opining on an ultimate issue in the case. 

The Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Sotis had sufficient knowledge of the illegality of his conduct to have willfully violated the export control laws. The Court also found that the government sufficiently proved that Sotis conspired with another individual to violate the export control laws. Moreover, the Court rejected Sotis&#039;s argument that there was a material variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. 

Regarding the expert and lay witness testimonies, the Court held that the testimonies were not improper. The Court also found that the district court did not err in applying the sentencing guidelines and that Sotis&#039;s sentence was not substantively unreasonable. As a result, the Court affirmed Sotis&#039;s conviction and sentence.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-12-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>MIZELLE</case:judge>
													<category term="Criminal Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1793/22-1793-2023-12-06.html</id>
        	<title>MAGID GLOVE &amp; SAFETY MANUFACTURING CO. LLC v. US</title>
        	<updated>2023-12-06T06:02:25-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-12-06T06:02:25-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1793/22-1793-2023-12-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The case involves the classification of certain knit gloves with partial plastic coating under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of International Trade that the gloves are properly classified under heading 6116. The plaintiff, Magid Glove &amp; Safety Manufacturing Co. LLC, imported the gloves from China and South Korea and argued that the gloves should have been classified under subheading 3926.20.10, a duty-free provision. However, the Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the gloves are not &quot;of plastics&quot; as required by heading 3926, but are &quot;knitted&quot; as described by heading 6116. The Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiff&#039;s argument that Section XI Note 1(h) and the &quot;completely embedded&quot; test applied in a previous case excluded the gloves from classification under heading 6116. The court concluded that the term &quot;completely embedded&quot; does not appear in Section XI Note 1(h) or the two competing headings in this case and is not applicable to the classification of the gloves. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1793/22-1793-2023-12-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "MAGID GLOVE &amp; SAFETY MANUFACTURING CO. LLC v. US" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The case involves the classification of certain knit gloves with partial plastic coating under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of International Trade that the gloves are properly classified under heading 6116. The plaintiff, Magid Glove &amp; Safety Manufacturing Co. LLC, imported the gloves from China and South Korea and argued that the gloves should have been classified under subheading 3926.20.10, a duty-free provision. However, the Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the gloves are not &quot;of plastics&quot; as required by heading 3926, but are &quot;knitted&quot; as described by heading 6116. The Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiff&#039;s argument that Section XI Note 1(h) and the &quot;completely embedded&quot; test applied in a previous case excluded the gloves from classification under heading 6116. The court concluded that the term &quot;completely embedded&quot; does not appear in Section XI Note 1(h) or the two competing headings in this case and is not applicable to the classification of the gloves.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-12-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>REYNA</case:judge>
													<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1175/22-1175-2023-12-04.html</id>
        	<title>SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US </title>
        	<updated>2023-12-04T06:01:51-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-12-04T06:01:51-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1175/22-1175-2023-12-04.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was asked to review a decision by the United States Court of International Trade. The dispute arose from an anti-dumping investigation conducted by the Department of Commerce into the sale of certain welded carbon steel pipes from Thailand, specifically those sold by Saha Thai Steel Pipe Public Company Limited and Thai Premium Pipe Company Ltd. 

The Department of Commerce initially found that the costs of producing these pipes were distorted by a &quot;particular market situation&quot; (PMS) in Thailand that affected the cost of hot rolled steel coil, a crucial component in the production of these pipes. As a result, the Department made upward adjustments to the production costs of these companies when calculating the anti-dumping margins, which impacted the duty rates assigned to each company. This decision was challenged in the Court of International Trade, which found that the Department had overstepped its statutory authority. 

The Court of International Trade ruled, based on the precedent set in Hyundai Steel Co. v. United States, that the Department of Commerce was not allowed to make a PMS adjustment to the cost of production when determining anti-dumping margins. The court remanded the case to the Department to recalculate the dumping margins without the PMS adjustment. 

The case was subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The appellant, Wheatland Tube Company, argued that this case could be distinguished from Hyundai Steel because the Department had relied on a subsection of the statute to adjust the cost of production upward to account for a PMS by framing it as a constructed value calculation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the lower court&#039;s decision and holding that the statute does not authorize PMS adjustments to cost of production calculations, regardless of how the Department attempted to frame it. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1175/22-1175-2023-12-04.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "SAHA THAI STEEL PIPE PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. US " on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was asked to review a decision by the United States Court of International Trade. The dispute arose from an anti-dumping investigation conducted by the Department of Commerce into the sale of certain welded carbon steel pipes from Thailand, specifically those sold by Saha Thai Steel Pipe Public Company Limited and Thai Premium Pipe Company Ltd. 

The Department of Commerce initially found that the costs of producing these pipes were distorted by a &quot;particular market situation&quot; (PMS) in Thailand that affected the cost of hot rolled steel coil, a crucial component in the production of these pipes. As a result, the Department made upward adjustments to the production costs of these companies when calculating the anti-dumping margins, which impacted the duty rates assigned to each company. This decision was challenged in the Court of International Trade, which found that the Department had overstepped its statutory authority. 

The Court of International Trade ruled, based on the precedent set in Hyundai Steel Co. v. United States, that the Department of Commerce was not allowed to make a PMS adjustment to the cost of production when determining anti-dumping margins. The court remanded the case to the Department to recalculate the dumping margins without the PMS adjustment. 

The case was subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The appellant, Wheatland Tube Company, argued that this case could be distinguished from Hyundai Steel because the Department had relied on a subsection of the statute to adjust the cost of production upward to account for a PMS by framing it as a constructed value calculation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the lower court&#039;s decision and holding that the statute does not authorize PMS adjustments to cost of production calculations, regardless of how the Department attempted to frame it.
            </summary_raw>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-12-04</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>HUGHES</case:judge>
													<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1392/22-1392-2023-11-13.html</id>
        	<title>Solar Energy Industries Association v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-11-13T07:01:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-11-13T07:01:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1392/22-1392-2023-11-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9693 imposed duties on imports of solar panels, starting at 30% and scheduled to decrease each year to 25%, 20%, and in the final year, 15%. Importers of bifacial solar modules, consisting of cells that convert sunlight into electricity on both the front and back of the cells, petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), asking that bifacial solar panels not be subjected to the duties. Ultimately, bifacial solar panels were excluded from the duties. In October 2020, Presidential Proclamation 10101, “modified” Proclamation 9693 to withdraw the exclusion of bifacial solar panels from the scheduled duties, and to increase the fourth-year duty rate to 18%. I

Importers of bifacial solar panels sued, alleging that the statute authorizing the President to “modify” Proclamation 9693 only allowed him to make previously adopted safeguard measures more trade-liberalizing while eliminating the exclusion of bifacial panels and raising the fourth-year duty were trade-restrictive. They further argued that even if the President had the authority to “modify” safeguards in a trade-restrictive direction, he failed to follow appropriate procedures. 

The Trade Court agreed that the authority to “modify” a safeguard is limited to trade-liberalizing changes but rejected the procedural challenges under the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. 2251.  The Federal Circuit reversed. The President’s interpretation of the statute, which allows him to “modify” an existing safeguard in a trade-restricting direction, is not unreasonable. In adopting Proclamation 10101, the President committed no significant procedural violation. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1392/22-1392-2023-11-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Solar Energy Industries Association v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9693 imposed duties on imports of solar panels, starting at 30% and scheduled to decrease each year to 25%, 20%, and in the final year, 15%. Importers of bifacial solar modules, consisting of cells that convert sunlight into electricity on both the front and back of the cells, petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), asking that bifacial solar panels not be subjected to the duties. Ultimately, bifacial solar panels were excluded from the duties. In October 2020, Presidential Proclamation 10101, “modified” Proclamation 9693 to withdraw the exclusion of bifacial solar panels from the scheduled duties, and to increase the fourth-year duty rate to 18%. I

Importers of bifacial solar panels sued, alleging that the statute authorizing the President to “modify” Proclamation 9693 only allowed him to make previously adopted safeguard measures more trade-liberalizing while eliminating the exclusion of bifacial panels and raising the fourth-year duty were trade-restrictive. They further argued that even if the President had the authority to “modify” safeguards in a trade-restrictive direction, he failed to follow appropriate procedures. 

The Trade Court agreed that the authority to “modify” a safeguard is limited to trade-liberalizing changes but rejected the procedural challenges under the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. 2251.  The Federal Circuit reversed. The President’s interpretation of the statute, which allows him to “modify” an existing safeguard in a trade-restricting direction, is not unreasonable. In adopting Proclamation 10101, the President committed no significant procedural violation.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit rejects challenges to a Presidential Proclamation imposing duties on imports of bifacial solar modules.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-11-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stark</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1392</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1463/22-1463-2023-10-10.html</id>
        	<title>Venequip, S.A. v. Caterpillar Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-10-10T07:31:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-10-10T07:31:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1463/22-1463-2023-10-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Venequip, a Venezuelan heavy-equipment supplier, sold and serviced products made by Illinois-based Caterpillar. Venequip’s dealership was governed by sales and service agreements with CAT Sàrl, Caterpillar’s Swiss subsidiary. In 2019 CAT Sàrl terminated the dealership. The contracts contain clauses that direct all disputes to Swiss courts for resolution under Swiss law. In 2021 Venequip brought contract claims against CAT Sàrl in Geneva, Switzerland.  Venequip filed applications across the United States seeking discovery from Caterpillar and its employees, dealers, and customers under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a), which authorizes (but does not require) district courts to order any person who resides or is found in the district to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” Venequip’s  Northern District of Illinois application sought wide-ranging discovery from Caterpillar.  

Ruling on Venequip’s application, the district judge addressed four factors identified by the Supreme Court (Intel) that generally concern the applicant’s need for discovery, the intrusiveness of the request, and comity considerations, and added the parties’ contractual choice of forum and law and Caterpillar’s agreement to provide discovery in the Swiss court, then denied the application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeal was not mooted by intervening developments in the Swiss court. The judge appropriately weighed the Intel factors and other permissible considerations. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/22-1463/22-1463-2023-10-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Venequip, S.A. v. Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Venequip, a Venezuelan heavy-equipment supplier, sold and serviced products made by Illinois-based Caterpillar. Venequip’s dealership was governed by sales and service agreements with CAT Sàrl, Caterpillar’s Swiss subsidiary. In 2019 CAT Sàrl terminated the dealership. The contracts contain clauses that direct all disputes to Swiss courts for resolution under Swiss law. In 2021 Venequip brought contract claims against CAT Sàrl in Geneva, Switzerland.  Venequip filed applications across the United States seeking discovery from Caterpillar and its employees, dealers, and customers under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a), which authorizes (but does not require) district courts to order any person who resides or is found in the district to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” Venequip’s  Northern District of Illinois application sought wide-ranging discovery from Caterpillar.  

Ruling on Venequip’s application, the district judge addressed four factors identified by the Supreme Court (Intel) that generally concern the applicant’s need for discovery, the intrusiveness of the request, and comity considerations, and added the parties’ contractual choice of forum and law and Caterpillar’s agreement to provide discovery in the Swiss court, then denied the application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeal was not mooted by intervening developments in the Swiss court. The judge appropriately weighed the Intel factors and other permissible considerations.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Seventh Circuit affirms the denial of applications under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a), which authorizes district courts to order any person who resides or is found in the district to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-10-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Diane S. Sykes</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1463</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Commercial Law"/>
							<category term="Insurance Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1176/22-1176-2023-09-07.html</id>
        	<title>Full Member Subgroup of the American Institute of Steel Construction, LLC v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-09-07T05:32:18-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-09-07T05:32:18-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1176/22-1176-2023-09-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2019, AISC, an association of U.S. producers and manufacturers of fabricated structural steel (FSS) products, filed antidumping duty petitions before the International Trade Commission and the United States Department of Commerce, alleging unfair trade practices involving the importation and sales in the United States of FSS from Canada, China, and Mexico. In 2020, the Commission issued a final negative determination that the U.S. (domestic) FSS industry was not materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of sales in the United States of those imports. 

The Trade Court upheld the determination, rejecting arguments that that the Commission erred by declining to resolve a purported ambiguity in the scope of the investigation in view of the parties’ dispute; that the Commission legally erred in its determination that the captive production exception in 19 U.S.C. 1673d(b)(1)(A)(i) did not apply in the investigation; and that the Commission erred in its price effects analysis under 19 U.S.C. 1677(7)(C)(ii). The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the Commission’s determination reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with the law. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1176/22-1176-2023-09-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Full Member Subgroup of the American Institute of Steel Construction, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2019, AISC, an association of U.S. producers and manufacturers of fabricated structural steel (FSS) products, filed antidumping duty petitions before the International Trade Commission and the United States Department of Commerce, alleging unfair trade practices involving the importation and sales in the United States of FSS from Canada, China, and Mexico. In 2020, the Commission issued a final negative determination that the U.S. (domestic) FSS industry was not materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of sales in the United States of those imports. 

The Trade Court upheld the determination, rejecting arguments that that the Commission erred by declining to resolve a purported ambiguity in the scope of the investigation in view of the parties’ dispute; that the Commission legally erred in its determination that the captive production exception in 19 U.S.C. 1673d(b)(1)(A)(i) did not apply in the investigation; and that the Commission erred in its price effects analysis under 19 U.S.C. 1677(7)(C)(ii). The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the Commission’s determination reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with the law.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds a Trade Commission negative determination that the U.S. (domestic) fabricated structural steel industry was not materially injured or threatened with material injury by sales in the U.S. of certain imports.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-09-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1176</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1832/22-1832-2023-08-03.html</id>
        	<title>United States v. Katana Racing, Inc.</title>
        	<updated>2023-08-03T07:01:19-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-08-03T07:01:19-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1832/22-1832-2023-08-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Katana, a California-based distributor of high-end wheels and tires, was the importer of record for 386 entries of passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China in 2009-2012 and supplied Customs and Border Protection with invoices that listed prices lower than what Katana actually paid its Chinese vendors. Due to this error, Katana undercalculated the amount of safeguard duties, regular customs duties, harbor maintenance fees, and merchandise processing fees it owed by $5,742,483.80. Customs issued a demand to Katana for the unpaid duties and fees and later filed suit under 19 U.S.C. 1592(d).  

Katana sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because the government had filed suit after the statute of limitations, 19 U.S.C. 1621, had run. Katana stated that, although it had signed a waiver of the limitations period on October 25, 2016, it had revoked the waiver before the expiration of the limitations period. The Trade Court found that Katana had properly revoked its waiver and that the suit was untimely.

The Federal Circuit reversed.  The statute of limitations in 19 U.S.C. 1621 is not a jurisdictional time limit; it is subject to waiver and equitable tolling.   On remand, Katana can assert an affirmative defense concerning the invalidity of its waiver. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1832/22-1832-2023-08-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "United States v. Katana Racing, Inc." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Katana, a California-based distributor of high-end wheels and tires, was the importer of record for 386 entries of passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China in 2009-2012 and supplied Customs and Border Protection with invoices that listed prices lower than what Katana actually paid its Chinese vendors. Due to this error, Katana undercalculated the amount of safeguard duties, regular customs duties, harbor maintenance fees, and merchandise processing fees it owed by $5,742,483.80. Customs issued a demand to Katana for the unpaid duties and fees and later filed suit under 19 U.S.C. 1592(d).  

Katana sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because the government had filed suit after the statute of limitations, 19 U.S.C. 1621, had run. Katana stated that, although it had signed a waiver of the limitations period on October 25, 2016, it had revoked the waiver before the expiration of the limitations period. The Trade Court found that Katana had properly revoked its waiver and that the suit was untimely.

The Federal Circuit reversed.  The statute of limitations in 19 U.S.C. 1621 is not a jurisdictional time limit; it is subject to waiver and equitable tolling.   On remand, Katana can assert an affirmative defense concerning the invalidity of its waiver.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit reinstates a suit by Customs to collect unpaid duties; the statute of limitations for such suits is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver or tolling.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-08-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alvin Anthony Schall</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1832</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1226/22-1226-2023-07-27.html</id>
        	<title>Royal Brush Manufacturing Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-07-27T07:02:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-07-27T07:02:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1226/22-1226-2023-07-27.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Royal imported five entries of pencils to the United States in 2017-2018 and was accused of evasion of antidumping duties under the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015, 130 Stat. 155, and related regulations, 19 C.F.R. 165. A competitor alleged that Royal was transshipping pencils from China through the Philippines, falsely claiming the pencils to be of Philippine origin and not subject to the antidumping duties assessed on certain pencils from China 

Customs conducted a site visit to the Philippines manufacturer. The resulting Verification Report concluded that the manufacturer did not have the capability to produce sufficient quantities of pencils to account for the number of pencils imported to the U.S. in 2018. Customs provided Royal with only a redacted version of the report, including neither the numbers used to calculate production capacity nor the final production capacity determinations. The redacted version also omitted other confidential business information, such as photographs and information about certain invoices and purchase orders. Royal sought to file a rebuttal. Customs determined that the report did not contain new factual information and denied the request.

The Federal Circuit first held that it had jurisdiction, although the entries had been liquidated, then remanded. The failure to provide access to the redacted information violated due process. Under the Customs regulation, Royal must be given an opportunity to rebut the information with its own evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1226/22-1226-2023-07-27.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Royal Brush Manufacturing Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Royal imported five entries of pencils to the United States in 2017-2018 and was accused of evasion of antidumping duties under the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015, 130 Stat. 155, and related regulations, 19 C.F.R. 165. A competitor alleged that Royal was transshipping pencils from China through the Philippines, falsely claiming the pencils to be of Philippine origin and not subject to the antidumping duties assessed on certain pencils from China 

Customs conducted a site visit to the Philippines manufacturer. The resulting Verification Report concluded that the manufacturer did not have the capability to produce sufficient quantities of pencils to account for the number of pencils imported to the U.S. in 2018. Customs provided Royal with only a redacted version of the report, including neither the numbers used to calculate production capacity nor the final production capacity determinations. The redacted version also omitted other confidential business information, such as photographs and information about certain invoices and purchase orders. Royal sought to file a rebuttal. Customs determined that the report did not contain new factual information and denied the request.

The Federal Circuit first held that it had jurisdiction, although the entries had been liquidated, then remanded. The failure to provide access to the redacted information violated due process. Under the Customs regulation, Royal must be given an opportunity to rebut the information with its own evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit remands a determination that an importer was &quot;transshipping&quot; pencils from China through the Philippines; the importer must be given an opportunity to rebut the evidence.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-07-27</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy B. Dyk</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1226</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-1495/22-1495-2023-06-05.html</id>
        	<title>Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wai Wong</title>
        	<updated>2023-06-05T10:31:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-06-05T10:31:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-1495/22-1495-2023-06-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Challenged two adverse rulings made by the district court in favor of defendant Wai L. Wong and his business entity, GT Omega Racing, Ltd. (collectively “GTOR”). Wudi and GTOR are Asian-centered business entities that compete in the marketing of video gaming chairs and other products. In March 2017, Wudi obtained from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) a registration for the stylized word mark “GTRACING.” For its part, GTOR claimed that it already owned an earlier use of a similar word mark — that is, “GT OMEGA RACING” — and challenged Wudi’s registration of the “GTRACING” word mark in cancellation proceedings before a USPTO component called the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (the “Board”). In June 2020, the Board ruled in favor of GTOR, concluding that Wudi’s use of the “GTRACING” word mark encroached on GTOR’s earlier use of its own “GT OMEGA RACING” word mark.
 
The Fourth Circuit vacated the challenged rulings and remanded. The court agreed with Wudi’s primary contention that the district court’s challenged rulings constitute awards of injunctive relief in favor of GTOR and against Wudi. Secondly, the court also agreed that the challenged rulings failed to comport with the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure and controlling precedent. The court emphasized that the First Order possesses all of the necessary attributes and thus qualifies as an injunction order. That is, the First Order contains “clear, enforceable directives” and threatens Wudi with contempt for noncompliance. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-1495/22-1495-2023-06-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wai Wong" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Challenged two adverse rulings made by the district court in favor of defendant Wai L. Wong and his business entity, GT Omega Racing, Ltd. (collectively “GTOR”). Wudi and GTOR are Asian-centered business entities that compete in the marketing of video gaming chairs and other products. In March 2017, Wudi obtained from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) a registration for the stylized word mark “GTRACING.” For its part, GTOR claimed that it already owned an earlier use of a similar word mark — that is, “GT OMEGA RACING” — and challenged Wudi’s registration of the “GTRACING” word mark in cancellation proceedings before a USPTO component called the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (the “Board”). In June 2020, the Board ruled in favor of GTOR, concluding that Wudi’s use of the “GTRACING” word mark encroached on GTOR’s earlier use of its own “GT OMEGA RACING” word mark.
 
The Fourth Circuit vacated the challenged rulings and remanded. The court agreed with Wudi’s primary contention that the district court’s challenged rulings constitute awards of injunctive relief in favor of GTOR and against Wudi. Secondly, the court also agreed that the challenged rulings failed to comport with the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure and controlling precedent. The court emphasized that the First Order possesses all of the necessary attributes and thus qualifies as an injunction order. That is, the First Order contains “clear, enforceable directives” and threatens Wudi with contempt for noncompliance.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s rulings in favor of Defendant and his business entity, GT Omega Racing, Ltd. (collectively “GTOR”). The court held that the district court erred in awarding injunctive relief in these circumstances.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-06-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>KING</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1495</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2162/20-2162-2023-05-19.html</id>
        	<title>Canadian Solar International Ltd. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-05-19T07:03:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-05-19T07:03:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2162/20-2162-2023-05-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A 2012 antidumping duty order (19 U.S.C. 1673) for solar cells from China and two subsequent reviews assigned Qixin a separate rate lower than the country-wide rate. For the third administrative review, for 2014-2015 Qixin requested review and filed a separate rate application with a Customs Entry Summary for a single sale. Commerce repeatedly asserted that Qixin had not provided an entry number that corresponded to subject merchandise. Commerce issued preliminary results without mentioning Qixin’s eligibility for a separate rate. Qixin argued that Commerce had erroneously omitted Qixin, or, if Commerce concluded that there had been no entries during the review period, it should rescind the review with respect to Qixin. Commerce rejected both arguments. On remand, Commerce issued a third supplemental questionnaire. Qixin responded that it was unable to obtain the requested information. Commerce noted that the burden rested on Qixin to show it was entitled to a separate rate and reaffirmed. 

Before the Trade Court, Qixin unsuccessfully sought to file new information. no longer contesting that the previously identified sale was not a sale of subject merchandise and identifying five additional entries.   The Trade Court and Federal Circuit sustained Commerce’s denial of a separate rate.  The Trade Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Qixin’s motion to file new material out of time. Commerce did not make a conclusive finding that Qixin had no entries in the review period as required to rescind a review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2162/20-2162-2023-05-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Canadian Solar International Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A 2012 antidumping duty order (19 U.S.C. 1673) for solar cells from China and two subsequent reviews assigned Qixin a separate rate lower than the country-wide rate. For the third administrative review, for 2014-2015 Qixin requested review and filed a separate rate application with a Customs Entry Summary for a single sale. Commerce repeatedly asserted that Qixin had not provided an entry number that corresponded to subject merchandise. Commerce issued preliminary results without mentioning Qixin’s eligibility for a separate rate. Qixin argued that Commerce had erroneously omitted Qixin, or, if Commerce concluded that there had been no entries during the review period, it should rescind the review with respect to Qixin. Commerce rejected both arguments. On remand, Commerce issued a third supplemental questionnaire. Qixin responded that it was unable to obtain the requested information. Commerce noted that the burden rested on Qixin to show it was entitled to a separate rate and reaffirmed. 

Before the Trade Court, Qixin unsuccessfully sought to file new information. no longer contesting that the previously identified sale was not a sale of subject merchandise and identifying five additional entries.   The Trade Court and Federal Circuit sustained Commerce’s denial of a separate rate.  The Trade Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Qixin’s motion to file new material out of time. Commerce did not make a conclusive finding that Qixin had no entries in the review period as required to rescind a review.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms the denial of a separate duty rate for solar cells from China.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-05-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy B. Dyk</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2162</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-5080/22-5080-2023-05-09.html</id>
        	<title>Steven Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran</title>
        	<updated>2023-05-09T07:32:41-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-05-09T07:32:41-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-5080/22-5080-2023-05-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The United States seized oil cargo it claims belongs to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Appellants attached the oil in order to satisfy money judgments they hold against Iran. The district court upheld the United States&#039; claim of sovereign immunity and quashed the attachments. 

 The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held (1) federal sovereign immunity prevents the attachment and garnishment of oil proceeds in a bank account of the United States and (2) the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) does not waive that immunity. The court explained that the TRIA does not expressly mention the United States, its sovereign immunity, or its susceptibility to suit under the statute. Because the TRIA has nothing express to say about federal sovereign immunity, the notwithstanding clause cannot aid Appellants. Because sovereign immunity prevents Appellants from taking further steps to seize the proceeds from the United States’ sale of the contested oil, the court wrote it has no occasion to reach the alternative grounds for affirmance raised by the Government. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/22-5080/22-5080-2023-05-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Steven Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The United States seized oil cargo it claims belongs to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Appellants attached the oil in order to satisfy money judgments they hold against Iran. The district court upheld the United States&#039; claim of sovereign immunity and quashed the attachments. 

 The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held (1) federal sovereign immunity prevents the attachment and garnishment of oil proceeds in a bank account of the United States and (2) the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) does not waive that immunity. The court explained that the TRIA does not expressly mention the United States, its sovereign immunity, or its susceptibility to suit under the statute. Because the TRIA has nothing express to say about federal sovereign immunity, the notwithstanding clause cannot aid Appellants. Because sovereign immunity prevents Appellants from taking further steps to seize the proceeds from the United States’ sale of the contested oil, the court wrote it has no occasion to reach the alternative grounds for affirmance raised by the Government.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the United States’ claim of sovereign immunity and quashed the attachments in a case where the United States seized oil cargo it claimed belongs to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-05-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>GINSBURG</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-5080</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Energy, Oil &amp; Gas Law"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1021/22-1021-2023-04-25.html</id>
        	<title>Committee Overseeing Action for Lumber International Trade Investigations or Negotiations v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-25T07:02:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-25T07:02:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1021/22-1021-2023-04-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Department of Commerce initiated a countervailing duty investigation concerning imports of softwood lumber products from Canada and individually investigated five groups of companies that produced and/or exported covered products. Commerce issued a final determination, imposing duties on the products of those companies at company-specific rates ranging from 3.34% to 18.19%, with an “all-others” rate, 14.19%. Within days of publication of the countervailing duty (CVD) order in January 2018, about 36 Canadian companies that alleged they were subject to the all-others rate requested “expedited review” to give them individually determined rates.  Commerce initiated that review and ultimately awarded the individual requesters reduced or de minimis CVD rates.  

A domestic trade group filed suit, arguing that Commerce lacked statutory authority to create the expedited-review process. Canadian parties intervened and, with the United States, asserted that Commerce had the authority to adopt the expedited-review procedures of 19 C.F.R. 351.214(k) to give exporters a chance to secure individual rates shortly after the publication of a CVD order, arguing for the existence of such authority chiefly in provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). The Trade Court ruled against Commerce. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the Secretary had statutory authority to adopt the expedited-review process as a procedure for implementing statutory provisions that authorize individualized determinations in CVD proceedings, 19 U.S.C.  1667f1(e), 1677m, 3513(a)(2). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1021/22-1021-2023-04-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Committee Overseeing Action for Lumber International Trade Investigations or Negotiations v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Department of Commerce initiated a countervailing duty investigation concerning imports of softwood lumber products from Canada and individually investigated five groups of companies that produced and/or exported covered products. Commerce issued a final determination, imposing duties on the products of those companies at company-specific rates ranging from 3.34% to 18.19%, with an “all-others” rate, 14.19%. Within days of publication of the countervailing duty (CVD) order in January 2018, about 36 Canadian companies that alleged they were subject to the all-others rate requested “expedited review” to give them individually determined rates.  Commerce initiated that review and ultimately awarded the individual requesters reduced or de minimis CVD rates.  

A domestic trade group filed suit, arguing that Commerce lacked statutory authority to create the expedited-review process. Canadian parties intervened and, with the United States, asserted that Commerce had the authority to adopt the expedited-review procedures of 19 C.F.R. 351.214(k) to give exporters a chance to secure individual rates shortly after the publication of a CVD order, arguing for the existence of such authority chiefly in provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). The Trade Court ruled against Commerce. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the Secretary had statutory authority to adopt the expedited-review process as a procedure for implementing statutory provisions that authorize individualized determinations in CVD proceedings, 19 U.S.C.  1667f1(e), 1677m, 3513(a)(2).
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Secretary of the Department of Commerce has the authority to create an expedited review process to obtain individual rates following a countervailing duty order.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1021</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1228/22-1228-2023-04-20.html</id>
        	<title>FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-20T07:01:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-20T07:01:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1228/22-1228-2023-04-20.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Corning filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission alleging FS violated 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed four patents that generally relate to fiber optic technology commonly used in data centers. After investigating, the ALJ found that FS’ importation of high-density fiber optic equipment violated section 337; that FS induced infringement of two claims of the 320 patent, multiple claims of the 456 patent, and four claims of the 153 patent; and that FS’ accused modules directly infringed claims of the 206 patent. The ALJ adopted the Office of Unfair Import Investigations’ construction of “a front opening” as recited in the claims. The ALJ rejected invalidity challenges, including arguments that certain claims of the 320 and 456 patents were not enabled. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination that FS violated section 337, and issuance a general exclusion order prohibiting the importation of infringing high-density fiber optic equipment and components thereof and a cease-and-desist order directed to FS. The court upheld the enablement determination and the claim construction of “a front opening.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1228/22-1228-2023-04-20.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Corning filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission alleging FS violated 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed four patents that generally relate to fiber optic technology commonly used in data centers. After investigating, the ALJ found that FS’ importation of high-density fiber optic equipment violated section 337; that FS induced infringement of two claims of the 320 patent, multiple claims of the 456 patent, and four claims of the 153 patent; and that FS’ accused modules directly infringed claims of the 206 patent. The ALJ adopted the Office of Unfair Import Investigations’ construction of “a front opening” as recited in the claims. The ALJ rejected invalidity challenges, including arguments that certain claims of the 320 and 456 patents were not enabled. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s determination that FS violated section 337, and issuance a general exclusion order prohibiting the importation of infringing high-density fiber optic equipment and components thereof and a cease-and-desist order directed to FS. The court upheld the enablement determination and the claim construction of “a front opening.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms the ITC&#039;s issuance of a general exclusion order prohibiting the importation of infringing high-density fiber optic equipment and components thereof and a cease-and-desist order.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-20</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Ann Moore</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1228</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2257/21-2257-2023-04-14.html</id>
        	<title>Zhejiang Machinery Import &amp; Export Corp. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-14T06:32:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-14T06:32:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2257/21-2257-2023-04-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The U.S. Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping duty investigation on certain tapered roller bearings (TRBs) from China, 19 U.S.C. 1673, and established a country-wide anti-dumping duty for TRBs from China. In 2009, Commerce revised the rate to 92.84%. Since 2017, ZMC had been granted separate rate status.  An interested domestic party requested a review of ZMC’s 2016-2017 entries and submitted data indicating de facto control of ZMC by the government. In response to a questionnaire issued by Commerce, ZMC provided details about its corporate structure. 

After assessing ZMC’s corporate structure, Commerce preliminarily found that ZMC failed to rebut the presumption of de facto government control over its export activities. The Court of International Trade held that Commerce erred in rejecting a revised translation of Articles of Association. On remand, Commerce reviewed the revised translation but maintained its determination that ZMC failed to rebut the presumption of de facto government control. The Trade Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Commerce’s determination that ZMC was not entitled to a separate rate was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence because a labor union is the majority shareholder with significant rights over ZMC and has overlapping membership with the employee stock-ownership committee. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2257/21-2257-2023-04-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Zhejiang Machinery Import &amp; Export Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The U.S. Department of Commerce initiated an antidumping duty investigation on certain tapered roller bearings (TRBs) from China, 19 U.S.C. 1673, and established a country-wide anti-dumping duty for TRBs from China. In 2009, Commerce revised the rate to 92.84%. Since 2017, ZMC had been granted separate rate status.  An interested domestic party requested a review of ZMC’s 2016-2017 entries and submitted data indicating de facto control of ZMC by the government. In response to a questionnaire issued by Commerce, ZMC provided details about its corporate structure. 

After assessing ZMC’s corporate structure, Commerce preliminarily found that ZMC failed to rebut the presumption of de facto government control over its export activities. The Court of International Trade held that Commerce erred in rejecting a revised translation of Articles of Association. On remand, Commerce reviewed the revised translation but maintained its determination that ZMC failed to rebut the presumption of de facto government control. The Trade Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Commerce’s determination that ZMC was not entitled to a separate rate was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence because a labor union is the majority shareholder with significant rights over ZMC and has overlapping membership with the employee stock-ownership committee.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms a finding of de facto government control concerning an exporter of tapered roller bearings from China; the exporter is not entitled to a separate duty rate.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2257</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1199/22-1199-2023-04-12.html</id>
        	<title>Al Ghurair Iron &amp; Steel LLC v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-04-12T06:32:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-04-12T06:32:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1199/22-1199-2023-04-12.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2015, the Department of Commerce received petitions from domestic producers requesting that Commerce impose antidumping and countervailing duties on corrosion-resistant steel (CORE) exports from China.  Commerce initiated investigations and published orders.  In 2019, Commerce initiated investigations to determine whether exports of CORE from the UAE were circumventing the China CORE orders. The Court of International Trade judgment affirmed the subsequent circumvention determination.  In making its determination, Commerce analyzed the circumvention factors and subfactors provided by 19 U.S.C. 1677j(b). 

The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce’s circumvention determination as reasonable and supported by substantial evidence with respect to “pattern of trade,” “level of investment,” “nature of the production process,” and “extent of production facilities.” Commerce’s analysis of the “value-added” subfactor was erroneous because Commerce did not reasonably explain why it rejected financial data that were purported to show a significant value added but the error was harmless because it was limited to a single factual finding within a multi-factor test. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1199/22-1199-2023-04-12.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Al Ghurair Iron &amp; Steel LLC v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2015, the Department of Commerce received petitions from domestic producers requesting that Commerce impose antidumping and countervailing duties on corrosion-resistant steel (CORE) exports from China.  Commerce initiated investigations and published orders.  In 2019, Commerce initiated investigations to determine whether exports of CORE from the UAE were circumventing the China CORE orders. The Court of International Trade judgment affirmed the subsequent circumvention determination.  In making its determination, Commerce analyzed the circumvention factors and subfactors provided by 19 U.S.C. 1677j(b). 

The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce’s circumvention determination as reasonable and supported by substantial evidence with respect to “pattern of trade,” “level of investment,” “nature of the production process,” and “extent of production facilities.” Commerce’s analysis of the “value-added” subfactor was erroneous because Commerce did not reasonably explain why it rejected financial data that were purported to show a significant value added but the error was harmless because it was limited to a single factual finding within a multi-factor test.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms a Department of Commerce determination of circumvention.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-04-12</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1199</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1227/22-1227-2023-03-31.html</id>
        	<title>Philip Morris Products S.A. v. International Trade Commission</title>
        	<updated>2023-03-31T08:10:10-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-03-31T08:10:10-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1227/22-1227-2023-03-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Reynolds filed a complaint at the International Trade Commission alleging that Philip Morris violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337, through the importation and sale of tobacco products (the IQOS line of electronic nicotine delivery system products) that infringed certain claims of the 123 and 915 patents. The patents are directed to electrically powered “smoking articles” that heat tobacco instead of burning it, providing an inhalable substance in vapor or aerosol form. After an investigation, the Commission barred Philip Morris and its affiliates from importing products infringing the asserted patents. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Commission satisfied its Section 337 duty to “consult with” the Department of Health and Human Services and asked interested government agencies, including the FDA, to provide written submissions on the public interest factor. The Commission provided a sufficient basis for the issuance of an exclusion order.  Philip Morris’s argument that Reynolds’ products that had not received FDA authorization are precluded from consideration by Section 337 for purposes of its domestic industry requirement has no merit. The court also upheld findings of non-obviousness and infringement concerning the patents. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1227/22-1227-2023-03-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Philip Morris Products S.A. v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Reynolds filed a complaint at the International Trade Commission alleging that Philip Morris violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337, through the importation and sale of tobacco products (the IQOS line of electronic nicotine delivery system products) that infringed certain claims of the 123 and 915 patents. The patents are directed to electrically powered “smoking articles” that heat tobacco instead of burning it, providing an inhalable substance in vapor or aerosol form. After an investigation, the Commission barred Philip Morris and its affiliates from importing products infringing the asserted patents. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Commission satisfied its Section 337 duty to “consult with” the Department of Health and Human Services and asked interested government agencies, including the FDA, to provide written submissions on the public interest factor. The Commission provided a sufficient basis for the issuance of an exclusion order.  Philip Morris’s argument that Reynolds’ products that had not received FDA authorization are precluded from consideration by Section 337 for purposes of its domestic industry requirement has no merit. The court also upheld findings of non-obviousness and infringement concerning the patents.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms an International Trade Commission exclusion order concerning electronic nicotine delivery system products that infringe certain patents.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-03-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stoll</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1227</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2097/21-2097-2023-03-15.html</id>
        	<title>Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-03-15T06:32:58-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-03-15T06:32:58-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2097/21-2097-2023-03-15.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2017-2018, Borusan imported circular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes that were subject to decades-old antidumping duties. In 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9705 separately imposed a duty on imported steel articles (including Borusan’s carbon steel pipe) under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. 1862. In the annual administrative review of the antidumping duties owed on Borusan’s imports for May 2017–April 2018, the Department of Commerce treated the Proclamation 9705 duty as a “United States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. 1677a(c)(2)(A), resulting in higher antidumping duties for Borusan’s imports. 

The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit affirmed. Commerce correctly determined that the particular duty imposed by Proclamation 9705 is a “United States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. 1677a(c)(2)(A). Proclamation 9705 makes clear that the newly-imposed duty was to add to, not partly or wholly offset, the antidumping duties that would be due without the new duty  The antidumping duty must be calculated as if the Proclamation 9705 duty did not exist. This treatment is not inconsistent with Commerce’s long-recognized categorical exclusion of antidumping duties themselves from classification as “United States import duties.” Antidumping duties cannot be subtracted in the calculation of dumping margins (and hence antidumping duties), because doing so would produce a spiraling circularity. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2097/21-2097-2023-03-15.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Borusan Mannesmann Boru Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2017-2018, Borusan imported circular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes that were subject to decades-old antidumping duties. In 2018, Presidential Proclamation 9705 separately imposed a duty on imported steel articles (including Borusan’s carbon steel pipe) under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. 1862. In the annual administrative review of the antidumping duties owed on Borusan’s imports for May 2017–April 2018, the Department of Commerce treated the Proclamation 9705 duty as a “United States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. 1677a(c)(2)(A), resulting in higher antidumping duties for Borusan’s imports. 

The Court of International Trade and Federal Circuit affirmed. Commerce correctly determined that the particular duty imposed by Proclamation 9705 is a “United States import dut[y]” under 19 U.S.C. 1677a(c)(2)(A). Proclamation 9705 makes clear that the newly-imposed duty was to add to, not partly or wholly offset, the antidumping duties that would be due without the new duty  The antidumping duty must be calculated as if the Proclamation 9705 duty did not exist. This treatment is not inconsistent with Commerce’s long-recognized categorical exclusion of antidumping duties themselves from classification as “United States import duties.” Antidumping duties cannot be subtracted in the calculation of dumping margins (and hence antidumping duties), because doing so would produce a spiraling circularity.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Duties imposed on carbon steel pipe under a 2018 presidential proclamation are not to be offset from duties that would have been imposed without the proclamation.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-03-15</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2097</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1345/22-1345-2023-03-02.html</id>
        	<title>China Custom Manufacturing, Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-03-02T06:34:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-03-02T06:34:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1345/22-1345-2023-03-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Department of Commerce issued duty orders covering imports from China of “aluminum extrusions which are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process, made from” specified aluminum alloys; &quot;parts for final finished products that are assembled after importation, including, but not limited to, window frames, door frames, solar panels, curtain walls, or furniture.&quot; The scope includes aluminum extrusion components that are attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise unless imported as part of the finished goods “kit.” The Orders exclude “finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and backing material, and solar panels and “finished goods containing aluminum extrusions that are entered unassembled in a ‘finished goods kit.’” A finished goods kit is a packaged combination of parts that contains, at the time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final finished good and requires no further finishing or fabrication, such as cutting or punching, and is assembled “as is” into a finished product. 

Commerce, the Trade Court, and the Federal Circuit concluded that CCM’s solar panel mounts are subject to the Orders. The mounts are not eligible for  “finished merchandise” exclusion because the mounts are just one component of a downstream product—i.e., a solar panel mounting system. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1345/22-1345-2023-03-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "China Custom Manufacturing, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Department of Commerce issued duty orders covering imports from China of “aluminum extrusions which are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process, made from” specified aluminum alloys; &quot;parts for final finished products that are assembled after importation, including, but not limited to, window frames, door frames, solar panels, curtain walls, or furniture.&quot; The scope includes aluminum extrusion components that are attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise unless imported as part of the finished goods “kit.” The Orders exclude “finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and backing material, and solar panels and “finished goods containing aluminum extrusions that are entered unassembled in a ‘finished goods kit.’” A finished goods kit is a packaged combination of parts that contains, at the time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final finished good and requires no further finishing or fabrication, such as cutting or punching, and is assembled “as is” into a finished product. 

Commerce, the Trade Court, and the Federal Circuit concluded that CCM’s solar panel mounts are subject to the Orders. The mounts are not eligible for  “finished merchandise” exclusion because the mounts are just one component of a downstream product—i.e., a solar panel mounting system.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Solar panel mounts from China are subject to duty orders covering “aluminum extrusions which are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process, made from” specified aluminum alloys.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-03-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond T. Chen</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1345</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2066/21-2066-2023-02-07.html</id>
        	<title>PrimeSource Building Products, Inc.v, United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-02-07T06:03:39-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-02-07T06:03:39-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2066/21-2066-2023-02-07.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2018, under the Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. 1862, the Secretary of Commerce reported to the President that steel imports threatened national security by contributing to unsustainably low use of domestic steel-producing capacity. The President, agreeing with the finding, issued Proclamation 9705, imposing higher tariffs on steel imports from certain countries but providing for monitoring and future adjustments. In 2020, the President issued Proclamation 9980, which, based on the required monitoring, raised tariffs on imports of steel derivatives such as nails and fasteners. The Trade Court held Proclamation 9980 to be unauthorized by the statute because the new derivatives tariffs were imposed after the passing of certain deadlines; within 90 days of receiving the Secretary’s report, the President must determine whether to concur in the finding and, if so, within the same 90 days “the President shall” also “determine the nature and duration of the action.”

In the meantime, in another case, the Federal Circuit upheld a presidential proclamation that increased tariffs on steel beyond Proclamation 9705’s rate, concluding that when the President, within the Act’s time limits, adopts a plan that contemplates future contingency-dependent modifications, those time limits do not preclude the President from adding to the initial import impositions to help achieve the originally stated national-security objective if the underlying findings and objective have not grown stale.  

The Federal Circuit then upheld Proclamation 9980, reversing the Trade Court. The proclamation’s new imposition reaches imports that are within section 232’s authorization of presidential action based on the Secretary’s finding and there is no staleness or other persuasive reason for overriding the President’s judgment. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2066/21-2066-2023-02-07.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "PrimeSource Building Products, Inc.v, United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2018, under the Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. 1862, the Secretary of Commerce reported to the President that steel imports threatened national security by contributing to unsustainably low use of domestic steel-producing capacity. The President, agreeing with the finding, issued Proclamation 9705, imposing higher tariffs on steel imports from certain countries but providing for monitoring and future adjustments. In 2020, the President issued Proclamation 9980, which, based on the required monitoring, raised tariffs on imports of steel derivatives such as nails and fasteners. The Trade Court held Proclamation 9980 to be unauthorized by the statute because the new derivatives tariffs were imposed after the passing of certain deadlines; within 90 days of receiving the Secretary’s report, the President must determine whether to concur in the finding and, if so, within the same 90 days “the President shall” also “determine the nature and duration of the action.”

In the meantime, in another case, the Federal Circuit upheld a presidential proclamation that increased tariffs on steel beyond Proclamation 9705’s rate, concluding that when the President, within the Act’s time limits, adopts a plan that contemplates future contingency-dependent modifications, those time limits do not preclude the President from adding to the initial import impositions to help achieve the originally stated national-security objective if the underlying findings and objective have not grown stale.  

The Federal Circuit then upheld Proclamation 9980, reversing the Trade Court. The proclamation’s new imposition reaches imports that are within section 232’s authorization of presidential action based on the Secretary’s finding and there is no staleness or other persuasive reason for overriding the President’s judgment.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds a presidential proclamation, raising tariffs on certain imports of steel derivatives, rejecting arguments that the action was untimely under the Trade Expansion Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-02-07</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2066</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1161/22-1161-2023-02-06.html</id>
        	<title>Acquisition 362, LLC v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-02-06T06:01:36-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-02-06T06:01:36-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1161/22-1161-2023-02-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Acquisition imported tires manufactured by Shandong from China. Shandong tires were subject to a countervailing duty order; Acquisition deposited estimated duties for the entries at the &quot;all others&quot; rate of 30.61%. Commerce initiated an administrative review of the duty order covering 2016 entries, instructing Customs to suspend the liquidation (final assessment of the duties owed) of entries under review. Before the review was completed, Shandong withdrew. Commerce ordered Customs to liquidate Shandong-manufactured entries imported in 2016.  The Acquisition entries were liquidated with final duties assessed at 30.61%.  Importers that wish to challenge the liquidation of their entries can file a protest within 180 days, 19 U.S.C. 1514(a)(5), (c)(3)(A). Acquisition did not do so. Commerce later set the final duty rates for the 2016 entries at 15.56% for “non-selected companies under review.”  Acquisition then filed protests to Customs’ failure to refund the difference between the 30.61% rate and the 15.56%  rate, arguing that Shandong was the same company as another company that had remained under review.  

Customs denied the protests as untimely. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Acquisition’s subsequent complaint. The Trade court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Acquisition could have timely protested the liquidations of these entries on the theory that Customs had improperly liquidated them because the manufacturer of Acquisition’s goods was participating in an administrative review. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1161/22-1161-2023-02-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Acquisition 362, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Acquisition imported tires manufactured by Shandong from China. Shandong tires were subject to a countervailing duty order; Acquisition deposited estimated duties for the entries at the &quot;all others&quot; rate of 30.61%. Commerce initiated an administrative review of the duty order covering 2016 entries, instructing Customs to suspend the liquidation (final assessment of the duties owed) of entries under review. Before the review was completed, Shandong withdrew. Commerce ordered Customs to liquidate Shandong-manufactured entries imported in 2016.  The Acquisition entries were liquidated with final duties assessed at 30.61%.  Importers that wish to challenge the liquidation of their entries can file a protest within 180 days, 19 U.S.C. 1514(a)(5), (c)(3)(A). Acquisition did not do so. Commerce later set the final duty rates for the 2016 entries at 15.56% for “non-selected companies under review.”  Acquisition then filed protests to Customs’ failure to refund the difference between the 30.61% rate and the 15.56%  rate, arguing that Shandong was the same company as another company that had remained under review.  

Customs denied the protests as untimely. The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Acquisition’s subsequent complaint. The Trade court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Acquisition could have timely protested the liquidations of these entries on the theory that Customs had improperly liquidated them because the manufacturer of Acquisition’s goods was participating in an administrative review.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms the dismissal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of a suit challenging a duty rate imposed by the Department of Commerce.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-02-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy B. Dyk</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1161</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1077/22-1077-2023-01-05.html</id>
        	<title>Pokarna Engineered Stone Ltd. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2023-01-05T07:02:03-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2023-01-05T07:02:03-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1077/22-1077-2023-01-05.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		MSI is a U.S. importer of QSPs–stone composite building materials, used primarily for countertops. Production of QSPs involves the creation of a QSP slab from raw materials and fabrication that transforms the slab into a finished product. Cambria, a domestic quartz slab producer, petitioned for the imposition of antidumping duties on QSPs from India. MSI challenged Cambria’s standing because Cambria failed to include QSP “fabricators” as domestic industry “producers” in its industry support calculation. “Domestic producers or workers” is defined as interested parties who are eligible to file a petition under 19 U.S.C. 1673a(b)(1)]. “Interested parties” include “a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a domestic like product,” 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C). The terms “manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler” are not defined.

The Department of Commerce found that “the fabrication process does not change the fundamental physical characteristics imparted during the slab production process,” and that “producers” did not include “fabricators.” The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed, as supported by substantial evidence, Commerce’s interpretation of the term “producers” as an entity that requires a stake in the domestic industry and use of the sufficient production-related activities test to determine that the fabricators did not have a sufficient stake in the domestic industry to qualify as “producers.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/22-1077/22-1077-2023-01-05.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Pokarna Engineered Stone Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                MSI is a U.S. importer of QSPs–stone composite building materials, used primarily for countertops. Production of QSPs involves the creation of a QSP slab from raw materials and fabrication that transforms the slab into a finished product. Cambria, a domestic quartz slab producer, petitioned for the imposition of antidumping duties on QSPs from India. MSI challenged Cambria’s standing because Cambria failed to include QSP “fabricators” as domestic industry “producers” in its industry support calculation. “Domestic producers or workers” is defined as interested parties who are eligible to file a petition under 19 U.S.C. 1673a(b)(1)]. “Interested parties” include “a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a domestic like product,” 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(C). The terms “manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler” are not defined.

The Department of Commerce found that “the fabrication process does not change the fundamental physical characteristics imparted during the slab production process,” and that “producers” did not include “fabricators.” The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed, as supported by substantial evidence, Commerce’s interpretation of the term “producers” as an entity that requires a stake in the domestic industry and use of the sufficient production-related activities test to determine that the fabricators did not have a sufficient stake in the domestic industry to qualify as “producers.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms the Department of Commerce in holding that a domestic quartz slab fabricator is not a &quot;producer&quot; with standing to file a petition for antidumping duties against an importer of composite building materials.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2023-01-05</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan David Lourie</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>22-1077</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-3626/20-3626-2022-10-18.html</id>
        	<title>Laydon v. Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., et al.</title>
        	<updated>2022-10-18T06:30:52-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-10-18T06:30:52-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-3626/20-3626-2022-10-18.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Plaintiff brought this putative class action against more than twenty banks and brokers, alleging a conspiracy to manipulate two benchmark rates known as Yen-LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR. Plaintiff brought claims under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sought leave to assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The district court dismissed the CEA and antitrust claims and denied leave to add the RICO claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by holding that the CEA claims were impermissibly extraterritorial, that he lacked antitrust standing to assert a Sherman Act claim, and that he failed to allege proximate causation for his proposed RICO claims.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the conduct—i.e., that the bank defendants presented fraudulent submissions to an organization based in London that set a benchmark rate related to a foreign currency—occurred almost entirely overseas. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege any significant acts that took place in the United States. Plaintiff’s CEA claims are based predominantly on foreign conduct and are thus impermissibly extraterritorial. Further, the court wrote that the district court also correctly concluded that Plaintiff lacked antitrust standing because he would not be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. Lastly, the court agreed that Plaintiff failed to allege proximate causation for his RICO claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/20-3626/20-3626-2022-10-18.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Laydon v. Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A., et al." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Plaintiff brought this putative class action against more than twenty banks and brokers, alleging a conspiracy to manipulate two benchmark rates known as Yen-LIBOR and Euroyen TIBOR. Plaintiff brought claims under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), and the Sherman Antitrust Act, and sought leave to assert claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The district court dismissed the CEA and antitrust claims and denied leave to add the RICO claims. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by holding that the CEA claims were impermissibly extraterritorial, that he lacked antitrust standing to assert a Sherman Act claim, and that he failed to allege proximate causation for his proposed RICO claims.
 
The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the conduct—i.e., that the bank defendants presented fraudulent submissions to an organization based in London that set a benchmark rate related to a foreign currency—occurred almost entirely overseas. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege any significant acts that took place in the United States. Plaintiff’s CEA claims are based predominantly on foreign conduct and are thus impermissibly extraterritorial. Further, the court wrote that the district court also correctly concluded that Plaintiff lacked antitrust standing because he would not be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. Lastly, the court agreed that Plaintiff failed to allege proximate causation for his RICO claims.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing Plaintiff’s CEA and antitrust claims and denying leave to add the RICO claims. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to allege any significant acts that took place in the United States. Plaintiff’s CEA claims are based predominantly on foreign conduct and are thus impermissibly extraterritorial.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-10-18</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>PARK</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-3626</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Business Law"/>
							<category term="Class Action"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="White Collar Crime"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2205/21-2205-2022-09-23.html</id>
        	<title>Xi’an Metals &amp; Minerals Import &amp; Export Co. Ltd. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-09-23T05:34:45-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-09-23T05:34:45-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2205/21-2205-2022-09-23.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In the tenth administrative review of the antidumping order on steel nails from China, the U.S. Department of Commerce found that Pioneer did not cooperate to the best of its ability with Commerce’s request for information, Commerce applied adverse facts available (AFA) and assigned an antidumping margin of 118.04 percent to Pioneer.  Following the 2013 third administrative review, Commerce had announced that “all other future respondents for this case report all FOPs [factors of production] data on a CONNUM-specific [control number] basis using all product characteristics in subsequent reviews, as documentation and data collection requirements should now be fully understood by [the particular respondent] and all other respondents.”  CONNUM is Commerce jargon for a unique product.

The Trade Court and the Federal Circuit affirmed.  Commerce’s 2013 pronouncement reflects a statement of policy, not the agency’s explicit invocation of general legislative authority; the CONNUM-specific rule is not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.  The use of the CONNUM rule is not inconsistent with 19 U.S.C. 1677b, concerning the calculation of the normal value of merchandise. Commerce determined that CONNUM-specific data is essential for the accurate calculation of costs due to the variations in the physical characteristics of the merchandise.  Pioneer did not provide required answers, so the application of AFA was supported by substantial evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2205/21-2205-2022-09-23.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Xi’an Metals &amp; Minerals Import &amp; Export Co. Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In the tenth administrative review of the antidumping order on steel nails from China, the U.S. Department of Commerce found that Pioneer did not cooperate to the best of its ability with Commerce’s request for information, Commerce applied adverse facts available (AFA) and assigned an antidumping margin of 118.04 percent to Pioneer.  Following the 2013 third administrative review, Commerce had announced that “all other future respondents for this case report all FOPs [factors of production] data on a CONNUM-specific [control number] basis using all product characteristics in subsequent reviews, as documentation and data collection requirements should now be fully understood by [the particular respondent] and all other respondents.”  CONNUM is Commerce jargon for a unique product.

The Trade Court and the Federal Circuit affirmed.  Commerce’s 2013 pronouncement reflects a statement of policy, not the agency’s explicit invocation of general legislative authority; the CONNUM-specific rule is not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.  The use of the CONNUM rule is not inconsistent with 19 U.S.C. 1677b, concerning the calculation of the normal value of merchandise. Commerce determined that CONNUM-specific data is essential for the accurate calculation of costs due to the variations in the physical characteristics of the merchandise.  Pioneer did not provide required answers, so the application of AFA was supported by substantial evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds Commerce&#039;s assignment of an antidumping margin on steel nails from China, which was calculated using adverse facts available, and Commerce&#039;s use of a &quot;CONNUM-specific&quot; rule.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-09-23</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Stoll</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2205</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Commercial Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/21-2080/21-2080-2022-09-13.html</id>
        	<title>Aldossari v. Ripp</title>
        	<updated>2022-09-13T09:00:12-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-09-13T09:00:12-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/21-2080/21-2080-2022-09-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In the 1990s, Aldossari’s company, Trans Gulf, entered into an agreement in Saudi Arabia with three other businesses to establish and operate an oil refinery in Saint Lucia, a Caribbean island nation. Crude oil was to be sourced from the Saudi government or its national oil company, Saudi Aramco. The project went forward, but, Aldossari alleged, the owners of the three contract counterparties – one of whom became the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia –refused to pay Trans Gulf its share of the proceeds. Two decades later, the soon-to-be Crown Prince promised to pay Aldossari but never did. Aldossari, transferred his rights to his minor son, a U.S. citizen.  

The federal district court dismissed Aldossari’s subsequent tort and contract claims.  The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal of the claims against a deceased defendant was proper because Aldossari failed to allege any basis for exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. As for the surviving defendants, the lack of any meaningful ties between those defendants and the United States in Aldossari’s claims defeats his effort to sue them in the U.S. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act precludes subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against Saudi Arabia and Saudi Aramco.  The case was remanded with directions to dismiss without prejudice since none of the dispositive rulings reach the merits. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/21-2080/21-2080-2022-09-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Aldossari v. Ripp" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In the 1990s, Aldossari’s company, Trans Gulf, entered into an agreement in Saudi Arabia with three other businesses to establish and operate an oil refinery in Saint Lucia, a Caribbean island nation. Crude oil was to be sourced from the Saudi government or its national oil company, Saudi Aramco. The project went forward, but, Aldossari alleged, the owners of the three contract counterparties – one of whom became the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia –refused to pay Trans Gulf its share of the proceeds. Two decades later, the soon-to-be Crown Prince promised to pay Aldossari but never did. Aldossari, transferred his rights to his minor son, a U.S. citizen.  

The federal district court dismissed Aldossari’s subsequent tort and contract claims.  The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that dismissal of the claims against a deceased defendant was proper because Aldossari failed to allege any basis for exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. As for the surviving defendants, the lack of any meaningful ties between those defendants and the United States in Aldossari’s claims defeats his effort to sue them in the U.S. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act precludes subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against Saudi Arabia and Saudi Aramco.  The case was remanded with directions to dismiss without prejudice since none of the dispositive rulings reach the merits.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Third Circuit affirms the dismissal of claims concerning a contract entered into in Saudi Arabia, to be performed in Saint Lucia, and involving defendants from other countries.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-09-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jordan</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2080</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Contracts"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2172/21-2172-2022-09-08.html</id>
        	<title>California Steel Industries, Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-09-08T06:32:59-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-09-08T06:32:59-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2172/21-2172-2022-09-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Domestic manufacturers or distributors who imported steel products subject to an ad valorem “national security” tariffs, 19 U.S.C. 1862, sought exclusions from the tariff. Domestic steel producers objected to those requests, asserting that “they could satisfactorily produce all of, or sufficient substitutes for, the material that was the subject of the exclusion requests.”  The Department of Commerce denied the exclusion requests. The importers paid the duties and imported the steel products, then filed lawsuits, contending that Commerce failed to consider relevant evidence, failed to give adequate explanations, and in some instances considered legally irrelevant factors.   

Domestic producers, who had objected to the tariff exclusion requests before Commerce, moved to intervene as party defendants in the importers’ lawsuits.   The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s denial of intervention.  Each of the proposed intervenors’ requested relief is largely identical to the government’s prayer for relief, so they have established “piggyback” standing but they did not identify a legally protectable interest to qualify as intervenors under Rule 24(a)(2).  The court rejected arguments that participation in adversarial administrative proceedings bestows a Rule 24(a)(2) interest in the result, that actions to undo tariffs that specifically protect domestic producers give rise to economic interests, and that judgments removing tariff protection may practically impair the interests of direct beneficiaries of those tariffs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2172/21-2172-2022-09-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "California Steel Industries, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Domestic manufacturers or distributors who imported steel products subject to an ad valorem “national security” tariffs, 19 U.S.C. 1862, sought exclusions from the tariff. Domestic steel producers objected to those requests, asserting that “they could satisfactorily produce all of, or sufficient substitutes for, the material that was the subject of the exclusion requests.”  The Department of Commerce denied the exclusion requests. The importers paid the duties and imported the steel products, then filed lawsuits, contending that Commerce failed to consider relevant evidence, failed to give adequate explanations, and in some instances considered legally irrelevant factors.   

Domestic producers, who had objected to the tariff exclusion requests before Commerce, moved to intervene as party defendants in the importers’ lawsuits.   The Federal Circuit affirmed the Trade Court’s denial of intervention.  Each of the proposed intervenors’ requested relief is largely identical to the government’s prayer for relief, so they have established “piggyback” standing but they did not identify a legally protectable interest to qualify as intervenors under Rule 24(a)(2).  The court rejected arguments that participation in adversarial administrative proceedings bestows a Rule 24(a)(2) interest in the result, that actions to undo tariffs that specifically protect domestic producers give rise to economic interests, and that judgments removing tariff protection may practically impair the interests of direct beneficiaries of those tariffs.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms the denial of a motion to intervene in lawsuits concerning tariff exclusion requests.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-09-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Michael Hughes</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2172</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2176/21-2176-2022-09-06.html</id>
        	<title>ARP Materials, Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-09-06T05:00:33-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-09-06T05:00:33-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2176/21-2176-2022-09-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The importers sought refunds of estimated duties they deposited with U.S. Customs and Border Protection for tariffs that the U.S. Trade Representative retroactively rescinded after granting exclusion requests submitted by other importers that covered the same category of products. The Trade Court dismissed the complaints for lack of jurisdiction. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed.  The jurisdictional provision cited by the importers, 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of 1581 could have been available and would have provided an adequate remedy if timely invoked. Jurisdiction would have been available under section 1581(a) had the importers timely protested Customs’ classification decisions.  Failure to invoke an available remedy within the timeframe prescribed does not render the remedy manifestly inadequate.  That Customs’ classification decisions became erroneous after USTR granted retroactive exclusions is irrelevant. The obligation to protest a Customs classification error does not turn on whether it was erroneous ab initio or became erroneous because of retroactive administrative action. It turns on whether Customs’ classifications of the importers’ entries were protestable “decisions” under 19 U.S.C. 1514. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2176/21-2176-2022-09-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "ARP Materials, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The importers sought refunds of estimated duties they deposited with U.S. Customs and Border Protection for tariffs that the U.S. Trade Representative retroactively rescinded after granting exclusion requests submitted by other importers that covered the same category of products. The Trade Court dismissed the complaints for lack of jurisdiction. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed.  The jurisdictional provision cited by the importers, 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of 1581 could have been available and would have provided an adequate remedy if timely invoked. Jurisdiction would have been available under section 1581(a) had the importers timely protested Customs’ classification decisions.  Failure to invoke an available remedy within the timeframe prescribed does not render the remedy manifestly inadequate.  That Customs’ classification decisions became erroneous after USTR granted retroactive exclusions is irrelevant. The obligation to protest a Customs classification error does not turn on whether it was erroneous ab initio or became erroneous because of retroactive administrative action. It turns on whether Customs’ classifications of the importers’ entries were protestable “decisions” under 19 U.S.C. 1514.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Because importers failed to timely protest classification decisions made by Customs, they may not seek refunds after a decision by the U.S. Trade Representative retroactively to rescind the tariff.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-09-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Michael Hughes</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2176</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1903/20-1903-2022-08-31.html</id>
        	<title>INVT SPE LLC v.  International Trade Commission</title>
        	<updated>2022-08-31T05:33:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-08-31T05:33:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1903/20-1903-2022-08-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		INVT alleged that the importation and sale of personal devices, such as smartphones, smartwatches, and tablets, infringed INVT&#039;s patents. An ALJ determined that the accused devices did not infringe claims 3 and 4 of the 590 patent and claims 1 and 2 of the 439 patent and that INVT had failed to meet the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement as to those claims. 

The International Trade Commission affirmed the finding of no 19 U.S.C. 1337 (section 337) violation.  The Federal Circuit affirmed the determination with respect to the 439 patent because INVT failed to show infringement and the existence of a domestic industry. The 439 patent relates to wireless communication systems, specifically an improvement to adaptive modulation and coding, which is a technique used to transmit signals in an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing system. The asserted 439 claims are drawn to “capability” but for infringement purposes, a computer-implemented claim drawn to a functional capability requires some showing that the accused computer-implemented device is programmed or otherwise configured, without modification, to perform the claimed function when in operation. INVT failed to establish that the accused devices, when put into operation, will ever perform the particular functions recited in the asserted claims. The determination with respect to the 590 patent is moot based on the patent’s March 2022 expiration. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1903/20-1903-2022-08-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "INVT SPE LLC v.  International Trade Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                INVT alleged that the importation and sale of personal devices, such as smartphones, smartwatches, and tablets, infringed INVT&#039;s patents. An ALJ determined that the accused devices did not infringe claims 3 and 4 of the 590 patent and claims 1 and 2 of the 439 patent and that INVT had failed to meet the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement as to those claims. 

The International Trade Commission affirmed the finding of no 19 U.S.C. 1337 (section 337) violation.  The Federal Circuit affirmed the determination with respect to the 439 patent because INVT failed to show infringement and the existence of a domestic industry. The 439 patent relates to wireless communication systems, specifically an improvement to adaptive modulation and coding, which is a technique used to transmit signals in an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing system. The asserted 439 claims are drawn to “capability” but for infringement purposes, a computer-implemented claim drawn to a functional capability requires some showing that the accused computer-implemented device is programmed or otherwise configured, without modification, to perform the claimed function when in operation. INVT failed to establish that the accused devices, when put into operation, will ever perform the particular functions recited in the asserted claims. The determination with respect to the 590 patent is moot based on the patent’s March 2022 expiration.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds a determination that the importation and sale of certain personal electronic devices did not infringe a patent relating to wireless communication systems.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-08-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond T. Chen</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-1903</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1489/21-1489-2022-08-29-0.html</id>
        	<title>Y.C. Rubber Co.(North America), LLC v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-08-30T08:31:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-08-30T08:31:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1489/21-1489-2022-08-29-0.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Commerce initiated a second administrative review of antidumping duties for certain passenger-vehicle and light-truck tires from China and selected two mandatory respondents, Junhon and Haohua as “the top two publicly identifiable exporters/producers of passenger vehicle and light truck tires sold to the United States.” Haohua withdrew.  Commerce investigated only Junhong.  Commerce issued its Preliminary Results and applied an individual dumping margin of 73.63%, which was then designated as the rate for all of the exporters and producers.  In its Final Results. Commerce continued to use only Junhong, for its investigation but reduced the weighted-average dumping margin to 64.57%. 
 
The Trade Court held that Commerce’s use of a sole mandatory respondent was a reasonable exercise of agency discretion and sustained Commerce’s decision to exclude Thai import data from India, Indonesia, and South Korea when determining surrogate values for Junhong.  The Federal Circuit vacated. Commerce erred in restricting its examination to only one exporter/producer. The statute calls for all respondents to be individually investigated unless the large number makes separate reviews impracticable. This statutory “exception” authorizes the review of a smaller number of exporters or producers than have requested review.   Commerce has not demonstrated that it was reasonable to review a single exporter or producer when multiple have requested review and to calculate the all-others rate based on only one respondent. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1489/21-1489-2022-08-29-0.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Y.C. Rubber Co.(North America), LLC v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Commerce initiated a second administrative review of antidumping duties for certain passenger-vehicle and light-truck tires from China and selected two mandatory respondents, Junhon and Haohua as “the top two publicly identifiable exporters/producers of passenger vehicle and light truck tires sold to the United States.” Haohua withdrew.  Commerce investigated only Junhong.  Commerce issued its Preliminary Results and applied an individual dumping margin of 73.63%, which was then designated as the rate for all of the exporters and producers.  In its Final Results. Commerce continued to use only Junhong, for its investigation but reduced the weighted-average dumping margin to 64.57%. 
 
The Trade Court held that Commerce’s use of a sole mandatory respondent was a reasonable exercise of agency discretion and sustained Commerce’s decision to exclude Thai import data from India, Indonesia, and South Korea when determining surrogate values for Junhong.  The Federal Circuit vacated. Commerce erred in restricting its examination to only one exporter/producer. The statute calls for all respondents to be individually investigated unless the large number makes separate reviews impracticable. This statutory “exception” authorizes the review of a smaller number of exporters or producers than have requested review.   Commerce has not demonstrated that it was reasonable to review a single exporter or producer when multiple have requested review and to calculate the all-others rate based on only one respondent.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit vacates the Department of Commerce&#039;s antidumping duties for certain passenger-vehicle and light-truck tires from China because Commerce investigated a single exporter.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-08-29</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Pauline Newman</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1489</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2909/21-2909-2022-08-16.html</id>
        	<title>NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH</title>
        	<updated>2022-08-16T13:00:57-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-08-16T13:00:57-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2909/21-2909-2022-08-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		NBA Properties owns the trademarks of the NBA and NBA teams. In 2020, a Properties investigator accessed HANWJH’s online Amazon store and purchased an item, designating an address in Illinois as the delivery destination. The product was delivered to the Illinois address.  Properties sued, alleging trademark infringement and counterfeiting, 15 U.S.C. 1114 and false designation of origin, section 1125(a).  Properties obtained a TRO and a temporary asset restraint on HANWJH’s bank account, then moved for default; despite having been served, HANWJH had not answered or otherwise defended the suit.  HANWJH moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it because it did not expressly aim any conduct at Illinois. HANWJH maintained that it had never sold any other product to any consumer in Illinois nor had it any “offices, employees,” “real or personal property,” “bank accounts,” or any other commercial dealings with Illinois.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss and the entry of judgment in favor of Properties.  HANWJH shipped a product to Illinois after it structured its sales activity in such a manner as to invite orders from Illinois and developed the capacity to fill them.  HANWJH’s listing of its product on Amazon.com and its sale of the product to counsel are related sufficiently to the harm of likelihood of confusion.  Illinois has an interest in protecting its consumers from purchasing fraudulent merchandise. HANWJH alleges no unusual burden in defending the suit in Illinois. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2909/21-2909-2022-08-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                NBA Properties owns the trademarks of the NBA and NBA teams. In 2020, a Properties investigator accessed HANWJH’s online Amazon store and purchased an item, designating an address in Illinois as the delivery destination. The product was delivered to the Illinois address.  Properties sued, alleging trademark infringement and counterfeiting, 15 U.S.C. 1114 and false designation of origin, section 1125(a).  Properties obtained a TRO and a temporary asset restraint on HANWJH’s bank account, then moved for default; despite having been served, HANWJH had not answered or otherwise defended the suit.  HANWJH moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it because it did not expressly aim any conduct at Illinois. HANWJH maintained that it had never sold any other product to any consumer in Illinois nor had it any “offices, employees,” “real or personal property,” “bank accounts,” or any other commercial dealings with Illinois.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss and the entry of judgment in favor of Properties.  HANWJH shipped a product to Illinois after it structured its sales activity in such a manner as to invite orders from Illinois and developed the capacity to fill them.  HANWJH’s listing of its product on Amazon.com and its sale of the product to counsel are related sufficiently to the harm of likelihood of confusion.  Illinois has an interest in protecting its consumers from purchasing fraudulent merchandise. HANWJH alleges no unusual burden in defending the suit in Illinois.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Seventh Circuit rejects jurisdictional challenges by a China-based online retailer that was sued in an Illinois district court for trademark infringement.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-08-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kenneth Francis Ripple</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2909</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Internet Law"/>
							<category term="Trademark"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1932/21-1932-2022-08-11.html</id>
        	<title>Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-08-11T07:01:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-08-11T07:01:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1932/21-1932-2022-08-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Meyer imports cookware. Each cookware item manufactured in Thailand began as a steel disc imported from China. In Thailand, the manufacturer transforms the discs into finished cookware and sells finished cookware to distributors in Macau and Hong Kong. The manufacturers, distributors, and Meyer have a common parent/shareholder.

Meyer requested duty-free treatment for the cookware produced in Thailand, based on Thailand’s status as a beneficiary developing country under the Generalized System of Preferences. Meyer also asked Customs to value its cookware based on the first-sale price that its affiliated distributors paid to the manufacturers. Customs denied duty-free treatment and assessed duties based on the second-sale price that Meyer paid to its distributors.  The Court of International Trade ruled that raw materials from nonbeneficiary developing countries must undergo a “double substantial transformation” in the beneficiary developing country to count toward duty-free treatment and the manufacturer did not substantially transform the input a second time by converting the shell into a finished pot; Meyer failed to show that an unfinished shell is a “distinct article of commerce.”  

The Federal Circuit affirmed in part.  The Trade Court properly found only one substantial transformation but erred in requiring Meyer to prove that the first sales were at arm’s length and also unaffected by China’s status as a non-market economy. The court remanded for reconsideration of whether Meyer may rely on its first-sale prices. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1932/21-1932-2022-08-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Meyer Corp., U.S. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Meyer imports cookware. Each cookware item manufactured in Thailand began as a steel disc imported from China. In Thailand, the manufacturer transforms the discs into finished cookware and sells finished cookware to distributors in Macau and Hong Kong. The manufacturers, distributors, and Meyer have a common parent/shareholder.

Meyer requested duty-free treatment for the cookware produced in Thailand, based on Thailand’s status as a beneficiary developing country under the Generalized System of Preferences. Meyer also asked Customs to value its cookware based on the first-sale price that its affiliated distributors paid to the manufacturers. Customs denied duty-free treatment and assessed duties based on the second-sale price that Meyer paid to its distributors.  The Court of International Trade ruled that raw materials from nonbeneficiary developing countries must undergo a “double substantial transformation” in the beneficiary developing country to count toward duty-free treatment and the manufacturer did not substantially transform the input a second time by converting the shell into a finished pot; Meyer failed to show that an unfinished shell is a “distinct article of commerce.”  

The Federal Circuit affirmed in part.  The Trade Court properly found only one substantial transformation but erred in requiring Meyer to prove that the first sales were at arm’s length and also unaffected by China’s status as a non-market economy. The court remanded for reconsideration of whether Meyer may rely on its first-sale prices.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit remands the question of whether an importer of cookware from Thailand may rely on its &quot;first-sale&quot; price in valuing the cookware for purposes of imposing duties.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-08-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Michael Hughes</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1932</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Commercial Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5219/21-5219-2022-07-19.html</id>
        	<title>Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. v. Gina Raimondo</title>
        	<updated>2022-07-19T07:00:40-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-07-19T07:00:40-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5219/21-5219-2022-07-19.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Acting under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) the Department of Commerce has maintained a so-called Entity List to restrict designated foreign parties from receiving United States exports. 
 
Plaintiff, Changji Esquel Textile Co, operates a spinning mill in Xinjiang. The United States has determined that China abuses the human rights of Uyghurs and other religious or ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including imprisonment and forced labor. Changji and its parent company filed a lawsuit alleging that the Department, in adding Changji to the Entity List, violated ECRA and its implementing regulations, the APA, and the Due Process Clause. They moved for a preliminary injunction on the theory that the alleged ECRA and regulatory violations were ultra vires. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on this claim. 
 
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to prevail on an ultra vires claim, Plaintiff must establish three things: “(i) the statutory preclusion of review is implied rather than express; (ii) there is no alternative procedure for review of the statutory claim; and (iii) the agency plainly acts in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the statute that is clear and mandatory.
 
The court explained that the canons invoked by Plaintiffs can resolve statutory ambiguity in close cases, but they do not allow the court to discern any clear and mandatory prohibition on adding entities to the List for human-rights abuses, particularly given the breadth of section 4813(a)(16) and the deference owed to the Executive Branch in matters of foreign affairs. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/21-5219/21-5219-2022-07-19.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. v. Gina Raimondo" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Acting under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) the Department of Commerce has maintained a so-called Entity List to restrict designated foreign parties from receiving United States exports. 
 
Plaintiff, Changji Esquel Textile Co, operates a spinning mill in Xinjiang. The United States has determined that China abuses the human rights of Uyghurs and other religious or ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, including imprisonment and forced labor. Changji and its parent company filed a lawsuit alleging that the Department, in adding Changji to the Entity List, violated ECRA and its implementing regulations, the APA, and the Due Process Clause. They moved for a preliminary injunction on the theory that the alleged ECRA and regulatory violations were ultra vires. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on this claim. 
 
The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to prevail on an ultra vires claim, Plaintiff must establish three things: “(i) the statutory preclusion of review is implied rather than express; (ii) there is no alternative procedure for review of the statutory claim; and (iii) the agency plainly acts in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the statute that is clear and mandatory.
 
The court explained that the canons invoked by Plaintiffs can resolve statutory ambiguity in close cases, but they do not allow the court to discern any clear and mandatory prohibition on adding entities to the List for human-rights abuses, particularly given the breadth of section 4813(a)(16) and the deference owed to the Executive Branch in matters of foreign affairs.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion seeking a preliminary injunction on the theory that the alleged Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) and regulatory violations were ultra vires.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-07-19</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>KATSAS</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-5219</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Antitrust &amp; Trade Regulation"/>
							<category term="Constitutional Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2106/21-2106-2022-07-13.html</id>
        	<title>Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Thales DIS AIS Deutschland GMBH</title>
        	<updated>2022-07-13T05:31:04-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-07-13T05:31:04-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2106/21-2106-2022-07-13.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Philips and Thales design and manufacture telecommunications equipment and related technologies, including those related to various generations of wireless networks. Philips and Thales have been engaged in negotiations over what Philips asserts are standard essential patents (SEPs) that Thales has implemented according to European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) specifications. After negotiations did not yield an agreed-upon fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) license for the SEPs, Philips filed an infringement and declaratory action against Thales in the District of Delaware and an International Trade Commission (ITC) action seeking an exclusion order. Thales filed a breach of contract counterclaim and declaratory counterclaim for a FRAND rate determination and moved for a preliminary injunction barring Philips from pursuing its ITC action. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of Thales’ motion. The district court did not clearly err in determining that Thales’ evidence of harm was conclusory and that it failed to meet its burden of establishing likely irreparable harm. Thales did not present any evidence that it lost customers, had customers delay purchases, or struggled to acquire new business because of the ongoing ITC proceedings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2106/21-2106-2022-07-13.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Thales DIS AIS Deutschland GMBH" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Philips and Thales design and manufacture telecommunications equipment and related technologies, including those related to various generations of wireless networks. Philips and Thales have been engaged in negotiations over what Philips asserts are standard essential patents (SEPs) that Thales has implemented according to European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) specifications. After negotiations did not yield an agreed-upon fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) license for the SEPs, Philips filed an infringement and declaratory action against Thales in the District of Delaware and an International Trade Commission (ITC) action seeking an exclusion order. Thales filed a breach of contract counterclaim and declaratory counterclaim for a FRAND rate determination and moved for a preliminary injunction barring Philips from pursuing its ITC action. 

The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of Thales’ motion. The district court did not clearly err in determining that Thales’ evidence of harm was conclusory and that it failed to meet its burden of establishing likely irreparable harm. Thales did not present any evidence that it lost customers, had customers delay purchases, or struggled to acquire new business because of the ongoing ITC proceedings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms the denial of a preliminary injunction that would bar a party from pursuing an International Trade Commission action seeking an exclusion order.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-07-13</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Ann Moore</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2106</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2067/21-2067-2022-07-06.html</id>
        	<title>Shanxi Hairui Trade Co., Ltd. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-07-06T06:31:06-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-07-06T06:31:06-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2067/21-2067-2022-07-06.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In its ninth administrative review of its antidumping order regarding certain steel nails from China, the Department of Commerce relied on adverse facts available (AFA) in calculating antidumping rates for two mandatory respondents. For Shandong, Commerce relied on total AFA to compute a rate of 118.04% because Shandong did not cooperate at all with Commerce’s investigation. For Dezhou, Commerce relied on partial AFA to compute a rate of 69.99% because it found that Dezhou’s supplier engaged in a fraudulent transshipment scheme and that this misconduct was attributable to Dezhou. Commerce then used those AFA-based rates to compute its all-others rate (the rate applied to all exporters of the subject merchandise who requested a separate rate but whom Commerce did not select as mandatory respondents). 

The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. During an initial investigation, Commerce must generally set the all-others rate equal to the weighted average of the mandatory respondents’ individual dumping margins, excluding any margins determined entirely on AFA, 19 U.S.C. 1673d(c)(5)(A); no such provision exists concerning administrative reviews.  Commerce acted reasonably in adopting a new sampling methodology because it found that smaller exporters were behaving differently than larger exporters and that AFA-based margins yield an all-others rate representative of the exporters as a whole. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-2067/21-2067-2022-07-06.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Shanxi Hairui Trade Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In its ninth administrative review of its antidumping order regarding certain steel nails from China, the Department of Commerce relied on adverse facts available (AFA) in calculating antidumping rates for two mandatory respondents. For Shandong, Commerce relied on total AFA to compute a rate of 118.04% because Shandong did not cooperate at all with Commerce’s investigation. For Dezhou, Commerce relied on partial AFA to compute a rate of 69.99% because it found that Dezhou’s supplier engaged in a fraudulent transshipment scheme and that this misconduct was attributable to Dezhou. Commerce then used those AFA-based rates to compute its all-others rate (the rate applied to all exporters of the subject merchandise who requested a separate rate but whom Commerce did not select as mandatory respondents). 

The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. During an initial investigation, Commerce must generally set the all-others rate equal to the weighted average of the mandatory respondents’ individual dumping margins, excluding any margins determined entirely on AFA, 19 U.S.C. 1673d(c)(5)(A); no such provision exists concerning administrative reviews.  Commerce acted reasonably in adopting a new sampling methodology because it found that smaller exporters were behaving differently than larger exporters and that AFA-based margins yield an all-others rate representative of the exporters as a whole.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds the Commerce Department&#039;s use of margins based on adverse facts available in calculating the &quot;all others&quot; rate on administrative review.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-07-06</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Ann Moore</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2067</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2665/21-2665-2022-06-16.html</id>
        	<title>Lam-Quang-Vinh v. Springs Window Fashions, LLC</title>
        	<updated>2022-06-16T09:02:44-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-06-16T09:02:44-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2665/21-2665-2022-06-16.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Lam began working at Springs as its senior manager of global trade in 2019. She learned that three of Springs’s manufacturing facilities in Mexico were inaccurately tracking import and export inventories because computer systems were not properly integrated. While attempting to resolve the issue, Lam came to believe that a product Springs imported (cellular fabric blankets) originated in China and not, as the supplier insisted, in Taiwan and Malaysia. Fabrics originating in China were subject to a 25 percent tariff. She claims that she repeatedly stated that the company would need to pay higher tariffs, was “angrily berated,” and was told to continue classifying the fabrics as Taiwanese and Malaysian.  She was placed on a performance improvement plan that cited her failure to adequately address the inventory problem, her failure to supplement tariff concerns with a “risk assessment,” a “solution,” or a “process change,” her reliance on outside consultants; and her inability to communicate concisely. 

Law was ultimately fired and sued, alleging that Springs retaliated against her, in violation of the False Claims Act, over her opinion that the company owed the 25 percent tariff, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Springs. Springs’s conduct falls short of “harassment” under section 3730(h)(1); Lam has not established a connection between the tariff violations she reported and the decision to fire her. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2665/21-2665-2022-06-16.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Lam-Quang-Vinh v. Springs Window Fashions, LLC" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Lam began working at Springs as its senior manager of global trade in 2019. She learned that three of Springs’s manufacturing facilities in Mexico were inaccurately tracking import and export inventories because computer systems were not properly integrated. While attempting to resolve the issue, Lam came to believe that a product Springs imported (cellular fabric blankets) originated in China and not, as the supplier insisted, in Taiwan and Malaysia. Fabrics originating in China were subject to a 25 percent tariff. She claims that she repeatedly stated that the company would need to pay higher tariffs, was “angrily berated,” and was told to continue classifying the fabrics as Taiwanese and Malaysian.  She was placed on a performance improvement plan that cited her failure to adequately address the inventory problem, her failure to supplement tariff concerns with a “risk assessment,” a “solution,” or a “process change,” her reliance on outside consultants; and her inability to communicate concisely. 

Law was ultimately fired and sued, alleging that Springs retaliated against her, in violation of the False Claims Act, over her opinion that the company owed the 25 percent tariff, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Springs. Springs’s conduct falls short of “harassment” under section 3730(h)(1); Lam has not established a connection between the tariff violations she reported and the decision to fire her.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Seventh Circuit rejects a False Claims Act suit by a terminated employee that she suffered retaliation for expressing her opinion that her employer owed higher tariffs.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-06-16</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Per Curiam</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-2665</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Labor &amp; Employment Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1726/21-1726-2022-06-09.html</id>
        	<title>USP Holdings, Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-06-09T06:01:20-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-06-09T06:01:20-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1726/21-1726-2022-06-09.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Trade Expansion Act authorizes the President to adjust imports if he concurs with a determination by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce “that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security” and to “determine the nature and duration” of the corrective action, 19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(1)(A). In a 2018 report, the Secretary determined that excessive steel imports threatened to impair national security. The President concurred and issued proclamations that imposed a 25 percent tariff on steel imports from several countries. 

The Court of International Trade rejected arguments that the President’s and Secretary’s finding of a threat to national security and the President’s imposition of a tariff for an indefinite duration conflicted with the statute.  The Federal Circuit affirmed. While claims that the President’s actions violated the statutory authority delegated by section 1862 are reviewable, the President cannot be sued directly to challenge his threat determination.  The Secretary’s threat determination is a reviewable final action, as a predicate to the President’s authority, but is reviewable only for compliance with the statute and not under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The court rejected an argument that the President failed to satisfy 1862(c)(1)(A)&#039;s “nature and duration” requirement.&quot; &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1726/21-1726-2022-06-09.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "USP Holdings, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Trade Expansion Act authorizes the President to adjust imports if he concurs with a determination by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce “that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security” and to “determine the nature and duration” of the corrective action, 19 U.S.C. 1862(c)(1)(A). In a 2018 report, the Secretary determined that excessive steel imports threatened to impair national security. The President concurred and issued proclamations that imposed a 25 percent tariff on steel imports from several countries. 

The Court of International Trade rejected arguments that the President’s and Secretary’s finding of a threat to national security and the President’s imposition of a tariff for an indefinite duration conflicted with the statute.  The Federal Circuit affirmed. While claims that the President’s actions violated the statutory authority delegated by section 1862 are reviewable, the President cannot be sued directly to challenge his threat determination.  The Secretary’s threat determination is a reviewable final action, as a predicate to the President’s authority, but is reviewable only for compliance with the statute and not under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The court rejected an argument that the President failed to satisfy 1862(c)(1)(A)&#039;s “nature and duration” requirement.&quot;
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit rejects challenges to the imposition of tariffs, by executive proclamation, on steel imports, and to the underlying findings of a threat to national security.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-06-09</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy B. Dyk</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1726</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2114/20-2114-2022-05-24.html</id>
        	<title>Hitachi Energy USA, Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-05-24T05:31:07-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-05-24T05:31:07-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2114/20-2114-2022-05-24.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The second administrative review of an antidumping duty determination for large power transformers imported from the Republic of Korea, 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)(b), was subject to four appeals to the Trade Court, with three remands to the Department of Commerce. The review concerned 19 U.S.C. 1677m(d), which requires Commerce to notify and permit a party to remedy or explain any deficiency in the information provided during an investigation. Commerce asserted that the statute did not apply and did not permit Hyundai to provide additional information relevant to Commerce’s change of methodology concerning normal value and sales price of service-related revenue. Commerce applied an adverse inference and partial facts available to increase the dumping margin. 

The Federal Circuit remanded for redetermination of the antidumping duty, based on the calculation of service-related revenue. Hyundai has the statutory right to correct the deficiencies that led to the application of adverse inferences and partial facts available. Before making adverse inference, Commerce must examine a respondent’s actions and assess the extent of the respondent’s abilities, efforts, and cooperation in responding to Commerce requests for information. The government does not assert that Hyundai withheld information, or committed any of the transgressions in section 1677e(a)(1) or (2) and relied on incomplete data to determine antidumping duties. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2114/20-2114-2022-05-24.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hitachi Energy USA, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The second administrative review of an antidumping duty determination for large power transformers imported from the Republic of Korea, 19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)(b), was subject to four appeals to the Trade Court, with three remands to the Department of Commerce. The review concerned 19 U.S.C. 1677m(d), which requires Commerce to notify and permit a party to remedy or explain any deficiency in the information provided during an investigation. Commerce asserted that the statute did not apply and did not permit Hyundai to provide additional information relevant to Commerce’s change of methodology concerning normal value and sales price of service-related revenue. Commerce applied an adverse inference and partial facts available to increase the dumping margin. 

The Federal Circuit remanded for redetermination of the antidumping duty, based on the calculation of service-related revenue. Hyundai has the statutory right to correct the deficiencies that led to the application of adverse inferences and partial facts available. Before making adverse inference, Commerce must examine a respondent’s actions and assess the extent of the respondent’s abilities, efforts, and cooperation in responding to Commerce requests for information. The government does not assert that Hyundai withheld information, or committed any of the transgressions in section 1677e(a)(1) or (2) and relied on incomplete data to determine antidumping duties.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit remands for redetermination of the antidumping duty for large power transformers imported from the Republic of Korea.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-05-24</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Pauline Newman</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2114</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1679/21-1679-2022-04-25.html</id>
        	<title>M S International, Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-04-25T05:00:37-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-04-25T05:00:37-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1679/21-1679-2022-04-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In parallel antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of quartz surface products from China, the Department of Commerce amended the scope of its investigations to prevent producers and exporters in China from evading its orders by using glass in place of quartz. Bruskin challenged Commerce’s authority to modify the scope of the investigation and to do so without a hearing. Bruskin also challenged the factual findings that led Commerce to modify the scope of its investigations. 

The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed.  Commerce has the discretion to set the scope of its investigations. Bruskin’s hearing request was untimely, and substantial evidence supports Commerce’s factual findings. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1679/21-1679-2022-04-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "M S International, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In parallel antidumping and countervailing duty investigations of quartz surface products from China, the Department of Commerce amended the scope of its investigations to prevent producers and exporters in China from evading its orders by using glass in place of quartz. Bruskin challenged Commerce’s authority to modify the scope of the investigation and to do so without a hearing. Bruskin also challenged the factual findings that led Commerce to modify the scope of its investigations. 

The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed.  Commerce has the discretion to set the scope of its investigations. Bruskin’s hearing request was untimely, and substantial evidence supports Commerce’s factual findings.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds the Department of Commerce&#039;s decision to modify the scope of its antidumping investigation of quartz products from China without holding a hearing.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-04-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Michael Hughes</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1679</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1747/21-1747-2022-04-21.html</id>
        	<title>Mid Continent Steel &amp; Wire, Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-04-21T05:31:13-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-04-21T05:31:13-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1747/21-1747-2022-04-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Department of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order covering steel nails from Taiwan. The Federal Circuit remanded for further explanation of one aspect of the methodology Commerce had adopted to determine whether there was “a pattern of export prices . . . that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time,” 19 U.S.C. 1677f-1(d)(1)(B)(i), The court stated that Commerce did not adequately explain why it was reasonable to use simple averaging. 

On remand, Commerce again used simple averaging for its version of a “Cohen’s d denominator.” The Trade Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the relevant statistical literature cited by Commerce uniformly uses weighted averaging in the Cohen’s d denominator calculation and that Commerce has not explained why the basic choice of weighted averaging of unequal-size groups fails to
apply to this context. The literature nowhere suggests simple averaging for unequal-size groups. When the entire population is known, the literature points toward using the standard deviation of the entire population as the denominator in Cohen’s d—which Commerce has not done. Commerce’s job is not to follow a statistical test as explained in published literature for its own sake, but to implement the statutory mandate to determine when prices of certain groups “differ significantly.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1747/21-1747-2022-04-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Mid Continent Steel &amp; Wire, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Department of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order covering steel nails from Taiwan. The Federal Circuit remanded for further explanation of one aspect of the methodology Commerce had adopted to determine whether there was “a pattern of export prices . . . that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time,” 19 U.S.C. 1677f-1(d)(1)(B)(i), The court stated that Commerce did not adequately explain why it was reasonable to use simple averaging. 

On remand, Commerce again used simple averaging for its version of a “Cohen’s d denominator.” The Trade Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the relevant statistical literature cited by Commerce uniformly uses weighted averaging in the Cohen’s d denominator calculation and that Commerce has not explained why the basic choice of weighted averaging of unequal-size groups fails to
apply to this context. The literature nowhere suggests simple averaging for unequal-size groups. When the entire population is known, the literature points toward using the standard deviation of the entire population as the denominator in Cohen’s d—which Commerce has not done. Commerce’s job is not to follow a statistical test as explained in published literature for its own sake, but to implement the statutory mandate to determine when prices of certain groups “differ significantly.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit vacates the Department of Commerce&#039;s use of simple averaging for its version of a “Cohen’s d denominator” in issuing an antidumping duty order covering steel nails from Taiwan.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-04-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1747</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2265/20-2265-2022-04-14.html</id>
        	<title>Bioparques de Occidente, S.A. de C.V. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-04-14T06:31:30-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-04-14T06:31:30-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2265/20-2265-2022-04-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 1996, the Commerce Department made a preliminary determination that tomatoes were being, or were likely to be, sold in the U.S. at less than fair value. Exporters of fresh tomatoes from Mexico signed an agreement to sell their products in the U.S. at minimum “reference” prices; Commerce suspended the investigation. In 2019, Commerce withdrew from the Agreement and resumed the investigation. A new agreement suspended the investigation, set higher minimum reference prices, and described the dumping margin. Domestic tomato producers asked Commerce to continue the investigation, which it did, as required by statute. Commerce reached a final determination and calculated estimated dumping margins.  An antidumping duty order has not been issued because the 2019 Agreement remains in effect. Three companies challenged Commerce’s termination of the 2013 Agreement, its continuation of the investigation, and final determination. 

The Trade Court dismissed, finding that claims regarding the termination of the 2013 Agreement became moot upon the execution of the 2019 Agreement, and claims regarding the final determination in the continued investigation were not ripe because before an antidumping duty order.

The Federal Circuit found no plausible challenge to the termination of the 2013 Agreement. Reversing in part, the court concluded that the challenge to the final determination is justiciable under Article III. The Tariff Act of 1930 provides jurisdiction for the Trade Court to review the final determination even before an antidumping duty order has been published. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2265/20-2265-2022-04-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Bioparques de Occidente, S.A. de C.V. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 1996, the Commerce Department made a preliminary determination that tomatoes were being, or were likely to be, sold in the U.S. at less than fair value. Exporters of fresh tomatoes from Mexico signed an agreement to sell their products in the U.S. at minimum “reference” prices; Commerce suspended the investigation. In 2019, Commerce withdrew from the Agreement and resumed the investigation. A new agreement suspended the investigation, set higher minimum reference prices, and described the dumping margin. Domestic tomato producers asked Commerce to continue the investigation, which it did, as required by statute. Commerce reached a final determination and calculated estimated dumping margins.  An antidumping duty order has not been issued because the 2019 Agreement remains in effect. Three companies challenged Commerce’s termination of the 2013 Agreement, its continuation of the investigation, and final determination. 

The Trade Court dismissed, finding that claims regarding the termination of the 2013 Agreement became moot upon the execution of the 2019 Agreement, and claims regarding the final determination in the continued investigation were not ripe because before an antidumping duty order.

The Federal Circuit found no plausible challenge to the termination of the 2013 Agreement. Reversing in part, the court concluded that the challenge to the final determination is justiciable under Article III. The Tariff Act of 1930 provides jurisdiction for the Trade Court to review the final determination even before an antidumping duty order has been published.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit reinstates a suit challenging a final order by the Department of Commerce that was brought before an antidumping duty order was issued.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-04-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2265</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2232/20-2232-2022-04-14.html</id>
        	<title>Confederacion de Asociaciones Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa, A.C. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-04-14T06:31:29-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-04-14T06:31:29-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2232/20-2232-2022-04-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 1996, the Department of Commerce issued a preliminary dumping determination concerning Mexican tomatoes.  Mexican exporters entered into an agreement (19 U.S.C. 1673c(c)) that suspended the investigation, terminated the collection of cash deposits or bonds, and ended the suspension of liquidation of entries. A series of agreements followed; the 2013 agreement permitted either party to withdraw from the agreement at will.  In 2018, U.S.-based tomato businesses and 48 members of Congress requested that Commerce terminate the 2013 agreement and resume the antidumping investigation.  Commerce resumed its investigation and re-imposed cash deposit requirements. CAADES, an association of Mexican growers, negotiated a new suspension agreement.  In October 2019, Commerce issued a final affirmative determination that increased the dumping margins over those reflected in a July 2019 preliminary determination. An antidumping duty order incorporating these new rates could not issue while the 2019 agreement remained in place; an order would issue immediately if any party withdrew,
 
The Trade Court dismissed CAADES’s ensuing lawsuit. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, first finding that it had jurisdiction over CAADES’s challenges to the government’s termination of the 2013 agreement and to the 2019 agreement. Those claims are not moot. The 2013 agreement’s termination was not invalid for failing to comply with statutory termination requirements or because of allegedly improper political influence and the 2019 agreement is not invalid on grounds of duress. CAADES’s claims that the October 2019 final antidumping determination is invalid are not premature; the Trade Court has jurisdiction to hear those claims. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2232/20-2232-2022-04-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Confederacion de Asociaciones Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa, A.C. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 1996, the Department of Commerce issued a preliminary dumping determination concerning Mexican tomatoes.  Mexican exporters entered into an agreement (19 U.S.C. 1673c(c)) that suspended the investigation, terminated the collection of cash deposits or bonds, and ended the suspension of liquidation of entries. A series of agreements followed; the 2013 agreement permitted either party to withdraw from the agreement at will.  In 2018, U.S.-based tomato businesses and 48 members of Congress requested that Commerce terminate the 2013 agreement and resume the antidumping investigation.  Commerce resumed its investigation and re-imposed cash deposit requirements. CAADES, an association of Mexican growers, negotiated a new suspension agreement.  In October 2019, Commerce issued a final affirmative determination that increased the dumping margins over those reflected in a July 2019 preliminary determination. An antidumping duty order incorporating these new rates could not issue while the 2019 agreement remained in place; an order would issue immediately if any party withdrew,
 
The Trade Court dismissed CAADES’s ensuing lawsuit. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, first finding that it had jurisdiction over CAADES’s challenges to the government’s termination of the 2013 agreement and to the 2019 agreement. Those claims are not moot. The 2013 agreement’s termination was not invalid for failing to comply with statutory termination requirements or because of allegedly improper political influence and the 2019 agreement is not invalid on grounds of duress. CAADES’s claims that the October 2019 final antidumping determination is invalid are not premature; the Trade Court has jurisdiction to hear those claims.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit reinstates a lawsuit by tomato importers, challenging a final antidumping determination by the Department of Commerce but rejects challenges to Commerce&#039;s termination of an earlier agreement between the parties and to a subsequent agreement.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-04-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Timothy B. Dyk</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2232</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2230/20-2230-2022-04-14.html</id>
        	<title>Red Sun Farms v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-04-14T05:31:01-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-04-14T05:31:01-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2230/20-2230-2022-04-14.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		“Red Sun Farms” is the trade name under which various entities do business as “U.S. producers of fresh tomatoes grown in the United States, U.S. importers and resellers of fresh tomatoes from Mexico, and foreign producers and exporters of fresh tomatoes from Mexico.”  

Red Sun filed suit against the government based on an antidumping duty investigation to determine whether fresh Mexican tomatoes were being imported into the United States and sold at less than fair value.  In its motion to dismiss, the government observed, with respect to the five identified entities doing business as “Red Sun Farms,” that “[i]t is unclear whether all of these parties possess standing or can be considered real parties in interest” and reserved its right to raise additional arguments on the subject.  In a discovery filing, the government noted the varying singular/plural usage by Red Sun Farms and stated that “‘Plaintiff’ Red Sun Farms actually consists of several companies.”  

The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit.  Red Sun challenged the Department of Commerce’s Final Determination resulting from a continued investigation under 19 U.S.C.  1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv); although no final antidumping order had been issued, its claims are not premature.  Jurisdiction exists based on 28 U.S.C. 1516a(g)(3)(A)(i) and 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2230/20-2230-2022-04-14.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Red Sun Farms v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                “Red Sun Farms” is the trade name under which various entities do business as “U.S. producers of fresh tomatoes grown in the United States, U.S. importers and resellers of fresh tomatoes from Mexico, and foreign producers and exporters of fresh tomatoes from Mexico.”  

Red Sun filed suit against the government based on an antidumping duty investigation to determine whether fresh Mexican tomatoes were being imported into the United States and sold at less than fair value.  In its motion to dismiss, the government observed, with respect to the five identified entities doing business as “Red Sun Farms,” that “[i]t is unclear whether all of these parties possess standing or can be considered real parties in interest” and reserved its right to raise additional arguments on the subject.  In a discovery filing, the government noted the varying singular/plural usage by Red Sun Farms and stated that “‘Plaintiff’ Red Sun Farms actually consists of several companies.”  

The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit.  Red Sun challenged the Department of Commerce’s Final Determination resulting from a continued investigation under 19 U.S.C.  1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv); although no final antidumping order had been issued, its claims are not premature.  Jurisdiction exists based on 28 U.S.C. 1516a(g)(3)(A)(i) and 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i).
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                An importer&#039;s challenge to the Department of Commerce&#039;s Final Determination in an antidumping investigation was not premature despite the fact that no antidumping order had been issued.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-04-14</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Gary Taranto</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2230</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1548/21-1548-2022-03-30.html</id>
        	<title>StarKist Co. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-03-30T06:01:11-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-03-30T06:01:11-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1548/21-1548-2022-03-30.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		StarKist produces two varieties of tuna salad products, albacore and chunk light, each of which is imported as ready-to-eat pouches or lunch-to-go kits. The fish is caught in South American or international waters, frozen, delivered to a facility in Ecuador, sorted, thawed, cooked, machine chopped, then hand-folded with a prepared mixture of other ingredients including a mayo base. The tuna salad products were classified by Customs under HSTUS subheading 1604.14.10, which carries a 35% ad valorem duty, and covers: Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs: Fish, whole or in pieces, but not minced: Tunas, skipjack and bonito: Tunas and skipjack: In airtight containers: In oil. 

StarKist sought classification under 1604.20.05, which covers “products containing meat of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; prepared meals,” and carries a 10% ad valorem duty. In the alternative, StarKist seeks a classification under either subheading 1604.14.22, which covers tuna that is “not minced” and “not in oil,” carrying a 6% ad valorem duty, or subheading 1604.14.30, which covers “other,” carrying a 12.5% ad valorem duty.  

Customs denied StarKist’s protests. The Trade Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The products at issue are “not minced” and are “in oil.” &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1548/21-1548-2022-03-30.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "StarKist Co. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                StarKist produces two varieties of tuna salad products, albacore and chunk light, each of which is imported as ready-to-eat pouches or lunch-to-go kits. The fish is caught in South American or international waters, frozen, delivered to a facility in Ecuador, sorted, thawed, cooked, machine chopped, then hand-folded with a prepared mixture of other ingredients including a mayo base. The tuna salad products were classified by Customs under HSTUS subheading 1604.14.10, which carries a 35% ad valorem duty, and covers: Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs: Fish, whole or in pieces, but not minced: Tunas, skipjack and bonito: Tunas and skipjack: In airtight containers: In oil. 

StarKist sought classification under 1604.20.05, which covers “products containing meat of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; prepared meals,” and carries a 10% ad valorem duty. In the alternative, StarKist seeks a classification under either subheading 1604.14.22, which covers tuna that is “not minced” and “not in oil,” carrying a 6% ad valorem duty, or subheading 1604.14.30, which covers “other,” carrying a 12.5% ad valorem duty.  

Customs denied StarKist’s protests. The Trade Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The products at issue are “not minced” and are “in oil.”
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds the classification of four imported tuna salad products under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-03-30</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1548</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1334/21-1334-2022-03-11.html</id>
        	<title>NEXTEEL Co., Ltd. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-03-11T08:32:05-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-03-11T08:32:05-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1334/21-1334-2022-03-11.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		The Department of Commerce initiated an administrative review of the antidumping order on oil country tubular goods from the Republic of Korea. Commerce generally compares the price at which the subject merchandise is sold in the U.S. to the “normal value,” the price of like products in the exporting country or a third country, Commerce found no“viable home market or third-country market” and calculated normal value using constructed value, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(a)(4), based on the costs of producing and selling the merchandise, allowing for profits. Commerce found five circumstances that created a “particular market situation” affecting inputs. The Court of International Trade “direct[ed] Commerce to reverse its finding of a particular market situation.” 

The Federal Circuit affirmed in part.  Three of the five circumstances Commerce used to show a particular market situation are not supported by substantial evidence but the Trade Court lacks authority to reverse Commerce. The court vacated the opinion to the extent that it directed Commerce to reach a certain outcome. Comparing normal value to export price, Commerce relied on its “differential pricing analysis” methodology. The Federal Circuit has previously vacated aspects of Commerce’s differential pricing analysis over concerns about Commerce’s use of statistical methodologies when certain preconditions for their use are not met.  Because Commerce’s analysis here raises identical concerns, the Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court’s decision upholding the methodology. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1334/21-1334-2022-03-11.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "NEXTEEL Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                The Department of Commerce initiated an administrative review of the antidumping order on oil country tubular goods from the Republic of Korea. Commerce generally compares the price at which the subject merchandise is sold in the U.S. to the “normal value,” the price of like products in the exporting country or a third country, Commerce found no“viable home market or third-country market” and calculated normal value using constructed value, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(a)(4), based on the costs of producing and selling the merchandise, allowing for profits. Commerce found five circumstances that created a “particular market situation” affecting inputs. The Court of International Trade “direct[ed] Commerce to reverse its finding of a particular market situation.” 

The Federal Circuit affirmed in part.  Three of the five circumstances Commerce used to show a particular market situation are not supported by substantial evidence but the Trade Court lacks authority to reverse Commerce. The court vacated the opinion to the extent that it directed Commerce to reach a certain outcome. Comparing normal value to export price, Commerce relied on its “differential pricing analysis” methodology. The Federal Circuit has previously vacated aspects of Commerce’s differential pricing analysis over concerns about Commerce’s use of statistical methodologies when certain preconditions for their use are not met.  Because Commerce’s analysis here raises identical concerns, the Federal Circuit vacated the Trade Court’s decision upholding the methodology.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit vacates, in part, an antidumping order on oil country tubular goods from the Republic of Korea, noting that the Court of International Trade lacks authority to reverse the Department of Commerce.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-03-11</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Todd Michael Hughes</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1334</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2008/20-2008-2022-03-08.html</id>
        	<title>Broadcom Corp. v.  International Trade Commission</title>
        	<updated>2022-03-08T08:00:38-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-03-08T08:00:38-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2008/20-2008-2022-03-08.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Broadcom’s 583 patent is directed to reducing power consumption in computer systems by “gating” clock signals with circuit elements to turn the signals ON and OFF for downstream parts of the circuit; its 752 patent is directed to a memory access unit that improves upon conventional methods of requesting data located at different addresses within shared memory. Broadcom alleged violations of 19 U.S.C. 1337 based on Renesas&#039;s importation of products that allegedly infringe those patents. 

An ALJ held that Broadcom failed to demonstrate a violation with respect to the 583 patent, citing the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement; Broadcom failed to identify an actual domestic industry article that practices claim 25. For the 752 patent, the ALJ held that claim 5 would have been unpatentable as obvious. The  International Trade Commission affirmed. In inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board held that claims 25 and 26 of the 583 patent and claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8 of the 752 patent would have been obvious over prior art but that Renesas failed to demonstrate that other claims of the 583 patent would have been obvious.

With respect to the 583 patent, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding and affirmed the holding that there was no domestic industry.  With respect to the 752 patent, the court affirmed the entirety of the Board’s holding. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2008/20-2008-2022-03-08.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Broadcom Corp. v.  International Trade Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Broadcom’s 583 patent is directed to reducing power consumption in computer systems by “gating” clock signals with circuit elements to turn the signals ON and OFF for downstream parts of the circuit; its 752 patent is directed to a memory access unit that improves upon conventional methods of requesting data located at different addresses within shared memory. Broadcom alleged violations of 19 U.S.C. 1337 based on Renesas&#039;s importation of products that allegedly infringe those patents. 

An ALJ held that Broadcom failed to demonstrate a violation with respect to the 583 patent, citing the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement; Broadcom failed to identify an actual domestic industry article that practices claim 25. For the 752 patent, the ALJ held that claim 5 would have been unpatentable as obvious. The  International Trade Commission affirmed. In inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board held that claims 25 and 26 of the 583 patent and claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 8 of the 752 patent would have been obvious over prior art but that Renesas failed to demonstrate that other claims of the 583 patent would have been obvious.

With respect to the 583 patent, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding and affirmed the holding that there was no domestic industry.  With respect to the 752 patent, the court affirmed the entirety of the Board’s holding.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms a holding that importation of products did not infringe patents, citing the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-03-08</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Alan David Lourie</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2008</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2342/20-2342-2022-03-01.html</id>
        	<title>DBN Holding, Inc. v.  International Trade Commission</title>
        	<updated>2022-03-01T08:01:21-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-03-01T08:01:21-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2342/20-2342-2022-03-01.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2015, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment invalidating BriarTek’s patent claims, which BriarTek had asserted against DBN in a parallel investigation by the International Trade Commission (ITC). The court upheld the ITC’s imposition of a $6,242,500 civil penalty for DBN’s violation of a consent order, in which it agreed not to import or sell in the U.S. any two-way global satellite communication devices that infringe those claims.  The court stated that the invalidation of the asserted claims did not negate DBN’s pre-invalidation violations of the consent order. 

DBN petitioned the ITC to rescind or modify the civil penalty order. Following a remand, the ITC again denied DBN’s petition.  The ITC reassessed the relevant factors for determining civil penalties and concluded that the invalidation of the asserted claims did not change its original assessment, citing: the good or bad faith of the respondent, the injury to the complainant, respondent’s ability to pay, the extent to which respondent has benefited from its violations, the need to vindicate the ITC’s authority; and the public interest.  The ITC again noted that the consent order expressly accounted for the subsequent invalidation of the patent claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed the determination as supported by substantial evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2342/20-2342-2022-03-01.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "DBN Holding, Inc. v.  International Trade Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2015, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment invalidating BriarTek’s patent claims, which BriarTek had asserted against DBN in a parallel investigation by the International Trade Commission (ITC). The court upheld the ITC’s imposition of a $6,242,500 civil penalty for DBN’s violation of a consent order, in which it agreed not to import or sell in the U.S. any two-way global satellite communication devices that infringe those claims.  The court stated that the invalidation of the asserted claims did not negate DBN’s pre-invalidation violations of the consent order. 

DBN petitioned the ITC to rescind or modify the civil penalty order. Following a remand, the ITC again denied DBN’s petition.  The ITC reassessed the relevant factors for determining civil penalties and concluded that the invalidation of the asserted claims did not change its original assessment, citing: the good or bad faith of the respondent, the injury to the complainant, respondent’s ability to pay, the extent to which respondent has benefited from its violations, the need to vindicate the ITC’s authority; and the public interest.  The ITC again noted that the consent order expressly accounted for the subsequent invalidation of the patent claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed the determination as supported by substantial evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit upholds the International Trade Commission&#039;s denial of a petition to modify a civil penalty order for violations of a consent order; the subsequent invalidation of the patent claims on which the consent order was based did not negate the earlier violations.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-03-01</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2342</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Government &amp; Administrative Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-55041/18-55041-2022-02-25.html</id>
        	<title>Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co. Ltd.</title>
        	<updated>2022-02-25T10:05:50-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-02-25T10:05:50-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-55041/18-55041-2022-02-25.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Cambodian villagers who alleged that they were trafficked into Thailand and subjected to forced labor at seafood processing factories sued under the civil remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  

Section 1596 authorizes extraterritorial application of the Act for specific criminal trafficking offenses. Even assuming that section 1595 permits a private cause of action for extraterritorial violations of section 1596&#039;s substantive provisions if other requirements are satisfied, certain defendants were not “present in the United States” at any time relevant to the lawsuit as section 1596 requires.  Even if section 1596 requires foreign companies to possess nothing more than minimum contacts with the United States, the plaintiffs did not meet that standard. The record did not support either specific or general jurisdiction as a basis for finding minimum contacts. The court rejected an argument that certain defendants were present in the U.S. through an agency relationship or joint venture with a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business in California. The plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue that a Thai company registered to conduct business in California knowingly benefitted from the alleged human trafficking and forced labor abuses, financially and by accessing a steady stream of imported seafood. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/18-55041/18-55041-2022-02-25.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co. Ltd." on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Cambodian villagers who alleged that they were trafficked into Thailand and subjected to forced labor at seafood processing factories sued under the civil remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  

Section 1596 authorizes extraterritorial application of the Act for specific criminal trafficking offenses. Even assuming that section 1595 permits a private cause of action for extraterritorial violations of section 1596&#039;s substantive provisions if other requirements are satisfied, certain defendants were not “present in the United States” at any time relevant to the lawsuit as section 1596 requires.  Even if section 1596 requires foreign companies to possess nothing more than minimum contacts with the United States, the plaintiffs did not meet that standard. The record did not support either specific or general jurisdiction as a basis for finding minimum contacts. The court rejected an argument that certain defendants were present in the U.S. through an agency relationship or joint venture with a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business in California. The plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue that a Thai company registered to conduct business in California knowingly benefitted from the alleged human trafficking and forced labor abuses, financially and by accessing a steady stream of imported seafood.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Ninth Circuit rejects claims of forced labor brought by Cambodians under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-02-25</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Bridget S. Bade</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>18-55041</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Law"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1434/21-1434-2022-01-28.html</id>
        	<title>Canadian Solar, Inc. v United States</title>
        	<updated>2022-01-28T08:31:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-01-28T08:31:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1434/21-1434-2022-01-28.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Canadian Solar produces and exports certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells from China. The U.S. Department of Commerce, after an investigation, issued an order imposing a duty to counteract subsidies Canadian Solar received from the government of China. During its fourth administrative review of that countervailing duty order, Commerce determined that Canadian Solar received regionally specific electricity subsidies subject to countervailing duties under 19 U.S.C. 1677(5A)(D)(iv); Commerce identified electricity price variation across the different provinces and applied adverse facts available—due to the central government of China’s failure to cooperate in Commerce’s investigation—to conclude that the central government sets variable electricity pricing that is region-specific for development purposes. 

The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed.  The record supports Commerce’s conclusions. Commerce sufficiently and reasonably explained that it lacked key information because the government of China failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with requests for information. As a result, Commerce was forced to fill informational gaps and properly relied on adverse inferences to find that Canadian Solar received a regionally specific electricity subsidy that must be countervailed. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1434/21-1434-2022-01-28.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Canadian Solar, Inc. v United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Canadian Solar produces and exports certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells from China. The U.S. Department of Commerce, after an investigation, issued an order imposing a duty to counteract subsidies Canadian Solar received from the government of China. During its fourth administrative review of that countervailing duty order, Commerce determined that Canadian Solar received regionally specific electricity subsidies subject to countervailing duties under 19 U.S.C. 1677(5A)(D)(iv); Commerce identified electricity price variation across the different provinces and applied adverse facts available—due to the central government of China’s failure to cooperate in Commerce’s investigation—to conclude that the central government sets variable electricity pricing that is region-specific for development purposes. 

The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed.  The record supports Commerce’s conclusions. Commerce sufficiently and reasonably explained that it lacked key information because the government of China failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with requests for information. As a result, Commerce was forced to fill informational gaps and properly relied on adverse inferences to find that Canadian Solar received a regionally specific electricity subsidy that must be countervailed.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit affirms the imposition of a countervailing duty order concerning crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells from China; the Commerce Department properly relied on adverse inferences to find that the exporter received a regionally specific electricity subsidy.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-01-28</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Raymond T. Chen</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1434</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1046/20-1046-2022-01-21.html</id>
        	<title>Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools Inc.v. International Trade Commission</title>
        	<updated>2022-01-21T08:02:15-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2022-01-21T08:02:15-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1046/20-1046-2022-01-21.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In 2017, Kyocera filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission, alleging Koki was violating 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing gas spring nailer products that infringe or were made using methods that infringe, certain claims in five patents. Those patents generally relate to linear fastener driving tools, like portable tools that drive staples, nails, or other linearly driven fasteners.  The Commission held that Koki induced infringement.  

The Federal Circuit vacated. The ALJ erred in admitting certain expert testimony.  The court upheld claim construction with respect to “driven position” and “main storage chamber” but rejected the construction of “lifter member.”  The “safety contact element” and “fastener driving mechanism” should have been construed as separate components. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1046/20-1046-2022-01-21.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools Inc.v. International Trade Commission" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In 2017, Kyocera filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission, alleging Koki was violating 19 U.S.C. 1337 by importing gas spring nailer products that infringe or were made using methods that infringe, certain claims in five patents. Those patents generally relate to linear fastener driving tools, like portable tools that drive staples, nails, or other linearly driven fasteners.  The Commission held that Koki induced infringement.  

The Federal Circuit vacated. The ALJ erred in admitting certain expert testimony.  The court upheld claim construction with respect to “driven position” and “main storage chamber” but rejected the construction of “lifter member.”  The “safety contact element” and “fastener driving mechanism” should have been construed as separate components.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit vacates a finding of induced infringement with respect to imported gas spring nailer products.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2022-01-21</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Kimberly Ann Moore</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-1046</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Intellectual Property"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
							<category term="Patents"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1748/21-1748-2021-12-10.html</id>
        	<title>Hyundai Steel Co. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2021-12-10T08:02:42-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-12-10T08:02:42-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1748/21-1748-2021-12-10.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In an administrative review of an antidumping duty order on welded line pipe from the Republic of Korea, the Department of Commerce found that a “particular market situation” (PMS) existed in the Korean market for welded line pipe. Commerce made an upward adjustment in its calculation of the costs of production of the subject welded line pipe for the two selected respondents, which resulted in enhanced antidumping duties. The Trade Court overturned Commerce’s determination holding that Commerce was not statutorily authorized to adjust the exporters’ costs of production to account for the existence of a PMS; “there is nothing in the statutory scheme which can be read
to grant Commerce the authority to modify the [sales-below-cost] test to account for a PMS.”  On remand, Commerce acquiesced under protest. 

The Federal Circuit agreed that the 2015 Trade Preferences Extension Act, which amended the constructed value calculation statute, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(e), does not authorize Commerce to use the existence of a PMS as a basis for adjusting a respondent’s costs of production to determine whether a respondent has made home market sales below cost. The court did not address whether Commerce’s finding of a PMS was supported by substantial evidence. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1748/21-1748-2021-12-10.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Hyundai Steel Co. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In an administrative review of an antidumping duty order on welded line pipe from the Republic of Korea, the Department of Commerce found that a “particular market situation” (PMS) existed in the Korean market for welded line pipe. Commerce made an upward adjustment in its calculation of the costs of production of the subject welded line pipe for the two selected respondents, which resulted in enhanced antidumping duties. The Trade Court overturned Commerce’s determination holding that Commerce was not statutorily authorized to adjust the exporters’ costs of production to account for the existence of a PMS; “there is nothing in the statutory scheme which can be read
to grant Commerce the authority to modify the [sales-below-cost] test to account for a PMS.”  On remand, Commerce acquiesced under protest. 

The Federal Circuit agreed that the 2015 Trade Preferences Extension Act, which amended the constructed value calculation statute, 19 U.S.C. 1677b(e), does not authorize Commerce to use the existence of a PMS as a basis for adjusting a respondent’s costs of production to determine whether a respondent has made home market sales below cost. The court did not address whether Commerce’s finding of a PMS was supported by substantial evidence.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                The 2015 Trade Preferences Extension Act does not authorize the Department of Commerce to use the existence of a particular market situation as a basis for adjusting a respondent’s costs of production to determine whether a respondent has made home market sales below cost.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-12-10</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>William Curtis Bryson</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1748</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1065/21-1065-2021-11-03.html</id>
        	<title>Kent International, Inc. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2021-11-16T15:28:35-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-11-16T15:28:35-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1065/21-1065-2021-11-03.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		A 2005 Customs ruling letter stated that Kent’s imported bicycle seats would be classified as “accessories of bicycles” under HTSUS heading 8714, with a 10% ad valorem duty.  In 2008, after Customs classified a competitor’s bicycle seats as “seats” under duty-free heading 9401. Kent started filing protests, post-entry amendments, and an application for further review. Customs approved the protests and reliquidated Kent’s merchandise under heading 9401.  Kent sought revocation of the 2005 Ruling but continued to make entries through New York and lodged protests for each. Customs stopped granting those protests. Kent began to import the same merchandise through Long Beach under heading 8714. Long Beach Customs treated these entries as bypass entries and liquidated them under heading 8714 without examination or Customs officer review. Kent protested. Although the New York protests were granted, Kent’s Long Beach protests were denied. In 2014, Customs revoked its earlier decisions classifying Kent’s competitors’ merchandise under heading 9401, concluding that the merchandise would be classified under heading 8714. Customs declined to revoke the 2005 Ruling.

The Trade Court rejected Kent’s claims that the classification violated 19 U.S.C. 1625(c) by departing from a “treatment previously accorded” and was contrary to a de facto “established and uniform practice” (EUP) under section 1315(d). The Federal Circuit reversed. The Trade Court erred in approving Customs’ use of bypass entries to show the absence of treatment previously accorded but properly found no de facto EUP. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/21-1065/21-1065-2021-11-03.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Kent International, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                A 2005 Customs ruling letter stated that Kent’s imported bicycle seats would be classified as “accessories of bicycles” under HTSUS heading 8714, with a 10% ad valorem duty.  In 2008, after Customs classified a competitor’s bicycle seats as “seats” under duty-free heading 9401. Kent started filing protests, post-entry amendments, and an application for further review. Customs approved the protests and reliquidated Kent’s merchandise under heading 9401.  Kent sought revocation of the 2005 Ruling but continued to make entries through New York and lodged protests for each. Customs stopped granting those protests. Kent began to import the same merchandise through Long Beach under heading 8714. Long Beach Customs treated these entries as bypass entries and liquidated them under heading 8714 without examination or Customs officer review. Kent protested. Although the New York protests were granted, Kent’s Long Beach protests were denied. In 2014, Customs revoked its earlier decisions classifying Kent’s competitors’ merchandise under heading 9401, concluding that the merchandise would be classified under heading 8714. Customs declined to revoke the 2005 Ruling.

The Trade Court rejected Kent’s claims that the classification violated 19 U.S.C. 1625(c) by departing from a “treatment previously accorded” and was contrary to a de facto “established and uniform practice” (EUP) under section 1315(d). The Federal Circuit reversed. The Trade Court erred in approving Customs’ use of bypass entries to show the absence of treatment previously accorded but properly found no de facto EUP.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit reverses a Trade Court decision, approving Customs’ use of bypass entries to show the absence of treatment previously accorded to imported bicycle seats.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-11-03</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Richard Linn</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>21-1065</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1044/20-1044-2021-09-02.html</id>
        	<title>Wanxiang America Corp. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2021-09-02T07:00:32-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-09-02T07:00:32-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1044/20-1044-2021-09-02.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		Wanxiang is a U.S. importer for Wanxiang Group, an automotive parts manufacturing company headquartered in China. In 1994-2001, Group and Wanxiang IE participated in Department of Commerce administrative reviews that covered entries of wheel hub assemblies that were subject to a 1987 antidumping duty order. Group and IE were assigned company-specific antidumping duty rates of zero percent. Wanxiang Q did not receive a company-specific antidumping duty rate because it did not participate in the reviews. Following a 2012 audit of Wangxiang, Customs found that some of the audited entries were imports from Q, subject to the China country-wide rate of 92.84%, and that, based on the sampling results, Wanxiang had underpaid dumping duties. In 2019, Customs issued a Penalty Notice. 

Wanxiang did not protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 and has not made any payment but filed a complaint before the Trade Court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(2) and (4). The court dismissed, concluding that it lacked “residual” jurisdiction because relief could have been available under a section 1581(c) action. Wangxiang has not shown that such relief would have been manifestly inadequate.  The Federal Circuit affirmed. Wanxiang could have challenged the assessments by a protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 and, if unsuccessful, by appealing to the Trade Court under 1581(a). Alternatively, Wanxiang could have initiated a test shipment and sought, as a new shipper, an administrative review, during which it could have argued the issues it raised in its complaint; the results of that review could have been challenged under 19 U.S.C. 1516a, invoking Trade Court jurisdiction under 1581(c). &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-1044/20-1044-2021-09-02.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Wanxiang America Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                Wanxiang is a U.S. importer for Wanxiang Group, an automotive parts manufacturing company headquartered in China. In 1994-2001, Group and Wanxiang IE participated in Department of Commerce administrative reviews that covered entries of wheel hub assemblies that were subject to a 1987 antidumping duty order. Group and IE were assigned company-specific antidumping duty rates of zero percent. Wanxiang Q did not receive a company-specific antidumping duty rate because it did not participate in the reviews. Following a 2012 audit of Wangxiang, Customs found that some of the audited entries were imports from Q, subject to the China country-wide rate of 92.84%, and that, based on the sampling results, Wanxiang had underpaid dumping duties. In 2019, Customs issued a Penalty Notice. 

Wanxiang did not protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 and has not made any payment but filed a complaint before the Trade Court, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(2) and (4). The court dismissed, concluding that it lacked “residual” jurisdiction because relief could have been available under a section 1581(c) action. Wangxiang has not shown that such relief would have been manifestly inadequate.  The Federal Circuit affirmed. Wanxiang could have challenged the assessments by a protest under 19 U.S.C. 1514 and, if unsuccessful, by appealing to the Trade Court under 1581(a). Alternatively, Wanxiang could have initiated a test shipment and sought, as a new shipper, an administrative review, during which it could have argued the issues it raised in its complaint; the results of that review could have been challenged under 19 U.S.C. 1516a, invoking Trade Court jurisdiction under 1581(c).
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Trade Court lacked &quot;residual jurisdiction&quot; to address an importer&#039;s protest of an assessment and penalty because relief would have been available under other sections of the statute.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-09-02</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-1044</case:docket_number>
														<category term="Civil Procedure"/>
							<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
            <entry>
        	<id>https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2017/20-2017-2021-08-31.html</id>
        	<title>Goodluck India Ltd. v. United States</title>
        	<updated>2021-08-31T07:01:56-08:00</updated>
                            <published>2021-08-31T07:01:56-08:00</published>
                    	<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2017/20-2017-2021-08-31.html"/> 
        	<summary type="html">
        		In an antidumping duty investigation on U.S. imports of cold-drawn mechanical tubing from India, the Department of Commerce rejected Goodluck’s submission of supplemental data and relied on “adverse facts available” under 19 U.S.C. 1677e(b) for its less-than-fair-value analysis, which resulted in an antidumping margin of 33.8% ad valorem applicable to Goodluck’s imports. The Court of International Trade agreed with Goodluck that its submission was a permissible correction of a minor clerical error and that it was entitled to submit supplemental information up to the day of verification. Commerce, under protest, conducted a new less-than-fair-value analysis resulting in a zero-percent antidumping margin for Goodluck, which theTrade Court affirmed. 

The Federal Circuit reversed. Commerce’s initial determination—rejecting Goodluck’s supplemental submission on grounds that it constituted new factual information and not a minor or clerical correction of the record, and that the submission was unverifiable as it was submitted on the eve of verification—was supported by substantial evidence and not otherwise contrary to law. Goodluck’s revisions were a systemic change to the entire reported database. The revisions were not singular, such as a missing word or an error in arithmetic. &lt;a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/20-2017/20-2017-2021-08-31.html" target="_blank"&gt;View "Goodluck India Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law&lt;/a&gt;
        	</summary>
            <summary_raw>
                In an antidumping duty investigation on U.S. imports of cold-drawn mechanical tubing from India, the Department of Commerce rejected Goodluck’s submission of supplemental data and relied on “adverse facts available” under 19 U.S.C. 1677e(b) for its less-than-fair-value analysis, which resulted in an antidumping margin of 33.8% ad valorem applicable to Goodluck’s imports. The Court of International Trade agreed with Goodluck that its submission was a permissible correction of a minor clerical error and that it was entitled to submit supplemental information up to the day of verification. Commerce, under protest, conducted a new less-than-fair-value analysis resulting in a zero-percent antidumping margin for Goodluck, which theTrade Court affirmed. 

The Federal Circuit reversed. Commerce’s initial determination—rejecting Goodluck’s supplemental submission on grounds that it constituted new factual information and not a minor or clerical correction of the record, and that the submission was unverifiable as it was submitted on the eve of verification—was supported by substantial evidence and not otherwise contrary to law. Goodluck’s revisions were a systemic change to the entire reported database. The revisions were not singular, such as a missing word or an error in arithmetic.
            </summary_raw>
                        <blurb>
                Federal Circuit reinstates the Department of Commerce&#039;s determination that an importer&#039;s supplemental data submission constituted new factual information, not a minor or clerical correction.
            </blurb>
                    	<case:opinion_date>2021-08-31</case:opinion_date>
			<case:jurisdiction>federal</case:jurisdiction>
						<case:court>U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit</case:court>
							<case:judge>Jimmie V. Reyna</case:judge>
															<case:docket_number>20-2017</case:docket_number>
														<category term="International Trade"/>
										<category term="U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"/>
								</entry>
    </feed>

